Journal articles: 'Socratic paradox'

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Edelstein, Wolfgang. "Lawrence Kohlberg's Socratic Paradox." New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 1990, no. 47 (1990): 93–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cd.23219904712.

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Chapa, Joseph O. "Reformed Soteriology in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments." Journal of Reformed Theology 10, no. 2 (2016): 129–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15697312-01002014.

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Johannes Climacus, pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, presents to his reader the “absolute paradox.” Though initially presented in terms of Socratic and Un-Socratic theories of knowledge, this paper argues that Climacus’ paradox is concerned with the tension between soteriological claims about human agency and divine sovereignty. Does man choose God? Or does God choose man? Though Climacus draws stark contrasts between the Socratic and the Un-Socratic, he goes to great lengths to retain them both. Through Climacus’ synthesis, Kierkegaard demonstrates his acceptance of free will and determinism as an uneasy unity—a kind of unstable equilibrium. This view of Fragments results in an emphasis on human agency that is affirmed in the broader Kierkegaardian corpus: Rather than being paralyzed by one’s inability to fathom the absolute paradox, Kierkegaard insists that one move forward in spite of the paradox, take the leap, and do Christianity.

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Tuozzo, Thomas M. "The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies." Ancient Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2009): 203–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil200929114.

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da Costa Martins, P. A., and L. J. De Windt. "miR-21: a miRaculous Socratic paradox." Cardiovascular Research 87, no. 3 (2010): 397–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cvr/cvq196.

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Calosi, Claudio, and Vincenzo Fano. "Pre-Socratic Discrete Kinematics." Disputatio 5, no. 35 (2013): 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2013-0002.

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Abstract We present a neglected heterodox version of Zeno’s paradox of the Stadium, underlining some problems that a discrete kinematics would have to account for. Building on our reconstruction of the Stadium argument we provide new arguments to show that a discrete kinematics cannot uphold three independently plausible assumptions about motion, that we label No Switching, Granular Continuity and Different Velocities, and hence it should drop at least one.

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THALBERG, IRVING. "The Socratic Paradox and reasons for action1." Theoria 31, no. 3 (2008): 242–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1965.tb00581.x.

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Gottlieb, Paula. "The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies - Roslyn Weiss." Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 234 (2009): 168–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.594_1.x.

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Jackson, Robin. "Socrates’ Iolaos: Myth and Eristic in Plato's Euthydemus." Classical Quarterly 40, no. 2 (1990): 378–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800042968.

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The Euthydemus presents a brilliantly comic contrast between Socratic and sophistic argument. Socrates' encounter with the sophistic brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus exposes the hollowness of their claim to teach virtue, unmasking it as a predilection for verbal pugilism and the peddling of paradox. The dialogue's humour is pointed, for the brothers' fallacies are often reminiscent of substantial dilemmas explored seriously elsewhere in Plato, and the farce of their manipulation is in sharp contrast to the sobriety with which Socrates pursues his own protreptic questioning. But the strategies of this text are complex: the Euthydemus may be a playful satire of the desire to confound, yet beneath its knockabout humour a serious purpose is also visible.

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Waterfield, Robin. "The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies. By Roslyn Weiss." Heythrop Journal 48, no. 4 (2007): 615–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2007.00333_1.x.

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Maureen Eckert. "The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies (review)." Journal of the History of Philosophy 46, no. 3 (2008): 476–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.0.0025.

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Lightbody, Brian. "Socratic Appetites as Plotinian Reflectors: A New Interpretation of Plotinus’s Socratic Intellectualism." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2020): 91–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v14i1p91-115.

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Enneads I: 8.14 poses significant problems for scholars working in the Plotinian secondary literature. In that passage, Plotinus gives the impression that the body and not the soul is causally responsible for vice. The difficulty is that in many other sections of the same text, Plotinus makes it abundantly clear that the body, as matter, is a mere privation of being and therefore represents the lowest rung on the proverbial metaphysical ladder. A crucial aspect to Plotinus's emanationism, however, is that lower levels of a metaphysical hierarchy cannot causally influence higher ones and, thus, there is an inconsistency in the Egyptian's magnum opus, or so it would seem. Scholars have sought to work through this paradox by positing that Plotinus is a "paleolithic Platonist" or Socratic. The advantage of this approach is that one may be able to resolve the tension by invoking Socrates's eliminativist solution to the problem of weakness of will, as found in The Protagoras. In the following article, I argue that such attempts are not wrong-headed just underdetermined. They take up the standard reading of Socratic moral intellectualism, namely the "informational" interpretation and, therefore, fail to render a coherent view of Plotinus's moral philosophy. The following paper, in contrast, utilizes a new reading of intellectualism advanced by Brickhouse and Smith, which, when subtended with a "powers approach" to causality, resolves the aforementioned, problematic passage of Enneads.

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Jenks, Rod. "On the Sense of the Socratic Reply to Meno’s Paradox." Ancient Philosophy 12, no. 2 (1992): 317–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil19921225.

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Weller, Shane. ""Gnawing to be naught": Beckett and Pre-Socratic Nihilism." Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui 20, no. 1 (2008): 321–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18757405-020001026.

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This essay re-examines Beckett's relation to nihilism in the light of his 1930s reading notes on pre-Socratic philosophy, in particular Democritus, Gorgias and Thrasymachos. Focusing on the distinction between "cosmological nihilism" and "ethical nihilism" in John Burnet's , I chart Beckett's abiding concern with the "nothing" conceived both ontologically and ethically, and assess the importance for him of Archibald Alexander's phrasing of the atomist paradox and the cosmological nihilism of Gorgias.

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Austin, Scott. "The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance (How to Know That You Don’t Know)." Philosophical Topics 15, no. 2 (1987): 23–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19871522.

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Kamtekar, Rachana. "Aristotle contra Plato on the Voluntariness of Vice: The Arguments of Nicomachean Ethics 3.5." Phronesis 64, no. 1 (2019): 57–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341361.

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AbstractAristotle’s arguments in NE 3.5 target Plato’s position that vice is not blameworthy but to be pitied because involuntary, i.e. contrary to our wish for our good—not the ‘Socratic paradox’ that wrongdoing is involuntary. To this end, Aristotle develops a causal account of voluntary action based on Plato, Laws 9, but replaces Plato’s character-based classification of actions with his own distinction between performing actions of a certain type and having a character of that type. This distinction, central to Aristotle’s account of character-formation by habituating actions, allows Aristotle to show how character, whether vicious or virtuous, can be voluntary.

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Carvalho, John M. "Socrates' Refutation of Apollo." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2014): 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p40-56.

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It has been argued about Plato’s early dialogues that Socrates is made there to privilege beliefs derived from “information” he receives through certain forms of divination. These beliefs, the argument continues, are allowed to supplement Socrates’s elenctically established human knowledge while remaining “logically independent” of it.Such a view is needed, some believe, to solve the paradox that, while Socrates disavows knowledge of anything great or small, he is convinced that his life is morally unimpeachable. Socrates will also claim that wrongdoing is the result of ignorance implying that virtue follows from knowledge. These apparent conflicts can be explained, it is supposed, by Socrates’s confidence in divine signs which, while failing to secure the knowledge Socrates is seeking in answers to his “What is F?” questions, gives him the warrant he requires to hold the beliefs he does. This warrant could be substantively challenged, however, if it turned out that Socrates also believes these divine signs may be subject to elenctic refutation. I show, here, that Socrates does refute Apollo or, rather, that Socrates performs an elenchus on the god’s pronouncement, and that this elenctic test sheds important light on the meaning and function of “refutation” in Socratic argumentation. What Socrates hopes to exhibit through his examinations of the politicians, poets and artisans is just that, since there is someone wiser than Socrates, he has reasons for believing the god means something other than what he appears at first to say. If the apparent meaning of Apollo’s pronouncement cannot be shown to be inconsistent with the god’s otherwise infallible wisdom, Socrates will have reasons for doubting his own claim to lack such wisdom and for accepting the indictment brought against him. At his trial, Socrates argues that he refuted Apollo, but the jury, ironically, disagrees and convicts him of impiety.

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Sauvé Meyer, Susan. "Colloquium 2 “God is Not To Blame”: Divine Creation and Human Responsibility in Plato’s Timaeus." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2014): 55–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00291p05.

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When Timaeus claims that all vice is involuntary, and that it is not individual human beings but their “nurturers” and begetters” who must be assigned causal responsibility for human vice (Timaeus 86b-87b), he is extending the grand cosmological discourse he has been offering to include the causes of human vice, and he is presenting a novel twist on the Socratic paradox familiar from earlier works, that no one does wrong voluntarily. He is not, however, contradicting his earlier claims (42d-e) that human beings, rather than the gods, are responsible for human evils. This is because (a) 86b-87b does assign responsibility to human causes and (b) responsibility for individual actions is not under discussion there.

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Brull, Sorin J., and Glenn S. Murphy. "The “True” Risk of Postoperative Pulmonary Complications and the Socratic Paradox: “I Know that I Know Nothing”." Anesthesiology 134, no. 6 (2021): 828–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/aln.0000000000003767.

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Jones, Marc V. "Controlling Emotions in Sport." Sport Psychologist 17, no. 4 (2003): 471–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/tsp.17.4.471.

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Emotions play a central role in sport performance. Accordingly, it is important that athletes are able to draw on a range of strategies to enhance emotional control. The present paper outlines a number of strategies based on Lazarus’ cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. Strategies are outlined that aim to change cognitions, resulting in either a more appropriate emotional response or a suppression of the expression of emotion and any maladaptive behavioral consequences. These techniques comprise self-statement modification, imagery, socratic dialogue, corrective experiences, self-analysis, didactic approach, storytelling metaphors and poetry, reframing, cognitive paradox, and use of problem-solving skills. Furthermore, given the changes in physiological arousal accompanying certain emotions, it is also suggested that general arousal control strategies could play an important role in emotional control.

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Barresi, Paul A. "China’s Ecological Civilization Concept as a Principle of Global Environmental Governance." Chinese Journal of Environmental Law 4, no. 2 (2020): 235–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24686042-12340060.

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Abstract The most fascinating feature of China’s ecological civilization (shengtai wenming 生态文明) concept is not its goals, which are essentially indistinguishable from the goals of other post-modern visions of sustainable societies, but its explicit embrace of both modern and traditional means as essential for achieving those goals. This feature of the concept highlights a paradox that would be inherent in its implementation as a principle of global environmental governance in societies where a strong rule of law remains aspirational. Fortunately, the ecological civilization concept also seems flexible enough to allow for an implementation strategy with Socratic overtones that would help all societies to learn how to craft blends of both modern and traditional means of building an ecological civilization even in the absence of a strong rule of law.

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Trelawny-Cassity, Lewis. "Tēn Tou Aristou Doxan: On the Theory and Practice of Punishment in Plato’s Laws." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 27, no. 2 (2010): 222–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000168.

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The penal code of the Laws has attracted scholarly attention because it appears to advance a coherent theory of punishment. The Laws’ suggestion that legislation follow the model of ‘free doctors’, as well as its discussion of the Socratic paradox, leads one to expect a theory of punishment that recommends kolasis and nouthetēsis rather than timōria In practice, however, the Laws makes use of the language of timōria and categorizes some crimes as voluntary. While the Laws provides a searching criticism of contemporary Greek penal practices rooted in anger and retribution, Kleinias’ dramatic participation in the discussion forces the qualified inclusion of these common beliefs.While the Laws provides a philosophic intervention intended to reform the injustices of contemporary penal practices, it ultimately suggests that educated doxa, not theoretical completeness, is the proper standard for establishing a workable penal code.

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Long, Alex. "Philosophy - (R.) Weiss The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2006. Pp. xii + 235. £22.50. 9780226891729." Journal of Hellenic Studies 128 (November 2008): 277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0075426900001233.

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WOLFSDORF, DAVID. "(R.) Weiss The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Pp. xii + 235. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006. Cased, £22.50, US$35. ISBN: 978-0-226-89172-9." Classical Review 58, no. 1 (2008): 72–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009840x07001874.

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Fine, Gail. "Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’." Phronesis 55, no. 2 (2010): 125–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852810791129195.

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AbstractAccording to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno’s paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn’t conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno’s paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.

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Grgic, Filip. "Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 4 (December 31, 1999): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.4.02grg.

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Abstract In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called Meno's paradox and the eristic arguments. This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a manner in which Meno's paradox can be generalized. This implies that they cannot be resolved by the same argument. It is then argued that the theory of recollection, as presented in Socrates' experiment with the slave, cannot resolve Meno's paradox, its target being only the eristic argument. Only the hypothetical method of inquiry is the effective answer to Meno's paradox. Finally, this essay contends that, contrary to what the text might suggest, Socrates, by introducing the hypothetical method, does not abandon his principle that knowing what something is precedes knowing what something is like.

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Pynes, Christopher A. "A Modern Analytic Socrates and Meno’s Paradox." Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 21, no. 3 (2003): 23–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/inquiryctnews200321310.

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Motta, Alfonso Correa. "Cuando el pez torpedo nos pone a pensar Consideraciones sobre un libro reciente de Gail Fine." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9, no. 2 (2015): 78. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i2p78-100.

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Rivero Weber, Paulina. "El paradigma socrático." Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, no. 14-15 (October 1, 2003): 153–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2003.14-15.310.

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The paper starts from some contradictory interpretations of the character of Socrates, to think over the fate of this paradigmatic philosopher. In order to do so, it restates how this character brings forth two different and mutually exclusive forms of understanding the value of life in society, on the one hand, and the value of freedom of thought, on the other. Socrates is thus seen as the individual who lives the paradox of caring for life in society and attributing supreme worth to critical, autonomous thinking, which always opposes custom and social norms.

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BALANSARD, ANNE. "DES ARGUMENTS PROTAGORÉENS CONTRE LE CHANGEMENT. THÉÉTÉTE ET PHÉDON." Méthexis 24, no. 1 (2011): 109–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000581.

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On the evidence of Plato’s Theaetetus and Phaedo the author claims that Protagoras argued against changement. The paper develops in four steps. First, the paradox of the dices is taken into account. Then four parallels to this argument are recovered in Socrates’ autobiography in Plato’ Phaedo. Third, the four parallels are identified with the wise causes of the antilogies. Finally, the author addresses the objection that both Theaetetus in the Theaetetus and Socrates in the Phaedo show serious wondering and dismiss such arguments as merely sophisms by focusing on how the notion of wondering is used in the Euthydemus.

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Whidden, Christopher. "True Statesmanship as True Rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 22, no. 2 (2005): 206–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000077.

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In the Gorgias, Plato explores the relationship between statesmanship and rhetoric. Socrates argues that the true statesman uses the true rhetoric in the attempt to make others better through speeches. In the conversation with Gorgias, Socrates forces him to see the potentially disastrous consequences of teaching a kind of rhetoric that is morally neutral, which suggests the need for an uncompromisingly true or just rhetoric. In the exchange with Polus, Socrates attempts the just reformation of rhetoric into true rhetoric to counter the unjust rhetoric of Polus. In his discussion with Callicles, Socrates uses the true rhetoric to try to moderate him, but his failure reveals the limits of true statesmanship. By examining these three exchanges, I shed light on a unique and neglected paradox of the Gorgias. As clearly as the dialogue articulates what constitutes a true statesman, it challenges his own practice. Socrates, as the true statesman possessing the true rhetoric, is powerless to achieve his goals. However, a potential way to expand the success of the true statesman can be seen by going back to the discourse between Socrates and Gorgias and forging an alliance between them.

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Vlasits, Justin Joseph. "The Possibility of Inquiry. Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2015): 580–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1022135.

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Castagnoli, Luca. "The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus." Philosophical Review 127, no. 2 (2018): 225–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-4326617.

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Rocha, Gabriel Kafure da, and Estela Araújo Silva. "As ironias do conceito socrático em Kierkegaard." Trilhas Filosóficas 11, no. 1 (2018): 239–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.25244/tf.v11i1.3042.

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Resumo: O presente artigo visa fazer uma análise do socratismo em O conceito de Ironia de Kierkegaard, para isso, pressupomos o valor da ironia na antiguidade e das visões pós-socráticas. Buscamos assim, também, entender essencialmente a relação entre o filósofo e as ironias dos pontos de vista pagão e cristão. Por fim, vimos na visão da morte uma ironia do destino, que por sua vez abre a perspectiva entre o trágico e o cômico. Para tal investigação, utilizamos comentadores como Vergote, Farago, Politis, Stewart e principalmente Reichmann. Dessa maneira, chegaremos ao desfecho no qual Kierkegaard faz a transposição da realidade grega para a atualidade do seu contexto, com a possibilidade do uso adequado de uma ironia controlada.Palavras-chave: Humor. Cômico. Destino. Abstract: This article aims to make an analysis of Socratism in Kierkegaard's Concept of Irony, for which we presuppose the value of irony in antiquity and post-Socratic visions. We also seek to understand, essentially, the relation between the philosopher and the ironies from the pagan and Christian point of views. Finally, we saw in the vision of death an irony of fate, which in turn opens the perspective between the tragic and the comic. For such investigation, we use commentators like Vergote, Farago, Politis Stewart and mainly Reichmann. In this way, we will arrive at the outcome in which Kierkegaard transposes Greek reality to the actuality of his context, with the possibility of proper use of controlled irony.Keywords: Humor. Comic. Destiny. REFERÊNCIASAMARAL, Ilana. O 'Conceito' de Paradoxo (Contantemente referido a Hegel) - Fé, história e linguagem em S. Kierkegaard. Tese de Doutorado. São Paulo: PUC, 2008. 247 f.FARAGO, France. Compreender Kierkegaard. Tradução de Ephraim Alves. Petrópolis: Ed. Vozes, 2006.GOUVÊA, Ricardo. Paixão pelo paradoxo: Uma introdução a Kierkegaard. São Paulo: Fonte Editorial, 2006.HOWLAND, Jacob. Kierkegaard and Socrates: A study in philosophy and faith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.KIERKEGAARD, Søren. O conceito de Ironia constantemente referido à Sócrates. Tradução de Álvaro Valls. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1991._______. Ponto de vista explicativo da minha obra de escritor: uma comunicação direta, relatório à História. Tradução de João Gama. Lisboa: Edições 70, 2002.OUBINHA, Oscar. Loquere ut Videam: “’Guilty?/‘Not Guilty?” and The writing of irony. IN: JUSTO; SOUSA: ROSFORT. Kierkegaard and the challenges of infinitude – Philosophy and literature in Dialogue. Lisboa: CFUL, 2013.REICHMANN, Ernani. Soeren Kierkegaard: Textos selecionados. Curitiba: Editora Imprensa Universitária, 1978._______. Intermezzo lírico-filosófico: Carta a Carlos Galvez. Curitiba: Edição do autor, 1963.SILVA, Fernando. A subjectivity raised to the second power – Kierkegaard’s view of Schelegel’s Concept of Irony. In: JUSTO; SOUSA: ROSFORT. Kierkegaard and the challenges of infinitude: Philosophy and literature in Dialogue. Lisboa: CFUL, 2013.STEWART, Jon. Søren Kierkegaard: subjetividade, ironia e a crise da modernidade. Tradução de Humberto Souza. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2017.PLATÃO. Apologia de Sócrates. In: Os pensadores. Tradução de Jaime Bruna. 2ª Ed.. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1980._______. Diálogos: Eutífron – Apologia de Sócrates – Críton – Fédon. Tradução de Marcio Pugliesi. São Paulo: Hemus, 1977.POLITIS, Hélène. Le concept de philosophie constamment rapporté à Kierkegaard. Paris: Editions Kimé, 2009.VERGOTE, Henri. Sens et Repetition: essai sur la ironie kierkegaardiene. Paris: Cerf/Orante, 1982.

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Hadikoesoemo, Niki. "Altering Bodies: Thinking of intervention through impersonation." Performance Philosophy 5, no. 2 (2020): 316–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.21476/pp.2020.52281.

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This essay stages a philosophical dialogue between one of Plato’s earliest and shortest works, Ion, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s deconstructive reflections on Diderot’s paradox of the actor. It takes the rhapsodic practice of the ancient figure of Ion as a reference point for thinking about the performer’s intoxicating nature and investigates its philosophical, bodily and psychological implications as well as its critical potential. It will proceed in three stages. The first part takes a detailed look at the absolute focal point of Ion, namely the analogy between the rhapsode’s intoxication and the Heraclean lodestone. The second part addresses the ‘logic’ of the magnet specifically from Ion’s point of view, which entails a critique of Socrates’ assumption of Ion being ‘out of his wits’ when he performs. The final part shows, with the help of Lacoue-Labarthe’s radicalization of Diderot’s paradox – the actor is nothing and everything at the same time – how Ion’s intoxicating impersonations can be considered an imperative for catharsis and critical intervention.

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Shaw, J. Clerk. "Poetry and Hedonic Error in Plato’s Republic." Phronesis 61, no. 4 (2016): 373–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341312.

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This paper reads Republic 583b-608b as a single, continuous line of argument. First, Socrates distinguishes real from apparent pleasure and argues that justice is more pleasant than injustice. Next, he describes how pleasures nourish the soul. This line of argument continues into the second discussion of poetry: tragic pleasures are mixed pleasures in the soul that seem greater than they are; indulging them nourishes appetite and corrupts the soul. The paper argues that Plato has a novel account of the ‘paradox of tragedy’, and that the Republic and Philebus contain complementary discussions of tragic and comic pleasure.

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Ebrey, David. "The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus by Gail Fine." Journal of the History of Philosophy 55, no. 3 (2017): 537–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2017.0053.

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Kulak, Avron. "Between Singularity and Plurality: Kierkegaard and the Paradox of Absolute Difference." Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 26, no. 1 (2021): 223–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0010.

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Abstract This study is dedicated to exploring the ways in which Kierkegaard provides a criterion for thinking about the principles of plurality when, in the context of distinguishing between Socrates and Christ, between different conceptions of difference—between those that support the difference of the other and those that do not—he writes that, just as no one must separate what God has joined, so no one must join what God has separated. When Kierkegaard then makes central to faith the incommensurability of single individuals, he indicates that the inviolable singularity of self and other is the one principle that can be true for all—that can be plural—since it is the one principle that is inclusive of all. In my paper I argue through Kierkegaard that the relationship between the singular and the plural embraces the paradox of absolute difference, the paradox of difference as absolute: the single individual exists only by standing in absolute relation to all others as absolute; the plural exists only insofar as it involves the commitment to the singular standard that, as absolute, preserves the difference of all.

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Weston, Michael. "Philosophy and Religion in the Thought of Kierkegaard." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 32 (March 1992): 9–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005622.

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Kierkegaard is often regarded as a precursor of existential philosophy whose religious concerns may, for philosophical purposes, be safely ignored or, at best, regarded as an unfortunate, if unavoidable, consequence of his complicity with the very metaphysics he did so much to discredit. Kierkegaard himself, however, foresaw this appropriation of his work by philosophy. ‘The existing individual who forgets that he is an existing individual will become more and more absent-minded’, he wrote, ‘and as people sometimes embody the fruits of their leisure moments in books, so we may venture to expect as the fruits of his absent-mindedness the expected existential system—well, perhaps, not all of us, but only those who are as absent-minded as he is’ (Kierkegaard, 1968, p. 110). However, it may be rejoined here, this expectation merely shows Kierkegaard's historically unavoidable ignorance of the development of existential philosophy with its opposition to the idea of system and its emphasis upon the very existentiality of the human being. How could a form of thought which, in this way, puts at its centre the very Being of the existing individual, its existentiality, be accused of absent-mindedness? Has it not, rather, recollected that which metaphysics had forgotten? Yet the impression remains that Kierkegaard would not have been persuaded himself that such recollection could constitute remembering that one is an existing individual, for he remarks, of his own ignoring of the difference between Socrates and Plato in his Philosophical Fragments, ‘By holding Socrates down to the proposition that all knowledge is recollection, he becomes a speculative philosopher instead of an existential thinker, for whom existence is the essential thing. The recollection principle belongs to speculative philosophy, and recollection is immanence, and speculatively and eternally there is no paradox’ (Kierkegaard, 1968, p. 184n). We must ask, therefore, whether the recollection of existentiality can cure an existential absent-mindedness or remains itself a form of immanence for which there is no paradox.

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Svetlov, Roman, and Konstantin Shevtsov. "Scepsis and paradox: the problem of skepticism in Plato and the ancient tradition of paradoxes." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 2 (2019): 683–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-2-683-694.

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The subject of the research is the question of what texts of Plato could become a stimulus for the formation of skeptical ideas in the Academy. Can we, in particular, raise the question of the presence in the texts of Plato of something similar to the principle of the “epoche”, which is the most important methodological sign of skepticism? Can be compared with skepticism the elenchic strategy of Socrates? In our opinion, there are a number of moments in the works of Plato, which brings him closer to skeptical discourse (although this does not make him a skeptic). We dwell only on two of them. The first is the ability of the protagonists of his dialogues to hold in their arguments the two opposite sides of the subject in their undoubted difference and, at the same time, in mutual necessity. This is the Platonic dialectic in its true expression, examples of which we see in the Sophistes and the Parmenides. The second specific aspect of Plato's thought is in the formulation by Plato of a number of logical paradoxes. In its classic version, it became known, however, a little later, in the works of representatives of the Megarian school. We shall deal in more detail with the paradox of the liar, or “the thesis of Epimenides”, which is often seen as a classic example of a self-referential statement. The article will show analogies to the paradox of the liar in Plato's texts. The key point is the last argument from the Theaetetus, where Socrates examines the definition of knowledge as a true opinion with the addition of a specifying attribute (Thaet 201c-208d), as well as the 7th and 8th hypotheses of the Parmenides (Parm. 164b-166c). It seems to us that this moment of the Platonic dialectic also turns out to be a definite resource for the future “skeptical turn” in the Academy. Especially in the situation when the dialogues of Plato were discussed in terms of interest in the arguments of Pyrrho and the Megarians, for whom paradoxes were one of the important methodological tools.

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Clausius, Katharina. "JOHN CAGE'S ‘WHITENESS’: ‘CHEAP IMITATION’." Tempo 65, no. 258 (2011): 11–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0040298211000350.

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‘To be interested in Satie one must be disinterested to begin with,’ declares John Cage of his contradictory relationship with the older composer. If paradox summarizes this particular discourse between an interested pupil and his predecessor, however, it is both a compositional and musicological discourse exploring the juxtaposition of explicit historicism and aesthetic distance, or ‘disinterest’. The project, or rather the problem, of musical ‘neutrality’ is one that Cage inherited from his idol and subsequently adopted with enthusiasm, as his stubborn pre-occupation with Erik Satie's 1918 symphonic drama, Socrate, evinces. Cage's initial encounter with Satie's work seems quickly to have inspired a commitment to interrogating modernism's engagement with history. Having been introduced to Socrate by Virgil Thomson in a performance that, in Anthony Tommasini's words, ‘profoundly changed Cage, [who] grew to revere Satie’, Cage immediately set out to adapt the score for Merce Cunningham's ballet Idyllic Song in 1947. Denied copyright permission for his two-piano arrangement, Cage resourcefully set out to re-write the musical accompaniment for the ballet (and appease the disobliging publishers) more than two decades later in 1969, retaining Satie's original phrasing in order to preserve Cunningham's choreography and sardonically re-titling the piece Cheap Imitation.

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Salkever, Stephen. "A Socrates Become Beautiful and Young - Jacob Howland: The Paradox of Political Philosophy: Socrates’ Philosophic Trial. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. Pp. x, 342. $68.00. $24.95, paper.)." Review of Politics 61, no. 1 (1999): 141–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500028163.

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Waterfield, Robin. "The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus. By Gail Fine. Pp. xiv, 399, Oxford University Press, 2014, £55.00/$85.00." Heythrop Journal 59, no. 4 (2018): 748–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12995.

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Grosso, Michael. "Divine Mania: Alteration of Consciousness in Ancient Greece by Yulia Ustinova." Journal of Scientific Exploration 35, no. 3 (2021): 682–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.31275/20212127.

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What role did altered states of consciousness play in the life of ancient Greek society? With consummate skill and scholarship, Yulia Ustinova answers this question in her book, Divine Mania: Alteration of Consciousness in Ancient Greece. It appears that the secret of the extraordinary creativity of the ancient Greeks was their receptivity to, and approval of, a particular altered state of consciousness they cultivated. Mania is the name for this but it must be qualified as “god-given.” Mania is a word that touches on a cluster of concepts: madness, ecstasy, and enthusiasm, engoddedness, to use Ustinova’s more vivid coinage. It seems a paradox that this special, strange and often quite frightening state of dissociation should be so closely linked to one of the most creative civilizations. Unlike the Roman and Egyptian, the Greek approved and recognized the value of god-inspired mania. Plato makes Socrates say in the Phaedrus that through mania we may obtain the “greatest blessings.” Whereas resistance to divine ecstasy can end in disaster, as Euripides illustrates in The Bacchants when Pentheus, a repressive authoritarian, tries to inhibit a posse of women from their ecstatic mountain dances. He is torn to shreds by his mother and her maniacal cohorts. This mindset of the ancient Greeks may have long ago petered out, but similar tendencies are constants, expressed in one form or another, throughout history.

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Nahhas, Rawa. "Invitation to Think: Technology and Sustainability – A Utopia Paradigm." GATR Global Journal of Business and Social Science Review (GJBSSR) Vol.5(3) Jul-Sep 2017 5, no. 3 (2017): 185–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gjbssr.2017.5.3(21).

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Objective - This paper pursues an approach of archaeological meditations into human achievement and its fruits; meditations in search of the possibility and the means of conditioning innovations in a manner that can harness these innovations to make "sustainable development" a reality that goes beyond mere "utopian dreams." The process seems like a feast for the thinking and inquiry: what do we do about the experienced paradox of the times: the abundant wealth of the scientific technological experience with its ever-evolving revolutions of innovation on one hand, and a plethora of deeply-rooted ever-increasing problems manifested in the issues of sustained development that challenge present creativity while pursuing the dream. Methodology/Technique - In this research, previous studies reviewed extensively. Findings - In conclusion, we intended our approach to be a feast for thinking based on the Aristotelian concept of "the will to live together," in order to foster mature and responsible thinking methodologies. This can be possible when the philosophical mind comprehensively and radically tackles existing and future realities, in light of the present situation while contending with irresponsible practices, to achieve a transition from mental deficiency to maturity as a first step towards a productive system for human activity in general. Novelty - The study justifies that we intended our approach to be a feast for thinking based on the Aristotelian concept of "the will to live together," to foster mature and responsible thinking methodologies. Type of Paper: Review Keywords: Question is Power; Sustainable Development; Utopia; Socrates Dialogue; Innovation. JEL Classification: B51, Z13.

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Hummler, Madeleine. "The Classical world - Martin M. Winkler (ed.). Troy: From Homer’s Iliad to Hollywood Epic. xi+236 pages, 20 plates. 2007. Oxford, Malden (MA) & Victoria: Blackwell; 1-4051-3182-9 hardback £55 & $74.95 & AUS$165; 1-4051-3183-7 paperback £19.99 & $29.95 & AUS$48.95. - Charles Martindale & Richard F. Thomas (ed.). Classics and the Uses of Reception. xiii+336 pages, 20 plates. 2006. Oxford, Malden (MA) & Victoria: Blackwell; 1-4051-3146-2 hardback £60 & $89.95 & AUS$231; 1-4051-3145-4 paperback £19.99 & $36.95 & AUS$58.95. - Roslyn Weiss. The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. xii+236 pages. 2006. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 0-226-89172-0 hardback $35 & £22.50. - Mark Munn. The Mother of the Gods, Athens, and the Tyranny of Asia. xviii+458 pages. 2006. Los Angeles (CA): University of California Press; 0-520-24349-1 hardback £32.50. - Waldemar Heckel. Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great. xxii+392 pages. 2006. Oxford, Malden (MA) & Victoria: Blackwell; 1-4051-1210-7 hardback £50 & $79.95 & AUS$193. - Nicholas J. Saunders Alexander’s Tomb: The Two Thousand Year Obsession to Find the Lost Conqueror. xiii+292 pages, 23 illustrations. 2006. New York: Basic Books; 0-465-07202-6 hardback US$26 & CAN$34.95." Antiquity 80, no. 310 (2006): 1034–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003598x00120034.

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Hannan, Natalie. "Knowledge and Voluntary Injustice in the Hippias Minor." Apeiron, November 16, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2020-0031.

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AbstractPlato’s Hippias Minor proposes a thesis that I call the Superiority of the Voluntary Wrongdoer (SVW), which states that the person doing something wrong voluntarily is better than the person doing it wrong involuntarily. This claim has long unsettled scholars, who have tried to determine whether Socrates is serious about SVW or disavows it. The primary strategy among interpreters is to appeal to Socrates’ prior commitment to the “Socratic paradox” that no one does injustice voluntarily; with the Socratic paradox in the background, it is argued, we can better understand how Socrates treats SVW. In this paper, I aim to show that the Hippias Minor points us towards a different understanding of SVW and the Socratic paradox, with implications for their role both in the dialogue and in Plato’s philosophy as a whole. My first step towards this understanding is to consider the distinctive methodology of the Hippias Minor. Socrates’ attitude towards his and Hippias’ arguments is characterized by πλάνη, or wavering; I argue that this wavering shows that Socrates wants to determine how he might accommodate what is compelling about both his and Hippias’ positions, rather than choosing one over the other. To that end, I look more closely at what each interlocutor proposes in the dialogue, concluding that many of their primary commitments are shared by both interlocutors and do not contradict. We do not, then, need to throw out SVW, and we can grasp the true role of the Socratic paradox: it is not axiomatic but a conditional conclusion of the dialogue, and Socrates’ attempt to reconcile SVW with Hippias’ arguments provides reasons and motivation for accepting it. Accordingly, we cannot assume that the Socratic paradox will be in place, and we should look for some indication in the Hippias Minor as to why it could hold. I argue that the dialogue provides a framework for doing so, by taking steps towards a new understanding of knowledge (epistēmē) that can support the Socratic paradox. These moves put the Hippias Minor in the position of beginning to examine and develop key ideas in Plato’s ethics and epistemology.

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"The Socratic paradox and its enemies." Choice Reviews Online 44, no. 04 (2006): 44–2062. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.44-2062.

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Noller, Jörg. "Rationalizing: Kant on Moral Self-Deception." SATS, August 25, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sats-2020-0011.

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Abstract Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”) helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason in order to construct the illusion according to which we are not bound to the absolute demand of the moral law, but rather subject to exceptions and excuses. Finally, the paper interprets the three rules of “common sense” (sensus communis) in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment in terms of an antidote to rationalizing.

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"The paradox of political philosophy: Socrates' philosophic trial." Choice Reviews Online 36, no. 01 (1998): 36–0251. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.36-0251.

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"Ambiguities in Kreitton logos?" Mnemosyne 57, no. 3 (2004): 284–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525041317949.

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AbstractIn the Agon of Aristophanes' Clouds, Pheidippides has to choose Kreitton logos or Hetton logos in order to get the proper education at Socrates' thinking-shop. Kreitton logos's account is a praise of old-time education. He praises courage, endurance and hard work but at the same time his account is full of sexual remarks. In an influential discussion, Dover found a paradox at the heart of Kreitton logos's account: "Kreitton logos is obsessed with boys' genitals", according to Dover. In this article, I shall argue that in the context of archaic and classical Greece desire is compatible with temperance, and, accordingly, that the message of the speaker is not undermined by the copious references to sex. Using evidence from the orators, as well as philosophical texts, I argue that the call for temperance is not subverted by the lurid details, and that Kreitton logos's account can be seen as a call for modesty and self-control. I also question the approach to characterization in comedy underlying interpretations which see Kreitton logos's account as subverted by the dramatist.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Socratic paradox'

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