Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Southeast Asian studies|International relations|Political science'

The South China Sea has long been a region of competition and tension. In the Spratly Islands alone, Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam maintain disputing claims to the region’s land features and surrounding maritime territories. Some argue that ongoing negotiations between China and the Philippines toward joint explorations of one of these disputed regions could be the key to promoting greater cooperation amongst the other claimants. These arguments, however, do not consider other elements of the international system that drive states to compete. Looking specifically at China, the Philippines, and the United States, this thesis analyzes joint explorations within the framework of motivational realism to understand the interaction of relevant historical elements, state objectives, and state estimations of one another’s power, offense-defense balance, and motives—greedy or security-seeking. The thesis then examines the specific case of joint explorations to understand historical, domestic, and international legal components restricting the pathways within which the two states could reach an agreement. Finally, this thesis concludes that, due to domestic constraints, international legal developments, state objectives, and the way in which China, the Philippines, and the United States assess one another’s motives, the South China Sea will likely remain a region of long-term competition and tension.

This thesis analyzes the evolution of the Sino-Japanese conflict over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands since the end of the Cold War. It argues that the 2012-2013 confrontation following the nationalization of the islands by Japan is the result of a process of conflict escalation that played out during repeated cycles of tensions over the previous two decades. Tensions reached a first peak in 1996 after Japanese activists built a lighthouse on one of the Senkaku/Diaoyu. Another confrontation would have erupted in 2004 after Chinese activists landed on one of the islands were it not for the intervention of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. After both events, nothing was done to prevent future confrontations, which allowed the conflict to fester and enter a downward spiral. This process resulted in worsening mutual perceptions and more assertive domestic audiences on both sides, which pushed Chinese and Japanese leaders towards increasingly confrontational attitudes, eventually resulting in two serious incidents in 2010 and 2012 that brought bilateral tensions to a new post-WWII high.

This study examines the factors that influence national decisions about developing nuclear fuel cycle technology, and the central question for this study is why countries have developed different national nuclear fuel cycles. Prospect theory is used as the basis of an analytical framework for studying nuclear fuel cycle decision making. In essence, prospect theory states that nations are risk averse when in a gains domain and risk acceptant when in a losses domain. This study hypothesizes that a country's nuclear fuel cycle decision making is determined by the frame of reference and domain (either gains or losses) and that security concerns are a factor driving policy behind all nuclear programs.

A structured, focused comparison of Indian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear fuel cycle decision making was conducted in order to test the hypotheses. Major nuclear fuel cycle decisions made between approximately 1950 and 1990 in each country were analyzed. The results verified this study's hypotheses. Decisions were mostly made according to the tenets of prospect theory, and security concerns (national security or energy security) were a driver for the nuclear programs in all three countries. The study also emphasized that nuclear fuel cycle technology is strategic and highly valued by countries and that national leaders are involved with making major nuclear fuel cycle decisions.

Prospect theory proved to be a more powerful analytical tool than existing theories of nuclear weapons proliferation. Prospect theory accounts for a country's capabilities, intentions, and situational and temporal context. In this way, prospect theory gives a holistic view of how all nuclear technologies fit into strategic interests and how a country's leadership's frame of reference with regard to strategic interests influences the direction of nuclear fuel cycle decision making. Prospect theory on its own does not offer a model or predictor of nuclear fuel cycle technology development, but it illuminates how leaders viewed nuclear fuel cycle decisions and why certain decisions were made.

Over the past two decades, a substantial literature has focused on the geopolitics of strategically located Central Asian energy supplies. Some analysts have even regarded the international competition over the regional oil and gas as a New Great Game among the developed West, Russia, and the emerging Asian energy importers. Much less attention has been paid to the means employed by the various competitors in achieving their interests in the Central Asian hydrocarbon sector. This Master Thesis analyzes the competition over the energy resources in Kazakhstan between two regional powers Russia and China for the period from 1991 to 2011. The study assesses the concept of power in its political, economic, and military terms as a way to achieve desired outcomes in the regional energy sector. The analysis concludes that economic statecraft is the dominant tool used in securing interests in the Central Asian oil and gas sector and thus allows China's economic clout to guarantee favorable energy deals. At the same time, the results suggest that Russia's soft power along with the traditional military engagements help to secure other strategic interests in the region apart from the energy sector.

The rise of nationalism and the proliferation of foreign policy actors in China has contributed to increasing levels of distrust between China and the Asia-Pacific region, and contributed to a significant decline in the stability of the US-China relationship. The overblown reaction from China's civil society to the US' strategic "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific, initiated in November 2011, demonstrates that Beijing's traditional foreign policy pragmatism is being threatened by hostile factions in China's society. This is further evidenced by China's provocative actions in the East China and South China Seas, which have led to heightened regional tensions. Calls for a more confrontational Chinese foreign policy among China's civil society have been exacerbated by a more diffuse foreign policy decisionmaking structure which Beijing now struggles to manage. While official rhetoric toward the rebalance has been characterized largely by restraint, the elites are being forced to cater to a nationalist civil society with greater freedom to pursue self-interested policies independent of central control.

Crucially, however, caution and restraint remains essential for ongoing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy. As a result, stability with the US and with its regional partners still forms the core of Beijing's policy. While China's rhetoric, and to some extents its actions, has become more forceful, a conflict on its periphery would pose enormous challenges which could overwhelm the Party and potentially cause internal implosion. In order to maintain CCP rule, Beijing may be forced to rein in overtly competitive elements within China, even if this comes at significant cost to its legitimacy.

As a result, the ebb and flow of Chinese policy is likely to continue as the leadership struggles to accommodate new and divergent interests within its civil society. Beijing must take steps to restructure its poorly managed bureaucracy, particularly its maritime agencies, to ensure it can rein in competing interests which threaten its ability to preserve stability. For Xi Jinping, China's new leader, balancing China's nationalist factions against the continuing need for stability may define his tenure. It will also play a central role in stabilizing US-China relations, which are increasingly characterized by distrust.

Despite being a popular tool for counterinsurgency, the literature on pro-government militias remain divided. One strand focuses on the security benefits that the militias bring, while the other argues that they generate a political backlash. Using India's counterinsurgency campaigns in Kashmir and Chhattisgarh, I test a wide variety of hypotheses generated from the literature.

This dissertation is a case study of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s approach to soft power with a focus on Iran’s use of soft power in Afghanistan. This dissertation is unique as it a delves into the diverse conceptual prescriptions on soft power, especially from a non-Western perspective. Studies of soft power in the current International Relations discipline ignore the implicit widespread liberal democratic bias in the current understanding of the concept. This dissertation argues that there are certain ontological assumptions lying deep within the soft power model first proposed by Joseph Nye (1990) that make it difficult to use as a model for studying non-Western states. This stems from Nye’s consideration that sources of attraction, essential in wielding soft power, as universal and equivalent to Western liberal values. Nye does not consider how the sources of attraction that he identifies are biased towards a Western notion of values, culture, policies and institutions. This has led to a disregard of the use of soft power by non-Western states. Thus, the aim of this study is to address the western-centric limitation of Nye’s concept by offering a reconceptualization that can be applied in studying the soft power of states that do not necessarily adhere to the same universal norms.

By applying Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis framework, this dissertation examines Iran’s soft power strategy in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2017, in order to enhance its influence. Iran’s soft power application relies on what that the author calls ‘affinity’, whereby audience-oriented and localized resources of attraction are identified in the target population and are subsequently discursively cultivated. Attraction build through the ‘affinity’ process is different than Western states’ use of attraction and application of soft power.

This dissertation highlights how Iran has created an affinity node centered on a ‘sense of brotherhood’ with its Afghanistan audience. It also shows that the strength of this narrative is in Iran’s ability to create an emotional connection that is embedded in commonalities between the two countries’ in terms of culture, historical legacy, and common language. The analysis presented shows the affinity node of brotherhood appears in over 20 speeches and statements targeted at the Afghan population by the Iranian supreme leader and successive Iranian presidents in recent decades. The notion of brotherhood provides Iran the emotional linkage, the affinity node, to connect with its Afghan audience.

The affinity that Iran establishes with Afghanistan allows Iran to articulate its foreign policy objectives by showing how Iranian influence benefits the Afghan population and appeals to existing Afghan values. In addition, this dissertation finds that Iran devotes considerable resources to the development of these discourses in Afghanistan through the various institutions that in charge of Iran’s public diplomacy activities. The focus of these activities is mainly in the realm of culture, education, and language, leveraging the common ties between Iran and their Afghan audience.

Lastly, the findings of this study indicate that Iran’s approach to soft power is strategically calculated. Iran makes explicit use of soft power that is different from the original notion of soft power as it was formulated by Nye. Iran’s actions show that sources of attraction do not have to be universal, attraction is contextual in its appeal, based on each target audience and can be constructed through discourses. Thus, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) would say, Iran’s articulation of an antagonistic discourse challenges the hegemonic discourses that are associated with the Western evaluation of soft power.

The Sino-Indian relationship marked by mutual mistrust for the last six decades has seen definitive changes since the late 1980s. Though considerable issues remain unresolved, the two have begun establishing mechanisms to establish a certain level of trust that began with the visit of Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988. The paper analyzes recent literature on this relationship and finds them predicting two outcomes primarily - either one where India admits Chinese supremacy and kowtows to it, or one that foresees increased clashes between the two. Neither outcome takes into account the complex association that the two nations are building guided by a series of frameworks, mechanisms and agreements. This paper posits that in the evolutionary arc of interstate relations, Sino-Indian relations have not reached a point where only one of the two options - cooperation and competition, will be chosen. This paper argues that economic interests of the two rising powers is behind the present behavior where the two are courting each other but at the same time, preparing for the other's rise. Both countries consider their economic identity to be primary and do not want to be distracted from the key national goal of economic development. They are particularly careful that their disagreements with each other do not come in the way of this goal. The paper analyzes the various frameworks and suggests that they are created with this end in consideration. Both India and China aim to continue collaboration in economic matters bilaterally or in international issues of mutual interest even when they don't see eye to eye on disputes left over from history. It is likely that competition will at times get the better of cooperation, driven by factors like strategic influence in the neighborhood, finding newer providers of energy as well as markets for their goods and services. But periodic flare-ups notwithstanding, in the absence of serious provocations, the two countries will avoid clashes that can escalate. The paper also analyzes certain black-swan events that might disturb the balancing act. Incidents like the death of the Dalai Lama creating a vacuum within the Tibetan leadership is one such scenario; a terrorist attack on India planned and executed form Pakistan like the one in Mumbai in 2008 is another. However, the presence of multiple bilateral platforms will continue to automatically insulate alternate channels of communication even in these situations. In conclusion, the paper suggests that as they grow, India and China will continue to engage each other at several levels, competing and cooperation, deterring and reassuring each other at once.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the human rights violations against one minority group in Myanmar – the Rohingya – by the majority Buddhist Rakhinese population with central government support, in order to call the international community to pursue immediate, cohesive diplomatic action to address this humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. The scope of this thesis, which is organized in five chapters, focuses on the early 21 ^st century from 2000 – 2014, but it includes earlier background information on Myanmar and the plight of the Rohingya. This thesis includes a Preface, which contains maps and images of Myanmar and its people, for the benefit of the reader.

Chapter I, "Background Information on the Ethnic and Religious Conflict," sets the stage for understanding this problem from pre-colonial times to 1999. Chapter II, "Evidence of Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide Against the Rohingya in Myanmar," examines the implicit government policies from 2000 - 2014 that target the Rohingya for extermination. This chapter analyzes Myanmar's political, economic, and socio-cultural intolerance for the Rohingya that have left them stateless and forced them to flee Myanmar for security in neighboring states like Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia. Chapter III, "Responsibility to Protect the Rohingya," challenges the international community, consisting of the United States (US), European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to pursue all peaceful means available to end the abuse of the Rohingya under the international norm of the responsibility to protect (RtoP). Chapter IV, "A Recommended Peacebuilding Plan for Ending the Plight of the Rohingya," identifies possible paths for integrating the Rohingya politically, economically, and socio-culturally into the fabric of Myanmar society as citizens of the country, with protection from different forms of persecution. Chapter V, "Conclusion," stresses that reconciliation with the Muslim Rohingya will pave the way for more peaceful relations between Myanmar's majority Buddhist population and its diverse minority ethnic and religious groups. Without peaceful relations with these minority groups, like the Rohingya, Myanmar's tenuous transition to democracy will not fully succeed.

This dissertation examines the influence of donor-driven and recipient-driven interests on foreign aid allocation.

Chapter 1 examines how the donor's trade interests together with elections and the political competitiveness of electoral processes in recipient countries are associated with bilateral foreign aid flows. US gives more aid to its non-competitive larger trade partners, but cuts their aid ahead of elections. It substitutes aid with market access for non-competitive countries for which it is an important export market, but not during election years. Germany, Japan and UK give more aid to countries with competitive electoral systems, but for these countries Japan and UK substitute aid with trade. The substitution disappears for UK during election years. Japan and UK also reward countries for which they are important export markets with more aid, but only during non-election years for Japan. During election years, Germany cuts aid to non-competitive countries, but gives more aid to non-competitive countries for which it is an export destination. There is weak evidence that France substitutes aid with market access for politically competitive countries.

Chapter 2 focuses on recipient incentives. I extend the Grossman and Helpman (1996) model of elections and special interests by adding foreign aid. I show that with conditional aid when the preferred policy of the donor and that of the special interest group are not aligned, the latter has an incentive to alter election probabilities so that the opposition party wins and implements the lobby's preferred policy. Under these circumstances, the government has an incentive to substitute away from conditional foreign aid. Furthermore, if the government has a higher probability of winning under unconditional aid, the lobby succeeds in asking the government to deviate the most in its policy stance.

In Chapter 3 I examine how China's growing importance as an export destination is related to countries' UN voting alignment with the US, and whether this relationship is different if the countries export oil and mineral resources that China. I find regional differences in UN voting alignment response. Latin American countries and Sub-Saharan African countries not heavily reliant on exports of oil and minerals show decreased political alignment with increased export dependence on China. UN voting alignment for the resource exporters from Sub-Saharan Africa do not vary with export dependence on China. Instead, they have a lower level of UN alignment with the US.