Relevant bibliographies by topics / Strawson, P. F

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Academic literature on the topic 'Strawson, P. F'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Strawson, P. F"

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Gomes, Anil. "Snapshot: P. F. Strawson." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 84 (2019): 48–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20198411.

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Campbell, Joe. "P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7, no. 1 (April 17, 2017): 26–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-006011220.

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This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the core assumption: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the core assumption. Strawson’s critiques of incompatibilism and free will skepticism are not intended to provide rational justifications for either compatibilism or the claim that some persons have free will. Hence, the charge that Strawson’s “arguments” are faulty is misplaced. The core assumption resting behind such critiques is mistaken.
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Grover, Dorothy. "The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson." International Philosophical Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2000): 105–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200040162.

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Harré, Rom. "The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson." International Studies in Philosophy 35, no. 4 (2003): 274–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil2003354100.

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Bezuidenhout, Anne L., L. E. Hahn, and P. F. Strawson. "The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson." Philosophical Review 110, no. 3 (July 2001): 460. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2693664.

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Bezuidenhout, A. L. "THE PHILOSOPHY OF P. F. STRAWSON." Philosophical Review 110, no. 3 (July 1, 2001): 460–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-3-460.

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Martens, David B. "In Memory of P. F. Strawson (1919–2006)." South African Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 3 (January 2008): 163–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2008.10751635.

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Rateau, Paul. "P. F. Strawson et la critique des monades." Philosophie N° 150, no. 3 (April 22, 2021): 17–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/philo.150.0017.

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Rainey, Stephen. "Austin, Grice and Strawson." Essays in Philosophy 8, no. 1 (2007): 182–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip20078123.

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Austin discusses the supposed opposition between performative and constative utterances in a paper delivered to a French audience in 1962 entitled Performative—Constative. It is his aim in this paper in a sense to recant his earlier views that such a distinction was clear. A translation of this paper made by G. J. Warnock appeared in 1972 in a collection of essays on the philosophy of language, edited by John Searle. Alongside this translation were criticisms and comments by P. F. Strawson and H. P. Grice. Taken altogether, I regard these papers as containing several important insights that have informed contemporary notions regarding meaning and communication, particularly as they are thought of by Brandom and Habermas. I follow the course of Austin's discussion in assessing the status of the distinction that gives his paper its name and consider its merits, as well as drawing upon some of Strawson's and Grice's thoughts on the matter. After these discussions, I hope that it shall be clear how indebted to these past thinkers are those important theorists of our time.
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Miller, Dale E. ""Freedom and Resentment" and Consequentialism." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8, no. 2 (June 5, 2017): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v8i2.79.

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In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” according to which the essay advances the thesis that good consequences are the “wrong kind of reason” to justify “practices of punishment and moral responsibility.” Darwall names this thesis “Strawson’s Point.” I argue for a different reading of Strawson, one according to which he holds this thesis only in a qualified way and, more generally, is not the unequivocal critic of consequentialism that Darwall makes him out to be. In fact, I contend, Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes can potentially be a useful resource for consequentialists.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Strawson, P. F"

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Gelain, Itamar Luís. "Metafísica descritiva e ceticismo em P. F. Strawson." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2016. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/168079.

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Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2016.
Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-20T04:51:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 339911.pdf: 1068505 bytes, checksum: e449767487c77823d554290c07275ff3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016
Esta tese procura examinar se a metafísica descritiva de P. F. Strawson produz provas anticéticas ou se sua tarefa é mais modesta enquanto se preocupa em descrever o enraizamento dos conceitos, bem como a conexão destes no interior do esquema conceitual. No primeiro capítulo apresentaremos o projeto de metafísica descritiva a partir do confronto com a metafísica revisionista, com a análise conceitual e com o historicismo. No segundo capítulo mostraremos, a partir de Individuals, que a metafísica descritiva de Strawson não tinha fins anticéticos, pois o objetivo dos argumentos transcendentais não é refutar o cético, mas promover a elucidação do esquema conceitual. No terceiro capítulo analisaremos as críticas dirigidas ao naturalismo de Strawson bem como o papel deste na metafísica descritiva. Defendemos nessa tese que Strawson não construiu argumentos transcendentais anticéticos como sugere Stroud. O máximo que Strawson faz, por meio da argumentação transcendental, é mostrar o enraizamento e a indispensabilidade de alguns conceitos para o esquema conceitual e o quanto estamos comprometidos com eles. Além disso, se há uma estratégia anticética que Strawson defende desde suas primeiras obras filosóficas, essa é o naturalismo. No entanto, esse naturalismo deixa aberta a possibilidade do ceticismo, uma vez que o seu objetivo central não é em última instância refutar o ceticismo, mas, sim, auxiliar a metafísica descritiva a demonstrar as (inter)dependências conceituais e o enraizamento de determinadas crenças e conceitos no nosso esquema conceitual.

Abstract : This thesis examines whether the descriptive metaphysics of P. F. Strawson produces anti-skeptical evidence or whether the task is more modest as he cares to describe the roots of the concepts as well as the connection of these within the conceptual scheme. In the first chapter we will present the descriptive metaphysics project from opposing it to the revisionist metaphysics, the conceptual analysis and historicism. In the second chapter we will show, from Individuals that Strawson´s descriptive metaphysics did not have anti-skeptical purposes, once the purpose of transcendental arguments is not to refute the skeptic one, but promote the elucidation of the conceptual scheme. In the third chapter we will analyze the criticisms of Strawson's naturalism and the role of the descriptive metaphysics. We defend Strawson did not build anti-skeptical transcendental arguments as Stroud suggests. In the maximum, Strawson shows through the transcendental argument the roots and the indispensability of some concepts for the conceptual scheme and how we are committed to them. Also, if there is an anti-skeptical strategy Strawson argues from his first philosophical works, that is naturalism. However, this naturalism leaves open the possibility of skepticism, once its main purpose is not ultimately refute skepticism, but assist descriptive metaphysics in explaining the conceptual (inter)dependence and roots of certain beliefs and concepts on our conceptual scheme.
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Pereira, Fredes Esteban. "Isaiah Berlin y P. F. Strawson : antecedentes del pluralismo en la tradición analítica de la filosofía." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2011. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/111019.

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Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)
La noción de pluralismo ha tenido una amplia recepción no solo en la literatura especializada en filosofía, sino que en la mayoría de las disciplinas que reflexionan sobre lo humano. Desde el último cuarto del siglo XX, una afirmación estándar en los ámbitos filosófico y jurídico es recalcar que es indispensable la aceptación y valoración de la diversidad humana. Aunque no siempre es claro qué exactamente se reclama, pero sí es incontrovertible su necesidad. Asimismo, el debate político cotidiano se nutre de este concepto, emplazando al ordenamiento jurídico a reconocer las distintas identidades que forman parte de la sociedad contemporánea, situada en contextos complejos de interacción y desarrollo cultural. Pocos autores reconocen sus sospechas frente a la valoración de la diversidad humana, pero no han despejado la oscuridad conceptual que aqueja al término pluralismo. En lo que sigue, intentaré desarrollar parte de los antecedentes que sirvieron de fundamento al entendimiento del pluralismo en la primera década del siglo XXI. Circunscribiré mi investigación a las contribuciones al pluralismo en las obras de sir Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) y sir P. F. Strawson (1919-2006); los dos pensadores de la Universidad de Oxford que alcanzaron mayor repercusión y prestigio internacional durante el siglo XX, como representantes de la tradición analítica en filosofía. Esta elección descansa en razones tanto de corte conceptual como institucional. Conceptuales, pues existe un parecido de familia que comparten sus posiciones en su rechazo al privilegio epistémico del pensamiento monista de la ciencia defendido desde principios del siglo XIX y su celebración de la diversidad de lo humano, como un aspecto normativamente deseable para nuestra civilización. Por el otro lado, mi formación académica en filosofía se inició en torno a tradición filosófica anglosajona, gozando del privilegio de estudiar con un heredero directo de sir P. F. Strawson, y cuya reflexión ha tenido por foco la legitimidad filosófica de las distintas formas en que se manifiesta la diversidad de lo humano.
Elaborada en el marco del Proyecto de Investigación FONDECYT Nº 1050348 “Pluralismo, igualdad jurídica y diversidad valorativa”.
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Walker, Kyle. "Moral Responsibility "Expressivism," Luck, and Revision." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/119.

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In his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment," Peter Strawson attempts to reconcile incompatibilism and compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. First, I present the error committed by the proponents of both these traditional views, which Strawson diagnoses as the source of their standoff, and the remedy Strawson offers to avoid the conflict. Second, I reconstruct the two arguments Strawson offers for a theory of moral responsibility that is based on his proposed remedy. Third, I present and respond to two proposed problems for the Strawsonian theory: moral luck and revisionism. I conclude with a summary of my defense of Strawsonian “expressivism” about moral responsibility, and offer suggestions for further research.
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"康德圖式法疑難及其現代批判." Thesis, 2011. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6075438.

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仲輝.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-164)
Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web.
Abstracts in Chinese and English.
Zhong Hui.
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Books on the topic "Strawson, P. F"

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Conrad, Sarah-Jane, and Silvan Imhof, eds. P. F. Strawson - Ding und Begriff / Object and Concept. Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110323702.

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Conrad, Sarah-Jane, and Silvan Imhof. P. F. Strawson e Ding und Begriff / Object and Concept. De Gruyter, Inc., 2010.

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Hahn, Lewis Edwin, and P. F. Strawson. The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson: The Library of Living Philosophers Volume XXVI (Library of Living Philosophers). Open Court, 1999.

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Russell, Paul. Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.003.0003.

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In “Freedom and Resentment” P. F. Strawson interprets the “Pessimist” as one who claims that if determinism is true then the attitudes and practices associated with moral responsibility cannot be justified and must be abandoned altogether. Against the pessimist Strawson argues that no reasoning of any sort could lead us to abandon or suspend our “reactive attitudes.” He claims that responsibility is a “given” of human life and society—something which we are inescapably committed to. This chapter argues that Strawson’s reply to the pessimist is seriously flawed. In particular, he fails to distinguish two very different forms or modes of naturalism and he is constrained by the nature of his own objectives (i.e., the refutation of pessimism) to embrace the stronger and far less plausible form of naturalism.
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Russell, Paul. Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.003.0005.

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This chapter discusses an important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free will debates, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This chapter disentangles three strands of Strawson’s argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson’s view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson’s view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The chapter concludes with suggestions of how a reactive attitude approach to moral responsibility that builds on the work of Strawson, Wallace, and others might be successfully developed.
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Hieronymi, Pamela. Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194035.001.0001.

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P. F. Strawson was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, and his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment” is one of the most influential in modern moral philosophy, prompting responses across multiple disciplines, from psychology to sociology. This book closely reexamines Strawson's paper and concludes that his argument has been underestimated and misunderstood. Line by line, the book carefully untangles the complex strands of Strawson's ideas. After elucidating his conception of moral responsibility and his division between “reactive” and “objective” responses to the actions and attitudes of others, the book turns to its central argument. Strawson argues that, because determinism is an entirely general thesis, true of everyone at all times, its truth does not undermine moral responsibility. The book finds the two common interpretations of this argument, “the simple Humean interpretation” and “the broadly Wittgensteinian interpretation” both deficient. Drawing on Strawson's wider work in logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics, the book concludes that the argument rests on an implicit, and previously overlooked, metaphysics of morals, one grounded in Strawson's “social naturalism.” The final chapter defends this naturalistic picture against objections. The book sheds new light on Strawson's thinking and has profound implications for future work on free will, moral responsibility, and metaethics. It also features the complete text of Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment.”
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Longworth, Guy. Surveying the Facts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0012.

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This chapter discusses some central themes in a dispute between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson over the nature of truth. The dispute is of contemporary interest in part because it prefigures elements in a more recent discussion concerning the objects of perceptual experience, between for example Charles Travis and John McDowell. The dispute turned in particular on a pair of Austin’s claims: (i) that facts are able to serve as truth-makers for some statements; and (ii) that facts are (in at least some cases) worldly particulars that are capable of being perceived. The chapter considers arguments deriving from the work of Strawson and Zeno Vendler that are widely held to have undermined (i) and (ii) and shows that those arguments fail to decide the issue.
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Deigh, John. Psychopathic Resentment. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878597.003.0005.

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Recent philosophical accounts of resentment make being a moral agent, that is, being someone who has a conscience, a condition for being liable to resentment. The argument of this essay opposes these accounts. The essay describes characters from two Hitchcock films, Shadow of a Doubt and Strangers on a Train, to illustrate the problem of taking moral agency or having a conscience as a condition for being liable to resentment. Both are psychopathic killers who are resentful of people they perceive as having mistreated them. The essay then uses the account of reactive attitudes and their role in interpersonal relations that P. F. Strawson offered in his “Freedom and Resentment” to explain the liability to resentment of psychopaths despite their lacking a conscience.
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Hutchison, Katrina. Moral Responsibility, Respect, and Social Identity. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190609610.003.0009.

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P. F. Strawson draws a distinction between what he calls the “participant stance” that people take toward those they regard as morally responsible agents, and the “objective stance” they take toward those who are not. This chapter explores the role these two stances play in oppressive moral responsibility practices. The argument has three parts. Section 2 argues it is better to regard the participant and objective stance as opposite ends of a spectrum, with many social interactions involving a stance somewhere between. Section 3 explores what sort of respect is involved in the two stances; it argues that the objective stance involves recognition respect for the person toward whom it is directed as a person. The participant stance involves recognition respect, but it also involves appraisal respect for the agent’s moral capacities. The final section 4 applies these insights to a set of cases involving oppressive moral responsibility practices.
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Pereboom, Derk. Transcendental Arguments. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.18.

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This article explores Immanuel Kant’s transcendental argument in philosophy. According to Kant, a transcendental argument begins with a compelling first premise about our thought, experience, knowledge, or practice, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a substantive and unobvious presupposition and necessary condition of the truth of this premise, or as he sometimes puts it, of the possibility of this premise’s being true. Transcendental arguments are typically directed against skepticism of some kind. For example, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction targets Humean skepticism about the applicability of a priori metaphysical concepts, and his Refutation of Idealism takes aim at skepticism about an external world. The article first considers the nature of transcendental arguments before analysing a number of specific transcendental arguments, including Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Refutation of Idealism. It also discusses contemporary arguments, such as those forwarded by P. F. Strawson and and Christine Korsgaard, together with their problems and prospects.
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Book chapters on the topic "Strawson, P. F"

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Glock, Hans-Johann. "P. F. Strawson." In Analytic Philosophy, 214–28. New York : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315733050-14.

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Lyons, Johnny. "Berlin and P. F. Strawson on Freedom." In Isaiah Berlin and his Philosophical Contemporaries, 125–71. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73178-6_4.

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Schwab, Daniel. "Optimismus in Sachen Vereinbarkeit von Determinismus und moralischer Praxis (2) – P. F. Strawson." In Umwege zur Freiheit, 97–110. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62209-4_10.

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"Truth (P. F. Strawson)." In The Nature of Truth. The MIT Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4884.003.0034.

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"P. F. Strawson: Individuals." In Central Works of Philosophy v5, 62–85. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315712239-9.

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"P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”." In Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals, 107–34. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9780691200972-010.

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"P. F. Strawson FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT." In Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory, 661–76. Routledge, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203723746-76.

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Hieronymi, Pamela. "Addressing the Crucial Objection." In Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals, 51–70. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194035.003.0006.

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This chapter focuses on the crucial objection, in which P. F. Strawson's question on whether people should use their resource at all times remains unanswered and left untouched. It points out Strawson's refusal to address the crucial objection and instead turns to make explicit another further point. It describes how Strawson moved from the claim that people are not always capable of suspending the reactive attitudes to the claim that people actually do in the case of the outliers because ordinary relating is impossible. However, the chapter argues that since ordinary relating is actual and determinism is already true, then being determined in whatever sense it specifies does not render ordinary relating impossible. It also mentions Strawson's conclusion that determinism and ordinary relating is not among the reasons for which people exempt outliers.
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Hieronymi, Pamela. "The Resource and the Role of Statistics." In Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals, 23–36. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194035.003.0004.

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This chapter confirms whether the truth of determinism could, would, or should lead people to exercise the resource available to them and react normally in the way people characteristically react to the outliers. It explains P. F. Strawson's initial admission that it does not seem to be self-contradictory to suppose people would always use their resource. It also reflects on Strawson's thought, implying that to be engaged in anything like interpersonal relationships is to expect some sort of regard or goodwill from others. The chapter also analyzes how Strawson can and should allow expectations to change in their content and corresponding reactions to change in their tone. It speculates the thought of a human society in which there were no expectations of goodwill and no distinctive sort of reaction to failures of expectations.
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Bakhurst, David. "The Spirit of Pragmatism in the Quads of Oxford." In The Practical Turn. British Academy, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266168.003.0006.

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This chapter discusses the influence of pragmatism in Oxford in the second half of the twentieth century. It begins by identifying five characteristic components of pragmatism: (1) a doxastic theory of truth; (2) a broadly empiricist account of meaning; (3) a fallibilist, dynamic, inquiry-centred account of knowledge; (4) a hostility to dualism; and (5) an affirmation of the primacy of practice. It then shows that each of these ideas finds expression in the writings of one of the great figures of Oxford philosophy—P. F. Strawson. Nevertheless, it argues that there are aspects of Strawson’s conception of philosophy—particularly his commitment to descriptive metaphysics—that are alien to the spirit of pragmatism in a way that reflects something deep about the style of Oxford philosophy of the period.
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