Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT

Contents

Journal articles
Books
Book chapters
Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 3 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT"

1

Eckes, Alfred E. "Revisiting Smoot-Hawley." Journal of Policy History 7, no. 3 (1995): 295–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s089803060000381x.

Full text

Abstract:

Reed Smoot and Willis Hawley are two deceased members of Congress the world loves to hate. Their principal legislative achievement, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, continues to evoke such disapproving adjectives as “infamous” and “notorious.” To most Americans, that act, which incidentally remains the fundamental tariff law of the U.S., conjures up images of rising tariff barriers, beggar-thy-neighbor nationalism, and ruinous trade wars.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Hansen, John Mark. "Choosing Sides: The Creation of an Agricultural Policy Network in Congress, 1919–1932." Studies in American Political Development 2 (1987): 183–229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x00000456.

Full text

Abstract:

In 1930, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the last of the major tariff bills that redistributed millions of dollars from consumers to domestic manufacturers. The Smoot-Hawley bill, E. E. Schattschneider observed, arose not from a process that was open and attentive to all but from “a free private enterprise in pressure politics which administered itself”, a process accessible only to protected industrialists and their congressional and bureaucratic allies. The outlines of public policy, he concluded, mirrored the membership of this “private enterprise”: “The nature of public policy is the result of ‘effective demands’ upon the government”.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Hansen, John Mark. "Choosing Sides: The Creation of an Agricultural Policy Network in Congress, 1919–1932." Studies in American Political Development 2 (1987): 183–229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x00001759.

Full text

Abstract:

In 1930, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the last of the major tariff bills that redistributed millions of dollars from consumers to domestic manufacturers. The Smoot-Hawley bill, E. E. Schattschneider observed, arose not from a process that was open and attentive to all but from “a free private enterprise in pressure politics which administered itself”, a process accessible only to protected industrialists and their congressional and bureaucratic allies. The outlines of public policy, he concluded, mirrored the membership of this “private enterprise”: “The nature of public policy is the result of ‘effective demands’ upon the government”.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Vasilyev, Alexander. "The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of the 1930 as the classic example of a near-sided economic policy of the U.S. government during the Great Depression." Исторический журнал: научные исследования, no. 1 (January 2021): 22–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2021.1.34632.

Full text

Abstract:

The object of this research is the antirecession policy of the United States during the Great Depression. The subject of this research The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, process of its adoption, and consequences. Special attention is given to the history of increase of tariffs on imported goods. The legislative bill drafted by congressmen R. Smoot and W. Hawley is considered one of the unsuccessful economic reforms in the history of the United States. The tax reform was conceived before the recession and was called to protect local farmers from excess of cheap foreign agricultural products on American markets. However, there was no substantial benefit from the increased tariffs on imports. Most historians find that this measure worsened the position of the lower classes of the population. There is also an opposing opinion that the legislation did not play a serious role in deepening of the recession. The article analyzes the extent of the impact of this legislation in the U.S. during the 1930s. The scientific novelty of this research consists in utilization of the transcripts of addresses of the members of U.S. Congress as the sources for research of the process of passing the legislation, as well as press materials in order to examine opinions on the legislative bill and consequences of increased tariffs. It is established that the adoption of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act had negative consequences for the economy, although not as severe as commonly cited. The impact of the new law was not as substantial on the background of the ongoing Great Depression. Passing of the protection measures took place almost simultaneously with other countries, with some countries raising the tariffs before the United States. The tax reform greatly affected the political situation in the United States, playing its role in diminishing the ratings of the President and the Republican Party.&nbsp;

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Haggard, Stephan. "The institutional foundations of hegemony: explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934." International Organization 42, no. 1 (1988): 91–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300007141.

Full text

Abstract:

In 1930, Congress approved the highly restrictive Smoot–Hawley tariff, the textbook case of pressure group politics run amok. Four years later, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), surrendering much of its tariff-making authority to a policy process in which internationalists had increasing influence. While the United States had used reciprocity to expand exports before, the stick of discriminatory treatment took precedence over the carrot of liberalizing concessions. With the transfer of tariff-making authority to the executive, the United States could make credible commitments and thus exploit its market power to liberalize international trade. Despite later modifications, the RTAA set the fundamental institutional framework for trade politics.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Cupitt, Richard T., and Euel Elliott. "SCHATTSCHNEIDER REVISITED: SENATE VOTING ON THE SMOOT-HAWLEY TARIFF ACT OF 1930." Economics & Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 187–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00096.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Koyama, Kumiko. "The Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: Why Did the President Sign the Bill?" Journal of Policy History 21, no. 2 (2009): 163–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030609090071.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Irwin, Douglas A. "Trade Policy in American Economic History." Annual Review of Economics 12, no. 1 (2020): 23–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-070119-024409.

Full text

Abstract:

This article reviews the broad changes in US trade policy over the course of the nation's history. Import tariffs have been the main instrument of trade policy and have had three main purposes: to raise revenue for the government, to restrict imports and protect domestic producers from foreign competition, and to reach reciprocity agreements that reduce trade barriers. Each of these three objectives—revenue, restriction, and reciprocity—was predominant in one of three consecutive periods in history. The political economy of these tariffs has been driven by the location of trade-related economic interests in different regions and the political power of those regions in Congress. The review also addresses the impact of trade policies on the US economy, such as the welfare costs of tariffs, the role of protectionism in fostering US industrialization, and the relationship between the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act and the Great Depression of the 1930s.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Daynes, Byron W., and Glen Sussman. "Rejoinder to Passé-Smith." American Review of Politics 15 (April 1, 1994): 99–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.1994.15.0.99-103.

Full text

Abstract:

We appreciate the careful reading that Professor John Passe-Smith has given our article, and generally value his perspectives. Moreover, after a thorough reading of his criticisms, we have concluded that our respective understandings of fast tracking may not be as far removed from one another as first might appear. All three of us, for instance, could probably agree that: (1) the two institutions (President and Congress) brought together by fast tracking share different perspectives on trade policy, as most clearly exhibited in the 1930s with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (Schattschneider 1935); (2) fast tracking encourages a distinct relationship between these institutions, dissimilar from treaty making and the executive agreement; and (3) we need to examine some empirical evidence supporting our assertion that fast tracking makes it difficult for members of Congress to represent and speak for their constituents on trade matters.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Beaudreau, Bernard C. "Electrification, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and the Decline in Investment Expenditure in 1931–1932: Testing the Excess-Capacity Hypothesis." International Advances in Economic Research 23, no. 3 (2017): 295–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11294-017-9642-z.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT"

1

Irwin, Douglas A. The Smoot-Hawley tariff: A quantitative assessment. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Peddling protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. Princeton University Press, 2011.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Irwin, Douglas A. Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Irwin, Douglas A. From Smoot-Hawley to reciprocal trade agreements: Changing the course of U.S. trade policy in the 1930s. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Irwin, Douglas A. Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. Princeton University Press, 2017.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Irwin, Douglas A., and Douglas Irwin. Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. Princeton University Press, 2011.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. Princeton University Press, 2017.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Irwin, Douglas A. Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. Princeton University Press, 2011.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT"

1

Irwin, Douglas A. "Aftermath and Legacy." In Peddling Protectionism. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691150321.003.0005.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter assesses the aftermath and legacy of the Smoot–Hawley tariff. Smoot–Hawley gave congressional trade policy making a bad name that persists to this day. Those who enacted it promised economic growth and prosperity, but it was followed instead by plummeting exports and depression. The Tariff Act of 1930, the formal name of the Smoot–Hawley tariff, was the last general tariff revision undertaken by Congress. Four years later, Congress ushered in a new era of U.S. trade policy by delegating power to the president to negotiate agreements with other countries to reduce tariffs. This approach gave the United States its current system, embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization. Yet the lessons of Smoot–Hawley continue to be debated whenever trade policy issues rise to the top of the national agenda.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Beaudreau, Bernard C. "Reexamining the Origins of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act." In Research in Economic History. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/s0363-326820170000033001.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Irwin, Douglas A. "Economic Consequences." In Peddling Protectionism. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691150321.003.0003.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter addresses the economic effects of the Smoot–Hawley tariff. The popular perception is that the tariff raised import duties to record levels and helped cause the Great Depression. In fact, the legislated tariff increase was much smaller than commonly imagined, although it still managed to erase 15 percent of America's imports of dutiable goods upon impact. It was the deflation of prices that accompanied the Great Depression that pushed the tariff to near record levels, restricting trade even more. Furthermore, most economic historians do not believe that the Smoot–Hawley tariff played a large role in the macroeconomic contraction experienced during the Depression. Instead, a series of monetary and financial shocks pushed the economy into a downward spiral, with the tariff playing a secondary role.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Irwin, Douglas A. "Introduction." In Peddling Protectionism. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691150321.003.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

This introductory chapter discusses the background of the Smoot–Hawley tariff, which President Herbert Hoover signed into law on June 17, 1930. The Smoot–Hawley tariff ranks among the most infamous pieces of congressional legislation of the twentieth century. Although imports were not surging into the country or causing any great problem for the economy, Congress raised tariffs on imported goods with the intention of protecting farmers and manufacturers from what little foreign competition they faced. In doing so, they did not follow any economic logic or consider the interests of consumers and exporters who would be harmed by the tariffs. Instead, they engaged in the most blatant form of pork-barrel politics, catering to the demands of special interests that wanted to limit imports. Not surprisingly, several foreign countries retaliated by imposing duties on U.S. exports. These trade restrictions spread just as the world economy was beginning to sink into a depression. The contribution of the Smoot–Hawley tariff to the collapse of trade and the Great Depression of the 1930s has been debated ever since.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

"The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff." In International Political Economy. Routledge, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203518588-9.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Irwin, Douglas A. "Foreign Retaliation." In Peddling Protectionism. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691150321.003.0004.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter examines at the international reaction to the Smoot–Hawley tariff. The popular perception is that the tariff backfired by triggering retaliation against U.S. exports and the spread of trade blocs that discriminated against the United States, inflicting long-term damage for U.S. commercial and foreign policy interests. This perception is largely accurate. While countries did not broadcast that they were retaliating against the United States for imposing the tariff, the nature and timing of the measures they took strongly suggest that was the primary motivation. A month after the Smoot–Hawley tariff was imposed, a pro-American Liberal government in Canada lost a general election to the pro-British Conservatives, who erected trade barriers designed to shift Canada's imports from the United States to Britain. Other countries discriminated against U.S. exports as well, and the nation's share of world trade fell sharply.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

"Appendix: The Economists’ Statement against the Smoot-Hawley Tariff." In Peddling Protectionism. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400888429-007.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

"Appendix The Economists’ Statement against the Smoot-Hawley Tariff." In Peddling Protectionism. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400838394-006.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Irwin, Douglas A. "Domestic Politics." In Peddling Protectionism. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691150321.003.0002.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter focuses on the long and politically divisive passage of the Smoot–Hawley tariff through Congress. The popular perception is that Congress enacted a higher tariff because it caved in to the demands of special interest groups. In fact, the tariff did not originate in response to demands by politically powerful industries facing competition from imports, but was offered up by Republican politicians who wanted to appease farmers during the presidential election campaign in 1928. The tariff was initiated near a business cycle peak when business was good, not in the midst of the Depression, and it was poorly suited to help farmers, many of whom depended on exports to foreign markets. Of course, the manner in which Congress handled the tariff gave rise to its association with special interest lobbying and logrolling (vote trading among members of Congress), a perception that is wholly accurate.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "SMOOT HAWLEY TARIFF ACT"

1

Irwin, Douglas. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5509.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Eichengreen, Barry. The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2001.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Bond, Eric, Mario Crucini, Tristan Potter, and Joel Rodrigue. Misallocation and Productivity Effects of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18034.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Irwin, Douglas, and Randall Kroszner. Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5510.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!