Academic literature on the topic 'Stockholders Corporations Management'

The provisions of the FASB standard on accounting for income taxes, SFAS No. 96, were complex and controversial. Moreover, the FASB provided corporations with considerable flexibility in deciding when to adopt SFAS No. 96. Under these circumstances, managements had an opportunity to time their adoption decisions to best serve the interests of the corporation and stockholders. This study compares the attitudes and perceptions of controllers for corporations that adopted SFAS No. 96 early with controllers of corporations that postponed adoptions. While the controllers opinions on the usefulness of SFAS No. 96 reporting are mixed, the results indicate that the effects on the financial statements and the ease of gathering needed data seem to influence a firms timing decision when there is a choice between early and delayed adoption of controversial accounting standards.

Corporations often transact in their own mispriced stock. This activity, known as equity market timing, can generate substantial profits and increase the long-term stock price. We challenge a closely related popular view that market timing always benefits firm shareholders. Opportunistic financing maneuvers by a firm can negatively affect its uninformed stock owners because of adverse selection and the change in the firm’s short-term price, whereas the long-term returns do not accumulate to departing stockholders. The negative effect of market timing on stockholders increases with the share turnover. Furthermore, the effect of timing is asymmetric: shareholders prefer that the firm corrects underpricing rather than overpricing. Our theory can be used to better interpret the observed stock issuance and repurchase activities of firms. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

In the corporative realm of the organization of firms, endemic to modern capitalist economy, a common allegation is that “limited liability”, State historically allowed for political or fiscal reasons, would (though asymmetrically) incite stockholders and managers to overconfidence in their characteristic profit-driven endeavours. It is asserted that the corporative judicial-legal shield absorbs risks and unleashes moral hazard, eroding the genuine market capitalism (gambling, greed, monopolism, wickedness). In this article, we will re-examine the moral hazard around modern corporation, starting from an “institutionally neutral” analysis of the interpersonal asymmetry of knowledge, and shifting over to the domain of “comparative inter-institutional” judgements, opposing two counterfactual mutually exclusive frameworks: the one respecting naturally defined private property rights and the other one hampering them through State-made regulatory interventions. We will add more precision to an old classical debate upon the “illiberalism of corporations”, arguing that, along with the factors fuelling the modern boom-bust business cycles by means of easy money and credit, guilty as well for instability in the global markets is some sort of “over-limited responsibility” of corporations (for instance, in finance and banking industry), granted with those “too big to fail” privileges, invoking their “systemic importance” in terms of resource allocation or employment dynamic.

Abstract:This paper addresses whether the adoption of Japanese financial practices by U.S. corporations can be used as a basis for encouraging U.S. managers to promote the interests of their (human) organizations over those of stockholders. An historical overview is provided of how the corporate organization in each country evolved and the corresponding development of managers’ responsibilities to the corporate organization versus shareholders. These concepts are then examined within the context of each country’s contemporary corporate financial structure and the corresponding financial responsibilities of managers to the corporate organization versus shareholders. A discussion is then provided of whether the values embodied in each system would affect the ability of the United States to encourage a more “corporate-oriented” ethic in its managers by adopting Japanese financial practices.

This essay and analysis brings to light how analytics and algorithms, such as those used by United Airlines in thedecision to forcibly remove a passenger, highlights the interdependence between American business and AmericanDemocracy. The focus is on the injustices to a diverse group of stakeholders. Considering the United States SupremeCourt ruling in 2010 that corporations have rights like people do, the critical question is in the relationships of rightsof the non-corporate people; stakeholders including passengers, company personnel, management, stockholders, andthe general public. All of this is in the context of corporate culture and the evolving culture of American Democracy.The concentration on bottom line analytics and disregard for ethical treatment of various stakeholders, especiallyfare-paying passengers, weakens the respect for the integrity of rights among the variety of stakeholders. Theconsequence is an endangerment of the future of American Democracy, especially from internal self-destructiveforces of unbridled capitalism.

Abstract:Can we achieve greater fairness by reforming the corporation? Some recent progressive critics of the corporation argue that we can achieve greater social justice both inside and outside the corporation by simply rewriting or reinterpreting corporate rules to favor non-stockholders over stockholders. But the progressive program for reforming the corporation rests on a critical assumption, which I challenge in this essay, namely that the rules of the corporation matter, so that changing them can effect a lasting redistribution of wealth from stockholders to non-stockholders. This essay uses a critique of the progressive reform program to argue that the rules of the corporation are distributively neutral. The corporation isn’t rigged against non-stockholders, and changing its rules will not improve the bargaining power of non-stockholders. However, while the rules may be epiphenomenal from the standpoint of distributive justice, they can have substantial impacts on the corporation’s efficiency. As a result, the proposed reforms may hurt the corporation’s capacity to generate benefits for all the parties concerned.

Despite the widespread criticism against double taxation of dividends, most countries follow the policy of taxing the same income twice – once when the corporations earn it and a second time when shareholders receive it. Critics of the double taxation policy clamor for its abolition citing the economic inefficiencies it engenders. In 1997, the Indian government eliminated double taxation of dividends by exempting dividend income from personal taxes but requiring the firms to pay a 10% tax on the amount of dividend distributed. Using this rule change as a natural experiment, we examine the impact of this rule change on firm valuation. We show that elimination of double taxation on dividends is not unambiguously beneficial to the stockholders of the firm. We find that tax status and ownership structure play a significant role in explaining the direction of observed changes in valuation. An interesting finding of this paper is that shareholders seem to value visibility. Visible firms are subject to the disciplining effect of more stringent disclosures in the financial press. We do find pervasive evidence that firms increased their dividends subsequent to rule change. We however, do not find any association between the change in dividends and ownership structure

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the economic consequence of the tax reductive strategy on stock price. The authors’ theory, empirically reinforced, suggests managerial tax aggressiveness endangers the corporation through a heightened risk in stock price crashing. Information opacity worsens the situation by reinforcing the relationship. Policymakers should emphasize two aspects: market openness and tighter institutional monitoring. The evidence shown in this paper demonstrates that these two weaken the tax aggressiveness impact on risk of a crashing stock price. Design/methodology/approach The sample in this paper consists of 9,702 observations from listed firms from 2008 to 2013 in China. The tax rate is manually collected and all the other original data used in this study are sourced from Wind and China Capital Market and Accounting Research databases. Both logistic regression and ordinary least squares regression methods are used to test the hypothesis in this paper. Findings One key insight is in tax aggressiveness to be strongly correlated with a greater risk of future stock price crashing. The authors also found information opacity to exert a positive moderating effect. That is, the higher the information opacity, the stronger and more positive the correlation between tax aggression and stock price crash risk. However, the market process and an institutional investor have opposite, negative impacts. An open market environment reduces their correlativeness. Similarly, stronger institutional vigilance leads to an attenuation of such a co-relationship. Practical implications The findings of this paper have wide policy implications for management and control by authorities of listed corporations. Aggressiveness in management of corporate taxes accentuates the risks borne by stockholders. If so, internally within the corporation, such aggression shown by management, if not proscribed, could be subject to scrutiny, possibly by an independent committee. Externally, this may be countered by the authority in emphasizing three key factors: openness in information sharing, the market environment and tighter institutional monitoring. Originality/value This study provides a consequential theory of aggressive management of tax, rigorously analyzed and strongly, empirically supported. Overall, aggressiveness in tax management is related with assumption of higher risks in the crashing of stock price. The relationship is enhanced through information opacity, but reduced via market environment and institutional monitoring.

Purpose The article outlines the arguments by the proponents and opponents of maximizing shareholder value and identifies the true threat the concept poses to U.S. businesses. Design/methodology/approach The author quotes authorities on both side of the debate over the validity of maximizing shareholder value as a driving principle of management and points out the risks and the alternatives. He notes that many long-established public corporations in the U.S. have chosen to bow to the power of shareholders and reward them instead of attempting risky initiatives that might create new customers or enhance customer value. Findings Maximizing shareholder value is either the guiding principle of business success that provides a rightful reward for investors or a corrupting influence that thwarts investment in employee talent, sustaining innovation, product quality and customer loyalty. Practical implications Since the C-suite is hugely compensated for increases in the current stock price, decisions based on “shareholder value” tend to be decisions that boost the current stock price. Social implications As evidence the problem is being recognized, some CEOs have already spoken out against preferentially rewarding stockholders instead of investing to sustain the organization. Originality/value The author concludes that shareholder value theory has not only failed on its own narrow terms of making money for shareholders. It has been steadily destroying the productive capacity and dynamism of the entire economy.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: McDonald's is world renowned for the benchmark standards it sets in operations management. This is evidenced by the numerous references in operations management textbooks over the last 10-15 years. However, since 1999, McDonald's has not been able to link this operations excellence to creating shareholder value. In fact, the McDonald's share price has declined by 64 % over the last 4 years. In comparison, Wendy's (McDonald's biggest competition in the US fast food market) share price has increased by 2 % over the same period. Understanding why McDonald's has not been able to link operational excellence and the creation of shareholder value is the reasoning behind this mini-thesis. The hypothesis is that there are a number of factors. which influence shareholder value, and operational excellence is but one of these factors. A literature survey was conducted in order lO understand the underlying theories which link operational excellence and shareholder value creation. Evidence supporting this hypothesis is then presented and discussed. In Chapter 3, McDonald's ability to deliver operational excellence is evaluated against the evidence presented in operations management textbooks and other sources. The success of McDonald's in delivering perfonnance in the other factors affecting shareholder value is then discussed in Chapter 4 and compared to its biggest competition. Firstly, the share price of McDonald's is compared to its biggest competition (Wendy's), then the strategy of McDonald's and its impact on shareholder value creation is discussed, along with McDonald's ability to implement the other important factors and drivers, namely customer value creation, efficiency of value delivery and direct financial impact on shareholders. As a result of the above evidence. it was found that there are two basic reasons why McDonald's has not been able to link operational excellence and shareholder value creation: 1. Relative to its competition, McDonald's has not demonstrated sufficient competence in the other factors, which influence shareholder value creation. These factors are: customer value creation and the efficiency of customer value delivery. This is further evidenced by the financial output measures of McDonald's relative to its competition. 2. McDonald's ability in delivering operational excellence has diminished recently. This is evidenced by falling ratings in customer satisfaction surveys. The above reasons are evidenced by customer satisfaction survey results, comparative financial results and a number of non-direct driver results. In order to increase shareholder value creation, it is recommended that McDonald's change the focus of its strategy from operations to the creation of customer value. In order to support this change, the organisational structure and business processes will have to be changed by top management, who must be the crusaders of this change.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: McDonald's is bekend vir die maatskappy se wereldklas bedryfs bestuur standaardc. Die standaarde word tel kens na verwys in menige bedryfs bestuur handboeke oor die afgelope 10 tot 15 jaar. McDonald's kon egtcr nie daarin slaag om die hoe bedryfsbetuur standaarde in aandeelhouer waarde te omskep nic. Die waarde van die McDonald's aandele het met 64% gedaaJ oor die afgelope 4 jaar. In kontras het Wendy's (McDonald's se grootste mededinger in die Amerikaanse kitskos mark) se aandeel pryse met meer as 2% gestyg oor dieselfde peri ode. Die redc vir hierdie studie is dan juis om te bepaal waarom McDonald's nie hul voortrcflike bestuurs standaarde kon koppel aan stygende aandeelhouer waarde nic. Die hipotese is dat daar 'n aantal faktore is wat die aandeelhouer waarde van 'n maatskappy bepaal en dat bedryfs bestuur standaarde maar net een van hierdie faktore is. 'n Literatuur studie is gedoen om te bepaal wat die verwantskap is tussen puik bedryfsbetuur standaarde en die skepping van aandeelhouer waarde. Die bewyse vanuit die literatuurstudie is dan gebruik om die hipotese mee te toets. In Hoofstuk 3 is die vennoe van McDonald' s om hoe bedryfsbestuur standaarde te handhaaf evalueer aan die hand van die literatuur studie. McDonald's se sukses in die implementering van die ander faktore wat lei tot verhoogde aandeelhouer waarde is in Hoofstuk 4 bespreek en terselfde tyd vergelyk met die verrnoens van sy grootste mededingers. Eerstens is die aandeelprys van McDonald's met die van sy grootste mededinger (Wendy's) vergelyk en tweedens is die strategie van McDonald's en die impak daarvan op aandeelhouer waarde bespreek. Ander belangrike faktore soos kliente waarde skepping. effektiwiteit van waarde toevoeging en direkte finansiele impak op aandeelhouers is ingesluit in die bespreking. Daar is gevind dat daar twee hoofredes is waarom McDonald's nie daarin geslaag het om bedryfs bestuur uitmuntenheid te omskep in aandeelhouer waarde nie: 1. McDonald's het in vergelyking met sy mededingers nie goed genoeg gedoen m.b.t. die ander faktore wat aandeelhouer waarde bernvloed nie. Hierdie faktore is kliente waarde skepping en effektiwiteit van waarde toevoeging. 2. McDonald's se bedryfs bestuur standaarde het begin afneem. Dit word gestaaf deur laer waarderings in klante tevredenheids bepalings. Die onvermoe van McDonald' s om die bogenoemde faktore te implementeer word deur die klante tevredenheids bepalings, vergelykende finansiele resultate en 'n aantaJ indirekte maatstawwe gestaaf. Daar word dus voorgestel dat McDonald's sy stralegiese fokus moet verskuif vanaf bedryfs bestuur optimisering na kliente waarde skepping. Die organisasie struktuur en besigheids prosesse van McDonald's sal dus deur bestuur herorganiseer moet word om die verandering in strategie te kan ondersteun.

Good corporate governance should be the cornerstone of all company management. Directors ought to know in whose interests the company should be managed. This thesis attempts to answer the following question: whose interests must be granted primacy in the management of a company? In chapter 1 it is stated that shareholders' interests are traditionally granted primacy in the management of a company. There has, however, been a shift in public opinion towards recognition of a wider variety of interests that should be considered than only those of the shareholders. These interests include, inter alia, environmental interests and those of the investors, employees and consumers. This thesis thus focuses on the primary stakeholders, namely individual shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers and suppliers. In chapter 2 a theoretical foundation is provided on the nature of a company. The different theories on the nature of a company, emphasising either shareholder primacy or stakeholder protection, are discussed. A combined new theory is proposed. It is suggested that the confusion relating to the meaning of "the company" needs to be eliminated. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide an international comparison of the company law in Botswana, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The focus falls, firstly, on directors' duties, secondly, on the question in whose interests directors should manage a company and, thirdly, on the codification of their duties. In chapter 6 the South African position is evaluated. First, the possible stakeholders are identified and the protection currently afforded them is explained. The reports of the King Committee on Corporate Governance, the Policy Document on company law reform as well as the Companies Bill of 2007 are discussed. Draft clauses are recommended to be incorporated in new company legislation to provide directors with clarity on what is expected of them. It is the aim of this thesis to provide clarity on whose interests should receive primacy when directors manage a company. The outcome of this research should provide a clear indication to South African directors of what is expected of them and who the beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties are.
Law
LL.D.

Attention to safety and health are of ever-increasing priority to industrial organizations. Good Safety is demanded by stockholders, employees, and the community while increasing injury costs provide additional motivation for safety and health excellence. Safety has always been a strong corporate value of DuPont and a vital part of its culture. As a result, DuPont has become a benchmark in safety and health performance. Since 1990, DuPont has re-engineered itself to meet global competition and address future vision. In the new re-engineered organizational structures, DuPont has also had to re-engineer its safety management systems. A special Discovery Team was chartered by DuPont senior management to determine the “best practices’ for safety and health being used in DuPont best-performing sites. A summary of the findings is presented, and five of the practices are discussed. Excellence in safety and health management is more important today than ever. Public awareness, federal and state regulations, and enlightened management have resulted in a widespread conviction that all employees have the right to work in an environment that will not adversely affect their safety and health. In DuPont, we believe that excellence in safety and health is necessary to achieve global competitiveness, maintain employee loyalty, and be an accepted member of the communities in which we make, handle, use, and transport products. Safety can also be the “catalyst” to achieving excellence in other important business parameters. The organizational and communication skills developed by management, individuals, and teams in safety can be directly applied to other company initiatives. As we look into the 21st Century, we must also recognize that new organizational structures (flatter with empowered teams) will require new safety management techniques and systems in order to maintain continuous improvement in safety performance. Injury costs, which have risen dramatically in the past twenty years, provide another incentive for safety and health excellence. Shown in the Figure 1, injury costs have increased even after correcting for inflation. Many companies have found these costs to be an “invisible drain” on earnings and profitability. In some organizations, significant initiatives have been launched to better manage the workers’ compensation systems. We have found that the ultimate solution is to prevent injuries and incidents before they occur. A globally-respected company, DuPont is regarded as a well-managed, extremely ethical firm that is the benchmark in industrial safety performance. Like many other companies, DuPont has re-engineered itself and downsized its operations since 1985. Through these changes, we have maintained dedication to our principles and developed new techniques to manage in these organizational environments. As a diversified company, our operations involve chemical process facilities, production line operations, field activities, and sales and distribution of materials. Our customer base is almost entirely industrial and yet we still maintain a high level of consumer awareness and positive perception. The DuPont concern for safety dates back to the early 1800s and the first days of the company. In 1802 E.I. DuPont, a Frenchman, began manufacturing quality grade explosives to fill America’s growing need to build roads, clear fields, increase mining output, and protect its recently won independence. Because explosives production is such a hazardous industry, DuPont recognized and accepted the need for an effective safety effort. The building walls of the first powder mill near Wilmington, Delaware, were built three stones thick on three sides. The back remained open to the Brandywine River to direct any explosive forces away from other buildings and employees. To set the safety example, DuPont also built his home and the homes of his managers next to the powder yard. An effective safety program was a necessity. It represented the first defense against instant corporate liquidation. Safety needs more than a well-designed plant, however. In 1811, work rules were posted in the mill to guide employee work habits. Though not nearly as sophisticated as the safety standards of today, they did introduce an important basic concept — that safety must be a line management responsibility. Later, DuPont introduced an employee health program and hired a company doctor. An early step taken in 1912 was the keeping of safety statistics, approximately 60 years before the federal requirement to do so. We had a visible measure of our safety performance and were determined that we were going to improve it. When the nation entered World War I, the DuPont Company supplied 40 percent of the explosives used by the Allied Forces, more than 1.5 billion pounds. To accomplish this task, over 30,000 new employees were hired and trained to build and operate many plants. Among these facilities was the largest smokeless powder plant the world had ever seen. The new plant was producing granulated powder in a record 116 days after ground breaking. The trends on the safety performance chart reflect the problems that a large new work force can pose until the employees fully accept the company’s safety philosophy. The first arrow reflects the World War I scale-up, and the second arrow represents rapid diversification into new businesses during the 1920s. These instances of significant deterioration in safety performance reinforced DuPont’s commitment to reduce the unsafe acts that were causing 96 percent of our injuries. Only 4 percent of injuries result from unsafe conditions or equipment — the remainder result from the unsafe acts of people. This is an important concept if we are to focus our attention on reducing injuries and incidents within the work environment. World War II brought on a similar set of demands. The story was similar to World War I but the numbers were even more astonishing: one billion dollars in capital expenditures, 54 new plants, 75,000 additional employees, and 4.5 billion pounds of explosives produced — 20 percent of the volume used by the Allied Forces. Yet, the performance during the war years showed no significant deviation from the pre-war years. In 1941, the DuPont Company was 10 times safer than all industry and 9 times safer than the Chemical Industry. Management and the line organization were finally working as they should to control the real causes of injuries. Today, DuPont is about 50 times safer than US industrial safety performance averages. Comparing performance to other industries, it is interesting to note that seemingly “hazard-free” industries seem to have extraordinarily high injury rates. This is because, as DuPont has found out, performance is a function of injury prevention and safety management systems, not hazard exposure. Our success in safety results from a sound safety management philosophy. Each of the 125 DuPont facilities is responsible for its own safety program, progress, and performance. However, management at each of these facilities approaches safety from the same fundamental and sound philosophy. This philosophy can be expressed in eleven straightforward principles. The first principle is that all injuries can be prevented. That statement may seem a bit optimistic. In fact, we believe that this is a realistic goal and not just a theoretical objective. Our safety performance proves that the objective is achievable. We have plants with over 2,000 employees that have operated for over 10 years without a lost time injury. As injuries and incidents are investigated, we can always identify actions that could have prevented that incident. If we manage safety in a proactive — rather than reactive — manner, we will eliminate injuries by reducing the acts and conditions that cause them. The second principle is that management, which includes all levels through first-line supervisors, is responsible and accountable for preventing injuries. Only when senior management exerts sustained and consistent leadership in establishing safety goals, demanding accountability for safety performance and providing the necessary resources, can a safety program be effective in an industrial environment. The third principle states that, while recognizing management responsibility, it takes the combined energy of the entire organization to reach sustained, continuous improvement in safety and health performance. Creating an environment in which employees feel ownership for the safety effort and make significant contributions is an essential task for management, and one that needs deliberate and ongoing attention. The fourth principle is a corollary to the first principle that all injuries are preventable. It holds that all operating exposures that may result in injuries or illnesses can be controlled. No matter what the exposure, an effective safeguard can be provided. It is preferable, of course, to eliminate sources of danger, but when this is not reasonable or practical, supervision must specify measures such as special training, safety devices, and protective clothing. Our fifth safety principle states that safety is a condition of employment. Conscientious assumption of safety responsibility is required from all employees from their first day on the job. Each employee must be convinced that he or she has a responsibility for working safely. The sixth safety principle: Employees must be trained to work safely. We have found that an awareness for safety does not come naturally and that people have to be trained to work safely. With effective training programs to teach, motivate, and sustain safety knowledge, all injuries and illnesses can be eliminated. Our seventh principle holds that management must audit performance on the workplace to assess safety program success. Comprehensive inspections of both facilities and programs not only confirm their effectiveness in achieving the desired performance, but also detect specific problems and help to identify weaknesses in the safety effort. The Company’s eighth principle states that all deficiencies must be corrected promptly. Without prompt action, risk of injuries will increase and, even more important, the credibility of management’s safety efforts will suffer. Our ninth principle is a statement that off-the-job safety is an important part of the overall safety effort. We do not expect nor want employees to “turn safety on” as they come to work and “turn it off” when they go home. The company safety culture truly becomes of the individual employee’s way of thinking. The tenth principle recognizes that it’s good business to prevent injuries. Injuries cost money. However, hidden or indirect costs usually exceed the direct cost. Our last principle is the most important. Safety must be integrated as core business and personal value. There are two reasons for this. First, we’ve learned from almost 200 years of experience that 96 percent of safety incidents are directly caused by the action of people, not by faulty equipment or inadequate safety standards. But conversely, it is our people who provide the solutions to our safety problems. They are the one essential ingredient in the recipe for a safe workplace. Intelligent, trained, and motivated employees are any company’s greatest resource. Our success in safety depends upon the men and women in our plants following procedures, participating actively in training, and identifying and alerting each other and management to potential hazards. By demonstrating a real concern for each employee, management helps establish a mutual respect, and the foundation is laid for a solid safety program. This, of course, is also the foundation for good employee relations. An important lesson learned in DuPont is that the majority of injuries are caused by unsafe acts and at-risk behaviors rather than unsafe equipment or conditions. In fact, in several DuPont studies it was estimated that 96 percent of injuries are caused by unsafe acts. This was particularly revealing when considering safety audits — if audits were only focused on conditions, at best we could only prevent four percent of our injuries. By establishing management systems for safety auditing that focus on people, including audit training, techniques, and plans, all incidents are preventable. Of course, employee contribution and involvement in auditing leads to sustainability through stakeholdership in the system. Management safety audits help to make manage the “behavioral balance.” Every job and task performed at a site can do be done at-risk or safely. The essence of a good safety system ensures that safe behavior is the accepted norm amongst employees, and that it is the expected and respected way of doing things. Shifting employees norms contributes mightily to changing culture. The management safety audit provides a way to quantify these norms. DuPont safety performance has continued to improve since we began keeping records in 1911 until about 1990. In the 1990–1994 time frame, performance deteriorated as shown in the chart that follows: This increase in injuries caused great concern to senior DuPont management as well as employees. It occurred while the corporation was undergoing changes in organization. In order to sustain our technological, competitive, and business leadership positions, DuPont began re-engineering itself beginning in about 1990. New streamlined organizational structures and collaborative work processes eliminated many positions and levels of management and supervision. The total employment of the company was reduced about 25 percent during these four years. In our traditional hierarchical organization structures, every level of supervision and management knew exactly what they were expected to do with safety, and all had important roles. As many of these levels were eliminated, new systems needed to be identified for these new organizations. In early 1995, Edgar S. Woolard, DuPont Chairman, chartered a Corporate Discovery Team to look for processes that will put DuPont on a consistent path toward a goal of zero injuries and occupational illnesses. The cross-functional team used a mode of “discovery through learning” from as many DuPont employees and sites around the world. The Discovery Team fostered the rapid sharing and leveraging of “best practices” and innovative approaches being pursued at DuPont’s plants, field sites, laboratories, and office locations. In short, the team examined the company’s current state, described the future state, identified barriers between the two, and recommended key ways to overcome these barriers. After reporting back to executive management in April, 1995, the Discovery Team was realigned to help organizations implement their recommendations. The Discovery Team reconfirmed key values in DuPont — in short, that all injuries, incidents, and occupational illnesses are preventable and that safety is a source of competitive advantage. As such, the steps taken to improve safety performance also improve overall competitiveness. Senior management made this belief clear: “We will strengthen our business by making safety excellence an integral part of all business activities.” One of the key findings of the Discovery Team was the identification of the best practices used within the company, which are listed below: ▪ Felt Leadership – Management Commitment ▪ Business Integration ▪ Responsibility and Accountability ▪ Individual/Team Involvement and Influence ▪ Contractor Safety ▪ Metrics and Measurements ▪ Communications ▪ Rewards and Recognition ▪ Caring Interdependent Culture; Team-Based Work Process and Systems ▪ Performance Standards and Operating Discipline ▪ Training/Capability ▪ Technology ▪ Safety and Health Resources ▪ Management and Team Audits ▪ Deviation Investigation ▪ Risk Management and Emergency Response ▪ Process Safety ▪ Off-the-Job Safety and Health Education Attention to each of these best practices is essential to achieve sustained improvements in safety and health. The Discovery Implementation in conjunction with DuPont Safety and Environmental Management Services has developed a Safety Self-Assessment around these systems. In this presentation, we will discuss a few of these practices and learn what they mean. Paper published with permission.