Academic literature on the topic 'South african income tax act no. 58 of 1962'

The popularity of client loyalty programmes has increased drastically over the past few years, with more than 100 suppliers in South Africa currently making use of them. Despite the fact that client loyalty programmes have been prevalent in South Africa since the 1980s, the South African Revenue Service has issued no specific guidance on the income tax treatment of client loyalty programme transactions. The main objective of the research was to determine whether South African client loyalty programme suppliers treat client loyalty programme transactions correctly for income tax purposes. In order to meet this objective, available local and international literature were analysed to determine the proposed income tax treatment of a client loyalty programme transaction expenditure incurred by supplier for purposes of the client loyalty programme. The proposed correct income tax treatment was compared with a survey circulated to a population of client loyalty programme suppliers in South Africa. The comparison indicated that in practice the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 is treated differently from the proposed treatment. This incorrect tax treatment could result in possible financial loss to the client loyalty programme supplier as taxpayer.

Sports clubs often trade players with each other through the player transfer system. Using the doctrinal research methodology, which involves an extended review of literature, the study aims at providing an interpretative analysis of the income tax implications from the transfer of professional soccer players between professional soccer clubs, based on the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (South Africa, 1962) (hereafter the Act) and the relevant case law. This study further provides hypothetical case studies that provide different scenarios of soccer player transfers and the analysis of the income tax implications arising from the facts presented in each case study.

Taxpayers who use intellectual property (such as patents and trademarks) in their trade in the production of income may obtain the right of such use in a number of different ways. The nature of the transaction granting the taxpayer the use of intellectual property items determines the tax treatment thereof. Taxpayers may be able to claim deductions for the cost of using these items in terms of specific income tax sections or the general deduction formula as outlined by the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. There are also a number of other sections in the Act which may affect the timing and extent of the deductions allowed. This article investigates the various income tax deductions which may be available to taxpayers in South Africa who make payments in respect of intellectual property. It considers the effect of important recent case law and changes to tax legislation on the timing and extent of these deductions and suggests a framework which can be applied to assist the taxpayer in understanding the structure of such deductions.

A wholesaler of petroleum products is prohibited in terms of section 12(2)(c) of Regulation 287 of the Petroleum Products Act, No. 120 of 1977, to own a retail licence for purposes other than that of training. As a result, petroleum companies make use of franchises to sell their products. The concept of a franchise is based on the principle that a franchisee obtains the franchise of an existing, often prosperous, business from a franchisor, and then operates the business under the banner of this franchise. The franchisee pays the franchisor franchise fees as consideration for certain items or privileges obtained. This article investigates the deductibility of franchise fees in terms of the current South African Income Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962 and includes an evaluation of Australian Income Tax Act sections that might offer deduction possibilities for franchise fees if applied within a South African context.

According to National Treasury’s Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2008, small businesses in South Africa are instrumental in the growth of the South African economy as they are a source of job creation and a counter to poverty. Research, however, indicates that small businesses face many obstacles, such as relatively high tax compliance costs. It was, therefore, proposed in the 2008 Budget Review that a turnover tax system be implemented for micro businesses with a turnover of up to R1 million per annum to simplify the tax compliance process. Similarly, section 12E was introduced earlier in the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 to offer additional income tax relief to small business owners. Sections 12E(4)(a)(iii) and (d) and paragraph 3(b) of the Sixth Schedule, however, prevent certain small business owners from making use of these concessions. This article investigates these barriers to entry and explores possible solutions to the problems presented by them.

One of the consequences of the change in the mineral policy of South Africa with the promulgation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 was the increase in junior exploration companies. Junior exploration companies are mainly involved in prospecting activities. No definition exists for either prospecting or exploration in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (Income Tax Act). The lack of research and case law on the tax treatment of prospecting expenditure by junior exploration companies may result in various interpretations for the treatment of prospecting expenditure. Through critical analysis of specific sections in the Income Tax Act, applicable case law and relevant literature, it is evident that there are different interpretations by junior exploration companies of the treatment of prospecting expenditure from an income tax perspective. The perceived challenges with interpretation of the tax treatment of prospecting expenditure by junior exploration companies create an opportunity for further research.

Even South Africa’s Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 uses the terminology ‘place of effective management’ when determining the residency of companies. This term is not, however, defined in the said legislation and there is no South African case law specifically dealing with this matter. In contrast, the United Kingdom (UK) uses the term ‘central management and control’, and its courts have been called upon to hear numerous cases on the interpretation of this phrase. Given the increasing pressure on South Africa to align its tax treatment with international trends as well as increased levels of trade with the United Kingdom, this study examined the interpretation of ‘place of effective management’ in a South African context and juxtaposed this with the conclusions reached in seven cases in the United Kingdom dealing with the interpretation of ‘centre of management and control’. The findings show that ‘place of effective management’ from a South African perspective may depend heavily on where decisions are implemented and day-to-day operations occur. ‘Central management and control’, however, appears to vest almost exclusively in where primary decisions are made or strategic directions emanate from.

This research seeks to add to the existing body of knowledge on the perceived impact of Capital Gains Tax (CGT) on the fairness of the South Africa Tax System. Building on the largely qualitative work done by Vivian (2006) and Smith (1776), this research makes use of an extensive literature review followed by a correspondence analysis to complement the existing body of research into this area. The literature review discuss the fairness criteria advanced by Smith (1776) (Smith’s tax canon) and identify ‘unfairness characteristics’ of CGT. The correspondence analysis only tests the theories advanced in the literature review and revealed that there are potential sources of unfairness inherent in the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (the Eighth Schedule). These include the possibility that that CGT gives rise to double tax and imposes a high burden on taxpayer’s ability to bear the tax load.

Section 9H and paragraph 40 of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) determines that a person is deemed to dispose of all of his assets (bar a few exceptions) at market value when that person ceases to be a South African resident or passes away, respectively. This deemed disposal is treated as a disposal event for capital gains tax purposes in terms of the Eighth Schedule of the Act. The question that arises is whether this deemed disposal event gives rise to a recoupment in terms of section 8(4)(a). In practice there currently seems to be uncertainty with regard to this issue, as there are different interpretations and applications of these provisions. This article investigates the interaction between sections 8(4)(a), 9H and paragraph 40 of the Eighth Schedule in order to determine whether a section 8(4)(a) recoupment should be included, or not, in the taxpayer’s gross income according to paragraph (n) of the gross income definition found in section 1 of the Act.

In terms of the new Dividends Tax, which came into effect on 1 April 2012, Dividends Tax may be the liability of the beneficial owner of the dividend. This makes it important to correctly identify the beneficial owner. The term beneficial owner is specifically defined in section 64D of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 as ‘the person entitled to the benefit of the dividend attaching to the share’, yet a distinct difference remains between the legal ownership and economic ownership of the share. Within a South African context, determining the beneficial owner within a discretionary trust might be problematic. The trustees are the legal owners of the shares, whilst the beneficiaries might be the economic owners of the shares. Further, consideration has to be given to the timing of the dividend distribution. This article formulates steps to determine which person is entitled to the benefit of the dividend attached to the share.

Thesis (MAcc)--University of Stellenbosch, 2009.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In November 2006 section 103(1) of the Act was abolished and replaced by a new Part IIA, containing sections 80A to 80L, which targets impermissible tax avoidance arrangements. Section 80A(c)(ii) introduced a new concept to the South African tax law: a misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act, including Part IIA thereof. The objective of this study was to establish the origin, meaning, application and effect of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. The evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) was therefore examined where after the enacted version was analyzed. It was essential to determine the origin of section 80A(c)(ii) in order to establish some point of reference from which inferences could be drawn as to the possible application and effect thereof. Case law, practice statements and articles relating to its proposed root was then examined. A ‘misuse or abuse’ of a provision, it was found, implies, frustrating or exploiting the purpose of the provision. This contention was confirmed by existing Canadian precedent. Such an interpretation, however, has a strong resemblance to the words in which the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) was couched. It is therefore in contrast to the presumption that different words (in the enacted version) imply a different meaning. The precise meaning of the words ‘misuse or abuse’ is thus still elusive. It was established that section 80A(c)(ii) has its roots in section 245 of the Canadian Act. Section 245(4) was regarded as an effective comparative to section 80A(c)(ii) as it also contained a so-called misuse or abuse rule. The application of this rule in the Canadian tax environment required the following process: - Interpret (contextually and purposively) the provisions relied on by the taxpayer, to determine their object, spirit and purpose. - Determine whether the transaction frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions. Section 245(4) had the effect of reviving the modern approach (a contextual and/or purposive theory) to the interpretation of statutes in Canada. Reference to the ‘spirit’ of a provision (above) was found not to extend the modern approach to statutory interpretation: it does not require of the court to look for some inner and spiritual meaning within the legislation. As section 245(4) was regarded as an effective comparative to section 80A(c)(ii) it was contented that it would have a similar effect, than that of its Canadian counterpart, on the approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa. However, it was established that a modern approach to statutory interpretation was already authoritative in South Africa. This finding led the author to the conclusion that section 80A(c)(ii) could at best only reinforce the case for applying such an approach. Such a purpose for section 80A(c)(ii) was however found to be void in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which was enacted in 1996, and provides a sovereign authority for the application of the modern approach. It was also found that the practical burden of showing that there was a ‘misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act (including the provisions of this Part)’ will rest on the shoulders of the Commissioner, notwithstanding section 82 of the Act.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 103(1) van die Inkomstebelastingwet is herroep in November 2006 en vervang deur Deel IIA, bestaande uit artikels 80A tot 80L, wat daarop gemik is om ontoelaatbare belastingvermydingsreëlings te teiken. Artikel 80A(c)(ii) het ‘n nuwe konsep in die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstebelastingreg ingebring: ‘n misbruik of ‘n wangebruik van die bepalings van die Wet, insluitende Deel IIA. Die doel van hierdie studie was om die oorsprong, betekenis, toepassing en uitwerking van artikel 80A(c)(ii) vas te stel. Die ontwikkeling van artikel 80A(c)(ii) is daarom ondersoek waarna die verordende weergawe daarvan geanaliseer is. ‘n Sleutelaspek van die analise was om die oorsprong van artikel 80A(c)(ii) vas te stel. Hierdie oefening het ‘n verwysbare bron daargestel waarvan afleidings rondom die moontlike toepassing en uitwerking van artikel 80A(c)(ii) gemaak kon word. Hofsake, praktyknotas en artikels rakende die voorgestelde oorsprong is vervolgens ondersoek. Daar is vasgestel dat ‘n ‘misbruik of wangebruik’ van ‘n bepaling neerkom op die frustering of uitbuiting van die doel van ‘n bepaling. Hierdie bewering is bevestig deur bestaande Kanadese presedent. So ‘n interpretasie is egter soortgelyk aan die woorde waarin die konsepweergawe van artikel 80A(c)(ii) uitgedruk is. Dit is daarom in teenstelling met die vermoede dat ‘n wysiging van die woorde (in die verordende weergawe) ‘n gewysigde betekenis impliseer. Die presiese betekenis van die woorde ‘misbruik of wangebruik’ is dus steeds ontwykend. Daar is bevind dat artikel 80A(c)(ii) waarskynlik sy ontstaan in artikel 245 van die Kanadese Inkomstebelastingwet gehad het. Artikel 245(4) van die Kanadese Inkomstebelastingwet is beskou as ‘n effektiewe vergelykende artikel vir artikel 80A(c)(ii), aangesien dit ook oor ‘n sogenaamde misbruik of wangebruik reël beskik. Die toepassing van hierdie reël in die Kanadese belastingmilieu vereis die volgende werkswyse: - Interpreteer (kontekstueel en doeldienend) die bepalings waarop die belastingpligtige steun, ten einde die oogmerk, gees en doel daarvan vas te stel. - Bepaal of die transaksie, deur die belastingpligtige aangegaan, die oogmerk, gees of doel van die bepalings frustreer. Artikel 245(4) het aanleiding gegee tot die herstel van die moderne benadering (‘n kontekstuele en/of doeldienende teorie) tot die interpretasie van wetgewing in Kanada. Daar is bevind dat die verwysing na die ‘gees’ van ‘n bepaling (hierbo) nie aanleiding gee tot die uitbreiding van die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg nie: dit vereis nie dat die hof moet soek na die innerlike of geestelike betekenis van die wetgewing nie. Aangesien artikel 245(4) as ‘n effektiewe vergelykende artikel vir artikel 80A(c)(ii) beskou is, is daar aangeneem dat dit ‘n soortgelyke uitwerking, as sy Kanadese eweknie, op wetsuitleg in Suid Afrika sal hê. By nadere ondersoek is daar egter bevind dat ‘n moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg alreeds gesaghebbend in Suid Afrika is. Hierdie bevinding het die skrywer tot die gevolgtrekking gebring dat artikel 80A(c)(ii), in beginsel, slegs die saak vir die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg in Suid Afrika sal versterk. Indien hierdie die doel is wat die wetgewer gehad het met die verordening van artikel 80A(c)(ii), sal dit egter niksseggend wees in die lig van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, wat verorden is in 1996, en ‘n oppermagtige gesag bied vir die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg. Daar is ook vasgestel dat die onus op die Kommissaris rus om te bewys dat daar ‘n ‘misbruik of wangebruik van die bepalings van hierdie Wet (waarby ingesluit die bepalings van hierdie Deel)’ was, ondanks artikel 82 van die Wet.

Includes bibliographical references.
I welcome you in reading this research dissertation looking at the South African General Anti Avoidance Rule. I hope that this paper will shed some light on the complex requirements of the GAAR as contained in section 80A, read together with relevant sections.

Thesis (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2011.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In February 2007 section 11D was inserted into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended. The aim of the section was to encourage private-sector investment in scientific or technological research and development (R&D). This was an indirect approach by National Treasury to increase national scientific and technological R&D expenditure in order to complement government expenditure on the subject matter. Although section 11D provides generous income tax incentives, the interpretation thereof was found to be a hindrance in attaining the goal sought by National Treasury. This is due to the fact that this section demands a firm grasp of intellectual property (IP) law, principles of tax, and technology in general. This is clearly shown by the lapse in time (i.e. three years) between the passing of section 11D into law and the release of the South African Revenue Services’ (SARS) final interpretation of section 11D, i.e. Interpretation Note 50. The release of Interpretation Note 50 in August 2009 sparked wide-spread controversy among many a patent attorneys and tax consultants. The interpretation of the section by SARS was found by many to be so draconian that it destroyed the incentive entirely. The objective of this study is to provide greater clarity on the areas of section 11D which have been found to be onerous to taxpayers. Hence the meaning of “new” and “non-obvious” in the context of a discovery of information as eligible R&D activity1 was examined. Hereafter the ambit of the exclusion of expenditure on “management or internal business process”2 from eligibility for the incentive in the context of computer program development was examined. It was established that the meaning of “novel” and “non-obvious” as construed by IP jurisprudence could mutatis mutandis be adopted for purposes of interpreting section 11D(1) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, information would be regarded as “new” if it did not form part of the state of the art immediately prior to the date of its discovery. The state of the art was found to comprise all matter which had been made available to the public (both in the Republic and elsewhere) by written or oral description, by use or in any other way. Information would also be regarded as non-obvious if an ordinary person, skilled in the art, faced with the same problem, would not have easily solved the problem presented to him by having sole reliance on his intelligence and what was regarded as common knowledge in the art at the time of the discovery. It was submitted that in construing the meaning of the “management or internal business process” exclusion, the intention of the lawgiver should be sought and given effect to. The Explanatory Memorandum issued on the introduction of section 11D states that the lawgiver’s intention with the section was to ensure that South Africa is not at a global disadvantage concerning R&D. The R&D tax legislation of Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada was therefore examined to establish the international bar set in this regard. SARS is of the view that the “management or internal business process” exclusion applies to the development of any computer program (with the said application) irrespective of whether the program is developed for the purpose of in-house use, sale or licensing. However, it was found that such a restrictive interpretation would place homebound computer development at a severe disadvantage when compared with the legislation of the above mentioned countries. In order to give effect to the intention of legislature, it was submitted that the exclusion provision should be construed to only include the development of computer programs for in-house management or internal business process use. Computer programs developed for the said application, but for the purpose of being sold or licensed to an unrelated third party, should still be eligible for the R&D tax incentive.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 11D is gevoeg tot die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962 gedurende Februarie 2007. Die wetgewing het ten doel om privaatsektor investering in tegniese en wetenskaplike navorsing en ontwikkeling (N&O) aan te moedig. Nasionale Tesourie dra dus op ‘n indirekte wyse by tot die hulpbronne wat die regering op nasionale vlak aan tegniese en wetenskaplike N&O bestee in ‘n gesamentlike poging om N&O in Suid-Afrika te stimuleer. Artikel 11D hou op die oog af baie gunstige inkomstebelasting aansporings in. Dit wil egter voorkom asof die interpretasie daarvan as ernstige struikelblok dien in die bereiking van die doel wat Nasionale Tesourie voor oë gehad het. Dit kan toegeskryf word aan die feit dat die artikel ‘n wesenlike begrip van intellektuele eiendom (IE) wetgewing, belasting beginsels en tegnologie in die algemeen vereis. Die feit dat dit die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstebelastingdiens (SAID) ongeveer drie jaar geneem het om hul interpretasie (i.e. Interpretasienota 50) van die artikel te finaliseer dien as bewys hiervan. Die SAID het gedurende Augustus 2009, Interpretasienota 50 vrygestel. Die nota het wye kritiek ontlok by menigte IE prokureurs en belastingkonsultante. Daar is algemene konsensus dat die SAID se interpretasie so drakonies van aard is, dat dit enige aansporing wat die artikel bied, geheel en al uitwis. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die problematiese bepalings van die aansporingsartikel te verlig en groter sekerheid daaroor te verskaf. Gevolglik is die betekenis van “nuut” en “nie-ooglopend” soos van toepassing op ‘n ontdekking van inligting as kwalifiserende N&O aktiwiteit, bestudeer. Verder is die omvang van die bepaling wat besteding op “bestuur of interne besigheidsprosesse” uitsluit van kwalifikasie vir die aansporingsinsentief, bestudeer in die konteks van rekenaar programmatuur ontwikkeling. By nadere ondersoek is daar bevind dat die betekenis van “nuut” en “nie-ooglopend” soos uitgelê vir doeleindes van IE wetgewing mutatis mutandis aangeneem kan word vir die uitleg van artikel 11D(1)(a) van die Inkomstebelastingwet. Vervolgens word inligting as “nuut” beskou indien dit nie deel uitmaak van die stand van die tegniek onmiddellik voor die datum waarop dit ontdek is nie. Die stand van die tegniek vir die bepaling van nuutheid behels alle stof wat reeds aan die publiek beskikbaar gestel is (hetsy binne die Republiek of elders) by wyse van skriftelike of mondelinge beskrywing, deur gebruik of op enige ander wyse. Inligting word as nie-ooglopend beskou indien ‘n gewone werker wat bedrewe is in die tegniek en gekonfronteer is met dieselfde probleem, nie geredelik die antwoord tot die probleem sou vind deur bloot staat te maak op sy intelligensie en die algemene kennis in die bedryf op die tydstip van die ontdekking nie. Daar is aan die hand gedoen dat die doel van die wetgewer nagestreef moet word met die uitleg van die “bestuur of interne besigheidsprosesse” uitsluiting. Die Verklarende Memorandum wat uitgereik is met die bekendstelling van artikel 11D het gemeld dat die wetgewer ten doel gehad het om Suid Afrika op ‘n gelyke speelveld met die res van die wêreld te plaas wat betref N&O. Die N&O belastingbepalings van Australië, die Verenigde Koninkryk (VK) en Kanada is dus bestudeer om die internasionale standaard in die opsig vas te stel. Die SAID is van mening dat die strekwydte van die uitsluiting so omvangryk is dat dit alle rekenaar programmatuur wat ontwikkel is vir ‘n bestuur- of interne besigheidsproses toepassing tref, ten spyte daarvan dat die bedoeling van die belastingpligtige was om die programmatuur te verkoop of te lisensieër aan ‘n onverbonde derde party. Dit was egter bevind dat so ‘n beperkende uitleg die aansporing van rekenaar programmatuur ontwikkeling in Suid Afrika geweldig benadeel in vergelyking met die regime wat geld in lande soos Australië, die VK en Kanada. Ten einde gevolg te gee aan die bedoeling van die wetgewer, is daar aan die hand gedoen dat die uitsluiting slegs so ver moet strek as om rekenaar programme vir eie gebruik te diskwalifiseer. Rekenaar programme wat dus ontwikkel word met die doel om dit te verkoop of te lisensieër aan onverbonde derde partye moet steeds vir die aansporingsinsentief kwalifiseer.

[This] dissertation is dedicated to this attempt of making South Africa a more environmentally sustainable economy through the development of new CDM projects. This dissertation examines the introduction of section 12K in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and how this novel incentive interacts with our current income tax legislation. This dissertation highlights some issues surrounding the section 12K exemption which may detract from its true potential and proposes ways to resolve these issues in order to make this incentive more attractive to the CDM project developers.

The study will be based on a comparative analysis of the general antiavoidance section of the South African Income Tax Act no. 58 of 1962 and the Tanzanian Income Tax Act no. 11 of 2004. The focus is on how the two provisions are interpreted by showing the similarities and differences. The approach will be analytical and comparative, starting by showing the concept of tax avoidance and historical backgrounds of the two provisions.

Thesis (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2015.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 24C of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) provides for a deduction of future expenditure that will be incurred by the taxpayer in the performance of his obligations under a contract from which the taxpayer derived income. Due to uncertainties regarding the meaning of certain words and phrases used in section 24C, the first aim of this assignment was to determine the meaning of the word ‘expenditure’ and the phrase ‘will be incurred’ as used in section 24C. The second aim was to establish how a taxpayer will prove with certainty that he will incur future expenditure in the performance of his obligations under a contract. This was done by discussing the effect of contractual terms and other circumstances and by taking into account certain additional guidelines regarding the interpretation of section 24C provided for in Interpretation Note: No. 78 (‘IN 78’). It was established that the word ‘expenditure’ means the amount of money spent, including the disbursement of other assets with a monetary value. The word ‘expenditure’ also specifically includes the voluntary payments and disbursements of assets. The word ‘expenditure’ can also include a loss if the word ‘loss’ can be equated to the word ‘expenditure’. The phrase ‘will be incurred’ implies that the taxpayer will, in a subsequent year of assessment, have an unconditional obligation to pay for expenditure, which must arise from the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. Contractual terms and other circumstances can indicate whether there is certainty that future expenditure will be incurred as aforementioned. Conditions and warranties are contractual terms that indicate that there is uncertainty regarding the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. A time clause in a contract can indicate that there is certainty regarding the taxpayer’s obligations to perform under the contract. Similar contracts with similar conditional obligations to perform cannot be grouped together in order to determine the probability, and thus the certainty, that future expenditure will be incurred in the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under a contract. The probability that a taxpayer will perform his unconditional obligation under the contract must, however, be proved in order to demonstrate that there is certainty regarding the incurral of the future expenditure. IN 78 does not specify whether a loss which can, in certain circumstances, be equated to the word ‘expenditure’, is deductible under section 24C. This should be clarified. The new undefined phrases (a high degree of probability, inevitability, certainty and potentially contractually obligatory), as used in IN 78, might cause confusion when interpreting section 24C. These phrases should be defined and it should be explained how the high degree will be measured. Lastly, is was shown that an anomaly occurs regarding trading stock at hand at the end of a year of assessment, which will be utilised in a subsequent year of assessment in the performance of the taxpayer’s obligations under a contract. Such trading stock does not represent ‘future expenditure’ and must be excluded from the section 24C allowance. However, due to the interplay between section 24C and section 22(1), the taxpayer does not receive any tax relief for the expenditure actually incurred to acquire the closing trading stock in the year in which such trading stock is acquired. It is, therefore, questioned whether the established interpretation of section 24C is in agreement with the Legislator’s original intention with section 24C namely, to match income received under a contract with the related deductible expenditure.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 24C van die Inkomstebelastingwet No. 58 van 1962 (‘die Wet’) voorsien ʼn aftrekking vir toekomstige onkoste wat deur die belastingpligtige aangegaan sal word in die nakoming van sy verpligtinge ingevolge ʼn kontrak waaruit hy inkomste verkry het. As gevolg van onsekerhede ten opsigte van die betekenis van sekere woorde en frases wat in artikel 24C gebruik word, was die eerste doelstelling van hierdie navorsingswerkstuk om die betekenis van die woord ‘onkoste’ en die frase ‘aangegaan sal word’, soos wat dit in artikel 24C gebruik word, te bepaal. Die tweede doelstelling was om vas te stel hoe 'n belastingpligtige met sekerheid sal bewys dat hy toekomstige onkoste sal aangaan in die nakoming van sy verpligtinge ingevolge ʼn kontrak. Dit is gedoen deur die effek van kontraksbedinge en ander omstandighede te bespreek en deur sekere bykomende riglyne ten opsigte van die interpretasie van artikel 24C, soos vervat in Interpretasienota No. 78 (‘IN 78’), in ag te neem. Daar is vasgestel dat die woord ‘onkoste’ die bedrag van geld wat bestee word, insluitend die uitbetaling van ander bates met 'n geldwaarde, beteken. Die woord ‘onkoste’ sluit ook spesifiek vrywillige betalings en uitbetalings van bates in. Die woord ‘onkoste’ kan ook 'n verlies insluit, indien die woord ‘verlies’ gelyk gestel kan word aan die woord ‘onkoste’. Die frase ‘aangegaan sal word’ impliseer dat die belastingpligtige, in 'n daaropvolgende jaar van aanslag, 'n onvoorwaardelike verpligting sal hê om vir onkostes te betaal. Hierdie onkostes moet ontstaan weens die belastingpligtige se verpligtinge ingevolge die kontrak. Kontraksbedinge en ander omstandighede kan aandui of daar sekerheid is dat die toekomstige onkoste, soos hierbo genoem, aangegaan sal word. Voorwaardes en waarborge is kontraksbedinge wat daarop dui dat daar onsekerheid is rakende die belastingpligtige se verpligtinge om ingevolge die kontrak op te tree. ʼn Tydsklousule in 'n kontrak kan aandui dat daar sekerheid is rakende die belastingpligtige se nakoming van sy verpligtinge ingevolge die kontrak. Soortgelyke kontrakte, met soortgelyke voorwaardelike verpligtinge kan nie saam gegroepeer word ten einde te bepaal of dit waarskynlik, en gevolglik seker is dat toekomstige onkoste in die nakoming van ʼn belastingpligtige se verpligtinge ingevolge die kontrak aangaan sal word nie. Die waarskynlikheid dat 'n belastingpligtige sy onvoorwaardelike verpligting ingevolge die kontrak sal nakom moet egter bewys word ten einde aan te dui dat daar sekerheid is dat toekomstige onkoste aangegaan sal word. IN 78 spesifiseer nie of 'n verlies wat, in sekere omstandighede, gelyk gestel kan word aan die woord ‘onkoste’, ingevolge artikel 24C aftrekbaar is nie. Duidelikheid hieromtrent moet verskaf word. Die nuwe, ongedefinieerde frases ('n hoë graad van waarskynlikheid, onafwendbaarheid, sekerheid en potensieel kontraktueel verpligtend (vry vertaal)), soos in IN 78 gebruik, kan moontlik verwarring veroorsaak wanneer artikel 24C geïnterpreteer word. Hierdie frases moet gedefinieer word en daar moet verduidelik word hoe ʼn hoë graad gemeet gaan word. Laastens blyk dit dat 'n teenstrydigheid ontstaan ten opsigte van handelsvoorraad op hande aan die einde van 'n jaar van aanslag, wat in 'n daaropvolgende jaar van aanslag deur die belastingpligtige in die nakoming van sy verpligtinge ingevolge 'n kontrak gebruik sal word. Sodanige handelsvoorraad verteenwoordig nie ‘toekomstige onkoste’ nie en moet by die artikel 24C toelaag uitgesluit word. Die belastingpligte ontvang egter, weens die wisselwerking tussen artikel 24C en artikel 22(1), nie ʼn belastingverligting vir die onkoste werklik aangegaan in die jaar waarin sodanige handelsvoorraad verkry is nie. Dit word dus bevraagteken of die bewese interpretasie van artikel 24C in ooreenstemming is met die Wetgewer se oorspronklike bedoeling met artikel 24C, naamlik, om inkomste ontvang ingevolge ʼn kontrak met die verwante aftrekbare uitgawes te paar.

Thesis (MComm)--University of Stellenbosch, 2004.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Despite the fact that transfer pricing legislation (i.e. section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (“the Act”) has been in force in South Africa since 1995, it has only been in the last three years that the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) has embarked on a number of assessments of taxpayers’ cross border transactions with foreign group companies. In particular, the SARS targets taxpayers that have rendered cross border services (including financial assistance) to a foreign group company for no consideration and has assessed these taxpayers on the adjusted interest/ fee amounts. Since the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer to demonstrate that its cross border transactions with foreign group companies do not infringe the provisions of section 31(2) of the Act, this study provides taxpayers with guidance as to when its transactions would fall within the scope of application of section 31(2) of the Act and when the SARS would be excluded from applying the provision of section 31(2) of the Act. Following upon a critical analysis of the essential components of section 31(2) of the Act the following conclusions are drawn by the author: • If the taxpayer proves that it did not transact with a connected party (as defined in section 1 of the Act), or it did not supply goods or services in terms of an international agreement (as defined in section 31(1) of the Act), or its transfer price would be regarded as arm’s length, the Commissioner would be excluded from applying the provision of section 31(2) of the Act since all of the components to apply section 31(2) of the Act are not present. • The current view held by the South African Revenue Service and tax practitioners that transactions between a South African company and an offshore company, which are both directly or indirectly held more than fifty percent by an offshore parent company, are transactions between connected persons (as defined in 5 section 1 of the Act) is incorrect in law. Section 31 of the Act is not applicable to such transactions. • The Commissioner will be excluded from making a transfer pricing adjustment to a service provider’s taxable income where the following circumstances are present: o Where the cross border transaction with a connected party does not give rise to gross income, which is the starting point in the determination of taxable income, since the service provider agreed to render services for no consideration and was therefore not entitled to receive income (i.e. no receipt or accrual) and o Where the service provider can provide evidence that demonstrates that there was no practice of price manipulation as regards the transaction under review.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Alhoewel oordragprysbeleid wetgewing (artikel 31 van die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962 (“die Wet”)) al sedert 1995 in Suid Afrika van krag is, het die Suid Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (“SAID”) eers werklik gedurende die laaste drie jaar begin om aanslae ten opsigte van belastingpligtiges se internasionale transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye uit te reik. In die besonder teiken die SAID belastingpligtes wat dienste (insluitend lenings) aan buitelandse groepmaatskappye vir geen vergoeding lewer. Aangesien die bewyslas op die belastingpligtige rus om te bewys dat sy internasionale transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye nie die bepalings van artikel 31(2) van die Wet oortree nie, word belastingpligtiges in hierdie studie van riglyne, wat aandui wanneer transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye binne die omvang van artikel 31(2) van die Wet val asook onder welke omstandighede die SAID verhoed sal word om artikel 31(2) van die Wet toe te pas, voorsien. Na aanleiding van ‘n kritiese analise van die deurslaggewende komponente van artikel 31(2) van die Wet kom die skrywer tot die volgende gevolgtrekkings: • As die belastingpligte kan bewys dat hy nie met ‘n verbonde persoon (soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Wet) handelgedryf het nie, of dat hy nie goedere of dienste in terme van ‘n internasionale ooreenkoms (soos omskryf in artikel 31(1) van die Wet) gelewer het nie, of dat sy oordragprys as arm lengte beskou kan word, sal die Kommissaris verhoed word om die bepaling van artikel 31(2) van die Wet toe te pas, aangesien al die komponente van artikel 31(2) van die Wet nie teenwoordig is nie. • Die huidige sienswyse van die SAID en belastingpraktisyns dat transaksies wat tussen ‘n Suid Afrikaanse maatskappy en ‘n buitelandse maatskappy plaasvind, waar ‘n buitelandse moedermaatskappy meer as vyftig persent van albei maatskappye se aandeelhouding (direk of indirek) hou, beskou kan word as 7 transaksies tussen verbonde persone (soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Wet) is regstegnies nie korrek nie. Artikel 31(2) van die Wet is nie van toepassing op sulke transaksies nie. • Die Kommisaris sal onder die volgende omstandighede verhoed word om enige oordragprysaanpassing aan ‘n diensleweraar se belasbare inkomste te maak: o Waar die internasionale transaksie met ‘n verbonde persoon nie bruto inkomste (die beginpunt van ‘n belasbare inkomste berekening) voortbring nie, aangesien die diensleweraar ingestem het om dienste teen geen vergoeding te lewer, wat tot die gevolg het dat die diensleweraar nie geregtig is om inkomste te ontvang nie (dus geen ontvangste of toevalling) en o Waar die diensleweraar kan bewys dat die transaksie nie onderhewig aan prys manipulasie was nie.

Thesis (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The requirements of section 11(a) and section 24J(2) were considered in this research assignment, from both a money-lender’s and an investment holding company’s perspective, to determine whether interest, losses on irrecoverable loans and raising fees were tax deductible. It was determined, that if the trade requirement is satisfied by the money-lender, then the above-mentioned expenses are fully tax deductible. However, if the trade requirement is satisfied by the investment holding company then only the interest is fully tax deductible. It is further submitted however in this research assignment that it cannot be said that the money-lender alternative is better than the investment holding company alternative – both alternatives are of equal value in the current tax system. What is important though is that taxpayers who will fit the mould of an investment holding company will now be able to use the principles set out in this research assignment to prove that it is in fact carrying on a trade for tax purposes, something that taxpayers are generally reluctant to pursue. If this is pursued, taxpayers may have the added tax benefit of tax deductible interest expenditure (in full) in cases where this was not previously the norm (and an investment holding company will not have to satisfy any of the guidelines of the “money-lender test” when it seeks to deduct its interest expense in full). However, if an investment holding company seeks to deduct losses on irrecoverable loans and raising fees for tax purposes, it will not have to satisfy all the guidelines of the “money-lender test”, but it will have to satisfy one guideline, that being the “system or plan” and “frequent turnover of capital” guideline. It will be very difficult for an investment holding company to prove this on the facts of the case – it will arguably take a special set of facts to accomplish this mean feat.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die vereistes van artikel 11(a) en artikel 24J (2) is in hierdie navorsingsopdrag vanuit ʼn geldskieter en 'n beleggingshouermaatskappy se perspektief oorweeg, om die belastingaftrekbaarheid van rente, verliese op oninvorderbare lenings en diensfooie te bepaal. Daar is vasgestel dat indien die bedryfsvereiste deur ʼn geldskieter nagekom word, bogenoemde uitgawes ten volle vir belastingdoeleindes aftrekbaar is. Indien die bedryfsvereiste egter nagekom word deur ʼn beleggingshouermaatskappy sal slegs die rente ten volle aftrekbaar wees vir belastingdoeleindes. Verder word dit in die navorsingsopdrag aan die hand gedoen dat daar nie gesê kan word dat die geldskieter-alternatief beter is as die beleggingshouermaatskappy-alternatief nie – beide alternatiewe is van gelyke waarde in die huidige belastingbestel. Die onderskeid is egter belangrik, aangesien die belastingbetalers wat aan die vereistes van ʼn beleggingshouermaatskappy voldoen, nou in staat sal wees om die beginsels wat in hierdie navorsingsopdrag uiteengesit word, te gebruik om te bewys dat die beleggingshouermaatskappy in werklikheid ʼn bedryf vir belastingdoeleindes beoefen. Belastingbetalers is oor die algemeen huiwerig om dit te poog. Indien wel, kan belastingbetalers ʼn belastingaftrekking ten opsigte van rente uitgawes kry, wat voorheen nie die norm was nie (ʼn beleggingshouermaatskappy sal nie enige van die “geldskietertoets” riglyne hoef na te kom wanneer dit poog om ʼn belastingafrekking vir die rente uitgawe te kry nie). Indien ʼn beleggingshouermaatskappy verliese op oninvorderbare lenings en diensfooie vir belastingdoeleindes wil aftrek, sal die belastingbetaler nie al die “geldskietertoets” riglyne hoef na te kom nie, maar sal egter moet voldoen aan die “stelsel of plan” en “gereelde omset van kapitaal” riglyne. Dit sal baie moeilik wees vir 'n beleggingshouermaatskappy om dit te bewys op grond van die feite van die saak – dit sal waarskynlik ʼn spesiale stel feite verg om dit te bereik.

A critical analysis of the implementation of the 'pay now, argue later' principle by SARS as provided by section 164 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011: Abstract: The 'Pay Now, Argue Later' principle applies in income tax or value-added tax collection procedure after the South African Revenue Services has concluded an assessment in terms of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 and found that an amount of tax is due and payable by the taxpayer. In terms of the 'pay now, argue later' principle, the taxpayer has to pay the assessed amount before being accorded an opportunity to raise any objections. The purpose of this paper is, to do an in-depth evaluation of the implications of the implementation of the 'pay now, argue later' principle by SARS. The implementation of the principle will be evaluated to determine if it is unjust, inequitable or unreasonable. In addition to the latter evaluation, the principle's shortfalls will be highlighted with the inclusion of a brief legal position in other countries. The paper acknowledges the existence of the principle, although the implementation thereof by SARS remains questionable and a source of controversy. The paper ultimately concludes that the 'pay now, argue later' principle, though constitutionally validated to a certain extent need to be revised. A balance has to be struck between the taxpayer's rights, public interest and SARS' powers in implementing the principle. A recommendation is therefore made to place the implementation thereof in the Tax Ombud in view of UK's Taxes Management Act where Commissioners resolve such disputes between taxpayers and the Inland Revenue Authority. ******************************************* Limitation of interest deduction in South Africa: a suggested approach to the application of sections 31 and 23M of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 to debt and equity business financing methods. Abstract: The South African income tax system acknowledges the financing of resident companies by a related non-resident company through the use of debt and equity. However, the use of debt financing method is a cause for concern to the South African Revenue Services as it results in the base erosion and profit shifting of taxable profits through mispricing and excessive interest deductions. Section 31 and 23M were inserted into the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 to address excessive debt levels and interest deductions. The objective of this paper is to analyse the rationale behind the use of debt and equity financing methods. This paper will also discuss the application of both s 31 and s 23M. Due to the close connection of s 31 and s 23M to debt transactions, an approach on how the two sections can be applied is suggested. This paper finds that the provisions of both s 31 and s 23M are applicable to the same set of facts. The paper also finds that s 31 provisions are applied to determine if a company has excessive debts taking into account the arm's length principle while s 23M provisions are applied to limit interest deductions. The paper suggests that the legislature should provide guidance on the interplay of the two provisions and in the absence of any guidance, the provisions of s 31 should be applied first followed by the provisions of s 23M.