Academic literature on the topic 'Statiskt mindset'

Reports of the Strange Death of Liberal America are greatly exaggerated. James Henretta's essay of that title offers a shrewd and insightful portrait of Charles Evans Hughes. But the liberalism whose death Henretta reports did not die. And the “statist,” “centralization,” “economic planning,” and broad “social insurance” minded liberalism he reports as prevailing did not prevail. From a certain lofty altitude (and rueful attitude), all “big,” “modern” “welfare states” look the same. That is Henretta's viewpoint. His wonderfully suggestive comparative framework has as one of its premises that America and England proceeded along the administrative-and-welfare-state-building path at different paces but arrived at the same destination. For me, a comparison of the law and politics, processes and outcomes of twentieth-century state-building in the U.S. and England prompts different conclusions. There were conspicuous differences between the New Deal state that was fashioned in 1930s and '40s America and the welfare state England created in those decades. More interestingly, the ideology and institutional contours of this new American state were deeply influenced by that ambivalent (and lawyerly) brand of American liberalism Henretta rightly attributes to figures such as Hughes and Roscoe Pound—poised between “progressive” commitments to social reform, social provision, and administrative-state-building, on the one hand, and older, “classical” liberal commitments to limited (and decentralized, dual federalist) government and the primacy of courts and common law and traditional legal and constitutional niceties, on the other. My notion is that this “transitional” and “forgotten” liberalism and its champions won more important battles than they lost against their “statist” rivals. A “strange death,” indeed!

The millennium to which my title refers is that of the Christianisation of Russia, which took place in 988, and which was recently celebrated the world over, not least in newly broad-minded Russia herself. And yet the designation is somewhat imprecise: the millennium was really that of a sovereign's baptism. After considering and rejecting Judaism and Islam (so the legend goes), the Great Prince Vladimir of Kiev embraced the Christian faith and established it as a state religion – the statiest state religion that ever was (or is: the situation has been updated under the Soviets, but not fundamentally changed). The distinction is necessary if the subject of these remarks is to have any meaning at all, and it will also help explain why there is relatively little to say about it.

This article studies a sixteenth-century sufi taz̠kirāt (biographical dictionary), Ak̲h̲bār al-Ak̲h̲yār written by ‘Abd al-Haqq Muhaddis Dehlawi (1551–1642), an ‘ālim (scholar), who was also a sufi. The text is frequently cited as the earliest, most comprehensive and reliable biographical compilation of South Asian sufis and ‘ulamā’ (learned men in religious sciences) from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Indeed ‘Abd al-Haqq is best remembered for his scholasticism as a mūḥaddis̤ (a person well-versed in Prophetic traditions) which is also supposed to have made him into a rather staid scholar of Sufism. But what of him in his own society of elite Muslim intellectuals in the early seventeenth century? ‘Abd al-Haqq was networked into the elite circles of the Mughal court, but he stayed away from Mughal patronage, communicating his ambivalence regarding its political experiments by espousing alternative paradigms. My article studies the structure of the Ak̲h̲bār al-Ak̲h̲yār to comprehend how a Muslim intellectual constructed a history of his peer group at a critical juncture in the making of Mughal authority. My article follows a prosopographical methodology to explore the innovative structure of the Ak̲h̲bār al-Ak̲h̲yār and its complex projection of the past of the piety-minded in Hindustan. As I argue, the Ak̲h̲bār al-Ak̲h̲yār is a carefully structured, remarkable history of sufis and their networks, providing them with contexts and significance that questioned both, inherited paradigms of moral authority present in the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century sufi texts as well as those emerging in the statist renditions of the past from the courts of the Mughal emperors Akbar and Jahangir.

Nedfarten til DødsrigetAf A.M. AllchinDer ligger for A.M. Allchin en dybere betydning gemt i det forhold, at Joakim Skovgaards maleri Kristus i de dødes Rige til udstillingen Sjælebilleder blev hentet op i lyset efter i mange år at have været opbevaret i kælderens magasiner i dyb glemsel. Ikke blot var billedet gemt væk, men dets motiv havde forekommet mange at v.re udtryk for noget underligt og aparte, noget tilsyneladende fremmedartet i forhold til kirkelig kristendom.Men for en nærmere betragtning af Skovgaards billede i forhold til den kirkelige tradition forholder det sig i virkeligheden modsat, påpeger Allchin. Hvis man søger tilbage til vidnesbyrd om den kristne tradition i det første årtusinde, vil man kunne finde markante udtryk for, at netop nedfartsmotivet hørte sammen med de centrale bestanddele af kirkens tro.I den østkirkelige, ortodokse tradition vil man således umiddelbart sætte Kristi helvedesstorm og befrielse af de fangne i forbindelse med selve opstandelsesbudskabet. Dette fundamentale forhold indgår endnu i dag p. markant m.de i den ortodokse kirkes påskeliturgi, når det hedder: Kristus er opst.et fra de d.de, idet han trådte døden under fode, hvorved han gav liv til de d.de i gravene. Det centrale i påskebudskabet er her dette, at opstandelsen er tolket som sejr over døden, og at denne sejr betyder liv for hele menneskeslægten.Skovgaards maleri skal ses og tolkes i denne sammenh.ng. Det betydningsfulde motiv hører uløseligt sammen med det universalistiske perspektiv: Kristi død og opstandelse som befrielse for hele skabningen. Hvor vigtige aspekter af påskebudskabet, der her står p. spil, vil fremgå, hvis man sammenholder sceneriet fra Skovgaards billede med den tolkning, der indgår i megen tidlig kristen kunst, mest i den østlige, men også i den vestlige kristenhed. Her er den opstandne Kristus ofte fremstillet i et dramatisk perspektiv: helten, den opstandne Frelser, stormer Helvedes porte, befrir de fangne og drager de d.de fra mærket, Adam og Eva, op til lys og liv.Ved nærmere betragtning viser Skovgaards billede sig at udtrykke samme tankegang. Kristus er nemlig ikke, som Allchin selv havde formodet, afbilledet statisk. Men den opstandne Herre ses som værende i bevægelse, p. vej hen imod de afdødes skare for at befri dem.Dette motiv, der af nogle har været betegnet som et sidetema i forhold til de centrale traditionselementer i den bibelske tradition, er i virkeligheden i pagt med de allermest afgørende lag i den tidligste forkyndelse, proklamationen af opstandelsen som skaberværkets genlæsning, påsken som dette at menneskeheden på ny får skænket adgang til at tr.de frem for Guds ansigt i paradishaven.Når vi rejser spørgsmålet, hvorpå det da beror, at Skovgaard fandt vej tilbage til denne urkristne t.nkem.de, selvom den havde v.ret tr.ngt i baggrunden i megen t.nkning, ogs. i det 19. årh.s Danmark, hvor Skovgaard voksede op, s. er svaret helt klart, at det skyldes indflydelsen fra Grundtvig.Allchin henviser til, således som han udførligere har udfoldet det i sin store indføring i Grundtvig, at denne forståelse af påskebegivenhedeme indgår som en hovedbestanddel af Grundtvigs forkyndelse i prædikenerne. Og det påpeges endvidere, med henvisning til S.A.J. Bradleys forskning om forbindelseslinjerne mellem Grundtvig og den oldengelske digtning, at Grundtvig havde som programmatisk ønske at g.re dette motiv til en hovedsag, og derved bringe det tilbage fra den glemsel, som kirke og teologi i århundrederne forud havde bragt det i. Ikke mindst Grundtvigs fremhævelse af Eva og Maria inden for rammerne af de frelses historiske krydshenvisninger mellem Paradishaven og Kristi budskab, rummer et tydeligt udtryk for dette grundsyn.Således skal Skovgaards billede Kristus nedfart til Dødsriget retteligt forstås i lyset af den årtusindegammel tradition. Interessant er det, at Jakob Knudsen p. sin side havde sans for ganske samme grundforhold og berettede om det som noget, han havde flet fortalt af sin moder.

Most politically minded Kurds agree that their people need liberty. Moreover, they agree they need liberation from the domination they suffer from the four states that divide them: Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. What is less certain is the precise nature of this liberty. A key debate that characterizes Kurdish political discourse is over whether the liberty they seek requires the existence of an independent Kurdish nation-state. Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed intellectual leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), has argued that Kurdish liberty can only be achieved through liberation from the nation-state model itself. Instead of founding an independent Kurdistan, Öcalan proposes regional autonomy for the Kurds through a strictly egalitarian and directly democratic confederalism reminiscent of Murray Bookchin’s anarchist-inspired libertarian municipalism. We argue, in response to Öcalan’s approach, that employing an anarchist rejection of the state is largely mistaken. We diagnose certain historical and conceptual problems with the anarchist understanding of the state and develop the admission made in passing by certain anarchists, including Öcalan, that anarchist liberty could only be achieved after a long period of statist existence. Mostly counter to the anarchist model of non-domination, we propose a republican model of liberty and liberation, also as non-domination, that necessitates the formation of an independent state, at least in this historical period, for Kurds and hence any dominated people to count as truly free. We conclude by attempting to combine certain elements of the anarchist and republican conceptions and offer a synthetic communitarian view that could serve as a better foundation for Kurdish aspirations for liberty.

We need a clear, unified, and consistent voice to effect the complete dismantling, the abolition, of the mechanisms of animal exploitation.And that will only come from what we say and do, no matter who we are.— Gary L. Francione, animal rights theoristThe history of hashtags is relatively short but littered with the remnants of corporate hashtags which may have seemed a good idea at the time within the confines of the boardroom. It is difficult to understand the rationale behind the use of hashtags as an effective communications tactic in 2019 by corporations when a quick stroll through their recent past leaves behind the much-derided #qantasluxury (Glance), #McDstories (Hill), and #myNYPD (Tran).While hashtags have an obvious purpose in bringing together like-minded publics and facilitating conversation (Kwye et al. 1), they have also regularly been the subject of “hashtag takeovers” by activists and other interested parties, and even by trolls, as the Ecological Society of Australia found in 2015 when their seemingly innocuous #ESA15 hashtag was taken over with pornographic images (news.com.au). Hashtag takeovers have also been used as a dubious marketing tactic, where smaller and less well-known brands tag their products with trending hashtags such as #iphone in order to boost their audience (Social Garden). Hashtags are increasingly used as a way for activists or other interested parties to disrupt a message. It is, I argue, predictable that any hashtag related to an even slightly controversial topic will be subject to some form of activist hashtag takeover, with varying degrees of success.That veganism and the dairy industry should attract such conflict is unsurprising given that the two are natural enemies, with vegans in particular seeming to anticipate and actively engage in the battle for the opposing hashtag.Using a comparative analysis of the #Veganuary and #Februdairy hashtags and how they have been used by both pro-vegan and pro-dairy social media users, this article illustrates that the enthusiastic and well-meaning social media efforts of farmers and dairy supporters have so far been unable to counteract those of well-organised and equally passionate vegan activists. This analysis compares tweets in the first week of the respective campaigns, concluding that organisations, industries and their representatives should be extremely wary of engaging said activists who are not only highly-skilled but are also highly-motivated. Grassroots, ideology-driven activism is a formidable opponent in any public space, let alone when it takes place on the outspoken and unstructured landscape of social media which is sometimes described as the “wild West” (Fitch 5) where anything goes and authenticity and plain-speaking is key (Macnamara 12).I Say Hashtag, You Say Bashtag#Februdairy was launched in 2018 to promote the benefits of dairy. The idea was first mooted on Twitter in 2018 by academic Dr Jude Capper, a livestock sustainability consultant, who called for “28 days, 28 positive dairy posts” (@Bovidiva; Howell). It was a response to the popular Veganuary campaign which aimed to “inspire people to try vegan for January and throughout the rest of the year”, a campaign which had gained significant traction both online and in the traditional media since its inception in 2014 (Veganuary). Hopes were high: “#Februdairy will be one month of dairy people posting, liking and retweeting examples of what we do and why we do it” (Yates). However, the #Februdairy hashtag has been effectively disrupted and has now entered the realm of a bashtag, a hashtag appropriated by activists for their own purpose (Austin and Jin 341).The Dairy Industry (Look Out the Vegans Are Coming)It would appear that the dairy industry is experiencing difficulties in public perception. While milk consumption is declining, sales of plant-based milks are increasing (Kaiserman) and a growing body of health research has questioned whether dairy products and milk in particular do in fact “do a body good” (Saccaro; Harvard Milk Study). In the 2019 review of Canada’s food guide, its first revision since 2007, for instance, the focus is now on eating plant-based foods with dairy’s former place significantly downgraded. Dairy products no longer have their own distinct section and are instead placed alongside other proteins including lentils (Pippus).Nevertheless, the industry has persevered with its traditional marketing and public relations activities, choosing to largely avoid addressing animal welfare concerns brought to light by activists. They have instead focused their message towards countering concerns about the health benefits of milk. In the US, the Milk Processing Education Program’s long-running celebrity-driven Got Milk campaign has been updated with Milk Life, a health focused campaign, featuring images of children and young people living an active lifestyle and taking part in activities such as skateboarding, running, and playing basketball (Milk Life). Interestingly, and somewhat inexplicably, Milk Life’s home page features the prominent headline, “How Milk Can Bring You Closer to Your Loved Ones”.It is somewhat reflective of the current trend towards veganism that tennis aces Serena and Venus Williams, both former Got Milk ambassadors, are now proponents for the plant-based lifestyle, with Venus crediting her newly-adopted vegan diet as instrumental in her recovery from an auto-immune disease (Mango).The dairy industry’s health focus continues in Australia, as well as the use of the word love, with former AFL footballer Shane Crawford—the face of the 2017 campaign Milk Loves You Back, from Lion Dairy and Drinks—focusing on reminding Australians of the reputed nutritional benefits of milk (Dawson).Dairy Australia meanwhile launched their Legendairy campaign with a somewhat different focus, promoting and lauding Australia’s dairy families, and with a message that stated, in a nod to the current issues, that “Australia’s dairy farmers and farming communities are proud, resilient and innovative” (Dairy Australia). This campaign could be perceived as a morale-boosting exercise, featuring a nation-wide search to find Australia’s most legendairy farming community (Dairy Australia). That this was also an attempt to humanise the industry seems obvious, drawing on established goodwill felt towards farmers (University of Cambridge). Again, however, this strategy did not address activists’ messages of suffering animals, factory farms, and newborn calves being isolated from their grieving mothers, and it can be argued that consumers are being forced to make the choice between who (or what) they care about more: animals or the people making their livelihoods from them.Large-scale campaigns like Legendairy which use traditional channels are of course still vitally important in shaping public opinion, with statistics from 2016 showing 85.1% of Australians continue to watch free-to-air television (Roy Morgan, “1 in 7”). However, a focus and, arguably, an over-reliance on traditional platforms means vegans and animal activists are often unchallenged when spreading their message via social media. Indeed, when we consider the breakdown in age groups inherent in these statistics, with 18.8% of 14-24 year-olds not watching any commercial television at all, an increase from 7% in 2008 (Roy Morgan, “1 in 7”), it is a brave and arguably short-sighted organisation or industry that relies primarily on traditional channels to spread their message in 2019. That these large-scale campaigns do little to address the issues raised by vegans concerning animal welfare leaves these claims largely unanswered and momentum to grow.This growth in momentum is fuelled by activist groups such as the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) who are well-known in this space, with 5,494,545 Facebook followers, 1.06 million Twitter followers, 973,000 Instagram followers, and 453,729 You Tube subscribers (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). They are also active on Pinterest, a visual-based platform suited to the kinds of images and memes particularly detrimental to the dairy industry. Although widely derided, PETA’s reach is large. A graphic video posted to Facebook on February 13 2019 and showing a suffering cow, captioned “your cheese is not worth this” was shared 1,244 times, and had 4.6 million views in just over 24 hours (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). With 95% of 12-24 year olds in Australia now using social networking sites (Statista), it is little wonder veganism is rapidly growing within this demographic (Bradbury), with The Guardian labelling the rise of veganism unstoppable (Hancox).Activist organisations are joined by prominent and charismatic vegan activists such as James Aspey (182,000 Facebook followers) and Earthling Ed (205,000 Facebook followers) in distributing information and images that are influential and often highly graphic or disturbing. Meanwhile Instagram influencers and You Tube lifestyle vloggers such as Ellen Fisher and FreeLee share information promoting vegan food and the vegan lifestyle (with 650,320 and 785,903 subscribers respectively). YouTube video Dairy Is Scary has over 5 million views (Janus) and What the Health, a follow-up documentary to Cowspiracy: The Sustainability Secret, promoting veganism, is now available on Netflix, which itself has 9.8 million Australian subscribers (Roy Morgan, “Netflix”). BOSH’s plant-based vegan cookbook was the fastest selling cookbook of 2018 (Chiorando).Additionally, the considerable influence of celebrities such as Miley Cyrus, Beyonce, Alicia Silverstone, Zac Efron, and Jessica Chastain, to name just a few, speaking publicly about their vegan lifestyle, encourages veganism to become mainstream and increases its widespread acceptance.However not all the dairy industry’s ills can be blamed on vegans. Rising costs, cheap imports, and other pressures (Lockhart, Donaghy and Gow) have all placed pressure on the industry. Nonetheless, in the battle for hearts and minds on social media, the vegans are leading the way.Qualitative research interviewing new vegans found converting to veganism was relatively easy, yet some respondents reported having to consult multiple resources and required additional support and education on how to be vegan (McDonald 17).Enter VeganuaryUsing a month, week or day to promote an idea or campaign, is a common public relations and marketing strategy, particularly in health communications. Dry July and Ocsober both promote alcohol abstinence, Frocktober raises funds for ovarian cancer, and Movember is an annual campaign raising awareness and funds for men’s health (Parnell). Vegans Matthew Glover and Jane Land were discussing the success of Movember when they raised the idea of creating a vegan version. Their initiative, Veganuary, urging people to try vegan for the month of January, launched in 2014 and since then 500,000 people have taken the Veganuary pledge (Veganuary).The Veganuary website is the largest of its kind on the internet. With vegan recipes, expert advice and information, it provides all the answers to Why go vegan, but it is the support offered to answer How to go vegan that truly sets Veganuary apart. (Veganuary)That Veganuary participants would use social media to discuss and share their experiences was a foregone conclusion. Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram are all utilised by participants, with the official Veganuary pages currently followed/liked by 159,000 Instagram followers, receiving 242,038 Facebook likes, and 45,600 Twitter followers (Veganuary). Both the Twitter and Instagram sites make effective use of hashtags to spread their reach, not only using #Veganuary but also other relevant hashtags such as #TryVegan, #VeganRecipes, and the more common #Vegan, #Farm, and #SaveAnimals.Februdairy Follows Veganuary, But Only on the CalendarCalling on farmers and dairy producers to create counter content and their own hashtag may have seemed like an idea that would achieve an overall positive response.Agricultural news sites and bloggers spread the word and even the BBC reported on the industry’s “fight back” against Veganuary (BBC). However the hashtag was quickly overwhelmed with anti-dairy activists mobilising online. Vegans issued a call to arms across social media. The Vegans in Australia Facebook group featured a number of posts urging its 58,949 members to “thunderclap” the Februdairy hashtag while the Project Calf anti-dairy campaign declared that Februdairy offered an “easy” way to spread their information (Sandhu).Februdairy farmers and dairy supporters were encouraged to tell their stories, sharing positive photographs and videos, and they did. However this content was limited. In this tweet (fig. 1) the issue of a lack of diverse content was succinctly addressed by an anti-Februdairy activist.Fig. 1: Content challenges. (#Februdairy, 2 Feb. 2019)MethodUtilising Twitter’s advanced search capability, I was able to search for #Veganuary tweets from 1 to 7 January 2019 and #Februdairy tweets from 1 to 7 February 2019. I analysed the top tweets provided by Twitter in terms of content, assessed whether the tweet was pro or anti Veganuary and Februdairy, and also categorised its content in terms of subject matter.Tweets were analysed to assess whether they were on message and aligned with the values of their associated hashtag. Veganuary tweets were considered to be on message if they promoted veganism or possessed an anti-dairy, anti-meat, or pro-animal sentiment. Februdairy tweets were assessed as on message if they promoted the consumption of dairy products, expressed sympathy or empathy towards the dairy industry, or possessed an anti-vegan sentiment. Tweets were also evaluated according to their clarity, emotional impact and coherence. The overall effectiveness of the hashtag was then evaluated based on the above criteria as well as whether they had been hijacked.Results and FindingsOverwhelmingly, the 213 #Veganuary tweets were on message. That is they were pro-Veganuary, supportive of veganism, and positive. The topics were varied and included humorous memes, environmental facts, information about the health benefits of veganism, as well as a strong focus on animals. The number of non-graphic tweets (12) concerning animals was double that of tweets featuring graphic or shocking imagery (6). Predominantly the tweets were focused on food and the sharing of recipes, with 44% of all pro #Veganuary tweets featuring recipes or images of food. Interestingly, a number of well-known corporations tweeted to promote their vegan food products, including Tesco, Aldi, Iceland, and M&S. The diversity of veganism is reflected in the tweets. Organisations used the hashtag to promote their products, including beauty and shoe products, social media influencers promoted their vegan podcasts and blogs, and, interestingly, the Ethiopian Embassy of the United Kingdom tweeted their support.There were 23 (11%) anti-Veganuary tweets. Of these, one was from Dr. Jude Capper, the founder of Februdairy. The others expressed support for farming and farmers, and a number were photographs of meat products, including sausages and fry-ups. One Australian journalist tweeted in favour of meat, stating it was yummy murder. These tweets could be described as entertaining and may perhaps serve as a means of preaching to the converted, but their ability to influence and persuade is negligible.Twitter’s search tool provided access to 141 top #Februdairy tweets. Of these 82 (52%) were a hijack of the hashtag and overtly anti-Februdairy. Vegan activists used the #Februdairy hashtag to their advantage with most of their tweets (33%) featuring non-graphic images of animals. They also tweeted about other subject matters, including environmental concerns, vegan food and products, and health issues related to dairy consumption.As noted by the activists (see fig. 1 above), most of the pro-Februdairy tweets were images of milk or dairy products (41%). Images of farms and farmers were the next most used (26%), followed by images of cows (17%) (see fig. 2). Fig. 2: An activist makes their anti-Februdairy point with a clear, engaging image and effective use of hashtags. (#Februdairy, 6 Feb. 2019)The juxtaposition between many of the tweets was also often glaring, with one contrasting message following another (see fig. 3). Fig. 3: An example of contrasting #Februdairy tweets with an image used by the activists to good effect, making their point known. (#Februdairy, 2 Feb. 2019)Storytelling is a powerful tool in public relations and marketing efforts. Yet, to be effective, high-quality content is required. That many of the Februdairy proponents had limited social media training was evident; images were blurred, film quality was poor, or they failed to make their meaning clear (see fig. 4). Fig. 4: A blurred photograph, reflective of some of the low-quality content provided by Februdairy supporters. (#Februdairy, 3 Feb. 2019)This image was tweeted in support of Februdairy. However the image and phrasing could also be used to argue against Februdairy. We can surmise that the tweeter was suggesting the cow was well looked after and seemingly content, but overall the message is as unclear as the image.While some pro-Februdairy supporters recognised the need for relevant hashtags, often their images were of a low-quality and not particularly engaging, a requirement for social media success. This requirement seems to be better understood by anti-Februdairy activists who used high-quality images and memes to create interest and gain the audience’s attention (see figs. 5 and 6). Fig. 5: An uninspiring image used to promote Februdairy. (#Februdairy, 6 Feb. 2019) Fig. 6: Anti-Februdairy activists made good use of memes, recognising the need for diverse content. (#Februdairy, 3 Feb. 2019)DiscussionWhat the #Februdairy case makes clear, then, is that in continuing its focus on traditional media, the dairy industry has left the battle online to largely untrained, non-social media savvy supporters.From a purely public relations perspective, one of the first things we ask our students to do in issues and crisis communication is to assess the risk. “What can hurt your organisation?” we ask. “What potential issues are on the horizon and what can you do to prevent them?” This is PR101 and it is difficult to understand why environmental scanning and resulting action has not been on the radar of the dairy industry long before now. It seems they have not fully anticipated or have significantly underestimated the emerging issue that public perception, animal cruelty, health concerns, and, ultimately, veganism has had on their industry and this is to their detriment. In Australia in 2015–16 the dairy industry was responsible for 8 per cent (A$4.3 billion) of the gross value of agricultural production and 7 per cent (A$3 billion) of agricultural export income (Department of Agriculture and Water Resources). When such large figures are involved and with so much at stake, it is hard to rationalise the decision not to engage in a more proactive online strategy, seeking to engage their publics, including, whether they like it or not, activists.Instead there are current attempts to address these issues with a legislative approach, lobbying for the introduction of ag-gag laws (Potter), and the limitation of terms such as milk and cheese (Worthington). However, these measures are undertaken while there is little attempt to engage with activists or to effectively counter their claims with a widespread authentic public relations campaign, and reflects a failure to understand the nature of the current online environment, momentum, and mood.That is not to say that the dairy industry is not operating in the online environment, but it does not appear to be a priority, and this is reflected in their low engagement and numbers of followers. For instance, Dairy Australia, the industry’s national service body, has a following of only 8,281 on Facebook, 6,981 on Twitter, and, crucially, they are not on Instagram. Their Twitter posts do not include hashtags and unsurprisingly they have little engagement on this platform with most tweets attracting no more than two likes. Surprisingly they have 21,013 subscribers on YouTube which featured professional and well-presented videos. This demonstrates some understanding of the importance of effective storytelling but not, as yet, trans-media storytelling.ConclusionSocial media activism is becoming more important and recognised as a legitimate voice in the public sphere. Many organisations, perhaps in recognition of this as well as a growing focus on responsible corporate behaviour, particularly in the treatment of animals, have adjusted their behaviour. From Unilever abandoning animal testing practices to ensure Dove products are certified cruelty free (Nussbaum), to Domino’s introducing vegan options, companies who are aware of emerging trends and values are changing the way they do business and are reaping the benefits of engaging with, and catering to, vegans. Domino’s sold out of vegan cheese within the first week and vegans were asked to phone ahead to their local store, so great was the demand. From their website:We knew the response was going to be big after the demand we saw for the product on social media but we had no idea it was going to be this big. (Domino’s Newsroom)As a public relations professional, I am baffled by the dairy industry’s failure to adopt a crisis-based strategy rather than largely rely on the traditional one-way communication that has served them well in the previous (golden?) pre-social media age. However, as a vegan, persuaded by the unravelling of the happy cow argument, I cannot help but hope this realisation continues to elude them.References@bovidiva. “Let’s Make #Februdairy Happen This Year. 28 Days, 28 Positive #dairy Posts. From Cute Calves and #cheese on Crumpets, to Belligerent Bulls and Juicy #beef #burgers – Who’s In?” Twitter post. 15 Jan. 2018. 1 Feb. 2019 <https://twitter.com/bovidiva/status/952910641840447488?lang=en>.Austin, Lucinda L., and Yan Jin. Social Media and Crisis Communication. New York: Routledge, 2018.Bradbury, Tod. “Data Shows Major Rise in Veganism among Young People.” Plant Based News 12 Oct. 2018. 10 Feb. 2019 <https://www.plantbasednews.org>.BBC. “Februdairy: The Dairy Industry Fights Back against Veganuary.” BBC.com 8 Feb. 2018. 1 Feb. 2019 <https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-42990941>.Campaign Brief. “Shane Crawford Stars in ‘Milk Loves You Back’ Work for Lion Dairy & Drinks via AJF Partnership.” Campaign Brief Australia 1 Jun. 2017. 12 Feb. 2019 <http://www.campaignbrief.com/2017/06/shane-crawford-stars-in-milk-l.html>.Chiorando, Maria. “BOSH!’s Vegan Cookbook Is Fastest Selling Cookery Title of 2018.” Plant Based News 26 April 2018. 18 Feb. 2019 <https://www.plantbasednews.org/post/bosh-s-vegan-cookbook-is-fastest-selling-cookery-title-of-2018>.Cowspiracy: The Sustainability Secret. Dir. Kip Anderson, and Keegan Kuhn. Appian Way, A.U.M. Films, First Spark Media, 2014.Dairy Australia. “About Legendairy Capital.” Legendairy.com.au, 2019. 12 Feb. 2019 <http://www.legendairy.com.au/dairy-talk/capital-2017/about-us>.Dawson, Abigail. “Lion Dairy & Drinks Launches Campaign to Make Milk Matter Again.” Mumbrella 1 Jun. 2017. 10 Feb 2019 <https://mumbrella.com.au/lion-dairy-drinks-launches-campaign-make-milk-matter-448581>.Department of Agriculture and Water Resources. “Dairy Industry.” Australian Government. 21 Sep. 2018. 20 Feb. 2019 <http://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/surveys/dairy>.Domino’s Newsroom. “Meltdown! 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Introduction This article is a study in anxiety with regard to social online spaces (SOS) conceived of as dark. There are two possible ways to define ‘dark’ in this context. The first is that communication is dark because it either has limited distribution, is not open to all users (closed groups are a case example) or hidden. The second definition, linked as a result of the first, is the way that communication via these means is interpreted and understood. Dark social spaces disrupt the accepted top-down flow by the ‘gazing elite’ (data aggregators including social media), but anxious users might need to strain to notice what is out there, and this in turn destabilises one’s reception of the scene. In an environment where surveillance technologies are proliferating, this article examines contemporary, dark, interconnected, and interactive communications for the entangled affordances that might be brought to bear. A provocation is that resistance through counterveillance or “sousveillance” is one possibility. An alternative (or addition) is retreating to or building ‘dark’ spaces that are less surveilled and (perhaps counterintuitively) less fearful. This article considers critically the notion of dark social online spaces via four broad socio-technical concerns connected to the big social media services that have helped increase a tendency for fearful anxiety produced by surveillance and the perceived implications for personal privacy. It also shines light on the aspect of darkness where some users are spurred to actively seek alternative, dark social online spaces. Since the 1970s, public-key cryptosystems typically preserved security for websites, emails, and sensitive health, government, and military data, but this is now reduced (Williams). We have seen such systems exploited via cyberattacks and misappropriated data acquired by affiliations such as Facebook-Cambridge Analytica for targeted political advertising during the 2016 US elections. Via the notion of “parasitic strategies”, such events can be described as news/information hacks “whose attack vectors target a system’s weak points with the help of specific strategies” (von Nordheim and Kleinen-von Königslöw, 88). In accord with Wilson and Serisier’s arguments (178), emerging technologies facilitate rapid data sharing, collection, storage, and processing wherein subsequent “outcomes are unpredictable”. This would also include the effect of acquiescence. In regard to our digital devices, for some, being watched overtly—through cameras encased in toys, computers, and closed-circuit television (CCTV) to digital street ads that determine the resonance of human emotions in public places including bus stops, malls, and train stations—is becoming normalised (McStay, Emotional AI). It might appear that consumers immersed within this Internet of Things (IoT) are themselves comfortable interacting with devices that record sound and capture images for easy analysis and distribution across the communications networks. A counter-claim is that mainstream social media corporations have cultivated a sense of digital resignation “produced when people desire to control the information digital entities have about them but feel unable to do so” (Draper and Turow, 1824). Careful consumers’ trust in mainstream media is waning, with readers observing a strong presence of big media players in the industry and are carefully picking their publications and public intellectuals to follow (Mahmood, 6). A number now also avoid the mainstream internet in favour of alternate dark sites. This is done by users with “varying backgrounds, motivations and participation behaviours that may be idiosyncratic (as they are rooted in the respective person’s biography and circumstance)” (Quandt, 42). By way of connection with dark internet studies via Biddle et al. (1; see also Lasica), the “darknet” is a collection of networks and technologies used to share digital content … not a separate physical network but an application and protocol layer riding on existing networks. Examples of darknets are peer-to-peer file sharing, CD and DVD copying, and key or password sharing on email and newsgroups. As we note from the quote above, the “dark web” uses existing public and private networks that facilitate communication via the Internet. Gehl (1220; see also Gehl and McKelvey) has detailed that this includes “hidden sites that end in ‘.onion’ or ‘.i2p’ or other Top-Level Domain names only available through modified browsers or special software. Accessing I2P sites requires a special routing program ... . Accessing .onion sites requires Tor [The Onion Router]”. For some, this gives rise to social anxiety, read here as stemming from that which is not known, and an exaggerated sense of danger, which makes fight or flight seem the only options. This is often justified or exacerbated by the changing media and communication landscape and depicted in popular documentaries such as The Social Dilemma or The Great Hack, which affect public opinion on the unknown aspects of internet spaces and the uses of personal data. The question for this article remains whether the fear of the dark is justified. Consider that most often one will choose to make one’s intimate bedroom space dark in order to have a good night’s rest. We might pleasurably escape into a cinema’s darkness for the stories told therein, or walk along a beach at night enjoying unseen breezes. Most do not avoid these experiences, choosing to actively seek them out. Drawing this thread, then, is the case made here that agency can also be found in the dark by resisting socio-political structural harms. 1. Digital Futures and Anxiety of the Dark Fear of the darkI have a constant fear that something's always nearFear of the darkFear of the darkI have a phobia that someone's always there In the lyrics to the song “Fear of the Dark” (1992) by British heavy metal group Iron Maiden is a sense that that which is unknown and unseen causes fear and anxiety. Holding a fear of the dark is not unusual and varies in degree for adults as it does for children (Fellous and Arbib). Such anxiety connected to the dark does not always concern darkness itself. It can also be a concern for the possible or imagined dangers that are concealed by the darkness itself as a result of cognitive-emotional interactions (McDonald, 16). Extending this claim is this article’s non-binary assertion that while for some technology and what it can do is frequently misunderstood and shunned as a result, for others who embrace the possibilities and actively take it on it is learning by attentively partaking. Mistakes, solecism, and frustrations are part of the process. Such conceptual theorising falls along a continuum of thinking. Global interconnectivity of communications networks has certainly led to consequent concerns (Turkle Alone Together). Much focus for anxiety has been on the impact upon social and individual inner lives, levels of media concentration, and power over and commercialisation of the internet. Of specific note is that increasing commercial media influence—such as Facebook and its acquisition of WhatsApp, Oculus VR, Instagram, CRTL-labs (translating movements and neural impulses into digital signals), LiveRail (video advertising technology), Chainspace (Blockchain)—regularly changes the overall dynamics of the online environment (Turow and Kavanaugh). This provocation was born out recently when Facebook disrupted the delivery of news to Australian audiences via its service. Mainstream social online spaces (SOS) are platforms which provide more than the delivery of media alone and have been conceptualised predominantly in a binary light. On the one hand, they can be depicted as tools for the common good of society through notional widespread access and as places for civic participation and discussion, identity expression, education, and community formation (Turkle; Bruns; Cinque and Brown; Jenkins). This end of the continuum of thinking about SOS seems set hard against the view that SOS are operating as businesses with strategies that manipulate consumers to generate revenue through advertising, data, venture capital for advanced research and development, and company profit, on the other hand. In between the two polar ends of this continuum are the range of other possibilities, the shades of grey, that add contemporary nuance to understanding SOS in regard to what they facilitate, what the various implications might be, and for whom. By way of a brief summary, anxiety of the dark is steeped in the practices of privacy-invasive social media giants such as Facebook and its ancillary companies. Second are the advertising technology companies, surveillance contractors, and intelligence agencies that collect and monitor our actions and related data; as well as the increased ease of use and interoperability brought about by Web 2.0 that has seen a disconnection between technological infrastructure and social connection that acts to limit user permissions and online affordances. Third are concerns for the negative effects associated with depressed mental health and wellbeing caused by “psychologically damaging social networks”, through sleep loss, anxiety, poor body image, real world relationships, and the fear of missing out (FOMO; Royal Society for Public Health (UK) and the Young Health Movement). Here the harms are both individual and societal. Fourth is the intended acceleration toward post-quantum IoT (Fernández-Caramés), as quantum computing’s digital components are continually being miniaturised. This is coupled with advances in electrical battery capacity and interconnected telecommunications infrastructures. The result of such is that the ontogenetic capacity of the powerfully advanced network/s affords supralevel surveillance. What this means is that through devices and the services that they provide, individuals’ data is commodified (Neff and Nafus; Nissenbaum and Patterson). Personal data is enmeshed in ‘things’ requiring that the decisions that are both overt, subtle, and/or hidden (dark) are scrutinised for the various ways they shape social norms and create consequences for public discourse, cultural production, and the fabric of society (Gillespie). Data and personal information are retrievable from devices, sharable in SOS, and potentially exposed across networks. For these reasons, some have chosen to go dark by being “off the grid”, judiciously selecting their means of communications and their ‘friends’ carefully. 2. Is There Room for Privacy Any More When Everyone in SOS Is Watching? An interesting turn comes through counterarguments against overarching institutional surveillance that underscore the uses of technologies to watch the watchers. This involves a practice of counter-surveillance whereby technologies are tools of resistance to go ‘dark’ and are used by political activists in protest situations for both communication and avoiding surveillance. This is not new and has long existed in an increasingly dispersed media landscape (Cinque, Changing Media Landscapes). For example, counter-surveillance video footage has been accessed and made available via live-streaming channels, with commentary in SOS augmenting networking possibilities for niche interest groups or micropublics (Wilson and Serisier, 178). A further example is the Wordpress site Fitwatch, appealing for an end to what the site claims are issues associated with police surveillance (fitwatch.org.uk and endpolicesurveillance.wordpress.com). Users of these sites are called to post police officers’ identity numbers and photographs in an attempt to identify “cops” that might act to “misuse” UK Anti-terrorism legislation against activists during legitimate protests. Others that might be interested in doing their own “monitoring” are invited to reach out to identified personal email addresses or other private (dark) messaging software and application services such as Telegram (freeware and cross-platform). In their work on surveillance, Mann and Ferenbok (18) propose that there is an increase in “complex constructs between power and the practices of seeing, looking, and watching/sensing in a networked culture mediated by mobile/portable/wearable computing devices and technologies”. By way of critical definition, Mann and Ferenbok (25) clarify that “where the viewer is in a position of power over the subject, this is considered surveillance, but where the viewer is in a lower position of power, this is considered sousveillance”. It is the aspect of sousveillance that is empowering to those using dark SOS. One might consider that not all surveillance is “bad” nor institutionalised. It is neither overtly nor formally regulated—as yet. Like most technologies, many of the surveillant technologies are value-neutral until applied towards specific uses, according to Mann and Ferenbok (18). But this is part of the ‘grey area’ for understanding the impact of dark SOS in regard to which actors or what nations are developing tools for surveillance, where access and control lies, and with what effects into the future. 3. Big Brother Watches, So What Are the Alternatives: Whither the Gazing Elite in Dark SOS? By way of conceptual genealogy, consideration of contemporary perceptions of surveillance in a visually networked society (Cinque, Changing Media Landscapes) might be usefully explored through a revisitation of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, applied here as a metaphor for contemporary surveillance. Arguably, this is a foundational theoretical model for integrated methods of social control (Foucault, Surveiller et Punir, 192-211), realised in the “panopticon” (prison) in 1787 by Jeremy Bentham (Bentham and Božovič, 29-95) during a period of social reformation aimed at the improvement of the individual. Like the power for social control over the incarcerated in a panopticon, police power, in order that it be effectively exercised, “had to be given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible … like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception” (Foucault, Surveiller et Punir, 213–4). In grappling with the impact of SOS for the individual and the collective in post-digital times, we can trace out these early ruminations on the complex documentary organisation through state-controlled apparatuses (such as inspectors and paid observers including “secret agents”) via Foucault (Surveiller et Punir, 214; Subject and Power, 326-7) for comparison to commercial operators like Facebook. Today, artificial intelligence (AI), facial recognition technology (FRT), and closed-circuit television (CCTV) for video surveillance are used for social control of appropriate behaviours. Exemplified by governments and the private sector is the use of combined technologies to maintain social order, from ensuring citizens cross the street only on green lights, to putting rubbish in the correct recycling bin or be publicly shamed, to making cashless payments in stores. The actions see advantages for individual and collective safety, sustainability, and convenience, but also register forms of behaviour and attitudes with predictive capacities. This gives rise to suspicions about a permanent account of individuals’ behaviour over time. Returning to Foucault (Surveiller et Punir, 135), the impact of this finds a dissociation of power from the individual, whereby they become unwittingly impelled into pre-existing social structures, leading to a ‘normalisation’ and acceptance of such systems. If we are talking about the dark, anxiety is key for a Ministry of SOS. Following Foucault again (Subject and Power, 326-7), there is the potential for a crawling, creeping governance that was once distinct but is itself increasingly hidden and growing. A blanket call for some form of ongoing scrutiny of such proliferating powers might be warranted, but with it comes regulation that, while offering certain rights and protections, is not without consequences. For their part, a number of SOS platforms had little to no moderation for explicit content prior to December 2018, and in terms of power, notwithstanding important anxiety connected to arguments that children and the vulnerable need protections from those that would seek to take advantage, this was a crucial aspect of community building and self-expression that resulted in this freedom of expression. In unearthing the extent that individuals are empowered arising from the capacity to post sexual self-images, Tiidenberg ("Bringing Sexy Back") considered that through dark SOS (read here as unregulated) some users could work in opposition to the mainstream consumer culture that provides select and limited representations of bodies and their sexualities. This links directly to Mondin’s exploration of the abundance of queer and feminist pornography on dark SOS as a “counterpolitics of visibility” (288). This work resulted in a reasoned claim that the technological structure of dark SOS created a highly political and affective social space that users valued. What also needs to be underscored is that many users also believed that such a space could not be replicated on other mainstream SOS because of the differences in architecture and social norms. Cho (47) worked with this theory to claim that dark SOS are modern-day examples in a history of queer individuals having to rely on “underground economies of expression and relation”. Discussions such as these complicate what dark SOS might now become in the face of ‘adult’ content moderation and emerging tracking technologies to close sites or locate individuals that transgress social norms. Further, broader questions are raised about how content moderation fits in with the public space conceptualisations of SOS more generally. Increasingly, “there is an app for that” where being able to identify the poster of an image or an author of an unknown text is seen as crucial. While there is presently no standard approach, models for combining instance-based and profile-based features such as SVM for determining authorship attribution are in development, with the result that potentially far less content will remain hidden in the future (Bacciu et al.). 4. There’s Nothing New under the Sun (Ecclesiastes 1:9) For some, “[the] high hopes regarding the positive impact of the Internet and digital participation in civic society have faded” (Schwarzenegger, 99). My participant observation over some years in various SOS, however, finds that critical concern has always existed. Views move along the spectrum of thinking from deep scepticisms (Stoll, Silicon Snake Oil) to wondrous techo-utopian promises (Negroponte, Being Digital). Indeed, concerns about the (then) new technologies of wireless broadcasting can be compared with today’s anxiety over the possible effects of the internet and SOS. Inglis (7) recalls, here, too, were fears that humanity was tampering with some dangerous force; might wireless wave be causing thunderstorms, droughts, floods? Sterility or strokes? Such anxieties soon evaporated; but a sense of mystery might stay longer with evangelists for broadcasting than with a laity who soon took wireless for granted and settled down to enjoy the products of a process they need not understand. As the analogy above makes clear, just as audiences came to use ‘the wireless’ and later the internet regularly, it is reasonable to argue that dark SOS will also gain widespread understanding and find greater acceptance. Dark social spaces are simply the recent development of internet connectivity and communication more broadly. The dark SOS afford choice to be connected beyond mainstream offerings, which some users avoid for their perceived manipulation of content and user both. As part of the wider array of dark web services, the resilience of dark social spaces is reinforced by the proliferation of users as opposed to decentralised replication. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) can be used for anonymity in parallel to TOR access, but they guarantee only anonymity to the client. A VPN cannot guarantee anonymity to the server or the internet service provider (ISP). While users may use pseudonyms rather than actual names as seen on Facebook and other SOS, users continue to take to the virtual spaces they inhabit their off-line, ‘real’ foibles, problems, and idiosyncrasies (Chenault). To varying degrees, however, people also take their best intentions to their interactions in the dark. The hyper-efficient tools now deployed can intensify this, which is the great advantage attracting some users. In balance, however, in regard to online information access and dissemination, critical examination of what is in the public’s interest, and whether content should be regulated or controlled versus allowing a free flow of information where users self-regulate their online behaviour, is fraught. O’Loughlin (604) was one of the first to claim that there will be voluntary loss through negative liberty or freedom from (freedom from unwanted information or influence) and an increase in positive liberty or freedom to (freedom to read or say anything); hence, freedom from surveillance and interference is a kind of negative liberty, consistent with both libertarianism and liberalism. Conclusion The early adopters of initial iterations of SOS were hopeful and liberal (utopian) in their beliefs about universality and ‘free’ spaces of open communication between like-minded others. 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Syftet med denna undersökning är att skapa en bättre förståelse för hur elever ser på sin egen intelligens och sitt lärande och om detta påverkar hur eleverna ser på undervisning. Detta gör jag genom att testa psykologiforskaren Carol S. Dwecks teorier om statiskt och dynamiskt mindset i svenska förhållanden på elever i mellanstadiet. En person med dynamiskt mindset tror på ständig möjlighet till utveckling, medan en med statiskt mindset tror på medfödd talang eller begränsningar. Jag har tagit reda på vilket mindset eleverna har och även undersökt och analyserat könsfördelningen. Det finns bara lite svensk forskning om mindset och den som finns handlar om äldre elever, vilket gör att jämförelser istället gjorts med Dwecks forskning i USA. För att få en bred kvantitativ bild, men ändå balansera mängden material mot uppsatsens omfång gjordes en enkätundersökning med tre klasser i mellanstadiet. Enkäten undersökte genom två-alternativsfrågor, baserade på Dwecks frågeformulär Mindset Assessment Profile (MAP), vilket mindset eleverna hade och innehöll även frågor kring vilka typer av undervisningsmetoder som eleverna mest gillade, producerade mest av och lärde sig bäst av. Genomgången av materialet visar att de flesta elever har ett dynamiskt mindset, men också att frågorna till viss del hade tolkats olika av eleverna och mätt deras generella attityd till skolan istället. Undersökningssvaren visar mer på tendenser och en jämförelse gjordes mellan elever med ett mer dynamiskt mindset mot de med ett mindre dynamiskt mindset. Resultaten visar att synen på undervisningen till viss del skiljer sig mellan grupperna och att valen eleverna gör matchar deras mindset. En av de tydligaste skillnaderna var att lusten att lära var mycket större i gruppen med dynamiskt mindset. Resultaten visar också en kraftig tendens att flickor med åldern blir mer dynamiska och att pojkar blir mer statiska. Mindset går till viss del att använda för att förstå elevers tänkande i svenska förhållanden men fortsatt forskning på området behöver ta in intervjuer, observationer samt effektstudier för att få fram mer tillförlitliga svar.

Denna studie visar hur ett matematiskt mindset kan modelleras och hur detta mindset ser ut hos grundskoleelever i norra Sverige. Studien utgår från ett sociokognitivt perspektiv och inspireras av Carol Dwecks teoretiska ramverk om mindset. En av grundpelarna i ett sådant mindset är att det finns statiska tankar som skapar hinder i kunskapsutvecklingen och dynamiska tankar som skapar förutsättningar för god kunskapsutveckling. Syftet med ett specifikt matematiskt mindset är att unga elever kan ha svårt att förstå abstrakta begrepp och företeelser. Många av de modeller som finns för att undersöka mindset använder abstrakta begrepp som exempelvis intelligens. Detta gör att elevens kognitiva förmåga kan bli en begränsande faktor när unga elevers tankar undersöks. Studien presenterar 4 komponenter som ingår i ett matematiskt mindset; Ansträngning och fysiska egenskaper, inlärd hjälplöshet, lärandemål/prestationsmål och utmaning med risk för misslyckande. Dessa fyra komponenter användes för att skapa en enkät, vars ändamål var att reflektera elevens tankar kring olika scenarion kopplade till matematikämnet. Deltagarna i studien var 37 grundskoleelever i årskurs 2 från två klasser i en skola i norra Sverige. Enkätsvaren från de 37 deltagarna resulterade i 4 olika modeller för ett matematiskt mindset. Resultatet från studien visade att det i urvalet fanns elever med flera statiska attributioner och att det finns elever med hög grad av dynamiska attributioner. Resultatet från denna studie har potential att ge pedagoger och forskare inblick i unga elevers mindset inom ämnet matematik. Eftersom Carol Dwecks teori bygger på att elevens statiska eller dynamiska tankar är förändringsbara så ger resultatet från denna studie en språngbräda till nästa steg; strategier för att förändra elevers statiska tankar till dynamiska tankar.

Den här studien tog sin början i de svårigheter som finns med att undervisa åldersblandade klasser i matematik. Syftet var att undersöka hur elevers mindset förändras vid undervisning med öppna uppgifter samtidigt som de får kunskap om hur hjärnan fungerar. Syftet var dessutom att undersöka i vilken utsträckning alla elever i klassen deltog i denna typ undervisningen. Studien genomfördes som en aktionsforskning i en liten åldersblandad klass i en glesbygdsskola. Resultatet var att de elever som hade minst dynamiskt mindset innan aktionen var de som ökade sitt dynamiska mindset mest. Dessa elever ökade även sina matematikkunskaper mest. Anledningen till att de elever som hade mer dynamiskt mindset från början inte ökade varken mindset eller kunskap i samma utsträckning kan bero på att uppgifterna inte vara tillräckligt öppna. Att undervisa med öppna uppgifter visade sig ändå ha tillräckligt mycket fördelar för att forskaren anser att det kan vara ett sätt att förbättra matematikundervisningen i en åldersblandad klass.

Syftet med studien är att undersöka om det finns en relation mellan lärares syn på sina elevers utvecklingspotential och deras undervisning, dvs attitydens påverkan på handling hos de lärare som ingår i studien. Utveckligspotential defenierar jag med utgångspunkt i Dwecks teori (2015) som elevernas utvecklings av intelligens och förmåga. Mot detta undersöker jag även samband mot demografiska variabler som kön, legitimation och år i yrket. Studien har sin utgångspunkt i ett sociokulturellt perspektiv och är en kvantitativ studie. Den genomförs som en webb-baserad enkätstudie vid två olika skolenheter. Det finns inga siginfikanta samband mellan lärares mindset och deras praktik. Inte heller finns några siginifikanta samband mellan lärares mindset och deras praktik i förhållande till demografiska variabler.
The purpose of the study is to investigate whether there is a relationship between the teachers view of the pupils´development potential and their teaching, ie the influence of the attitude towards action by the teachers included in the study. Development potential, I define on the basis of Dweck´s theory (2015) as the students´development of intelligence and abels such as gender, legitimacy and years in profession. The study is based on a socio-cultural perspective and is quantitativ. It is contucted as a web-based survey of comprising two different schools. The result indicates that there are no general significate realtionships between teachers´mindet and their internship. There are also ni significant relationships between teachers´mindset and their practice in relation to demographic variables.

Matematikämnet behövs göras tillgänglig för fler då det inom detta ämne finns en stark rotad uppfattning om att det endast är till för en viss typ av människor som besitter en speciell medfödd matematisk förmåga. Denna inställning är i behov av förändring och vi reflekterar i denna studie över om det kan finnas ett samband mellan beröm och elevers inställning till och självkänsla inom ämnet. Syftet är därför att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan beröm för intelligens gentemot beröm för ansträngning och elevers utvecklande av ett statiskt respektive dynamiskt mindset vid lösandet av matematikuppgifter samt om detta beröm påverkar elevers självkänsla. En kvantitativ metod används tillsammans med en experimentell design och har delvis haft utgångspunkt i en studie av Mueller och Dweck (1998). Resultatet visade inga generella samband mellan en viss typ av beröm och elevers utvecklande av ett mindset, dock fanns det ett visst samband till elevers självkänsla. Resultatet analyseras utifrån teorierna behaviorism, self-theory samt Maslows behovstrappa och diskuteras i förhållande till den tidigare forskning gjord inom forskningsfältet. Utveckling av studien presenteras avslutningsvis som förslag på framtida forskning.

Det är skolans ansvar att motivera sina elever till lärande. Efter ett initierande samtal med en avgångsklass på ekonomiprogrammet på en kommunal gymnasieskola framkom det att eleverna inte såg någon nytta i själva inlärningsprocessen. Motivation för att kunna något fanns, men motivation till att lära sig något saknades.Carol Dweck ger genom sina teorier om mindsets en beskrivning av just detta fenomen. Hon delar in elever i två grupper efter hur de ser på sin egen intelligens och vilka mål eleverna ser med sitt eget lärande. I följande arbete görs en studie av Dwecks arbete genom att, i första delen, beskriva teorin för att se om man kan dra paralleller mellan en elevs mindset och dennes benägenhet att engagera sig i sitt eget lärande. Studien visar genom Dwecks definition av statiska respektive dynamiska mindsets att så är fallet, teoretiskt. Studien går vidare med att beskriva Dwecks tankar om hur man kan göra för att påverka eleverna till att öka sitt engagemang. Teorin exemplifieras genom en sammanfattning av en av Dwecks forskningsstudier.I den andra delen av studien appliceras Dwecks teorier på elever vid en kommunal gymnasieskola. Genom att testa elevernas mindset med två av Dwecks egna instrument undersöks om Dwecks teorier är applicerbara för att förklara intrycket att eleverna i det ursprungliga samtalet inte ser en nytta i själva lärandet som process. Elevernas mindset testades genom en enkät med 22 frågor. 38 elever svarade på enkäten. Enkäten följdes upp med semistrukturerade intervjuer där 11 elever studerades mer ingående.Genom Dwecks teorier och definitioner av mindsets kan man tänka sig att det uppfattade fenomenet i det initierande samtalet beror på att eleverna främst besitter statiska mindsets. Genom enkät och intervjuer visade det sig att så inte var fallet. Då enkät och intervjuer utgick från elevernas allmänna uppfattning om intelligens, talang och arbete kan man inte dra slutsatser om teorierna har bevisats eller ej. Vid fortsatta studier skulle det vara intressant att göra om samma studier med specifikt skolan och inlärningsmål som domän.

Syftet med den här studien är att undersöka i vilken utsträckning ett statiskt mindset förekommer bland elever i årkurs 3, i Sverige. Frågeställningen besvaras genom en enkätundersökning där 8 skolklasser, totalt 125 elever, medverkar. Resultatet visar att ett statiskt mindset förekommer, men i låg utsträckning, bland elever i årskurs 3. Ett utstickande resultat förekommer på tre av de enkätfrågor som behandlas i detta arbete, där ett statiskt mindset förekommer i betydligt högre utsträckning. Resultatet diskuteras med utgångspunkt i tidigare forskning och teorier om mindset samt i bredd med läroplanen (LGR 2011) och resultatet från PISA-provet med den efterföljande elevenkäten. Resultatet kan fylla en tom lucka i tidigare forskning då ingen studie hittats som direkt undersökt i vilken utsträckning ett statiskt mindset förekommer bland elever i lägre årskurser. Resultatet visar på ett behov av att fortsatt forskning bedrivs om mindset och dess konsekvenser för elevers utveckling och prestation inom matematikämnet.

matematik

För att hantera den förändrade situationen i närområdet måste Försvarsmakten öka sin operativa förmåga och med det, även sin rekrytering. För specialförbanden har utebliven värnplikt inneburit en reducerad rekryteringsbas samtidigt som Försvarsmakten, för att öka sin operativa förmåga, bl.a. skapat förband med specifika kompetenser, förmågor och uppgifter vilket i sin tur lett till en konkurrenssituation avseende bemanning. För specialförbanden har detta tillsammans med ett lågt utfall från uttagningstesterna inneburit en utmaning att tillgodose det operativa behovet av systemets viktigaste resurs, personalen. Denna kvalitativa studie som baseras på semistrukturerade intervjuer och en workshop syftar till att, utifrån operativ personal vid specialförbanden, fördjupa förståelsen för hur utfallet av uttagningstesterna skall kunna förbättras. Studiens identifierade drivkrafter, som ligger till grund för individer att söka till samt fullfölja de fysiskt och psykiskt krävande uttagningstesterna, analyseras därför gentemot motivationsteorier, organisatoriska perspektiv och psykologiska begrepp. Studien tyder på att även om drivkrafterna för att söka till respektive fullfölja testerna skiljer sig åt, så bidrar dessa tillsammans med stödjande funktioner till individens förmåga att härda ut, vilken är avgörande för att fullfölja uttagningstesterna.  Utifrån resultatet kan specialförbandens attraktion utformas och riktas på ett tydligare sätt. Vidare kan befintliga urvalskriterier vidareutvecklas för att ur det totala antalet sökande, kunna kalla de individer med bäst förutsättningar att lyckas fullfölja och klara uttagningsprocessen.
The Swedish Armed Forces needs to increase the recruitment rate and operational capability in order to handle the developing situation in the region. For the Special Forces, the lack of conscripts has meant a reduced recruitment at the same time as the rest of the Armed Forces, in order to increase operational capability, has created units with specific skills, abilities and tasks, which in turn have led to a competitive situation regarding the staff. This together with a high attrition rate from selection process has led to a challenge meeting the operational demand regarding the Special Forces most valuable asset, the personnel. This qualitative research, based on semi-structured interviews and a workshop with operational personnel at the Special Forces aims to increase the understanding of how the outcome of the selection process can be improved. The driving factors identified in this research, which form the basis for individuals to apply to the Special Forces and complete the physically and psychologically demanding selection tests, are hence analysed in relation to motivational theories, organizational perspectives and psychological terms. The study indicates that the drive for applying to and completing the selection differ, however, both of them combined with supportive functions contribute to the individual's ability to persevere and are crucial elements for completing the selection process.  Based on the results attraction of the Special Forces can be designed and directed more accurately. Furthermore, existing selection criteria can be refined in order to, out of the total number of applicants, be able to select the individuals with the best chance to successfully complete the selection process.

Following the 1960s, the decade's focus on consciousness-raising transformed into an array of intellectual projects far afield of movement politics. The mind's powers came to preoccupy a range of thinkers and writers: ethicists pursuing contractual theories of justice, radical ecologists interested in the paleolithic brain, cultists, and the devout of both evangelical and New Age persuasions. This book presents a boldly revisionist argument about the revival of subjectivity in postmodern American culture, connecting familiar figures within the intellectual landscape of the 1970s who share a commitment to what the book calls “neo-idealism” as a weapon in the struggle against discredited materialist and behaviorist worldviews. In a heterodox intellectual and literary history of the 1970s, the book mixes ideas from cognitive science, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, deep ecology, political theory, science fiction, neoclassical economics, and the sociology of religion. It also delves into the decade's more esoteric branches of learning, including Scientology, anarchist theory, rapture prophesies, psychic channeling, and neo-Malthusianism. Through this investigation, the book argues that a dramatic inflation in the value of consciousness and autonomy beginning in the 1970s accompanied a growing argument about the state's inability to safeguard such values. Ultimately, the thinkers who the book analyses found alternatives to statism in conditions that would lend intellectual support to the consolidation of these concepts in the radical free market ideologies of the 1980s.

This chapter examines Ecuador as a case of policy regime juxtaposition, marked by the success of the first type of subnational policy challenge and the failure of the second. With respect to the first challenge, two dynamic mayors on the right of the political spectrum—León Febres Cordero (1992–2000) and Jaime Nebot (2000–18)—were able to design, build, and consolidate a distinctly neoliberal model in the critical port city of Guayaquil. Thanks to high levels of administrative capacity and strong internal coalitions, the architects of this model subsequently managed to defend it in the face of repeated assaults after 2006 by leftist President Rafael Correa. While the mayor of Guayaquil has managed to defend its neoliberal policy regime, he and his allies have been unable to moderate the President’s statist project at the national level owing to Guayaquil’s declining structural leverage and the absence of external coalitions with other like-minded subnational officials.

In the two decades since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia cinema has become one of the most productive and exciting film industries in Asia. From a position in the 1990s when local films were on the cultural periphery, they are now part of the mainstream with two new films in the cinemas every week. This book traces how the film industry reformed and returned to popularity and conceptualises it as a process of going mainstream. It overturns long held paradigms of national cinema and statism to see the film industry as pop culture in which market mechanisms are determinant. In going mainstream, new independent-minded filmmakers representing new creativity had to accommodate with capital and producers from old production companies. Appeal to audiences has resulting in the reimagining of the horror film and its traumas and the representation of new kinds of piety in a new subgenre Islamic themed films. Yet legacy structures and players remain, as the film industry has struggled to overcome regulation and censorship and the oligopoly of senior producers. In catering to a growing audience, the exhibition sector has become the focus of new investment as it becomes a site for competing local operators and global capital. The book argues for a reconceptualization of Indonesian cinema as pop culture with consequences to how Asian cinema is studied.

This afterword reflects on the afterlife of neo-idealism and clarifies the author's stance on questions of social justice, utilitarian ethics, and the nearly universal repudiation of statism. The author's argument has been focused on the degree to which the collective consciousness that formed a staple of the New Social Movements — perhaps its key catalyst — gives way in seventies culture to a profound displacement onto subjectivity. But it would be a mistake to see this as a perversion of sixties thinking. The appeal to subjectivity was always the latent grounding of social change among important movements of that earlier decade; hence the coming to dominance of identity politics in the generation after the sixties. It is no surprise that the effort to reclaim consciousness's underappreciated power in sixties discourses should give rise to celebrations of unfettered power in seventies thinking. The afterword examines how the market became the megastructure for a wide array of antistatist impulses.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of “neo-idealism,” which can be defined as the effort to retool features of the Kantian tradition as weapons in the struggle against a behaviorism discredited by post-sixties thinkers because it appeared to underwrite the failed policies of the Great Society. The book's basic premise is that a dramatic inflation in the value of consciousness and autonomy in the seventies accompanied a recognition of the state's refusal to safeguard such values. And this premise's central implication is that figures from different schools and literary traditions found alternatives to statism in conditions that, while not reducible to neoliberalism's free market ideal, would lend support to that ideal's consolidation. To put the point this way is to keep in view the distance between neo-idealism (the embrace of subjectivity) and neoliberalism (the embrace of the market). The space between these terms contracts and dilates depending on the positions staked out by neo-idealists. The chapter explains that neo-idealism affords more than an ideology for neoliberalism and less than a stark alternative to it.

This chapter starts off with Alexander v. United States, a case from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia involving a defendant from a “rotten social background” charged with murder. The question it ultimately seeks to answer is this: When a democratic state has treated a citizen so badly, as a matter of distributive justice, that we are inclined to say of him that he has been excluded from the life of the polity, is the state nonetheless morally permitted to punish him if and when he commits a crime? It starts with several answers an anarchist might give to this question, distinguishing between a revolutionary response and a reformist response. It then moves onto discuss how a statist, as a believer in the authority of a democratic state, might respond. It concludes that a democratic state, even if it has lost its authority over the disadvantaged, is nonetheless morally permitted to punish those among the disadvantaged who commit serious (or core) crimes, but that it lacks any moral permission, derived from its own authority, to punish them for less serious (non-core) crimes.

The Introduction distinguishes justice and legitimacy as distinct metrics by which to evaluate the rules of the substantive criminal law. It also distinguishes anarchists, who believe no state can or does possess authority (understood as the power to impose moral obligations), and for whom justice is the only metric by which to evaluate the rules of the substantive criminal law, from statists, who believe democratic states can possess authority, and for whom legitimacy is another metric by which the rules of the substantive criminal law can be evaluated. The Introduction introduces the concepts of actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind) as limitations, embodied in immunity rights, against the exercise of the otherwise legitimate authority of a democratic state to define rules ascribing culpability when someone is charged with committing a crime. It concludes with a roadmap briefly describing the plan of the book.

This introductory chapter briefly considers the ways in which the reforms of Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi unfolded along the lines of mid-nineteenth-century British-style orthodoxy or the late-twentieth-century International Monetary Fund version. It then goes on to argue that Matsukata was dealing with the challenge, shared by many of his contemporaries, of establishing a modern financial system in a developing state emerging from warfare and aiming to industrialize. At least on monetary policy, his economic nationalism was of the liberal nationalist variety like that of state leaders in other late industrializers. Moreover, Matsukata emerged as a practitioner primarily of unorthodox policies from the standpoint of both nineteenth- and late-twentieth-century versions of financial and economic orthodoxy. He also departed from orthodox mindsets in his pursuit of statist and nationalist priorities, his commitment to made-in-Japan solutions, his reliance on local intellectual tradition, and his willingness to be flexible in response to “the dictates of practical expediency,” as he would proclaim in 1886.