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1
Volpe, Enrico. "The Figure of Socrates in Numenius of Apamea: Theology, Platonism, and Pythagoreanism (fr. 24 des Places)." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 13, no. 1 (December 23, 2022): 169–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2022.1.8.
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Numenius is one of the most important authors who, in the Imperial Age, deal with the figure of Socrates. Socrates is important in the Platonic tradition, in particular in the sceptical tradition, when the Socratic dubitative “spirit” of the first Platonic dialogues became important to justify the “suspension of judgement.” Numenius criticises the whole Academic tradition by saying that the Academics (particularly the sceptics) betrayed the original doctrine of Plato and formulated a new image of Socrates. For Numenius, Socrates plays a central role because Plato would have inherited his doctrine. What does Socrates’s doctrine consist in? According to Numenius, Socrates theorised a “doctrine of three Gods” (which can be likely found in the second Platonic epistle) which is strictly bound up with the main aspect of Plato’s thought. In fact, in Numenius’s view, Plato belongs to a genealogy which can be linked to Pythagoras himself. From this perspective, Numenius says that Socrates’s original thought is a theology which also belongs to the Pythagorean tradition and which Plato further developed. For Numenius, Socrates is not the philosopher of doubt, but a theologian who first theorised the existence of three levels of reality (Gods), which is also the kernel of Numenius’s metaphysical system. For this reason, Numenius puts Socrates within a theological genealogy that begins with Pythagoras and continues with Socrates and Plato, and that the Academics and the Socratics failed to understand.
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Araújo, Fabíola Menezes, and Micael Silva. "A Doença de Sócrates, ou a Doença Sócrates? Nietzsche entre Instinto e Razão." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77, no. 1 (April 30, 2021): 297–324. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2021_77_1_0297.
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“Socratism despises instinct and, with it, art. It denies wisdom just where it is in its most proper reign”. With this quote from The Dionysian world’s view Nietzsche shows up how he takes the philosophy’s most emblematic figure since the phylosophy’s birth in a duel. Nietzsche starred a duel with Socrates, or rather with what his represents in the course of Western thought. Nietzsche will regard Socrates as a kind of philosopher-antipode that will be present in early Nietzschean’s writings to the later works. The term ‘socratism’ encompasses a number of consequences not exactly to Socrates’s philosophy, but to the way within the German philosopher considers the master of Plato legacy’s as a cultural degeneration to what is here called Socrates’s sickness, other the sickness that is Socrates. Our intention here is to put in question this legacy. To overcome the metaphysics where the socratism as a disease takes place, our author calls the tragic.
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Pentassuglio, Francesca. "One Socrates and Many. A Discussion of the Volume Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue." Elenchos 40, no. 2 (November 26, 2019): 431–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2019-0020.
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Abstract The volume Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, recently edited by Ch. Moore and A. Stavru (Brill, 2018), favours the pluralistic approach to the sources that has gained increasing acceptance over the last decades, and thus shares the choice not to limit the study of Socrates to the canonical ‘quartet’ Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle. Indeed, the volume partly continues an existing trend, but at the same time proves to reinforce it by further refining and scrutinising this field of research. The very welcome result is a collection of essays that provides a rich and nuanced picture of Socrates from the Old Comedy to Neoplatonism, based on Socratic literature as well as non-Socratic material – the latter including both non-Socratic authors and non-Socratic passages by Socratic authors. Because of the variety of themes and the number of contributions, which present a vast range of methodological approaches, the work offers a privileged point of view for investigating the ongoing advancements in our understanding of Socratism. Rather than providing a thorough presentation of all chapters, which would inevitably oversimplify their content, this paper attempts to highlight – also through the comparison with the existing literature – the main results of the analysis conducted and their specific contribution to the field.
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Carvalho, John M. "Socrates' Refutation of Apollo." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 8, no. 2 (November 10, 2014): 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p40-56.
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It has been argued about Plato’s early dialogues that Socrates is made there to privilege beliefs derived from “information” he receives through certain forms of divination. These beliefs, the argument continues, are allowed to supplement Socrates’s elenctically established human knowledge while remaining “logically independent” of it.Such a view is needed, some believe, to solve the paradox that, while Socrates disavows knowledge of anything great or small, he is convinced that his life is morally unimpeachable. Socrates will also claim that wrongdoing is the result of ignorance implying that virtue follows from knowledge. These apparent conflicts can be explained, it is supposed, by Socrates’s confidence in divine signs which, while failing to secure the knowledge Socrates is seeking in answers to his “What is F?” questions, gives him the warrant he requires to hold the beliefs he does. This warrant could be substantively challenged, however, if it turned out that Socrates also believes these divine signs may be subject to elenctic refutation. I show, here, that Socrates does refute Apollo or, rather, that Socrates performs an elenchus on the god’s pronouncement, and that this elenctic test sheds important light on the meaning and function of “refutation” in Socratic argumentation. What Socrates hopes to exhibit through his examinations of the politicians, poets and artisans is just that, since there is someone wiser than Socrates, he has reasons for believing the god means something other than what he appears at first to say. If the apparent meaning of Apollo’s pronouncement cannot be shown to be inconsistent with the god’s otherwise infallible wisdom, Socrates will have reasons for doubting his own claim to lack such wisdom and for accepting the indictment brought against him. At his trial, Socrates argues that he refuted Apollo, but the jury, ironically, disagrees and convicts him of impiety.
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Pichanick, Alan. "Socratic Silence in the Cleitophon." PLATO JOURNAL 17 (March 1, 2018): 65–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_17_4.
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Plato’s Cleitophon is the only dialogue in which Plato presents an unanswered rebuke of Socratic philosophy by an interlocutor. Consequently, most commentators have thus rejected the dialogue as inauthentic, or have otherwise explained away the bewildering Socratic silence at the dialogue’s conclusion. In this paper I explore why Socrates chooses silence as the response to Cleitophon’s rebuke of Socrates. I argue that (and why) Socratic silence is the only way of “talking” with Cleitophon: Cleitophon’s “Socratic speech” implies notions about nomos, the soul, and philosophy that turn out to be uniquely anti-Socratic. The dramatic disjunctions between Cleitophon’s distorted image of Socrates and the real Socrates, and between Cleitophon himself and Socrates, not only make most poignant the tension between the philosopher and the city but also point to the very conditions of philosophical dialogue.
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Suvák, Vladislav. "Obrazy Sókrata v Diónových Řečech." REFLEXE 2021, no. 61 (February 28, 2022): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/25337637.2022.1.
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The paper deals with three topics that could help us in attempting to understand the way Dio Chrysostom approaches the figure of Socrates and transforms it. The first part demonstrates that, with regard to Socrates, Dio prefers non-Platonic sources over Platonic ones, as he relies mainly on the Antisthenian line of Socratic literature. The second part deals with Dio’s concept of the relationship between the philosopher and the ruler, which is closely linked to his personal attitude to the Roman emperor. The third part focuses on how Dio reinterprets Socratesʼs demand for philosophical education and endows it with a Cynical character.
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Rosano, Michael J. "Citizenship and Socrates in Plato's Crito." Review of Politics 62, no. 3 (2000): 451–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500041656.
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Plato's Crito articulates the problem of political obligation by clarifying the paradoxical relation between Socratic philosophy and citizenship embodied in the relationship between Socrates and Crito. Scholars obscure the dialogue either by taking the arguments Socrates gives to the laws of Athens as his own reasons for obeying the law rather than as agents of Crito's edification or by severing Socrates from the laws while misunderstanding Crito's significance to political obligation. Socrates bolsters Crito's commitment to civic virtue and the rule of law while revealing their parameters and the self-sufficiency of Socratic philosophy by implicitly raising the issue of voluntary injustice. The tension between Socratic philosophy and citizenship shows the need to view Socrates' defense of citizenship in the light of his defense of philosophy.
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Cornelli, Gabriele. "Socrates and Alcibiades." PLATO JOURNAL 14 (July 22, 2015): 39–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_14_3.
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In Plato’s Symposium eros and paideia draw the fabric of dramatic and rhetorical speeches and, especially, the picture of the relation between Socrates and Alcibiades. This paper will focus, firstly, on two important facts, which are essential for the correct understanding of the dialogue, both of which appear at the beginning. First, it is said that Socrates, Alcibiades and the others (172 b) were present at the famous banquet, and second, that the banquet and the erotic speeches of the participants were so celebrated as to attract the attention for several decades to come. So, the memory of that symposium is thus the memory, far beyond the other symposiasts, and through the erotic speeches, of something precise: that is, a particularly significant relationship, that between Socrates and Alcibiades. What matters most for the aim of this paper is the fact that Alcibiades is considered one of the major reasons for the defeat of Athens and the main cause of the crisis into which the city was plunged during the last years of 5th century BC. Due to the distrust of the city towards the groups of ‘philosophers’ that remitted to Alcibiades’ group, it is no surprise that the so-called Socratics committed themselves to refuting the accusation of Socrates having been Alcibiades’ mentor, to the point of reversing the charge. In the same way as the others Plato, also a Socratic, concerns himself with what might be called the ‘Alcibiades’ Connection’. Realizing there obviously was no way to deny the deep connection between Socrates and Alcibiades, he uses a clever dramatic construction with the intention of operating a political intervention upon the memory of this relationship, that is, of rewriting history, with the intent of relieving him of a more precise charge, which must have especially weighed upon Plato andupon Socrates’ memory: of him having been Alcibiades’ lover/mentor. This Platonic apology is based, ultimately, in a clever rhetorical strategy, which emphasizes the now traditional sexual paranomia of Alcibiades, in order tomake him guilty of an attempted excessive and outrageous seduction not only of Socrates, but of the polis itself. Reusing comic and oratorical/rhetorical motifs of his time, therefore, Plato deepens the J’accuse against Alcibiades, trying to withdraw him from the orbit of Socrates and the Socratics.
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Prince, S. H. "Socrates and the Socratics." Classical Review 55, no. 2 (October 2005): 424–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni236.
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Etemadifard, Azam, and Malik Hoseyney. "Socrates in Thee Plato's Works: Uniformity of Styles and Life in all the Works." International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences 59 (September 2015): 13–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18052/www.scipress.com/ilshs.59.13.
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Despite the fact, only one of the Plato's treatises among his coaction of works is titled "Defending Socrates"; however, one can say that all the Plato's works are based on defense of Socrates. Meanwhile, they are founded on defending Socratic thoughts, manners and finally his life. Some scholars have considered historic Socrates as being distinct from the Platonic Socrates with regards to the Plato's thoughts. The author intends, contrary to that which is famous regarding Socrates inthe Plato's works, to see the Socratic life and manner as being uniform in all the works; Hence based on this uniformity, the principles governing on his original philosophical life have been inferred from the content of his thoughts.
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Protopopova, Irina. "The Socratic question: old problems and new trends." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 1 (2019): 330–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-1-330-338.
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The article deals with new approaches to the solution of the so-called “Socratic question” associated with the search for a “historical” Socrates in different sources. The author outlines the history of the issue starting with Schleiermacher and his distinction between the images of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon. It is shown how, at the beginning of the 20th century, a consensus on the authenticity of Plato’s Socrates was reached (Robin, Taylor, Burnet, Maier), and then a sceptical view on the possibility itself to ever solve the “Socratic question” developed (Gigon). Vlastos’ position, which became influential in the late 20th century, is considered: he believed that Socrates of early Platonic dialogues is “historical”, while Socrates of the middle dialogues is a fiction of Plato’s. The second part of the article provides a brief overview of the six editions devoted to Socrates in 2006–2018, and the conclusion is made that there is an obvious trend towards a return to the sceptical position of Gigon in regard to the “Socratic question”.
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Duque, Mateo. "An-other Socratic Method." PLATO JOURNAL 25 (September 9, 2024): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_25_3.
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There is another Socratic method, Socratic mimēsis, and an instance of this is when Plato has Socrates play ‘the annoying questioner’ in the Hippias Major. Other interpreters have suggested that the reasons for Socrates’s dramatic play are depersonalization and distance. I argue for viewing Socrates’s role-playing as a way to dramatize the inner dialogue that happens inside one’s mind in what we may call conscience. Hippias the sophist lacks a conscience: his focus is acquisitive as opposed to inquisitive. Plato has staged a pedagogical theater of Hippias’s failed lesson for the benefit of Plato’s audience, the listeners/readers of the dialogue.
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Tomin, Julius. "Socratic Midwifery." Classical Quarterly 37, no. 1 (May 1987): 97–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800031682.
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In Plato's Theaetetus Socrates is portrayed as a midwife of the intellect. The comparison of Socratic questioning to midwifery had until recently been commonly attributed to Socrates himself. In 1977 M. F. Burnyeat published Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration, which transformed the way in which the dialogue has since been perceived. The author maintains that the midwife comparison is in no sense to be attributed to the historical Socrates.
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Bryan, Jenny. "PSEUDO-DIALOGUE IN PLATO'S CLITOPHON." Cambridge Classical Journal 58 (November 26, 2012): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1750270512000024.
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Scholars disagree over why Plato's Clitophon ends without any response to Clitophon's criticisms of Socratic method. A close examination of the characterisation of Clitophon provides a potential answer. During the course of his speech, Clitophon shows himself to have misunderstood Socrates, in terms both of method and teaching. The manner in which he reports Socratic conversations suggests that he is more interested in Socrates' personal authority than in entering into productive dialogue. Clitophon represents the kind of young man who wants Socrates to tell him what to think and who will go elsewhere if Socrates will not answer this desire. Socrates remains silent in the face of Clitophon's criticisms because Clitophon has offered no thoughts of his own and, this being the case, there is no possibility of making elenctic progress.
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Feldman, Sarah. "Common Ground or Double Bind? The Possibility of Dialogue in Plato’s Crito." Areté 36 (March 28, 2022): 21–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.2022ext.002.
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Much recent scholarship on Plato’ Crito has revolved around the controversy about the relationship and possible compatibility between the arguments Socrates gives in his own person (SocratesS) and those he gives in the person of the Laws (SocratesL). By contrast, the relation between the arguments given by SocratesL and those given by Crito continues to be seen as uncontroversial: by the end of the dialogue, commentators agree, Crito has no choice but to concede to the force of SocratesL’s arguments. Against this traditional reading, this paper will argue not only that SocratesL’s arguments fail to secure Crito’s agreement, but also that two characters’ attempts to communicate end at an impasse that seems to leave little room for meaningful shared discourse –and may even undermine Crito’s belief in the possibility of meaningful speech. My interpretation is informed by Socrates’ account (at 49c9-e3) of the need for and nature of a “common ground” as a requisite for genuine dialogue. This passage, I argue, challenges the traditional analysis of Crito as the representative of a particular value system or a particular “type”, demanding, instead, a consideration of the effect of Socrates’ arguments upon Crito in light of a more robust view of the latter’s perspective. Such a reconsideration has consequences not only for our appreciation of the dramatic structure of the dialogue, but also for how we understand one of the dialogue’s central, if underexplored, themes: the belief in a shared logos and the psychagogic necessity and perils of testing that belief.
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Wardhaugh, Bruce. "Socratic Civil Disobedience: Some Reflections on Morgentaler." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 2, no. 2 (July 1989): 91–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900002782.
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Plato’s dialogue Crito, as is well known, presents Socrates’ response to the question why must one obey the law. The facts surrounding Socrates’ trial, imprisonment and subsequent execution are all well known, I shall not repeat them here. Rather my present task will be to analyze the other side of the Socratic argument, in order to determine Socrates’ possible response to the question of when (or under what circumstances) may we chose to disobey the law. The purpose of this present analysis is three-fold: first, to determine what in fact might be the Socratic response to the question. Second, to show – as against at least one recent writer – that Socrates could be said to have a theory of civil disobedience. My third task, given that such a theory could be attributed to Socrates, is to assess the adequacy of this theory.
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Streltsov, Alexey. "Which Socrates? “Supplement to the Memorabilia of the Blessed Socrates”." Respublica Literaria 5, no. 3 (October 12, 2014): 49–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.47850/rl.2024.5.3.49-66.
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Provided is translation into Russian as well as commentary of the J. G. Hamann’s treatise «Supplement to the Memorabilia of the Blessed Socrates» (Beylage zun Denkwürdigkeiten des seligen Sokrates) of 1773, which up to this time has not received sufficient treatment in the historical-philosophical research. This work represents concluding part of Hamann’s trilogy of sorts, which began with «Socratic Memorabilia» of 1759 and «Clouds» of 1760. The treatise deals with Socratic perspective and interpretation of the character of Socrates in the context of the Enlightenment project. In this work Hamann confronts rationalistic reading of Socrates by the Enlightenment follower Johann August Eberhard by means of maintaining theological orthodoxy of the preceding epoch.
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Cleveland, Timothy. "The Irony of Contingency and Solidarity." Philosophy 70, no. 272 (April 1995): 217–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100065384.
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Irony is nothing new to philosophy; quite the contrary, it is as familiar as the figure of Socrates. Yet when, for example, Socrates asks Euthyphro to teach him about piety because of Euthyphro's obvious knowledge of the subject, Socrates‘ irony has little philosophical significance. Socrates says something contrary to what he means, and Euthyphro in his arrogance takes the statement literally. Plato uses Socratic irony to dramatic affect by allowing the events of the drama to unfold in such a way that it becomes clear that Socrates’ literal praise of Euthyphro’s knowledge is incongruous with the results of the discussion taking place, although Euthyphro is hardly aware of the incongruity. The significance of this literary technique is that the reader be made conscious of the possibility of his own arrogance and the hindrance this would create to true philosophical understanding. As important as this use of irony is to Plato's Socratic dialogues, the irony is not the philosophical thesis.
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Botter, Barbara. "Socrate nel Gorgia platonico: Ulisse nella teatrocrazia ateniese. Le armi della persuasione nel dialogo Gorgia di Platone." Revista Ágora Filosófica 20, no. 2 (October 1, 2020): 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.25247/p1982-999x.2020.v20n2.p22-61.
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L’obbiettivo del presente articolo è di circoscrivere ed approfondire lo studio di alcune strategie persuasive messe in atto da Socrate nel Gorgia platonico. Analizzando dapprima lo stile letterario, quindi gli scambi di battute fra gli interlocutori, ci proponiamo di evidenziare le ragioni della scelta platonica per lo stile drammatico, le strategie argomentative messe in atto dai protagonisti e le finalità in vista delle quali Platone crea un Socrate a due volti, un Socrate filosofo e un Socrate erista. In vista di ciò divideremo il testo in due sezioni principali: dapprima forniremo la cornice letteraria nella quale si inserisce il dialogo Gorgia; quindi esamineremo le strategie discorsive usate dagli interlocutori per difendere le rispettive tesi e giustificheremo la ragioni per cui la cura del discorso è importante per garantire un regime politico corretto. The aim of this article is to investigate the persuasive strategies produced by Socrates in the Plato’s Gorgias. First we’ll analyse the literary style, then the dialectical practices between Socrates and the other people, specifically Polo and Calicles. Our aim is to highlight the reasons why Plato choices a dramatic style in Gorgias; the argumentative strategies put in place by the protagonist and the other dialogue’s figures; and the Plato’s aims to create a Socrates with two faces: a Socrates philosopher and an eristic Socrates. With these aspects in mind, this paper has two main objectives. First we will consider the literary framework in which the dialogue Gorgias is put; then we’ll look at the discursive strategies used by the interlocutors to defend their arguments and justify why the care of speech is important to safeguard an appropriate politics.
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Kumar, Dushyant. "SOCRATES’ METHOD OF ‘NOT WRITING’." Fedro, revista de estética y teoría de las artes, no. 23 (2023): 116–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.12795/fedro/2023.i23.07.
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In this paper, I intend to propound that Socrates’ choice of abstaining himself from writing not only leads to the “Socratic Problem” but also renders him vulnerable to misappropriations; a vulnerability he attributes to writing while substantiating his downright dismissal of it. The paper has been divided into three sections. In section one; effort is to contemplate “The Socratic Problem” which has been baffling scholars across centuries. Whether, for example, in Plato’s works, is it Plato’s or the historical Socrates’ views? Absence of Socrates’ own work has put his historical existence in a blurry picture and his character under shadows of doubts. In section two, there is an attempt to outline the debate between Phonocentrism and Oral tradition. Socrates is seen projecting phonocentric viewpoints in Plato’s Phaedrus, when he censures writing by invoking an Egyptian myth. In the last section, I have put forth a surmise that Plato’s Socrates must be an apotheosized and misappropriated version of the historical Socrates. And I question, if it can be taken as an insinuation that we need to consider possibility of misappropriation every time we read history without historicity.
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Jenks, Rod. "Socratic Piety and Socrates’ Defense." Modern Schoolman 82, no. 4 (2005): 193–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman200582418.
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Guilhamet, Leon. "Socrates and Post-Socratic Satire." Journal of the History of Ideas 46, no. 1 (January 1985): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2709772.
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Hansen, David T. "Was Socrates a "Socratic Teacher"?" Educational Theory 38, no. 2 (March 1988): 213–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1988.00213.x.
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Greene, Ross Preuss. "Sources of Shame: Shame and the Refutation of Polus and Callicles in Plato's Gorgias." Illinois Classical Studies 47, no. 2 (October 1, 2022): 315–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/23285265.47.2.06.
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Abstract Shame is a theme that permeates Plato's Gorgias. While every interlocutor accuses each other of feeling ashamed, Socrates's arguments also depend on judgments about what is shameful. This essay offers an account of the sources of shame for Polus, Socrates, and Callicles. A source of shame determines whose value judgments are relevant for feelings of shame. I argue that Polus has other-sourced shame, whereas Socrates and Callicles both have self-sourced shame. Socrates and Callicles are distinguished by their conceptions of the good life. The Gorgias's complex portrayal of shame shows why shame is essential to Socrates's discussions and refutations.
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Katić, Nemanja. "THE SOCRATIC INTELLECTUALISM." Godišnjak Međunarodne filozofske škole Feliks Romulijana 1, no. 1 (2024): 184–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/felixr24.08nk.
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The subject of this inquiry is the analysis of the so-called Socratic intellectualism that was put forward by Socrates’ student, Plato, in his dialogue Protagoras. The two leading questions that we shall raise are: how does Plato formulate this position, and can it actually be ascribed to Socrates (as it is traditionally done)? Firstly, we shall address the part of the dialogue in which Plato, through Socrates, lays down this position, while trying to explicate its formulation and the argument that Plato offers for it. Secondly, by looking at the context of the dialogue itself, that is, by trying to see what are the main questions that are raised — what virtue is, can it be taught, and is it the skill that sophists propose to teach — we shall try to show, through a careful reading of the dialogue, that the Socratic intellectualism, a position traditionally ascribed to Socrates, but a radical consequence of sophistical skill that Protagoras proposes to teach, which Socrates unravels through his elenctic method.
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Kroczak, Justyna. "THE SOCRATIC PRACTICE OF �CARE OF THE SELF� (EPIMELEIA HEAUTOU) AND THE COACHING PROCESS." Studia Humanistyczne AGH 22, no. 2 (2023): 101–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.7494/human.2023.22.2.101.
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In this paper I present a comparative analysis of the knowledge discovery process applied by Socrates and the contemporary life coach. On one hand, I will use the method of in-depth analysis of selected (Socratic) dialogues by Plato, and on the other one of coaching practice and coaching values formulated by the International Coach Federation. The term �care of the self� (epimeleia heautou) appears in the Socratic dialogues, Alkibiades I and Apology of Socrates, and this term is juxtaposed with the coaching idea of �being resourceful�. �Taking care of yourself� is about constantly gaining knowledge about yourself. This knowledge is extracted by Socrates and, in contemporary terms, by a life coach. The process of uncovering knowledge involves certain key elements that are shared by both the Socratic method and modern life coaching: establishing a relationship, a purpose and relevant questions. The analysis of each of these elements leads us to the conclusion that the key value of coaching, �the resourceful state of the coach and the coachee�, has its roots in ancient philosophy � in the wisdom of Socrates.
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Anfinsen, Roar. "Sokrates og oss: Et essay om Sokrates’ forsvarstale, tekstfortolkning og filosofihistorie." Nordlit, no. 33 (November 16, 2014): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.7557/13.3181.
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<p><em>Socrates and Us: An Essay on the </em>Apology of Socrates<em>, Philological Interpretations and History of Philosophy. </em>I start out with a philological problem, the question of how to translate a disputed passage (30b 2–4) in Plato’s Apology. This problem is connected to a philosophical question, the Socratic and Platonic opinion on the relation between virtue, material goods and happiness. I then discuss the role of our «pre-understanding» in the interpretation of historical texts. Is a «purely» historical interpretation possible? Is a «purely» historical reading of philosophical texts worthwhile, if it does not concern our modern philosophical problems? In discussing these hermenutical questions I use John Stuart Mill’s reading of Plato as an example. A peculiar problem in the history of philosophy is the question of the historical Socrates and the different roles he has played. I investigate especially Mill’s use of the character of Socrates, but I also include examples from the twentieth century. Furthermore, I analyze Plato’s staging of Socrates in the <em>Apology</em> as a moral hero and the mythological status he is given. Finally, I discuss whether the Socratic philosophy is of any value today. I argue that the Socratic method ought to have an important place in moral and political education, and that this method is not value-neutral. It presupposes certain virtues, virtues taught and incarnated by the historical Socrates.</p>
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Kremer, Mark. "Socratic Philosophy and the Cleitophon." Review of Politics 62, no. 3 (2000): 479–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500041668.
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In the Cleitophon, Cleitophon abandons Socrates because he could not provide an art of justice that would bring an end to strife by eliminating cities, families, and the love of one's own on which they depend. Cleitophon's disappointment in reason prepares us for the misology of his legal positivism in the Republic. Although Socrates does not refute Cleitophon, Plato points to the deficiencies of art and legal positivism by pointing to poetic foils. By pointing to the poetic, Plato shows what is sound in poetry and the city informed by it, and, therewith, what they share with Socrates despite their ultimate differences. By not having his Socrates succumb to the promises of art and the irrational conformism of legal positivism, and by pointing to the humane learning of the poets, Plato opens a window on to the meaning of Socratic wisdom and the Socratic life.
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Meyer, Martin F. "Platon und das Sokratische Pragma." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 9 (December 31, 2004): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.9.01mey.
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What made Socrates so special that he became the object of mockery, slander and hate? The answer in the Apology is expressed in the formula of the ‘Socratic pragma’. Plato claims that Socrates’ philosophical enterprise was a reaction to the Delphic oracle according to which no living Greek was wiser than Socrates. But does this really explain what it pretends to explain? The paper argues that this explanation tells us more about Plato’s philosophical approach than about this alleged turning point in Socrates’ life. Our understanding of Socrates’ philosophical development should be based on other Platonic dialogues and the Old Comedy as well, for they inform us about the historical shift of philosophical interest from questions of physics to questions of ethics and political anthropology.
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Hobden, Fiona. "Reading Xenophon's Symposium." Ramus 34, no. 2 (2005): 93–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0048671x00000965.
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In just over a decade, interest in Xenophon'sSymposiumhas risen dramatically. No longer the poor relation to its author's more popular Socratic works or to Plato's dialogue of the same name, it now merits scholarly attention on a regular basis. However, despite an increased sensitivity to the author's literary and philosophical strategies, modern readings of the text are informed above all by the presence of Socrates. Because the philosopher is assumed to be Xenophon's primary interest, theSymposiumis viewed as an apology for the radical philosopher or a promotion of his ideas and methods. This perception derives in part from an old-fashioned dismissal of Xenophon as a poor man's Plato, intellectually incapable of anything more than biography. But it also relates to the work's longstanding association with Xenophon's other Socratic works, namely theApology, Memorabilia, andOeconomicus. Since scholarship on Xenophon began, the four texts have been treated as a unit, bound in purpose by their depiction of Socrates. However, although the philosopher certainly features prominently in these four texts, each work is structurally distinct. In theApology, the narrator invites Hermogenes to replay his final conversation with Socrates and to describe the philosopher's performance in court, in order to correct inadequate understandings of Socrates' choice of death over life. By contrast, theMemorabiliadepicts Socrates in extended disputation with many interlocutors on a wide variety of subjects as he seeks to lead them towards virtue and, in the narrator's opinion, demonstrates himself to bekalos kagathos(literally ‘beautiful and good’). Then again, theOeconomicusrecords two exchanges, one between Socrates and Critoboulus and another between Socrates and Ischomachus, and juxtaposes their arguments one against the other. And finally, theSymposiumlocates Socrates within a livelysymposion(drinking party) at the house of Callias, son of Hipponicus, in Athens during 422 BCE. Here, the philosopher often directs the conversation. However, his drinking companions also participate freely in the performances and conversations that take place. In short, Xenophon's four Socratic texts all have their own dramatic contexts and conceits, with different structures and ambitions, and different roles for Socrates. Yet even amongst them, theSymposium'sdramatic staging of a vibrant and variedsymposionparticularly stands out.
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Rider, Benjamin. "Transforming Ambition." Ancient Philosophy 42, no. 1 (2022): 11–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202242117.
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Plato’s Gorgias depicts Socratic psychotherapy, showing Socrates aiming at “what’s best” for those he talks to (521d). The negative aspect of Socrates’ efforts—refuting claims, shaming people for misplaced values—has been well documented and discussed. Focusing on the conversations with Gorgias and Callicles, I highlight a neglected positive side to these interactions: How Socrates seeks to draw on what these characters deeply care about—here, leadership—to inspire philosophical reflection on how they live.
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Notomi, Noburu. "Socrates and the Sophists: Reconsidering the History of Criticisms of the Sophists." Humanities 11, no. 6 (December 7, 2022): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/h11060153.
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To examine the sophists and their legacy, it is necessary to reconsider the relation between Socrates and the sophists. The trial of Socrates in 399 BCE seems to have changed people’s attitudes towards and conceptions of the sophists drastically, because Socrates was the first and only “sophist” executed for being a sophist. In the fifth century BCE, people treated natural philosophy, sophistic rhetoric and Socratic dialogue without clear distinctions, often viewing them as dangerous, impious and damaging to society. After the trial of Socrates, however, Plato sharply dissociated Socrates from the sophists and treated his teacher as a model philosopher and the latter as fakes, despite many common features and shared interests between them. While Plato’s distinction was gradually accepted by his contemporaries and by subsequent thinkers through the fourth century BCE, some disciples of Socrates and the second generation of sophists continued to pride themselves on being sophists and philosophers at the same time. Thus, this paper argues that Socrates belonged to the sophistic movement before Plato dissociated him from the other sophists, although the trial of Socrates did not immediately eliminate confusion between the sophist and the philosopher. The reconstructed view of the contemporaries of Socrates and Plato will change our conception of the sophists, as well as of Socrates. Finally, the paper examines the relation of Socrates to Antiphon of Rhamnus. Plato deliberately ignored this Athenian sophist because he was a shadowy double of Socrates in democratic Athens.
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Shannon, Phillip. "The Piety of Escape." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 4, no. 1 (September 10, 2019): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.4.1.3-14.
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This paper examines two seemingly contradictory views of piety found in Plato’s Euthyphro and Crito. Using the Socratic dialogues for evidence of what Socrates actually believed and to piece together a Socratic account of piety, it seems that his argument in favor of remaining in prison is inconsistent with his own beliefs. The paper concludes that Socrates ought not to have thought it was impious to escape from prison.
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Gottlieb, Paula. "The Complexity of Socratic Irony: A Note on Professor Vlastos' Account." Classical Quarterly 42, no. 1 (May 1992): 278–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800042798.
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Professor Vlastos argues that Socratic irony was responsible for a momentous change in the way in which irony was understood in ancient times. Before Socrates, he argues, irony is connected with lying and deceit, but after Socrates it is associated with wit and urbanity. Vlastos claims that Socratic irony is distinctive and complex. According to Vlastos, Socratic irony involves no hint of deception; it consists simply in saying something which when understood in one way is false, but when understood in another way is true.
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Woodruff, Paul. "Wrong Turns in the Euthyphro." Apeiron 52, no. 2 (April 24, 2019): 117–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2018-0011.
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Abstract No Socratic theory of forms is implied by the questions Socrates asks in Plato’s Euthyphro. His questions appear to commit him to the existence of a certain kind of paradigm form in the Euthyphro, but there is no place for such a form in his philosophy, and that is a good thing, for such a form cannot exist. As stated, the main question does not have an answer, but it is reasonable for Socrates to ask it in the context of Euthyphro’s claims. if they could be supported, Socrates’ question would have an answer. But Euthyphro’s claims are not supportable. The turn toward a paradigm form for piety is a wrong turn; the turn toward the part-whole relation is another. Piety cannot be a proper part of justice on any view that is plausibly Socratic. Piety concerns the whole of virtue in a way that distinguishes it from primary virtues such as justice, and this point prepares the way for Socrates’ defense in the Apology.
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Danzig, Gabriel. "Crito and the Socratic Controversy." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 23, no. 1 (2006): 21–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000085.
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Crito was written in response to popular slanders concerning Socrates’ failure to escape from prison, and accompanying misgivings within the Socratic circle. Plato responds by asking his audience to disregard the slander of the mob and obey the moral expert instead. But he also responds by creating an image of Socrates and his friends widely at odds with the popular slander; by implying that Socrates’ critics were themselves guilty of some of the behaviour they charged against Socrates; by pointing out that Socrates had no viable alternative to death; and, in partial contradiction to all this, by rejecting the popular morality which saw Socrates’ abandonment and death as signs of failure. In the rhetorical climax of the composition, Plato shows that Socrates chose to die rather than victimize or offend the laws of the city, which he represents as sentient beings. The weaknesses that have been perceived in the arguments of the Athenian Laws are not fatal to the composition, because it aims not at a convincing demonstration, but at providing a portrait of Socrates’ own overwhelming conviction of the rightness of his decision.
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Gutschmidt, Holger. "Das Menschenbild des Kallikles im platonischen Gorgias." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 20 (December 31, 2017): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.00001.gut.
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Zusammenfassung The sophist Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias is one of the few interlocutors of the Platonic Socrates who persistently refuses to be refuted by Socrates’ arguments. In the contrary, he develops an alternative conception of man which he believes can show Socrates’ ideas about the good and man’s happiness wrong and illusory. This contribution analyses Callicles’ anthropology in the Gorgias and argues that Callicles’ position indicates a systematic problem in Socrates’ conception of happiness. Therefore, its function within the Gorgias is to introduce in to the conception of the Politeia where Plato abandons his earlier individualistic (and Socratic) concept of happiness and replaces it by the idea of the philosopher’s state.
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Schultz, Anne-Marie. "Colloquium 5 Socrates on Socrates: Looking Back to Bring Philosophy Forward." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 30, no. 1 (May 7, 2015): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00301p14.
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In this paper, I explore three autobiographical narratives that Plato’s Socrates tells: his report of his conversations with Diotima (Symposium 201d–212b), his account of his testing of the Delphic oracle (Apology 21a–23a), and his description of his turn from naturalistic philosophy to his own method of inquiry (Phaedo 96a–100b).1 This Platonic Socrates shows his auditors how to philosophize for the future through a narrative recollection of his own past. In these stories, Plato presents us with an image of a Socrates who prepares others to do philosophy without him. In doing so, Plato’s Socrates exhibits philosophical care for his students. In the first part of the paper, I briefly discuss Socrates’ overall narrative style as Plato depicts it in the five dialogues that Socrates narrates. I then analyze each of these autobiographical accounts with an eye toward uncovering what they reveal about Plato’s presentation of Socrates’ philosophical practice.2 Finally, I offer a brief description of what it might mean to practice philosophy as care for self and care for others in a Socratic fashion.
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Vasiliou, Iakovos. "Conditional irony in the Socratic dialogues." Classical Quarterly 49, no. 2 (December 1999): 456–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/49.2.456.
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Socratic irony is potentially fertile ground for exegetical abuse. It can seem to offer an interpreter the chance to dismiss any claim which conflicts with his account of Socratic Philosophy merely by crying ‘irony’. If abused in this way, Socratic irony can quickly become a convenient receptacle for everything inimical to an interpretation. Much recent scholarship rightly reacts against this and devotes itself to explaining how Socrates actually means everything he says, at least everything of philosophical importance. But the fact that a commentator needs to argue that Socrates is really serious when he disavows knowledge or claims to be the saviour of Athens is by itself sufficient to establish that there is an abundance of what I will call ‘play’ in the Socratic dialogues. The term ‘play’ refers to occasions when Socrates at least appears not to be speaking straightforwardly. ‘Play’ covers cases of real or apparent humour, mockery, teasing, irony, and sarcasm, without differentiation or further elaboration. When left undefined, as often, the phrase ‘Socratic irony’ seems to be used to refer to what I am calling ‘play’.
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Anton, Audrey. "The Epistemological Benefits of Socrates’ Religious Experience." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 19, no. 1 (April 5, 2016): 70–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01901006.
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There seems to be tension between portrayals of Socrates as both a committed philosopher and a pious man. For instance, one might doubt Socrates’ commitment to philosophy since he seems to irrationally defer to a daimonion. On the other hand, the fact that he challenges messages from Oracles (Apology 21–22) and the gods’ role concerning the origin of the pious (Euthyphro 10–15) draws into question Socrates’ piety. In this paper, I argue that Socratic piety and rationality are not only compatible, but they are also symbiotic. Socrates could not be rational without being pious, nor could he be pious without being rational because, for him, care and curiosity are intimately intertwined. In this regard, Socrates’ epistemology, when applied, resembles Karl Popper’s falsificationism. For Socrates, maintaining human wisdom amounts to regular purification of one’s belief-system. In addition, this maintenance is functionally identical to caring for one’s soul, which is morally imperative.
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Baluch, Faisal. "Machiavelli as Philosopher." Review of Politics 80, no. 2 (2018): 289–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670517001097.
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AbstractThis paper deals with Zuckert's book Machiavelli's Politics. It takes as its point of departure Zuckert's remark that Machiavelli is “surprisingly like Socrates.” The paper begins with a brief discussion of what makes a Socratic philosopher and then charts out the many similarities between Socrates and Machiavelli. Responses are offered to some of the key reservations against terming Machiavelli a Socratic. In particular, the paper points to a less activist and more meditative mode in Machiavelli's writings that allows one to make a more convincing case for a Socratic Machiavelli.
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Lorch, Benjamin. "Moderation and Socratic Education in Xenophon’s Memorabilia." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 26, no. 2 (2009): 185–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000150.
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This essay examines the first stage of the positive part of the Socratic education in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, whose subject is moderation concerning the gods. This stage of the Socratic education investigates whether providential gods exist and whether it ismoderate to be pious. Socrates does not accept either one of the two teleological sarguments in favour of the existence of providential gods that he advances in the Memorabilia. Instead, he holds that human beings cannot know whether or not the gods exist, and moderation refers to the manner in which Socrates deems it reasonable to proceed in light of this uncertainty. Socrates suggests that the smoderate alternative to piety is justice, and this essay concludes by considering why justice is moderate but piety is not.
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Corey, David D. "Socratic Citizenship: Delphic Oracle and Divine Sign." Review of Politics 67, no. 2 (2005): 201–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500033490.
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Socrates was not only a paradigmatic philosopher; he was also a paradigmatic citizen according to some contemporary political theorists—paradigmatic for his moral integrity and his political practices of dissent and noncompliance. What is perhaps most exemplary about Socrates, according to some commentators, is that his citizenship was “purely secular,” relying upon no sources of authority beyond the naked moral self. The present article challenges this dominant view of Socratic citizenship by examining Socrates′ relationship to the oracle at Delphi and the mysterious divine sign that frequently turned him away from certain civic activities. Arguing that these sources of authority affected Socrates′ practice of citizenship in significant ways, the essay presents a picture of Socrates that is at once truer to the texts to which these secular views appeal and more instructive for contemporary theorizing about citizenship.
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Moore, Christopher. "SOCRATES AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN ARISTOPHANES'CLOUDS." Classical Quarterly 65, no. 2 (October 1, 2015): 534–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838815000257.
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This article argues that Aristophanes'Cloudstreats Socrates as distinctly interested in promoting self-knowledge of the sort related to self-improvement. Section I shows that Aristophanes links the precept γνῶθι σαυτόν (‘know yourself’) with Socrates. Section II outlines the meaning of that precept for Socrates. Section III describes Socrates' conversational method in theCloudsas aimed at therapeutic self-revelation. Section IV identifies the patron Cloud deities of Socrates' school as also concerned to bring people to a therapeutic self-understanding, albeit in a different register from that of Socrates. Section V discusses a sequence of jokes connected to ‘stripping’ that give a concrete image to the search for self-knowledge. Both the action of the Clouds and the tales of cloak-stripping provide models for understanding self-knowledge in a Socratic key. Section VI argues that Socrates' other interest in thephrontistērion, myth-rationalization, is consistent with the promotion of self-knowledge. Section VII supports the claim that Plato'sPhaedrusalludes constantly to theClouds, and because thePhaedruspays careful attention to self-knowledge, Plato must think that theCloudsdoes too. It notes in particular that we can explain the Platonic Socrates' famous self-knowledge-related curiosity about his similarity to Typhon (230a) as Plato's allusion to Aristophanes, an allusion made apt by Aristophanes' coordination of Socrates with self-knowledge. Section VIII concludes the paper.
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Seferoğlu, Tonguç. "A Reliabilist Interpretation of Socrates’ Autobiography." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 17, no. 2 (2023): 582–604. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2023-17-2-582-604.
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This paper aims to offer a novel interpretation of Socrates’ autobiography in the Phaedo 96-102 by using reliabilist epistemology as a heuristic guide to spell out the complex dynamics of the intellectual development of Socrates of the Phaedo. Surprisingly, scholars have mostly focused on the outcomes of Socrates’s scientific investigations, but they neglected the dynamics of the discovery process. The reason why Socrates rejected many earlier scientific ideas and the way in which he discovered new theories as much significant and noteworthy as those theories. I argue that Socrates’ discovery and implementation of new methods of inquiry meet the epistemic standards of reliabilism that emphasize the reliability of processes involved in belief-formation. I show that Socrates criticized the physicists’ materialistic-mechanistic approach to explain coming-to-be, perishing, and being because of its unreliability. The paper concludes that (a) the concept of reliability is used as a guide to theory choice in Socrates’ autobiography (b) the positive feature of Socrates’ second sailing is its reliability and (c) reliability is the motive behind Socrates’ choice of certain belief-forming processes, namely a priori reasoning, the method of hypothesis, and the theory of Forms, in the search of the cause of coming-to-be, perishing, and being.
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Christensen, Anna B. "The Suicidal Philosopher: Plato's Socrates." History of Philosophy Quarterly 37, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 309–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521026.37.4.01.
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Abstract Because the Phaedo characterizes Socrates's death as a punishment by Athens, many scholars argue that he could neither have been responsible for nor have intended his death, so that his death was not suicide. This is no mere semantic quibble: the question turns on issues of responsible and intentional action. I argue that the dialogues portray Socrates as committing suicide. To do so, I use a Platonic account of responsibility and intention to show how Athens and Socrates were jointly responsible for Socrates's death and that his intention was not only to do what justice requires but also to kill himself.
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Stern, Michael. "Clouds: The Tyranny of Irony over Philosophy." Konturen 7 (August 23, 2015): 167. http://dx.doi.org/10.5399/uo/konturen.7.0.3679.
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Both Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche maintained an abiding concern for Socrates throughout their productive lives. Kierkegaard wrote his dissertation on irony through a Socratic lens and Nietzsche once declared that try as he might, he could not completely separate his concerns from those he associated with the Greek.
Kierkegaard famously favored Aristophanes’ portrait of Socrates in his comedy Clouds, claiming that it accurately portrayed the illegibility of the ironist. Nietzsche leaned toward Xenophon’s Socratic writings but most famously blamed Plato’s Socrates for the demise of tragic culture. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche engaged with the variety of Socratic depictions throughout their careers and perhaps more importantly, both employed irony in a Socratic fashion inflected by textual concerns. In other words, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche understood irony as both the indication of an epistemological limit, and as a strategy to induce the reader to think herself into the text. My article “Clouds: The Tyranny of Irony over Philosophy” analyzes this common concern and its implications for our understanding of European modernity.
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Saxonhouse, Arlene. "Xanthippe: Shrew or Muse." Hypatia 33, no. 4 (2018): 610–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12440.
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Socrates's wife Xanthippe has entered the popular imagination as a shrewish character who dumps water on the inattentive Socrates. Such popular portrayals are intended largely to highlight what makes Socrates such an appealing character. But she also appears briefly in Plato's dialogue the Phaedo, the dialogue that takes place in Socrates's prison cell, recounts the conversation about death and immortality that took place there, and then reports the events surrounding Socrates's death after drinking the hemlock. After a review of the ancient anecdotes about Xanthippe and possible readings of those anecdotes, this article considers the significance of Xanthippe's presence early in the Phaedo for our understanding of the conversation between Socrates and his companions. In this way, Xanthippe moves from the role of the shrew to—if not exactly a muse—at least a question mark. That we even know her name may indicate a force of personality too readily scorned by those highlighting her shrewish nature.
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Hare, William. "Socratic Open-mindedness." Paideusis 18, no. 1 (October 16, 2020): 5–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1072334ar.
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A philosophical conception of open-minded inquiry first emerges in western philosophy in the work of Socrates. This paper develops an interpretation of Socratic open-mindedness drawing primarily on Socratic ideas about (i) the requirements of serious argument, and (ii) the nature of human wisdom. This account is defended against a number of objections which mistakenly interpret Socrates as defending, teaching, or inducing skepticism, and neglecting the value of expert wisdom. The ongoing significance of Socratic open-mindedness as an ideal of inquiry is brought out through examination of a notorious Canadian case in the context of forensic pathology.
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Shichalin, Yury. "PLATO: FROM SOCRATES TO PRE-SOCRATICS?" St.Tikhons' University Review 58, no. 2 (April 30, 2015): 27–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.15382/sturi201558.27-42.
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