Relevant bibliographies by topics / Spinozistic Ethics

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Spinozistic Ethics'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2025
Last updated: 23 June 2025

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Spinozistic Ethics.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Spinozistic Ethics"

1

NEWLANDS, SAMUEL. "Spinozistic Selves." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 1 (2020): 16–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.28.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractSpinoza's Ethics promises a path for sweeping personal transformations, but his accounts face two sets of overarching problems. The first concerns his peculiar metaphysics of action and agents; the second his apparent neglect of the very category of persons. Although these are somewhat distinct concerns, they have a common, unified solution in Spinoza's system that is philosophically rich and interesting, both in its own right and in relation to contemporary work in moral philosophy. After presenting the core of the problem facing Spinoza's action theory, I turn to his overlooked account of selves, one that can be illuminated by contemporary work on so-called deep-self theories. I then show how Spinoza's distinctive account of selves prevents his action theory from collapsing into metaphysical incoherence, and conclude with an implication for Spinoza's broader account of transformation.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

de Dijn, Herman. "The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand RusselI." International Studies in Philosophy 21, no. 3 (1989): 99–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil198921310.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Aksoy, Neşe. "Spinoza’s Conatus: A Teleological Reading of Its Ethical Dimension." Conatus 6, no. 2 (2021): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.25661.

Full text
Abstract:
In this article I examine how the teleological reading of Spinoza’s conatus shapes the ethical trajectory of his philosophy. I first introduce the Spinozistic criticism of teleology and argue contra many critics that Spinoza has a mild approach to human teleology. On the basis of this idea, I develop the claim that conatus is a teleological element pertaining to human nature. From the teleological reading of conatus, I draw the conclusion that Spinozistic ethics is inclusive of objective, humanistic, and essentialist elements. In this sense, this paper emerges to be a challenge against the anti-teleological reading of conatus that is predominantly related to the subjectivistic, anti-humanistic, and non-essentialist interpretation of Spinoza’s ethics. It mainly situates Spinoza in a traditionally teleological context where the human conatus is seen as an act of pursuing objective and essential moral ends that is distinctive to human nature.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Bilge, Sever Kıyak. "Spınoza's Understandıng of 'Conatus' And Evolutıonary Ethıcs: Two Approaches for Search of The Source of Morality." Danişname Beşeri ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 1 (September 20, 2020): 107–25. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4036947.

Full text
Abstract:
In this paper, two ethical theories are discussed: Spinozistic ethics and evolutionary ethics. The reason for evaluating these theories is because both of them start with the very same question: “what is good?” and they both underlie the importance of the benefits of morality. According to Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, people called the thing as good which are good for their power to survive (conatus). While he points out the personal conatus, he al-so supports that living in a society is best for their personal conatus. For evo-lutionary ethics, social norms like morals are the result of living in a society. Moral judgments are crucial for cooperation and thus survival. With the light of these two ethical theories, in this paper, it will be argued that the main purpose of moral traits was to increase the collaboration and survival of the society and so to provide a more livable surrounding for the individu-als. Therefore, today’s multicultural societies the best thing for us to do is to capture the essence of the reason why we need morality in the first place. This will help us to create a more collaborative society.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Den Uyl, Douglas. "AUTONOMOUS AUTONOMY: SPINOZA ON AUTONOMY, PERFECTIONISM, AND POLITICS." Social Philosophy and Policy 20, no. 2 (2003): 30–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052503202028.

Full text
Abstract:
These epigraphs present us with part of the problem that is to be discussed in this essay. For Spinoza (1632–1677) there is no metaphysical freedom, except for God/Substance/Nature. The behavior of individual things, or modes, is completely a function of causes that bring about the behavior. This might suggest that there can be no autonomy in any meaningful sense either, thus aborting at the outset any talk of autonomy in Spinoza. To add to this problem, “autonomy” is somewhat anachronistic when applied to Spinoza. The philosophical theory surrounding the concept of autonomy seems to have developed later, perhaps mostly from Kant (1724–1804), which is not to say that it did not have parallels earlier. Kantian metaphysics is certainly different from Spinozistic metaphysics in allowing for freedom, if nothing else. But even if we ignore the metaphysics, the structure of a Kantian ethics is different from a Spinozistic one in its focus on duty and imperatives. One finds little of that in Spinoza. Consequently, on both metaphysical and historical grounds, it seems somewhat problematic to speak of Kantian autonomy in Spinoza.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Ayalon, Noa Lahav. "spinoza on children and childhood." childhood & philosophy 17 (December 27, 2021): 01–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/childphilo.2021.59537.

Full text
Abstract:
Baruch Spinoza, the 17th century philosopher best known for his metaphysical rigor and the radical heterodoxy of his conception of God as Nature, did not say much about children or childhood. Nevertheless, his few mentions of children in his masterpiece, the Ethics, raise fascinating questions of autarky, rationality and mind-body relations as they are perceived in the contrast between children and adults. Generally, philosophical theories of childhood benefit greatly from a strong metaphysical foundation. Spinoza’s philosophy, which has recently been gaining considerable attention by contemporary neuroscientists and psychologists, can serve as stable and fertile ground for developing a strong philosophy of childhood. In this paper I address the Spinozistic conception of a flourishing, happy human and the way this understanding of human excellence reflects on his understanding of children and childhood. I argue that the use of Spinozistic concepts can be valuable in the analysis of children and childhood—especially essence, striving to persevere in being, and the nature of the imagination. Spinoza’s epistemology can explain the unique rationality of children, and provide a metaphysical basis for normative behavior. Moreover, it can help us as caregivers better understand and empathize with children, by explaining the similarities and differences between children and adults.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

SOYARSLAN, SANEM. "Two Ethical Ideals in Spinoza's Ethics: The Free Man and The Wise Man." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5, no. 3 (2019): 357–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.19.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractAccording to Steven Nadler's novel interpretation of Spinoza's much discussed ‘free man’, the free man is not an unattainable ideal. On this reading, the free man represents an ideal condition not because he is passionless, as has often been claimed, but because even though he experiences passions, he ‘never lets those passions determine his actions’. In this paper, I argue that Nadler's interpretation is incorrect in taking the model of the free man to be an attainable ideal within our reach. Furthermore, I show that Spinoza's moral philosophy has room for another ideal yet attainable condition, which is represented by the wise man. On my reading, becoming a wise man consists not in surmounting human bondage, but in understanding ourselves as finite expressions of God's power and, thereby, coming to terms with the ineliminability of bondage for us due to our very human or modal condition in the Spinozistic universe.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Newlands, Samuel. "Regis's Sweeping and Costly Anti-Spinozism." Journal of the History of Philosophy 62, no. 2 (2024): 211–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a925518.

Full text
Abstract:
abstract: Pierre-Sylvain Regis, once a well-known defender of Cartesianism, offers an unusually rich and innovative refutation of Spinoza. While many of his early modern contemporaries raised narrower objections to particular claims in Spinoza's Ethics , Regis develops a broader anti-Spinozistic position, one that threatens the very core of Spinoza's metaphysical ambitions and offers a philosophically robust alternative. However, as with any far-reaching philosophical commitment, Regis's gambit comes with substantive costs of its own, including creating instabilities within the core of his own philosophical system. Far from diminishing the significance of Regis's anti-Spinozism, this critical appraisal helps us better appreciate both the conceptual pull of Spinozism within early modern metaphysics and one sweeping, albeit costly way of escaping its orbit.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Maxwell, Vance. "The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand RussellKenneth Blackwell London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. Pp. ix, 262. $20.00." Dialogue 26, no. 4 (1987): 765–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300018412.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Detcheverry, Thomas. "Deleuze on Spinoza and Rousseau: Ethics and Materialism." Deleuze and Guattari Studies 16, no. 2 (2022): 159–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dlgs.2022.0473.

Full text
Abstract:
In the lecture of December 16, 1980, Deleuze proposes a cross-reading of Spinoza and Rousseau. First, Deleuze reinterprets Rousseau’s morality in the light of Spinoza’s critique of ‘morality’ based on the opposition of good and evil; second, and reciprocally, he rereads Spinoza’s practical and ethical philosophy from a concept extracted from Rousseau’s work: that of the ‘materialism of the wise’. According to Deleuze, this ‘practical materialism’ (and not metaphysical) evoked by Rousseau, consisting of both ‘determinism’ and ‘sensualism’, has a Spinozist inspiration, insofar as it has an amoralist dimension, close to the critique of morality developed in the Ethics. But on the other hand, Rousseau’s ‘materialism of the wise’ allows us, conversely, to reread the Spinozist explanation of the conquest of freedom, by revealing the presence of practical principles very close to those of Rousseau’s ethical materialism. The cross-reading of Spinoza and Rousseau thus presents a double aim: on the one hand, to identify the presence of amoralist themes and issues in Rousseau’s work; on the other, to reveal the existence of materialist principles (in the sense of Rousseau’s ‘materialism of the wise’) in the Spinozist ethical itinerary.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Spinozistic Ethics"

1

Henry, Julie. "L'éthique spinoziste comme devenir. Variations affectives et temporalité de l'existence." Thesis, Lyon, École normale supérieure, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013ENSL0820.

Full text
Abstract:
Ce travail se propose de comprendre l’éthique élaborée par Spinoza comme cheminement individuel dans le cadre d’une nature déterminée de part en part, et au sein de laquelle aucune finalité n’est assignée aux hommes. La question consiste donc à se demander comment l’on peut passer à une autre manière d’exister sans postuler de distance de soi à soi ; et cela revient à incarner différemment, singulièrement, le déterminisme commun. S’appuyant sur l’étude de concepts tels fabrica, constitutio, occasio, ou encore aptitudes, ce travail part du dynamisme des choses singulières afin d’établir l’historicité propre à l’existence humaine. Dans ce cadre, les rencontres déterminantes sans être librement choisies sont parties prenantes du cheminement éthique, comme autant de circonstances propices à l’occasion desquelles on peut accroître son aptitude à être diversement affecté. Il s’agit ainsi de constituer une « anthropologie éthique » qui permette de concevoir l’éthique à partir de l’existence courante des hommes du commun, mais sans jamais la réduire à une science des comportements. Cela requiert ainsi de penser la possibilité de changements sur fond de continuité, en incluant dans le cheminement tout ce qui est à même d’alimenter des variations orientées, comme le désir, l’imagination d’un modèle ou la sensation de soi à divers moments de son existence. Est requis pour cela de constituer un concept de « singularité », qui se distingue de ce qui est simplement particulier, mais qui ne s’oppose pas cependant à un cheminement commun. Cela revient alors à considérer l’éthique non comme un état à atteindre (un devenir « quelque chose »), mais comme le fait même d’être « en devenir »<br>The aim of this study is to conceive of Spinoza’s ethics as an individual progression within the framework of a completely determined existence wherein no finality is assigned to man. Hence, the question is how to pass from one mode of existence to another without distancing one from oneself or, that which amounts to the same, how to embody, differently and in a singular way, the common determinism. Taking our point of departure in concepts such as fabrica, constitutio, occasio or aptitude, this study thus begins by looking at the dynamics of individual things in order to determine the historicity proper to human existence. Within this framework, encounters that are determining but not freely chosen are integral parts of the ethical progression, constituting so many circumstances propitious for the production of the occasions where one’s aptitude to be affected in many ways can be augmented. The objective is then to establish an “ethical anthropology” allowing to conceive of an ethics taking its point of departure in the everyday existence of common people but without ever reducing to a science of behaviors. This also requires that the possibility of change must be thought on the basis of continuity by including in the progression everything that supports the different variations and their orientations, such as desire or the imaginary models or senses of self that we have at different moments of our existence. In order to do that, one must construct a concept of “singularity” as of something different from the merely “particular” but that nonetheless is not opposed to a common progression. This amounts to considering ethics, not as a state to achieve (a “becoming something”) but rather as the very fact of being “in becoming.”
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Spinozistic Ethics"

1

Blackwell, Kenneth. The Spinozistic ethics of Bertrand Russell. Allen & Unwin, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Blackwell, Kenneth. Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Blackwell, Kenneth. Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Blackwell, Kenneth. Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Blackwell, Kenneth. The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2012.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

The Spinozistic ethics of Bertrand Russell. Allen & Unwin, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Newlands, Samuel. Conceptual Dependence Monism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198817260.003.0004.

Full text
Abstract:
Chapter three examines Spinoza’s views on metaphysical dependence, in which the role of the conceptual is arguably the clearest. Spinoza uses some twenty-two different terms for dependence in the opening pages of the Ethics, and a fierce interpretive debate has erupted over how to understand the relations among these seemingly different forms of dependence. This chapter argues that Spinoza holds an especially austere view, which is here named conceptual dependence monism: there is exactly one form of metaphysical dependence, and it is conceptual in kind. This interpretation is defended on both textual and systematic grounds, pointing out some of its implications for our understanding of other, more familiar Spinozistic doctrines. Along the way, a clearer understanding is also gained of Spinoza’s explanatory requirements in metaphysics.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Newlands, Samuel. Reconceiving Spinoza. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198817260.001.0001.

Full text
Abstract:
In Reconceiving Spinoza, Newlands returns to Spinoza’s self-described foundational project and provides an integrated interpretation of his metaphysical system and the way in which his metaphysics shapes, and is shaped by, his moral program. One of the overarching theses of this book is that conceptual relations form the backbone of Spinoza’s explanatory project and perform a surprising amount of work in his metaphysics and ethics. Conceptual relations are the philosophical grease that keeps the Spinozistic machine running smoothly, allowing him to do everything from reconciling monism with diversity to providing non-prudential grounds for altruism within an ethical egoist framework. One of the author’s main goals is to exhibit how much work conceptual relations do for Spinoza and how much seeing this changes our understanding of his philosophical outlook. Furthermore, given Spinoza’s metaphysics of individuals, a moral agent’s interests and even self-identity can vary, relative to some of these different ways of being conceived. This will have the startling implication that Spinoza’s ethical egoism, when combined with his concept-sensitive metaphysics, is ultimately a call to a radical kind of self-transcendence. We will thus be challenged to reconceive not only the world, but also Spinoza’s project, and perhaps even ourselves, along the way.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Spinozistic Ethics"

1

Davis, Gordon F., and Mary D. Renaud. "Spinoza Through the Prism of Later ‘East-West’ Exchanges: Analogues of Buddhist Themes in the Ethics and the Works of Early Spinozists." In Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67407-0_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

"The Spinozistic outlook." In Russell on Ethics. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315824642-45.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

"Evaluation of a Normative Ethic." In The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220-13.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

"Amor Dei Intellectually." In The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220-11.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

"Development of the Ethic of Impersonal Self-Enlargement." In The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220-12.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

"Introduction." In The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220-5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

"The Early Period (1888-1901)." In The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220-7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

"The Middle Period (1907-12)." In The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220-8.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

"The Late Period (1914-64)." In The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074220-9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Andrew, Youpa. "The Empowered Life." In The Ethics of Joy. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190086022.003.0011.

Full text
Abstract:
The person of Spinozistic fortitudo takes intelligent care of himself, which is to possess the virtue of tenacity, and he takes intelligent care of others, which is to possess the virtue of nobility. The person of fortitudo is a friend to himself and he is a friend to others. This chapter examines Spinoza’s theory of nobility and the central role of friendship in his conception of the empowered life. The author argues that nobility is a distinct type of love. Nobility is empowered love. Essential to empowered love is the desire to help and befriend others, and he shows that helping others is about empowering others to live joyously and lovingly. The most important way to help others to live in this way is through education. Moreover, education, in Spinoza’s view, is a social project, and the author highlights three ways that it is social. Finally, the chapter shows how Spinozistic friendship and the virtue of courtesy (modestia) prepare us for a life of learning.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Spinozistic Ethics' for particular source types:
Journal articles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography