Academic literature on the topic 'South African military'
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Journal articles on the topic "South African military"
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Kynoch, Gary. "The ‘Transformation’ of the South African Military." Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 3 (September 1996): 441–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00055543.
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SouthernAfrica has been at war since the 1960s. Following the capitulation of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front and the acceptance of majority rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, the widely acknowledged root of most of the regional conflict has been South Africa. In defendingapartheid, the régime in Pretoria engaged in a systematic campaign of destabilisation designed to bring its neighbours to heel. Military invasions, raids, sabotage, support of dissident groups, and assassinations were all part of the National Party (NP) Government's ‘total strategy’ that employed violence as a key element in its regional policy to achieve economic, military, and political hegemony. P. W. Botha during his tenure as Prime Minister and President, 1978–89, ‘politically modified the role’ of the South African Defence Force (SADF), as explained by Herbert Howe, and ‘created the military-dominated State Security Council, which effectively replaced the Cabinet and became the centre of national decision-making and official power in the 1980s’.1The result was the militarisation of South African society and a swath of destruction across the southern part of the continent.
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WOOD, GEOFFREY. "The South African Military in Transition." Australian Journal of Political Science 31, no. 3 (November 1996): 387–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361149651111.
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Ferreira, Rialize. "SOUTH AFRICA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PEACE MISS IONS: A COMPARISON." Politeia 33, no. 2 (October 20, 2016): 4–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.25159/0256-8845/1776.
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After the peacekeeping tragedy in the Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2013, South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping missions on the African continent is under investigation. Military personnel of the South African National Defence Force recently took part in both conventional and unconventional, asymmetric warfare in two peace missions, one in the CAR and one in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the CAR a unilateral military agreement between states existed, while in the DRC a United Nations (UN) mandate for multilateral offensive peacekeeping was authorised. The rationale for South Africa’s participation in African missions is important while the country is serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Its role as one of the leading nations in Africa to deploy peacekeepers is central to its foreign policy. The article focuses on contrasting operations, and diverse challenges such as the authorisation of mandates, funding, logistics and shortcomings in asymmetric training for irregular “new wars†where peacekeepers are required to protect civilians in countries to which they owe little allegiance. Lessons learnt from the widely differing operational experiences in these recent peace missions are discussed.
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Adetiba, Toyin Cotties. "South Africa’s Military and Peacekeeping Efforts: A new paradigm shift in its foreign policy since 1994." Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 9, no. 5 (October 21, 2017): 157–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jebs.v9i5.1920.
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One of the South Africa's great soft power attributes has been the attraction and power of its transition to inclusive democratic governance after a long period of apartheid rule. This gave South Africa a certain moral authority and prestige to play very significant roles in conflict resolution and mediation through peacekeeping operations. Every government in an ever-changing and dynamic geopolitical environment ensure that its defence force cum foreign policy conform to the international environment while aiming at the defence and protection of its national interests. Using interpretive approach; this work argues that; fundamentally, there are three basic factors that reinforce South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping which are politics, economy and security. By extension these three elements is considered a transformational agent of South Africa’s economy. SANDF is, therefore, considered a dynamic and exceptional foreign policy tool that complements and at same time enhances South Africa’s diplomatic manoeuvrings and influence within the wider international developments. It is concluded that South Africa’s multilateral and foreign policy agendas have been driven by the pursuit of its national interest while trying to ensure peace in other African states.
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Coates, Oliver. "Between Image and Erasure." Radical History Review 2018, no. 132 (October 1, 2018): 200–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/01636545-6942513.
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Abstract Approximately 73,290 West Africans traveled to South Asia during World War II, but relatively little is known about their activities on the subcontinent. The photographs of African soldiers in India published in the British Army’s RWAFF News, a Bombay-printed newspaper specifically designed for West African troops overseas, provide a rare and little-known insight into the lives of African soldiers in India. Existing accounts of African military service in India often outline the soldiers’ experience of India in only very general terms and typically privilege the combat experience of troops in Burma. The images described in this brief article reveal a very different face of African overseas military service: they depict a group of soldiers visiting the Taj Mahal and encountering the Mughal monument. Although published and choreographed by the British, these images reflect a moment of South-South encounter between West Africans and India’s Islamic history.
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Esterhuyse, Abel. "Professional Military Education and Training: Challenges Facing the South African Military." Defence Studies 6, no. 3 (September 2006): 377–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702430601060206.
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Obeng, Pashington. "Service to God, Service to Master/Client: African Indian Military Contribution in Karnataka." African and Asian Studies 6, no. 3 (2007): 271–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920907x212231.
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AbstractThis essay examines how African Indians (Abyssinians, Habshis, Siddis) from medieval times to the present have played significant political and military roles to forge sovereignties in the land area currently covered by the State of Karnataka, South India. I provide a brief history of the military activities of African Indians in the Indian subcontinent to foreground how the Africans deployed the unstable political climate in the Deccan, ethnicization of military culture, religious filiation, and force of personality to assert influence over communities that settled in areas bounded by present-day Karnataka.
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Gewald, Jan-Bart. "Mbadamassi of Lagos: A Soldier for King and Kaiser, and a Deportee to German South West Africa." African Diaspora 2, no. 1 (2009): 103–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187254609x433369.
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Abstract In 1915 troops of the South African Union Defence Force invaded German South West Africa, present day Namibia. In the north of the territory the South African forces captured an African soldier serving in the German army named Mbadamassi. Upon his capture Mbadamassi demanded to be released and claimed that he was a British national from Nigeria. In addition, he stated that he had served in the West African Frontier Force, and that he had been shanghaied into German military service in Cameroon. Furthermore, whilst serving in the German army in Cameroon, Mbadamassi claimed that he had participated in a mutiny, and that, as a consequence, he had been deported to GSWA. The article covers the remarkable military career of the African soldier, Mbadamassi, who between 1903 and 1917 served both the King of the British Empire as well as the Kaiser of the German Empire. In so doing, the article sheds light on the career of an individual African soldier serving in three colonial armies; the West African Frontier Force, the Schutztruppe in Cameroon, and the Schutztruppe in GSWA. The article argues that beyond the fact that colonial armies were institutions of repression, they also provided opportunity for those willing or condemned to serve within their ranks. Furthermore the article provides some indication as to the extent of communication that existed between colonial subjects in the separate colonies of Africa at the time. En 1915, les troupes de l'Union de l'Afrique du Sud ont envahi l'Afrique du Sud-Ouest allemande, l'actuelle Namibie. Dans le Nord du territoire, les forces sud-africaines ont capturé un soldat africain servant dans l'armée allemande nommé Mbadamassi. Celui-ci exigea d'être libéré et revendiqua être un Britannique du Nigeria. De plus, il déclara avoir servi dans la West African Frontier Force et avoir été enrôlé de force dans l'armée allemande au Cameroun. En outre, pendant qu'il servait dans l'armée allemande au Cameroun, Mbadamassi a prétendu avoir pris part à une mutinerie, ce qui avait conduit à sa déportation vers l'Afrique du Sud-Ouest allemande. Cet article couvre la remarquable carrière militaire du soldat africain Mbadamassi, qui, entre 1903 et 1917, a servi à la fois le roi de l'empire britannique et le Kaiser de l'empire allemand. Ainsi, l'article éclaire sur la carrière individuelle d'un soldat africain servant dans trois armées coloniales; la West African Frontier Force, le Schutztruppe au Cameroun et le Schutztruppe en Afrique du Sud-Ouest allemande. L'article soutient qu'au-delà du fait que les armées coloniales étaient des institutions de répression, elles ont aussi offert la possibilité à ceux qui le voulaient ou ceux qui y étaient condamnés de servir dans leurs rangs. En outre, l'article fournit une indication sur l'étendue de la communication qui a existé entre les sujets coloniaux dans les colonies d'Afrique séparées de l'époque.
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Heinecken, Lindy, and Deon Visser. "Officer Education at the South African Military Academy." Armed Forces & Society 35, no. 1 (October 2008): 145–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x08316052.
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Harris, Geoff. "What Drives Military Expenditure? A South African Study." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 21, no. 2 (July 2009): 197–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02601079x09002100205.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "South African military"
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Louw, Gerhard Martin. "South African defence policy and capability : the case of the South African National Defence Force." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/85766.
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Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Armed forces the world over have three primary functions — force development, force deployment and force employment. Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but is especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of those military capabilities that force development brings about. The end of the Cold War, which coincided with a new political dispensation in South Africa, also gave rise to a new security paradigm: a theory implying both a reduction in the utility of military force, and an adjustment in the use of military forces. This phenomenon changed the context within which states generate modern defence policy, but did not affect the causal relationship between policy publications and the outcomes of a military’s force development activities. Usually, a defence policy presupposes the development of armed forces that are effective and efficient at executing their mandate — a condition that is measurable in terms of the organisation’s levels integration, skill, quality and responsiveness. The thesis uses this concept, both as a point of departure and as a structural organising device, to describe the variance between defence policy and military capabilities. A general analysis of South Africa’s defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the policymakers had thoroughly considered the armed forces’ effectiveness when they wrote the White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review (1998). By 2006, the South African Army has interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own, very much in alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications. However, further analysis of the actual capabilities of the South African National Defence Force indicates a major variance between the relevant defence policy publications, the military’s force development outcomes, and the present demands of the South African security environment. There appears to be quite serious deficiencies in the attribute of integration, which arise primarily from political influences; furthermore, the military’s quality is under strain, mainly because of the defence force’s seeming inability to formulate a strategy that is not only acceptable, but also suitable and feasible. While the armed forces appear to be skilful enough to execute their present (peacetime) missions, success in the type of operations that policy demands is unlikely. In summary, the study suggests that the principal reason for the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from defence’s lack of responsiveness to its resource constraints and operational realities. The thesis therefore concludes that the defence force has been largely unsuccessful in complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itself may be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context; furthermore, that military effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful. Finally, the defence force’s schizophrenic organisational culture may be the primary cause of it moving ever closer to reneging on its constitutional mandate.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Gewapende magte wêreldwyd het drie primêre funksies — magsontwikkeling, magsontplooiing en magsaanwending. Verdedigingsbeleid vervul ‘n rigtinggewende rol in al hierdie funksies, maar is veral belangrik om die skepping van die militêre vermoëns, wat deur magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite daargestel word, te regverdig. Gevolglik beoog hierdie tesis om die mate van ooreenkoms tussen die voorskrifte van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid en die werklike militêre vermoëns van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag te beskryf, soos dit ontwikkel het tussen 2000 en 2011. Die einde van die Koue Oorlog (samelopend met die totstandkoming van ‘n nuwe bedeling in Suid-Afrika) het geboorte gegee aan nuwe denke betreffende veiligheid, wat ook ‘n afname in die nuttigheid van militêre mag en ‘n aanpassing in die aanwending van militêre magte tot gevolg gehad het. Hierdie verskynsel het die omgewing waarbinne moderne state verdedigingsbeleid ontwikkel verander, maar nie die kousale verband tussen beleidspublikasies en die uitkomste van ‘n weermag se magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite aangeraak nie. Gewoonlik veronderstel ‘n verdedigingsbeleid die ontwikkeling van gewapende magte wat doeltreffend en doelmatig is in die uitvoering van hul mandaat — ‘n toestand wat meetbaar is in terme van die organisasie se vlakke van integrasie, vaardigheid, kwaliteit, en hul vermoë om toepaslik op omgewigsinvloede te reageer. Die tesis gebruik hierdie konsep, beide as ‘n vertrekpunt en as ‘n strukturele ordeningsmeganisme, en om die verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid en militêre vermoëns te beskryf. ‘n Algemene ontleding van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleidspublikasies toon dat, met die skryf van die Witskrif (1996) en Verdedigingsoorsig (1998), beleidmakers wel deeglike oorweging geskenk het aan die weermag se doeltreffenheid; so ook die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër, wat teen 2006 sy eie toekomsstrategie die lig laat sien het. Desnieteenstaande getuig verdere ontleding van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasional Weermag se werklike vermoëns van diepgaande verskille tussen verbandhoudende beleidspublikasies, die weermag se ontwikkelingsuitkomste, en die huidige eise van die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsomgewing. Dit wil voorkom asof daar ernstige integrasie-leemtes is, komende hoofsaaklik vanuit die politieke omgewing; verder is die gewapende magte se kwaliteit onder druk, hoofsaaklik vanweë die weermag se onvermoë om ‘n strategie te formuleer wat gelyktydig aanvaarbaar, geskik en uitvoerbaar is. Die gewapende magte mag dalk vaardig genoeg wees om hul huidige (vredestydse) take te verrig, maar dit is te betwyfel of hulle suksesvol sal wees in die voer van die tipe operasies soos beleid voorgeskryf. Ter opsomming dui die studie aan dat die groot verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid, militêre vermoëns en werklike operasionel eise voor die deur van ‘n gebrek aan doelmatige aanpassing by hulpbrontekorte en operasionele werklikhede gelê kan word. Die tesis maak dus die gevolgtrekking dat die weermag grootliks onsuksesvol was om aan die vereistes van verdedigingsbeleid te voldoen, ongeag die feit dat verdedigingsbeleid op sigself verouderderd en/of ontoepaslik binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks mag wees; verder, dat militêre effektiwiteit ter voldoening aan huidige operasionele eise tans ook verdag is. Ten slotte is die weermag se tweeslagtige organisasiekultuur moontlik die belangrikste oorsaak van die neiging na die versaking van verdediging se grondwetlike mandaat.
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Jordaan, Evert. "South African defence since 1994 : a study of policy-making." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/16340.
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Thesis (MMil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As South Africa entered the transitional period towards establishing a multi-party democracy, its defence policy changed fundamentally. The African National Congress (ANC) as the upcoming governing party established the Military Research Group (MRG), to help formulate its defence policy positions, which subsequently largely determined South African defence policy. Through this think-tank the ANC leadership became interested in and supported the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD). NOD is a European idea of the Cold War era, which was aimed at preventing the security dilemma, arms races and accidental war between states. The aim of this study is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994, by describing how NOD became prominent. Non-offensive defence ideas influenced South African defence policy significantly and appeared in all legislation and policies pertaining to defence. NOD complemented the ANC’s domestic policy goals with the new security paradigm, which like NOD, originate from the Peace Research school of thought. As a defensive idea, NOD emphasised South Africa’s intention to improve relations with Southern African states, as well as its strategic defensiveness, which determined the military doctrine of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The ANC used NOD to transform the SANDF, especially to scale down its power projection capabilities. Two arguments are made in this study to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa when the prominence of NOD is considered. Firstly, that South African defence policy-makers are open to ideas and models from industrialised states, despite the limited applicability and shortcomings of such models. Secondly, models can be used in various ways by interest groups to influence policy. NOD was used as a theoretical tool by the MRG and the military to influence defence policy according to their interests. Several characteristics of South African defence policy-making were also identified. Firstly, that the Constitution does not prioritise state or individual security as more important. This makes conflicting world-views of realism and idealism about defence possible. Defence policy therefore often has to involve a compromise between these views. Secondly, although the Constitution makes provision for public participation in defence policy-making, there is no equal distribution of power for interest groups to influence policy. In this regard the legislature and parliamentary defence committees are also weak compared to the executive authority. Thirdly, the use of non-governmental organisations in defence policy-making has created a form of direct and unrestricted lobbying, as well as the privatisation of policy-making.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Tydens die politieke oorgangsperiode en die aanloop tot die vestiging van ‘n veelparty demokrasie, het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid wesenlike veranderinge ondergaan. As opkomende regerende party het die African National Congress (ANC), die Military Research Group (MRG) gestig om díe party se standpunte rondom verdedigingsbeleid te formuleer. Sedertdien het die MRG, Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid grootliks omskrywe. Die MRG het ANC leiers aan die term non-offensive defence (NOD), wat ‘n Europese idee uit die Koue Oorlog-era is, bekendgestel. NOD is daarop gemik om die veiligheidsdilemma, wapenwedlope en toevallige oorlog te verhoed. Die ANC het NOD ondersteun en bevorder. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die aard van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking sedert 1994 te beskryf aan die hand van NOD se prominensie. Non-offensive defence idees het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid beduidend beïnvloed en verskyn in alle wetgewing en beleid wat verband hou met verdediging. NOD het die ANC se plaaslike beleidsdoelwitte binne die nuwe veiligheidsparadigma ondersteun. Soos NOD, is díe paradigma ‘n produk van die Peace Research denkskool. As ‘n defensiewe idee het NOD, Suid-Afrika se oogmerk om betrekkinge met state in Suider-Afrika te verbeter, benadruk. NOD het verder ook SA se strategiese defensiewe postuur en gepaardgaande militêre doktrine bepaal en beklemtoon. Die ANC het NOD gebruik om die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW) te transformeer en magsprojeksievermoëns af te skaal. Twee argumente word in hierdie studie benut om die aard van verdedigingsbeleidmaking in Suid-Afrika te beskryf, met die inagneming van die belangrikheid van NOD. Eerstens, dat beleidmakers ontvanklik is vir idees en modelle van nywerheidslande, ten spyte van die beperkte toepaslikheid en tekortkomings van sulke modelle. Tweedens, dat modelle deur verskeie belangegroepe gebruik kan word om beleid te beïnvloed. Die MRG en die SANW het NOD as ‘n teoretiese instrument benut om verdedigingsbeleid tot die bevordering van eie belange te beïnvloed. Verskeie eienskappe van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking is geïdentifiseer in die studie. Eerstens, dat die Grondwet nie die staat of die individu se veiligheid bo die ander stel nie. Dit veroorsaak botsende wêreldbeskouings van realisme en idealisme oor verdediging. Beleid behels dus dikwels kompromieë tussen die twee uitgangspunte. Tweedens, alhoewel die Grondwet voorsiening maak vir openbare deelname in beleidmaking, is daar nie gelyke ‘n verspreiding van mag tussen belangegroepe om beleid te beïnvloed nie. In die opsig is die wetgewende gesag en parlementêre komitees aansienlik swakker as die uitvoerende gesag.
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Esterhuyse, Abel Jacobus. "Professional military education in the South African national defence force : the role of the military academy." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/5691.
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340 leaves printed on single pages, preliminary pages i-xvii and numbered pages 1-322. Includes bibliography, table of contents, list of figures, list of tables, list of abbreviations.Dissertation (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The study represents a descriptive analysis of the tensions that drive the need for an educated military in South Africa and, more specifically the role of the South African Military Academy in the provision thereof. The purpose of the research was to demarcate the proper role of the South African Military Academy in the academic and professional preparation of officers for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This purpose necessitated, firstly, an analysis of the need for education in armed forces in general and in South Africa in particular, with specific reference to the tensions underpinning military education and training. It secondly called for a broad assessment of the nature of professional military education in the SANDF at large to contextualise the role and function of the South African Military Academy. These discussions are based on a literature overview, document analysis and unstructured interviews with decision makers. In the first part of the study, a framework is developed for the education of officers. The framework is based on the assumption that modern military professionalism is rooted in a need for training to develop military skills, education to understand and develop the military body of knowledge and experience as the application of skills and knowledge. It is also based on the identification of four knowledge clusters that need to be the focus of officer education, namely the external security environment within which armed forces operate, the nature of armed forces as organisations, the professional employment of armed force(s), and the physical environment within which armed forces operate. The framework highlights three levels of officer development: the making of lieutenants, the making of colonels, and the making of generals. This framework is used for the analysis of education, training and development in the SANDF. Both the positive and negative attributes as well as trends in training and education in the SANDF are discussed. The discussion serves as the departing point for an outline of the debate about the role of the Military Academy since democratisation in 1994. It is argued that there is no clarity about the role and function of the Military Academy. Critical questions are also asked about the nature of the academic programmes offered to officers at the Military Academy. The departmental level agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch is pointed out as the raison d'être for many of the problems with which the Military Academy is confronted. The study finally highlights the need for education as a requirement for officership in the SANDF, a reconsideration of military socialisation at the Military Academy, the difficult position of the Faculty of Military Science, the need for a core academic programme, and structural changes that are needed at the Military Academy. It is recommended that, like many foreign military academies, the future existence of the Military Academy be assured through national legislation. The involvement of the University of Stellenbosch in the education of young officers at the Military Academy should not be terminated. However, the existence, functioning, organisation and structure of the Military Academy should not be based on a “goodwill-approach” between the University and the Department of Defence.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die studie bied beskrywende analise van die spannings wat die behoefte aan opgevoede weermag in Suid-Afrika onderlê en, meer spesifiek, die rol van die Militêre Akademie in die voorsiening van opvoeding in dié verband. Die besondere oogmerk van die navorsing is die afbakening van die werklike rol van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie in die akademiese en professionele voorbereiding van offisiere vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW). Hierdie oogmerk vereis, eerstens, ontleding van die noodsaaklikheid vir die opvoeding van weermagte in die algemeen en in Suid-Afrika in die besonder, met spesifieke verwysing na die spannings wat militêre opvoeding en opleiding onderlê. Dit noodsaak, tweedens, breë waardering van die aard van professionele militêre opvoeding in die SANW om die rol en funksie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie te kontekstualiseer. Die besprekings is gebaseer op literatuuroorsig, dokumentontleding en ongestruktureerde onderhoude. In die eerste deel van die studie word raamwerk vir die opvoeding van offisiere ontwikkel. Dié raamwerk is gebaseer op die aanname dat moderne militêre professionalisme gebaseer is op militêre opleiding om vaardighede te ontwikkel, opvoeding om die militêre kennisliggaam te verstaan en ontwikkel, asook ervaring as toepassing van vaardighede en kennis. Die raamwerk omvat ook die identifisering van vier fokus kennisareas, naamlik die eksterne omgewing waarin weermagte opereer, die organisatoriese aard van krygsmagte, die professionele aanwending van krygsmag(te), en die fisiese omgewing waarin krygsmagte opereer. Die raamwerk beklemtoon voorts drie vlakke van offisiersopvoeding: die ontwikkeling van luitenante, die ontwikkeling van kolonels, en die ontwikkeling van generaals. Die raamwerk word vervolgens vir ontleding van opvoeding, opleiding en ontwikkeling in die SANW gebruik. Beide die positiewe en die negatiewe kenmerke sowel as tendense van opleiding en opvoeding in die SANW word bespreek. Dié bespreking dien as vertrekpunt vir ontleding van die debat oor die rol van die Militêre Akademie sedert demokratisering in 1994. Daar word aangevoer dat daar geen duidelikheid oor die rol en funksie van die Militêre Akademie bestaan nie. Kritiese vrae word gevra oor die aard van die akademiese programme wat aan offisiere by die Militêre Akademie gebied word. Die departementele ooreenkoms tussen die departement van Verdediging en die Universiteit Stellenbosch word voorgehou as die raison d'être van baie probleme waarmee die Akademie gekonfronteer word. Die studie beklemtoon die behoefte aan opvoeding as vereiste vir offisierskap in die SANW, die heroorweging van militêre sosialisering by die Militêre Akademie, die heroorweging van die posisie van die Fakulteit Krygskunde, die behoefte aan akademiese kernleerplan, en strukturele veranderinge wat by die Militêre Akademie vereis word. Daar word aanbeveel dat, soos in die geval van verskeie buitelandse militêre akademies, die toekoms van die Militêre Akademie deur nasionale wetgewing verseker word. Die betrokkenheid van die Universiteit Stellenbosch in die opvoeding van offisiere moenie daardeur beëindig word nie. Die bestaan, funksionering, organisering en struktuur van die Militêre Akademie moet egter nie op “welwillendheidsooreenkoms” tussen die Universiteit en die Departement van Verdediging gebaseer wees nie.
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Collison, Kurt Ryan. "The South African military aerospace industry: An overview of the special defence account more commmonly known as 'The South African Arms Deal'." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2007. http://etd.uwc.ac.za/index.php?module=etd&action=viewtitle&id=gen8Srv25Nme4_5741_1256300601.
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The paper focuses specifically on the South African Military Aerospace Industry as most of the weapons procured under the arms deal were military aircraft. Taking into account the numerous social needs of South Africa, the purpose of this paper is to inter alia try to establish the rationale behind the South African government's decision to to purchase an array of military weapons from foreign suppliers at an initial cost of almost thirty billion rand. In order to gain a better undrstanding of the topic, the author gives a brief overview and history of the South African Aerospace industry.Furthermore, an examination of the politics of the transition from apartheid to democracy and how this affected the aeropace industry is given.
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Fokkens, Andries Marius. "Idealised redesign : the South African Military Academy by the year 2030." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/85386.
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Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2011.The changing external environment of the security sector and higher education influences the South African Military Academy (SAMA) as an institution within the broader Department of Defence, which is also associated with Stellenbosch University (SU) through the SAMA’s Faculty of Military Science (FMS). Graduates of the SAMA operate mostly within this changing security environment where their abilities and competencies are required. The research problem investigates the triggers that will initiate change and the drivers that will bring about paradigm shifts on the SAMA as an institution that delivers graduates for a changing security environment. The research question is to forecast an ideal SAMA in the year 2030. This ideal comes forth from critical analyses of current literature and qualitative data collected from experts through the Delphi technique. Sub-questions of the research question includes the programme content of the academic and military training programmes, the profile of the academic and administrative personnel, the student profile upon entering and exiting the SAMA, the organisational structure required, the infrastructure and finally the financial model. Furthermore, triggers and drivers identify actions to bring about change and critical success factors determine the requirements to achieve an ideal SAMA in 2030. The SAMA is a unique military unit that houses the only Faculty of Military Science in Southern Africa. The research report will empower decision-makers in the DOD and SU, including the unit members of the SAMA, to identify the triggers that will precipitate a coming change and properly manage the drivers pressuring change from the perspective of functionality, politics and society.
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Kleynhans, Evert Philippus. "Armoured warfare : the South African experience in East Africa 1940-1941." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/95919.
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Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Na Suid-Afrika se toetrede tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op 6 September 1939, het die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) verander vanaf ‘n verouderde vredestydse weermag na ‘n moderne mag met offensiewe projeksievermoëns. Gedurende die tussenoorlogperiode het ‘n gevoel van swaarmoedigheid in terme van militêre inovasie in die UVM geheers. Die resultaat hiervan was verwarde denke ten opsigte van pantseroorlogvoering en meganisasie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeplanners het nie die offensiewe potensiaal van pantsermagte verstaan nie. Die gevolg was dat die UVM in September 1939 slegs oor ‘n simboliese pantsermag beskik het. Die Suid-Afrikaanse toetrede tot die oorlog het die stukrag vir die ontwikkeling van ‘n lewensvatbare pantsermag binne die UVM verleen. Gevolglik is die Suid-Afrikaanse Tenkkorps (SATK) in Mei 1940 gestig. Veranderinge in beide die aard en organisatoriese struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsinstellings het gevolg. Die Italiaanse teenwoordigheid in Abessinië en Italiaans-Somaliland is as ‘n direkte bedreiging vir die aangrensende Britse Oos-Afrika gebiede gesien. In Junie 1940, kort na die Italiaanse oorlogsverklaring, is Suid-Afrikaanse magte na Kenia ontplooi. Die UVM ontplooiing na Oos-Afrika was die eerste in ‘n gereelde oorlogsituasie sedert die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Ten spyte van die doktrine wat die Suid-Afrikaanse ontplooiing van pantsermagte na Oos-Afrika ondersteun het, het die SATK-eenhede gou geleer dat die aanvaarde doktrine, ontleen aan die Britse Ministerie van Oorlog gedurende die tussenoorlogsjare, slegs ‘n gids was tot offensiewe aanwending. Die storie van die Suid- Afrikaanse ontplooiing in Oos-Afrika gedurende die oorlog, word as ‘n lens gebruik waardeur die rol en aanwending van beide die UVM se pantserkarre en ligte tenks ondersoek word. Die geallieerde offensiewe deur Italiaans-Somaliland en suidelike Abessiniȅ gedurende 1940 – 1941 illustreer duidelik dat die taktiese en operasionele aanwending van die Suid- Afrkaanse pantsermagte gedurende hierdie tydperk van groot belang was vir die suksesse en mislukkings van die veldtog. Die aard van die opponerende magte in Oos-Afrika, die voortdurend veranderende topografie en klimaat van die operasionele teater, asook die aard van die Suid-Afrikaanse offensiewe operasies gedurende die veldtog, het gekombineer om die unieke manier waarop die pantserkarre en tenks van die UVM van 1940 tot 1941 aangewend is, te vorm. Die operasionele ervarings wat die UVM opgedoen het gedurende die Oos-Afrika Veldtog, het die verdere ontplooiings van Suid-Afrikaanse pantser na Noord- Afrika, Madagaskar en Italiȅ gedurende die res van die oorlog gevorm.
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Radebe, Chrystal. "The mentoring of officers commanding in the SA Military Health Service (SAMHS): a military social work perspective." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/2878.
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Thesis (M Social Work (Social Work))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009.An exploratory research design together with a quantitative research approach were chosen to determine whether military social workers possess the necessary knowledge, skills and values to mentor Officers Commanding (OCs) in the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS). The motivation for this study was based on questions the researcher asked as to whether there was a link between the methods in social work intervention processes, supervision and mentoring processes. During the preliminary investigation, the researcher found that no prior research under this specific subject was undertaken. The researcher also determined from her role as consultant to Officers Commanding in the SAMHS, that whereas military social workers received supervision upon joining the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), OCs, received no formal mentoring. It was also found that although a mentoring policy in the Department of Defence (DOD) existed, no evidence existed that a mentoring programme was implemented in the SAMHS. The goal of the study is therefore to provide military social workers with a framework of a mentoring process for Officers Commanding in the SAMHS. The literature study firstly focused on describing the military social work environment in which the military social worker is employed, as well as theoretical frameworks that guide the military social worker’s task. Although more than one theoretical framework was discussed, the main focus was on the systems theory and ecological perspective. The work environment of the OC was also included, as well as the challenges of their functions, tasks and roles in the SAMHS. Primarily, the literature study explored the knowledge, skills and values of the military social worker and the mentoring process. The sample that was selected for this study was 46 military social workers that represented all the chief military social workers in specialist posts and those with a higher ranking from Captain to Colonel. A quantitative investigation was undertaken by means of a questionnaire which was completed in groups in the respective provinces. The results of the investigation largely confirmed the findings of the literature study namely that military social workers do fit the requirements to mentor. These requirements to mentor were evident in the results of the knowledge, skills and values of military social workers and their understanding of the parallels between the methods in social work, supervision and the mentoring process. The results gave an indication of the knowledge, skills and values of military social workers to mentor Officers Commanding in the SAMHS, and the framework of the mentoring process and how it relates to the casework, group work and supervision processes in social work. The recommendations demonstrated that a central body should be identified to coordinate and plan a mentoring programme in the SAMHS. The recommendations also include that the Directorate Social Work should provide clear guidelines on how military social workers should implement the DOD Mentoring policy, and ensure that military social workers are trained in staff development methods and its processes. The recommendations included further research: both quantitative and qualitative research by means of questionnaires and interviews with OCs, as well as monitoring and evaluation of the mentoring process. This information will benefit military social workers in their training as mentors. In implementing these recommendations, military social workers will be able to contribute significantly to the development of Officers Commanding in the SAMHS and the profession of social work.
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Jacobs, Noel Mkhululi. "An organisational culture approach to improve military-civilian relations at The South African Military Academy." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/95564.
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Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.The primary focus of this study is to look at the interplay of the military and academic cultures at the South African Military Academy (SAMA). The question was raised about the nature of these two conflicting subcultures within the SAMA faculty, some avoidable damage that is being done, and ways to overcome the conflict for the future. Research data obtained from interviewing a sample of the SAMA members was used to investigate whether the two subcultures, which appear each to have a different ethos, can complement one another and how they define and shape the organisational culture of the institution. Findings from this study confirmed the existence of conflict between the academic and military culture and showed that this conflict has historical origins. It was further shown that part of the conflict arises from the tendency of the military culture to impose itself over the academic culture. The study revealed that this conflict also affects the civilian-military relations amongst the staff members, which impacts on the staff morale and organisational performance. It was found that ineffective organisational communication of the Academy was partly the source of this organisational culture and that the strengthening of an effective organisational communication particularly on the part of senior management of the Academy could go a long way towards creating an inclusive organisational culture that accommodates and encourages the coexistence of both the academic and military subcultures. The study concluded that peaceful coexistence of both these subcultures will lead to healthier relations between the civilian and uniformed members and to the SAMA as a whole. Recommendations for further consideration and action by the Military Academy were given.
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Thiart, Theunis Johannes Daniel. "Peace support in Africa : potential contribution and roles of the South African Navy." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/5335.
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BibliographyThesis (MPhil (Military Science. Security Management))--University of Stellenbosch, 2011.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The South African Navy (SAN) was created after the First World War as an indigenous naval capability for South Africa was deemed necessary. Its roles and responsibilities through the years have depended on both the requirements of the state, and the political realities of the time. Possible future roles in peace support would therefore depend on political requirements as well as the capabilities and composition of the SAN. To date, the SAN has only contributed to peace support by way of the patrols carried out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika, and assistance from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi. The seemingly minor nature of this contribution is disconcerting, because the contributions of the SANDF in present (ongoing) peace support are very highly rated by the South African Government. To enhance its visibility, the SAN should preferably play a more visible role in peace support in Africa, and generally in assisting in the maintenance of good order at sea around the African coastline. The potential contributions to or during peace support activities should therefore not only be seen as the direct support which the SAN can give to land forces carrying out peace support in a specific country, but also the support the SAN can give to maintaining good order in the corresponding, and other African, maritime zones. Potential contributions and roles of the SAN in particular therefore need to be interrogated more comprehensively to foster a deeper understanding of this unexplored field of study within the peace support environment, and that of Africa in particular. To determine the possible contributions and roles of the SAN, the traditional roles and the doctrines of navies (specifically those involved in peace support operations) were investigated. It was found that the roles emanating from the traditional roles for navies were assimilated into navies. doctrines, roles and tasks. Possible roles and missions for the SAN are reflected in the SAN Maritime Doctrine. Regional expectations have added more roles and missions like the sharing of training, assets, expertise, information, the requirement of maintaining maritime security and the maintenance of good order at sea. The assets available in the SAN (and the future assets) seem to be adequate to carry out possible peace support activities. However, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN to peace support will be limited by the scope of future budgets and the shortages of skills, equipment and capacity. The foreseen budgets available will not allow participation in activities beyond those being undertaken at present. Unless more funding is received, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support activities in Africa will probably not extend beyond some lake patrols and VIP protection.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Suid Afrikaanse Vloot (SAV) het na die Eerste Wêreld Oorlog tot stand gekom omrede so 'n inheemse vloot as broodnodig vir Suid Afrika beskou was. Die SAV se rol en verantwoordelikhede was deur die geskiedenis gerig deur die behoeftes van die regering van die dag en van die politieke oorwegings van die oomblik. Toekomstige verantwoordelikhede vir vredesteun sal insgelyks afhang van politieke oorwegings, sowel as die aard van, en bates beskikbaar vir, die SAV. Tot dusver was die SAV bydrae aan vredesteun beperk tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op die Tanganjika meer in Burundi, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie Eskader met BBP werk in Burundi. Hierdie geringe bydraes is onstellend omrede vredesteun pogings belangrik geag word deur die Suid Afrikaanse regering. Die SAV sal dus 'n groter rol in vredesteun in Afrika moet speel, en veral in die instandhouding van goeie orde op see, ten einde beter sigbaarheid te bewerkstellig. Die potensiële SAV bydraes aan vredesteun aktiwiteite moet dus nie slegs gesien word in die direkte SAV steun aan landmagte betrokke by vredesteun in een of ander land nie, maar ook in die bydrae tot die instandhouding van goeie orde in die ooreenkomstige maritieme omgewings in Afrika. Potensiële SAV bydraes moet daarom in diepte ontleed word ten einde 'n beter insig te vekry in die maritieme streke (veral in Afrika) waar tot dusver maar min navorsing gedoen is. Om hierdie potensiële bydraes te bepaal, is die tradisionele rol en doktrines van vlote (veral die wat betrokke is by vredesteun) ondersoek. Daar is bevind dat die huidige doktrines, rol en take van vlote voortgevloei het uit die tradisionele rol van vlote. Moontlike rolle en bydraes van die SAV is reeds beskikbaar in die SAV Maritieme Doktrine (2006). Verdere moontlike bydraes spruit voort uit die verwagtinge van die verskillende streke in Afrika soos die deelname in Suid Afrikaanse opleiding, kundigheid en informasie, en die behoefte aan instandhouding van maritieme veiligheid en goeie orde op see. Die huidige en toekomstige bates van die SAV (insluitende skepe, eenhede en personeel) blyk voldoende te wees om by te dra tot moontlike vredesteun aktiwitiete. Die moontlike bydraes sal egter beperk word deur ontoereikende toekomstige begrotings en tekortkominge met betrekking tot kundigheid, toerusting en kapasiteit. Trouens, die huidige en toekomstige begrotings is ontoereikend vir verdere vredesteun bydraes buiten dit wat tot dusver gelewer word. Sonder 'n toename in die begroting sal die vredesteun pogings van die SAV beperk bly tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op die Tanganjika Meer, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie Eskader in BBP werk.
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Surridge, Keith Terrance. "British civil-military relations and the South African War (1899-1902)." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1994. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/british-civilmilitary-relations-and-the-south-african-war-18991902(24971b52-a519-4100-83b2-a730462bc426).html.
Full textBooks on the topic "South African military"
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Uys, Ian S. South African military whoʼs who, 1452-1992. Germiston, Republic of South Africa: Fortress Publishers, 1992.
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On the border: The white South African military experience, 1965-1990. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2008.
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Grensvegter?: South African army psychologist. Halifax, Eng: Sentinel Projects, 1996.
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L'Ange, Gerald. Urgent imperial service: South African forces in German South West Africa, 1914-1915. Rivonia: Ashanti Pub., 1991.
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Belling, Ron. A portrait of military aviation in South Africa. Cape Town: Struikhof Publishers, 1989.
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Tale gunner: The lighter side of South African military life. Johannesburg: 30 ̊South, 2010.
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Gutteridge, William Frank. The military in South African politics: Champions of national unity? [London]: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994.
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The military in the making of modern South Africa. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996.
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McLean, Steven. Squadrons of the South African Air Force and their aircraft, 1920-2005. Table View, South Africa: Steven McLean, 2005.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "South African military"
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Spence, J. E. "The Military in South African Politics." In South Africa: No Turning Back, 240–57. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19499-5_7.
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Smit, H. A. P., and T. J. Mokiri. "Environmental Reporting in the South African Department of Defense and Military Veterans." In Military Geosciences and Desert Warfare, 191–203. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-3429-4_13.
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Heinecken, Lindy. "The South African Military and Gender Integration: Bridging Theory and Practice." In Clinical Sociology: Research and Practice, 277–94. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54584-0_15.
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Heinecken, Lindy. "Transitions and Transformation in Gender Relations in the South African Military: From Support in Warfare to Valued Peacekeepers." In The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military, 355–68. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51677-0_22.
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Jok, Jok Madut. "Lessons in Failure: Peacebuilding in Sudan/South Sudan." In The State of Peacebuilding in Africa, 363–77. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_20.
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Abstract Common to most protracted conflicts that relapse into war is a disconnect between elites and local communities, which typically suffer the most when the former undermine peace agreements to further their own narrow interests. The central argument in this chapter, drawing heavily on the recent history of Sudan/South Sudan and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), is that African conflict resolution and peacebuilding relies too heavily on political agreements between politico-military elites. These deals focus largely on elite power and resource-sharing arrangements. Mostly ignored are the communal and societal dynamics that initially fed the violence. Sudan/South Sudan’s persistent conflict and instability is a prime example of what happens when peace agreements are signed without due regard for the true nature and genesis of the conflict.
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Jaster, Robert Scott, and Shirley Kew Jaster. "Confronting the Military." In South Africa’s Other Whites, 31–40. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22456-2_3.
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Hay, George. "South Africa, 1899−1902." In The Yeomanry Cavalry and Military Identities in Rural Britain, 1815–1914, 171–208. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65539-0_6.
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Jaster, Robert Scott, and Shirley Kew Jaster. "A Militant Peacemaker." In South Africa’s Other Whites, 102–13. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22456-2_10.
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Cochran, Shawn T. "South Africa in Namibia (1966–1989)." In War Termination as a Civil-Military Bargain, 115–35. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137527974_6.
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Seegers, Annette. "Transitional South Africa: Negotiations and the Military." In Reaction and Renewal in South Africa, 1–24. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24772-1_1.
Full textConference papers on the topic "South African military"
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Benson, J., W. Miglietti, S. J. Glass, and K. Getliffe. "Problems in Military Propulsion Engines of the South African Air Force." In ASME 1995 International Gas Turbine and Aeroengine Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/95-gt-425.
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The Nimonic 105 first stage turbine blade of the Rolls Royce Viper 22/1 engine has a design life of 2400 hrs. Over the years, these blades have prematurely failed (1 200–1 800 hrs), necessitating a service limit of 1 000 hrs. Initial investigations thought the cause of failure to be linked with higher than desired lead content but the final cause of failure was attributed to an incorrect heat treatment, forming continuous grain boundary carbides, resulting in embrittlement of the blade. A rejuvenation heat treatment was then developed. The IN-713 and IN-X-40 first stage vanes of the Allison T56 engine suffer thermal fatigue cracking. The IN-713 vanes suffer narrow, fine but long cracks, whereas the X-40 vanes suffer severe cracking (cracks as wide as 3 mm) and excessive oxidation due to overheating. The X-40 alloy is protected by a Cr2O3 scale compared with Al3O3 on the IN-713 alloy. Above 1 000 °C the Cr2O3 breaks down and excessive oxidation results. A braze repair was developed for the X-40 vanes.
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Robertson, Jaco. "Integrity of a common operating picture in military situational awareness." In 2014 Information Security for South Africa (ISSA). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/issa.2014.6950514.
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Perry, Brandon J., Sara B. Heltzel, and Robert S. Salzar. "The Use of Dermestidae in Documenting Underbody Blast Injuries to Foot-Ankle-Leg Complex." In ASME 2017 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2017-70413.
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Conflicts in the Gulf have exposed warfighters to injury by means of improvised explosive device (IED) detonation beneath armored military vehicles, commonly referred to as underbody blast (UBB). Together with the pelvis, injuries to the foot-ankle-leg number among those most commonly sustained by warfighters in the event of a UBB. Multiple biomechanical tests are currently being conducted in order to develop injury thresholds and risk functions for warfighters subjected to these vertical loads. In a previous study of 38 foot-ankle-leg complexes tested under automotive and UBB load rates, a distribution of injuries was produced. High-speed x-ray video and post-test CT, Statscan (Lodox, Johannesburg, South Africa), and dissection were performed to document injuries. It is, however, difficult to thoroughly remove soft tissue and cartilage from the calcaneus and talus without inducing damage that could be mistaken as a test-induced injury. For this test series, Dermestidae macerated 31 tali and 18 calcanei revealing 12 and 4 injuries, respectively, that were previously undiagnosed through more traditional techniques. Logistic regressions were produced to quantify the significance of the findings. The pre- and post-maceration regressions predicted a 50% injury risk of 6626N and 4228N, respectively, or a 44% difference in mean.
Reports on the topic "South African military"
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Steyn, Jacobus J. The Changing Face of South Africa's Military Forces. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada394656.
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