Academic literature on the topic 'Southern Africa political economy series'

The so-called ‘mfecane’ has been explained in many ways by historians, but never adequately. Julian Cobbing has absolved the Zulu of culpability for ongoing regional conflicts, but his work is severely flawed in its use of evidence. Cobbing is incorrect to argue that the Delagoa Bay slave trade existed on a large scale prior to the disruptions beginning in 1817, and European slaving therefore cannot have been a root cause of political turmoil and change, as he claims. Cobbing correctly identifies European-sponsored slave-raiding as a major cause of violence across the north-eastern Cape Frontier, but his accusations of missionary involvement are false. Jeff Guy's interpretation of the rise of the Zulu kingdom based on environmental factors is inadequate because he examined only stock-keeping and not arable land use, which led him to false conclusions about demography and politics. In this paper I argue that the socio-political changes and associated demographic turmoil and violence of the early nineteenth century in southern Africa were the result of a complex interaction between factors governed by the physical environment and local patterns of economic and political organization. Increasing inequalities within and between societies coupled with a series of environmental crises transformed long-standing competition over natural resources and trade in south-eastern Africa into violent struggles.

Cross border and inter country financial recourse is like a civilization hold. It is fundamentally important phenomenon to study. Purpose of this study is to investigate inter country global private financial flows in context of current financial regimes. Design of the study is quantitative based on a secondary data taken from website of World Development Indicators (WDI) 2020. A literature review of relevant studies extracted from renowned research databases is also integral part of the overall design of the study. For the purpose of analysis and investigation the study uses Grey Relational Analysis (GRA). GRA is a mathematical technique capable of handling a multitude of alternatives with plenty of criteria simultaneously. It is a ranking technique that generates the reference series, normalizes the data and compares the weighted average grey coefficients with reference series. GRA is a popular methodology espoused in grey systems theory. It is the study of eighty-three countries on the basis of five different criteria. The countries have been ranked according to Grey relational grades by using rank function of excel and are divided into seven different categories on the basis of intensity of financial flows. The categories have been made on the basis of ordinal scale e.g. exceptionally high level of private global financial flows, excellent, very good, good, fair, poor and very poor. Results show that China, Niger, Brazil, Mozambique, Mongolia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Cambodia, Grenada, Thailand, Indonesia, Argentina and Maldives have exceptionally high private financial flows, whereas, countries namely Lesotho, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Botswana, Guatemala, Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Bhutan, Angola and Russian Federation have poor financial flows. Majorly, Arabian Countries (AC), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) countries fall under exceptionally high ensign, whereas, member countries of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries fall under very poor ensign. This study is useful for political governments, international agencies, researchers and academia (students and teachers of international finance). It also provides new information and deeper insights by way of assigning grey relational grades to countries and classifies them into seven groups. It also extends discussion to enlighten upon bloc level position.

Post-apartheid South Africa has recast its regional relations. Nonetheless, much of the literature depicts its policy as a projection of captured interests, for instance big business as embedded in Pretoria's apparent neo-liberal turn. Instead, post-apartheid South Africa's regional relations represent a political compromise, albeit not necessarily an explicit one, that reflects the different visions of South Africa's regional role and their respective political bases. Because their policies reflect the push and pull of competing constituencies, democratic states are rarely one dimensional. Post-apartheid South Africa is no exception, as it attempts to square the political circle of competing political constituencies, such as big business and labour. South Africa's regional relations and, in particular, its policy of regional economic cooperation/integration, are best understood as a reflection of the competing interests within its domestic political economy.

In sub-Saharan African countries that have made democratic transition from military rule and military-backed authoritarian regimes, state elites have embarked upon strategies aimed at demilitarising the new democratic political process. Demilitarisation of the state and politics has become an imperative because it is decisive for consolidating democratic politics and for ensuring improvements in public safety and security. Yet the process of such demilitarisation in these countries has often generated a paradox, whereby the reduction of the political influence of state institutions of violence has been associatedw ith rising civil militarism and the prevalenceo f organised violence in the wider society. In these circumstances, taking cognisance of the dangers of civil militarism and other forms of private violence is a priority for designing and implementing demilitarisation strategies and other security reforms in post-authoritarian African states. Reformminded political elites and external supporters need to be sensitive to these dangers or risk perpetuating the shell of electoral democracy that cannot deliver the goal of human security in the region. This dissertation explored how the current approach to demilitarisation is related to the problem of civil militarism by examining the case studies of Nigeria and South Africa. It explains that given the condition of the state in Africa, demilitarisation of politics after transition from military or military-backed authoritarianism contributes to the emergence of civil militarism. Based on this finding, it argues for a comprehensive approach to demilitarisation as a strategy that caters to both state and societal violence in order to mitigate the risks of civil militarism in the process.

In sub-Saharan African countries that have made democratic transition from military rule and military-backed authoritarian regimes, state elites have embarked upon strategies aimed at demilitarising the new democratic political process. Demilitarisation of the state and politics has become an imperative because it is decisive for consolidating democratic politics and for ensuring improvements in public safety and security. Yet the process of such demilitarisation in these countries has often generated a paradox, whereby the reduction of the political influence of state institutions of violence has been associatedw ith rising civil militarism and the prevalenceo f organised violence in the wider society. In these circumstances, taking cognisance of the dangers of civil militarism and other forms of private violence is a priority for designing and implementing demilitarisation strategies and other security reforms in post-authoritarian African states. Reformminded political elites and external supporters need to be sensitive to these dangers or risk perpetuating the shell of electoral democracy that cannot deliver the goal of human security in the region. This dissertation explored how the current approach to demilitarisation is related to the problem of civil militarism by examining the case studies of Nigeria and South Africa. It explains that given the condition of the state in Africa, demilitarisation of politics after transition from military or military-backed authoritarianism contributes to the emergence of civil militarism. Based on this finding, it argues for a comprehensive approach to demilitarisation as a strategy that caters to both state and societal violence in order to mitigate the risks of civil militarism in the process.

This thesis examines the recent experience of industrial policy in Mozambique in the context of developments in the economy as a whole and in the Southern African region, in order to draw attention to the fundamental pressures and issues that form part of the economic policy decision-making process. The thesis analyses the debate between opponents and proponents of industrial policy, and concludes that there is no abstract rationale for or against industrial policy that is independent of the specific socio-economic pressures and processes of change under consideration. Orthodox and heterodox arguments for and against industrial policy tend to analyse either agents or linkages in a simplistic way and to ignore the dynamic relationships between them. Thus, they fail to acknowledge that decisions regarding investment and industrial strategies reflect a three-way interaction between the state, capital and labour under specific socio-economic conditions and pressures; that the state and the relationships between the economic agents through or outside the state are influenced by similar conditions, processes and forces; and that the state operates through the market. Hence, the state and the market are not alternatives to each other. Outside the analysis of specific socio-economic conditions there is no way of determining how strategies, policies and interactions between agents and linkages will materialise in economic performance. The main original contribution of the thesis consists of the expansion and application of the linkages-agencies analytical framework to the study of the recent experience of industrial development in Mozambique. This is done within the context of dynamic pressures, conflict, policy reform and development that occur in the economy as a whole, and pressures and influences associated with the Southern African region, in particular with the re-structuring of South African capitalism. Consistent long-term time series and cross section data sets were constructed, out of fragmented and inconsistent data sets, to analyse the performance and role of the manufacturing sector within the Mozambican economy over the last four decades, and to study the patterns of investment in the Mozambican economy in the 1990s.

Land ownership remains an important and contested issue in contemporary South African politics. Drawing inspiration from Hernando de Soto’s work, especially his book, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000), which sees equitable and private land ownership as a key factor for economic growth and development, this thesis details South Africa’s own landed past in order to better understand its political present. Its central research question asks: What role did South Africa’s land and agricultural policies from 1860-1920 play in the country’s unequal development over time? This thesis traces historical transitions in land ownership patterns from the four weak and underdeveloped settler colonies (The Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State and the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek) to the rapidly industrialising, but racialised, South African state and the eventual emergence of white commercial farming by 1920. The thesis engages with a long heritage of South African historical writing on political economy as a central methodology, from its early liberal roots with W.M. Macmillan’s writings on rural poverty in the 1920s, to more radical, neo-Marxist writings of the 1970s and 1980s. This thesis argues that the racialised land and labour policies from 1860-1920 produced a white oligarchy of landowners, which led to an unequal distribution of wealth over time and following De Soto, therefore inhibited economic growth and development. The thesis ultimately speaks to the validity of De Soto’s work, as well as the importance of land and agricultural policies in South Africa today.
Dissertation (MScoSci (History))--University of Pretoria, 2020.
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
Historical and Heritage Studies
MSocSci (History)
Unrestricted

In Africa and elsewhere, producers form a critical dimension to archaeological reconstructions of the political economy. However, few studies address the relationship between producers and the political economy from the vantage point of production sites. This study addresses the position of metal producers in the regional political economy of Iron Age (AD 200 – 1900) communities in southern Africa through an in-depth analysis of one production locale, Shankare. Shankare is a production and habitation site located in close proximity to the Lolwe mineral body in Phalaborwa. Studying the organisation of production, identity of producers, mechanisms of exchange and evidence of consumption at Shankare provided an important platform to assess producers in the context of the domestic and regional economy. Research at Shankare and surrounding sites revealed that production was characterised by a community of homestead based producers located in proximity to the ore source. Metal production took place in domestic contexts in conjunction with other activities, and with clear evidence of scheduling and cross-crafting overlaps. Producers acted independently and were well connected within a regional exchange system that facilitated the flow of local products and imported items such as glass beads and cowrie shells (Cypraea annulus). The study of producers at Shankare indicates the presence of a decentralised political economy resulting in a high degree of autonomy of producers and consumers in the region. Comparisons between the organisation of metal production at Shankare through time indicate that in both occupational periods, AD 900-1300 and AD 1700-1900, production strategies were contextually negotiated, with no clear correlation between political centralisation and specialised production. This research challenges existing models of control and the enactment of power in the political economy of the Iron Age. It has further potential implications for reconsidering the parameters for identifying power relations utilised in global archaeological theory.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD
The MOZAL aluminium smelter in Maputo is the largest-ever foreign direct investment in Mozambique. South Africa's state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) owns 24% shares in MOZAL and the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and Eskom provided road and power supply infrastructure to ensure the success of the smelter. BHP Billiton is the majority shareholder, the other being Mitsubishi. MOZAL is the flagship of South Africa's foreign policy for regional integration in southern Africa and economic reconstruction in Mozambique: a practical manifestation of the African Renaissance. This thesis is a case study of MOZAL as an example of cross-border industrial development and its implications for development in Mozambique. Using an eclectic multidisciplinary Critical Global Political Economy (critical GPE) theoretical framework, a survey of relevant literature and a series of selected open interviews, it examines how development based on the assumptions of industrialisation and neo-modernisation espoused by the governments and private sector champions of MOZAL impact on class, gender, environmental and social justice in Mozambique. The research identifies the socio-economic development dimensions of MOZAL for Mozambique and how the cost and benefits are distributed among the various social groups and actors directly and/or indirectly involved with the MOZAL aluminium smelter. The main findings are that MOZAL as a private sector FDI project is a qualified success. On the positive side, it contributes to economic growth. However, the benefits to Mozambique are exaggerated and are not broadly distributed. On the negative side, it contributes to increasing the economic dependence of Mozambique on the South African economy. Instead of narrowing the development gap, the smelter has contributed to increased differentiation between companies in South Africa and Mozambique and, within Mozambique, between the Northern and Southern regions, as well as among MOZAL employees and the majority of the population in Maputo. The implications are that the development benefits from foreign direct investment cross-border industrial development projects may, at least in the short-term, lead to uneven regional integration and development enjoyed by a few.
South Africa

This thesis offers a critical assessment of anti- child trafficking discourse, policy and practice, using a case study of the situation in Southern Benin. It seeks to achieve two main goals. First, to transcend the reductiveness of the dominant paradigm around child trafficking, including dominant representations of it and prevailing policy approaches to dealing with it. Second, to complicate the simplistic nature of much of the academic literature that explains the existence and persistence of this dominant paradigm. Based on 14 months of multi-sited fieldwork, the thesis demonstrates, first, that the institutional narrative of ‘child trafficking’ misrepresents what would be better understood as adolescent labour migration in Benin, and second, that mainstream policy approaches to tackling this fail to account for the sociocultural or political-economic conditions that underpin it. The thesis suggests that this can be interpreted as a result of the power of three framing orders of discourse – ‘Apollonian Childhood’, Neoliberalism and that of the Westphalian State – which structure both what ‘trafficking’ can mean and what can be done about it. The thesis suggests that the material and power structures of the anti-trafficking discourse- and policy-making field are such that, even where individuals within it reject both the dominant paradigm and its (and the field’s) framing orders of discourse, little space exists for them to construct meaningful alternatives. The result is a degree of formal and representational stability, hiding practical hybridity. The conclusion is offered that, while anti-trafficking discourse is presumed to be accurate and while antitrafficking policy is justified in terms of its contribution to ‘beneficiaries’, theprinciple achievement of both is the depoliticised reproduction of the institutions, orders of discourse and political-economic context within which they are constructed.

The objective of the study is to establish how original financial integration could be attained in southern Africa in order to attract more foreign investment and develop a financially robust and stable region in the southern part of Africa; also to deal with the challenges, risks and remedies of prospective future financial crises. Financial markets are rapidly integrating into a single global market. Developing countries of various regions are drawn into the process with little choice, and without having sound financial infrastructure and policies in place. It is against this background that countries and regions of global integration choose policies that would benefit their regional economy and avert potential economic shock. The challenges posed to countries and regions by the progressive global integration of financial markets are becoming more urgent by the day. These challenges need to be addressed more effectively, either nationally or regionally, as demonstrated by the 1998 financial turmoil in Asia. Private capital flows are becoming intra regionally concentrated, particularly in the USA, Europe, Asia and Latin America. Be that as it may, failure in one market is likely to have immediate and large regional repercussions. Globalisation also marginalises Africa and other Least Developed Countries (LDC), leaving them more impoverished and with greater disparities in terms of income, GDP and FDI. Regional financial integration has to be efficient and sound in order to prevent or contain currency and capital market crises in the southern African region. This study identifies macro economic challenges and risks associated with financial integration. Recommendations are made about methodologies of addressing these issues in order to realise the benefits of regional financial integration in southern Africa, which could be a building block in realising the dream of an African Monetary Union. The study contributes greatly to the debate around the most appropriate criteria that are to be met by the SADC countries, before monetary integration can become a reality. A comparison of the benchmark macro economic convergence criteria of the EU and of the African Monetary Union is done and the performance of SADC countries is assessed in terms of both sets of benchmarks. Southern African states are found to not even be at a comparable level with regard to the EU targets of 1997. The thesis is also critical to the impact of the political instability in the SADC region on prospective monetary integration. Most importantly, SADC would be at a permanent disadvantage and face a long-run depreciation of its common currency, should it continue to integrate financially at macro economic benchmark levels inferior to those of its major trading partner, the EU.
Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2009.
Economics
unrestricted

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.