Relevant bibliographies by topics / Strawson, P. F / Books

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Strawson, P. F.

Books on the topic 'Strawson, P. F'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 15 books for your research on the topic 'Strawson, P. F.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse books on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

Conrad, Sarah-Jane, and Silvan Imhof, eds. P. F. Strawson - Ding und Begriff / Object and Concept. Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110323702.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conrad, Sarah-Jane, and Silvan Imhof. P. F. Strawson e Ding und Begriff / Object and Concept. De Gruyter, Inc., 2010.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Hahn, Lewis Edwin, and P. F. Strawson. The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson: The Library of Living Philosophers Volume XXVI (Library of Living Philosophers). Open Court, 1999.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Russell, Paul. Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.003.0003.

Full text

Abstract:

In “Freedom and Resentment” P. F. Strawson interprets the “Pessimist” as one who claims that if determinism is true then the attitudes and practices associated with moral responsibility cannot be justified and must be abandoned altogether. Against the pessimist Strawson argues that no reasoning of any sort could lead us to abandon or suspend our “reactive attitudes.” He claims that responsibility is a “given” of human life and society—something which we are inescapably committed to. This chapter argues that Strawson’s reply to the pessimist is seriously flawed. In particular, he fails to distinguish two very different forms or modes of naturalism and he is constrained by the nature of his own objectives (i.e., the refutation of pessimism) to embrace the stronger and far less plausible form of naturalism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Russell, Paul. Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.003.0005.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter discusses an important class of new compatibilist theories of agency and responsibility, frequently referred to as reactive attitude theories. Such theories have their roots in another seminal essay of modern free will debates, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This chapter disentangles three strands of Strawson’s argument—rationalist, naturalist, and pragmatic. It also considers other recent reactive attitude views that have attempted to remedy flaws in Strawson’s view, focusing particularly on the view of R. Jay Wallace. Wallace supplies an account of moral capacity, which is missing in Strawson’s view, in terms of an account of what Wallace calls “reflective self-control.” The chapter concludes with suggestions of how a reactive attitude approach to moral responsibility that builds on the work of Strawson, Wallace, and others might be successfully developed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Hieronymi, Pamela. Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691194035.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

P. F. Strawson was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, and his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment” is one of the most influential in modern moral philosophy, prompting responses across multiple disciplines, from psychology to sociology. This book closely reexamines Strawson's paper and concludes that his argument has been underestimated and misunderstood. Line by line, the book carefully untangles the complex strands of Strawson's ideas. After elucidating his conception of moral responsibility and his division between “reactive” and “objective” responses to the actions and attitudes of others, the book turns to its central argument. Strawson argues that, because determinism is an entirely general thesis, true of everyone at all times, its truth does not undermine moral responsibility. The book finds the two common interpretations of this argument, “the simple Humean interpretation” and “the broadly Wittgensteinian interpretation” both deficient. Drawing on Strawson's wider work in logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics, the book concludes that the argument rests on an implicit, and previously overlooked, metaphysics of morals, one grounded in Strawson's “social naturalism.” The final chapter defends this naturalistic picture against objections. The book sheds new light on Strawson's thinking and has profound implications for future work on free will, moral responsibility, and metaethics. It also features the complete text of Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment.”

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Longworth, Guy. Surveying the Facts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0012.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter discusses some central themes in a dispute between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson over the nature of truth. The dispute is of contemporary interest in part because it prefigures elements in a more recent discussion concerning the objects of perceptual experience, between for example Charles Travis and John McDowell. The dispute turned in particular on a pair of Austin’s claims: (i) that facts are able to serve as truth-makers for some statements; and (ii) that facts are (in at least some cases) worldly particulars that are capable of being perceived. The chapter considers arguments deriving from the work of Strawson and Zeno Vendler that are widely held to have undermined (i) and (ii) and shows that those arguments fail to decide the issue.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Deigh, John. Psychopathic Resentment. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878597.003.0005.

Full text

Abstract:

Recent philosophical accounts of resentment make being a moral agent, that is, being someone who has a conscience, a condition for being liable to resentment. The argument of this essay opposes these accounts. The essay describes characters from two Hitchcock films, Shadow of a Doubt and Strangers on a Train, to illustrate the problem of taking moral agency or having a conscience as a condition for being liable to resentment. Both are psychopathic killers who are resentful of people they perceive as having mistreated them. The essay then uses the account of reactive attitudes and their role in interpersonal relations that P. F. Strawson offered in his “Freedom and Resentment” to explain the liability to resentment of psychopaths despite their lacking a conscience.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Hutchison, Katrina. Moral Responsibility, Respect, and Social Identity. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190609610.003.0009.

Full text

Abstract:

P. F. Strawson draws a distinction between what he calls the “participant stance” that people take toward those they regard as morally responsible agents, and the “objective stance” they take toward those who are not. This chapter explores the role these two stances play in oppressive moral responsibility practices. The argument has three parts. Section 2 argues it is better to regard the participant and objective stance as opposite ends of a spectrum, with many social interactions involving a stance somewhere between. Section 3 explores what sort of respect is involved in the two stances; it argues that the objective stance involves recognition respect for the person toward whom it is directed as a person. The participant stance involves recognition respect, but it also involves appraisal respect for the agent’s moral capacities. The final section 4 applies these insights to a set of cases involving oppressive moral responsibility practices.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Pereboom, Derk. Transcendental Arguments. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.18.

Full text

Abstract:

This article explores Immanuel Kant’s transcendental argument in philosophy. According to Kant, a transcendental argument begins with a compelling first premise about our thought, experience, knowledge, or practice, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a substantive and unobvious presupposition and necessary condition of the truth of this premise, or as he sometimes puts it, of the possibility of this premise’s being true. Transcendental arguments are typically directed against skepticism of some kind. For example, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction targets Humean skepticism about the applicability of a priori metaphysical concepts, and his Refutation of Idealism takes aim at skepticism about an external world. The article first considers the nature of transcendental arguments before analysing a number of specific transcendental arguments, including Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Refutation of Idealism. It also discusses contemporary arguments, such as those forwarded by P. F. Strawson and and Christine Korsgaard, together with their problems and prospects.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Collins, John, and Tamara Dobler, eds. Reply to Guy Longworth. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0023.

Full text

Abstract:

Starting in about 2004 John McDowell and I have engaged in a debate. There have been a number of public exchanges, and quite a few more private ones. In my view, some progress has been made (though the debate continues). Others may disagree (the ‘law of diminishing fleas’). I, at any rate, think I have learned from him. Guy Longworth does us both the honour of comparing our debate to one a half century earlier between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Honours apart, I think he has pointed to an illuminating connection between what I have long thought the main issue and another. If I had been asked what question McDowell and I had been (most centrally) debating, I would have said: it is the question how enjoying an experience of perceiving (e.g., of seeing) can make judging one thing or another intelligibly rational (that last term lifted from McDowell). I have a story to tell which is, in one key respect, sparser than his. To telegraph, he thinks such experience must have (representational) content. I think, not just that it needn’t, but that if it did, we would be cut off from ...

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Deigh, John. Reactive Attitudes Revisited: A Modest Revision. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878597.003.0006.

Full text

Abstract:

The essay offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” on which attributions of moral responsibility presuppose a practice of holding people morally responsible for their actions, and what explains the practice is our liability to such reactive attitudes as resentment and indignation. The interpretation is offered to correct a common misinterpretation of Strawson’s essay. On this common misinterpretation, attributions of moral responsibility are implicit in the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation, and consequently our liability to these attitudes cannot explain these attributions. The reason this is a misinterpretation of Strawson’s essay is that Strawson’s compatibilist solution to the free will problem requires that our liability to the reactive attitudes be conceptually prior to our attributions of moral responsibility.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

McKenna, Michael, and Paul Russell. Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment'. Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Russell, Paul. Responsibility, Naturalism, and “The Morality System”. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.003.0006.

Full text

Abstract:

Even those who follow the general strategy of P. F. Strawson’s enormously influential “Freedom and Resentment” accept that his strong naturalist program needs to be substantially modified, if not rejected. An important effort to revise the Strawsonian program has been provided by R. Jay Wallace. This chapter argues that Wallace’s narrow construal of reactive attitudes, as they are involved in holding an agent responsible, comes at too high a cost. Related to this point, it is also argued that Wallace’s narrow conception of responsibility is a product of his effort to construct his account within the confines of the morality system and that this way of construing responsibility turns on a series of unnecessary and misleading oppositions. A more plausible middle path, it is maintained, can be found between Strawson’s excessively strong naturalist program and Wallace’s narrow and restrictive view of responsibility.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Coates, D. Justin, and Neal A. Tognazzini, eds. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 5. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830238.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

No one has written more insightfully on the promises and perils of human agency than Gary Watson, who has spent a career thinking about issues such as moral responsibility, blame, free will, weakness of will, addiction, and psychopathy. The chapters of this volume pay tribute to Watson’s work by taking up and extending themes from his pioneering essays. Themes covered include:: compatibilist views of freedom and moral responsibility, the distinction between attributability and accountability, the responsibility of psychopaths, the nature of blame and its relationship to morality, the relevance of addiction to responsibility, the continuing influence of P. F. Strawson’s work, the connection between criminal and moral responsibility, the philosophical development of Gary Watson and the ways Watson’s views have changed over time. Contributors include: Michael McKenna, Susan Wolf, Pamela Hieronymi, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, T. M. Scanlon, Jeanette Kennett, Antony Duff, Gideon Yaffe, Gary Watson, Sarah Buss, Neal Tognazzini, and D. Justin Coates.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!