Academic literature on the topic 'Sophistes'

Il existe des liens intellectuels significatifs entre la sophistique ancienne et l'ecole d'abdere. Ces echanges, qu'ils soient le reflet d'une communaute de vue ou celui d'une opposition doctrinale, revetent une dimension systematique et revelent une remarquable continuite temporelle. Leur mise en evidence permet de rendre compte des difficultes de la theorie atomistique. L'influence de protagoras sur son concitoyen democrite autorise a justifier le caractere recurrent des sentences pre-sceptiques dans l'oeuvre de l'atomiste. L'infraction du sophiste a l'interdit parmenidien a provoque, en reaction, l'edification par democrite du systeme atomistique, mais a aussi ouvert la voie a l'elaboration de la notion de non-etre relatif : le vide. C'est enfin pour rester fidele aux orientations anthropologiques et politiques de son maitre protagoras que democrite suppose, en contradiction avec le determinisme atomistique, l'existence de la liberte humaine. La these d'une communaute philosophique sophisticoabderitaine permet, en outre, de rendre raison du double heritage -sceptique et atomistique- de l'ecole du nord. Dans les deux cas, un sophiste, par son intransigeance intellectuelle, joue un role central de radicalisation qui induit au sein meme de l'ecole une evolution doctrinale. Cela est vrai de gorgias, qui par son nihilisme absolu inflechit l'ethique du sophiste abderitain anaxarque, aboutissant a la prudente aphasie pyrrhonienne. Cela est egalement vrai d'antiphon l'athenien, democriteen a outrance, qui pousse l'atomisme a ses consequences extremes, soutenant l'existence d'undeterminisme psychique et elaborant une anthropologie strictement atomistique. Representant une radicalisation de la doctrine, dont on trouve une approche parallele chez l'abderitain nausiphane, sophiste lui aussi, une telle orientation conduira epicure a modifier la physique atomistique afin de donner un fondement naturel, contre antiphon, a la liberte de l'homme.

In the first half of the fourth century BCE, when Plato is writing his dialogues, the titles ‘sophist’ and ‘philosopher’ have no widely-accepted application and, as a result, the use of them for some purposes rather than others is controversial and subject to dispute. In the tradition that follows Plato, ‘philosophy’ becomes a term of art and the philosophos is distinguished from the class of the sophistai and other alleged sophoi such as poets, orators and politicians. Considering Plato is among other competitors for the appropriation and legitimisation of these labels, the present dissertation examines the importance each of these notions have in the Platonic corpus, drawing attention to the way they are (re)defined and appropriated, whether they are novel or distinct. By observing examples in pre-Platonic and Platonic literature, section I of the thesis focuses on sophos/sophia, section II on philosophos/philosophia and section III on sophistēs. The investigation allows us to reassess two problems that have not been fully considered in Platonic scholarship: (i) Plato’s conception of 'sophia' within the Greek tradition of wisdom, and (ii) the identity of and distinction between the philosopher and the sophist in Plato’s dialogues. I intend to consider both Plato’s inheritance from the tradition and Plato’s own contribution to creating an identity for the sophistēs and the philosophos from a deeper understanding of sophos/sophia. The legacy of the precedent tradition is reflected by the presence of the agonistic, authoritative, and moral strands. Plato’s contribution, on the other hand, is reflected by the presence of two elements, namely the principle whereby these titles are meaningful names, and a consistent conceptualisation of them in epistemic terms. I propose that Plato makes use of the meaning of these words by conceiving of them more as descriptors than as titles of authority or reputation. By using ‘real’ definitions, he is allowed to confront the ‘apparent’ with the ‘real sophos’ (Apology), to create a narrative of love for the philosopher (Phaedo, Lysis, Symposium and Republic), and to argue that the sophist ‘seems to know’—hence the name 'sophistēs' (Sophist).