Relevant bibliographies by topics / Sovereign Debt Default

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
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Academic literature on the topic 'Sovereign Debt Default'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2025
Last updated: 23 June 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Sovereign Debt Default"

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Bolton, Patrick, Mitu Gulati, and Ugo Panizza. "Sovereign Debt Puzzles." Annual Review of Financial Economics 15, no. 1 (2023): 239–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-111620-030025.

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We review the state of the sovereign debt literature and point out that the canonical model of sovereign debt cannot be easily reconciled with several facts about sovereign debt pricing and servicing. We identify and classify more than 20 puzzles. Some are well-known and documented, others are less so and are sometimes based on anecdotal evidence. We classify these puzzles into three categories: puzzles about how sovereigns issue debt; puzzles about the pricing of sovereign debt; and puzzles about sovereign default and the working out of defaults. We conclude by suggesting possible avenues for new research aimed at reconciling theory with what we observe in the real world.
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Chatterjee, Satyajit, and Burcu Eyigungor. "A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt." American Economic Review 105, no. 12 (2015): 3740–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130932.

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A sovereign’s inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate this problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in debt contracts. In the event of default, creditors are to be paid off in the order in which they lent (the “absolute priority” or “first-in-time” rule). In this paper, we propose a modification of the absolute priority rule suited to sovereign debts contracts and analyze its positive and normative implications within a quantitatively realistic model of sovereign debt and default. (JEL E32, E44, F34, G15, H63, O16, O19)
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Aitken, Rob. "The Sovereignty of Finance? Distress and the Financialization of Sovereign Debt." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 18, no. 5-6 (2019): 493–526. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341529.

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Abstract This article argues that the relationship between finance and state sovereignty is neither automatic nor understandable in some generalized manner. To develop this argument, I pay particular attention to the financialization of distressed sovereign debt, especially sovereign debt defaults in the Global South with particular reference to Argentina’s default in 2001 and the string of legal cases it triggered. These legal processes breathed a strange after-life into Argentina’s defaulted debt by converting that debt into fully commodified financial contracts. I argue that the financialization of sovereign debt is enabled by a long and complex evolution in the application of the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity. This financialization, moreover, is indicative of ways in which forms of financial distress are reworked as renewed sources of financial value. This provokes questions about the very relationship between waste and value in our global political economy.
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Jeremy, Cripps, and Feeney Kevin. "Consequences of Eurozone Sovereign Debt Default." AICEI Proceedings 7, no. 1 (2012): 237–51. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4502186.

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After the Second World War in connection with the potential for a national Euro sovereign debt crisis and sovereign debt default, we identify potential and positive consequences of such sovereign debt crises and sovereign debt defaults. This history reveals that four principle consequences have resulted from prior sovereign debt crises and defaults. These are generally seen to be: first, lost national reputation and reduced national borrowing capacity; second, the exclusion of some national companies from trading in certain markets; third, the impact on the domestic economy relating in particular to the cost of imports; and lastly, the impact on political activity and socioeconomic policy. Reviewing the consequences of sovereign debt crisis and default post 1980, this paper considers the consequences of the current Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis, the potential for default and its likely short and long-term significance, as well as the potential for unexpected consequences. The paper considers the likely magnitude of the output losses and the human costs that will inevitably follow on the current Euro-zone crisis. The Euro-zone has unique peculiarity because it is an economy within the European Union economy so the possibility of devaluation within the zone does not exist. The paper finds that there is potential for both positive and negative impacts on the citizens of Europe.
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Amador, Manuel, and Christopher Phelan. "Reputation and Sovereign Default." Econometrica 89, no. 4 (2021): 1979–2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta16685.

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This paper presents a continuous‐time model of sovereign debt. In it, a relatively impatient sovereign government's hidden type switches back and forth between a commitment type, which cannot default, and an opportunistic type, which can, and where we assume outside lenders have particular beliefs regarding how a commitment type should borrow for any given level of debt and bond price. In any Markov equilibrium, the opportunistic type mimics the commitment type when borrowing, revealing its type only by defaulting on its debt at random times. The equilibrium features a “graduation date”: a finite amount of time since the last default, after which time reputation reaches its highest level and is unaffected by not defaulting. Before such date, not defaulting always increases the country's reputation. For countries that have recently defaulted, bond prices and the total amount of debt are increasing functions of the amount of time since the country's last default. For countries that have not recently defaulted (i.e., those that have graduated), bond prices are constant.
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Isakov, K. S. "Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises." Zhurnal Economicheskoj Teorii 18, no. 1 (2021): 29–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.31063/2073-6517/2021.18-1.2.

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This research is aimed at contributing to the endogenization of default costs. Higher exposure of a banking system to sovereign bonds increases the likelihood of banking panics due to sovereign defaults. Following (Gertler, Kiyotaki, 2015), the research models the possibility of a banking crisis occurring after a sovereign default. While a higher exposure of a banking system is associated with potential losses, this mechanism creates a stronger commitment to honor the sovereign debt. A marginal increase in the sovereign debt raises the ex-post costs of default through a higher likelihood of a banking crisis, thus making a default option less desirable. This mechanism might increase investors’ confidence and resolve the coordination problem of self-fulfilling crises. In part, this may explain the findings of Bocola and Dovis (2019), who claim that non-fundamental risk played only a limited role during the European sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, as opposed to the standard solution of the coordination problem — to issue debt of longer maturity — a government can resolve this problem by forcing its banking system to hold more sovereign bonds.
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Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default." Journal of Economic Literature 47, no. 3 (2009): 651–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.3.651.

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This paper surveys the recent literature on sovereign debt and relates it to the evolution of the legal principles underlying the sovereign debt market and the experience of the most recent debt crises and defaults. It finds limited support for theories that explain the feasibility of sovereign debt based on either external sanctions or exclusion from the international capital market and more support for explanations that emphasize domestic costs of default. The paper concludes that there remains a case for establishing institutions that reduce the cost of default but the design of such institutions is not a trivial task.
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Bagwell, Stephen. "Repudiation and Repression: The Human Costs of Sovereign Default." Social Sciences 12, no. 3 (2023): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci12030121.

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Sovereign default has myriad economic and political consequences. Existing research, however, has not explored the human costs of sovereign default, though some link the fiscal flexibility afforded by sovereign creditworthiness to improved human rights performance. But what are the consequences when sovereigns lose all creditworthiness and default on their debt obligations? I argue that while the average effect of default is negative for respect for physical integrity rights, a conditional effect exists. When states devote more of their resources to debt service and default, they are likely to see a short term increase in respect for physical integrity rights. I find robust support for these arguments using panel data on over 90 developing countries from 1981–2010.
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Mitchener, Kris James, and Christoph Trebesch. "Sovereign Debt in the Twenty-first Century." Journal of Economic Literature 61, no. 2 (2023): 565–623. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20211362.

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How will sovereign debt markets evolve in the twenty-first century? We survey how the literature has responded to the eurozone debt crisis, placing “lessons learned” in historical perspective. The crisis featured: (i) the return of debt problems to advanced economies, (ii) a bank–sovereign “doom loop” and the propagation of sovereign risk to households and firms, (iii) rollover problems and self-fulfilling crisis dynamics, (iv) severe debt distress without outright sovereign defaults, (v) large-scale sovereign bailouts from abroad, and (vi) creditor threats to litigate and hold out in a debt restructuring. Many of these characteristics were already present in historical debt crises and are likely to remain relevant in the future. Looking forward, our survey points to a growing role of sovereign bank linkages, legal risks, domestic debt and default, and of official creditors, due to new lenders such as China as well as the increasing dominance of central banks in global debt markets. Questions of debt sustainability and default will remain acute in both developing and advanced economies. (JEL E58, F33, F34, G01, G21, H63, N20)
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Guler, Bulent, Yasin Kürşat Önder, and Temel Taskin. "Hidden Debt." AEA Papers and Proceedings 112 (May 1, 2022): 536–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20221003.

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We study the role of transparency in debt and default dynamics in a quantitative sovereign default model augmented with asymmetric information. We assume that the sovereign debt portfolio is not transparent and part of the debt is not observable to lenders. The quantitative model is calibrated to the Bolivian economy and matches its long-term and business cycle properties. The quantitative results show that when the government moves to a transparent reporting regime, bond prices improve and the sovereign debt portfolio shifts toward noncontingent debt with an increase in overall debt level. However, higher debt increases default frequency and reduces welfare.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Sovereign Debt Default"

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Mukherjee, Mudra. "Essays in Sovereign Debt and Default." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1440430623.

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Bi, Ran. "Essays on sovereign debt structure, default and renegotiation." College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/8024.

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Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2008.<br>Thesis research directed by: Dept. of Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
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Lanau, Grau Sergi. "Essays on sovereign debt markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7380.

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Aquesta tesis anal.litza les Clausules d'Acció Col.lectiva i les Clàusules de Precedència quan: 1) el repagament és endogen i depèn d'un esforç de lobbying dels creditors. 2) el litigi és purament redistributiu. Hi ha una externalitat positiva del esforç que interactua amb la distribució dels actius i les clàusules contractuals. Els litigis individuals no són desitjables socialment perquè redueixen l'incentiu al esforç. Les Clàusules d'Acció Col.lectiva bloquegen els litigis i maximitzen el repagament. La introducció de Clàusules de Precedència modifica els incentius al esforç. Aquest efecte pot ser positiu o negatiu.<br/>El capítol 2 explora la relació entre les crisis de deute sobirà i el creixement de les industries manufacureres. Les industries amb competició importadora intensa rendeixen relativament millor després del default. Les industries exportadores creixen més lentament al voltant del default. Les industries caracteritzades per alta intensitat del capital i tangibilitat dels actius sofreixen menys els effectes dels defaults.<br>This thesis analyzes Collective Action Clauses and Seniority Clauses when: 1) repayment is endogenous and depends on creditor lobbying effort; 2) litigation for full repayment is purely redistributive. There is a positive externality of effort that interacts with asset distribution and contractual clauses. Individual litigation is not desirable from a social point of view since it weakens the incentives to exert effort. Collective Action Clauses block litigation and maximize repayment. The adoption of Seniority Clauses modifies the incentives to exert effort and thus repayment. This effect can be positive or negative.<br/>Chapter 2 explores the linkage between sovereign debt crises and manufacturing industry growth using a difference-in-difference methodology. Industries facing tough import competition perform relatively better after a sovereign default. Export-oriented sectors grow more slowly around default times. Industries characterized by high physical capital intensity and asset tangibility tend to suffer less from default episodes.
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Adama, Adams Sorekuong Yakubu. "Essays on institutions, firm funding and sovereign debt." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2017. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/essays-on-institutions-firm-funding-and-sovereign-debt(0516466e-8937-4a1a-aca2-f9064b961b07).html.

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This thesis explores the effects of institutions on macroeconomic performance. It does so in two main chapters, a summary of each of which is given below. In the first main chapter of the thesis, the interactions between government spending, government borrowing, political corruption and political turnover were examined. Incorporating these factors in a sovereign default model, we show how sovereign default decisions and business cycle fluctuations are affected by the level of corruption. In particular, we show that when there is turnover, corruption can generate higher risks of default and higher credit spreads when there is enough stability. Intuitively, we establish that a change in power from a less corrupt to a more corrupt government is more likely to cause default than the reverse. The results also shows that households suffer welfare losses as a result of corruption. As regards business cycles, the general effect of corruption is to alter business cycle statistics. Further, we estimate an empirical model using data on sovereign default, corruption, political stability and other macroeconomic variables for a sample of emerging economies. The results of this provide strong evidence of a positive relationship between both corruption and political stability and sovereign default. The second main chapter of the thesis looks at the effects of limited financial contract enforcement in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework where firms have access to both internal and external means of finance. The results shows how limited enforceability affects fluctuations in key macroeconomic variables (e.g., output, employment and price) through its impact on key financial variables (e.g., interest rates, risk premium, default risk and leverage). In particular, we find that weaker enforcement tends to amplify the effects of shocks, creating greater volatility, as well as lowering small firm funding. We provide some empirical evidence to support our results. Using cross-country data on measures of financial market imperfections, we find that limited enforcement has a negative effect on output and that this effect is exacerbated by poor credit information. We also find that weaker contract enforcement is associated with higher output volatility.
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Arráiz, Irani. "Essays on sovereign debt default, settlement, and repayment history /." College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/3752.

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Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2006.<br>Thesis research directed by: Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
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Thakkar, Nachiket Jayeshkumar. "Essays On Sovereign Debt, Governance And Inequality." OpenSIUC, 2019. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/1714.

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In my first chapter I follow the methodology put forth by Bohn(1998), the market-based sustainability method to measure whether the sovereign debt is sustainable or not. I work with a panel of 125 countries for 26 years and along with incorporate different institutions ratings by ICRG’s political risk ratings. In my analysis I find out that the debt on average is sustainable for countries up to certain extent and thus giving us an inverted U shape debt-exports curve. I use country exports to find out if the debt is sustainable or not. I also find that better institutions do give an edge to countries when it comes to borrowing as it lowers the risk expectations on the lenders part. The findings do vary based on the country’s income level and based on its geographical location.
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Nolte, Angela. "Essays on sovereign debt in federations : bailout, default and exit." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7744.

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The thesis analyses the moral hazard problem which arises in political or fiscal federations when member states anticipate being bailed out by the centre in case of financial distress. In particular, I examine whether an orderly default mechanism or deeper fiscal integration within the European Union can alleviate the soft budget constraint phenomenon and provide a solution to the sovereign debt crises engulfing the Eurozone and other parts of the world. The first essay adapts the standard Stackelberg approach of the bailout literature in order to study the effects of bankruptcy procedures on regional opportunistic behaviour. The insolvency mechanism is shaped by two parameters: the costs of default and the exemption level for public assets. The model lends support to the market discipline hypothesis if all public assets are exempt from seizure. If, by contrast, the exemption level for public assets is low, it is the central government rather than the credit market that discourages overborrowing since the former is incentivised to tax heavily indebted regions. The model's major policy insight is that an insolvency mechanism can lower the federation's welfare if it is not carefully designed. The second essay sheds light on the incentive effects of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism which has been drafted by the Eurozone in response to the debt crisis. Employing a global game approach, the model analyses the impact of insolvency procedures on the size of the bailout, the level of effort exerted by the debtor country and EU welfare. Challenging some arguments in the policy literature, the model's major policy implication is that a half-hearted debt restructuring mechanism fails to mitigate the commitment and moral hazard problems embedded in the current EMU framework. The third essay questions the conventional wisdom that the Euro cannot survive without closer integration, using a simple political economy framework. The model compares the stability and welfare implications of the current "muddling through" scenario, an orderly default mechanism as well as a fiscal and a political union setting. Interestingly, the results suggest that the "muddling through" scenario is not more prone to break-up than the political or the fiscal union. The model's major policy recommendation is that implementing an orderly default mechanism and inserting an explicit exit clause into the European Treaties might prove more effective in preventing a Eurozone break-up than far-reaching institutional reforms.
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Pereira, Gonçalo André Nunes. "Modelling sovereign debt with Lévy Processes." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/7611.

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Mestrado em Ciências Actuariais<br>Propomos modelizar o risco de crédito soberano de cinco países da zona Euro (Portugal, Irlanda, Itália, Grécia e Espanha) seguindo uma abordagem estrutural de primeira passagem em que o movimento Browniano geométrico é substituído por um processo de Lévy regido apenas por uma componente de saltos. Deste modo, introduzimos incrementos assimétricos e leptocúrticos e a possibilidade de incumprimento instantâneo, removendo assim algumas das principais limitações do modelo Black-Scholes. Calculamos a probabilidade de sobrevivência como preço de uma opção barreira discreta, utilizando um método de valorização de opções baseado na aproximação da densidade de transição como expansão em série de Fourier de cossenos. Assumindo uma taxa de recuperação determinística, calibramos o modelo de Lévy Carr-Geman-Madan-Yor (CGMY) utilizando spreads de Credit Default Swaps semanais e obtemos a estrutura temporal de probabilidades de incumprimento. Tiramos ainda partido da representação do processo Variance Gamma (uma instância do modelo CGMY) como movimento Browniano modificado temporalmente para considerar uma estrutura de dependência entre os riscos de crédito soberanos através de uma modificação temporal comum. Em seguida, ilustramos um possível procedimento de calibração multidimensional e obtemos a distribuição de sobrevivência conjunta via simulação.<br>We propose to model the sovereign credit risk of five Euro area countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) under a first passage structural approach, replacing the classical geometric Brownian motion dynamics with a pure jump Lévy process. This framework caters for skewness, fat tails and instantaneous defaults, thus addressing some of the main drawbacks of the Black-Scholes model. We compute the survival probability as the price of a discrete barrier option, using an option pricing method based on the approximation of the transition density as a Fourier-cosine series expansion. Assuming a deterministic recovery rate, we calibrate the Carr-Geman-Madan-Yor (CGMY) Lévy model to weekly Credit Default Swaps data and obtain the default probability term structure. By drawing on the representation of the Variance Gamma process (a particular instance of the CGMY model) as a time-changed Brownian motion, we accommodate dependency between sovereigns via a common time change. We then illustrate a possible multivariate calibration procedure and simulate the joint default distribution.
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Menzies, John Alexander. "Sovereign contingent liabilities : a perspective on default and debt crises." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c25e36be-bd42-4a0f-9af6-42d17f87424f.

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Chapters 2-3: A global games approach to sovereign debt crises The first chapters present a model that investigates the risks involved when a fiscal authority attempts to roll-over a stock of debt and there is the potential for coordination failure by investors. A continuum of investors, after receiving signals about the authority's willingness to repay, decides whether to roll-over the stock of debt. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates, the authority defaults. With one fiscal authority, private information results in a deterministic outcome. When a public signal is available, the model behaves in a similar manner to a sunspot model. In line with much of the global games literature, improving public information has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Finally, the model is extended to include a second fiscal authority, which captures a similar sunspot result and illustrates the potential for externalities in fiscal policy. Lower debt in the less indebted authority can push a more indebted authority into crisis. Lower debt makes the healthier authority relatively more attractive, which causes the investors to treat the heavily indebted authority more conservatively. In certain circumstances, this is sufficient to cause a coordination failure. Chapter 4: A debt game with correlated information This chapter models of debt roll-over where a continuum of investors receives correlated signals on whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent. The investors face a collective action problem: a sufficient proportion of investors must agree to participate in the debt roll-over for it to be a success. If an insufficient proportion of investors participates in the deal, the debtor will default. The game has a unique switching strategy, which results in global uncertainty being preserved. The ex ante distribution of play (conditional on the true solvency of the debtor) follows a Vasicek credit distribution. The ex ante probability of a debt crisis is affected by the exogenous model parameters. Of particular interest is the observation that increasing private noise unambiguously reduces the probability of a debt crisis. Unsurprisingly, increasing the fiscal space or return on debt also decreases the probability of a crisis. Chapter 5: Bailouts and politics The final chapter examines the political-economic equilibrium in a two-period model with overlapping generations and a financial sector, which is inspired by the model in Tabellini (1989). The public policy is chosen under majority rule by the agents currently alive. It demonstrates that the bailout policy adopted in the second period has important effects on the bank's financing decisions in the first period. By adopting a riskier financing regime (i.e. higher leverage) in the first period, the older generation can extract consumption from the younger generation in the second period. Sovereign backstops of the financial sector are state-contingent: they can appear costless for long periods of time but eventually result in a socialization of private-sector debt. It is this mechanism that makes implementing capital requirements costly to investors yet beneficial to the younger generation. The model also highlights two important issues: (i) bank capital is endogenous and (ii) proposed resolution mechanisms must be politically credible. It suggests that a major benefit of increasing and narrowing equity-capital requirements or increasing liquidity ratios is that they are implemented ex ante and therefore available either to absorb losses in the event of a crisis or to reduce the possibility of large drops in asset values. Finally, this chapter also provides a structure by which to interpret the stylized facts of Calomiris et al. (2014): that more populist political institutions are associated with more fragile financial systems.
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Krey, Katherine Gorter. "Sovereign Debt after Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital: Developing a Framework for Sovereign Default Arbitration." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1648.

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In July 2014, Argentina entered selective default, even as the country remained financially solvent. The default stemmed not from economic woes, but rather from protracted international litigation between Argentina and a group of hedge funds who, for years, refused to negotiate with Argentina over their bond holdings in the wake of the country’s first default in 2001. These holdouts stalled negotiations and locked Argentina out of international credit markets, damaging the country’s economy and financially harming other creditors and Argentinian citizens alike. Argentina ended up in such a dilemma because of the current sovereign debt restructuring process. No international arbitrator of sovereign debt currently exists. Instead, a country must negotiate with creditors on an ad-hoc basis, gathering support from 100% of creditors before it can restructure its debt and reenter international credit markets, an extremely inefficient system. This paper will assess the current system of sovereign default renegotiations, identifying inefficiencies in the current system, reviewing past proposals for improvements to the system, and ultimately proposing an international arbitrator for default negotiations. This text uses the development of the US Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 as a guide for an international bankruptcy court. Prior to the passage of the law, municipalities faced many of the same challenges faced by defaulted nations today, including powerful holdouts and a lack of structure in the negotiation system. Given the similarities between the two cases, the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act serves as an ideal framework for sovereign default arbitration internationally.
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Books on the topic "Sovereign Debt Default"

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Babbel, David F. Insuring sovereign debt against default. World Bank, 1996.

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Eaton, Jonathan. Sovereign debt, reputation, and credit terms. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.

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Sturzenegger, Federico. Haircuts: Estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings, 1998-2005. International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., 2005.

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Singh, Manmohan. Recovery rates from distressed debt: Empirical evidence from chapter 11 filings, international litigation, and recent sovereign debt restructuring. International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets Department, 2003.

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Chan-Lau, Jorge A. Anticipating credit events using credit default swaps, with an application to sovereign debt crises. International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets Department, 2003.

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Aizenman, Joshua. Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard--on debtors or creditors? National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.

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Kruger, Mark. Sovereign debt defaults and financing needs. International Monetary Fund, 2004.

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Arellano, Cristina. Internal debt crises and sovereign defaults. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.

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Reinhart, Carmen M. Default, currency crises and sovereign credit ratings. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002.

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Catão, Luis. Sovereign defaults: The role of volatility. International Monetary Fund, Research Department, 2002.

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Book chapters on the topic "Sovereign Debt Default"

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Catão, Luis A. V., Ana Fostel, and Sandeep Kapur. "Default Traps." In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch34.

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Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Leonardo Martinez, and Horacio Sapriza. "Understanding Sovereign Default." In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch15.

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Paoli, Bianca De, Glenn Hoggarth, and Victoria Saporta. "Output Costs of Sovereign Default." In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch3.

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Cuadra, Gabriel, and Horacio Sapriza. "Sovereign Default Risk and Implications for Fiscal Policy." In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch33.

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Jalilvand, Abolhassan, and Jeannette Switzer. "Sovereign Spreads and Perceived Risk of Default Revisited." In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch45.

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Georgievska, Angelina, Ljubica Georgievska, Aleksandar Stojanovic, and Natasa Todorovic. "Country Debt Default Probabilities in Emerging Markets: Were Credit Rating Agencies Wrong?" In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch39.

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Das, Udaibir S., Michael G. Papaioannou, and Christoph Trebesch. "Spillovers of Sovereign Default Risk: How Much is the Private Sector Affected?" In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch4.

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Waldenström, Daniel. "How Important Are the Political Costs of Domestic Default?: Evidence from World War II Bond Markets." In Sovereign Debt. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118267073.ch31.

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Barr, David, Oliver Bush, and Alex Pienkowski. "GDP-linked Bonds and Sovereign Default." In Life After Debt. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137411488_16.

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Ayala, Astrid, Szabolcs Blazsek, and Raúl B. González de Paz. "Default Risk of Sovereign Debt in Central America." In Emerging Markets and Sovereign Risk. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137450661_2.

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Conference papers on the topic "Sovereign Debt Default"

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Thomas, Benitta, and Shreya John. "THE 2019 SRI LANKAN CRISIS AND ITS SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON INDIA: THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS." In Transforming Knowledge: A Multidisciplinary Research on Integrative Learning Across Disciplines. The Bhopal School of Social Sciences, 2025. https://doi.org/10.51767/ic250305.

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The Sri Lankan economic crisis, which escalated dramatically in 2022, marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s history, stemming from a combination of internal mismanagement and external shocks. The crisis is primarily rooted in excessive foreign debt and fiscal mismanagement, particularly following significant tax cuts in 2019 that drastically reduced government revenue. This led to soaring budget deficits as the value-added tax was cut to 8% and corporate tax was reduced from 28% to 24%. Consequently, the Central Bank resorted to printing money, resulting in inflation and currency devaluation. Additionally, poor agricultural policies, notably an abrupt shift to organic farming that banned chemical fertilizers, caused widespread crop failures and increased reliance on food imports. The COVID-19 pandemic further strained the economy by devastating the tourism sector, a crucial source of foreign currency. Coupled with geopolitical tensions from the Russia-Ukraine war, these factors culminated in Sri Lanka declaring its first-ever sovereign default in April 2022. The ensuing economic turmoil sparked widespread protests, leading to significant political changes, including the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In response to the crisis, Sri Lanka sought international assistance, securing a $2.9 billion bailout from the IMF in early 2023. The socioeconomic impact has been severe, with poverty rates surging and challenges for micro, small, and medium enterprises exacerbated by reduced consumer spending power. The purpose of this study is to analyse the 2019 Sri Lankan economic crisis and its repercussions on India from a political, economic, and social standpoint. It aims to comprehend how trade, investment, and regional economic dynamics in India were impacted by Sri Lanka’s financial instability. The study also looks at the political ramifications, such as diplomatic reactions and changes in Indo-Sri Lankan relations strategy. Social effects, such as migratory patterns and labour market disturbances, are also investigated. This study intends to emphasise the larger regional ramifications of Sri Lanka’s crisis and provide insights into India’s policy actions and future initiatives by conducting a thorough examination
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SIMONE, Pierluigi. "THE RECASTING OF THE OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT AND THE ABOLITION OF THE CAPITULATIONS REGIME IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ACTION OF TURKEY LED BY MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK." In 9. Uluslararası Atatürk Kongresi. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.51824/978-975-17-4794-5.64.

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The recast of the international debt contracted by the former Ottoman Empire and the overcoming of the capitulations regime that had afflicted Turkey for centuries, are two of the most relevant sectors in which the political and diplomatic action promoted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has been expressed. Extremely relevant in this regard are the different disciplines established, respectively, by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 and then by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. After the Ottoman Government defaulted in 1875, an agreement (the Decree of Muharrem) was concluded in 1881 between the Ottoman Government and representatives of its foreign and domestic creditors for the resumption of payments on Ottoman bonds, and a European control of a part of the Imperial revenues was instituted through the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire was burdened by capitulations, conferring rights and privileges in favour of their subjects resident or trading in the Ottoman lands, following the policy towards European States of the Byzantine Empire. According to these capitulations, traders entering the Ottoman Empire were exempt from local prosecution, local taxation, local conscription, and the searching of their domicile. The capitulations were initially made during the Ottoman Empire’s military dominance, to entice and encourage commercial exchanges with Western merchants. However, after dominance shifted to Europe, significant economic and political advantages were granted to the European Powers by the Ottoman Empire. Both regimes, substantially maintained by the Treaty of Sèvres, were considered unacceptable by the Nationalist Movement led by Mustafa Kemal and therefore became the subject of negotiations during the Conference of Lausanne. The definitive overcoming of both of them, therefore represents one of the most evident examples of the reacquisition of the full sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey.
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Reports on the topic "Sovereign Debt Default"

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Dvorkin, Maximiliano A., Emircan Yurdagul, Juan M. Sánchez, and Horacio Sapriza. News, sovereign debt maturity, and default risk. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2018.033.

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Tomz, Michael, and Mark L. Wright. Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18855.

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Bocola, Luigi, Gideon Bornstein, and Alessandro Dovis. Quantitative Sovereign Default Models and the European Debt Crisis. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24981.

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Rojas, Luis E., and Dominik Thaler. The bright side of the doom loop: banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives. Banco de España, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.53479/36258.

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The feedback loop between sovereign and financial sector insolvency has been identified as a key driver of the European debt crisis and has motivated an array of policy proposals. We revisit this “doom loop” focusing on governments’ incentives to default. To this end, we present a simple 3-period model with strategic sovereign default, where debt is held by domestic banks and foreign investors. The government maximizes domestic welfare, and thus the temptation to default increases with externally-held debt. Importantly, the costs of default arise endogenously from the damage that default causes to domestic banks’ balance sheets. Domestically-held debt thus serves as a commitment device for the government. We show that two prominent policy prescriptions – lower exposure of banks to domestic sovereign debt or a commitment not to bailout banks – can backfire, since default incentives depend not only on the quantity of debt, but also on who holds it. Conversely, allowing banks to buy additional sovereign debt in times of sovereign distress can avert the doom loop. In an extension we show that in the context of a monetary union (such as the euro area) similar unintended negative consequences may arise from the pooling of debt (such as European safe bonds (ESBies)). A central bank backstop (such as the ECB’s Transmission Protection Instrument) can successfully disable the loop if precisely calibrated.
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D'Erasmo, Pablo, and Enrique Mendoza. History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25073.

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Paluszynski, Radoslaw. Multiplicity in Sovereign Default Models: Calvo Meets Cole-Kehoe. Inter-American Development Bank, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0005150.

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This paper proposes a model of sovereign default that features interest rate multiplicity driven by rollover risk. Our core mechanism shows that the possibility of a rollover crisis by itself can lead to high interest rates, which in turn reinforces the rollover risk.By exploiting complementarity between the traditional notions of slow- and fast-moving crises, our model generates a rich simulated dynamics that features frequent defaults and a volatile bond spread even in the absence of shocks to fundamentals. In the presence of risky income, our mechanism amplifies the dynamics of debt and spreads relative to model benchmarks where equilibrium multiplicity relies on the underlying shocks to income.
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Rochet, Jean-Charles. Optimal Sovereign Debt: An Analytical Approach. Inter-American Development Bank, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010867.

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This paper develops a model of sovereign debt where governments are myopic. Instead of focusing on the incentives to repay, as in most of the theoretical literature on the topic (which assumes implicitly that governments have long-term objectives), I therefore consider that governments always repay when they can, but also borrow as much as possible. without paying attention to the burden of future repayments. The pattern of debt is then only determined by the willingness of international investors to lend to the country. I characterize the Rational Expectations Equilibria of the credit market. These equilibria behave like rational bubbles: international investors lend a lot because they anticipate that other investors will lend again in the future. Capital flows are procyclical: the government borrows a fixed proportion of its income until a sudden stop occurs, generating default and an economic crisis. I suggest possible remedies to the high volatility of public expenditures that is generated by such borrowing patterns.
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Grossman, Herschel, and John Van Huyck. Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1673.

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Edwards, Sebastian. Sovereign Default, Debt Restructuring, and Recovery Rates: Was the Argentinean “Haircut” Excessive? National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20964.

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Bru Muñoz, María. The forgotten lender: the role of multilateral lenders in sovereign debt and default. Banco de España, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.53479/25026.

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The role of multilateral lenders in sovereign default has been traditionally overlooked by the literature. However, these creditors represent a significant share of lending to emerging markets and feature very distinct characteristics, such as lower interest rates and seniority. By including these creditors in a traditional DSGE model of sovereign default, I reproduce the high debt levels found in the data while maintaining default probabilities within realistic values. Additionally, I am able to analyze the role of multilateral debt in emerging economies. Multilateral loans complement private financing and reduce the incompleteness of international financial markets. Also, multilateral funding acts as an insurance mechanism in bad times, providing countries with some degree of consumption smoothing, opposite to the role of front-loading consumption fulfilled by private financing.
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