Journal articles: 'Sino-Soviet Split'

1

Leese, Daniel. "Identity Discourses and the Sino-Soviet Split." Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 16, no. 4 (2015): 988–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/kri.2015.0057.

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Roberts, Priscilla, Steven I. Levine, Péter Vámos, Deborah Kaple, Jeremy Friedman, Douglas A. Stiffler, and Lorenz Lüthi. "FORUM: Mao, Khrushchev, and China's Split with the USSR: Perspectives on The Sino-Soviet Split." Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 1 (January 2010): 120–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2010.12.1.120.

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This forum includes six commentaries on Lorenz M. Lüthi's book The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, published by Princeton University Press in 2008. Drawing on recently declassified documents and memoirs from numerous countries, Lüthi explains how and why the close alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fell apart in a remarkably short time, dissolving into fierce mutual enmity. Amassing a wealth of evidence, Lüthi stresses the role of ideology in the split, lending support to the arguments put forth nearly five decades ago by analysts like Donald Zagoria in his pioneering book on the Sino-Soviet rift. Six leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Soviet relations discuss the strengths of Lüthi's book but also raise questions about some interpretations and omissions. The forum includes Lüthi's reply to the commentaries.

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Keith, Ronald C. "Revisiting Ideology's Role in the Sino-Soviet Split." Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 619–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2010.00877.x.

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Xia, Yafeng. "Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 4 (October 2014): 260–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_00495.

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Schelchkov, Andrey. "Communist movement in Argentina and the Sino-Soviet split." Latinskaia Amerika, no. 5 (2020): 66–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s0044748x0009124-5.

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Whibley, James. "Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma." Asian Journal of Political Science 20, no. 3 (December 2012): 326–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2012.748973.

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Cheng, Yinghong. "Sino-Cuban Relations during the Early Years of the Castro Regime, 1959–1966." Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 3 (July 2007): 78–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2007.9.3.78.

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China's relations with Cuba in the first half of the 1960s—when the Sino-Soviet split was rapidly intensifying—were important to both Beijing and Havana as well as to the world Communist movement. The Sino-Cuban relationship during this period moved from one of intimate comradeship to deterioration and finally a bitter separation. Although Fidel Castro's ties with Mao Zedong survived the immediate start of the Sino-Soviet rift, Castro's dependence on the Soviet Union ultimately doomed his courtship of China. Castro's vehemently anti-Chinese speech in March 1966 marked the end of Sino-Cuban amity. The Sino-Cuban case sheds valuable light on the tensions that bedeviled the international Communist movement after the Sino-Soviet divide flared to the surface.

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Croitor, Mihai. "The beginning of the Sino-Soviet Split: two different approaches." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Historia 62, no. 1 (December 30, 2017): 60–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbhist.2017.2.05.

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Shiwen, Wang. "The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the communist world." Cold War History 9, no. 4 (November 2009): 525–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682740903268586.

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Moody, Peter R. "Book review: Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma." China Information 27, no. 1 (March 2013): 133–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0920203x12472012e.

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Li, Mingjiang. "Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63." Cold War History 11, no. 3 (October 27, 2010): 387–419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2010.498822.

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Brar, B. S. "Sino-Soviet Split and Retrospective Explanations: A Critique of Power-Centric Analysis." International Studies 23, no. 1 (January 1986): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020881786023001001.

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Shen, Zhihua, and Yafeng Xia. "The Great Leap Forward, the People's Commune and the Sino-Soviet Split." Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 72 (November 2011): 861–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2011.604505.

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Cai, Yuan. "The Chinese Legionaries at the Western Frontier: The Military Role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, 1960-1975." Journal of Chinese Military History 1, no. 1 (2012): 61–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221274512x651651.

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Abstract The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is an important paramilitary organization in Xinjiang with the mandate of checking the Uyghur independence movement. However, in the past the XPCC also played an important military role as a strategic reserve force for the defence of Xinjiang, especially during the period of Sino-Soviet confrontation. This paper examines available documentary and archival materials on the national defence role played by the XPCC during the height of the Sino-Soviet split, especially with reference to the XPCC militia and frontier farms.

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Mëhilli, Elidor. "Globalized Socialism, Nationalized Time: Soviet Films, Albanian Subjects, and Chinese Audiences across the Sino-Soviet Split." Slavic Review 77, no. 3 (2018): 611–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/slr.2018.202.

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In the 1950s, films like Sergei Yutkevich'sVelikii voin Albanii Skanderbegsymbolized Albanian-Soviet friendship, which was said to be undying. The Soviets brought their reels and their famous actors to this corner of the Mediterranean, and they also designed the country's first film agency, baptized “New Albania.” By the early 1960s, however, the friendship was dead. Albania's communist regime sided with Mao's China during the dramatic Sino-Soviet schism. From instruments of friendship, films turned into weapons in a global battle over the soul of socialism. Unexpectedly, Albanian war films assumed revolutionary meaning—far away from the Balkans—during China's Cultural Revolution. Recapturing these zigzags, this article shows how globalized socialism interacted with national imperatives. Bringing about exchange on a cross-continental scale, socialism encouraged constant mental mapping, and it also produced competing temporal frameworks. Going beyond nationalized histories of cinema, the article draws on archival sources from three countries, including previously classified Albanian materials.

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Li, Danhui, and Yafeng Xia. "Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961–July 1964." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 1 (January 2014): 24–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00430.

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In October 1961 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a policy of tacit struggle against the program of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU's resumption of de-Stalinization alarmed the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, but he did not yet want to discard a limited rapprochement with Moscow. However, when high-level Sino-Soviet talks in July 1963 collapsed, the relationship between the CPSU and the CCP became irretrievable. Through the subsequent great polemics, the CCP intended to project itself as the spokesman of true Marxism-Leninism and the natural leader of world Communism. After the CCP attacked the top leaders of the CPSU by name, hostility between the two parties intensified. The breakdown of the CCP-CPSU organizational relationship was only a matter of time. Relying on a large array of Chinese-language sources, including records of Chinese leaders' speeches and comments at secret party meetings, this article reassesses the most critical period in the Sino-Soviet split from October 1961 to July 1964.

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Hussain, T. Karki. "Sino-Soviet Detente in the Making." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 42, no. 1 (January 1986): 38–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492848604200103.

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Increasingly, the trend in Sino-Soviet normalization has acquired the kind of high visibility which compels serious attention within India. There are several valid reasons for our interest in the matter. Historically, both the Sino-Indian dispute and the Sino-Soviet split occurred in the fifties when the parties concerned had appeared to the outside world as friends and allies. In subsequent developments, the sixties began with a border war between India and China and ended with another border war between China and the Soviet Union. Although the nature of China's bilateral controversies, leading to actual confrontation with India and Soviet Union, were not identical in their origin and evolution, chronologically, its durability with either protagonist has spanned more than a quarter of a century. More recently, an almost parallel movement towards arapprochement is taking place, formally signified by an ongoing process of seven rounds of Sino-Soviet consultations and six meetings between the Indian and the Chinese representatives till date. Although their initial differences concerning some political issues persist, China and the Soviet Union have been interacting with each other at a frequency which was unimaginable barely a couple of years ago. In 1985, for example, more than 70 visits were exchanged between the two erstwhile adversaries. Following the 27th Congress of the CPSU which ended on 3 March 1986, in the forthcoming weeks sometime, Soviet First Vice-Premier Arkhipov is scheduled to visit Beijing to review bilateral, economic, scientific and cultural relations. Later, in the summer of 1'86, Soviet and Chinese Foreign Ministers will hold important talks with each other which are expected to contribute further towards normalization. Similarly, Sino-Indian contacts at several levels have also grown considerably. It may be explained that it does not lie within the scope of this article to examine the derivative triangular linkages present in the Sino-Indian and the Sino-Soviet issues or to argue that the apparent dynamic of the Sino-Soviet thaw would weaken India's bargaining positionvis-a-vis China and therefore a border settlement should be precipitated in order to match the pace of the evolving pattern in Sino-Soviet relations. Rather, the following presentation precludes any juxtaposition with the Sino-Indian problems and focuses almost entirely on certain initiatives taken by the Chinese leadership which have rendered its earlier posturing somewhat obsolete and created an opportunity for it to weigh the Soviet factor afresh in the immediate perspective. Finally, the article seeks to analyse the imperatives behind Beijing's current moves within the larger framework of the primary objective of removing once for all the backward economic status of the country. However, to the extent that the process of Sino-Soviet normalization flows from the shifts in China's foreign and domestic policies, its implications for India are self-evident and for that very reason worthy of our deep interest.

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Marku, Ylber. "Communist Relations in Crisis: The End of Soviet-Albanian Relations, and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1960–1961." International History Review 42, no. 4 (May 30, 2019): 813–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1620825.

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Sheng, Michael, Qiang Zhai, and Deborah Kaple. "Perspectives on Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens." Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 1 (January 2012): 96–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00196.

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In this forum, three leading experts on Sino-Soviet relations and Mao Zedong's policy toward the Soviet Union offer their appraisals of Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens, The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967, published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. The commentators praise many aspects of Radchenko's book, but Michael Sheng and to a lesser extent Qiang Zhai and Deborah Kaple wonder whether Radchenko has gone too far in downplaying the role of ideology in Mao's foreign policy. Unlike Lorenz Lüthi, who gives decisive weight to ideology in his own book about the Sino-Soviet split, Radchenko argues that a classical realist approach is the best framework for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Sheng and Zhai also raise questions about some of the sources used by Radchenko. Replying to the commentaries, Radchenko defends his conception of Mao's foreign policy, arguing that it is a more nuanced view than Sheng and Zhai imply. Radchenko also stresses the inherent shortcomings of the source base scholars are forced to use when analyzing Chinese foreign policy.

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Radchenko, Sergey. "Reply to the Commentaries." Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 1 (January 2012): 107–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00197.

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In this forum, three leading experts on Sino-Soviet relations and Mao Zedong's policy toward the Soviet Union offer their appraisals of Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens, The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967, published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. The commentators praise many aspects of Radchenko's book, but Michael Sheng and to a lesser extent Qiang Zhai and Deborah Kaple wonder whether Radchenko has gone too far in downplaying the role of ideology in Mao's foreign policy. Unlike Lorenz Lüthi, who gives decisive weight to ideology in his own book about the Sino-Soviet split, Radchenko argues that a classical realist approach is the best framework for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Sheng and Zhai also raise questions about some of the sources used by Radchenko. Replying to the commentaries, Radchenko defends his conception of Mao's foreign policy, arguing that it is a more nuanced view than Sheng and Zhai imply. Radchenko also stresses the inherent shortcomings of the source base scholars are forced to use when analyzing Chinese foreign policy.

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Li, Danhui, and Yafeng Xia. "Competing for Leadership: Split or Détente in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1959–1961." International History Review 30, no. 3 (September 2008): 545–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2008.10415485.

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Tromblay, Darren E. "From Old Left to New Left: The FBI and the Sino–Soviet Split." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 33, no. 1 (December 18, 2019): 97–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2019.1670207.

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23

Rozman, Gilbert. "China's Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship." World Politics 37, no. 4 (July 1985): 435–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010340.

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What are Chinese scholars writing about internal developments in the Soviet Union? Are they positive or negative in their assessments of each stage of Soviet history, from the early leadership of Lenin to the recent accession of Gorbachev? What are the consequences that changing Chinese attitudes are likely to have for Sino-Soviet relations? After a quarter-century of the Sino-Soviet split, foreign observers no longer need to grasp at tiny straws of information, or to rely solely on a small number of official documents and authoritative articles. The study of new, published sources can add substantially to our understanding of international perceptions in the socialist world, and can bring us nearer to the elusive goal of learning about debates on foreign policy in communist-led countries. Academic journals and books from the late 1960s in the Soviet Union, and from 1979 in China, present an impressively detailed and intriguingly lively literature on the problems of socialism in the other country. Having previously examined Soviet writings on China, I will introduce Chinese publications on the Soviet Union in this article.

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Munteanu, Mircea. "When the Levee Breaks: The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia on Romanian-Soviet Relations, 1967–1970." Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 1 (January 2010): 43–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2010.12.1.43.

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Romania's position regarding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the culmination of almost a decade of increasingly autonomous moves vis-à-vis Moscow. Based on new evidence from the Romanian archives, this article paints a more complete picture of Nicolae Ceauşescu's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, placing it in the context of the international system and especially the Sino-Soviet split. Following the invasion, Romania remained just as committed as before to the goal of ensuring its maneuverability on the world scene, especially with regard to sovereignty and independence. Although Romanian leaders tried not to provoke the Soviet Union outright, they did not back down on important issues concerning Sino-Romanian relations and did not embrace Moscow's call for a common Warsaw Pact foreign policy. Romania did agree to certain compromises, but only because Ceauşescu believed that Romania would remain largely unaffected by them.

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Spektor, Ilya. "Transformation of the Soviet Ties with Indian Communist Movement in the1960s: from the Struggle with “Pro-Chinese Sectarians” towards the Left Unification Politics." Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost, no. 1 (2022): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s086919080016330-0.

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The history of the Communist party of India is important due to the party’s activities during the struggle for the country’s independence and in virtue of its leading position in Indian politics during the period when the government of J. Nehru was in power. Differences between so-called “leftists” and “rightists” in the party lead to the split in the CPI and to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) which was founded by the leaders of the “leftist” faction. The main reasons of the split were the differences in the attitude of different groups of Indian communists towards the Indian National Congress and the politics of Indian government. At the same time the spit related to the foreign politics of India and with the international communist movement. At the first stage of the conflict within the party, the sympathies of the USSR were entirely on the side of the “rightist” faction and the current leadership of the CPI. The “leftist” and the CPI (M) were considered as anti-Soviet group and potential political allies of China. However, the electoral success of the CPI(M) and the neutral position of the party during the Sino-Soviet split changed the attitude of the Soviet government towards this political force. Since the second half of the 1960s the USSR tried to maintain relations with the two main communist parties in India. The key sources are the documents of the Soviet Embassy in Delhi, which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

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ATHWAL, AMARDEEP. "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Split: The Key Role of Nuclear Superiority." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17, no. 2 (June 2004): 271–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040490450547.

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Yang, Yiting. "The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941: China's response." Исторический журнал: научные исследования, no. 2 (February 2021): 67–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2021.2.35602.

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The subject of this research is response of the government, political parties, and society of the Republic of China to signing the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan on April 13, 1941 – one of the crucial bilateral agreements of the World War II, which entailed fundamental changes to the Far Eastern international system. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact negatively affected the relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China. The goal of this work is to objectively assess the impact of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941 upon the domestic and foreign policy of the Chinese government, as well as further development of the Sino-Soviet relations. The novelty of this work consists in the fact that based on the poorly studied Russian and foreign documentary materials, the author examines the questions that have been rarely touched upon within the Russian historiography, such as: China’s response to conclusion of the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan; its effect upon Sino-Soviet relations. The conclusion is made that the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, which marked the most difficult moment of the Sino-Japanese War, was a psychological blow to China. The position of the Kuomintang government was ambivalent: on the one hand, it refrained from the public anti-Soviet propaganda; while on the other hand, used dissatisfaction of China’s population to enhance pressure on its major political opponent – China’s Communist Party. Therefore, the Sino-Soviet relations in general did not experience severe problems; however, the internal split in the Chinese society has worsened, which substantially undermined the formation of Second United Front.

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Stanciu, Cezar. "Fragile Equilibrium: Romania and the Vietnam War in the Context of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1966." Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no. 1 (January 2016): 161–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00623.

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How many powerful allies should a small country have? This was a question to which Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania had a specific answer. Romania's policy of autonomy in the Soviet bloc was based on a delicate balance between Moscow and Beijing, as Romanians claimed that all Communist parties were equal and none had the right to question the others’ policy choices. Such a political course involved numerous risks for a Soviet satellite, and the Vietnam War added one more. Moscow was in favor of negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the conflict, whereas China was vehemently against negotiations and in favor of military victory on the battlefield. Whose side was Romania going to take? To preserve an autonomous position in the Soviet bloc, Romania was compelled to maintain a fragile equilibrium between the two leading powers of the Communist world and prevent Moscow from rallying the Communist movement against China on many divergent issues, including the Vietnam War.

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Kochavi, Noam. "Washington's view of the Sino‐Soviet split, 1961–63: From puzzled prudence to bold experimentation." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 1 (March 2000): 50–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432587.

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McNamee, Lachlan, and Anna Zhang. "Demographic Engineering and International Conflict: Evidence from China and the Former USSR." International Organization 73, no. 02 (2019): 291–327. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818319000067.

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AbstractWhen and where do states coercively alter their internal demography? We build a theory that predicts under what conditions states alter the demographic “facts on the ground” by resettling and expelling ethno-national populations. We predict that, under particular scope conditions, states will employ demographic engineering to shore up control over (1) nonnatural frontiers, and (2) areas populated by ethnic minorities who are co-ethnics with elites in a hostile power. We then substantiate our predictions using new subnational data from both China and the USSR. Causally identifying the spatially differential effect of international conflict on demographic engineering via a difference-in-differences design, we find that the Sino-Soviet split (1959–1982) led to a disproportionate increase in the expulsion of ethnic Russians and resettlement of ethnic Han in Chinese border areas lacking a natural border with the USSR, and that resettlement was targeted at areas populated by ethnic Russians. On the Soviet side, we similarly find that the Sino-Soviet split led to a significant increase in expulsion of Chinese and the resettlement of Russians in border areas, and that resettlement was targeted at areas populated by more Chinese. We develop the nascent field of political demography by advancing our theoretical and empirical understanding ofwhen, where, andto whomstates seek to effect demographic change. By demonstrating that both ethnic group concentration and dispersion across borders are endogenous to international conflict, our results complicate a large and influential literature linking ethnic demography to conflict.

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Guleva, Mariia. "Through the Looking Glass of Intimate Friendship and Common Enemies: Images of Sino–Soviet Relations in Chinese and Soviet Political Cartoons of the 1950s." AUC PHILOLOGICA 2021, no. 3 (February 15, 2022): 79–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/24646830.2022.5.

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This article examines Sino–Soviet relations in the 1950s through the medium of political cartoons in Manhua and Krokodil, satire magazines published in the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Images of friendship and enmity produced an intricate narrative about world affairs and the paths of socialism and capitalism. By comparing the stories and visual representations in Krokodil and Manhua, this study underscores the similarities and contradictions existing between the Soviet Union and China in the years before their split. This approach provides an example of two ideological machines working to reflect unexpected shifts in alliances while maintaining a claim on the teleological coherence of socialist development. It also exemplifies the mechanics of visual propaganda under the stress of contradictory policies and purposes.

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Tagirova, Alsu. "Europe and China in the Cold War: exchanges beyond the bloc logic and the Sino-Soviet split." Cold War History 20, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 527–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2020.1819315.

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Jersild, Austin. ":The Sino‐Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World.(Princeton Studies in International History and Politics.)." American Historical Review 114, no. 2 (April 2009): 426–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.114.2.426.

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Radchenko, Sergey S. "Mongolian Politics in the Shadow of the Cold War: The 1964 Coup Attempt and the Sino-Soviet Split." Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 1 (January 2006): 95–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039706775212021.

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After Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of some of Stalin's crimes in 1956, the Mongolian People's Republic, following in the footsteps of the “fraternal” Soviet Union, also succumbed to the “thaw.” Khrushchev used de Stalinization to discredit his hardline opponents. Mongolia's leader, Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, was a Stalin-era holdover who came under criticism from his rivals for being unenthusiastic about political reforms. Tsedenbal had good reason to downplay de-Stalinization:He shared responsibility with Marshal Horloogiyn Choibalsan for violent repressions in the 1940s. But Tsedenbal outmaneuvered and eliminated his opponents in the late 1950s and early 1960s and consolidated his grip on power by 1964.Toward the end of that year, however, Tsedenbal once again was challenged, this time from an unexpected direction. Several members of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) used the precedent of Khrushchev's forced retirement from his leadership posts in Moscow in October 1964 as a pretext to overthrow Tsedenbal. At a plenum of the MPRP Central Committee in December 1964, Tsedenbal was accused of incompetence, corruption, disrespect for principles of “party democracy,” lack of economic discipline, and overreliance on the Soviet Union for credits. But Tsedenbal rebuffed the “anti-party group” and depicted the affair as an attempted coup engineered by pro-Chinese sympathizers and spies. Soviet leaders were wary of Chinese efforts to “subvert” Moscow's in fluence in the socialist camp and were therefore willing to endorse Tsedenbal's version of events.

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Lalande, J. Guy. "The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. By Lorenz M. Lüthi; Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967. By Sergey Radchenko." European Legacy 17, no. 4 (July 2012): 548–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2012.686757.

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Shen, Zhihua, and Yafeng Xia. "Chinese–North Korean Relations and China's Policy toward Korean Cross-Border Migration, 1950–1962." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 4 (October 2014): 133–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00518.

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Making use of Chinese Foreign Ministry archives and provincial and municipal archives, this article traces the history of cross-border migration of ethnic Koreans from 1950 to 1962, especially the illegal migration of ethnic Koreans to North Korea (DPRK) in 1961. A historical examination of Koreans in northeast China demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party attempted to achieve a workable policy toward Korean border crossers as well as a disposition to accommodate the DPRK's concerns and imperatives in defining nationality, handling cases of Sino-Korean marriages and exit procedures for ethnic Koreans, receiving Korean nationals to visit China, and dealing with cases of illegal border crossings. To this end, the Chinese authorities were pursuing larger Cold War interests, specifically the desire to keep the DPRK aligned with China during the Sino-Soviet split.

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Lin, Mao. "China and the Escalation of the Vietnam War: The First Years of the Johnson Administration." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (April 2009): 35–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.2.35.

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This article reexamines how concerns about China contributed to the escalation of the Vietnam War during the first years of Lyndon Johnson's administration. Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam to protect America's global credibility as the leader and defender of the non-Communist world in the face of the threat posed by China's “wars of national liberation” strategy in Vietnam. U.S. officials evaluated this threat in the context of the broadening Sino-Soviet split. The concern in Washington was that if Hanoi, a regime openly supported by Beijing as a star in the “wars of national liberation,” were to take over South Vietnam, the Soviet Union might then be forced to discard the “peaceful coexistence” principle and the incipient détente with the West. The escalation in Vietnam was spurred largely by apprehension that a failure to contain China in Vietnam might prompt the Soviet Union to shift back to a hard line toward the West.

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Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li. "The Predicament of Proletariat Internationalism ― Structural Defects of Inter-Socialist State Relations as Reflected in the Sino-Soviet Split." DAEDONG MUNHWA YEON'GU ll, no. 98 (June 2017): 11–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.18219/ddmh..98.201706.11.

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Scalice, Joseph. "The geopolitical alignments of diverging social interests: the Sino-Soviet split and the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, 1966–1967." Critical Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 45–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2020.1870867.

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Stock, Thomas. "North Korea’s Marxism-Leninism: Fraternal Criticisms and the Development of North Korean Ideology in the 1960s." Journal of Korean Studies 24, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 127–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/21581665-7258081.

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Abstract During the 1960s, as the Sino-Soviet conflict raged on, North Korea, for the first time in its history, officially began to reject the USSR’s ideological leadership and instead tread its own path under the slogan of self-reliance. As a result, those forces aligned with the Soviet Union, especially East Germany, heavily criticized North Korea’s new ideological path. Drawing on the East German archives, this study seeks to understand the nature of fraternal criticisms and their implications for the development of North Korean ideology in the 1960s. Scholars typically stress North Korean ideology’s departure from Marxism-Leninism, sometimes suggesting a departure as early as the 1950s. The present study, based on a thorough reading of archival documents and North Korean materials, challenges such portrayals, arguing that North Korea remained in the Marxist-Leninist tradition even while contesting Soviet orthodoxy. Developments in North Korean ideology were far more gradual than is usually assumed, building on what came before. These developments were by no means revolutionary or removed from the global intellectual environment. The Soviets and East Germans could understand North Korean heterodoxy and engage with it in Marxist-Leninist terms, just as North Korea did with Soviet Marxism-Leninism—there was no fundamental ideological split.

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Nguyen, Liêên-Hang T. "The War Politburo: North Vietnam's Diplomatic and Political Road to the Têêt Offensive." Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1, no. 1-2 (February 1, 2006): 4–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/vs.2006.1.1-2.4.

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This article explores the strategy deliberation leading up to Hàà N 4i's decision to go to war in 1959, to embark on a "bigger" war in 1963, and to launch the Tet Offensive in 1968. The militants who controlled the party apparatus advanced their agenda for armed conflict in the South at the expense of socialist transformation in the North. While battling their internal opponents, these hardliners also had to navigate the Sino-Soviet split to advance their war agenda. This article reveals that the launching of the Têêt Offensive signified the militants' neutralization of domestic opposition and foreign obstruction through the implementation of a mass purge known as the "Revisionist Anti-Party Affair."

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도지인. "An Unintended Truce: The American Factor in the Sino-Soviet Split and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), 1962-1963." 중소연구 37, no. 4 (February 2014): 175–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.21196/aprc.37.4.201402.006.

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Gnoinska, Margaret K. "Promoting the ‘China Way’ of communism in Poland and beyond during the Sino-Soviet Split: the case of Kazimierz Mijal." Cold War History 18, no. 3 (September 18, 2017): 343–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2017.1362394.

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Hoang Hai, Ha, and Dung Vu Thi. "Mobilizing American and Western support and sympathy for the Vietnamese Revolution through people’s diplomacy (1965-1973)." Journal of Science Social Science 66, no. 3 (August 2021): 118–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.18173/2354-1067.2021-0054.

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The article investigates people's diplomacy of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) from 1965 to1973, aiming to gain American and Western support and sympathy for the Vietnamese revolution. The resistance war against the US became more difficult and fiercer when the US government deployed more political and diplomatic activities to support its military campaigns in South Vietnam as well as negotiations at the Paris Conference. In addition, the Sino-Soviet split had been growing more tense, causing many difficulties for Vietnam’s anti-imperialist struggle. Therefore, the Labor Party of Vietnam and the Government of the DRV paid great attention to people’s diplomacy aiming to demonstrate Vietnam's position on American War, the legitimacy of the anti-American resistance war, thereby bringing popular pressure to bear on US government to sign the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and withdraw US military troops.

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Zhai, Qiang. "Mercy A. Kuo, Contending with Contradictions: China's Policy toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953–1960. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. 192 pp. $60.00." Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 4 (October 2002): 132–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2002.4.4.132.

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Altehenger, Jennifer. "Industrial and Chinese: Exhibiting Mao’s China at the Leipzig Trade Fairs." Journal of Contemporary History 55, no. 4 (April 3, 2020): 845–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009419888265.

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Between 1951 and 1965, the People’s Republic of China regularly exhibited at the international trade fairs in the East German city of Leipzig. One of the major attractions of the fairs, China’s grand pavilion was second in size only to the pavilion of the Soviet Union. This article examines the planning and execution of China’s exhibitions, illustrating how the young communist regime displayed its products and political system abroad and how citizens of other socialist and capitalist countries experienced China through objects, materials, images and narratives. Because the People's Republic of China was a new revolutionary state of enormous political and economic significance and yet also a state that other socialist regimes deemed too poorly developed to transition to socialism, these exhibitions were the site of constant negotiations and tension between Chinese and East German organizers and other local decision-makers and participants. As such, the People's Republic of China’s engagement with the fairs sheds further light on its international activities after 1949 and on the local history of the Sino-Soviet split. It is also a case study that calls attention to the historical significance of materiality that underpinned China’s interactions with the wider world, from minute quotidian things to grand gifts and major export goods.

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Pozefsky, Peter C. "The Sino‐Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. By Lorenz M. Lüthi. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008. Pp.xvii, 375. $27.95.)." Historian 72, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 478–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6563.2010.00267_58.x.

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TYERMAN, EDWARD. "Stalled at Friendship Station: Under Ancient Desert Skies , the Socialist Silk Road, and Cinematic Collaboration on the Eve of the Sino‐Soviet Split." Russian Review 80, no. 4 (September 3, 2021): 603–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/russ.12333.

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Sousa, Julião Soares. "Amílcar Cabral, the PAIGC and the Relations with China at the Time of the Sino-Soviet Split and of Anti-Colonialism. Discourses and Praxis." International History Review 42, no. 6 (January 8, 2020): 1274–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1695139.

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Lin, Mao. "More Than a Tacit Alliance." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 24, no. 1 (April 8, 2017): 41–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02401004.

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It is well known that President Richard M. Nixon’s 1972 visit to the People’s Republic of China (prc) established an anti-Soviet alliance between Beijing and Washington that reshaped the global Cold War power balance. Naturally, scholars have focused on strategic issues such as the Sino-Soviet split, the Vietnam War, Taiwan, and other factors of “high politics” to understand the u.s.-China rapprochement. However, one can no longer dismiss u.s.-prc trade in the 1970s, albeit small in total volume, as insignificant and thus unimportant to the reconciliation. This article first examines how the Johnson and Nixon administrations conceived trade as a useful tool to improve relations with Communist China. It then explores how the Americans and Chinese carried out trade between themselves in the 1970s. It argues that many Americans were enthusiastic about u.s.-prc trade because they believed that reopened economic relations with the United States would persuade the prc to abandon its Communist model of modernization and move closer to following the capitalist example. If the United States could promote China’s attraction to its capitalist model for future development, then their shared economic interests and developmental visions would consolidate further the u.s.-China strategic alliance. In this sense, promoting trade was a way for the United States to apply soft power to change the prc.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Sino-Soviet Split'

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