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1
Kenney, Jeffrey T. "The New Politics of Movement Activism." Nova Religio 16, no. 3 (February 1, 2013): 95–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nr.2013.16.3.95.
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This paper examines the challenges facing the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt as it negotiates the democratic opening of the Arab spring. An Islamist movement with an established ideological track record, the Society of Muslim Brothers has played a prominent role in Egyptian society for over eighty years. It has now emerged as a major political faction, but its Islamist values and goals may conflict with the democratic politics to which it has committed. Compromise is not new to the Society of Muslim Brothers; it has survived as a movement by doing so. Working on behalf of the Islamist cause in the streets, however, is vastly different than representing an entire nation in the halls of power. Now the Society of Muslim Brothers must decide whether to reinterpret its Islamist agenda for the good of the polity or reinterpret democracy for narrow movement interests.
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Larise, Dunja. "Civil Society in the Political Thinking of European Muslim Brothers." Journal of Religion in Europe 5, no. 2 (2012): 245–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187489212x639217.
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It is generally assumed that the European Muslim brothers derive their concepts of state and society primarily from the traditional Islamic political theory that originated in the historical context of the Muslim Middle East. In contrast, this article asserts the hitherto scantily analyzed influence of liberal political theory, especially its idea of civil society, in the evolution of the political and social theory of the European Muslim Brotherhood within the context of the Muslim minority position in Europe. The article identifies the tendency of the European Muslim brotherhood towards the multiculturalist communitarian model of political and social accommodation, and does this by tracing the history of the conceptual interconnectedness between modern Islamic and liberal concepts of civil society as a privileged space of political action in the absence of realistic prospects for the seizure of state power.
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Weismann, Itzchak. "Framing a Modern Umma." Sociology of Islam 3, no. 3-4 (February 2, 2015): 146–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00303008.
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This article’s point of departure is that da‘wa – the preaching or call to Islam – rather than jihad constitutes the backbone of modern organized Islamic action. The Society of the Muslim Brothers made it the essence of its mission since its foundation in 1928, turning its main thrust inwards, toward the Muslims themselves. Focusing on its processes of framing within the social movement theory approach, the essay analyzes three generations of Muslim Brothers and related Islamist thinkers in three concentric geographical circles: Banna, the Egyptian founding father, who strove to re-Islamize society of Christian missionary and Western secular materialism; his moderate successors such as Sa‘id Hawwa and Fathi Yakan, who struggled to overcome the double challenge of the ordeal they suffered by the Arab authoritarian regimes and of Sayyid Qutb’s radical response; and the contemporary Islamic thinkers Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Tariq Ramadan, who seek to remold it as a dialogue and example in the Western and global environments. I argue that this resilience of the Muslim Brotherhood’s da‘wa is an important key to its survival and to the viability of its ongoing project of framing the modern umma.
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Michael, Marc Aziz. "The politics of rurbanization and The Egyptian society of the Muslim Brothers." Political Geography 72 (June 2019): 99–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.04.005.
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El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah M. "Jihadia Education and the Society of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers: 1928‐49." Journal of Beliefs & Values 21, no. 2 (October 2000): 213–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713675500.
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Garipova, Rozaliya. "Muslim Female Religious Authority in Russia: How Mukhlisa Bubi Became the First Female Qāḍī in the Modern Muslim World." Die Welt des Islams 57, no. 2 (June 23, 2017): 135–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700607-00572p01.
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On 11 May 1917, the participants of the All-Russia Muslim Congress elected a woman, Mukhlisa Bubi, as a qāḍī (a Muslim judge) to the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia. Granting legal authority to a woman at a central religious institution was unprecedented in the Muslim world. This article explores how this election was possible in Russia and suggests that it was the outcome of several factors. First, Muslim women of the Volga-Ural region already occupied a well-established place in traditional Muslim education, and many women were part of the Islamic scholarly culture. Second, modernist (Jadīd) religious scholars and intellectuals had brought up the issue of women education and female schooling, and supported the formation of a network of young women who made new claims about women’s education, rights, and active public stance in serving the nation. Among these were Bubi’s brothers. Third, the Russian revolutionary atmosphere worked as a catalyst for promoting the claims of women activists and provided the Jadīds the opportunity to take over the authority at the Central Spiritual Administration. Finally, Mukhlisa’s election seems to be a compromise between conservative and feminist/liberal groups in the society, and seems to have therefore been acceptable to most male congress delegates.
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Hamdani, Fauzan. "التعددية بين الواقعية الاجتماعية والتيارات الفكرية الفلسفية." Al-Fikra : Jurnal Ilmiah Keislaman 4, no. 2 (July 28, 2017): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.24014/af.v4i2.3762.
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The phenomenon of plurality has been found since early establishment of human society. Islam acknowledged its existence and necessity as a social reality, because Allah never creates human being as a prototype that was precisely same with the other. Islam taught its adherents to hold peaceful life beside other religion adherents. The Muslims, for centuries, treated the non-Muslim as their brothers as well as the creature of God. There no prohibition to associate with the non-Muslims as long as it is no connection with the ritual affairs. It was decided by the Prophet an as contained in the Madina Islamic constitution. Peaceful life of neighborhood with the non-Muslims had been held since the establishment of the Islamic State in Madina. Thus, the plurality is not a new problem. In secular globalization era, the West makes pluralism as a philosophical or political-ideological current. Their assert that all religions are same, so that there is no religion which is righter than the other. This is the view that Islam rejects. A Muslim that truly believes in and prides his religion, is of course very confident in Islam as only pleasant religion of Allah. Nevertheless, this case will not make the relationship between man to man defective. The Muslim wherever can constantly live neighborly peacefully with the non-Muslims. This took place since the establishment of Islamic State in Madina.
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Levy, Ran A. "The Idea of jihād and Its Evolution: Ḥasan al-Bannā and the Society of the Muslim Brothers." Die Welt des Islams 54, no. 2 (August 24, 2014): 139–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700607-00542p01.
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This article aims to present the evolution of jihād in Ḥasan al-Bannā’s thought and writings throughout the 1930s, the first decade of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. While in the early years of the Society al-Bannā gave jihād a moderate interpretation, the idea assumed a different, more militant one during the latter half of the 1930s. This change corresponded with and reflected a transformation that the Society itself experienced; from a developing socio-religious Society to one that was intertwined with Egyptian politics and won the support of the masses. This analysis revolves around two rasāʾil written by al-Bannā during this formative period of his Society – Daʿwatunā and Risālat al-Jihād.
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Al-Sudairi, Mohammed Turki A. "Adhering to the Ways of Our Western Brothers." Sociology of Islam 4, no. 1-2 (April 15, 2016): 27–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00402007.
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This paper attempts to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Chinese Salafism. The paper traces, on the basis of a historical approach, the ways in which Wahhabi influences – doctrinal, ritual, and financial - have been transmitted into China since the late 19th century. It focuses specifically on the channels that had emerged following the 1970s and which have facilitated the spread of these influences including the Hajj, the impact of the Saudi-Chinese diaspora, the work of Saudi organizations and preachers operating within China, and study opportunities in the Kingdom. The paper argues that these influences have led to the strengthening of Salafisation tendencies within Muslim Chinese society on the one hand, and intensifying fragmentary pressures within Chinese Salafism on the other.
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Zollner, Barbara. "PRISON TALK: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S INTERNAL STRUGGLE DURING GAMAL ABDEL NASSER'S PERSECUTION, 1954 TO 1971." International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 3 (August 2007): 411–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743807070535.
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These words, which were written by the unnamed editor of the book Duʿat la Qudat (Preachers Not Judges), summarize the Society of the Muslim Brothers' (Jamʿiyya al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) prison discourse in the late 1960s. The writer claims that once the organization became aware that radical ideas had surfaced in its midst, it objected to these ideas, even as it lived through the very context of their germination, namely Gamal Abdel Nasser's prisons.
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Karbal, Mohamed. "Western Scholarship and the Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World." American Journal of Islam and Society 10, no. 1 (April 1, 1993): 49–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v10i1.2523.
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During the last two decades, the politics of certain Arab countrieshave been influenced by various Islamic groups. Some of these groupshave expressed their dissatisfaction with the performances of theirgovernments by Using the available political channels to seek change;others have resorted to violence. Armed protests have taken the form ofbombings, assassinations, and mass demonstrations.Suicide attacks and armed struggle took place against Israeli, American,and French forces in Lebanon (1982-83). President Sadat of Egyptwas assassinated in 1981 by Egyptian military pemnnel who were membersof an Islamic movement. Another armed struggle against the Syrianregime was initiated by the Syrian Islamic Front in 1976-82. Numerousdemonsttations against the governments of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisiatook place during the 1980s.Other Muslim groups attempted to participate in the decision-makingprocess in their countries. The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt encouragedits prominent members to run for election to the Egyptian Parliament.However, the Society was not considered a legal party accordingto Egyptian law. The Wafd, a legitimate party, allowed the Society ofMuslim Brothers to campaign under their banner. As a result, membersof the Society voted in accordance with their ideological and political beliefsrather than the Wafd party line. In Jordan, the Society of MuslimBrothem campaigned as an independent party during the 1988 electionsand won twenty percent of the seats.Due to the Arab countries’ economic and strategic importance, variousgovemments, scholars, and private and public organizations have paid closeattention to these incidents. In an attempt to understand this phenomenon,academic conventions have been held, books and articles have been published,and gmnts have been awarded for research. Western and Arabscholars have described it with such labels as Islamic fundamentalism,revivalism, awakening, reformism, resurgence , renewal, militancy, or simply ...
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Fauzi, Achmad Fauzi. "Internalisasi Nilai-Nilai Multikultural Melalui Budaya Nyama Beraya Pada Masyarakat Muslim Pegayaman." Al-Mada: Jurnal Agama, Sosial, dan Budaya 2, no. 1 (February 14, 2019): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.31538/almada.v2i1.220.
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Nyama Culture is a culture that encourages people to have tolerance attitudes and behaviors for differences because they see others as their own brothers. The form of Nyama culture in Pegayaman is realized by acculturation of local religious and cultural traditions such as the tradition of crossing or the day of cutting off large religious holiday animals such as Eid al-Fitr, Maulid Nabi, Eid al-Adha and several other big celebrations. Where in every celebration of the big day Muslims continue to preserve their ancestral culture, namely Ngejot or provide various types of food to Nyama Hindu. The discussion of this study is 1) The existence of Nyama Beraya culture is influenced by: historical background, cultural acculturation, community cohesiveness, openness of society, Islamic religious ideology. 2) The process of internalizing multicultural values through the culture of Nyama Beraya in Muslim communities pegayaman through three stages, namely: planting, practice and appreciation. 3) The strategy of internalizing multicultural values through the culture of Nyama Beraya in Muslim communities pegayaman consists of: free strategies, traditional strategies and transinternal strategies. 4) The impact of the internalization of multicultural values through the culture of Nyama Beraya in Muslim communities pegayaman includes: no conflict, high spirit of knitting unity and preventing radicalism, growing togetherness, high enthusiasm of the community to maintain the tradition and the friendly welcome of the community.
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Pusceddu, Antonio Maria. "Local Brothers, National Enemies: Representations of Religious Otherness in Post-Ottoman Epirus (Greece)." Oriente Moderno 93, no. 2 (2013): 598–622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22138617-12340035.
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Abstract The paper presents a general overview of an ongoing research on representations of multi-religious Epirote society in local textual narratives. Aim of the paper is to explore the interplay between the Greek nationalistic script of anti-Muslim discourses and the local narratives of the Ottoman past. The focus is on the objectification of local memories in textual narratives and how this process has been affected by the diglossic relationships between oral and written Greek, which favoured a textual re-elaboration of local memories through the lens of dominant national narratives. It is argued that the analysis of ‘marginal texts’ in ‘marginal contexts’ can provide a useful ground to reflect on the complexities implied in the reshaping of the Ottoman past and the multi-religious character of Ottoman Balkan society, caught in between the imperatives of national narratives and the selective processes of local memories.
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Salakory, Revaldo Pravasta Julian Mb, Izak Yohan Matriks Lattu, and Rama Tulus Pilakoannu. "Teong Negeri: Sentralitas Folklore Nama Lokal Komunitas dalam Jejaring Sosio-Kultural Islam Kristen di Maluku." Jurnal Antropologi: Isu-Isu Sosial Budaya 22, no. 1 (May 31, 2020): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.25077/jantro.v22.n1.p70-80.2020.
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This article analysis about Teong Negeri has folklore centrality of community local name of Muslim-Christian socio-cultural network in Maluku. This study is qualitative research. Data were collected through interviews, documentary studies an observation. Methods analysis employed was descriptive qualitative. In the folklore of the village Wassu of Erihatu Samasuru (Christian), it has pela of the village of Haya Nakajarimau (Muslim) which means leader (older brother) for his three brothers, the village of Hatu Silalou (Christian) and the village of Tehua Lounusa Amalatu (Muslim). Communal narratives bind and become a link to give spirit to identity because society listens to local stories about Teong Negeri that have strong meanings, believing in each other. The four villages, in central Maluku, which are Wassu, Haya, Hatu, and Tehua, use the Teong Negeri symbol as an identity to maintain relations of kinship bond. The network that was built was challenged when the religious communal conflict happened, but the spirit towards the culture was always unheld. Teong Negeri became a symbol of central identity towards the traditional village that was able to regulate the socio-cultural system of every village in Maluku. not only for every community that has a bond of brotherhood or ethnicity. However, it becomes a universal symbol when, as a socio-cultural capital that is able to bridge the community from outside (buton migrants) based on cross-generation dialogue carried out by early generations of indigenous Maluku people with Buton migrants (migrants) in Maluku in order to have knowledge about the relationship harmonious.
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Weismann, Itzchak. "THE POLITICS OF POPULAR RELIGION: SUFIS, SALAFIS, AND MUSLIM BROTHERS IN 20TH-CENTURY HAMAH." International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 1 (February 2005): 39–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002074380505004x.
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With the advent of the 20th century, Sufism found itself under increasing attack in many parts of the Muslim world. In previous centuries, mystical movements had played a prominent role in the struggle for the revival of Islam and occasionally, where governments were weak or nonexistent, also in actual resistance to European encroachment. In the wake of the increasing consolidation of the state and the spread of Western rationalism, however, Sufis came to be regarded as a major cause of the so-called decline of Islam and an obstacle to its adaptation. In the Arab world, this anti–Sufi feeling was generally associated with the Salafiyya trend. The Salafi call for a return to the example of the forefathers (al-salaf al-**sdotu**āli**hdotu**) amounted to a discrediting of latter-day tradition, which was described as cherishing mystical superstition as well as scholarly stagnation and political quietism. Under the burden of this critique, and as a response to the general expansion of education and literacy, Sufism has been forced to assimilate new ideas and to make room for a new form of organization; the populist Islamic association. These developments culminated in the establishment of the Society of the Muslim Brothers.
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Palamar, Antonіі. "The Influence of Religion on the Political Situation in Egypt in 2011–2013: "Political Islam" and "Islamic Fundamentalism"." Grani 24, no. 1 (January 31, 2021): 58–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/172106.
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The influence of religion on politics is inherent not only to the Islamic world, however, none of political theorist should ignore the role of Islam in Muslims’ public life, its impact on the policies of Muslim nations and the global geopolitical situation. Due to its historical uniqueness Modern Islam is not only a religion but also a way of life for the vast majority of Muslims and the basis of their civilizational and even national self-identification. Therefore, the role of religion in the Muslim world is different to that of countries, mostly populated by Christians, as Christianity is legally separated from the system of public administration in European countries. Islam, on the other hand, regulates not only the sociocultural sphere of society, including human relations, but also significantly affects the socio-political life of many Muslim countries, where Islamist movements have now become the major part this sphere.In Egypt, where authoritarian secular regime of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown during the revolution, Islamists took the lead in the protest movement, won the first democratic elections and used the opportunity to lead the country after nearly 60 years of underground activity. This paper examines the influence of the religious factor on the change of Egypt’s political regime in 2011-2013 by conceptualizing the terms of “political Islam” and “Islamic fundamentalism.” The author concludes that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party should not be defined as “fundamentalists” because: 1. they don’t try to return to a “righteous caliphate,” Sharia, and a literal perception of the sacred texts; 2. the Brothers could not be viewed as the most conservative force among Islamists, while Salafists are properly rightly considered to be; 3. the association is considered as a part of moderate Islamism, an ideology that does not mandate any the use of armed methods of struggle. At the same time, the author argues that owing to the fact that Egyptian “Muslim Brotherhood” adhered to moderate Islamism as an ideological party basis, it became a decisive reason that provided them a venue at the top tier of the government in 2011-2013.
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Weismann, Itzchak. "A Perverted Balance: Modern Salafism between Reform and Jihād*." Die Welt des Islams 57, no. 1 (March 29, 2017): 33–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700607-00571p04.
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This article argues that there are structural affinities and continuities between the late nineteenth-century modernist reformers and today’s quietist, political, and jihādī Salafī factions. Salafism refers to the basic theological-ideological formation that postulates a return to pristine Islam to overcome tradition and bring regeneration. The Salafī balance between authenticity and modernization promoted by enlightened religious intellectuals in the late Ottoman period was shattered by the events of World War I and its aftermath. This resulted in its bifurcation between conservatives, who adopted literalist and xenophobic Wahhābī positions, and modernists, primarily the Muslim Brothers, who employed innovative means in their religio-political struggle to re-Islamize society and oust colonialism. The Salafī balance was reconstructed after independence on new, unenlightened lines in the Saudi Islamic Awakening (al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya), which combined the erstwhile rigorous Wahhābī teachings with radicalized Islamism. Global jihādī-Salafism completed the perversion of the modernist Salafī balance by reducing the authentic way of the salaf to excommunication and violence and by using the most modern means in its war against both Westerners and indigenous Muslim governments.
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Sultana, Kishwar. "Women’s Rights as Propounded by Fatima Jinnah." Pakistan Development Review 42, no. 4II (December 1, 2003): 761–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v42i4iipp.761-764.
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During the years (1937-1947) when Pakistan movement was at its peak, Fatima Jinnah’s role was nothing less than a beacon of hope for the Muslim women. Though the guidance of her elder brother Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, she herself became a role model not only for the Muslims women of South Asia, but for the women of whole Asian society. Her role as a women leader was even more important when after the death of Quaid-i-Azam in 1948 she became the focal point for aspirations of Pakistani women. It was under very difficult circumstances that she worked for the promotion of women’s rights and privileges in Pakistan.
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van Bruinessen, Martin. "The Netherlands and the Gülen movement." Sociology of Islam 1, no. 3-4 (April 30, 2014): 165–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00104004.
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The Gülen movement has been active among immigrant workers from Turkey in the Netherlands since the 1980s. Its first institutions—educational centers, boarding houses, schools, business associations—were established when a (partly) Dutch-educated second generation came to adulthood in the mid-1990s. Ağabeyler (“older brothers”) dispatched from Turkey remained in the background, while students and graduates of Dutch universities and colleges built up support networks in Dutch civil society and municipal administrations, finding official endorsement as well as subsidies for some of their initiatives. They encountered increasing opposition from a coalition of Kemalist and former leftist Turks and anti-Muslim Dutch politicians and journalists, reflecting changing attitudes towards Islam in Dutch popular discourse as well as power struggles in Turkey. Activities that had previously been praised and supported by Dutch counterparts, such as homework assistance centers, dormitories, and (secular) schools came under suspicion when public opinion was alerted that these were the initiatives of a non-transparent Muslim piety movement. In response to negative publicity that accused these schools of brainwashing and Islamic indoctrination, and to prove that it made positive contributions to social integration, the movement closed its dormitories for secondary school students. This was followed by intensified efforts to show success in secular ventures. The result turned the Gülen movement into arguably the most successfully integrated immigrant-based organization in the country.
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Ahmed Mahmoud, Ahmed Ragheb. "The Acoustic Efforts of the Medieval Arab Philosophers: Brethren of Purity as a Model." World Journal of Social Science Research 2, no. 2 (September 7, 2015): 191. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/wjssr.v2n2p191.
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<p><em>This study discusses the acoustic efforts of the Medieval Arab philosophers and thinkers, and explain specifically the efforts of Brethren of Purity (ikhwãn al</em><em>-</em><em>safã) also The Brethren of Sincerity). They were a famous </em><a title="Secret society" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_society"><em>secret society</em></a><em> of Muslim philosophers in Basra, Iraq, in 4th century HD/8th century CE. The structure of this mysterious organization and the identities of its members have never been clear. This study is an overview of the reality and the actuality of the vocal acoustic research which the Arab thinkers produced. It also will discusses the efforts of Al-Safa brothers community in the Arab Acoustic field, who presented a logical definition of the linguistic sound, then started to categorize the sound according to the meaning, quantity and quality, determined the sounds articulation and the ways of its production, then they made a great analysis on the ways of analyzing it based on all the qualitative and quantitative levels, and highlighted the semantic aspects and the ways of recognizing and perceiving the sounds.</em><em></em></p>
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Casado, Santos, and Santiago Aragón. "Vignettes of Spanish Nature." Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 44, no. 3 (November 2012): 197–233. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2014.44.3.197.
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Taxidermy played a pivotal role in the renewal of the Spanish Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales in Madrid during the first few decades of the twentieth century. This essay examines the work of the brothers José María Benedito (1873–1951) and Luis Benedito (1884–1955) and their part in the making of a remarkable series of biological groups and habitat dioramas, mainly devoted to the most characteristic species of Spanish fauna. The Benedito brothers’ taxidermy mounts can be viewed as an attempt to construct a new image of a national fauna. From this point of view, taxidermic practices appear as an integral component of an ambitious educational and cultural project, with their foundations in the scientific work of the museum’s zoologists, and aimed at a broad, educated public, at a time of widespread political effort to reinvigorate Spanish society. Indeed, efforts to regenerate a troubled Spanish national identity and to promote science and education as drivers of social progress are typical of the critical turn-of-the-century period. In this context, the Benedito brothers’ work at the museum can be related both to an international trend to modernize natural history displays in museums around the world, and to more specific cultural and scientific developments characteristic of the processes of modernization at work in early twentieth-century Spanish society. Modern taxidermy, it is argued, has been incorporated in various ways into political and cultural discourses contingent on national contexts, while at the same time its technical procedures have remained essentially unchanged.
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Manning, Patricia W. "Disciplining Brothers in the Seventeenth-Century Jesuit Province of Aragon." Renaissance and Reformation 37, no. 2 (September 8, 2014): 115–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/rr.v37i2.21812.
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This article studies the leave-taking process in the Society of Jesus’ Province of Aragon. According to the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and decrees of General Congregation 7, the community could decide to dismiss a Jesuit or an individual could request to depart. Provincial and Roman authorities consulted about leave-takings. Although Ignatius of Loyola favoured immediate dismissal of misbehaving men, by the seventeenth century the process had evolved. As archival references demonstrate, the religious community developed atonement processes, including confinement, for wayward Jesuits in the hopes of reforming poor comportment.
Cet article analyse le système mis en place de la Compagnie de Jésus concernant les congés et renvois dans la Province d’Aragon. Selon les Constitutions de la Compagnie de Jésus et les décrets de la Congrégation Générale 7, la congrégation pouvait décider de renvoyer un jésuite ou un particulier pouvait faire la démarche de demander un congé de la communauté. Les autorités romaines et provinciales se consultaient au sujet des renvois et congés. Bien qu’Ignace de Loyola préférât le renvoi immédiat des hommes de mauvaise conduite, le système évolua à partir du dix-septième siècle. Comme le révèle les archives de la Société, la Compagnie de Jésus développa des procédures pour l’expiation, parmi lesquels la détention, pour les jésuites réfractaires dans l’espoir de réformer leur mauvaise conduite.
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Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.463.
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The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.
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Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.463.
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The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.
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Fokin, Pavel E., and Ilya O. Boretsky. "The First Production of The Brothers Karamazov on the Russian stage in the Mirror of the Press (Based on the Collections of the Vladimir Dahl State Museum of the History of Russian Literature)." Dostoevsky and world culture. Philological journal, no. 4 (2020): 219–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/2541-7894-2020-4-219-241.
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The first Russian theatrical production of Dostoevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov premiered on the eve of Dostoevsky’s 20th death anniversary on January 26 (February 7) 1901 at the Theater of the Literary and Artistic Society (Maly Theater) in St. Petersburg as a benefit for Nikolay Seversky. The novel was adapted for the stage by K. Dmitriev (Konstantin Nabokov). The role of Dmitry Karamazov was performed by the famous dramatic actor Pavel Orlenev, who had received recognition for playing the role of Raskolnikov. The play, the staging, the actors’ interpretation of their roles became the subject of detailed reviews of the St. Petersburg theater critics and provoked controversial assessments and again raised the question about the peculiarities of Dostoevsky’s prose and the possibility of its presentation on stage. The production of The Brothers Karamazov at the Maly Theater in St. Petersburg and the controversy about it became an important stage in the development of Russian realistic theater and a reflection of the ideas of Dostoevsky’s younger contemporaries about the distinctive features and contents of his art. The manuscript holdings of the Vladimir Dahl State Museum of the History of Russian Literature includes Anna Dostoevskaya’s collection containing a set of documentary materials (the playbill, newspaper advertisements, reviews, feuilletons), which makes it possible to form a complete picture of the play and Russian viewers’ reaction to it. The article provides a description of the performance, and voluminous excerpts from the most informative press reviews. The published materials have not previously attracted special attention of researchers.
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Moore, P. G. "Dr Baird and his feminine eponyms; biographical considerations and ostracod nomenclature." Archives of Natural History 32, no. 1 (April 2005): 92–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/anh.2005.32.1.92.
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An attempt is made to identify the female personalities behind the specific attributions of four of William Baird's Scottish ostracod species: viz. Philomedes brenda (Baird, 1850), Macrocypris minna (Baird, 1850), Cylindroleberis mariae (Baird, 1850) and Cypris joanna Baird, 1835. A Scottish borderer by birth, although he spent most of his career in the British Museum (Natural History), Baird (1803–1872) was co-responsible, with two older brothers, plus George Johnston (the Club's first President) and five other gentlemen, for establishing the Berwickshire Naturalists' Club in 1831. This is generally regarded as the first society of its kind. In common with most of his contemporaries, it seems that he held Sir Walter Scott's romantic works in high regard. Brenda and Minna are Shetland heroines from Scott's novel The pirate, which would tie in with these species' type localities being in the wild waters offshore from that archipelago. The suggestion is advanced that the other two names honour two ladies of high literary repute, who were also prominent associates of Walter Scott: Joanna Baillie and Maria Edgeworth (though it is possible though that the epithet mariae might also acknowledge Baird's wife, Mary). Both these writers, of plays, poetry and novels (respectively) were radical proto-feminists who espoused social reform. As such their views and reputation may have resonated with William Baird. His brother, the Revd John Baird of Kirk Yetholm, became famous for espousing the rights of gypsies. William Baird's biography is considered in the context of his social contacts in the Scottish borders. Various associations between these ladies, Sir Walter Scott, the Baird family and the type localities of these ostracods are brought forwards in support of these contentions.
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Cole, Ross. "Vernacular Song and the Folkloric Imagination at the Fin de Siècle." 19th-Century Music 42, no. 2 (2018): 73–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ncm.2018.42.2.73.
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This article foregrounds discrepancies between vernacular singing in England and the work of London’s Folk-Song Society during the 1890s. Figures such as Lucy Broadwood, Kate Lee, and Hubert Parry acted as gatekeepers through whom folk culture had to pass in order to be understood as such. Informed by colonialist epistemology, socialist radicalism, and literary Romanticism, what may be termed the “folkloric imagination” concealed the very thing it claimed to identify. Folk song, thus produced, represents the popular voice under erasure. Situated as the antidote to degeneration, burgeoning mass consumer culture, and escalating urbanization, the folk proved to be the perfect tabula rasa upon which the historiographical, political, and ethnological fantasies of the fin de siècle could be inscribed. Positioned as a restorative bulwark against the shifting tides of modernity, the talismanic folk and their songs were temporal anachronisms conjured up via the discursive strategies that attempted to describe them. Increased attention should hence be paid to singers such as Henry Burstow and the Copper brothers of Rottingdean in order to rescue their histories from the conceptual apparatus of folk song.
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Suhaimi, Suhaimi, Agustri Purwandi, and Akhmad Farid Mawardi Sufyan. "Binsabin dan Tongngebban as Madurese Local Wisdom: An Anthropology of Islamic Law Analyses." AL-IHKAM: Jurnal Hukum & Pranata Sosial 16, no. 1 (June 27, 2021): 161–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.19105/al-lhkam.v16i1.3861.
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There is a unique tradition in the Madurese community of East Java, namely Binsabin and Tongngebban. Both are the absolute requirements for a valid engagement. It means that the engagement is not totally legal without the two things. In the perspective of Islamic law, this is permitted, but from an anthropological perspective, found that there is a social inheritance that is imposed on social bonds, the rules of marriage law and ceremonies in the marriage process. In line with that, this paper wants to describe a local wisdom in a proportional framework, not only seeing society legally, but also society must be seen as a culture (anthropology). This paper is collected from data interviews with two different types of community groups. The results of the study show that first, from an anthropological perspective; the binsabin and tongngebban traditions express the fulfillment of individual psycho-biological needs and maintain the continuity of life of social groups. Anthropology also shows strong the Madurese community is in upholding this tradition from generation to generation even though times round and round. Second, in the perspective of Islamic law, this tradition seeks to build three things, first building a strong agreement between fellow Muslim families, second establishing friendship so as to create a strong emotional bond, third sharing the joy that shown by giving gifts or goods so as to increase the strength of brotherly bonds by religious way (engagement).
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Doesburg, Charlotte. "Of heroes, maidens and squirrels: Reimagining traditional Finnish folk poetry in metal lyrics." Metal Music Studies 7, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 317–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/mms_00051_1.
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The Kalevala (1849), the Finnish folk epic, has inspired all types of artists throughout the years. It could be argued that it was only a matter of time before Finnish metal musicians started adapting material from the epic in their music and lyrics. This article presents two case studies of two lyrics. The first is ‘Lemminkäisen laulu’ (‘Lemminkäinen’s Song’) by Kotiteollisuus. This song is about one of the epic’s main heroes, Lemminkäinen, and his unfortunate marriage to Kyllikki. It draws on poems 11‐13 from the Kalevala and on the book Seitsemän veljestä (‘The Seven Brothers’) (1870) by novelist Aleksis Kivi. The second song discussed is ‘Rautaa rinnoista’ (‘Iron from the Breasts’) by Mokoma. The lyrics for this song are inspired by the painting Raudan synty (‘The Origins of Iron’) (1917) by Joseph Alanen. This painting is based on the birth of iron poem from the Kalevala. The interpretation of the lyrics of both songs will show that artists in the same genre have a larger general awareness of other cultural products, including those inspired by the Kalevala and that they use the epic for different purposes. The two case studies will show that adaptation of Finnish folk poetry can be used for various reasons, such as to parodize contemporary society or to voice personal ideas and world-views. Furthermore, the analysis of these lyrics will show that the songs are connected to a sense of Finnishness and the topics and themes of metal music internationally.
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Mcnamara, Kenneth, and Frances Dodds. "The Early History of Palaeontology in Western Australia: 1791-1899." Earth Sciences History 5, no. 1 (January 1, 1986): 24–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.17704/eshi.5.1.t85384660311h176.
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The exploration of the coast of Western Australia by English and French explorers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries led to the first recorded discoveries of fossiliferous rocks in Western Australia. The first forty years of exploration and discovery of fossil sites in the State was restricted entirely to the coast of the Continent. Following the establishment of permanent settlements in the 1820s the first of the inland fossil localities were located in the 1830s, north of Albany, and north of Perth. As new land was surveyed; particularly north of Perth, principally by the Gregory brothers in the 1840s and 1850s, Palaeozoic rocks were discovered in the Perth and Carnarvon Basins. F.T. Gregory in particular developed a keen interest in the geology of the State to such an extent that he was able, at a meeting of the Geological Society of London in 1861, to present not only a geological map of part of the State, but also a suite of fossils which showed the existence of Permian and Hesozoic strata. The entire history of nineteenth century palaeontology in Western Australia was one of discovery and collection of specimens. These were studied initially by overseas naturalists, but latterly, in the 1890s by Etheridge at The Australian Museum in Sydney. Sufficient specimens had been collected and described by the turn of the century that the basic outline of the Phanerozoic geology of the sedimentary basins was reasonably well known.
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El-Ghobashy, Mona. "THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS." International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 3 (July 22, 2005): 373–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743805052128.
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Jihane al-Halafawi's small apartment above a barbershop in Alexandria is exceedingly orderly, a cool oasis on a sweltering summer afternoon. Plant leaves brush up against curtains undulating with the breeze from the nearby Mediterranean. As she walks into the living room with a tray full of cakes and tea, al-Halafawi is the picture of a kindly Egyptian mother, a genuine smile gracing her youthful face. But when this fifty-year-old mother of six and grandmother announced her candidacy for Egypt's parliamentary elections in fall 2000, the state geared up a massive security force outside polling stations; leftists shrugged her off as a “front” for her husband; and state feminists dedicated to the electoral empowerment of women were silent. When Halafawi outperformed her ruling-party rival in the first round, despite rigging, the Interior Ministry promptly stepped in and canceled the results on the pretext of respecting an earlier court ruling postponing the elections.
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Alhourani, Ala Rabiha. "Aesthetics of Muslim-ness: Art and the Formation of Muslim Identity Politics." Journal of Religion in Africa 48, no. 3 (December 5, 2018): 185–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700666-12340142.
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AbstractThe paper explores two opposing yet simultaneous forces of aesthetics as transformative and constitutive force of Muslim identity politics, religiosity and cultural style in Cape Town The ethnography focuses on Muslim artists in Cape Town, namely Thania Petersen and twin brothers Hasan and Husain Essop, whose artworks embody a ‘social drama’ of a lived experience of Muslims’ ongoing individual and collective active engagement with and appropriation of the plurality of competing discourses that are religious and secular, local and global. The discussion unpacks the ways in which the artworks of Petersen and the Essop brothers serve as a transformative force and as a politic of authenticity to Muslim identity, religiosity, and cultural style. The paper offers an appreciative but critical reading of Talal Asad’s idea of an anthropology of Islam. Taking into consideration the incommensurable diversity and internal contradiction that could be conceived as Islamic discursive traditions, this paper argues that the aesthetics of Muslimness is what inspires coherence within and across diverse, contradictory Islamic traditions.
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Larsson, Göran. "The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse." Journal of Religion in Europe 3, no. 1 (2010): 189–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187489210x12597396698906.
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Steinberg, Guido. "The Muslim Brothers in Europe. Roots and Discourse." Die Welt des Islams 52, no. 2 (2012): 216–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/004325309x12529279606375.
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Brownlee, Jason. "The Muslim Brothers: Egypt’s Most Influential Pressure Group." History Compass 8, no. 5 (May 2010): 419–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2010.00685.x.
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Talhamy, Yvette. "The Syrian Muslim Brothers and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship." Middle East Journal 63, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 561–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/63.4.12.
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Al Shalabi, Jamal. "The Muslim Brothers in Jordan: From Alliance to Divergence." Confluences Méditerranée N° 76, no. 1 (2011): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/come.076.0117.
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Methodieva, Milena B. "How Turks and Bulgarians Became Ethnic Brothers." Turkish Historical Review 5, no. 2 (October 7, 2014): 221–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18775462-00502005.
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In 1905 the Bulgarian authorities initiated preparations for a large-scale propaganda project in order to advertise the wellbeing of Bulgaria’s Muslims among the Muslim inhabitants of Ottoman Macedonia. Its purpose was to dispel inter-communal hostility during particularly turbulent times in the area. The project capitalized on arguments about ethnic and historical connections between Turks and Bulgarians by developing a novel theory maintaining that Bulgaria’s Turks were descendants of the Bulgars who founded the first Bulgarian state in the seventh century. However, Young Turk activists from the area were also involved in the enterprise hoping to use it for their own purposes. The article uses this interesting background to explore questions concerning Bulgarian policies and narratives about the local Muslim Bulgarian aspirations in Ottoman Macedonia, relations between Young Turks and Bulgarians, and Young Turk revolutionary strategies.
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Lutsenko, N. "MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ACTIVITY IN EGYPT (20th – EARLY 21st CENTURIES)." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. History, no. 145 (2020): 52–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2020.145.9.
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The article examines the origins of political Islam in the Middle East and the terminological aspect of the problem. The stages of the formation of the Egyptian Islamic organization Muslim Brotherhood were clarified and its key ideological tenets were established. The political and socio-economic circumstances in which the organization was formed are outlined. Attention is drawn to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the military and economic presence in Egypt of the United Kingdom, which consolidated political Islamic parties. The process of transforming the Muslim Brotherhood from a "group of like-minded people" into a political party is considered. The political and legal ideas of the founder of the organization Hasan al-Banna are covered. which became the main strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation of the organization in the 30's and 40's was analyzed during the attempt of Nazi Germany to turn the Brothers into their own puppet. The article reveals the role in the organization of its ideologist Said Qutb. His main ideas and views, which formed the basis of the radical Muslim Brotherhood branch, are analyzed. The link between the radicalism of the organization and the ultra-conservative trend of Islam - "Salafism" - was noted. The connection of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Free Officers organization, which came to power in Egypt in 1952, has been disclosed. It was stated that the Brothers supported General Gamal Nasser in the struggle for power, which allowed them to take part in the parliamentary elections. It is stated that the Brothers' criticism of the policies of Gamal Nasser and Anwar Sadat on Israel led to a ban of the organization's activities in Egypt. It has been established that under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, the "Brothers" tried to enter parliament in other parties. The place and role of the organization during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, which led the Muslim Brotherhood to power, were examined. The main reasons for the failure of the organization are indicated.
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Masud, Muhammad Khalid. "Religion and State Are Twin Brothers : Classical Muslim Political Theory." Islam and Civilisational Renewal 9, no. 1 (January 2018): 9–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.12816/0049513.
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Masud, Muhammad Khalid. "Religion and State Are Twin Brothers: Classical Muslim Political Theory." ICR Journal 9, no. 1 (September 22, 2020): 9–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.52282/icr.v9i1.135.
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The current reluctance for democratic transition in Muslim societies is mostly attributed to Islamic political theories that do not allow a separation between religion and politics. Extremist views often reject democracy because it is perceived to be anti-religion. This paper examines the thread of classical Islamic political theory that considers religion and state to be inseparable twin brothers. Exploring the origins of this thread in Sassanid and tenth century Islamic thought, analysis of the doctrine reveals that Muslim political thought more generally has traditionally been more pragmatic on political issues (siyasah), with Muslim jurists continuously marking boundaries between religion and culture in their fatawa, particularly concerning bid’ah (innovation) and tashabbuh bi’l kuffar (imitation of the infidels). Indeed, all definitions of religion that make it inseparable from the state are seen to be a modern phenomenon, in which religion is defined in terms of the ideology of political power, with secularism perceived as its rival. Analysing diverse interpretations of the doctrine from the Abbasid period to the twenty-first century, the paper finds that, like twin brothers, religion and politics are separate in Islam albeit united in their origin. This perspective becomes more meaningful in modern times if we recognise the role of social consensus (ijma’), besides the political and the religious spheres.
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Ahmad, Asmar. "Dakwah Komunitas (Sinergitas Masjid Nurul Islam Kalijudan Dan Komunitas Bikers Muslim Dalam Membendung Kristenisasi)." Tadbir: Jurnal Manajemen Dakwah 5, no. 2 (June 30, 2020): 127–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/tadbir.v5i2.2018.
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Masjid adalah pusat peradaban dan sentral bagi orang islam didalam kehidupan beragama. Berbagai upaya yang dilakukan musuh-musuh islam dalam melemahkan kaum muslim dari berbagai aspek, maka perlu adanya wadah tertentu untuk meluaskan dakwah para ulama, khususnya di indonesia untuk selalu membentengi iman saudara muslim kita di manapun berada menyatukan umat dan saling tolong menolong untuk kesejahteraan bersama. Salah satu yang harus diperhatikan olehkeislaman kepada Allah ta’ala. Satu-satunya masjid di kota surabaya yang bergerak di bidang dakwah berbasis komunitas adalah masjid nurul islam kalijudan surabaya. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mendeskripsikan tentang sinergitas dakwah masjid dan komunitas yang dilakukan di daerah kristenisasi di lamongan. Dalam penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan metode kualitatif deskriptif. Dalam sinergitas dakwah, masjid nurul islam kalijudan dan komunitas bikers muslim memperluas jangkauan dakwahnya untuk memberikan kepedulian kepada saudara muslim tertindas dan meperkuat ukhuwah islamiyah. Berbagai upaya yang dilakukan untuk mempertahankan iman saudara muslim kita di daerah kristenisasi dengan tujuan islam rahmatan lil ‘alamin.
Mosques are the center of civilization and central to Muslims in their religious life. The various efforts made by the enemies of Islam in weakening the Muslims from various aspects, it is necessary to have a certain forum to expand the preaching of the scholars, especially in Indonesia to always fortify the faith of our Muslim brothers wherever they are to unite the people and help each other for common prosperity. One thing that must be considered by Islam is to Allah Ta'ala. The only mosque in the city of Surabaya that is engaged in community-based da'wah is the Nurul Islam Kalijudan Mosque in Surabaya. The purpose of this study is to describe the synergy of mosque and community preaching carried out in Christianized areas in Lamongan. In this study using a qualitative method with a descriptive qualitative method approach. In the synergy of da'wah, the Kalijudan Nurul Islam Mosque and the Muslim bikers community are expanding the reach of their da'wah to give concern to oppressed Muslim brothers and strengthen Islamic brotherhood. Various efforts have been made to defend the faith of our Muslim brothers in Christianized areas with the aim of Islam rahmatan lil 'alamin.
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Archer, Louise. "‘Muslim Brothers, Black Lads, Traditional Asians’: British Muslim Young Men’s Constructions of Race, Religion and Masculinity." Feminism & Psychology 11, no. 1 (February 2001): 79–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959353501011001005.
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Hroub, Khaled. "Through Brothers' Eyes: The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928-1947 . Abd Al-Fattah El-Awaisi." Journal of Palestine Studies 29, no. 1 (October 1999): 92–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.1999.29.1.02p0011i.
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SCUPIN, R. "MUSLIM ACCOMMODATION IN THAI SOCIETY." Journal of Islamic Studies 9, no. 2 (February 1, 1998): 229–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jis/9.2.229.
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