Journal articles on the topic 'Slovak Civilization'

The need to examine the value orientations resulted from current requirements in practice. At present, the paradigm of education is changing. Contradictions of today's civilization are naturally reflected in the education and training systems worldwide. The crisis of our civilization and the current systems of education are based on a crisis of value systems, a crisis of value orientations. Value systems represent an important regulator of social behaviour as value orientations influence the expression of a personality in its actions and behaviour, in identifying and achieving life goals. This is another reason why it is important to address this issue. In this paper we deal with an analysis of research findings related to preference of values ​​in older school age students from Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

The article considers changes in most important areas of Slovak society after 1989: dynamics of social stratification, family values, religiosity, leisure activities, voting behavior and preferences, democratic participation. The aim is to examine the contemporary position of Slovakia between the East and the West European civilization systems after two waves of social transformation in the middle and at the end of the 20th century, considering the accelerated change of the underdeveloped agrarian social structure into the industrial type under the "real socialism". However, at the beginning of the 21st century Slovak settlements still retain a strong rural character. As a result of market reforms and westernization a large part of the countryside tremble in the balance, processes of depopulation and formation of excluded social groups take place especially in small municipalities. Further still, in the context of increasing migration from cities to countryside more and more rural patterns of thinking extend to urban environments. The primarily important urban-rural line of societal differentiation, perceptions, attitudes and voters decision-making process are analyzed on base of Slovak sociologists' research. They discovered the phenomenon of historic “embedding” of the party type gaining the voters' support and commitment to one-party system, starting from the Inter-War Period till present. Slovakia represents the case of the weak left-right party profiling and inclination to various “parties of collective identity”. Definitive significance of ethnicity and religion as divisions in mass political orientations, traditionally characterized by the emphasis on leftist orientations, social rights and value of nation are shown in the paper. According to results of the latest socio-empiric studies in the country, most people in Slovakia (mainly the so called “loosers”) did not adopt neoliberal, Western-type path of development, regarding the existing inequalities as too large, and preferring social equality in a society of poor to social differentiation in a society of abundance. Social rights are estimated by the majority of Slovak people higher than political rights now.

The development of society is being affected by a range of potential risks and threats. The very existence of these threats negatively influences the level of safety as well as the sustainable development of society. Given that security is one of the fundamental building blocks of civilization for citizens, social groups, states and the overall international community, it is vital to eliminate such threats. This paper focuses on the specifics of security in the territorial units of the Slovak Republic. Regional safety is affected by several factors and activities carried out within a region. A spatial plan is developed for the purpose of permanent harmonization of ongoing activities in a region. This plan, being the fundamental strategic document of an area, does not sufficiently incorporate the issue of security or its improvement; thus, it does not include preventive measures in it. Bearing the above-stated in mind, this paper first points out developing tendencies in the area of security within the Slovak Republic and further identifies the potential and real risks and threats directly affecting the citizens living in the regions. The principal focus of the paper is to describe and define the concept of the activities needed to design territorial planning documents, while at the same time maintaining an active role in minimizing the threats and risks in a selected territorial unit. Keywords: security, territorial units, spatial plan, preventive measures;

Background: Cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) are the number one cause of death globally. Most can be prevented by addressing behavioral risk factors, where advanced practice nurses- clinical specialists in cardiovascular nursing play a fundamental role. This modern and effective role is based on advanced activities, knowledge, skills, and experience in a specialized field, which can make a significant contribution to solving the problems of these civilization diseases. The aim of this work is to explore the self-perception of advanced-practice nurses (APNs) working in cardiology and vascular medicine departments within the context of advanced-practice nursing. Methods: This quantitative exploratory study included 103 APNs working in cardiology and vascular diseases departments of specialized hospitals in Slovakia. A validated instrument was used. Results: The overall perception was at the level of 68.01%. The highest-rated domain was the outcomes for patients/clients, and subdomains were meeting the needs, education of healthcare workers, and quality in relation to management. There was a significant difference found among hospitals with a better scoring of specialized institutions. Conclusion: There have been promising advances due to the current legislation in Slovakia defining APNs and specialists’ competencies. However, the practice in nursing for CVD patients remains fragmented, uncategorized and less valued by stakeholders and the public. According to the results, nurses have the potential and preparedness for this role in the context of their knowledge and skills in general. The Authors conclude that there is a need of such specialization of APNs in Slovakia.

The area of the Slovak Republic has served over history as a ‘melting pot’ of civilizations and migrations. Thus during numerous conflicts and wars it turned into a stage of military operations. It is remarkable that a relatively small surface of the country gave so much space to numerous armies. Those campaigns have left many traces, represented by battlefields, monuments and also movable items, militaria. However, since Slovakia is a relatively young republic, several problems are present with respect to building military museology on the national level. In the past, Slovakia’s military museology was presented mostly in museums in other countries. The fall of the Communist regime enabled to transform the existing military museums into serious institution to present and research into the national military history. Currently, the process of the development of military museology in our country can neither be considered as completed nor as satisfactory.

AbstractThe paper focuses on the thinking of Jonáš Záborský (1812–1876) and Štěpán Launer (1821–1851), which were marginalized in Slovak national-forming thinking. Emphasis is placed on the comparison between non-romantic nationalism and Štúr’s ethnic enthusiasm. Attention is paid to the value of their thinking, which can be analyzed in the context of reflections in the role of cultural identity in Štúr’s conception of culture and its place in relation to European cultural and civilizational affiliation. At the same time, the critique of romantic thinking draws attention to the issue of the responsibility of nation-forming elites for the concept of civic development, which holistically approaches social change. Launer’s and, partly Záborský’s thinking draws attention to the dangers associated with the romantic search for ethnocultural specifics, which may result in the questioning the importance of civil liberties and Western cultural and civilizational affiliation.

The study examines contemporary discourses in two small Central European states, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The aim is to analyze how key domestic political players discursively construct foreign policy vis-à-vis the migration crisis. Securitization, a concept developed by the Copenhagen School, serves as an analytical framework for revealing the kinds of discourse being produced in the two countries. The analysis of the discourse of the Prime Ministers from 2015 to 2018, indicates that in the Czech Republic and Slovakia foreign policy is being constructed around the issue of Europeanness (belongingness) and accommodation in the core-periphery spectrum. The article shows that the construction of external threats is done in different security sectors in each country, but in both it seems to promote the in-group coherence needed to affirm their belongingness to Europe, and it no longer happens on grounds of ethnically defined nations, but on grounds of the broader idea of civilizational Europe.

AbstractSince the United States committed to withdraw from the UN Paris Agreement on climate change, international observers have increasingly asked if China can take the lead instead to raise global ambition in the context of a world leadership vacuum. Given the country's increasing economic and strategic focus on sustainable and low-carbon innovation, China might seem well placed to do so. However, much depends on the direction of governance and reform within China regarding the environment. To better understand how the government is seeking to make progress in these areas, this article explores key political narratives that have underpinned China's policies around sustainable development (kechixu fazhan) and innovation (chuangxin) within the context of broader narratives of reform. Drawing on theoretical insights from work that investigates the role of power in shaping narratives, knowledge and action around specific pathways to sustainability, this article explores the ways in which dominant policy narratives in China might drive particular forms of innovation for sustainability and potentially occlude or constrain others. In particular, we look at ecological civilization (shengtai wenming) as a slogan that has gradually evolved to become an official narrative and is likely to influence pathways to sustainability over the coming years.

The Etruscan city states flourished in westcentral Italy from the late 8th century BC until their conquest and absorption by the emergent state ofRome in the 4th century BC. In 1985 Italy celebrated the century or so of work on its oldest civilization with a series of major exhibitions under the slogan, ‘Buongiorno Etruschi’ (‘Good morning, Etruscansi!’). There were eight major exhibitions in Tuscany displaying over 5000 objects from all the major collections in the region, designed to cover most aspects of Etruscan culture – settlement systems, domestic and religious architecture, religion, everyday life, crafts, and artistic achievement. As the sponsors FIAT wrote in their preface to the splendid catalogues produced for the project (e.g. Camporeale 1985; Carandini 1985; Cristofani 1985; Stopponi 1985), the intention of this massive undertaking was to convey to the Italian public that the Etruscans were not just a dead civilization known above all for the way of death of its élite, but ‘a lively culture of ordinary people, merchants, and craftsmen’.

Falsa calma is a denunciation of the dystopia in which the Patagonian utopia of hydrocarbons of the mid-twentieth century became. The same oil camps that populated Patagonia in such a short time under the slogan of development, today succumb to the lack of opportunities. Half-done villages, abandoned by the State, whose inhabitants barely survive in an adverse environment. But it is no longer about the hostility of the "wild" nature, which the narratives of the 19th century portrayed: it is the decadence of civilization itself that corrupts the foundations of society.

The deterministic approach (philosophy) considers natural and civilizational phenomena (architecture) as a result of complex interactions and relations between passive and active actors. This view of architecture has a very close relation to digital methods. It has developed from automatized processes of design through parametric approach to the generative and emergent design. Architecture emerges as a non-linear interaction of endogenous and exogenous forces. It is technically impossible to predict this process (to plan or sketch it). It is, on the other hand possible to simulate it in digital as well as physical world. According to paradigm of emergent design, material and fabrication tool may be considered to be agents of the design process. A long-term goal of the research activities in the collaboration between Academy of Performing Arts, Faculty of Architecture at Slovak University of Technology and an independent platform Rese arch with the KUKA robotic arm is to create an emergent fabrication tool (process).

The article deals with the creative interpretations of Central Europe by means of cinematography in the context of discussions about whether modernization means Westernization. The position is asserted that within Europe the ideal type of modernization is persistently associated with the West. The constructed in horror films images of Central European capitals are analyzed, with the example of such films as Short Night of Glass Dolls (La Corta notte delle bambole di vetro, 1971), The Spider Labyrinth (Il nido del ragno, 1988) and Hostel (2005). Prague (Chech Republic), Budapest (Hungary) and Bratislava (Slovakia), represented in these films, are marked with features of pseudo-modernity, which destroys the representatives of Western civilization or forces them to degenerate into monsters.

This article deals with art functioning as a practice of localness and an identity activity. Discussing two examples – the town of Kovačica in Serbia, inhabited by the Slovak minority, and the Nikiszowiec housing estate located in Silesia, Poland – the author shows how the so-called naïve art today participates in the creation of a sense of belonging to a given place, its memory, the image of its past and the articulation of ethnic and cultural specificity, both on a micro and macro scale (region, national culture, state). In both cases, localness is treated as a task and as a project. Artistic activities undertaken by the individuals from the local communities serve to shape and display the iconographic codes and visual representations, as well as to stimulate the institutionalisation of activities related to the experience and identity of the place. Such instrumentalisation also connotes the reframing of art – a change in its communicative, civilizational or ideological-political context – and leads to the transformation of its semantics, social existence and its status in the field of artistic practices.

This paper attempts to explore the socio-political and economic dimensions of increasingly becoming popular rise of the Global South. It is argued that the slogan of the rise of Global South which seemingly implies that the Global South in its pursuit of development as an ideal will end up being different than the North is questionable. Scholars have long debated on the nature and spirit of development in South and explain the rising South either in terms of gradual expansion of Westernization or in terms of emerging indigenous alternate model of development or alternate modernity. This distinction in describing the emerging economies rely primarily on the specific use of notion of capital as somewhat Western and the culture it produces as Western culture or either in the sense of internalizing the spirit of capital yet maintaining distinctive identity (other than the Western) which tends to reflect in the vocabulary of the Global South. This is to argue here that the spirit of capital is neither West nor East. And similarly it is neither North nor South. It is only the question of when and how the forces underlying capitalism will emerge in particular geography. The development discourse emerged primarily after the WWII put all post-colonial nations pursuing development instead of questioning it. There may have been changes in the vocabulary of development in the Global South to adjust in local cultures and perhaps also in the structure. There may have been call for alternate modernity. Notwithstanding the spirit remains the same. It is in this backdrop locating or understanding the very notion of the East not as a homogenous civilization but rather a pool of civilizations intending to express power of traditions in transitions becomes important. The purpose of this paper is to understand the withering traditions of East in the Global South development process dominated by the spirit of Capitalism. It is asked in environmental debate that can capitalism go green, in the political and cultural realm I would try to explore can capitalism go East in the Global South; can traditions survive in transitions? If not then Why?

<p>State defense is a very important aspect in maintaining the existence and sovereignty of a country. Since ancient century Chanakya in a very famous treatise Arthasastra emphasized the importance of diplomacy and efforts to build up the strength of a country. This paper aims to examine the Arthasastra text as the basis of the Defense Diplomacy strategy. Indonesia adopted a Sanskrit slogan in the military world which indicated the close relationship of Indonesian defense and the treasury of Asian civilization with the influence of Indian text. Chanakya asserted, the state must build defense, ready to fight but can maintain peace. A country is deemed to be authoritative so that other countries either with a hostile tendency or as partners, will have high respect. Nevertheless, Arthasastra insists the supreme goal of a country is to build prosperity with defense and security as a prerequisite to build prosperity for a country.</p>

Modern society can be identified as a capitalist civilization, rapidly developing through the accumulation of capital in the process of entrepreneurial (primarily innovative scientific and technical) activities, which radically transformed the world around us and ensured the progress of mankind. Fighting against the closed elite-hierarchical religious system of the Premodern (traditional society), Modern (capitalism) raised the slogan: Freedom, Equality, Fraternity, which, according to its ideologists, could be realized on the basis of the secular democratic structure of society and scientific and technological progress. The article says that ultraeconomics is an economy that is not justified by anything (labor, capital, innovation etc.). The necessary condition for the victory of ultraeconomics was the destruction of scientific and rational reason, morality and conscience. This dirty work was done by countermodernism and ultra-liberalism. The victory of countermodernism, ultra-liberalism and ultra-economism led to the state of Postmodernism, and then to the global financial and economic crisis, the way out of which is impossible in the Postmodern paradigm.

The idea of the Redeemer prevailed in most human civilizations, but in different forms. This, however, was coupled with a state of despair and the inability to change the reality. The idea was manifested in Islamic history through religious, tribal, and political determinants. Thus, it was one of the slogans of the Umayyad against the Abbasid authority to denounce their legitimacy in power. The Rebel, Abu Al Wared, used this slogan to establish the foundation of the revolution against the Abbasid power. Nevertheless, they realized its danger and took efforts to eliminate such danger before the spread of the revolution. Savior logo continued to be a way to convince the masses to revolt against authority for a long time, especially in the Abbasid era. In addition, it had a socio-economic determinant against feudal power on one hand and military power on the other hand.

This research aims to find the philosophical foundation of the article "Principles of Education of Tamansiswa at the Beginning of Its Establishment" in the book of "Ki Hajar Dewantara's Thought and Struggle" which is published by The National Awakening Museum of the Directorate General of Culture Ministry. This book consists of six parts, which discusses about some topics related to KHD. The researcher chose the second part to be analyzed because it discusses the teachings of KHD which is interesting and is relevant in recent education. The research method uses inferential content analysis. The researcher comprehend and interpret the symbolic message in the article. The research procedure used are the procurement of data, data reduction, inference, and data analysis. Construct analysis is done using qualitative approach with conceptual domain. Data validity was measured by using semantic validity and test retest reliability. The research result shows that there are philosophical basis on education principles of Tamansiswa, philosophy of essentialism and humanism, which is values ​​issued in cultural or social heritage that have existed since human civilization, for example in the among systems and trilogy leadership slogan Ing Ngarso Sung Tulodho, Ing Madyo Mangun Karso and Tut Wuri Handayani implemented in Tamansiswa education.

In order to understand the process of neolithisation of Southeastern and Central Europe, must be underlined the important role played by Transylvania through the numerous springs and salt lakes. The whole Carpathian arch of Transylvania is surrounded by impressive salt sources (Map 1). After a cold period in Europe between 6300-6100 BC, around 6000 BC there is a heating that corresponds to Greece and Anatolia with very hot and dry periods, which causes small pastoral communities to migrate from the Greek-Macedonian areas to the north. These first shepherds’ communities with sheep flocks, defined with a general term, as Early Neolithic, migrate northwards and sit in salt areas. In the Carpatho-Danubian Basin, this civilization is defined by archaeologists with the term Starčevo-Criş culture. The first horizon was defined as Monocrom- Frühkeramik and Starčevo-Criş IA respectively (shortly SC). Very soon, finding out the beneficial conditions (pastures, forests, mountains with alpine pastures, but especially salty springs), other communities with large cattle come, laying the foundations of some important Early Neolithic sites in Transylvania: Cristian, Ocna Sibiului, Miercurea Sibiului, Gura Baciului and those in Apahida – Cojocna zone. Migration after migration and diffusion sought and used salt sources which together with the environmental factor (pastures, forests, and alpine meadows) contributed to the neolithisation process. In SE Transylvania, Moldova, central and north Crişana neolithisation process starts only with the evolved phases of the Starčevo-Criş culture. The most interesting and important discoveries related with the end of Early Neolithic are those of Lunca – Poiana Slatinii (Neamţ County). The salt roll for the neolithisation processes of N Hungary, Slovakia (Hurbanovo and Biňa, Košice-Červeny Rak a.s.o.) and E Austria (Prellenkirche a.s.o.) is related with the evolved phases of SC culture (Zăuan, Tăşnad – Sere). Neolithic sites located in area of salt sources of Someş and Tisa basins prove also ethno-cultural exchanges (obsidian import of NE Hungary, SW Slovakia and maybe other).

Since the ‘migration crisis’ in 2015 at the latest, the politics of a broadly conceived Central Europe has been marked by conflicts over symbols, values and norms. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Austria, and the Czech Republic have witnessed divisive debates and campaigns over refugee quotas, women’s and gay rights, abortion laws and public monuments. As the term ‘culture wars’ was becoming ubiquitous, it remained ambivalent in its meaning and usage. The aim of this article is to identify a political logic of recent Central European cultural conflicts without leaning solely on the ideological explanation, e.g. the anti-liberal backlash thesis of Rupnik, and Krastev and Holms. By borrowing R. Brubaker’s conceptualizations of identity and populism, the article contends that it is possible to analyze culture wars as a repertoire of a populist political style. To do so, the article develops a critical perspective on culture wars, defined as polarizing conflicts in the arenas of the politics of memory, politics of identity and politics of morality. Culture wars are analyzed as a strategy of re-politicization of memory (especially of World War II), (civilizational) identity and public morality and a code used in struggles for political and cultural hegemony.

Introduction. The paper reviews the phenomenon of perception of Western Europe as the "other" in Russian intellectual tradition. The purpose of this survey is to analyze and identify the features of Russian historiosophical consciousness in the transition of Russian civilization from the middle ages to modernity in the context of the idea of perceiving Europe as the "other".Materials and Methods. The main material of the paper is a monograph by Nizhny Novgorod researches «The problem of correlation of panhuman and national in the history of Russian thought». In addition, the material of the research is the works and articles by Russians and foreign authors focus on the subject under consideration. The article used the following methods: historical-philosophical analysis, interpretation, comparison and generalization.Results. In the medieval period the main consolidating power of society was religion, which identified the «other» as the Catholic of Western Europe. During the reign of Emperor Nicholas I, the «other» is still the same West, but the revolutionary West with its slogan «Liberty, equality, fraternity». The minister of national education – the earl S.S. Uvarov, in turn, proposed the following triad – «Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality». Formation of the Russian nationality was under intense pressure from the West (the «other» of Russian civilization) during this period. The split of the Russian Orthodox Church (Raskol) in XVII century led to destruction of the Orthodox unity. The Orthodoxy was the source of sacralisation of monarchial power. However, the autocracy, having dealt a blow tothe Orthodoxy, set a course for the Western absolutism. Certain social circles, keeping up old traditions of the Orthodoxy, perceived the political authority as the «other». This led not only to the religion split (Orthodoxy), but also to the split in nationality. A pro-Western elite is being formed and, having lost its connection with Orthodoxy and traditional folk culture, it finds itself in the desert of its own historical identity. As a result, historiosophical projects, created by government and intelligentsia, caused an additional split, being unable to restore the lost unity.Discussion and Conclusions. The authors of the research managed to make systematic and detailed historical-philosophical analysis of sources and literature on this topic. The paper presents the main concepts that explain the phenomenon of Russian national identity. This makes it possible to consider and evaluate the key ideas of Russian thinkers. As a result, the authors of the research managed to make comprehensive and systematic historical-philosophical analysis of the development of the idea of Russian national identity through the prism of the concept of perception of Western Europe as the «other» of Russia.

The last decade, and especially the years after the Revolution of Dignity and the association of Ukraine with the EU, are marked by the rhetoric of the «European civilization choice» and «the return to European values». In the education system, it is reflected in the slogan «New Ukrainian School», built on values. The last slogan raises the question: is there a school (or certain type of school education), which is NOT built on values? Or, in other words: is it a school, which is not built on values, possible in general? The questions are obviously rhetorical, because without values education is impossible. It is the values that are the basis of any upbringing. Therefore, in the declared general sense, this slogan is not different from the former Soviet “datsi-bao”, such as “We will come to a victory of covictory of commmunist labour!”. We need to be much more concrete in these cases. It seems to me, . It seems to me, that the major-that to me, that the major-that the major-the majorthe major--ity of the failures in the reforms in our country arise from the lack of concretization of common slogans – an alive consequence of the communist methodological heritage in this area. Therefore, the article deals with the ideological, philosophical and methodological foundations of constructing formal and ethical (moral) requirements for the system of school education in the USSR, the system of education and upbringing which Ukraine had inherited. In particular, this applies to the so-called “cosmocentric” ontology, the methodology of “dialectical materialism” (in particular, the so-called “unity of theory and practice”) and the class (so-called “proletarian”) - absolutely relativistic – ethics, constructed on it.So, the problem is the lack of a rational explanation and concretization of common slogans, in particular educational ones, which are put forward as a leit­motif of reforms in the school, and appeals to the concept of “values” that has emerged. As a result, we have absence of a corresponding scientific (philosophical) theory of values in Ukraine and a kind of vacuum in the field of ethics. In my opinion, in this area, we should study the Polish experience, represented by a whole school of rational thinking in all branches of humanities, known as the Lviv-Warsaw School. Due to the traditions of this school, the Polish school system and society as a whole could resist the dialectical “brainwashing” and liberate itself from the dogmas of communist thinking, as far as carry out the necessary reforms, in particular, in the area of education, making it compatible with the educational systems of EU countries. As an example, logically connected, based on experience and open to criticism, is the presentation of ethical issues in the theory of values of one of the last repre­sentatives of the Lviv-Warsaw School, Andrzej Gzegorczyk, presented in his paper “An attempt to describe the world of values and its ethical implications”.

The article is devoted to the history of the creation and functioning of the Visegrad Group as a regional entity, which not only did not cease activities after achieving the goal of Atlantic and European integration, but also successfully develops it, already being a member of NATO and the European Union. Based on the use of a broad documentary framework, in particular, protocols and declarations as a result of meetings of various levels within the framework of the Visegrad Group, analyzed and identifies the concrete stages of its development and interaction with Ukraine in a wide range of components that form the essence of Euro-Atlantic integration. On concrete examples, it was illustrated that Ukraine has always been in the field of key interests of the Visegrad Four, received effective help and support from her side in a variety of forms. It is not just about practical issues of regional cooperation and security, but also about the many aspects of the value and civilization dimension. The participating countries of the Visegrad Group, having become the initiators of the “B4 + Ukraine” cooperation format, have never stood apart from the most important processes and transitional stages, through which Ukraine passed on its way to becoming and self-determination. The opinion is upheld, that the experience gained by the member countries of the Visegrad format is relevant and useful for Ukraine and today on the way of implementing its Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations. Despite the existing difficulties both within the European Union and between Ukraine and individual signatory countries of the Visegrad Declaration of 1991, cooperation with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary is the most effective communication platform for intensifying the broad dialogue between Ukraine and European Union.

This article unpacks the idea of police as a “thin blue line” as narrating a story about the police invention of the human through a civilizing and exterminating war against beasts. To speak in the name of the “thin blue line,” then, is to articulate the police as the primary force which secures, or makes possible, all the things said to be at the core of “human” existence: liberty, security, property, sociality, accumulation, law, civility, and even happiness. The current project is less a history of the thin blue line slogan than a more conceptually grounded sketch, and abolitionist critique, of its most basic premises: the idea at the heart of thin blue line is that the most routine mode of violent state prerogative—the police power—is imagined as always a defense of civilization, which at once means the “human species.” In other words, thin blue line, to use a formulation from Sylvia Wynter, is best understood as a defense of a particular genre of the human, or “Man,” that “overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself.” But importantly, thin blue line articulates this police project of inventing the human as always incomplete, insecure, and unstable. Of course, it must always be incomplete, because it is through its inability to fully eradicate the bestial trace that police claim a license to endless war in the name of humanity. As a discourse of ordinary emergency, thin blue line becomes an expression of what Diren Valayden outlines as “racial feralization,” or the colonial bourgeois anxiety that humanity will regress back into a violent nature. A critique of the thin blue line encourages a consideration of how fantasies and failures of becoming human animate all things police, including the racialized violence at the heart of the police project.

The article analyzes the philosophical problems of legal Slavistics associated with the formation of the updated pan-Slavic state-legal ideology aimed at the development and improvement of Confederate and Federal forms of Slavic Association. The author consistently investigates conceptual, civilizational and geopolitical obstacles of the Slavic unity connected with religious, military-political and nationalist dissociation of the Slavic peoples. At the same time, the presented work suggests ways to overcome the anti-Slavic political and legal dogmas, with the help of education aimed at the formation among the Slavs of the pan-Slavic doctrine of the primacy of the Slavic communal-tribal system, built on the basis of archaic socialism (mutual responsibility and mutual assistance); Veche rule; freedom, denial of all forms of slavery; linguistic kinship; organic unity of personal and community interests, with the recognition of the unconditional primacy of sovereign values over private; as well as the supremacy of spiritual and moral principles over material needs. In practical terms, a legal project is proposed for the development of the Union State of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, which in the form of government can be a collegial Republic, in the form of state-territorial structure - a Confederation with a tendency to federalization and a democratic-polyarchic state regime. In addition, the author believes that from a civilizational point of view, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are predisposed to unite in the West Slavic Confederation-the Great Vagria or Venea; Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, having common historical, state and religious - Orthodox roots are obliged within the framework of reunification to create the East Slavic Confederation-Svetlorossia; in the Balkans, led by Serbia, it is necessary to revive the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the inclusion of the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Serbia Krajina. Slovenia and Croatia should be merged into the Croatian-Slovenian Federation. In the future, Slavic confederal unions and the Federation, together with the Slavic communities beyond the national borders of the Slavic Nations ( for example, Sorbs in Germany) for the preservation of their identity and the free development have the potential to unite in a pan-Slavic Union state - the Great Vseslav. It is advisable to elect a collegial Republic as a form of government of the great all-Russia; a form of state-territorial unity of the Confederate-Federal Union of Slavic peoples, communities and States with a socially guaranteed regime of political democracy.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the main stages of creation and development of the Visegrad Group as a regional grouping, which is successfully developing when being a member of NATO and the European Union. This kind of research is especially relevant in connection with the exacerbation of the economic crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The purpose of the research is to analyze the strategic stages of creation and development of various cooperative aspects of the Visegrad countries; such a format of interaction has not lost its relevance after accession to the European Union. Analytical separation of periodization of the stages of formation, identification of problems and solutions faced by the Visegrad group’s countries is important for creating a modern economic and political worldview of cooperation and indentifying the main areas of cooperation in Europe. Based on the use of documents, including protocols and declarations as a result of meetings at various levels within the Visegrad Group, the specific stages of its development and interaction with Ukraine in a wide range of components that are the essence of Euro-Atlantic integration are analyzed and identified. Specific examples illustrate that Ukraine has always been in the field of key interests of the Visegrad Four, getting effective assistance and support in various forms from it. There have been identified not only practical issues of regional cooperation and security, but also some aspects of the value and civilization dimension. The member countries of the Visegrad Group, having initiated the format of cooperation “V4 + Ukraine”, took an active part in the most important processes that Ukraine went through on its way. The assumption is proved that the experience of the Visegrad countries is relevant and useful for Ukraine on the way to the realization of its Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations. Despite the difficulties within the European Union, between Ukraine and some of the signatories of the 1991 Visegrad Declaration, cooperation with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary is the most effective communication platform for intensifying a broad dialogue between Ukraine and the European Union.

The subject of this research is the phenomenon of conceptual metaphor in the works of Michel Houellebecq. Leaning on the cognitive theory of metaphor, the author traces the methods of conceptualization of &ldquo;new identity&rdquo; within cultural identity of a modern Frenchman. The article highlights the metaphor of &ldquo;home&rdquo;, and reveals the methods of conceptualization of &ldquo;new identity&rdquo; (&ldquo;new&rdquo; France as a &ldquo;new home&rdquo;) in its relation to the cultural tradition (&ldquo;old&rdquo; France as an &ldquo;old home&rdquo;). M. Houellebecq's criticism of the political myth of &ldquo;pan-European identity&rdquo; is followed on the basis of the metaphor of &ldquo;home&rdquo;; the reasons of Houellebecq's objections against the simplified division of the levels of such identity into local, national, and pan-European are determined. The goal of this research lies in identification of various aspects of cultural reality of the &ldquo;new&rdquo; France reflected in the works of M. Houellebecq using the metaphor of &ldquo;home&rdquo; (sorrows of the object of threat on disruption of cultural tradition, unification of lifestyle, and crisis of values). The relevance of culturological analysis is defined by the ability to observe the process of conceptualization of &ldquo;European identity&rdquo; in French artistic culture as a moment of cultural dynamics. Reference to the texts Of M. Houellebecq revealed the cognate concepts used for realization of the metaphor of &ldquo;home&rdquo; (&ldquo;old France&rdquo;/ &ldquo;old home&rdquo;, &ldquo;castle&rdquo;; &ldquo;new France&rdquo; / &ldquo;hotel&rdquo;, &ldquo;high-rise building&rdquo;, &ldquo;tower&rdquo;, &rdquo;poultry farm&rdquo;); as well the predicates that disclose certain aspects of conceptualization (&ldquo;empty&rdquo;, &ldquo;old&rdquo;, &ldquo;confined&rdquo;, &ldquo;rural&rdquo;, &ldquo;destroyed&rdquo;, &ldquo;awful&rdquo;, &ldquo;disgusting&rdquo;). The novelty lies in substantiation of heuristic potential of consideration of the image created By M. Houellebecq as a cultural metaphor, which not only reflects social moods, but also designs cultural reality. &ldquo;Home&rdquo; manifests as the antithesis to the actual feeling of homelessness on the background of achievements of industrial civilization; it becomes a slogan that fills &ldquo;emptiness&rdquo; of everyday existence with cultural meaning. The main result is the substantiation of the writer's contribution to the development of conceptual model of identity of a modern Frenchman using the metaphor of home&rdquo;.

The article analyzes the results of a sociological study of the historical memory of students about the World War II in general (and the Great Patriotic War in particular), conducted by the Russian Society of Sociologists in 2020, as well as materials from surveys of other research teams. The author comes to the conclusion that historical memory is formed, first of all, by the information field, set by state institutions or encouraged by them (school, mass media, network resources). Contradictory assessment of the events of the twentieth century led to the rupture of the historical memory of generations and the formation of a large group of people ready to accept the revision of the geopolitical results of the war from the standpoint of history falsifiers. The attitude of young people to the past, without taking into account the cause-and-effect liaison of the events of that time, is explained not only by the extinction of communicative memory for the departure of war generations, the desacralization of their life, deed, death. The range of factors is much wider. Since there is no integral picture of the history of the USSR, there is no value core for assessing events of the Great Patriotic War either. In the absence of historical hygiene in the Russian Federation, the entire Soviet period turns into historical antiques for new generations. They treat this in different ways: with reverence, condescension, aggressiveness, indifference, but it is excessive for the daily life of the majority. The slogan “If required, we repeat / can repeat”, replicated on May 9, is nothing more than a short-term emotional reaction, including to PR management, but not the readiness / mindset / promise of action in a real war. The opposition of the state to the country, that is reflected in the popular among young people song of the group Lumen, actually testifies to alienation from both the state and the country, since there is no one without the other. Questions are inevitable: how adequate are the methodologies and techniques based on which social scientists choose the range of factors that form the portrait of modern youth and predict the direction of further socialization of its individual groups? How many meaningful collaborators should there be to lose / win a civilizational battle in which historical memory is only one of the components? According to the author, the conditions and opportunities for the realization of the desired worldview values ​​in modern Russia adjust the attitude to the present and the life strategies of young people to a greater extent than historical memory.

The project on the organization of trade relations between China and other countries arose in the second half of the II century BC. The caravan road connecting East Asia with the Mediterranean in the ancient time and to the Middle Ages was used, first of all, for export of silk from China. Therefore in 1877 the German geographer F.F. von Richtgofen called this route giving the chance for establishment of business contacts, cultural dialogue, promoting to mutual enrichment of large civilizations,—“A Silk Road”. By XV century the overland Silk Road fell into decay, sea trade and navigation began to develop. At the present stage of its development the mankind realized need of restitution of the interstate and international interaction inherent in the period of existence of the Great Silk Road. At the XXIV session of the UNESCO General conference in 1987 the project on complex studying of the Great Silk Road was developed. This international project worked according to two large programs of UNESCO: “The environment surrounding the person, resources of the ground and sea” and “The culture and the future”. In the next years development of the idea of reconstruction and expansion of the opportunities put in the ancient times in the Great Silk Road continued. In 2013 the Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the concept of “A New Silk Road” under the slogan “One Belt – One Road” including the “Economic Belt of the Silk Road” and “Sea Silk Road of the XXI Century” projects. The strategy of “A New Silk Road” included the project of development of the Northern Sea Route. The Northern Sea Route—the major navigable main passing across the seas of Arctic Ocean, connecting the European and Far East ports and also mouths of the navigable Siberian rivers into the unified transport system of the Arctic. The history of the Northern Sea Route began with the first voyages of the Pomors. Development, studying and the description of sea routes of the Russian Arctic continued further. Development of the Arctic navigation promoted the beginning of the industrial development of natural resources of the region. The large-scale industrial development of the Arctic territories began in the 1930s. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 ice breakers played a large role in conducting of northern convoys. The existing ports were specially converted, new polar stations are built and also additional airfields are developed. In post-war years the Arctic navigation gained further development thanks to the commissioning of icebreaking vessels of new classes. The map of the Northern Sea Route on which the objects built in the 1930–1940s are shown is presented in the article. In July, 2017 during the visit to Russia the chairman Xi Jinping with the president V.V. Putin reached the important agreement on development and use of the Arctic Sea Route and creation of the Ice Silk Road, the sea way uniting North America, East Asia and Western Europe. Within the project of “The Ice Silk Road” tankers with production of Yamal LNG for the first time in the history went the Arctic Sea Route without icebreaking maintenance in the summer of 2018 and arrived from the Arctic port Sabbeta to the Chinese port Jiangsu Zhudong. By these flights the beginning of the regular supply of LNG across the Northern Sea Route is opened.

AbstractThe paper explores how the ethos in Slovakia has been shaped and “matured” in the context of the values, principles and norms inherent in the European ethos. The presence of this ethos, including its sources and forms, can be considered in the Slovak historical context to be a moral phenomenon and an integral part of human being, encoded in the moral values held by individuals and society. By seeking out its ties and analysing the way it is intertwined with the evolution of the European ethos, it provides us with the space to understand and resolve many of today’s issues and conflicts in an ethical manner. The author considers moral consciousness to be an important part of the culture of civilization today, which faces the challenge of finding new forms of human coexistence and a life in peace. It attests to the importance of ethics and morality in the life of individual and society, and the utility of ethical reflection in solving moral issues in life and in searching for one’s own way through it.

'Let me give you an analogy; analogies, it is true, decide nothing, but they can make one feel more at home.' -- Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures 72 (1933) This paper emerged from a larger study of Freud's view of culture, which used elements of Freud's own way of proceeding to mount a critique of the elaboration of that view. It is proposed here that the use of analogy is foundational to Freud's procedure in building his model of the mind, rather than just a temporary means to an end, and, crucially, that Freud is himself unaware of both the necessity of the analogical move and also of his desire for it. The creation of the concept of the Freudian psyche is a rhetorical tour de force, a structure made of figures of speech, the chief among which is the analogy. Freud constructs an analogy between culture and mind: what is left of his theory of both if this rhetorical connexion is removed? In the opening pages of one of his last works Freud considers the problem of the interpretation of culture, and he concludes that there too it is a question of getting the patient on the couch: '... one is justified [he writes] in attempting to discover a psychoanalytic -- that is, a genetic explanation ...' -- in that psychoanalysis is a method of explaining the origins of present condition of such things as states of mind, to which culture more generally is analogous (Civilization 65). Understanding may be an end in itself, but there may be a more practical purpose in bringing psychoanalysis to bear: a culture may become sick, neurotic, and psychoanalysis may be able to play a part in understanding the nature of the problem, if not also in treating it. Civilization and Its Discontents concludes with the idea that 'we may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural communities' (144). What Freud has to say about culture can be read, I propose, on a number of levels. The smallest elements which begin to reveal meaning -- which are capable of being differentiated in a meaningful way, and therefore analysed as texts -- are parapraxes and the minute revelations of the psychoanalytic techniques of free association and dream analysis. A second level of text is that produced by a unitary, identified 'author', such as Wilhelm Jensen's Gradiva, or Leonardo da Vinci's Virgin with St Anne. An epoch, such as Freud's Civilization (and its Discontents), and then his view of a species (as in Totem and Taboo), each with its own teleology, form texts of a higher order. My engagement with Freud here is with his method of argument by analogy. On some occasions he makes explicit the extent to which he is dependent on (flexible!) analogies of the description of his method -- as when he writes this in The Question of Lay Analysis: 'In psychology we can only describe things by the help of analogies. There is nothing peculiar in this, it is the case elsewhere as well. But we have constantly to keep changing these analogies, for none of them lasts us long enough. (195) In a key moment in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, he again explicitly uses analogy instead of argument, writing: 'Instead of a discussion, however, I shall bring forward an analogy to deal with the objection' (21). This is a point at which he is dealing with the reason for the forgetting of names, and although he is not yet prepared to indicate what is in his view the precise reason for this (namely: repression), he wishes to persuade his reader to stay with him; and so he inserts a narrative about what we would now call a mugging, an event with just the right combination of violence and yet familiarity to allow readers to accept that such things happen but that the agents are usually unknown. That he is confident of the efficacy of this procedure is indicated by that fact that he uses the same analogy again in the Lecture 3 of the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (40-59). Although Freud uses analogy -- as a comparison between two separate and distinct and different things -- what he is most interested in is primary process. This is a mode of thinking which may be capable of an awareness of the differences between things, but is more interested in their confluences (overdetermination and condensation), and their similarities and ability to replace each other (displacement). I suggest that analogy is actually primary process subjected to 'secondary revision', and that Freud is himself unaware of the source of his recurrent need to use analogy. Consider also the 'Slovakia' example in Lecture 23 of the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in which Freud is extrapolating his division of the mind into the three parts: super-ego, ego and id, the 'three realms, regions, provinces, into which we divide an individual's mental apparatus...' He introduces this in a characteristically persuasive way: 'Let me give you an analogy; analogies, it is true, decide nothing, but they can make one feel more at home' (New Introductory Lectures 72). He then proceeds to a brief description of some of the characteristics of (what is now) Slovakia, in which German, Magyars and Slovaks live, in which there are three kinds of topography and also three groups of industry. He constructs the image partly to demonstrate the complexity of the interrelationships of the parts of the mental apparatus (and partly to have a shot at the powers that at Versailles divided up parts of Europe), and to show that the assignment of distinct names to them tends to obscure the way in which they in fact overlap and interact. However, what the analogy powerfully imports is the 'naturalness', indeed the inevitability, of the division into three. Despite the argument actually being that this division is in fact not clear-cut, it nevertheless implies the necessity of the division. So that his audience is all the more ready the accept the tripartite model of the mind. We could analyse this analogy between the two 'geographies' somewhat in the way that Freud would examine the account of a dream. Firstly, there are the day's residues: in this case his experiences in growing up in this part of Europe together with his reflections on the politics of defining a nation. Then we see the conflation of the two different realms of human experience, political geography and metapsychology; and the displacement of the one set of structures for the other. There is also the overdetermination of the tripartite structures: German, Magyars, Slovaks; hills, plains, lakes; cattle, cereals, fish; superego, ego, id. Finally an instance of secondary revision can be clearly seen in the conclusion of Freud's demonstration. If the partitioning could be neat and clear-cut like this, a Woodrow Wilson would be delighted by it; it would also be convenient for a lecture in a geography lesson. The probability is, however, that you will find less orderliness and more missing, if you travel through the region. ... A few things are naturally as you expected, for fish cannot be caught in the mountains and wine does not grow in the water. Indeed, the picture of the region that you brought with you may on the whole fit the facts; but you will have to put up with deviations in the details. (New Introductory Lectures 73) The implication for my analogy (with dream-analysis) is clearly that there will be a slippage between the different meanings of the images as the process of overdetermination tries to get each to do different work at the same time, and certain elements will have to be refined or retuned, whether in the service of more or less precise relation. A final point might be made, while still on the topic of Slovakia. Freud is, as we have seen, critical to some extent of the political-geographical situation that he receives and describes in his image. The reference to the American president suggests that there might have been a better way to carry out the partition, and certainly events in the region in our own very recent past suggest that this is so. Freud, however, is ultimately accepting of many of the aspects of the picture. He takes the different kinds of primary industry as givens: agriculture, viticulture, and the human culture implied in the national names. The fact that an outsider like Wilson might get it wrong only makes clearer the implication that received political geography is meaningful and in some senses right. This is an example of a cultural unconscious about which Freud does not speak because he cannot. It is not that his assumption about this matter, that which is taken-for-granted, is unthinkable: it is unsayable, something which is outside consciousness because it is so taken-for-granted. This kind of unconscious, which I am calling a kind of cultural unconscious for want of a better term -- and perhaps a notion of the 'non-conscious' might be more accurate -- simply cannot be accommodated by consciousness. Here Freud was appealing to geography to make his point. He far more often appeals to the authority of literature. To give a crude example, it is well known that it was the essay on nature -- thought at one time to be by Goethe -- which is supposed to have been the spur that pricked the side of Freud's intent and actually drove him into what was to become psychoanalysis. So literature not only has an inspirational effect for him, but is also evidence of the interpenetration of Freud's mind -- his way of thinking by analogy and citation -- and the culture of which he is the recipient, and in which he is caught up. If analogy is essential to Freud's theory, rather than just part of its explication (and space has permitted mention of only a few instances) -- if analogy functions as the clasps that hold together the new clothes of the Emperor of Psychoanalysis - what happens when the clasps are removed? References References to the works of Freud in English refer by volume to the Standard Edition (SE): Freud, Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the the Complete Psychological Works. 24 vols. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953-74. Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents. SE 21. (1930.) 59-145. ---. "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 'Gradiva'." SE 9. (1907 [1906].) 1-95. ---. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. SE 15-6. (1916-17.) ---. "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood." SE 11. (1910.) 59-137. ---. Postscript. SE 20. (1927.) 251-8. ---. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. SE 22. (1933.) ---. The Origins of Psychoanalysis. Trans. Eric Mosbacher & James Strachey. Ed. Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud and Ernst Kris. London: Imago; New York: Basic Books, 1950. (1887-1902.) Partly including "A Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895), in SE 1. Freud, Sigmund. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. SE 6. (1901.) ---. "The Question of Lay Analysis." SE 20. (1926.) 177-250. ---. Totem and Taboo. SE 13. (1912-13.) 1-161. Citation reference for this article MLA style: Garry Gillard. "Mind and Culture: Freud and Slovakia." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.2 (2000). [your date of access] <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/freud.php>. Chicago style: Garry Gillard, "Mind and Culture: Freud and Slovakia," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3, no. 2 (2000), <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/freud.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Garry Gillard. (2000) Mind and culture: Freud and Slovakia. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(2). <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/freud.php> ([your date of access]).

There has been a lot of talk about terrorism and exaggeration, between excessive and negligent, as those who are involved in the excess, they have been exaggerated and extremism by the abandonment, and in contrast counter-little. Because one of the parties to one side becomes alienated by the other side, so it became half-truth and half-exaggeration, and between them moderation and mediation. And we found that the greatest delegation to the society and corrupted, and left the most impact, are deviant ideas, which was canceled in the pure Islam of Islam, and these ideas would not have been more harmful if not affected by the intellectual invasion; which is the largest war of thought imposed on us, As a phenomenon? In addition, as a procedural act affecting interested parties? Moreover, why he was not described by nonMuslims. It has become clear to us that the countries that claim peace and democracy, that they represent terrorism to silence the concept of terrorism, making them cover their solution to whom they want for one reason or another, and show the fact of corruption and prejudice to Islam, so invent all the ways and means to fight it, which is only supportive of corruption, Dictatorship, and that in the first place and the last seeks to maintain their interests under any curtain, but it did not accept the curtain based on the Islamic system. As the nation must be aware of the magnitude of the danger of American hegemony globally and Iran regionally, and reveal the triangle of a conspiracy directed towards the Islamic nation, and that conspiracy is only an extension of the old conspiracies suffered by the Muslim community since the dawn of Islam, and the extent of conspiracy suffered by the people Islam as the form of terrorism on them, and the need to recognize the reality of the conflict between civilizations and aimed at ideological rivalry, and integration in this conflict only with an emphasis on the year of stampede between the conflicting parties. And that the American western gendarmes are still following the nation, and the Muslim community is still being deceived by the lies and tricks played against it, and the latest lies and I do not think the latter will be a lie (death to America), although the slogan is actually seen as a policy of loyalty and hostility, Its truth carries deceit and a style of the methods of the apostate scoundrel in our time.

The article analyzes the dynamics of the development of spiritual and moral searches of society in historical retrospect, including identifying current trends and evaluating the transformation of religiosity in the current period under the influence of postmodern ideas. Correlations between changes in fundamental paradigms and changes in the ideological foundations of the functioning of state and legal institutions are revealed. It is determined that each of the four types of society — archaic, traditional, industrial and post-industrial (informational) — has its own specific forms of religiosity that determine the worldview and directly affect the social (state) system. Thus, the early forms of religious beliefs of an archaic society did not create prerequisites for the emergence of a social hierarchy, and, consequently, statehood (which is confirmed by the social practice of preserved archaic societies of our time). The archaic society is gradually replaced by the traditional one, hierarchy, social inequality, Patriarchy appear, political Genesis is carried out, and power is legitimized through religious institutions. It is in traditional societies that polytheism is replaced by monotheism, which promotes (and is used for this purpose as a state ideology) the strengthening of statehood. The state-legal institutions of traditional societies have no alternative but to be sacred. The main form of government of the state is monarchy (theocratic or clerical). The transition to modernity takes place under the slogan of desacralization and rationalization, in the ideological field this is manifested in the formation of “quasi-religions” or secular “religions”: Nazism, communism, liberalism (these ideologies replace God in the public consciousness, Absolute (Ultimate) reality — the ultimate reality, while preserving certain features of the religious: ritual, dogmas, symbolism, meaning-making, mythological, etc.). These ideologies determine the global transformation of the geopolitical picture of the world in the XIX—XX centuries. There is the overthrow of the monarchy (or the transition to parliamentary forms of monarchies), the collapse of empires, the establishment of the Republican form of government as the dominant one, with the choice of the appropriate ideology as the basis for state-legal construction. Spiritual search in modern societies was pushed out of public discourse into the area of personal choice. By the end of the XX — beginning of the XXI century, the West begins processes that can be described as the beginning of the transition from modern to postmodern. The transformation of society’s religiosity is characterized by contradictory trends — the emergence of «hyperreal religions» (parody religions, Internet religions, alternative (non-traditional) religious movements), a return to archaic beliefs (neo-paganism), and the activation of fundamentalism. In the context of globalization and legal integration, these processes directly affect other countries (paradigmally still at the stage of modernity and even pre-modernity), which causes civilizational conflicts and destabilizes international relations. Taking these trends into account, as well as understanding the paradigmatic heterogeneity of both the world as a whole and Russian society, is necessary in the implementation of law-making and management activities, domestic and foreign policy. Acknowledgments: The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 20-011-31235 “Non-traditio­nal religiosity as a form of social activity in the postmo­dern era”.

I. First Brexit, then Trump: Has the past year or so ushered in a “wave” (Weisberg), a “barrage” (Desmond-Harris) or a “deluge” (Sidahmed) of that notoriously noxious affect, hate? It certainly feels that way to those of us identified with progressive social and political causes—those of us troubled, not just by Trump’s recent electoral victory, but by the far-right forces to which that victory has given voice. And yet the questions still hanging over efforts to quantify emotional or affective states leaves the claim that there has been a clear spike in hate moot (Ngai 26; Massumi 136-7; Ahmed, Promise 3-8). So let’s try asking a different question. Has this same period seen a rise, across liberal media platforms, in the rhetorical work of “hate-attribution”? Here, at least, an answer seems in readier reach. For no one given to scrolling distractedly through liberal Anglophone media outlets, from The New York Times, to The Guardian, to Slate, will be unfamiliar with a species of journalism that, in reporting the appalling activities associated with what has become known as the “alt-right” (Main; Wallace-Wells; Gourarie), articulates those activities in the rubric of a calculable uptick in hate itself.Before the U.S. Presidential election, this fledgling journalistic genre was already testing its wings, its first shudderings felt everywhere from Univision anchor Jorge Ramos’s widely publicized documentary, Hate Rising (2016), which explores the rise of white supremacist movements across the South-West U.S, to an edition of Slate’s Trumpcast entitled “The Alt-Right and a Deluge of Hate,” which broached the torment-by-Twitter of left-wing journalist David French. In the wake of the election, and the appalling acts of harassment and intimidation it seemed to authorize, the genre gained further momentum—leading to the New Yorker’s “Hate Is on the Rise After Trump’s Election,” to The Guardian’s “Trump’s Election led to Barrage of Hate,” and to Vox’s “The Wave of Post-Election Hate Reportedly Sweeping the Nation, Explained.” And it still has traction today, judging not just by James King’s recent year-in-review column, “The Year in Hate: From Donald Trump to the Rise of the Alt-Right,” but by Salon’s “A Short History of Hate” which tracks the alt-right’s meteoric 2016 rise to prominence, and the New York Times’ recently launched hate-speech aggregator, “This Week in Hate.”As should already be clear from these brisk, thumbnail accounts of the texts in question, the phenomena alluded to by the titular term “hate” are not instances of hate per se, but rather instances of “hate-speech.” The word “hate,” in other words, is being deployed here not literally, to refer to an emotional state, but metonymically, as a shorthand for “hate-speech”—a by-now widely conventionalized and legally codified parlance originating with the U.N. Declaration to describe “violent or violence-inciting speech or acts that “aim or intend to inflict injury, or incite prejudice or hatred, against persons of groups” because of their ethnic, religious, sexual or social affiliation. And there is no doubt that, beyond the headlines, these articles do incredibly important work, drawing connections between, and drawing attention to, a host of harmful activities associated with the so-called “alt-right”—from a pair of mangled, pretzel-shaped swastikas graffiti-ed in a children’s playground, to acts of harassment, intimidation and violence against women, African-Americans, Latinos, Muslims, Jews, and LGBTQ people, to Trump’s own racist, xenophobic and misogynistic tweets. Yet the fact that an emotion-term like hate is being mobilized across these texts as a metonym for the “alt-right” is no oratorical curio. Rather, it perpetuates a pervasive way of thinking about the relationship between the alt-right (a political phenomenon) and hate (an emotional phenomenon) that should give pause to those of us committed to mining that vein of cultural symptomatology now consigned, across the social sciences and critical humanities, to affect theory. Specifically, these headlines inscribe, in miniature, a kind of micro-assessment, a micro-geography and micro-theory of hate. First, they suggest that, even prior to its incarnation in specific, and dangerous, forms of speech or action, hate is in and of itself anathema, a phenomenon so unquestioningly dangerous that a putative “rise” or “spike” in its net presence provides ample pretext for a news headline. Second, they propose that hate may be localized to a particular social or political group—a group subsisting, unsurprisingly, on that peculiarly contested frontier between the ideological alt-right and the American Midwest. And third, they imply that hate is so indubitably the single most significant source of the xenophobic, racist and sexist activities they go on to describe that it may be casually used as these activities’ lexical proxy. What is crystallizing here, I suggest, is what scholars of rhetoric dub a rhetorical “constellation” (Campbell and Jamieson 332)—a constellation from which hate emerges as, a) inherently problematic, b) localizable to the “alt-right,” and, c) the primary engine of the various activities and expressions we associate with them. This constellation of conventions for thinking about hate and its relationship to the activities of right-wing extremist movement has coalesced into a “genre” we might dub the genre of “hate-attribution.” Yet while it’s far from clear that the genre is an effective one in a political landscape that’s fast becoming a political battleground, it hasn’t appeared by chance. Treating “hate,” then, less as a descriptive “grid of analysis” (Sedgwick 152), than as a rhetorical projectile, this essay opens by interrogating the “hate-attribution” genre’s logic and querying its efficacy. Having done so, it approaches the concept of “alternatives” by asking: how might calling time on the genre help us think differently about both hate itself and about the forces catalyzing, and catalyzed by, Trump’s presidential campaign? II.The rhetorical power of the genre of hate-attribution, of course, isn’t too difficult to pin down. An emotion so thoroughly discredited that its assignment is now in and of itself a term of abuse (see, for example, the O.E.D’s freshly-expanded definition of the noun “hater”), hate is an emotion the Judeo-Christian tradition deems not just responsible for but practically akin to murder (John 3:1). In part as a result of this tradition, hate has proven thoroughly resistant to efforts to elevate it from the status of an expression of a subject’s pestiferous inner life to the status of a polemical response to an object in the world. Indeed, while a great deal of the critical energy amassing under the rubric of “affect theory” has recently been put into recuperating the strategic or diagnostic value of emotions long scorned as irrelevant to oppositional struggle—from irritation and envy, to depression, anger and shame (Ngai; Cvetkovich; Gould; Love)—hate has notably not been among them. In fact, those rare scholarly accounts of affect that do address “hate,” notably Ahmed’s excellent work on right-wing extremist groups in the United Kingdom, display an understandable reluctance to rehabilitate it for progressive thought (Cultural Politics). It should come as no surprise, then, that the genre of “hate-attribution” has a rare rhetorical power. In identifying “hate” as the source of a particular position, gesture or speech-act, we effectively drain said position, gesture or speech-act of political agency or representational power—reducing it from an at-least-potentially polemical action in or response to the world, to the histrionic expression of a reprehensible personhood. Yet because hate’s near-taboo status holds across the ideological and political spectrum, what is less clear is why the genre of hate-attribution has achieved such cachet in the liberal media in particular. The answer, I would argue, lies in the fact that the work of hate-attribution dovetails all too neatly with liberal political theory’s longstanding tendency to laminate its social and civic ideals to affective ideals like “love,” “sympathy,” “compassion,” and, when in a less demonstrative humor, “tolerance”. As Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions has recently shown, this tradition has an impressive philosophical pedigree, running from Aristotle’s philia (16), John Locke’s “toleration” and David Hume’s “sympathy” (69-75), to the twentieth century’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its promotion of “tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups.” And while the labour of what Lauren Berlant calls “liberal sentimentality” (“Poor Eliza”, 636) has never quite died away, it does seem to have found new strength with the emergence of the “intimate public sphere” (Berlant, Queen)—from its recent popular apotheosis in the Clinton campaign’s notorious “Love Trumps Hate” (a slogan in which “love,” unfortunately, came to look a lot like resigned technocratic quietism in the face of ongoing economic and environmental crisis [Zizek]), to its revival as a philosophical project among progressive scholars, many of them under the sway of the so-called “affective turn” (Nussbaum; Hardt; Sandoval; hooks). No surprise, then, that liberalism’s struggle to yoke itself to “love” should have as its eerie double a struggle to locate among its ideological and political enemies an increasingly reified “hate”. And while the examples of this project we’ve touched on so far have hailed from popular media, this set of protocols for thinking about hate and its relationship to the activities of right-wing extremist movements is not unique to media circles. It’s there in political discourse, as in ex-DNC chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s announcement, on MSNBC, that “Americans will unite against [Trump’s] hatred.” And it’s there, too, in academic media studies, from FLOW journal’s November 2016 call for papers inviting respondents to comment, among other things, on “the violence and hatred epitomized by Trump and his supporters,” to the SCMS conference’s invitation to members to participate in a pop-up panel entitled “Responding to Hate, Disenfranchisement and the Loss of the Commons.” Yet while the labor of hate-attribution to which many progressive forces have become attached carries an indisputable rhetorical force, it also has some profound rhetorical flaws. The very same stigma, after all, that makes “hate” such a powerful explanatory grenade to throw also makes it an incredibly tough one to land. As Ahmed’s analysis of the online rhetoric of white supremacist organizations should remind us (Cultural Politics), most groups structured around inciting and promoting violence against women and minorities identify, perversely, not as hate groups, but as movements propelled by the love of race and nation. And while left-wing pundits pronounce “hate” the signature emotion of a racist, misogynist Trump-voting right, supporters of Trump ascribe it, just as routinely, to the so-called “liberal elite,” a group whose mythical avatars—from the so-called “Social Justice Warrior” or “SJW,” to the supercilious Washington politico—are said to brand “ordinary [white, male] Americans” indiscriminately as racist, misogynistic, homophobic buffoons. Thus, for example, The Washington Post’s uncanny, far-right journalistic alter-ego, The Washington Times, dubs the SPLC a “liberal hate group”; the Wikipedia mirror-site, Conservapedia, recasts liberal objections to gun violence as “liberal hate speech” driven by an “irrational aversion to weapons”; while one blood-curdling sub-genre of reportage on Steve Bannon’s crypto-fascist soapbox, Breitbart News, is devoted to denouncing what it calls “ ‘anti-White Racism.’” It’s easy enough, of course, to defend the hate-attribution genre’s liberal incarnations while dismissing its right-wing variants as cynical, opportunistic shams, as Ahmed does (Cultural Politics)—thereby re-establishing the wellspring of hate where we are most comfortable locating it: among our political others. Yet to do so seems, in some sense, to perpetuate a familiar volley of hate-attribution. And to the extent that, as many media scholars have shown (Philips; Reed; Tett; Turow), our digital, networked political landscape is in danger of being reduced to a silo-ed discursive battleground, the ritual exchange of terminological grenades that everyone seems eager to propel across ideological lines, but that no one, understandably, seems willing to pick up, seems counter-productive to say the least.Even beyond the genre’s ultimate ineffectiveness, what should strike anyone used to reflecting on affect is how little justice it does to the ubiquity and intricacy of “hate” as an affective phenomenon. Hate is not and cannot be the exclusive property or preserve of one side of the political spectrum. One doesn’t have to stretch one’s critical faculties too far to see the extent to which the genre of hate-attribution participates in the emotional ballistics it condemns or seeks to redress. While trafficking in a relatively simple hate-paradigm (as a subjective emotional state that may be isolated to a particular person or group), the genre itself incarnates a more complex, socially dynamic model of hate in which the emotion operates through logics of projection perhaps best outlined by Freud. In the “hate-attribution” genre, that is, hate—like those equally abjected categories “sentimentality,” “worldliness” or “knowingness” broached by Sedgwick in her bravura analyses of “scapegoating attribution” (150-158)—finds its clearest expression in and through the labor of its own adscription. And it should come as no surprise that an emotion so widely devalued, where it is not openly prohibited, might also find expression in less overt form.Yet to say as much is by no means to discredit the genre. As legal scholar Jeremy Waldron has recently pointed out, there’s no particular reason why “the passions and emotions that lie behind a particular speech act” (34)—even up to and including hate—should devalue the speech acts they rouse. On the contrary, to pin the despicable and damaging activities of the so-called “alt right” on “hate” is, if anything, to do an injustice to a rich and complex emotion that can be as generative as it can be destructive. As Freud suggests in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” for example, hate may be the very seed of love, since the forms of “social feeling” (121) celebrated under the liberal rubric of “tolerance,” “love,” and “compassion,” are grounded in “the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into a positively-toned tie in the nature of an identification” (121; italics mine). Indeed, Freud projects this same argument across a larger, historical canvas in Civilization and its Discontents, which contends that it is in our very struggle to combat our “aggressive instincts” that human communities have developed “methods intended to incite people into identifications and aim-inhibited relationships of love” (31). For Freud, that is, the practice of love is a function of ongoing efforts to see hate harnessed, commuted and transformed. III.What might it mean, then, to call time on this round of hate-attribution? What sort of “alternatives” might emerge when we abandon the assumption that political engagement entails a “struggle over who has the right to declare themselves as acting out of love” (Ahmed, Cultural Politics 131), and thus, by that same token, a struggle over the exact location and source of hate? One boon, I suggest, is the license it gives those of us on the progressive left to simply own our own hate. There’s little doubt that reframing the dangerous and destructive forms of speech fomented by Trump’s campaign, not as eruptions of hate, or even as “hate-speech,” but as speech we hate would be more consistent with what once seemed affect theory’s first commandment: to take our own affective temperature before launching headlong into critical analysis. After all, when Lauren Berlant (“Trump”) takes a stab at economist Paul Krugman’s cautions against “the Danger of Political Emotions” with the timely reminder that “all the messages are emotional,” the “messages” she’s pointing to aren’t just those of our political others, they’re ours; and the “emotions” she’s pointing to aren’t just the evacuated, insouciant versions of love championed by the Clinton campaign, they’re of the messier, or as Ngai might put it, “uglier” (2) variety—from shame, depression and anger, to, yes, I want to insist, hate.By way of jump-starting this program of hate-avowal, then, let me just say it: this essay was animated, in part, by a certain kind of hate. The social critic in me hates the breathtaking simplification of the complex social, economic and emotional forces animating Trump voters that seem to actuate some liberal commentary; the psychologist in me hates the self-mystification palpable in the left’s insistence on projecting and thus disowning its own (often very well justified) aggressions; and the human being in me, hating the kind of toxic speech to which Trump’s campaign has given rise, wishes to be able to openly declare that hatred. Among its other effects, hate is characterized by hypervigilance for lapses or failings in an object it deems problematic, a hypervigilance that—sometimes—animates analysis (Zeki and Romoya). In this sense, “hate” seems entitled to a comfortable place in the ranks of what Nick Salvato has recently dubbed criticism’s creative “obstructions”—phenomena that, while “routinely identified as detriments” to critical inquiry, may also “form the basis for … critical thinking” (1).Yet while one boon associated with this disclosure might be a welcome intellectual honesty, a more significant boon, I’d argue, is what getting this disclosure out of the way might leave room for. Opting out of the game of hurling “hate” back and forth across a super-charged political arena, that is, we might devote our column inches and Facebook posts to the less sensational but more productive task of systematically challenging the specious claims, and documenting the damaging effects, of a species of utterance (Butler; Matsuda; Waldron) we’ve grown used to simply descrying as pure, distilled “hate”. And we also might do something else. Relieved of the confident conviction that we can track “Trumpism” to a spontaneous outbreak of a single, localizable emotion, we might be able to offer a fuller account of the economic, social, political and affective forces that energize it. Certainly, hate plays a part here—although the process by which, as Isabelle Stengers puts it, affect “make[s] present, vivid and mattering … a worldly world” (371) demands that we scrutinize that hate as a syndrome, rather than simply moralize it as a sin, addressing its mainsprings in a moment marked by the nerve-fraying and life-fraying effects of what has become known across the social sciences and critical humanities as conditions of social and economic “precarity” (Muehlebach; Neil and Rossiter; Stewart).But perhaps hate’s not the only emotion tucked away under the hood. Here’s something affect theory knows today: affect moves not, as more traditional theorists of political emotion have it, “unambiguously and predictably from one’s cognitive processing,” but in ways that are messy, muddled and indirect (Gould 24). That form of speech is speech we hate. But it may not be “hate speech.” That crime is a crime we hate. But it may not be a “hate-crime.” One of the critical tactics we might crib from Berlant’s work in Cruel Optimism is that of decoding and decrypting, in even the most hateful acts, an instance of what Berlant, herself optimistically, calls “optimism.” For Berlant, after all, optimism is very often cruel, attaching itself, as it seems to have done in 2016, to scenes, objects and people that, while ultimately destined to “imped[e] the aim that brought [it to them] initially,” nevertheless came to seem, to a good portion of the electorate, the only available exponent of that classic good-life genre, “the change that’s gonna come” (“Trump” 1-2) at a moment when the Democratic party’s primary campaign promise was more of the free-market same. 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