Academic literature on the topic 'Sinhalese (Sri Lankan people) in literature'

In modern Sri Lankan society, caste has become less significant as a marker of social identity and exclusion than was the case in the past. While acknowledging this trend across South Asian societies, the literature does not adequately explain why this is happening. Increasing urbanization, the growing number of inter-caste marriages, the expanding middle class, and the bulging youth population have all been suggested as contributory factors. In rural Sri Lanka, family names are used as identifiers of family and kinship groups within each caste. The people belonging to the “low castes” identified with derogatory village and family names are socially marginalized and stigmatized. Social segregation, marked with family names and traditional caste occupations, makes it difficult for the low-caste people to move up in the class ladder, and socialize in the public sphere. Political and economic development programs helped to improve the living conditions and facilities in low-caste villages, but the lowness of such castes continued to linger in the social fabric. Socially oppressed low-caste youth in rural villages moved to cities and the urban outskirts, found non-caste employment, and changed their names to acaste names. By analyzing newspaper notifications and selected ethnographic material, this article shows how name changes among the Sinhalese have facilitated individualization and socialization by people who change their names to acaste names and seek freedom to choose their own employment, residence, marriage partners, and involvement in activities of wider society—a form of assimilation, in the context of growing urbanization and modernization.

In Sri Lanka, the various groups of Tamils are jointly the largest minority group who migrated from different places of South India and in different time periods. South Indian music is widely appreciated and learnt by both the Sinhala including by large parts of the Tamil minority spread over Sri Lanka. Although a number of Sinhala people prefer and practice North Indian music geographically, and probably culturally, they are much closer to South India than to North India. Some historical sources report that Sinhalese are descendants of North Indians who are believed to be Aryans who migrated from Persia to the Northern part of India in the 13th century and later. Therefore, some scholarly authorities believe that the Sinhalese ‘naturally’ prefer North Indian music as they also continue the suggested Aryan heritage. Nevertheless, some other sources reveal that the North Indian music was spread in Sri Lanka during the British rule with the coming of the Parsi Theatre (Bombay theatre), which largely promoted Hindustani raga-based compositions. This paper explores selected literature and opinions of some interviewees and discusses what could be the reasons for preferences of North Indian music by the Sinhalese. The interviewees were chosen according to their professional profile and willingness to participate in this research. As a result, this paper will offer insights through analysing various opinions and statements made by a number of interviewees. The research also considered some theories which may relate to the case whether Hindustani classical music is due to these reasons a dominating minority culture or a rather self-imposed musical ideology. The latter would establish an aesthetic hierarchy, which is not reflected in the cultural reality of Sri Lanka. This is a new research scrutinizing a long-term situation of performing arts education in this country taking mainly interviews as a departing point.

In February 1989, in Pune, a city of a million people in the western Indian state of Maharashtra, I visited a simple outdoor pottery workshop. It consisted of a shallow pit kiln surrounded by eleven spaces shaded by gunny sacks on a flat area at the top of stairs leading down to a large river that ran through the city center. The families who used this space werekumbhars, members of a Hindu caste group found throughout the subcontinent. In India to teach, I thought that time spent with these potters might provide a perspective on Sinhalese potters I had known in a Sri Lankan village in the 1970s.The Indian potters were willing, so this first visit was followed by many more over the next four months.

A major food contamination scandal occurred in Sri Lanka in 2013 after it was alleged that Fonterra dairy products contained chemicals known to have a negative effect on human health. This crisis was influenced by unique factors that, I argue, are particular to the social and cultural context of Sri Lanka. In this article, I will be focusing on several such factors: (a) specific considerations about the Sri Lankan dairy industry; (b) the growing influence of the worship of the deity Kiri Amma, a god that is associated uniquely with dairy and dairy production; (c) the common belief that milk possesses a unique transformative and curative property; and (d) prevailing food conspiracies that maintain that external groups are seeking to harm the Sinhalese people by purposefully poisoning confectionary and dairy products. By considering these factors, we can better understand how inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions can precipitate in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka is home to multi-cultural communities. It is the responsibility of the people across various religions, and communities to develop and maintain harmony with each other. Historically, the Sri Lankan Muslims and Sinhala Buddhists had an excellent relationship. Recently, the ethnic harmony between these two communities has been strained reflecting the fault lines running in a current social structure which lead to ethnic tensions, social animosities, restlessness, and disharmony among communities, amidst diverging political ideologies. Hence, this study focuses on identifying the root causes that wreck the harmony and social stability of the country. Hundred and fifty students from the South Eastern University of Sri Lanka were randomly selected to respond for a structured questionnaire, and fifteen formal interviews with students were also conducted to validate the questionnaire data. The secondary data were collected from various sources of information. The collected data were analyzed using descriptive and basic statistical analytic techniques, and findings of the study were presented in the form of table and text. This study underlines the array of reasons, and root causes that prevent the harmony among Sinhala Buddhists and Muslim communities, such as ethnic differences, spreading hatred via social media, extremism that uses religion to forward their extremist ideologies. This study concludes with the argument that the government and people who strive for social harmony should act with commitment and dedication in the efforts to build harmony among religious communities in post-war Sri Lanka.

Following the end of the thirty years old civil war in Sri Lanka, there were expectations that the post‐war period would usher in peace, development and reconciliation. The last four years have witnessed several positive developments including resettlement of people and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Nonetheless there are range of problems and policy gaps that have hindered the transition from war to sustainable peace. A key post-war challenge is that of violence against religious sites and members of religious communities. More recently, from last year, there has been an unprecedented level of violent attacks, demonstrations and hate speech targeting Sri Lanka’s Muslim population. It noted a ‘sharp uptick’ in religiously-motivated violence and said the authorities are ‘passively and sometimes actively’ condoning extremist Buddhist groups, Mainly perpetrated by Buddhist-fascist fundamentalist groups, such as the ‘Bodu Bala Sena’ or ‘Buddhist power force’ and the Hela Urmaya or Sinhala Heritage Party are the main groups behind these targeting of Muslims.The events have left the country’s second largest minority community - the Muslims feeling afraid and vulnerable which forcing a concerted campaign against them. In addition to attacks on places of religious worship there are calls to boycott Muslim shops and establishments, all of which is increasing tensions, particularly in areas where Muslims and Sinhalese live close to each other. These were virtually programmed by some prominent and influential personalities in governing circles, besides others who had a vested interest in seeing Sri Lanka imploding amid heightening ‘communal tensions.’On this context, this study focuses on the recent incident of violence against Muslims in Sri Lanka. The primary objective of this study is to examine the motive for violence against Muslims as well as impact of the violence. The fundamental questions of this research are the following: why does post-war violence and hate propaganda arise against Muslim in Sri Lanka? In which ways the violence against minorities, particularly Muslims impact on reconciliation process? And why does Buddhist nationalist hegemony arise soon after civil war in Sri Lanka? This study is based on an interpretive approach. The data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. In addition to primary sources, qualitative interviews were conducted with selected specialist on this particular research area. I conclude that after end of war against LTTE by government of Sri Lanka, religious tension has been increased in the recent past and the government’s reluctance even to take firm action against to perpetrators which would be helpful in restoring the rule of law and security of Sri Lankan minorities has been a big hurdle in the post-conflict situation and government are perceived to serve only the Buddhist side and to marginalize those holding legitimate grievances.

The Sri Lankan Ministry of National Coexistence, Dialogue, and Official Languages published the work “People of Sri Lanka” in 2017. In this comprehensive publication, 21 invited Sri Lankan scholars introduced 19 different people’s groups to public readers in English, mainly targeted at a growing number of foreign visitors in need of understanding the cultural diversity Sri Lanka has to offer. This paper will observe the presentation of these different groups of people, the role music and allied arts play in this context. Considering the non-scholarly design of the publication, a discussion of the role of music and allied arts has to be supplemented through additional analyses based on sources mentioned by the 21 participating scholars and their fragmented application of available knowledge. In result, this paper might help improve the way facts about groups of people, the way of grouping people, and the way of presenting these groupings are displayed to the world beyond South Asia. This fieldwork and literature guided investigation should also lead to suggestions for ethical principles in teaching and presenting of culturally different music practices within Sri Lanka, thus adding an example for other case studies.

The Sri Lankan civil war began in 1983 and lasted until 2009. The tension stems from Sri Lanka's colonial period and subsequent post-colonial policies that harmed the Tamil people. Without viable alternatives, a part of the Tamil population resorted to the degree of brutality that precipitated a second civil war. Regional, domestic, and global attempts to bring the war to a halt have been futile, though some more local measures have been active. A ruthless military campaign brought the conflict to an end. However, nothing has been done in the aftermath of the war to try to resolve the civil war, including its roots. Sri Lanka's civil war exemplifies the uncertain existence of civil war resolution. With this in mind, the war's conclusion was unquestionably the product of a strategic triumph. However, the civil war should have ended; a unique constellation of structural, state, and national forces collaborated to allow for unrestricted military aggression. As long as the dominant forces, including the United States and significant European countries, understood that enough bloodshed had happened, the country's aggression could be brought to a stop. China and India, with India abstaining, voted to support the Sri Lankan government in its major offensive against insurgents. Internationally, the newly restored government used the full might of the forces against the rebels. As a consequence, those variables are deemed unusable in other situations.
 Tamil-Sinhala rivalry stretches all the way back to Sri Lanka's colonial period. The Tamil community took advantage of numerous market opportunities under British rule, which lasted from 1815 to 1948. Additionally, many group members attended school in colonial countries owing to a shortage of educational facilities in their home countries. With the exception of a few, the Sinhalese culture, on the other side, maintained its isolation from the British. As could be anticipated, the proportion of Tamils employing in the civil service, academia, and law increased dramatically following Sri Lanka's independence in 1948. Historically, the Sinhalese population has been hesitant to accept pluralism, having collaborated with the British to effect a shift of domination since the 1930s. When Sri Lanka's compulsory adult franchise was expanded to all citizens in 1931, there were no arrangements for minority rights. Tamil and Muslim community members shared discontent in the inconsistency with which their desires are pursued. T was dissatisfied with current political developments, and a large number of Tamils boycotted the elections conducted in compliance with this document. Also immediate liberty was abolished in 1947 by the Soulbury Constitution. The argument that no individual should be discriminated against on the grounds of racial origin or faith, though, proved to be a procedural impediment. Finally, in effect, it established a unitary and majoritarian state.

While a stalemate in the predominantly Tamil North and East of Sri Lanka continues despite Indian intervention on the government's behalf, in the Sinhala South death squads associated with the pseudo People's Liberation Front, the JVP, have been ruthlessly eliminating its opponents. The United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), having created and nurtured popular racism for over thirty years in order to get into power (through a ready-made Sinhalese majority of 70 per cent of the population), * would now like to draw back from the brink of another crippling civil war, this time in the South. But they are unable to do so because the JVP has taken up the Sinhala cause and pushed it to the point of social fascism through assassination and murder. Popular racism based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism promoted in the schools and expressed in song, textbook and media served to fuel the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983, in which thousands were killed at the hands of street mobs. Some of the most violently anti- Tamil propaganda (deriving inspiration from mythical Sinhalese history) has emanated from the present government. Colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese was justified on the pretext of protecting ancient Buddhist shrines. And it is an open secret that ministers hired their own hit squads in the 1983 pogrom. When, in a bid to end the unwinnable war with the Tamils, the UNP signed the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987, allowing Indian troops to operate on Sri Lankan soil, it alienated the very Sinhala nationalists it had itself fostered. And it was the JVP which capitalised on the resentment over India's interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Accusing the UNP government (and other supporters of the Accord) of treachery, it enlarged and deepened popular racism into fanatical patriotism. But what has given the JVP terror tactics a hold over the population has been the steady erosion of democratic freedoms, on the one hand, and the self-abasement of the Left, on the other. Both the SLFP and UNP governments have postponed elections to stay in power, but the UNP went further and got itself re-elected en bloc on a phoney referendum to postpone elections. Local elections were never held under the SLFP and whatever elections took place under the UNP have either been rigged and/or carried out under conditions of massive intimidation. In the process, the political literacy that the country once boasted has been lost to the people and, with it, their will to resist. At the same time the collaborationist politics of the Left in the SLFP government of 1970-77 have not only served to decimate its own chances at the polls (it obtained not a single seat in the election of 1977) but also to leave the working-class movement defenceless. So that it was a simple matter for the UNP government to crush the general strike of 1980, imprison its leaders and throw 80, 000 workers permanently out of work. And it has been left to the JVP to pretend to take up the socialist mantle of the Left even as it devotes itself to the racist cause of the Right, and so win the support of the Sinhala-Buddhist people. In the final analysis the choice before the country is that of two terrors: that of the state or that of the JVP. Below we publish an analysis of the situation as at October 1988, put out by the underground Campaign for Social Democracy in the run up to the presidential elections.

How does civil war shape the prospects of lasting peace between formerly opposing ethnic groups after the end of violence? This article addresses the complex relationship between war experience, interethnic attitudes, interethnic forgiveness, and the willingness to permit basic civil liberties to former enemies in the context of postwar Sri Lanka. Despite the end of the 26-year-long civil war in 2009, social and political tensions between the two largest ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils, still prevail. Political tolerance is in the literature considered a crucial micro-level condition for peaceful coexistence, yet, its determinants, in particular the role of war experiences, have not received sufficient attention. Using new and unique all-island representative survey data (N = 1,420), we examine the mutual permission of civil liberties of these two ethnic groups. Our analyses reveal two important findings: first, the likelihood of granting civil liberties varies by civil liberty and ethnic group. Whereas most members of both ethnic groups are willing to grant the right to vote, to hold a speech, and to hold a government position, the right to demonstrate is highly contested, with only low shares of both Tamils and Sinhalese being willing to grant the other group this right. Second, the structural equation models reveal that the direct impact of war exposure is less powerful than expected and depends on the political right in question. Not forgiving the other ethnic group, partly driven by war experience and ethnic prejudice, appears to be a more consistent predictor of intolerance. These results imply that postwar efforts to further forgiveness are important to promote political tolerance and thereby long-lasting peace.