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Journal articles on the topic 'Strategic voting'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Meir, Reshef. "Strategic Voting." Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 12, no. 2 (2018): 1–167. http://dx.doi.org/10.2200/s00849ed1v01y201804aim038.

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2

BOND, PHILIP, and HÜLYA ERASLAN. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals." Review of Economic Studies 77, no. 2 (2010): 459–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00581.x.

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3

Kawai, Kei, and Yasutora Watanabe. "Inferring Strategic Voting." American Economic Review 103, no. 2 (2013): 624–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.2.624.

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We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (63.4 percent, 84.9 percent) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (1.4 percent, 4.2 percent) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voti

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4

Holt, Charles A., and Lisa R. Anderson. "Agendas and Strategic Voting." Southern Economic Journal 65, no. 3 (1999): 622–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00182.x.

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5

Holt, Charles A., and Lisa R. Anderson. "Agendas and Strategic Voting." Southern Economic Journal 65, no. 3 (1999): 622. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1060821.

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6

Green-Armytage, James. "Strategic voting and nomination." Social Choice and Welfare 42, no. 1 (2013): 111–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3.

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7

Tyszler, Marcelo, and Arthur Schram. "Information and strategic voting." Experimental Economics 19, no. 2 (2015): 360–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9443-2.

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8

Buchanan, James M., and Yong J. Yoon. "All voting is strategic." Public Choice 129, no. 1-2 (2006): 159–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9021-4.

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9

Taylor, Brad R. "Strategic and expressive voting." Constitutional Political Economy 26, no. 2 (2014): 159–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9180-0.

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10

Artabe, Alaitz, and Javier Gardeazabal. "Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals." Political Analysis 22, no. 2 (2014): 243–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt047.

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The random utility model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this article is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calcula

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11

Holliday, Wesley H., and Eric Pacuit. "Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method." Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297 (July 19, 2019): 252–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/eptcs.297.17.

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12

García-Viñuela, Enrique, Joaquín Artés, and Ignacio Jurado. "Strategic voting and non-voting in Spanish elections." Party Politics 21, no. 5 (2013): 738–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068813499869.

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13

Dekel, Eddie, and Michele Piccione. "The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 4 (2014): 164–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.162.

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Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, an

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14

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, and Michele Garagnani. "Voting under time pressure." Judgment and Decision Making 17, no. 5 (2022): 1072–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009335.

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AbstractIn a controlled laboratory experiment we investigate whether time pressure influences voting decisions, and in particular the degree of strategic (insincere) voting. We find that participants under time constraints are more sincere when using the widely-employed Plurality Voting method. That is, time pressure might reduce strategic voting and hence misrepresentation of preferences. However, there are no effects for Approval Voting, in line with arguments that this method provides no incentives for strategic voting.

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15

Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal. "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty." American Political Science Review 79, no. 1 (1985): 62–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956119.

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The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.

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16

Crisp, Brian F., and Betul Demirkaya. "Strategic Entry and Strategic Voting in Majoritarian Systems." Journal of Politics 82, no. 1 (2020): 57–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/705598.

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17

Dutta, Bhaskar, Matthew O. Jackson, and Michel Le Breton. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures." Econometrica 69, no. 4 (2001): 1013–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00228.

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18

Asako, Yasushi. "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting." Journal of Theoretical Politics 31, no. 4 (2019): 626–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875516.

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Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72

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19

Ordeshook, Peter C., and Langche Zeng. "Rational Voters and Strategic Voting." Journal of Theoretical Politics 9, no. 2 (1997): 167–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692897009002002.

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20

Harstad, Bård. "Strategic delegation and voting rules." Journal of Public Economics 94, no. 1-2 (2010): 102–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.09.004.

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21

Alvarez, R. Michael, Frederick J. Boehmke, and Jonathan Nagler. "Strategic voting in British elections." Electoral Studies 25, no. 1 (2006): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2005.02.008.

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22

Herrmann, Michael, and Franz Urban Pappi. "Strategic voting in German constituencies." Electoral Studies 27, no. 2 (2008): 228–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007.

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23

Loewen, Peter John, Kelly Hinton, and Lior Sheffer. "Beauty contests and strategic voting." Electoral Studies 38 (June 2015): 38–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.01.001.

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24

Cox, G. W., and M. S. Shugart. "Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12, no. 2 (1996): 299–324. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023365.

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25

Kselman, Daniel, and Emerson Niou. "Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections." Political Analysis 18, no. 2 (2010): 227–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpp027.

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This paper extends the Calculus of Voting of McKelvey and Ordeshook, providing the first direct derivation of the conditions under which voters will vote strategically: choose their second-most preferred candidate in order to prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning. Addressing this theoretical problem is important, as nearly all empirical research on strategic voting either implicitly or explicitly tests hypotheses which originate from this seminal model. The formal result allows us to isolate the subset of voters to which strategic voting hypotheses properly apply and in turn mot

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26

Chen, Kong-Pin, and Sheng-Zhang Yang. "Strategic Voting in Open Primaries." Public Choice 112, no. 1/2 (2002): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1015618514309.

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27

Morton, S. "Strategic voting in repeated referenda." Social Choice and Welfare 5, no. 1 (1988): 45–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00435497.

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28

Marquardt, Blair B., Brett W. Myers, and Xu Niu. "Strategic voting and insider ownership." Journal of Corporate Finance 51 (August 2018): 50–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.05.002.

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29

Santucci, Jack. "Variants of Ranked-Choice Voting from a Strategic Perspective." Politics and Governance 9, no. 2 (2021): 344–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3955.

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Ranked-choice voting has come to mean a range of electoral systems. Broadly, they can facilitate (a) majority winners in single-seat districts, (b) majority rule with minority representation in multi-seat districts, or (c) majority sweeps in multi-seat districts. Further, such systems can combine with rules to encourage/discourage slate voting. This article describes five major versions used, abandoned, and/or proposed for US public elections: alternative vote, single transferable vote, block-preferential voting, the bottoms-up system, and alternative vote with numbered posts. It then consider

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30

EGGERS, ANDREW C., and NICK VIVYAN. "Who Votes More Strategically?" American Political Science Review 114, no. 2 (2020): 470–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000820.

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Strategic voting is an important explanation for aggregate political phenomena, but we know little about how strategic voting varies across types of voters. Are richer voters more strategic than poorer voters? Does strategic behavior vary with age, education, gender, or political leaning? The answers may be important for assessing how well an electoral system represents different preferences in society. We introduce a new approach to measuring and comparing strategic voting across voters that can be broadly applied, given appropriate survey data. In recent British elections, we find that older

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31

ALVAREZ, R. MICHAEL, and JONATHAN NAGLER. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections." British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1 (2000): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000712340000003x.

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Whether citizens vote strategically, using their votes to defeat their least-preferred candidate, or vote sincerely, voting for their first choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We offer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Secondly, we incorporate a new operationalization of the objective potential for strategic behaviour. We offer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British general elect

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32

Endersby, James W., and Kelly B. Shaw. "Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections: A Simulation of Duverger's Law." PS: Political Science & Politics 42, no. 02 (2009): 393–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096509090532.

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Experiments designed as an election simulation involve participants in an investigation of strategic voting. Participants assigned political preferences and informed of candidate/party positions on an ideological dimension respond to and learn the results of two public opinion polls before voting. When given two alternatives, the participants vote sincerely. Confronted with three or more alternatives, participants make tactical decisions to narrow the field. Strategic behavior quickly reduces the number of alternatives to two. Consistent with Duverger's law, candidate/party viability encourage

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33

PERESS, MICHAEL. "Strategic Voting in Multi-Office Elections." Legislative Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2008): 619–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3162/036298008786403060.

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34

Buchholz, Wolfgang, Alexander Haupt, and Wolfgang Peters. "International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting*." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107, no. 1 (2005): 175–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00401.x.

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35

Tolbert, Caroline J., Daniel A. Smith, and John C. Green. "Strategic Voting and Legislative Redistricting Reform." Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2008): 92–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314201.

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36

Volovik, D., M. Mobilia, and S. Redner. "Dynamics of strategic three-choice voting." EPL (Europhysics Letters) 85, no. 4 (2009): 48003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/85/48003.

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37

Culbert, Gar. "Realizing “strategic” voting in presidential primaries." Rationality and Society 27, no. 2 (2015): 224–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463115576139.

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38

Feddersen, T., and W. Pesendorfer. "Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96, no. 19 (1999): 10572–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.19.10572.

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39

Daoust, Jean-François, and Damien Bol. "Polarization, Partisan Preferences and Strategic Voting." Government and Opposition 55, no. 4 (2018): 578–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.42.

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AbstractIn this article, we study how polarization affects the propensity of supporters of non-viable parties to cast a strategic vote. To do so, we rely on Canadian election panel surveys from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project that were specifically designed to identify strategic voting. We find that the polarization between viable parties increases the probability of a supporter of a non-viable party casting a strategic vote, because it increases how much she likes her favourite viable party, and decreases how much she dislikes her least favourite viable party. Polarization thus in

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40

Meffert, Michael F., and Thomas Gschwend. "Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria." Electoral Studies 29, no. 3 (2010): 339–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.005.

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41

GEISZ, STEVEN F. "An Indirect Argument for Strategic Voting." Journal of Applied Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2006): 433–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00343.x.

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42

Lago, Ignacio. "Strategic voting in proportional representation systems." Party Politics 18, no. 5 (2011): 653–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068810389638.

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43

Xefteris, Dimitrios. "Strategic voting when participation is costly." Games and Economic Behavior 116 (July 2019): 122–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.010.

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44

Apesteguia, Jose, Miguel A. Ballester, and Yusufcan Masatlioglu. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting." Games and Economic Behavior 87 (September 2014): 91–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.006.

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45

Eraslan, Hülya, and Andrew McLennan. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures." Journal of Economic Theory 117, no. 1 (2004): 29–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005.

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46

Núñez, Matías. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting." Economic Theory 56, no. 1 (2013): 157–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x.

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47

MacIntyre, Ian. "The Pareto rule and strategic voting." Theory and Decision 31, no. 1 (1991): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00134130.

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48

Bartholdi, John J., and James B. Orlin. "Single transferable vote resists strategic voting." Social Choice and Welfare 8, no. 4 (1991): 341–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00183045.

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49

Austen-Smith, David. "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas." American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (1987): 1323–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962591.

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The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical wo

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50

Maškarinec, Pavel. "Ticket splitting, strategic voting and personal vote in the 2012 Mongolian elections." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 3 (2018): 235–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.08.002.

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This article examines ticket splitting under Mongolia's new mixed-member majoritarian system used for the elections in 2012, reaching several conclusions. First, we confirm that strategic ticket splitting depends on party size, as especially candidates of larger parties receive, on average, more district votes. Second, we show that strategic voting is not a universal phenomenon under the Mongolian mixed-member majoritarian system. Finally, as personal vote rather than strategic voting generally influences electoral behaviour of Mongolian voters at the district level, we hypothesize that instit

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