Academic literature on the topic 'Socratic paradox'

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Journal articles on the topic "Socratic paradox"

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Edelstein, Wolfgang. "Lawrence Kohlberg's Socratic Paradox." New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 1990, no. 47 (1990): 93–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cd.23219904712.

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Chapa, Joseph O. "Reformed Soteriology in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments." Journal of Reformed Theology 10, no. 2 (2016): 129–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15697312-01002014.

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Johannes Climacus, pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, presents to his reader the “absolute paradox.” Though initially presented in terms of Socratic and Un-Socratic theories of knowledge, this paper argues that Climacus’ paradox is concerned with the tension between soteriological claims about human agency and divine sovereignty. Does man choose God? Or does God choose man? Though Climacus draws stark contrasts between the Socratic and the Un-Socratic, he goes to great lengths to retain them both. Through Climacus’ synthesis, Kierkegaard demonstrates his acceptance of free will and determinism as an uneasy unity—a kind of unstable equilibrium. This view of Fragments results in an emphasis on human agency that is affirmed in the broader Kierkegaardian corpus: Rather than being paralyzed by one’s inability to fathom the absolute paradox, Kierkegaard insists that one move forward in spite of the paradox, take the leap, and do Christianity.
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Tuozzo, Thomas M. "The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies." Ancient Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2009): 203–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil200929114.

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da Costa Martins, P. A., and L. J. De Windt. "miR-21: a miRaculous Socratic paradox." Cardiovascular Research 87, no. 3 (2010): 397–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cvr/cvq196.

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Calosi, Claudio, and Vincenzo Fano. "Pre-Socratic Discrete Kinematics." Disputatio 5, no. 35 (2013): 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2013-0002.

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Abstract We present a neglected heterodox version of Zeno’s paradox of the Stadium, underlining some problems that a discrete kinematics would have to account for. Building on our reconstruction of the Stadium argument we provide new arguments to show that a discrete kinematics cannot uphold three independently plausible assumptions about motion, that we label No Switching, Granular Continuity and Different Velocities, and hence it should drop at least one.
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THALBERG, IRVING. "The Socratic Paradox and reasons for action1." Theoria 31, no. 3 (2008): 242–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1965.tb00581.x.

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Gottlieb, Paula. "The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies - Roslyn Weiss." Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 234 (2009): 168–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.594_1.x.

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Jackson, Robin. "Socrates’ Iolaos: Myth and Eristic in Plato's Euthydemus." Classical Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1990): 378–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800042968.

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The Euthydemus presents a brilliantly comic contrast between Socratic and sophistic argument. Socrates' encounter with the sophistic brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus exposes the hollowness of their claim to teach virtue, unmasking it as a predilection for verbal pugilism and the peddling of paradox. The dialogue's humour is pointed, for the brothers' fallacies are often reminiscent of substantial dilemmas explored seriously elsewhere in Plato, and the farce of their manipulation is in sharp contrast to the sobriety with which Socrates pursues his own protreptic questioning. But the strategies of this text are complex: the Euthydemus may be a playful satire of the desire to confound, yet beneath its knockabout humour a serious purpose is also visible.
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Waterfield, Robin. "The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies. By Roslyn Weiss." Heythrop Journal 48, no. 4 (2007): 615–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2007.00333_1.x.

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Maureen Eckert. "The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies (review)." Journal of the History of Philosophy 46, no. 3 (2008): 476–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.0.0025.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Socratic paradox"

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Firey, Thomas Anthony. "Socrates' Conception of Knowledge and the Priority of Definition." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/35294.

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Throughout the early Platonic dialogues, Socrates repeatedly tells his interlocutors that if, as they claim, they truly have knowledge concerning some morally significant property, then they should be able to define the nature of that property. Invariably, the interlocutors fail to furnish him with such definitions, leading him to conclude that they, and all humankind, are ignorant of any knowledge about such property. This leads him to encourage his interlocutors, and us, to adopt a sense of intellectual humility and to dedicate their lives to studying these properties in an effort to gain moral insight. Many scholars have cited Socrates' demand for definition as evidence that he accepts a Priority of Definition principle - an epistemological principle asserting that a person must first know the definition of a property before she can know anything else about the property. Many of the scholars who make this ascription also argue, for various reasons, that such a principle is erroneous. If these scholars are correct and Socrates does accept a flawed Priority of Definition principle, then his epistemology, along with his whole philosophy, suffers devastating harm. Students of the early dialogues must consider whether Socrates does, in fact, accept the principle and, if so, whether the principle is incorrect. The thesis will examine the issues that arise from the ascription of a Priority of Definition principle to Socrates. The study will first examine textual evidence supporting the ascription along with texts that bring the ascription into question. It will then outline three general philosophical criticisms of the principle. Finally, this study will examine a number of different understandings of Socrates' conception of knowledge. Hopefully, an understanding can be discovered that preserves his philosophy by effectively showing that either (1) Socrates does not accept the principle, or (2) he does accept the principle but the principle is not philosophically problematic. If such an understanding can be discovered, then Socrates' conception of knowledge is saved from the criticisms raised by scholars. Otherwise, his whole philosophy will be placed in a very troubling light.<br>Master of Arts
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Korkut, Hacer. "Irony As A Philosophical Attitude In Socrates." Master's thesis, METU, 2008. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12609135/index.pdf.

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This thesis analyzes the reasons for Socrates&#039<br>being presented as a paradoxical figure in the early dialogues of Plato. Irony as a fundamental philosophical attitude in Socratic philosophy is discussed with reference to some of the major philosophers of the history of philosophy. The thesis also suggests the possibility of seeing philosophy as an ironic activity and it traces the etymology of the concept of irony in terms of its philosophical importance.
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Johansson, Einar. "Frivilliga fel : den sokratiska paradoxen och Platons Staten." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-419137.

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I denna uppsats undersöker jag hur två olika tolkningar av den sokratiska frivillighetsparadoxen ingen gör fel frivilligt påverkar möjligheten att förstå Platons dialog Staten. Min hypotes är att de två tolkningarna av frivillighetsparadoxen kastar ljus över diskussionen i Staten, och att det är nödvändigt att förstå frivillighetsparadoxens roll för att förstå vad som står på spel i Staten. I uppsatsen ämnar jag visa att ett möjligt sätt att läsa Staten är att tolka Sokrates och de övriga samtalsdeltagarnas uttalanden baserat på kontexten, eftersom vissa uttalanden är polemiska i sin karaktär, medan andra är traditionella. Jag argumenterar för att såväl den traditionella synen på Sokrates som den polemiska dito är korrekta analyser av Sokrates filosofiska gärning, men inte heltäckande sådana, eftersom Sokrates ibland är polemisk – mot de som kvickt måste nedkämpas – och ibland är instruerande på traditionellt manér, mot de som kan förbättras genom det filosofiska samtalet. Detta sätt att läsa Staten skiljer sig från andra genom att läsaren bör avstå a priori-uppfattningar om Sokrates, Thrasymakos eller Glaukons och Adeimantos ståndpunkter till förmån för att tolka beteenden hos samtalsdeltagarna samt deras uppfattningar, vilka förmedlas av texten.
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Hannan, Natalie Hejduk. "The Socratic Paradoxes and Plato's Epistemology." Thesis, 2021. https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-bj2n-xb34.

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Plato’s “Socratic paradoxes” state that no one does wrong voluntarily and that virtue is knowledge. Outside of moral psychology, the importance of the Socratic paradoxes has been neglected. My dissertation defends two related proposals that showcase their importance in ancient epistemology. The first proposal is that they are a major motivation for Plato to develop a unique view of epistēmē (knowledge or understanding) as an infallible and robust cognitive power that is set over a special class of objects. The second proposal is that understanding the influence of the Socratic paradoxes can help us see how epistēmē improves our doxai (beliefs or opinions) about the world around us, solving a long-standing problem in Plato’s epistemology. I will start by examining the Hippias Minor, in which we see Plato seeking to embrace the Socratic paradoxes (rather than already assuming them) and looking to develop his notion of epistēmē as a result. I will then move to the Protagoras, in order to show Plato proceeding with this project by embracing epistēmē as something that produces good action and involves measurement. I will show the Protagoras’ picture to be fully developed in the Republic, in which epistēmē emerges as something that measures the truth of our doxai and has clear practical benefits as a result. Finally, I will compare this account to Aristotle’s treatment of virtue and epistēmē in the Eudemian Ethics, in order to consider the legacy of the Socratic paradoxes after Plato.
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Fortin, Jérôme. "Le Banquet de Platon : l'apologie d'Alcibiade ou les paradoxes d'Éros." Thèse, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/3551.

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Ce mémoire cherche à évaluer la culpabilité de Socrate face à l’échec et à la corruption d’Alcibiade, telle que la question se pose dans le Banquet de Platon. Il comprend quatre chapitres. Le premier démontre que le cadre dramatique lui-même fait occuper une place centrale à la vie et au déclin d’Alcibiade et au problème de la responsabilité de Socrate face aux accusations de corruption de la jeunesse qui ont pesé sur lui. Le deuxième chapitre interprète le discours d’Alcibiade comme une tentative de disculpation qui repose sur une critique acerbe du comportement de Socrate. Il se serait détourné de Socrate et de ses enseignements en raison de son ironie, de son arrogance et de son indifférence – de son hybris. Le troisième chapitre étudie le discours de Socrate sur l’accession à la beauté intelligible. Il expose la nature particulière de son éros, qui repose sur l’ironie et l’inversion des rôles comme moyens d’exhorter à la philosophie. Le quatrième chapitre pose la question de l’efficacité de ce type de pédagogie et de la responsabilité du philosophe vis-à-vis de ses disciples. L’étude conclut que l’amour et l’ironie de Socrate sont essentiellement des moyens d’inviter l’autre à se remettre lui-même en question et à prendre soin de son âme. Socrate n’est donc pas coupable d’avoir corrompu Alcibiade. La faute est entièrement celle du jeune homme. Il s’est montré incapable, par égocentrisme et fierté excessive, de réagir correctement à l’énigme posée par le comportement érotique de Socrate.<br>This essay on Plato’s Symposium assesses to what extent Socrates could be held guilty for Alcibiades’ failure and corruption. The first of the four chapters shows that Alcibiades’ life and decline and the accusation against Socrates of youth corruption are central to the dramatic structure. The second chapter interprets Alcibiades’ speech as a sharp criticism of Socrates’ behaviour meant to exculpate himself. Alcibiades justifies his walking away from Socrates and his teachings on the basis of the philosopher’s irony, arrogance and indifference – his hybris. The third chapter looks at Socrates’ speech, which sets out the path to the highest form of Beauty. It explores the particular nature of his eros, which relies especially on irony and role inversion to induce philosophical thinking. The fourth chapter asks how effective this kind of pedagogy is, and what is the responsibility of the philosopher to his students. It is concluded that Socratic love and irony are essentially to be conceived of as means of inciting followers to put themselves into question and take greater care of their souls. Socrates is thus not guilty of corrupting the young man. The fault is entirely Alcibiades’. His pride and selfishness are what prevented him from meeting the challenge that Socrates’ erotic behavior put before him.
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Gilbert, Tremblay Ugo. "La disculpation platonicienne : étude sur la signification et l'évolution du concept de faute involontaire dans l’œuvre de Platon." Thèse, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/12422.

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La présente étude se propose de dégager les significations successives qu’emprunte le fameux paradoxe socratique du mal involontaire dans l’œuvre de Platon. Pour ce faire, notre propos se déclinera en trois principaux développements : 1) le premier consistera à clarifier le sens que recouvraient les catégories du volontaire et de l’involontaire dans l’Antiquité, de manière à éviter toute confusion anachronique avec les acceptions modernes de ces mêmes notions ; 2) le second tâchera de mettre au jour le postulat anthropologique qui fonde chez Platon l’idée qu’aucun homme ne saurait agir méchamment de son plein gré ; 3) le troisième exposera à tour de rôle les trois grands dispositifs de disculpation qu’élabore Platon dans son œuvre : les dispositifs de l’âme ignorante, de l’âme renversée et de l’âme malade. Nous montrerons ainsi comment Platon, à rebours de la théodicée chrétienne classique, cherche à blanchir l’homme de toute implication morale véritable dans la genèse causale de ses « mauvaises » actions.<br>This study intends to describe the successive meanings borrowed by the famous Socratic paradox of involuntary evil in the work of Plato. For that purpose, our ideas we will developed under three main themes: 1) the first will be to clarify the meaning covered by the voluntary and involuntary categories in ancient times, in order to avoid any anachronistic confusion with the modern meanings of these same concepts; 2) the second will seek to bring to light the anthropological postulate underlying Plato’s idea that no one could do wrong on his own purpose; 3) the third will in turn expose the three major exculpation devices developed by Plato in his work: the ignorant soul devices, of the inverted soul and of the diseased soul. We will thus show how Plato, contrary to the classic Christian theodicy, seeks to absolve human being from any real moral involvement in the causal genesis of his ‘‘bad’’ actions.
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Books on the topic "Socratic paradox"

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The socratic paradox and its enemies. University of Chicago Press, 2006.

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The paradox of political philosophy: Socrates' philosophic trial. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998.

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Weiss, Roslyn. Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies. University of Chicago Press, 2008.

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Rosen, Frederick. 3. Socrates. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198708926.003.0003.

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This chapter examines some of Socrates' key political ideas. Socrates was the first philosopher to see the connections and the potential opposition between the search for truth and the world of politics. Among Socrates' most important ideas are the so-called Socratic paradoxes, the method of question and answer (the elenchus), and the use of craft analogies. The chapter first provides a biographical background on Socrates and some information about him before discussing the Socratic paradoxes and the elenchus. It then describes the trial of Socrates through Plato's dialogues Apology and Crito. Socrates shows how the quest for wisdom challenges the acknowledged experts and leaders in society, but at the same time looks for points of reconciliation so that politics will not be wholly devoid of contact with truth and justice. The chapter also considers Socrates' political philosophy and concludes with an assessment of his attachment to Athenian democracy.
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Walsh, Denis M. “Chance Caught on the Wing”. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199377176.003.0008.

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Jacques Monod’s Chance and Necessity poses a paradox for modern biology: Organisms both must be and cannot be purposive systems. To resolve the paradox we must explain purpose by appeals to invariance or invariance by appeal to purpose. The methodology of modern science, however, allows no unreduced appeals to purpose. Monod traces the modern synthesis commitment to ineluctable chance back to its animadversion to teleology. He credits the pre-Socratic Atomist philosopher Democritus with holding that everything in the world is the fruit of chance and necessity. It is becoming increasingly obvious that their purposiveness is pivotal to the dynamics of evolution. This chapter outlines a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ alternative to the neo-Democritean commitments of modern synthesis biology, one that accords the purposiveness of organisms a central explanatory role in evolution.
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Kamtekar, Rachana. Plato's Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798446.001.0001.

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Plato’s Moral Psychology is concerned with Plato’s account of the soul insofar as it bears on our living well or badly, virtuously or viciously. The core of Plato’s moral psychology is his account of human motivation, and PMP argues that throughout the dialogues Plato maintains that human beings have a natural desire for our own good, and that actions and conditions contrary to this desire are involuntary (from which follows the ‘Socratic paradox’ that wrongdoing is involuntary). Our natural desire for our own good may be manifested in different ways: by our pursuit of what we calculate is best, but also by our pursuit of pleasant or fine things—pursuits which Plato assigns to distinct parts of the soul, sometimes treating these soul-parts as homuncular sub-agents to facilitate psychic management, and other times providing a natural teleological account for them. Thus PMP develops a very different interpretation of Plato’s moral psychology from the mainstream interpretation, according to which Plato first proposes that human beings only do what we believe to be the best of the things we can do (‘Socratic intellectualism’) and then in the middle dialogues rejects this in favour of the view that the soul is divided into parts with good-dependent and good-independent motivations (‘the divided soul’). PMP arrives at its different interpretation through the methodology of reading dialogues with a close eye to the dialectical dependence of what the main speaker says on the precise intellectual problem set up between himself and his interlocutors.
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Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus. Oxford University Press, 2014.

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Fine, Gail. Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus. Oxford University Press, 2018.

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Berryman, Sylvia. Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198835004.001.0001.

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This work challenges the common belief that Aristotle’s virtue ethics is founded on an appeal to human nature, an appeal that is thought to be intended to provide both substantive ethical advice and justification for the demands of ethics. It is argued that it is not Aristotle’s intent, but the view is resisted that Aristotle was blind to questions of the source or justification of his ethical views. Aristotle’s views are interpreted as a ‘middle way’ between the metaphysical grounding offered by Platonists and the scepticism or subjectivist alternatives articulated by others. The commitments implicit in the nature of action figure prominently in this account: Aristotle reinterprets Socrates’ famous paradox that no one does evil willingly, taking it to mean that a commitment to pursuing the good is implicit in the very nature of action. This approach is compared to constructivism in contemporary ethics.
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Book chapters on the topic "Socratic paradox"

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Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith. "Is the Prudential Paradox in the Meno?" In Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian Studies: Essays in Honor of Gerasimos Santas. Springer Netherlands, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1730-5_6.

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Magrini, James M. "The Ontological Context of the Human Condition: Original Socratic Questions and the Paradox of Learning." In SpringerBriefs in Education. Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71356-4_3.

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Irwin, T. H. "Socratic paradox and Stoic theory." In Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139166348.007.

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"The Socratic Paradox and Remorse." In Enigmas of Agency. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315829951-18.

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COHEN, L. JONATHAN. "Self-deceit and the Socratic Paradox." In An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford University Press, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.003.0005.

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"The first Socratic Paradox: George Nakhnikian." In Plato's Meno In Focus. Routledge, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203401552-12.

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"Socratic Paradoxes." In In Dialogue with the Greeks. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315264608-12.

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Taylor, C. C. W. "5. The iconic Socrates." In Socrates: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198835981.003.0005.

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‘The iconic Socrates’ considers Socrates’ role as a gay icon and an icon for civil disobedience. In the Platonism revival of the Florentine Renaissance, the high-minded picture of Platonic/Socratic love focused on the spiritual and intellectual perfection of the beloved, but in an alternative ancient tradition Socrates was presented as a sexual enthusiast, with a penchant for attractive boys. The context of Socrates’ emergence as a major political icon of the 20th century was provided by the US civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement, but there is no evidence that Socrates ever actually espoused civil disobedience as a political ideology or performed any act of civil disobedience. Socrates remains a pioneer of systematic ethical thought and a paragon of moral and intellectual integrity.
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"10. Paradox, Simile, and Gnomic Utterance in Heraclitus." In The Pre-Socratics. Princeton University Press, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400863204.229.

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"Virtue and Knowledge I: The Socratic Paradoxes." In Socrates-Arg Philosophers. Routledge, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203849613-14.

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