Academic literature on the topic 'Specialia generalibus derogant'

Law Number 11 / 2008 on Information and Electronic Transaction (UU ITE) is the regulation concerning on criminal law in addition to the Criminal Code (KUHP). UU ITE is commonly regarded additional regulation of the Criminal Code as a special law (lex specialis) in which Penal Code is deemed as lex generalis. It is based on the principle of lex specialis derogate legi generalis. This article uses legal research to review the decision of District Court in Bandung Number 1033/PID.B/2014/PN.BDG where it comprises legislation and cases. It concludes that the judge is not frugal in applying the principle lex specialis derogat legi generalis in the consideration. This is associated with the indictment of public prosecutor which only prejudges with article 303 paragraph (1) to 2. In contrast, the indictment which does not meet the requirement of a careful, clear, and complete description asserts to become void by law. Keywords: Online Gambling, Criminal Principle, Indictment

Gambling is a crime and can be punished for its actions. However, along with the development of the gambling era it was played with electronic media, namely online gambling. The State of the Republic of Indonesia has overcome gambling crimes with evidence such as the existence of laws contained in criminal law and if carried out online there is an Electronic Information and Transaction law. The research entitled The implementation of principle lex specialis derogat legi generalist concerning information and electronic transaction laws in online lottery gambling crimes Case Study Decision of North Jakarta Districts Courted Number 599 / PID.B / 2018 / PN.Jkt Utr, having a problem statement is why the public prosecutor did not apply the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generalist in the online lottery gambling crime Case Study of the Decision of the North Jakarta District Court Number 599 / PID.B / 2018 / PN.Jkt Utr. The purposed paper for the law enforcement officials to appllied the principled of Lex Specialise Derogat Legi Generalits in the case of prosecution of court decisions.

Lex posterior derogat priori, lex specialis derogat generali, Guidelines for a history of conflicting norms with a focus on these two competing solutions. – The two Latin maxims, Lex posterior derogat priori and Lex specialis derogat generali, sometimes presented as evidentially logical, have a complex history and a delicate relationship (whereas the latter can contradict the former). They take their origins in the Digest, but in rather paradoxical forms: Lex posterior is coming from a text written in Greek by Modestinus, lex generalis is induced from a general regula exposed by Papinianus. How have these two ways of resolving the problem of conflicting norms emerged in Roman law? How have they been quoted and explained in canon and in civil law during the Middle Ages? How have they been used by sovereigns and in which scope do they serve the foundations of modern States? This paper tries to answer these questions by analyzing texts where the two maxims are mentioned and proposes to treat this subject as a significant chapter of the history of the sources of law.

AbstractArticle 37 paragraph (1) states that the transfer of rights to land and property rights can only be registered if proven by deed made by PPAT authorized under the provisions of the legislation in force. However, based on Circular Letter of the Minister of Agrarian and Spatial Planning/Head of National Land Agency Number: 1855/15.1/IV/2016 dated April 22, 2016 on Implementation Guidelines for Land Registration Government Agencies, so that government agencies in this government of Lampung Province has specificity (Lex Specialist derogat legi generalist) and ease in order titling and completion certificate of land that became assets. Keywords: Transition, Regional Assets (Land), Secondary Education. AbstrakPasal 37 ayat (1) yang menyatakan bahwa peralihan hak atas tanah dan hak milik hanya dapat didaftarkan jika dibuktikan dengan akta yang dibuat oleh PPAT yang berwenang menurut ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku. Namun, berdasarkan Surat Edaran Menteri Agraria dan Tata Ruang/Kepala Badan Pertanahan Nasional Nomor: 1855/15.1/IV/2016 tanggal 22 April 2016 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Pendaftaran Tanah Instansi Pemerintah, sehingga instansi pemerintah dalam hal ini pemerintah Provinsi Lampung mempunyai kekhususan (Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generalis) dan kemudahan dalam rangka pengurusan hak dan penyelesaian sertifikat tanah-tanah yang menjadi asetnya. Kata kunci: Peralihan, Barang Milik Daerah (tanah), Pendidikan Menengah

Hopes that the Constitutional Court (CC) is not acting as legislator (maker norm) was not easy to achieve. This is because in some cases the judicial examined, tried, and decided, the CC actually act as a norm-making body (one of them in the Case Number 21/PUU-XIV/2016). Thus, in terms of the concept of state power, the CC has a dual role as the holders of state power in the judiciary and the legislature. The problem of this study is the interpretation of the CC of the of conspiracy and the relationship between of conspiracy according to Article 88 of the Code of Penal (CP) in accordance with Article 15 of the Law on the Eradication of Corruption (LEC) before and after the enactment quo decision. CC interpretation against conspiracy is the right step to ensure legal certainty. However, the CC for an interpretation of action are included unlawful. Thus, in hearing and deciding the case a quo, the CC took a negative role, namely to uphold the law by breaking the law. The relationship between conspiracy under Article 88 of CP with according to Article 15 of LEC before the stipulated judgment a quo is not applied the principle of Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generalis after adoption of a quo decision to do is to be the application of the principle of Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generalis.

Tulisan ini mengkaji Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2004 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 1998 tentang Bank Indonesia, yang berlaku umum. Sedangkan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 21 Tahun 2008 tentang Perbankan Syariah, berlaku khusus. Penerapan asas lex specialis derogat legi generali menegaskan bahwa Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 21 Tahun 2008 memiliki kedudukan lebih kuat dibandingkan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2004 yang berlaku umum. Keberlakuan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 21 Tahun 2008 mengokohkan eksistensi perbankan syariah untuk leluasa menjalankan aktivitas dan produk-produknya. Di samping itu, apabila merujuk kepada Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 30 Tahun 1999, maka penyelesaian sengketa perbankan syariah dapat ditempuh melalui dua cara yaitu, pengadilan negeri dan badan arbitrase. Namun setelah berlakunya Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 21 Tahun 2008 Pasal 55, dengan jelas disebutkan bahwa pengadilan yang berwenang melaksanakan putusan Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional (Basyarnas) dan menyelesaikan sengketa perbankan syariah adalah pengadilan agama.(This paper reviews the Act of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23/2004 regarding Amendment to the Act Number 10/1998 concerning Indonesia Bank, which is in effect generally. On the other hand, the Act number 21/2008 regarding sharia banking applies more specifically. The application of lex specialis derogat legi generali principle confirms that the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 21/2008 has a stronger position than the Law Number 23/2004, which is generally in effect. The enforcement of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 21/2008 affirms the existence of sharia banking to freely run its activities and products. In addition, when referring to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 30/1999, the resolution of Islamic banking disputes can be done through two ways, namely, the district court and the arbitration body. However, after the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 21/2008, Article 55 comes into effect, it is clearly stated that the court authorized to enforce the decision of the National Sharia Arbitration Board (Basyarnas) and settle the disputes over sharia banking is a religious court)

The operation of military courts is clearly allowed for and, in some cases, mandated by international humanitarian law (IHL). Nevertheless, the use of military courts has been one of the most controversial and hotly debated areas of human rights. Despite the ostensibly exclusive military domain, many human rights bodies have registered significant scepticism towards this type of justice. Consequently, they have sought actively to regulate this ‘IHL space’ with scant attention to the requirements of IHL itself. The article examines comments, case law, draft rules and other measures taken by two human rights frameworks: the United Nations Human Rights Council and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. It will analyse how, since 2000, these bodies have approached the issue of IHL when assessing the legitimacy and operation of military courts. For instance, do they consider IHL as a source of law guiding their efforts and rely on IHL instruments? How do they resolve conflicts between IHL and international human rights law? Additionally, the article will consider the validity, legality and effectiveness of these efforts. It concludes that, in reviewing military courts, there exists significant neglect of IHL in human rights frameworks. Through overlooking IHL or relegating it to a sub-specialty of international human rights law, these bodies not only ignore applicable law, they deprive themselves of the wealth of expertise found in commentary, debate, jurisprudence and practice in the IHL sphere. Instead, integrating IHL analysis and theory and affording it its appropriate respect within relevant human rights discussions will allow for greater legal and policy coherence, and human rights bodies will be better placed to fulfil their mandates.

AbstrakUU No.3 of 2006 regarding Amendment of UU NO.7 of 1989 regardingReligion Court (Peradilan Agama) give the additional authority to theReligion Court, for examine, decide, and resolute dispute Syaria banking.While UU No.21 of 2008 regarding Syaria Banking decides that a dispute insyaria banking can be resoluted at Religion Court also can be resoluted atGeneral Court (Peradilan Umum). This of course can create a Choice ofForum. Therefore it needs to be examine what are the method and thedispute resolution type of syaria banking? And if the "Lex posterioriederogate lex priorie" principle and "lex specialis derogate lex generalis "principle can be used in Choice of Forum resoluting a dispute in syariabanking? From Ihe examinalion result can be delermine that the method andthe type of dispute resoluting of syaria banking according to UU No. 3 of2006 and UU No.21 of 2008 can be used through the litigation process, inReligion Court and General Court. Besides through the litigation processalso can be performed from the non-litigate process, discussion, bankingmediation, through Basyarnas or other arbitrate institution and alternativedispute resolution with the regulation not against the syaria principal. The"lex posteriorie derogate lex priorie " principle and "the lex specialisderogate lex generalis" principle cannot be used in Choice of Forumresoluting a dispute in syaria banking.

Since May 2020, BLT DD has been implemented in Jember Regency, including Bangsalsari Village. However, in fact it’s couldn’t avoid a pros and cons, especially to recipients. So, it’s mean Bangsalsari must be respons and give right information public. Every regulation must referent to hierarchy of legislation, same as the BLT DD rules. However, we know law have the legal principles "lex specialis derogat legi generalis", Then regulation of Jember regency Number 8 of 2016 about Public Information Openness must be a reference to do programs of Jember regency. There are three elements that must be fulfilled in the implementation of BLT DD in Bangsalsari Village, in order to realize information transparency, namely publication, participation and reporting. Bangsalsari Village has fulfilled these three elements in the implementation of BLT DD.

Distinguer entre le droit commun et le droit spécial est une habitude fortement ancrée chez les juristes, dans le domaine de la théorie comme de la pratique. Les rôles attribués à cette distinction sont d’une grande diversité ; mais ils sont aussi sous la menace de deux phénomènes : la multiplication des degrés de spécialité et le développement de rapports -horizontaux - entre droits communs d'une part, et entre droits spéciaux d'autre part. Véritable "summa divisio", elle disposerait cependant toujours d’une vertu ordonnatrice très importante,tant pour le législateur que pour le juge, et tant à l’université que dans la pratique.Il y a pourtant un singulier paradoxe. Le droit commun et le droit spécial sont indéfinissables ; leur relativité est telle qu’ils ne se conçoivent pas abstraction faite l’un de l’autre. Et, toutefois, la relation qu’ils entretiennent est généralement décrite en termes d’opposition. Or, la relativité appelle bien plutôt la collaboration que l’opposition.C’est ainsi que, s’agissant de l’élaboration du droit, des influences positives sont à l’oeuvre. Le droit commun et le droit spécial se servent mutuellement de modèle. Leur évolution se déroule en contemplation l'un de l'autre. Cela permet surtout, concernant l’application du droit, de réfuter l’idée suivant laquelle le droit commun et le droit spécial s’excluraient mécaniquement. En dehors des hypothèses prévues par le droit écrit, aucun fondement ne justifie l’exclusivisme. Ce dernier ne dispose en outre que d’un régime juridique plein d’incertitude. La valeur de la solution préconisée par l’adage "Specialia generalibus derogant" n’est que celle d’une présomption, simple. « Sur-mesure », le droit spécial est supposé mieux adapté à la situation litigieuse, mais il peut concrètement se révéler moins approprié que le droit commun
Distinguishing between general and specific rules of law is a deeply rooted habit among civilist lawyers, concerning the field of theory as the practice one. The roles of this distinction are very different, but they are threatened by two kinds of phenomenas as well : the increasing degreesof specialization and the development of -horizontal- relationship between general rules of lawon the one hand, and specific rules of law in the other hand. As a genuine, it would work,however, always as a good way to order the priority of different rules of law for both legislature and judges, both in academia and in practice.There is however a singular paradox. The general and specific rules of law can't be defined,their relativity is such an obvious one that they inconceivable if the other doesn't exist. According to this idea, their relationship is usually described in terms of opposition. Yet, the meaning of "relativity" is closer to collaboration rather than opposition.Thus, as regards to the development of the law, positive influences are at work. General and specific rule of law are a model to each other. Their evolution takes place in contemplation ofeach part. This especially helps the application of law to refute the idea that the general andspecific rules of law are mechanically mutually exclusive. A part from the possibilities provided by statute law, no basis justifies exclusiveness. Furthermore, specific rules of law sometimes contain a lot of less-defined rules. The value of the solution advocated by the adage "specialia generalibus derogant " is just a presumption, a simple one. A specific rule of law is supposes to be perfectly adapted to a situation, but it may pragmatically, about some case, be less appropriate than the general rule of law

La renaissance du droit commun des contrats est trompeuse. C’est d’un droit fragilisé qu’on vante le renouveau, le droit spécial s’émancipant de son emprise. Le droit commun n’est plus l’unique cadre de référence vers lequel se tourner en cas de lacune ou d’ambiguïté des dispositions spéciales. Il est concurrencé dans cette fonction par de nouveaux corps de règles, comme le droit communautaire ou les droits et libertés fondamentaux, dans l’orbite desquels gravitent certaines règles spéciales. Le droit commun est, de surcroît, instrumentalisé, pour servir les intérêts défendus par la réglementation spéciale. Le terrain des concours de normes est révélateur de cette application à éclipse du droit commun, l’absence de toute règle de conflit ayant favorisé le développement d’une résolution opportuniste des concours. Le droit commun des contrats se mue insensiblement en un fonds commun de règles, susceptibles d’être adaptées ou écartées si l’obtention de la solution jugée la plus opportune l’exige. Cette transformation progressive cache des faiblesses qui invitent à plaider en faveur d’une restauration de l’emprise du droit commun sur le droit des contrats. L’instrument principal de cette restauration consiste en l’élaboration d’une règle de conflit gouvernant la résolution des concours entre normes communes et normes spéciales, l’adage specialia generalibus derogant n’étant qu’un remède illusoire au désordre jurisprudentiel en la matière. La règle de conflit proposée conserverait aux dispositions communes leur vocation de principe à s’appliquer aux côtés des dispositions spéciales concurrentes, l’éviction des premières étant subordonnée à la caractérisation d’une antinomie.

Le présent travail propose une étude d’ensemble sur le droit commun, notion fondamentale au coeur de la théorie et de la pratique quotidienne du droit. Contrairement à une première impression suivant laquelle il serait une notion à géométrie variable (droit civil ? théorie générale ? droit romain ? droit européen ? principes ?), le droit commun apparaît comme le concept technique désignant, pour une institution donnée, les règles juridiques dont le domaine d’application est indéfini. En outre, l’étude en révèle les deux applications pratiques fort distinctes que sont le droit commun territorial et le droit commun matériel. Le droit commun territorial d’abord, apparaît mal connu mais techniquement et historiquement premier ; c’est celui que l’on trouve par exemple à l’article 1393, alinéa 2, du code civil (qui vise le « droit commun de la France » des régimes matrimoniaux), ou dans un principe fondamental reconnu par les lois de la République dégagé par le Conseil constitutionnel en 2011. Le droit commun matériel ensuite, se révèle mieux connu mais appelle une synthèse ; c’est celui qui est visé, par exemple, dans la section contenant les articles 2333 et suivants du code civil (sur le « droit commun du gage ») tels qu’ils résultent de l’ordonnance du 23 mars 2006. Ces deux volets du droit commun expriment une "summa divisio", dans laquelle s’ordonnent toutes ses utilisations en droit positif. S’ils présentent des similitudes de régime, ils se distinguent néanmoins : ils ne renvoient pas aux mêmes règles – règles au domaine d’application "ratione loci" indéfini d’un côté, règles au domaine d’application "ratione materiæ et personæ" indéfini de l’autre
This work offers a comprehensive study on the “droit commun” (approximately translated into “general rules of law” or “ordinary law”), a fundamental concept at the core of the theory and daily practice of French law. Contrary to traditional approaches involving the impression of a changing and variable concept (civil law, general theory, Roman law, European law, principles?), “droit commun” is a technical concept referring, for a given institution, to the legal rules whose scope of application is indefinite. This study also reveals the two distinct applications of “droit commun”; “droit commun territorial” (“territorial general rules of law”) and “droit commun matériel” (“material general rules of law”). The first application, “droit commun territorial”, although lesser known, is technically and historically primal. Droit commun territorial is specifically mentioned for in article 1393 of the French civil code (regarding the matrimonial property regimes), and in a fundamental principle identified by the French Constitutional Council in 2011. The second application, “droit commun matériel”, is better known but needs an overview. In particular, the section of the French civil code which contains articles 2333 and following (on the “droit commun” of pledging of corporeal movables), refers to it. These two applications of “droit commun” are the expressions of a summa divisio. Although both applications have similarities, they remain fundamentally different. The respective applications of “droit commun” do not refer to the same rules of law: rules where territorial scope of application is unlimited versus rules where material and personal scope of application is unlimited

L’accroissement sensible des références au principe lex specialis dans le discours des acteurs du droit international, notamment depuis la fin du XXe siècle, a contribué à le faire apparaître comme un concept incontournable. Pourtant, la question de son contenu fait toujours débat dans les travaux de la doctrine comme dans la pratique de ces acteurs. Une dualité des perceptions de la fonction du principe lex specialis existe en effet dans leurs discours où il est entendu soit comme un principe d’articulation de règles concurrentes soit comme un principe de solution de conflit entre règles incompatibles. Cette dualité n’est pas surprenante : elle prend sa source dans des genèses historiquement différentes et conceptuellement antagonistes de chacune de ces fonctions. Celle de solution de conflit procède pourtant dès l’origine d’une incohérence conceptuelle puisque deux règles contradictoires n’entretiennent en fait pas de relation de généralité et de spécialité. Elle n’est au demeurant pas transposable dans l’ordre juridique international moderne car le fait qu’un de ses sujets puisse ne pas se conformer à une obligation qui lui incombe en raison de l’existence d’une autre obligation contradictoire avec celle-ci, et ce licitement, est irréconciliable avec le principe axiomatique pacta sunt servanda. Par contraste, sa fonction d’articulation constitue un outil pour l’interprète au service de l’affirmation de la cohérence et de l’unité du droit qu’il applique. Dans le contexte contemporain d’interrogation sur la fragmentation du droit international, il n’est donc pas étonnant que ce soit cette fonction que les acteurs mettent majoritairement en œuvre de nos jours
The significant increase in references to the lex specialis principle by international actors, especially since the end of the twentieth century, has made it appear as an unavoidable concept. However, the question of its content is still debated by scholars and in practice. A duality of perceptions of the function of the lex specialis principle exists. Indeed, it is understood either as a principle of articulation of competing rules or as a principle of solution of conflict between contradictory rules. That duality is not surprising: each of these functions derives from historically different and conceptually antagonistic genesis. But the solution of conflict function proceeds from the outset of a conceptual incoherence since two contradictory rules have no relation of generality and specialty. Moreover, it can not be transposed into the modern international legal order because the fact that one of its subjects may lawfully not comply with one of its obligation due to the existence of another obligation contradictory to it is irreconcilable with the axiomatic principle pacta sunt servanda. By contrast, its articulation function constitutes a tool for the interpreter to affirm the coherence and unity of the law it applies. In relation to the contemporary concerns about fragmentation of international law, it is not surprising that this is the function most of its actors implement today