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Books on the topic 'Split-brain'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 31 July 2024

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1

Maryse, Lassonde, Jeeves Malcolm A. 1926-, and International Brain Research Organization, eds. Callosal agenesis: A natural split brain? New York: Plenum Press, 1994.

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2

Lieb, Kathrin. Split-Brain-Forschung und ihre Folgen: Medizin, Geschichte, Populärwissenschaft. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012.

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3

Erika, Erdmann, ed. A mind for tomorrow: Facts, values, and the future. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2000.

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4

Erdmann, Erika. Beyond a world divided: Human values in the brain-mind science of Roger Sperry. Boston: Shambhala, 1991.

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5

Herrmann, Ned. The Creative brain. [S.L.]: [S.N.], 1991.

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6

1928-, Benson D. Frank, and Zaidel Eran, eds. The Dual brain: Hemispheric specialization in humans. New York: Guilford Press, 1985.

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7

1913-, Sperry Roger Wolcott, and Trevarthen Colwyn, eds. Brain circuits and functions of the mind: Essays in honor of Roger W. Sperry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

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8

Zimbardo, Philip G. Discovering psychology: Disc 7, programs 25-26. S. Burlington, VT: Annenberg Media, 2001.

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9

Psyche and the split-brain. Lanham: University Press of America, 1994.

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10

Jeeves, Malcolm A. Callosal Agenesis: A Natural Split Brain? Springer, 2012.

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11

Lassone, Maryse. Callosal Agenesis: A Natural Split Brain? Springer, 2011.

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12

Jeeves, Malcolm A. Callosal Agenesis: A Natural Split Brain? Springer, 2011.

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13

Nelson, Aurealia N. The Split Brain: An Analysis of Schizophrenia. Writers Club Press, 2001.

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14

Schechter, Elizabeth. Self and Other in the Split-Brain Subject. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0007.

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This chapter concerns self-consciousness in split-brain subjects. I argue, first, that R and L are both capable of thinking I-thoughts: thoughts containing the mental or conceptual analogue of the English word “I.” On the other hand, R’s and L’s self-consciousness differs, in its operative dynamics, from self-consciousness in, say, my sister and me. First of all, neither R nor L recognizes the existence of a second thinker sharing its body. I call this lack of mutual recognition. Second, L seems to assume that its I-thoughts refer to S, and R seems to assume the same of its I-thoughts. I call this (subjective) co-identification as S. I then argue that lack of mutual recognition and co-identification as S are explained by the fact that R and L lack the capacity for self-distinction: neither can first-personally distinguish itself from the other.
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15

Self-Consciousness and 'Split' Brains: The Mind's I. Oxford University Press, 2018.

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16

Split screen: Attack of the soul-sucking brain zombies. New York, NY: HarperTempest, 2007.

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17

Nelson, Aurealia N. The Split Brain II: Alternative Research and Voices of Schizophrenia. Writer's Showcase Press, 2002.

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18

Nelson, Aurealia N. The Split Brain II: Alternative Research and Voices of Schizophrenia. Writer's Showcase Press, 2002.

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19

(Editor), Maryse Lassone, and Malcolm A. Jeeves (Editor), eds. Callosal Agenesis: A Natural Split Brain (Advances in Behavioral Biology). Springer, 1994.

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20

A Mind for Tomorrow: Facts, Values, and the Future. Praeger Publishers, 2000.

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21

Hall, Terry Lynn. Brightness discriminability and degree of interhemispheric transfer of an avoidance response in rats under cortical spreading depression. 1997.

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22

Hartinger, Brent. Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies; Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperCollins Publishers, 2009.

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23

Hartinger, Brent. Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies / Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperTeen, 2007.

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24

Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies; Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperCollins Publishers, 2009.

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25

Hartinger, Brent. Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies; Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperCollins Publishers, 2009.

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26

Hartinger, Brent. Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies; Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperCollins Publishers, 2009.

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27

Hartinger, Brent. Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies / Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperTeen, 2007.

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28

Hartinger, Brent. Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies / Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperTeen, 2007.

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29

Hartinger, Brent. Split Screen: Attack of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies / Bride of the Soul-Sucking Brain Zombies. HarperTeen, 2007.

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30

Schechter, Elizabeth. Self-Consciousness and "Split" Brains. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.001.0001.

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The largest fiber tract in the human brain is the corpus callosum, which connects the two cerebral hemispheres. A number of surgeries severing this structure were performed on adults in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. After they are surgically separated from each other in this way, a “split-brain” subject’s hemispheres begin to operate unusually independently of each other in the realms of perception, cognition, and the control of action—almost as if each had a mind of its own. But can a mere hemisphere really see? Speak? Feel? Know what it has done? The split-brain cases raise questions of psychological identity: How many subjects of experience are there within a split-brain subject? How many persons? How many minds? Under experimental conditions, split-brain subjects often act as though they were animated by two distinct conscious beings, evoking the duality intuition. On the other hand, a split-brain subject seems like one of us—not like two of us sharing one body. Split-brain subjects thus also evoke the unity intuition.This book is devoted to reconciling these two apparently opposing intuitions. The key to doing so are facts about the way self-consciousness operates in split-brain subjects. A split-brain subject is composed of two conscious psychological beings that fail to recognize each other’s existence and indeed cannot distinguish themselves from each other. Instead, each must first-personally identify with the split-brain subject as a whole, and in so doing, the two make themselves into one person.
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31

An Odd Kind of Fame: Stories of Phineas Gage. The MIT Press, 2000.

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32

Macmillan, Malcolm. An Odd Kind of Fame: Stories of Phineas Gage. The MIT Press, 2002.

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33

Schiffer, Fredric. Of Two Minds : The Revolutionary Science of Dual-Brain Psychology. DIANE Publishing Company, 2002.

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34

S, Gazzaniga Michael. Tales from Both Sides of the Brain: A Life in Neuroscience. HarperCollins Publishers, 2019.

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35

Ehrenwald, Jan. Anatomy of Genius: Split Brains and Global Minds. Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1986.

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36

Massimini, Marcello, and Giulio Tononi. Brain Islands. Translated by Frances Anderson. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198728443.003.0003.

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This chapter examines the clinical problem of detecting consciousness in brain-injured patients who emerge from coma in a state of behavioral unresponsiveness. Intensive care medicine is artificially producing, as a by-product of saving many lives, brains that may remain isolated, split, or fragmented. In extreme cases, large cortical islands or an archipelago of islands may survive totally dissociated from the world outside. Can these islands sustain consciousness? Does it feel like anything to be a big chunk of isolated human cortex? Scientific and philosophical doubts aside, we need to urgently address this question. The text underscores the necessity and difficulty of developing brain-based objective measures of consciousness, which are independent of sensory processing and motor behavior.
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37

Split-Brain und Lateralität: Ein intermanueller Vergleich motorischer Leistungen bei intakten und callosotomierten Rhesusaffen (Macaca mulatta). Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1988.

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38

Semantic priming in the cerebral hemispheres: Brain asymmetries in automatic, expectancy-based, and postlexical processing. Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1999.

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39

Micallef, John Joseph. The neuropsychology of selective attention difficulties in dyslexia. 1993.

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40

Schechter, Elizabeth. Bodies and Being One. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0006.

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This chapter concerns the relationship between the split-brain case and the non-split case. In the first half of the chapter, I consider arguments to the effect that if split-brain subjects have two minds apiece, then so do non-split subjects. Sometimes these arguments have taken the form of a reductio against the 2-thinkers claim for split-brain subjects. These arguments do not work: that a split-brain subject has two minds does not mean that I have two minds, although it does mean that I could. The second half of the chapter offers my own proposal for the respect in which R’s and L’s co-embodiment as one animal, S, makes a split-brain subject one of us: I argue that S must be the single object of both R’s and L’s implicit bodily self-awareness.
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41

Schechter, Elizabeth. The Unity Puzzle. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0001.

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This chapter introduces the major philosophical debate about the split-brain phenomenon. Split-brain surgery severs the major white matter fiber tract connecting the two cerebral hemispheres. A number of individuals who underwent this surgery later agreed to act as participants in experiments designed to reveal its psychobehavioral consequences. The basic finding is that, after they are surgically divided in this way, the two hemispheres cannot interact in all the ways they once could: indeed, split-brain subjects sometimes give the impression of having two minds and spheres of consciousness, one associated with each hemisphere. A split-brain subject nonetheless seems to be one of us, at the end of the day. The aim of the book is to reconcile these apparently opposing intuitions by explaining how a split-brain person could have multiple minds.
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42

Pomaville, Derik, and Becky Pomaville. Split down the Middle: Tapping into Both Hemispheres of the Brain for Successful Marketing of Any Home Inspection Business. Higher Ground Training, Education, & Certification, 2024.

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43

The Dual Brain: Hemispheric Specialization in Humans. The Guilford Press, 1985.

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44

Schechter, Elizabeth. Duality Myths. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0009.

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This chapter addresses the intuitive fascination of the split-brain phenomenon. According to what I call the standard explanation, it is because we ordinarily assume that people are psychologically unified, while split-brain subjects are not psychologically unified, which suggests that we might not be unified either. I offer a different interpretation. One natural way of grappling with people’s failures to conform to various assumptions we make about them is to conceptualize them as having multiple minds. Such multiple-minds models take their most dramatic form in narrative art as duality myths. The split-brain cases grip people in part because the subjects strike them as living embodiments of such myths.
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45

Schechter, Elizabeth. Dual Intentional Agency. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0003.

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This chapter defends the 2-agents claim, according to which the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are associated with distinct intentional agents. The empirical basis of this claim is that, while both hemispheres are the source or site of intentions, the capacity to integrate them in practical reasoning no longer operates interhemispherically after split-brain surgery. As a result, the right hemisphere-associated agent, R, and the left hemisphere-associated agent, L, enjoy intentional autonomy from each other. Although the positive case for the 2-agents claim is grounded mainly in experimental findings, the claim is not contradicted by what we know of split-brain subjects’ ordinary behavior, that is, the way they act outside of experimental conditions.
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46

One split second. Robbie Dean Press, 1993.

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47

Schechter, Elizabeth. Subjects of Experience and Subjective Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0002.

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This chapter offers a preliminary defense of the claim that the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are associated with distinct subjects of experience. The empirical basis of this 2-subjects claim is that, while both hemispheres are the source or site of elements of experience, these elements are unified only within each hemisphere system, and not across them. In other words, consciousness is unified intrahemispherically, but disunified interhemispherically. A split-brain subject thus has two subjective perspectives, one associated with the right hemisphere and one with the left. Our first-personal way of understanding what it is to be an experiencing subject, however, makes it impossible for a single subject of experience to have multiple subjective perspectives in just the same way that another subject of experience has one. It seems to follow that the two hemispheres of a split-brain subject are associated with distinct subjects of experience, each standing in just the relation to its one perspective that I do to mine.
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48

Schechter, Elizabeth. How Many Minds? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0004.

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The previous chapters argued that within a split-brain subject there are two subjects of conscious experience and intentional agents, R and L. This chapter explains who these two thinking beings are and how it is possible for two thinkers to be co-embodied. The basis of the 2-thinkers claim is, naturally, that R and L think, feel, decide, and so on, independently of each other. Of course, this does not mean that they do not causally interact; since they are co-embodied, they interact all the time. What split-brain experiments show, however, is that R’s mental activities interact with L’s largely only indirectly: one of them acts or reacts in some way, and the other senses or perceives this re/action. Mental activities are causal activities whose psychological kinds are defined by their powers to interact directly. Thus the thinking things in the split-brain case are R and L, and only derivatively S.
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49

The Social Brain: Discovering the Networks of the Mind. Basic Books, 1987.

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50

The social brain: Discovering the networks of the mind. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

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