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Journal articles on the topic 'Soft euroscepticism'
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1
Hargitai, Tibor. "How Eurosceptic is Fidesz actually?" Politics in Central Europe 16, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 189–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2020-0009.
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AbstractUntil now there is no consensus in the academic literature as to whether Fidesz is a (soft) Eurosceptic party or rather Europragmatic. By identifying the manifestations of Euroscepticism on the policy level rather than the party level, this article sheds light on the dynamics of Fidesz’s Euroscepticism. It also looks at the party strategy of Fidesz regarding its main Eurosceptic competitor Jobbik, and how this facilitated further Euroscepticism. Hungary’s vision of the EU is at odds with the vision of most member states and EU institutions, which makes Fidesz not only Eurosceptic; but there is a form of inverted soft Euroscepticism characterising Fidesz’s vision and policies towards the EU.
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Vainshtein, G. "Euroscepticism: New Factor of European Politics." World Economy and International Relations, no. 8 (2015): 40–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-8-40-48.
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The phenomenon of Euroscepticism, not long ago a marginal part of the European political landscape, increasingly moves forward to the political foreground. This article explores the meaning of the notion of Euroscepticism, analyzes current peculiarities of this phenomenon, its scale and main sources, as well as differentiation of anti-integrationist political actors. While the very phenomenon existed in European politics throughout the implementation of the European project, a new characteristic of the socio-political situation in the EU is the ongoing broadening of this phenomenon's scale, the growth of its electoral support and the radicalization of its articulation forms. The strengthening of critical public attitudes towards realities of the European integration which is a feature of the contemporary socio-political climate in Europe not only has weakened the traditional pro-integrationist consensus of the political establishment, but has also led to a substantial reinforcement of more or less radical opponents of the European project within the European party-political space. This development seems to be an indicator of the European political mainstream “qualitative renewal”. Though the current growth of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is to a great extent induced by the global financial and economic crisis, economic factor is not the main driving force of the Euroscepticism. At present, a wide range of diverse political and cultural factors increasingly determine commitment of European citizens to the EU. In some cases, these factors are crucial to the development of Euroscepticism. This fact is of significant importance, with regard to assessing the prospects for the given phenomenon, since political and socio-cultural motives of public Euroscepticism build much more sustainable basis for the Eurosceptical trend than economic ones. Issues relating to the prospects of Euroscepticism are of particular relevance, in connection with high performance of Eurosceptic politicians at the 2014 European Parliament elections. The elections result is not only strengthening of the "soft Eurosceptics'" positions, but also a sensational electoral “breakthrough” of “hard Eurosceptics” (Europhobes). While ability of Eurosceptics' direct influence on the decision-making process in the EP seems insignificant, much more important is their capacity to influence the agenda of the mainstream pro-European parties both in Europe and at home. Ultimately, the rise of the Euroscepticism makes the future of the European project more uncertain. Today (and probably, in the foreseeable future), the real purpose of European political elites may only be countering the trends of national sovereignty restoration, and maintenance of an integration process at its current level rather than its extension.
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Koźbiał, Krzysztof. "Znaczenie eurosceptycyzmu na scenie politycznej Republiki Czeskiej." Politeja 17, no. 3(66) (June 25, 2020): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.17.2020.66.18.
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The Importance of Euroscepticism on the Political Scene of the Czech Republic. Conditions and Consequences
Czech society is one of the most eurosceptic in the European Union. One of the reasons is a low degree of trust in authority (government, parliament) in general, also at the supranational level. Consequently, Czech political parties have eurosceptic slogans in their programs that do not prevent voters from supporting them, both in the elections to the Czech and European Parliaments. The political system is dominated by parties presenting the so‑ called „soft euroscepticism” (according to Taggart’s and Szczerbiak’s approach), such as: Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011), Civic Democratic Party (ODS) or Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). In the 2017 election, they received a total of almost 50% of the vote. However, euroscepticism is not a threat to the Czech presence in the EU. Extremely eurosceptic parties do not enjoy great public support.
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Van Klingeren, Marijn, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Claes H. De Vreese. "Going Soft or Staying Soft: Have Identity Factors Become More Important Than Economic Rationale when Explaining Euroscepticism?" Journal of European Integration 35, no. 6 (February 20, 2013): 689–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2012.719506.
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Oskolkov, P. V., and E. A. Sergeev. "Party System of the Netherlands: between Pillarization and European Integration." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 10, no. 6 (February 28, 2018): 155–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-6-155-168.
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In the article, the party system of the Netherlands is examined in the focus of two key factors: the historically inherent pillarization system that shaped the current party segmentation, and the European integration that left its impact on the party programs (the authors’ intention was to analyze especially Euroscepticism of several Dutch parties). The Dutch party system was shaped under the influence of the early 20th century corporatism, and, unlike other elements of the pillarization that was eroded in 1960-1970 years under the pressure of exogenous and endogenous factors, it is still based on the pillars backbone. This backbone largely remains as a form of institutionalization, while the party ideologies (except for orthodox Calvinist parties) moved to the center; it should also be noted here that, as a part of the depillarization process and the pan-European tendency of antiestablishment party formation, several “new type” and “new wave” parties were created. The European integration, intensively institutionalized after 1992, left an impact on the programs of all parties, old and new; soft Euroscepticism is inherent in all of them, being largely a reflection of the fear that small EU countries have towards supra-nationalization and the loss of sovereignty (in the case of clerical parties, it is also fear of the further liberalization of societal order). However, in most cases, Euroscepticism is just a background element (except for right-wing populist parties); programs are largely focused on socio-economic aspects, and the Eurosceptic features do not influence directly electoral mobilization.
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Dorey, Peter. "Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party’s Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s." Politics and Governance 5, no. 2 (April 5, 2017): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.873.
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Since the 1980s, Britain’s Conservative Party has become increasingly critical of the European Union, and of the country’s membership of it. So contentious and controversial has this issue become that it was a significant factor in the downfall of three consecutive Conservative Prime Ministers, all of whom found it increasingly difficult to manage their Party in Parliament, and thereby maintain any semblance of Party unity. Initially, during the 1980s and 1990s, the intra-Party divisions were between Europhiles (pro-Europeans) and Eurosceptics, but this demarcation was subsequently superseded by a division between soft Eurosceptics and hard Eurosceptics. The development and deepening of these intra-Party divisions are attributable to a plethora of endogenous and exogenous factors, the combined and cumulative effect of which ultimately led to the ‘Brexit’ vote in the June 2016 referendum.
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Ágh, Attila. "INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM FACADE DEMOCRACIES TO VELVET DICTATORSHIPS." Baltic Journal of Political Science 5, no. 5 (January 17, 2017): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/bjps.2016.5.10334.
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Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election has launched a wave of discussions in the international media and political science literature on “authoritarian populism” and a “populist explosion.” Although this paper also reflects on this new wave of populism in the West, it concentrates on the connections between democracy’s decline and the so-called populist explosion in eastern central Europe (ECE) and closely investigates the Hungarian case within the context of ECE. This paper describes populism in ECE as a product of the transition from fading facade democracies to emerging velvet dictatorships. These velvet dictatorships rely on the soft power of media and communication rather on the hard power of state violence. Paradoxically, the ruling anti-elite populist parties have developed a system of populism from above, managed by the new politico-business elite. Populism (social and national) and Euroscepticism are the two most basic, and twin, terms used to describe these new (semi)authoritarian regimes. Populism and Euroscepticism are convertible; they are two sides of the same coin as they express the same divergence from the EU mainstream. Therefore, this paper introduces the term: Eupopulism.
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Lees, Charles. "‘Dark Matter’: Institutional Constraints and the Failure of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany." Political Studies 50, no. 2 (June 2002): 244–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00369.
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The article is built on four propositions. First, there is a latent potential within the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration. Second, at present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the ‘dark matter’ of German politics. Third, the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical agenda is not due to the inherent ‘enlightenment’ of the German political class about the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the preferences of rational acting politicians. Finally, these systemic disincentives are to be found within the formal institutions of the German polity. The key ideas here are of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ Eurosceptical narratives, sustained versus heresthetic agendas, and ‘polis constraining’ versus ‘polis shaping’ strategies for their promotion. Political agents' choice of strategy depends on the nature of the institutional setting within which they are operating. The institutional configuration of the Federal Republic provides poor returns for party-based Euroscepticism. The mobilisation of popular unease about aspects of European integration remains an unattractive option for rational acting political agents.
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Kaniok, Petr. "Strana svobodných občanů – čeští monotematičtí euroskeptici?" Středoevropské politické studie Central European Political Studies Review 16, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cepsr.2014.1.75.
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When, in the beginning of 2009, the Party of Free Citizens was founded, it was believed that the main impulse for establishing a new political party was the generally positive approach towards the Lisbon Treaty adopted by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) a couple of months before. Thus, since its foundation, the media, commentators and political analysts have labelled the Party of Free Citizens as a single issue Eurosceptic party. This article challenges this prevailing evaluation of the Party of Free Citizens and subsequently confronts the party´s programs and press releases with three concepts – the concept of Euroscepticism connected with the work of Taggart and Szczerbiak, the concept of a single issue party developed by Mudde, and the concept of a niche party brought into political science by Meguide. The article concludes that while the Party of Free Citizens is undoubtedly a Eurosceptic party, both in terms of its soft and hard versions, its overall performance as a political entity does not meet the criteria of Mudde´s concept of a single issue party. As the Party of Free Citizens puts a strong emphasis on European issues (compared to other mainstream Czech political parties), it can, at most, be described as a niche party.
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Fadeeva, Tatiana. "EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: PROJECT IN AN ERA OF CHANGE AND ITS REFLECTION IN WESTERN LITERATURE." Istoriya: Informatsionno-analiticheskii Zhurnal, no. 4 (2021): 44–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ihist/2021.04.03.
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The article is devoted to the project of European integration in the context of the problems of globalization of the 21 st century, widely covered in Western literature. The process of globalization in a multipolar world, the decline in the role of the United States, the rise of China, the strengthening of Russia, and the stagnation of the economy are aptly characterized in Western literature as «global disorder» and «global turbulence». In the European Union itself, the unifying tendencies (the expansion of the number of member states) were replaced by a slowdown in the process of deepening («Europe at different speeds»), the strengthening of centrifugal forces, the positions of Eurosceptics, nationalist and populist movements. The democratic deficit and immigration problems are sharply criticized. In the context of «global turbulence» or «global disorder», the need to preserve the EU's «autonomy», its own leadership strategy, so-called «soft power», again comes to the fore.
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Beaumont, Paul. "Brexit futures: Between a model and a martyr: An addendum to ‘Brexit and EU Legitimation’." New Perspectives 28, no. 2 (May 17, 2020): 238–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2336825x20909945.
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Brexit has a habit of rendering research redundant rapidly. Since I wrote ‘Brexit and EU Legitimation: Martyr for the EU Cause?’ (published in New Perspectives vol. 27 [3]), Boris Johnson has won a large majority on the back of his promise to ‘Get Brexit Done’ and his ability to pass a withdrawal agreement. As such the chances of a no-deal Brexit have receded (for now). This has not rendered my analysis obsolete, but reflecting upon Johnson’s slogan has led me to realise that my analysis could be broadened. In this addendum, I flesh out what is left ambiguous in the article and develop a more holistic framework for analysing the discursive effects of Brexit. In doing so, I make the argument that for the European Union (EU), Brexit will never be ‘done’, at least for the EU. Instead, Britain’s fortunes look set to become a bellwether for soft Eurosceptics considering turning hard. The extent to which Britain is perceived to bask in the ‘sunlit uplands’ or, conversely, to suffer economic and/or political disaster as a consequence of leaving the EU will inform whether Britain is used as a ‘model’ or a ‘martyr’ at any given time. Thus, Britain’s fortunes have thus become inextricably linked to the EU.
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Kaniok, Petr, and Magda Komínková. "Hard and Soft Euroscepticism in the European Parliament." European Review, July 6, 2020, 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798720001088.
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Euroscepticism has become a stable component of the European Parliament. But is there one distinct Euroscepticism in the European Parliament or do various types exist there? Departing from the widely accepted definitions of hard and soft Euroscepticism, we analysed the behaviour of Eurosceptical groups in the European Parliament in order to assess how they differ. Using data from parliamentary questions, we argue that there are substantial differences between these two groups. This suggests that hard and soft Euroscepticisms do not represent different degrees of one phenomenon, but instead refer to two fundamentally different stances towards European integration.
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Anggraheni, Palupi, and Chitra Regina Apris. "COLLECTIVE MANIFESTATION OF EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES AND GROUPS CRITICAL IDEAS IN EUROPEAN UNION TREATIES." Jurnal Studi Diplomasi Dan Keamanan 13, no. 1 (January 26, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.31315/jsdk.v13i1.4361.
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The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU) increases awareness of how far the Euroscepticism ideas spread among EU's members. As one of the pivotal EU members, the UK's withdrawal will bring consequences, especially how other countries' members perceived this action. The research focuses on how far the Eurosceptic party's critical ideas are manifested in the European Union treaties. This type of research is descriptive and qualitative. The scope of this research will focus on the Euroscepticism parties and movements in Austria, France, Italy, Netherland, and the United Kingdom. In this study, the authors use the concept of Euroscepticism to explain the classification of parties into the Euroscepticism Hard and Soft category and Neil J. Smelser's Value-Added Collective Behaviour scheme to describe the determinants of their collective action against the European Union. The result of this research is that Euroscepticism spreads throughout Europe by manifesting their critical ideas through six determinants factor, such as structural conduciveness, structural tension, growth, and spread of general beliefs, trigger factors, participant mobility, and social control. The manifestation of critical ideas carried out by Euroscepticism parties in the three countries can be seen through the Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe, Referendum British Exit. The culmination of collective action by the Eurosceptic parties was the launch of EU critical campaigns (No to EU!) As well as a significant vote in the EU parliamentary elections.
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Taggart, Paul, and Andrea L. P. Pirro. "European populism before the pandemic: ideology, Euroscepticism, electoral performance, and government participation of 63 parties in 30 countries." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, April 16, 2021, 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2021.13.
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Abstract This contribution is conceived as a resource on the state of European populist parties before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It reports on cross-national comparative findings generated by data collected from 30 European countries as to the state of populist parties in one calendar year (2019) and provides an extensive qualitative overview of the national cases. The article shows that while populist parties are preponderantly on the right, there is a significant degree of ideological variation among European populism. The data show significant diversity in their electoral performance but also that populist party participation in government is no longer a marginal phenomenon. The article ultimately elaborates on the various types of positions on European integration – from soft/hard Euroscepticism to lack thereof – and discusses the implications of their affiliation in the European Parliament.
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Power, Benjamin. "Euroscepticism and the Treaty of Lisbon: Why did the size of the No vote change so dramatically between the first and second referenda in Ireland?" Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 3, no. 1 (May 5, 2011). http://dx.doi.org/10.30722/anzjes.vol3.iss1.15123.
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CESAA 18TH ANNUAL EUROPE ESSAY COMPETITION 2010 - Honours winner: Benjamin Power, Australian National UniversityThis paper demonstrates that the existing literature on voter preference formation in European referenda is insufficient to explain the shift in support for Lisbon in just 16 months. Building on a range of existing work to classify different Eurosceptic attitudes within Ireland, it focuses on why so many ‘soft’ Eurosceptics switched their votes from No to Yes between Lisbon I and II. Mainstream scholarly attention has converged around two distinct accounts of the way voters form preferences in European referenda, focusing on either domestic politics or the contents of individual treaties as the primary determinants of results. However, these explanations fail to describe for the significant role played by the worsening economic environment in Ireland between Lisbon referenda, as demonstrated by both polling data and immediate media reaction. This highlights a significant gap in the current understanding of European referenda, and points to an important future research agenda.