Academic literature on the topic 'Soft euroscepticism'
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Journal articles on the topic "Soft euroscepticism"
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Hargitai, Tibor. "How Eurosceptic is Fidesz actually?" Politics in Central Europe 16, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 189–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2020-0009.
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AbstractUntil now there is no consensus in the academic literature as to whether Fidesz is a (soft) Eurosceptic party or rather Europragmatic. By identifying the manifestations of Euroscepticism on the policy level rather than the party level, this article sheds light on the dynamics of Fidesz’s Euroscepticism. It also looks at the party strategy of Fidesz regarding its main Eurosceptic competitor Jobbik, and how this facilitated further Euroscepticism. Hungary’s vision of the EU is at odds with the vision of most member states and EU institutions, which makes Fidesz not only Eurosceptic; but there is a form of inverted soft Euroscepticism characterising Fidesz’s vision and policies towards the EU.
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Vainshtein, G. "Euroscepticism: New Factor of European Politics." World Economy and International Relations, no. 8 (2015): 40–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-8-40-48.
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The phenomenon of Euroscepticism, not long ago a marginal part of the European political landscape, increasingly moves forward to the political foreground. This article explores the meaning of the notion of Euroscepticism, analyzes current peculiarities of this phenomenon, its scale and main sources, as well as differentiation of anti-integrationist political actors. While the very phenomenon existed in European politics throughout the implementation of the European project, a new characteristic of the socio-political situation in the EU is the ongoing broadening of this phenomenon's scale, the growth of its electoral support and the radicalization of its articulation forms. The strengthening of critical public attitudes towards realities of the European integration which is a feature of the contemporary socio-political climate in Europe not only has weakened the traditional pro-integrationist consensus of the political establishment, but has also led to a substantial reinforcement of more or less radical opponents of the European project within the European party-political space. This development seems to be an indicator of the European political mainstream “qualitative renewal”. Though the current growth of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is to a great extent induced by the global financial and economic crisis, economic factor is not the main driving force of the Euroscepticism. At present, a wide range of diverse political and cultural factors increasingly determine commitment of European citizens to the EU. In some cases, these factors are crucial to the development of Euroscepticism. This fact is of significant importance, with regard to assessing the prospects for the given phenomenon, since political and socio-cultural motives of public Euroscepticism build much more sustainable basis for the Eurosceptical trend than economic ones. Issues relating to the prospects of Euroscepticism are of particular relevance, in connection with high performance of Eurosceptic politicians at the 2014 European Parliament elections. The elections result is not only strengthening of the "soft Eurosceptics'" positions, but also a sensational electoral “breakthrough” of “hard Eurosceptics” (Europhobes). While ability of Eurosceptics' direct influence on the decision-making process in the EP seems insignificant, much more important is their capacity to influence the agenda of the mainstream pro-European parties both in Europe and at home. Ultimately, the rise of the Euroscepticism makes the future of the European project more uncertain. Today (and probably, in the foreseeable future), the real purpose of European political elites may only be countering the trends of national sovereignty restoration, and maintenance of an integration process at its current level rather than its extension.
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Koźbiał, Krzysztof. "Znaczenie eurosceptycyzmu na scenie politycznej Republiki Czeskiej." Politeja 17, no. 3(66) (June 25, 2020): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.17.2020.66.18.
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The Importance of Euroscepticism on the Political Scene of the Czech Republic. Conditions and Consequences
Czech society is one of the most eurosceptic in the European Union. One of the reasons is a low degree of trust in authority (government, parliament) in general, also at the supranational level. Consequently, Czech political parties have eurosceptic slogans in their programs that do not prevent voters from supporting them, both in the elections to the Czech and European Parliaments. The political system is dominated by parties presenting the so‑ called „soft euroscepticism” (according to Taggart’s and Szczerbiak’s approach), such as: Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011), Civic Democratic Party (ODS) or Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). In the 2017 election, they received a total of almost 50% of the vote. However, euroscepticism is not a threat to the Czech presence in the EU. Extremely eurosceptic parties do not enjoy great public support.
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Van Klingeren, Marijn, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Claes H. De Vreese. "Going Soft or Staying Soft: Have Identity Factors Become More Important Than Economic Rationale when Explaining Euroscepticism?" Journal of European Integration 35, no. 6 (February 20, 2013): 689–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2012.719506.
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Oskolkov, P. V., and E. A. Sergeev. "Party System of the Netherlands: between Pillarization and European Integration." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 10, no. 6 (February 28, 2018): 155–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-6-155-168.
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In the article, the party system of the Netherlands is examined in the focus of two key factors: the historically inherent pillarization system that shaped the current party segmentation, and the European integration that left its impact on the party programs (the authors’ intention was to analyze especially Euroscepticism of several Dutch parties). The Dutch party system was shaped under the influence of the early 20th century corporatism, and, unlike other elements of the pillarization that was eroded in 1960-1970 years under the pressure of exogenous and endogenous factors, it is still based on the pillars backbone. This backbone largely remains as a form of institutionalization, while the party ideologies (except for orthodox Calvinist parties) moved to the center; it should also be noted here that, as a part of the depillarization process and the pan-European tendency of antiestablishment party formation, several “new type” and “new wave” parties were created. The European integration, intensively institutionalized after 1992, left an impact on the programs of all parties, old and new; soft Euroscepticism is inherent in all of them, being largely a reflection of the fear that small EU countries have towards supra-nationalization and the loss of sovereignty (in the case of clerical parties, it is also fear of the further liberalization of societal order). However, in most cases, Euroscepticism is just a background element (except for right-wing populist parties); programs are largely focused on socio-economic aspects, and the Eurosceptic features do not influence directly electoral mobilization.
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Dorey, Peter. "Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party’s Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s." Politics and Governance 5, no. 2 (April 5, 2017): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.873.
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Since the 1980s, Britain’s Conservative Party has become increasingly critical of the European Union, and of the country’s membership of it. So contentious and controversial has this issue become that it was a significant factor in the downfall of three consecutive Conservative Prime Ministers, all of whom found it increasingly difficult to manage their Party in Parliament, and thereby maintain any semblance of Party unity. Initially, during the 1980s and 1990s, the intra-Party divisions were between Europhiles (pro-Europeans) and Eurosceptics, but this demarcation was subsequently superseded by a division between soft Eurosceptics and hard Eurosceptics. The development and deepening of these intra-Party divisions are attributable to a plethora of endogenous and exogenous factors, the combined and cumulative effect of which ultimately led to the ‘Brexit’ vote in the June 2016 referendum.
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Ágh, Attila. "INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM FACADE DEMOCRACIES TO VELVET DICTATORSHIPS." Baltic Journal of Political Science 5, no. 5 (January 17, 2017): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/bjps.2016.5.10334.
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Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election has launched a wave of discussions in the international media and political science literature on “authoritarian populism” and a “populist explosion.” Although this paper also reflects on this new wave of populism in the West, it concentrates on the connections between democracy’s decline and the so-called populist explosion in eastern central Europe (ECE) and closely investigates the Hungarian case within the context of ECE. This paper describes populism in ECE as a product of the transition from fading facade democracies to emerging velvet dictatorships. These velvet dictatorships rely on the soft power of media and communication rather on the hard power of state violence. Paradoxically, the ruling anti-elite populist parties have developed a system of populism from above, managed by the new politico-business elite. Populism (social and national) and Euroscepticism are the two most basic, and twin, terms used to describe these new (semi)authoritarian regimes. Populism and Euroscepticism are convertible; they are two sides of the same coin as they express the same divergence from the EU mainstream. Therefore, this paper introduces the term: Eupopulism.
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Lees, Charles. "‘Dark Matter’: Institutional Constraints and the Failure of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany." Political Studies 50, no. 2 (June 2002): 244–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00369.
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The article is built on four propositions. First, there is a latent potential within the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration. Second, at present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the ‘dark matter’ of German politics. Third, the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical agenda is not due to the inherent ‘enlightenment’ of the German political class about the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the preferences of rational acting politicians. Finally, these systemic disincentives are to be found within the formal institutions of the German polity. The key ideas here are of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ Eurosceptical narratives, sustained versus heresthetic agendas, and ‘polis constraining’ versus ‘polis shaping’ strategies for their promotion. Political agents' choice of strategy depends on the nature of the institutional setting within which they are operating. The institutional configuration of the Federal Republic provides poor returns for party-based Euroscepticism. The mobilisation of popular unease about aspects of European integration remains an unattractive option for rational acting political agents.
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Kaniok, Petr. "Strana svobodných občanů – čeští monotematičtí euroskeptici?" Středoevropské politické studie Central European Political Studies Review 16, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cepsr.2014.1.75.
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When, in the beginning of 2009, the Party of Free Citizens was founded, it was believed that the main impulse for establishing a new political party was the generally positive approach towards the Lisbon Treaty adopted by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) a couple of months before. Thus, since its foundation, the media, commentators and political analysts have labelled the Party of Free Citizens as a single issue Eurosceptic party. This article challenges this prevailing evaluation of the Party of Free Citizens and subsequently confronts the party´s programs and press releases with three concepts – the concept of Euroscepticism connected with the work of Taggart and Szczerbiak, the concept of a single issue party developed by Mudde, and the concept of a niche party brought into political science by Meguide. The article concludes that while the Party of Free Citizens is undoubtedly a Eurosceptic party, both in terms of its soft and hard versions, its overall performance as a political entity does not meet the criteria of Mudde´s concept of a single issue party. As the Party of Free Citizens puts a strong emphasis on European issues (compared to other mainstream Czech political parties), it can, at most, be described as a niche party.
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Fadeeva, Tatiana. "EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: PROJECT IN AN ERA OF CHANGE AND ITS REFLECTION IN WESTERN LITERATURE." Istoriya: Informatsionno-analiticheskii Zhurnal, no. 4 (2021): 44–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ihist/2021.04.03.
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The article is devoted to the project of European integration in the context of the problems of globalization of the 21 st century, widely covered in Western literature. The process of globalization in a multipolar world, the decline in the role of the United States, the rise of China, the strengthening of Russia, and the stagnation of the economy are aptly characterized in Western literature as «global disorder» and «global turbulence». In the European Union itself, the unifying tendencies (the expansion of the number of member states) were replaced by a slowdown in the process of deepening («Europe at different speeds»), the strengthening of centrifugal forces, the positions of Eurosceptics, nationalist and populist movements. The democratic deficit and immigration problems are sharply criticized. In the context of «global turbulence» or «global disorder», the need to preserve the EU's «autonomy», its own leadership strategy, so-called «soft power», again comes to the fore.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Soft euroscepticism"
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Haxha, Engjell. "Vad är Euroskepticism? : What is Euroscepticism?" Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Statsvetenskap, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-154771.
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The focus of this study was to examine what euroskepticism stands for and what it is. Euroskepticism has been a marginal phenomenon under some long time but in the later years the definition of euroskepticism has become a mainstream definition. This definition has become in a longer extent a way to describe the dissatisfaction of the EU´s problems and crisis by the citizens of the European nation’s states. The studies approach point was to understand how Brexit went down, and what were the consequences that made this referendum a vote for the discontent of the elites in Brussels by the common man in United Kingdom. And if so, were the consequences something that could apply to euroskepticism, were the incitements of eurosceptic origin. When the study cleared this chapter about the timeline of Brexit then the study aimed for the consequences Brexit could have on euroscepticism and if euroscepticism would grow because of Brexit. This could only be explained by which deal UK would get from the European union. The results of the study demonstrate that in the end Brexit and the referendum was infused by the discontent of the lower classes in the community and by a notion that expressed itself in a way that was eurosceptic. The results demonstrated moreover that the eurosceptic as a definition has been a way to show the establishment that the losers of globalisations are there and their voices are going to get heard, and the voices are getting heard now through eurosceptic incitements and euroscepticism has become a banner of the common people.
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Öman, Béatrice. "Euroscepticism – from 1986 to 2020 and beyond." Thesis, Högskolan Dalarna, Statsvetenskap, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-35033.
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A semi-systematic literature review of research carried out on the evolution of the concept of Euroscepticism since the term first was reportedly used in 1986 with special focus on articles published around the year before the 2019 European Parliament elections and to this date. The thesis was conducted with a particular interest in gathering more knowledge on using an evidence-based method in political science. The purpose was twofold, therefore: one to see how the concept itself has evolved in research, in terms of definition and salience as well as in terms of measuring and explanatory factors, and the other to see if the method used is appropriate to this purpose. From the data gathered, it can be said that the method is pertinent and relevant when assembling research from a widespread and multifaceted area in terms of geography and content, since it is meant to avoid the pitfalls of ‘picking and choosing’ data. The articles thus uncovered have shown that there is a red thread in research on Euroscepticism, that its context has changed and therefore its content, and that Euroscepticism 2020 is a salient issue.
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Laestander, Vestin Robin. "Det skeptiska Europa : En jämförande fallstudie av euroskepticism hos Vänsterpartiet och Sverigedemokraterna inför Europaparlamentsvalen 2014 och 2019." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-162610.
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The purpose of this study is to describe and compare eurosceptic elements of the Swedish Left-Party and the Sweden Democrats leading up to the European Parliament elecetions of 2014 and 2019. Previous research has focused on many different aspects of eurocepticism; the definition and meaning of euroscepticism, eurosceptic voting among citizens and euroscepticism in democratic party-systems. Hence, this case-study aims at explaining euroscepticism in a Swedish context among the two clearly eurosceptic parties in the Swedish party-system. The two parties both have eurosceptic sentiments, although they have different ideological starting points and values. The Sweden Democrats consider themselves social conservatives with a nationalistic basic view. On the other hand, the Swedish Left-Party consider themselves as socialists and feminists with an ecological basic view. In order to find and compare these eurosceptic sentiments, a text analysis is combined with an analysis of arguments used in the two party’s election platforms leading up to the European Parliament elections. The empirical evidence is consequently interconnected with Taggart and Szczerbiak theory of soft and hard euroscepticism. This theory, or model of analysis, is used the catogorize parties based on their ”resistance” against different aspects of the European Union or the European process of integration as a whole. The study finds that the euroscepticism of the Swedish Left-Party and the Sweden Democrats have somewhat changed from the elections of 2014 and 2019. The resistance has mitigated to some degree leading up to the 2019 elections, in comparison to the elections of 2014. Although netither party could be categorized as soft or hard eurosceptics, they both lean more towards the features of soft euroscepticism.
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Beránková, Barbora. "Euroskepticismus a jeho pozice ve Velké Británii." Master's thesis, 2013. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-327490.
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Euroscepticism is considered as a stream of thoughts whch is typical of the EU distrust or of the European integration and its goals as such. The most common objections to joining the integration proces are loss of national sovereignty, not paying enough attention to national interests or too strict policy unification that does not allow for national particularities. This master thesis will focus on euroscepticism as a concept, il will analyze its ideological roots and the most frequent arguments in favour of this concept. Furthermore, it will analyze various classifications of euroscepticism as well as its potential to be called a new cleavage or even ideology as I suggest that there is no widely-accepted definition. Great Britain - a representative of traditionally very sceptical approach towards European integration project has been chosen as a model case. In this case study firstly, the development of potential eurosceptical thinking within the Conservative Party and the Labour Party will be explored. More importantly, it will concentrate on the (in)consistency of their European policies in time, analysis of their attitudes in the 21st century and finally it will try to derive the future development of their possible eurosceptical opinions from their current manifestos and public speeches. The...
Book chapters on the topic "Soft euroscepticism"
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Krouwel, André, and Yordan Kutiyski. "Soft Sceptics and Hard Rejectionists." In The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism, 189–203. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315464015-18.
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Lynch, Philip, and Richard Whitaker. "Continuing fault lines and new threats: European integration and the rise of UKIP." In David Cameron and Conservative Renewal. Manchester University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9781784991531.003.0007.
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This chapter examines the difficulties that European integration has posed for the Conservatives under Cameron in the context of modernisation of the Conservative Party. It explores how two familiar problems, albeit in a new form, have reappeared and posed problems for Cameron’s modernisation project. First, the desire of EU Member States to pursue further integration has limited UK influence and second, Conservative divisions have returned with a vengeance, this time between soft Eurosceptics supporting membership of a reformed EU and hard Eurosceptics seeking fundamental renegotiation or withdrawal. The chapter also assesses an important new dimension to Conservative difficulties on the EU issue, namely the rise of UKIP. It looks at the challenge it poses and the Conservative response. The chapter concludes by considering how the EU issue may play out in the post-2015 general election period.