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Journal articles on the topic 'Skeptic'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 3 June 2025

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Shermer, Michael. "The Skeptic's Skeptic." Scientific American 303, no. 5 (2010): 86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1110-86.

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2

Grams, Timm. "Skeptic Encounters Skeptical Movement." Journal of Anomalistics / Zeitschrift für Anomalistik 21, no. 1 (2021): 47–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.23793/zfa.2021.47.

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This is the experience report of a skeptic who encounters the skeptical movement. The field of activity of this society is the promotion of scientific and critical investigations in an open discourse. But soon he discovered inconsistencies. The internal customs of the community deviates from the original intentions. Conspicuous are groupthink, self-conceit and the inability to define clear goals. The main reason for the inconsistencies are certain basic principles: metaphysical naturalism and its concept of truth. There are ways out of these difficulties. First steps in a new direction become

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3

Stojanović, Pavle. "Can a skeptic be pious and why would he be? Lessons from ancient Pyrrhonism." Belgrade Philosophical Annual 37, no. 2 (2024): 65–74. https://doi.org/10.5937/bpa2402065s.

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The Pyrrhonian skeptics argue that we should suspend belief about everything because, according to them, there are mutually exclusive accounts for and against every object of investigation, and because there are no good reasons to prefer either of the two positions. They also think that this suspension results in ataraxia, a mental state in which the skeptic is free from all unnecessary disturbance. Since ataraxia is also meant to apply to the matters pertaining to religion, it would seem to follow that the skeptic would be disinterested in taking any kind of position towards piety. But, this

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4

Chabot, Dana. "Thomas Hobbes: Skeptical Moralist." American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (1995): 401–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082433.

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Thomas Hobbes is usually held to have been a skeptic in matters of religion and morality. I accept the claim that there is a distinctive skeptical strain in Hobbes' thought but argue that his skepticism informs his moral vision, rather than depriving him of a conception of morality. As evidence for this reading, I situate Hobbes in a tradition of “skeptical moralism,” along with Montaigne and certain other Renaissance figures. As opposed to moral skeptics, skeptical moralists think of moral agents as divided selves, pulled in one direction by law and another by conscience. Skeptical moralists

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5

Schwab, Whitney. "Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth." Apeiron 46, no. 3 (2013): 327–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2012-0026.

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Abstract This paper deals with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It argues that the central argument presented by Jonathan Barnes in favor of the view that skepticism precludes the possession of any belief fails. In brief, Barnes maintains that, because skepticism requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, no skeptic can, consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of truth; this entails, he argues, that no skeptic can make any judgments about anything and, hence, cannot come to possess any beliefs. I evaluate this argument in two ways: first, if we understand criteria of tru

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6

Nordby, Halvor. "Skepticism and Internalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 1 (2009): 35–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0039.

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The skeptical Dream argument appeals to the possibility of dreaming. The skeptic holds that states of being awake are subjectively indistinguishable from possible dream states and that this means that we do not know that we are awake. This, the skeptic then claims, means that we have to accept that we do not have external world knowledge.It is natural to assume that there must be a connection between the Dream argument and epistemic internalism, the view that a belief is justified for a given person if and only if the person has cognitive access to all the factors that are needed for the belie

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7

Sgaravatti, Daniele. "In Conversation with the Skeptic: Contextualism and the Raising of Standards." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, no. 2 (2013): 97–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057012x630704.

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I begin by describing the solution to the problem of skepticism propounded by contextualists, which constitutes the background of the rest of the paper. I then address the question of what happens when a skeptic and a non-skeptic are confronted in dialogue to the standards in play for correct knowledge ascription, on the assumption that contextualism about knowledge is right. I argue against Keith DeRose that there are reasons, both intuitive and theoretical, to conclude that the standards will be raised in such a way as to make the skeptic’s denials of knowledge true. Next, I argue, again aga

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8

Zivotic, Pavle. "Why does urban interpretation of pyrhonism has a greater chance of success than rustic?" Theoria, Beograd 58, no. 3 (2015): 87–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1503089z.

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Delineation of the skeptical way of thinking and vision of life, from ordinary people (idiotes), academics and dogmatic is important. After that, we can start to (by Sextus) search and make sense of the good life, which is for skeptics achieving ataraxia. To restraint from the judgment is crucial for skeptic. For the correct setting of the problem and possible solutions, we come to two interpretations, rustic and urban. In my opinion, urban has a greater chance of success because rustic interpretation collapses into an academic, and does not meet the four desiderata which we have set as a requ

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9

Collier, Mark. "The Humean Approach to Moral Diversity." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2013): 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2013.0046.

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In ‘A Dialogue’, Hume offers an important reply to the moral skeptic. Skeptics traditionally point to instances of moral diversity in support of the claim that our core values are fixed by enculturation. Hume argues that the skeptic exaggerates the amount of variation in moral codes, however, and fails to adopt an indulgent stance toward attitudes different from ours. Hume proposes a charitable interpretation of moral disagreement, moreover, which traces it back to shared principles of human nature. Contemporary philosophers attempt to locate examples of moral variability that cannot be accomm

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10

Gleick, Peter H. "Is the Skeptic All Wet?The Skeptical Environmentalist." Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 44, no. 6 (2002): 36–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00139150209605930.

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11

Peric, Marko. "The principle of deductive closure of knowledge and contextualism." Theoria, Beograd 61, no. 3 (2018): 55–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1803055p.

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The hypotheses of radical skeptics are so conceived to put the attributor of knowledge in such position that she can?t ascribe knowledge to anyone, because the subject can?t get proper evidence to exclude skeptical alternatives. There are several versions of the skeptical arguments by which she tries to point out the impossibility of knowledge ascriptions as direct consequence of the impossibility to rule out skeptical alternatives. All of those arguments are based on a very intuitive epistemological principle: if we know p, and if we know that p implies q, then we know q as well. This princip

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12

Ribeiro, Brian. "Skeptic-cum-Augur." Ancient Philosophy 43, no. 2 (2023): 503–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343228.

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In section 1 I present a case for understanding Cicero as a radical Academic skeptic, based on evidence from the Academica. In section 2 I offer an explanation of the concept of skeptical fideism and present a way to taxonomize various versions of the view. The material in sections 1 and 2 positions us to ask, was Cicero, the Academic augur, a sincere orthopraxic skeptical fideist? In section 3 I attempt to answer that question, beginning with an examination of De divinatione. Reading that work in a skeptical light, as I do, we are led to an impasse on our central question. However, in section

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13

Murphy, Peter. "The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, no. 4 (2013): 271–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03011096.

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What epistemic defect needs to show up in a skeptical scenario if it is to effectively target some belief? According to the false belief account, the targeted belief must be false in the skeptical scenario. According to the competing ignorance account, the targeted belief must fall short of being knowledge in the skeptical scenario. This paper argues for two claims. The first is that, contrary to what is often assumed, the ignorance account is superior to the false belief account. The second is that the ignorance account ultimately hobbles the skeptic. It does so for two reasons. First, when t

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14

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 92 (2021): 16–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm2021925.

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15

Siegel, Fred, and John P. Diggins. "The Skeptic." Reviews in American History 21, no. 1 (1993): 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2702965.

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16

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 32 (2005): 96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20053231.

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17

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 73 (2016): 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20167367.

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18

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 74 (2016): 22–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20167492.

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19

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 75 (2016): 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm201675123.

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20

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 78 (2017): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20177871.

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21

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 80 (2018): 24–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm2018807.

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22

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 82 (2018): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20188270.

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23

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 83 (2018): 14–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20188395.

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24

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 84 (2019): 17–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm2019845.

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25

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 86 (2019): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20198656.

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26

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 87 (2019): 12–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20198780.

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27

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 88 (2020): 9–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm2020883.

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28

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 89 (2020): 16–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20208930.

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29

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 90 (2020): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20209057.

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30

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 91 (2020): 16–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20209186.

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31

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 95 (2021): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20219585.

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32

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 93 (2021): 22–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20219333.

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33

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 94 (2021): 21–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20219457.

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34

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 1 (1997): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1997126.

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35

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 2 (1998): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1998295.

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36

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 3 (1998): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1998363.

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37

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 4 (1998): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1998431.

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38

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 5 (1999): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm19995148.

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39

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 6 (1999): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm19996113.

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40

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 7 (1999): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1999776.

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41

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 8 (1999): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1999839.

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42

Grossman, Wendy M. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 10 (2000): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20001076.

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43

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 11 (2000): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20001140.

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44

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 12 (2000): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm200012144.

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45

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 9 (2000): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20009109.

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46

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 13 (2001): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20011339.

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47

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 14 (2001): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm200114156.

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48

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 15 (2001): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm200115117.

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49

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 16 (2001): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20011679.

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50

Grossman, Wendy. "The Skeptic." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 17 (2002): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm200217142.

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