Academic literature on the topic 'Srebrenica Massacre, Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995'

On 14 December 1995, an agreement as the Elysée Treaty (earlier initialled in Dayton after weeks of difficult negotiation) was signed in Paris by the Heads of State of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One of the witnesses at the ceremony was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and, in a real sense, it marked the nadir of his term of office. In June 1992, amidst the euphoria of U.S. President George Bush's articulation of hopes for a new world order, Boutros-Ghali had presented a report to U.N. members entitled An Agenda for Peace which painted an ambitious picture of the opportunities for constructive involvement of the U.N. in conflict resolution. Yet ironically, this was almost the moment at which the intensification of intergroup conflict precipitated Bosnia-Hercegovina's slide into social and political disarray. The ultimate humiliation for the U.N. came in July 1995 when the massacre of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces in the U.N.-declared “safe area” of Srebrenica triggered the chain of events which saw responsibility for Bosnia-Hercegovina decisively removed from the U.N.'s grasp, and assumed by the United States and its NATO allies. The U.N. may recover from the shame of its Balkan entanglement, but the scars are likely to prove permanent.

The relationship between identity and national consciousness is one of the important issues, not only, of the sociology of identity but of the overall opinion of the social sciences. This scientific question has been insufficiently researched in the sociological thought of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with this paper we are trying to actualize it. Aware of theoretical-methodological and conceptual-logical difficulties related to the research problem, we considered that in the first part of the paper we make some theoretical-methodological notes on the problems in studying this phenomenon, in order to, above all, eliminate conceptual-logical dilemmas. The use of terms and their meaning in sociology and other social sciences is a very important theoretical and methodological issue. The question justifiably arises whether we can adequately name and explain some of the “character traits” of the contemporary national identity of the Bosniak nation that we want to talk about in this paper with classical, generally accepted terms, identity, consciousness, self-awareness, shame or shame, self-shame. Another important theoretical issue of the relationship between identity and consciousness in our case, the relationship between the national consciousness of Bosniaks and their overall socio-historical identity is the dialectical relationship between individual and collective consciousness, ie. the extent to which the national consciousness of an individual or a particular national group, political, cultural, educational, age, etc., is contrary to generally accepted national values and norms. One of the important factors of national consciousness is the culture of remembrance. What does it look like for Bosniaks? More specifically, in this paper we problematize the influence of “prejudicial historiography” on the development of the culture of memory in the direction of oblivion or memory. What to remember, and why to remember. Memory is part of our identity. The phrase, not to deal with the past but to turn to the future, is impossible. How to project the future and not analyze the past. On the basis of what, what social facts? Why the world remembers the crimes of the Nazis, why the memory of the Holocaust and the suffering of the Jews is being renewed. Which is why Bosniaks would not remember and renew the memory of the genocides committed against them. Due to the Bosniak memory of genocide, it is possible that the perpetrators of genocide are celebrated as national heroes and their atrocities as a national liberation struggle. Why is the history of literature and art, political history and all other histories studied in all nations and nations. Why don't European kingdoms give up their own, queens and kings, princesses and princes. These and other theoretical-methodological questions have served us to use comparative analysis to show specific forms of self-esteem among Bosniaks today. The concrete socio-historical examples we cite fully confirm our hypothesis. Here are a few of these examples. Our eastern neighbors invented their epic hero Marko Kraljevic (Ottoman vassal and soldier, killed as a “Turkish” soldier in the fight against Christian soldiers in Bulgaria) who killed the fictional Musa Kesedzija, invented victory on the field of Kosovo, and Bosniaks forgot the real Bosniak epic heroes , brothers Mujo and Halil Hrnjic, Tala od Orašac, Mustaj-beg Lički and others, who defended Bosniaks from persecution and ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian Krajina. Dozens of schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been named after the Serbian language reformer, the Serb Vuk Stefanović Karađić (1787-1864), who was born in the village of Tršić near Loznica, Republic of Serbia. Uskufije (1601 / 1602.-?), Born in Dobrinja near Tuzla. Two important guslars and narrators of epic folk songs, Filip Višnjić (1767-1834) and Avdo Medjedović (1875-1953), are unequally present in the memory and symbolic content of the national groups to which they belong, even if the difference in quality is on the side of the almost forgotten. Avdo Medjedovic, the “Balkan Homer”, is known at Harvard University, but very little is known in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And while we learned everything about the murderer Gavril Princip, enlightened by the “logic of an idea” (Hannah Arendt) symbolizing him as a “national hero”, we knew nothing, nor should we have known, about Muhamed Hadžijamaković, a Bosnian patriot and legal soldier, he did not kill a single pregnant woman , a fighter in the Bosnian Army who fought against the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878. When it comes to World War II and the fight against fascism are full of hero stories. For one example, we will take Srebrenica, the place of genocidal suffering of Bosniaks. Before the war against Bosnian society and the state 1992-1995. in Srebrenica, the elementary school was called Mihajlo Bjelakovic, a partisan, born in Vidrići near Sokolac. Died in Srebrenica in 1944. The high school in Srebrenica was named Midhat Hacam, a partisan born in the vicinity of Vares. It is not a problem that these two educational institutions were named after two anti-fascists, whose individual work is not known except that they died. None of them were from Srebrenica. That's not a problem either. Then what is it. In the collective memory of Bosniaks. Until recently, the name of the two Srebrenica benefactors and heroes who saved 3,500 Srebrenica Serbs from the Ustasha massacre in 1942, who were imprisoned by the Ustashas in the camp, has not been recorded. These are Ali (Jusuf) efendi Klančević (1888-1952) and his son Nazif Klančević (1910-1975). Nothing was said about them as anti-fascists, most likely that Alija eff. Klančević was an imam-hodža, his work is valued according to Andrić's “logic” as a work that cannot “be the subject of our work” In charity, humanitarian work, but also courage, sacrifice, direct participation in the fight for defense, the strongest Bosniaks do not lag behind Bosniaks, but just like Bosniaks, they are not symbolically represented in the public space of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We had the opportunity to learn about the partisan Marija Bursać and many others, but why the name Ifaket-hanuma Tuzlić-Salihagić (1908-1942), the daughter of Bakir-beg Tulić, was forgotten. In order to feed the muhadjers from eastern Bosnia, Ifaket-hanum, despite the warning not to go for food to Bosanska Dubica, she left. She bravely stood in front of the Ustashas who arrested her and took her to Jasenovac. She was tortured in the camp and eventually died in the greatest agony, watered and fried with hot oil. Nothing was known about that victim of Ustasha crimes. Is it because she is the daughter of Bakir-beg Tuzlić. Bey's children were not desirable in public as benefactors because they were “remnants of rotten feudalism”, belonging to the “sphere of another culture”. In this paper, we have mentioned other, concrete, examples of Bosniak monasticism, from the symbolic content of the entire public space to naming children.

In February 2017, an exhibition was opened in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) telling the story of the Bosnian war (1992-1995) and the Srebrenica genocide (1995). In this article we describe how the exhibition was designed and we reflect on the impact of the exhibition on the processes of restorative justice and social reconstruction. Leading question is: Does the exhibition successfully construct a shared sense of truth about the Srebrenica genocide? This evaluative question demands insight in the concept of truth and, more specific, in the debate about plural truths and multiple narratives. En febrero de 2017, se inauguró en Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina) una exposición que narraba la historia de la Guerra de Bosnia (1992-1995) y el genocidio de Srebrenica (1995). En este artículo, describimos cómo se diseñó la exposición, y reflexionamos sobre el impacto de la exposición en los procesos de justicia restaurativa y reconstrucción social. La pregunta que nos guía es: ¿Consigue la exposición construir un sentido compartido de verdad sobre el genocidio de Srebrenica? Esta pregunta evaluativa exige indagar en el concepto de verdad y, más específicamente, en el debate sobre pluralidad de verdades y multiplicidad de narrativas.

A small town Srebrenica, located in the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina became globally known after the genocide of 8.372 Bosniaks in July 1995. Three months before the Dayton peace agreement was signed, in November of 1995, the Army of Republika Srpska troops led by General Ratko Mladic committed genocide. Other than killing over 8.000 Bosniak men, they persecuted thousands of Srebrenica inhabitants. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić have been sentenced to life in jail for the crime of genocide committed in Srebrenica. While the international institutions and the European Union recognize this crime and work proactively on remedying its consequences, the Republic of Serbia and Republika Srpska are facing deep social and political negation of the Srebrenica genocide. This denial has been an obstacle for rebuilding the trust between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the West Balkans in general. Meanwhile, Srebrenica and its adjoining villages lack wide and systematic support for the durable return of its displaced inhabitants. There was a failed attempt in 2007 to give the city a special administrative status as a way towards reviving it. This paper will critically analyze the approach of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian, EU, and international institutions as well as that ofneigh-boring countries towards a durable and sustainable return to Srebrenica, its economic and cultural development between 1996. and 2020. This paper argues for giving Srebrenica a special status in order to promote its development supported by a law that would ensure a solidarity fund for its development.

Late in the afternoon of July 11, 1995, the Bosnian Serb army, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, seized the northeastern Bosnia town of Srebrenica. Declared a “safe area” by the United Nations two years earlier, the predominately Muslim community had swollen from a prewar population of 9,000 to over 40,000, many of whom had been “cleansed” from elsewhere in Bosnia. As Mladic's troops swarmed over the town, the women, children, elderly, and many of the men took refuge two kilometers away in the United Nations's Srebrenica headquarters, staffed by a Dutch battalion, in the village of Potocari. Meanwhile, the remaining Srebrenica men and boys—some 10,000 to 15,000—fled through the woods on foot, trying to reach Muslim-controlled territory, nearly 40 miles away.

Abstract The Srebrenica massacre occurred in July 1995 during the last year of the war in Bosnia (1992––1995). It was the single worst atrocity during the war and in Europe since World War II. The Betrayal of Srebrenica: The Ten-Year Commemoration, with photographs by New York City human rights photographer Paula Allen, focuses on the July 11, 2005 commemoration of Srebrenica, which was attended by over 30,000 survivors and their supporters. The exhibit comprises photographs of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, the survivors, the activities of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), and key aspects of the commemoration. The text panels accompanying the photographs feature quotes by survivors, journalists, United Nations officials, Bosnian Serb political officials and military commanders, and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) judges. The article discusses how the author conceptualized and organized this exhibit as a public history project.

Sućeska is a physio-geographical and anthropogeographical area in the northwestern part of the Srebrenica municipality. In the narrow sense, this area is bordered by Zeleni Jadar river canyon in the south and the valley of the Bukovica river in the north. In a broader sense, the area of Sućeska includes the area between the upper basin of the Potočari River, in the north, and plateau of Podravnje, in the south. The western border is the valley of the river Zeleni Jadar, and in the east it is the area of springs of the Kazani river and Kutlicka river. These boundaries of the Sućeska region should be taken on a conditional basis, because in the defining boundaries of an area should also be consider the anthropogeographical features of the area, such as the historical development of the area, ethno-geographical and cultural-geographical features, then the sense of mutual affiliation to some geographical area, etc. In the Middle Ages, area of Sućeska belonged to the Trebotići parish, with a much larger area, which included a large part of the upper and middle river flow of the river Zeleni Jadar.Taking into account cultural, ethnographic and historical facts, the geographic area of Sućeska includes the following inhabited places: Bostahovine, Brakovci, Bučinovići, Bučje, Kutuzero, Lipovac, Opetci, Podgaj, Podosoje, Slatina, Staroglavice, Sućeska i Žedanjsko. The area of Sućeska is approximately 64.3 square kilometers and covers the territory of thirteen populated places in the northwestern part of the municipality of Srebrenica. According to the population census of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991, there were 638 households in the area of Sućeska, with an average size of 5.1 members, and a total population of 3,291 members, mostly Bosniaks ethnicity. According to the latest census of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted in 2013, 1,475 people (757 women) lived in Sucesska, of which 1,461 Bosniak people (751 women). The paper presents the most important demographic consequences of war suffering of Bosniaks, in the area of Sućeska, in the municipality of Srebrenica, particulary during the genocide in so called "UN Safe Area of Srebrenica" , in July 1995. During the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, 118 Bosniak were killed, including 33 of the female, of the average age of 38.1 years. The average age of killed men was 36.4 years. Number of the widows whose husbands were killed is 50, with 111 children orphans, with an average age of 10.6 years. During the genocide, 619 people were killed, including 9 women, with the average age of 60.1 years. The average age of killed men, the victims of genocide, was 35.6 years. Number of the widows whose husbands were killed is 383, with 624 children orphans, with an average age of 7.9 years. Until today, there are less than 500 Bosniaks living in the area of Sućeska, and more than 600 people whose living outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly in the United States of America.

AbstractIn the decision on the second Genocide case (Croatia v. Serbia) the ICJ did not deviate from its ruling of 2007 (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) in matters of evidence. A comparison between the two cases nevertheless shows subtle but interesting nuances. Whereas in the first Genocide case the Court was confronted with a ICTY finding that a genocide had indeed been committed in Srebrenica in July 1995, in the present case the ICTY Prosecutor had not even indicted any Serbian or Croatian organ of such a crime. The ICJ was able to find the actus reus of genocide in many instances, both on the part of Serbia and Croatia, but it found that neither party had been able to prove the existence of the mens rea, either by relying on a pattern of conduct, or even by relying on the transcript of a governmental meeting. This throws a disquieting light on the actual capacity of the Court to deal with claims of commission of genocide, as distinguished from claims of lack of prevention or repression.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has filed an Indictment (originally July 25, 1995, and an operational Indictment on October 19, 2009) against Radovan Karadzic, the former President of Republika Srpska and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Republika Srpska. After many years of hiding in Serbia, Karadzic was arrested on July 21, 2008, and transferred to the ICTY on July 30 of that year. The trial began on 26 October 2009. Radovan Karadzic is charged for genocide (Counts 1 and 2); crimes against humanity: persecution (count 3), extermination (count 4), murder (count 5), deportation (count 7), inhumane acts - forcible transfer (count 8); and violations of the laws or customs of war: murder (count 6), terrorism (count 9), unlawful attacks on civilians (count 10), hostage-taking (count 11). Radovan Karadzic has been charged with individual criminal responsibility in accordance with Rule 7 (1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal through his participation in several joint criminal enterprises (JCEs). According to the Indictment, no later than October 1991 to November 30, 1995, Karadzic participated in a JCE aimed at the permanent removal of Bosniaks and Croats from certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina; from April 1992 to November 1995, he participated in the JCE to launch and conduct a campaign of sniping and shelling of the civilian population of Sarajevo, aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population; from July 1995 until 1 November 1995, he participated in the JCE of the elimination of Bosniaks in Srebrenica, by killing men and boys, as well as forcibly expelling women, children and the elderly from the area; and for participated in the JCE of taking members of the United Nations hostage during May and June 1995. Pursuant to Article 7 (3) of the Statute, the Indictment charges him with superior responsibility because he knew or had reason to know that forces under his effective control were being prepared to commit crimes or have already committed them, and has not taken measures to prevent the commission of crimes or to punish the perpetrators of those crimes. On June 11, 2012, Karadzic filed a motion for acquittal on all counts of the Indictment. Pursuant to Rule 98bis, on 28 June 2012, the Trial Chamber rendered a Decision dismissing the motion for acquittal on ten counts of the Indictment, but acquitted Count 1 of the Indictment relating to genocide committed in certain municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bratunac, Foca, Kljuc, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica and Zvornik. This count of the Indictment alleges that Karadzic is responsible for the genocide as a superior, and that in agreement with others he committed, planned, instigated, ordered and/or aided and abetted the genocide. Following the Prosecution's appeal against the decision to exclude Count 1 from the Indictment, on 11 July 2013 the Appeals Chamber quashed the Trial Chamber's decision and returned Count 1 of the Indictment charging Karadzic with genocide in the said municipalities, and the proceedings continued before the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber's verdict against Radovan Karadzic was handed down on March 24, 2016, sentencing him to 40 years in prison for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war. In 6,073 paragraphs is explained the role of the RS Army, as well as police structures, territorial defense, and regional and municipal authorities and other participants in joint criminal enterprises. The forms and methods of committing crimes committed in the municipalities of Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Foča, Rogatica, Sokolac, Višegrad, Vlasenica and Zvornik in eastern Bosnia are described; Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, Ključ, Prijedor and Sanski Most in the Autonomous Region of Krajina (“ARK”); Hadžići, Ilidža, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale and Vogošća in the area of Sarajevo, and precise ways of carrying out a comprehensive joint criminal enterprise, but also joint criminal enterprises related to Srebrenica (genocide), Sarajevo (terrorizing citizens with sniper fire and shelling), and hostage-taking (UNPROFOR international peacekeepers). The first-instance verdict found Karadzic guilty of 10 of the 11 counts in the indictment. Both the Prosecution and the Defense for the Accused appealed the Trial Chamber's judgment, and the second-instance proceedings continued. On March 20, 2019, the Appeals Chamber issued a final verdict sentencing Radovan Karadžić to life imprisonment. The verdict found him guilty of persecution from a territory that Bosnian Serbs considered to be claiming the right, sniping and shelling of Sarajevo, taking UNPROFOR members hostage and genocide in Srebrenica. Both Trial and Appeals Chambers acquitted Karadzic of genocide committed in seven Bosnian municipalities (Bratunac, Foca, Kljuc, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica and Zvornik) committed in 1992.

The whole of the soceites havehappiness and proudly remembered events in the past, at the same time that has got the period is remembered with pain and sorrow.The grief of that event to visit the places now, search for the traces of the historical background, nationality, religion or community to share the pain of the cultural ties that desire has led to the grief tourism today. Tourism literature; dark, grief, thane, morbid, death, war and so on. grief associated with names tourism, has been used in the marketing of a new type of tourism destinations as a travel motivation.The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992-1995 year in Europe. That is the greatest human tragedy after the Second World war Indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina, There was an ethnic cleansing and genocide and 26.02. 2007 International Court of Justice massacres committed against Bosniaks in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been described as genocide. Although tourism has significant potential, Bosnia and Herzegovina's state system accommodates a problem in terms of griefness tourism. The Bosnian Serb Republic and the grief of local governments in the region in terms of tourism activity seen in front of or opposed to symbolic elements. In this context, our work; primarily related literature scanning, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be given conceptual information about the traces of war, then griefness in the document of Bosnia and Herzegovina tourism centers will be evaluated on the basis of photos and observations. It will also focus on the importance and differences in comparison with the grief came into prominence in world tourism destinations. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina, grief tourism potential of putting forward for Bosnia and Herzegovina will be presented recommendations for addressing the importance and contribution.

Cooking and Dining in Times of War and Peace: Changing Contexts and Modes of Food Production, Preparation and Consumption in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mgr. Markéta Slavková Abstract (English) This project opens up the topic of armed conflict and subsequent post-conflict development in the Former Yugoslavia from a non-traditional perspective - that of the anthropology of food. At the centre of attention there stand the ways in which the production, preparation and consumption of food were and are carried out in Srebrenica, BiH in the context of the dramatic changes that the region has undergone over the last few decades. Food is the precondition of reproduction, a primary form of interaction with the world, a mediator of socialization, a sign of identity and social cohesion but also a tool of power. In this sense, Farquhar notes that the "mantra" 'You are what you eat,' continues to be thematized by social sciences (Farquhar, 2006: 146). On the other hand, the question of the relationship between social actors and their "daily bread" in conditions of starvation and overall material scarcity in wartime has not been satisfyingly answered. This project, based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork, addresses these issues more closely, affording greater insight into them.

This chapter focuses on how the massacre of 8,700 Bosniak men and boys in Srebrenica in June in 1995 caused a major change in the Clinton administration's Bosnia policy. It examines Clinton's shift from restraint towards limited intervention through Operation Deliberate Force, showing how the massacre at Srebrenica rekindled narratives likening the atrocities to the Holocaust. Images of the cruelty, along with the vision of dead and dying Bosnians gave these narratives tremendous power. Such principled ideas were driven by Madeline Albright, Anthony Lake, and in particular Al Gore's powerful, symbolic appeal: ‘What am I supposed to tell [my daughter]?’ if the US were to maintain a position of indifference. The massacre made it clear that US policy towards Bosnia had not only become ineffective but was doing significant damage to the administration's credibility — undermining their capacity to manage other foreign policy issues. The fall of Srebrenica served to reframe the debate on Bosnia by providing a moment of crisis and spurring principled interpretations yielding normative displacement which would override more refined cognitive interpretations.

In the case of the Bosnian War (1992-1995), international participation has just maintained interethnic peace with limited success. Peace-keeping strategies implemented without consensus subsequently set up an environment in which ethnic cleansings transformed into genocide in UN “Safe Areas.” According to the World Bank’s (2004) reports, following the end of military conflict late 1995, of a pre-war population of 4.4 million, an estimated 250,000 people had lost their lives or were considered missing, 200,000 to 400,000 people had been wounded, and an estimated 2.5 million people, more than half the population, either left the country as refugees or were internally displaced. Despite what has happened during the turmoil, the worst happened in Srebrenica, one of UN’s Security Zones, which was protected by Dutch soldiers. It is unknown how many people lost their lives in Srebrenica. According to Human Right Watch Reports, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was systematically planned and implemented by Serbian irregulars. This chapter illustrates the negative effects of dissolving interethnic peace in Bosnia. The case of Bosnian interethnic war is examined from the security matter to genocide.

When Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić was attacked on the 11th of July 2015 in Srebrenica on the day of the commemoration and burial of the victims of the genocide committed in that town in 1995, he characterized it as an assassination attempt. Furthermore, he stated that “hand of peace” that he was offering was rejected once more from the “Bosnian” side. Of course, he didn't mention that he, in the previous six months, together with Serbia's ally, Russia, advocated that the UN Security Council rejects the resolution that would call all sides to accept the final decisions of the ICTY and draw necessary lessons in regard of commemoration of the 20 years from the Srebrenica Genocide. He didn't mention that he is, along with the leaders of Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among those negating the Srebrenica Genocide (sarcastically calling it “grave crime”). He also did not mention his inflammatory rhetoric in the Parliament of Serbia in 1995 when during the events in Srebrenica he said “If you kill one Serb, we will kill 100 Muslims.”