Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Soeharto, Indonesia Indonesia'

Based on the author's doctoral dissertation entitled : Breaking the immortalized past : anti-communist discourse and reconciliatory politics in post-Suharto Indonesia.
Includes bibliographical references and index.

This thesis examines the processes through which the redistribution of political and economic power is taking place in post-Soeharto Indonesia. In order to do this, patterns of `grand' corruption between the business community and the state are explored in three sites: the allocation of government contracts, the interaction between business associations and the state, and the negotiations over the repayment of debt. It is found that corruption has become more widely dispersed with the inclusion of new state actors and that the basis of allocation has moved away from the political influence of the Soeharto-era towards the more uncomplicated power of money. It is proposed that the conventional arguments which either invest institutions with the sole responsibility for limiting corruption or alternatively view them as completely irrelevant to the real exercise of power are both flawed. Rather, it is argued in this thesis that institutional change does indeed affect patterns of corruption, freezing out some participants, introducing others and defining new sites of corrupt exchange. The significance of such an analysis lies in the idea that corruption can never be destroyed but rather it is controlled through alterations of its character. Thus, any attempts to limit corruption must be grounded in such an analysis of its particular character. It is found that corruption has become more widely dispersed with the inclusion of new state actors and that the basis of allocation has moved away from the political influence of the Soeharto-era towards the more uncomplicated power of money. It is proposed that the conventional arguments which either invest institutions with the sole responsibility for limiting corruption or alternatively view them as completely irrelevant to the real exercise of power are both flawed. Rather, it is argued in this thesis that institutional change does indeed affect patterns of corruption, freezing out some participants, introducing others and defining new sites of corrupt exchange. The significance of such an analysis lies in the idea that corruption can never be destroyed but rather it is controlled through alterations of its character. Thus, any attempts to limit corruption must be grounded in such an analysis of its particular character. It is further hypothesised that efforts to limit corruption are badly served by an exclusive focus on the rules inherent in institutions at the expense of the inclusion of corruption's deeper structural causes. In response to this, the idea that corruption is partially driven by the need to foster the domestic capital accumulation process in a context of historic underdevelopment is explored throughout this thesis. Thus, it is proposed that corruption can be viewed as a system of wealth distribution based not just on money and connections, but also ethnicity and nationality.

The thesis will address the question of why Islamic political parties, in the first decade of the reform era, suffer internal fragmentation and have failed to develop cohesion, while one Islamic party has been able to develop and consolidate. This thesis will explore and analyze factors and reasons behind the problem of the cohesion of the Islamic political parties by associating it with the existence of party institutionalization. For this purpose, this thesis would be a study of comparative institutionalization of Islamic political parties, particularly between the National Wakening Party (PKB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). PKB is a good exemplar for an Islamic party that experienced severely fragmented parties. In fact, this party has became the largest among Islamic political parties and including one of the worst fragmentations among all new political parties in Indonesia. Meanwhile, PKS has been able to maintain its internal discipline and unity, although factionalism and fragmentation have become commonplace during the first decade of the Reform Era. This thesis believes that the more a party have been institutionalized, which is indicated by the existence of procedural leadership in decision-making process, the effectiveness of internal conflict resolution mechanism, the continuation of systematic cadrerization and the commitment to the shared values, there is a bigger chance of the party to preserve its cohesion. On the other hand, the less a party have been institutionalized which is indicated by the ineffectiveness of procedural leadership, the failure of internal conflict resolution mechanism, the impediment of systematic cadrerization, and the failure to provide ideology as the guidance of policy and uniting values, there is more possibility for the party to be fragmented.

The author discusses library and information science education before and after 1998, the year President Soeharto stepped down. Before 1998, the government centralized policy making. For LIS education, the Ministry of Education through the Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE), issued a nation-wide curriculum for sarjana or undergraduate programmes, leaving little space for LIS schools to establish additional courses. After 1998, the Directorate General of Higher Education issued minimum requirements for LIS schools with the remaining credit hours to be decided by each institution. Also before 1998, DGHE issued permission to open new LIS schools after reviewing the submitted proposals. Post 1998, any university could open undergraduate and graduate programmes in LIS without DGHE permission even though not all academic requirements are fulfilled. However, LIS schools must be supervised for two years after their programmes begin by an accrediting agency. The centralised policy also influenced course content.

Prevailing perspectives on the role of the Indonesian Parliament (DPRlMPR) under President Soeharto's New Order deride it as a politically quiescent institution that had insignificant influence over policy-making. Indeed, approaches that evaluate the legitimacy and effectiveness of legislatures in terms of regularly held free and fair elections and the ability of parliamentarians to initiate or reject legislation will find scant evidence that the Indonesian parliament has played a significant role under Soeharto. From this conventional perspective, the DPR was politically insignificant, save, perhaps, as one of several instruments available to the authoritarian regime to legitimate its rule. Yet a closer look at the history of the New Order casts serious doubts over the notion of a placid legislature where nothing of substance ever took place. For example, the DPR was key in enabling Soeharto to become lawfully President in 1967, and was again instrumental in May 1998 by compelling the dictator to resign from office. This thesis examines the apparent paradox, and makes two clusters of arguments. The first cluster addresses the broad concerns of students of political systems, in particular authoritarianism, and makes two main points. First, there was far more political activity within the DPRlMPR under Soeharto than commonly assumed, especially in the final decade of his rule that is the focus of this study. Secondly, a close scrutiny of the Indonesian parliament demonstrates that the 'authoritarian' New Order underwent some important changes throughout its 32 years. In a nutshell, the New Order degenerated from collusion between capitalists, the military and the bureaucracy into 'monarchical' personal rule, losing some of its modem structures and much of the credibility of its claim to favour democracy. To use the terms coined by Max Weber and subsequently adapted by Juan Linz to the study of contemporary politics of transition, Soeharto's regime developed over the years from a bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime to one with strong 'sultanistic' features. A sultanistic regime is one that involves an increasingly discretionary use of the powers that have been usurped by the ruler. The second cluster of argument adds to scholarship on Indonesia in three respects. First, the factionalism among elites under Soeharto is shown to be far more complex than conventional views that have usually focussed on the Armed Forces to the relative neglect of civilian factionalism. The evidence also indicates that factional lines straddle the civil-military divide. Therefore, it is a false dichotomy to distinguish between civil and military factionalism since the two are inextricably intertwined. Examples of such alliances are discussed in chapters three and four. Secondly, a case is made about periodisation, and the accuracy of commonly accepted milestones in the last decade of the New Order. Again, the evidence gathered in this study points to some anachronisms regarding Indonesia's "Islamic tum," the political clout of the armed forces as an institution, and the cohesiveness of Soeharto's alleged 'inner circle'. The importance of pinpointing the origins of Soeharto' s cultivation of an Islamic middle class basis of support at the expense of the armed forces as an institution sheds considerable light on the balance of power between the officers and the palace, and in particular the validity of describing the New Order as a military dictatorship, as was commonly accepted in the late 1980s. The question of the New Order's 'Islamisation' is discussed in depth in chapter three. The third point examines the limit to Soeharto's sultanistic strategy. It is argued that the shift to absolutist rule, while undermining the logic of the bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime did not provide an alternative that accommodated the interests of powerful elites. Instead, it was perceived as threatening the long-term interests of key factions within both the political Islamic civilian elites and the military. Sultanism ushered unpredictability in the recruitment of elites and in the dispensation of patronage, and threatened the interests of the armed forces as an institution. It gradually alienated these crucial groups, paving the way for an unlikely tactical alliance between Armed Forces commander-in-chief General Wiranto and vice-president Habibie. The origins of this internal realignment in the regime are discussed in detail in chapters four and five. Chapter six brings this study into the final months of the New Order, and examines the background to the critical role played by the parliamentary institutions in giving Soeharto his coup de grace, when the DPR Speaker Harmoko called on the President to resign on 18 May 1998, three days before Soeharto stepped down. We conclude by highlighting the continuities between parliament under the New Order and in the Post-Soeharto era, and assessing the likely role of parliament in Indonesia's democratization.

This study explores the marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of political parties. More specifically, it attempts to provide a systematic understanding of the structural conditions and factors that determine such developments in a new democracy. The following propositions commence this study. In new democracies that are indicated by a set of conditions postulated by Strömbäck (2007: 63), Strömbäck (2010: 28-29) and Strömbäck et al. (2012: 86), political parties are likely to adopt marketing principles, procedures and techniques to advance not only market-orientation, but also campaign structure and strategies. However, none of these parties is likely to turn into either market-oriented or the professional-electoral/sales-oriented parties. To evaluate such propositions, this study selected the new democracy of Indonesia as a case study, adopted critical realism as a research philosophy, formulated a holistic conceptual framework and applied a pure-mix of qualitative and the quantitative research methodology. Survey data were collected from marketers/campaigners of 10 Indonesian political parties during the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. The in-depth interview data were derived from these parties’ leaders/secretaries, senior editors of the Indonesian media and political consultants and pollsters. These data were combined with reports released by these media and pollsters, the Indonesian research centres and the Indonesian General Election and Broadcasting Commissions. This study reveals that there were ‘structural conditions’, which stimulated the Indonesian political parties Post-Soeharto New Order to develop such practices. In facing these elections, these parties realized the importance of political market arenas and political sub-markets and advanced such practices strategically. None of these parties however, turned into either market-oriented or the professional-electoral/sales-oriented parties. The main finding of this study is that in the emerging democratic countries, which have been ruled under the presidential government system and indicated by the candidate-centred system, such as Indonesia, the party orientations related to such practices seem to be matters of mode and degree rather than of type. The following factors determined such orientations. They include: a) perceptions of the party leaders, candidates and marketers/campaigners regarding the relative importance of the internal party, the media and electoral arenas; b) the party-specific factors, especially, party ideology, size, campaign resources and position in the government and experiences with internal and external shocks; c) the party’s competitive chances to fulfil the minimum number of the presidential election threshold, assemble a political coalition and nominate a pair of presidential candidates; and d) the party presidential candidate-specific factors. This study offers the following novelty theoretical and prescriptive models. The first theoretical model conceptualises the structural conditions and factors that determine developments of marketisation and professionalisation of campaigning of political parties in such countries within and across the parliamentary and presidential elections. The second theoretical model underpins formation of the party presidential candidate-specific factors and theorises its impacts on such developments systematically; while the third theoretical model provides a baseline framework to explore the effects of these aforementioned factors on such developments holistically. The second and the third theoretical models could be transformed into the prescriptive models to help these parties to achieve their goals in these elections effectively. The mainstream centre-right or centre- left parties in the Western democracy could adopt these models, as they want to tactically confront the rises of the radical-right wing populist parties and movements and strategically manage the sustainability of the liberal democratic system and society.

碩士
國立中山大學
中國與亞太區域研究所
104
Indonesia in the past was a region long under the colonial rule of Netherland. It was not until the era of president Sukarno that it became an independent country. He established the 1945 constitution on the basis of the Pancasila principles. Indonesia then undertook three temporary constitutions until the presidency of president Soeharto, when the 1945 constitution was finally established as the fundamental law of the country. Vice president B.J.Habibie then succeeded president Soeharto after he was forced to resign under pressure of the financial crisis. A series of constitutional reforms have been taken since in an attempt to solve the problems created during the authoritarian reign of president Soeharto, and to create a more democratic Indonesia. Through the review of literature, this thesis reviewed the process and outcomes of the four constitutional amendments since president Soeharto’s resignation, which includes the reform of the president’s power and term, limitation of the military’s involvement in social and political issues, judicial reforms, and the structural as well as functional reform of the parliament. This thesis analyzed the impact of the four amendments on the democratization of Indonesia, the governmental system, and state reforms, with further analysis of the needs for future constitutional amendments and democratization.

This dissertation examines the production and reproduction of knowledge among Salafi groups in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It specifically discusses the issues of how Salafi groups produce the knowledge they claim to be based on the authentic form of Islam in the context of social, political, and economic change. Salafis advocate the need for a return to the authoritative religious sources: the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Salafi manhaj (methods and paths of Salafi teachings). Without the last element, Salafis claim, the proper understanding and practice of Islamic teachings are impossible. The research was carried out in three major sites: Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Makassar, where significant numbers of Salafis are found. Ethnographic fieldwork, conducted from January to June 2011, and from July 2012 to February 2013, focused on the individual roles, organizational networks, and historical and sociological processes which shaped the reproduction of Salafi knowledge. To create an ideal community based on the Salafist understanding of Islamic ethics, many Salafis create separate enclaves where they erect madrasa and mosques, two strategic institutions fundamental for their development. Claiming to be based on the authority of the Prophet, Salafis develop a medicine and market it to other Muslim groups. Most Salafis engage in endogamous marriage to maintain the groups’ solidity. The roles of women within Salafi groups are highly circumscribed. While having careers is possible, women are expected to stay at home and take care of their families. Salafis represent only a tiny minority of Indonesian Muslims, and they compete with a diverse admixture of Muslim groups, which challenge Salafi interpretations of Islamic knowledge. The political aspects of Salafism are visible in a number of matters of religious knowledge and practice. Salafis use the issues of religious purification as a political tool to maintain their identities and to attack other Muslim groups. Heated debates between Salafis and traditionalist, and to a lesser degree, reformist Muslims, which sometimes lead to violent conflicts, are inevitable. While creating sharp social and religious divisions, debates also result in an exchange of ideas among Muslim groups, heightening the diversity of Salafist forms of knowledge and practice.

This thesis examines several dynamics of Islamic politics and Islamism in contemporary post-Soeharto Indonesia. Islamism in Indonesia is investigated both through the lens of a social movement and through its ability to effect political and social change for contemporary Indonesian society. Historical and post-independence contexts of Islamism are briefly covered, before a survey of Islam in contemporary Indonesian politics is presented. Ultimately, this thesis argues that Islamism has achieved some success and influence presently through its articulation of a religiously inspired agenda, but present divisions related to competing external strategies dealing with state, and its own internal fractures, will continue to hamper Indonesian Islamism as a fully effective realized social movement.

碩士
國立臺灣師範大學
東亞學系
104
In 2014, Basuki Cahaya Purnama (popularly known as Ahok) was inaugurated as the first governor with Tionghoa ethnicity in the post-Soeharto era. His case not only marks the milestone of Tionghoa’s political participation in Indonesia, but also inspires more Tionghoa to engage in the local politics, with the aim of maintaining their social status and rights. Nevertheless, while Tionghoa enthusiastically participate in the local politics by means of establishing political parties, being upheld by mainstream parties for representative elections, or running for local elections, there are still some people in the public who do not recognize Tionghoa’s identity and their political participation. Therefore, with companion of recent advocacy to strive for self-identity, the Indonesian-Tionghoa can leap at the chance, through the approach of political participation in the democratic electoral system, to gain the preliminary identity from local society, and gradually achieve identity in other aspects. By analyzing the facts of Indonesian-Tionghoa’s political participation after the fall of Soeharto, this research firstly shows that running for elections of local chief executives has steadily become the trend for Tionghoa’s political participation. Moreover, with netnography as the method of data collecting for further analysis, the ideology of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) has been rooted in the public’s mind since several significant cases, discriminating Basuki’s Tionghoa identity, are denounced by most people in their comments. Accordingly, more people in Indonesia can also accept Tionghoa, as national citizens, to engage in local politics. Therefore, it is shown in these case analyses that Tionghoa’s political participation is not only the way to sustain their development, but also the entry point to obtain identity from the local public. Although Tionghoa still need to be more active in political participation with facing internal and external hampers, they may be benefited from interaction brought by more Tionghoa’s political participation, which enhances both their self-identity bound and the identity from the society. To sum up, this exploratory research concludes that Indonesian-Tionghoa should seize the opportunity to strive for identity from the public by political participation, which gives Tionghoa a potential approach to stimulating their interaction with the local public and other dimensions of identity from the latter, so as to embody the values disclosed in the national ideology, Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.