Journal articles on the topic 'Swedish Foreign opinion'

The article analyzes a set of problems related to Sweden’s planned accession to NATO. The author examines the impact on this process of various factors, both foreign and domestic, analyzes the processes of public opinion formation (pages dedicated to the annual representative security conference in January 2023 in Stockholm). Among them, Turkish-Swedish relations occupy a special place, since Turkey, as a NATO member, puts forward to Sweden a number of conditions dictated by the interests of the Turkish Republic itself and affecting Sweden’s immigration policy. They concern both the fate of the Kurdish community in Sweden, and the willingness or unwillingness of the Swedish authorities to adjust their actions against Muslim communities in this northern country under pressure from Turkey (in this regard, the immediate and long-term consequences of such provocative acts as the public burning of the Koran in Stockholm are being considered). The article also shows how the topical problems of Sweden’s foreign policy affect domestic political processes. The author comes to the conclusion that it is possible to analyze the problem of Sweden’s accession to NATO only in the context of analyzing the processes in the entire system of modern international relations

This article offers a new perspective on the Swedish protests against the Vietnam War by placing it in its broader global Cold War context. As a case study on ‘people's diplomacy’ and ‘united front strategy’, it acknowledges the importance of Chinese and Vietnamese influences on the peace campaigns in Sweden and aims, as far as possible, to reconstruct Hanoi's motives, strategies and actions to create and direct Sweden's policy and opinion on the war. With the extremely generous political freedoms granted it by official Sweden, Hanoi was able to find new international allies as well as organise political propaganda manifestations from their Stockholm base. In the end, North Vietnam's version of the war as being about national liberation fought by a people united in their resistance to a foreign, genocidal, aggressor won a large enough share of the opinion in the West to force the American political leadership to give up the fight. Hanoi's Diplomatic Front in Sweden was one of the important battlefields behind that victory

This rejoinder article takes the contributions in the Special Issue of Cooperation and Conflict – Vol. 46(3) – on Neutrality and ‘Military Non-Alignment’ as point of departure for a discussion of some of the problems former neutrals face in shaping their foreign and security policies. The author argues that current and future developments regarding neutrality norms are dependent on internal factors such as national identity and public opinion, and on external factors such as the military non-aligned states’ relationships to EU, NATO and, not least, the UN. The possibility of a ‘Second Option’ of full-scale military cooperation if a preferred neutral position fails is discussed. Increased UN activism, for example, connected with the R2P concept and the tendency to outsource major UN-mandated military operations to NATO, is touched upon as well as the Libya crisis of 2011 and some of its implications for European foreign and security policy cooperation. Special attention is given to current Swedish debates on military non-alignment and NATO membership.

The article presents an overview of modern international studies of the problem of activation of professional self-determination of high school students. The results of the study conducted by Chinese scientists aimed at studying cognitive and affective self-esteem and their role in building the educational and professional path of high school students are presented. The effectiveness of applying relevant interventions in the classroom to enhance the professional interest of high school students in STEM professions, a model that combines natural sciences and engineering subjects into a single system, is analyzed in comparison to the study conducted in Germany. Mentoring is considered as a mechanism for professional self-determination in high school, contributing, in the opinion of Swedish scientists, to solving the problem of a shortage of specialists in the labor market. The article gives a comparative analysis of the systems of academic training and initial vocational education, which provides graduates with a smooth transition to the modern labor market. The experience of Denmark is analyzed, which is an institutional context for the study of inequality associated with vocational education.

Introduction. The author examines the insufficiently studied period of diplomatic communicationsof the Moscow Tsardom and the Crimean Khanate after Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov’s enthronement, which led to establishing relatively peaceful mutual relations between them at the final stage of military and political confrontation of Russia with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Swedish Crown. Materials. The paper reveals the circumstances of establishing contractual relations between Moscow and Bakhchysarai on the basis of unpublished sources. The information from the columns of 1613–1614 about the stay of the embassy of A. Lodyzhensky and P. Danilov in the Crimea from autumn of 1613 to July 1614, the preparation and holding of the embassy congress and exchange of ambassadors at Livny in August 1614, the stay of the embassy of Prince G.K. Volkonsky and P. Ovdokimov in the Crimea in August 1614 – June 1615, the stay of Magmet Chelebi’s embassy in Moscow in September 1614 – March 1615 and, finally, the embassy exchange under Valuyki in July 1615 form a single set of documents that let us trace the course of diplomatic relations between the Moscow Tsardom and the Crimean Khanate in 1613–1615. The decisive stage in difficult and tense diplomatic negotiations of the parties in this period, in our opinion, is the stay of the embassy of Prince Grigory Konstantinovich Volkonsky and clerk Peter Ovdokimov in the Crimea. Results. This article shows the role of relations with the Crimea in general foreign policy of the government of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and in the restoration of military and political control over the Lower Volga Region territory.

The American scientist R. Tyler formulated the concept of “libertarian paternalism”, which outlined a strategy aimed at ensuring that a person makes optimal choices dictated by reasons, not feelings. These ideas formed the basis of the “nudge theory”. In this article, we make an attempt to consider the possibility of using the concept of pushing with reference to the urgent problems of today - the development of environmental patriotism in people. The concept of "environmental patriotism" reflects not only an active life position on the protection and restoration of nature, but also active participation in specific activities to strengthen environmental well-being. Ecological patriotism today is a real factor aimed at neutralizing the environmental challenges and threats of our time. The nudge theory with the development of environmental patriotism can be demonstrated by the example of the inclusion of a person’s individual resources, which in turn explains what exactly “shifts” in the process of pushing and makes a person make his choice: – Natural resources of a person: understanding the impact of the ecological situation on personal health, a clear vision of the essence of the influence of specific natural factors on the well-being, lifestyle and life expectancy of an individual, when any harm caused to nature is returned by a boomerang to different systems of the human body (the famous Russian saying is «more expensive for yourself» discloses this aspect well). For today researches conducted by the authors of the article show that so many people are united by the idea that their health is directly related to the ecology of the region in which they live. Through “encourage” we must try to do everything possible so that installations of this kind become a constant possession of environmental consciousness and the environmentally friendly behavior of people; – Personality orientation: awareness of the solidarity of their environmental positions and actions, their thoughts with the opinions and attitudes of other people and hence their social significance; – Skills and competencies: presentation of the possibilities of using one’s potentials to protect the environment, ensure its prosperity, to develop its talents that are somehow related to the natural world, for the prosperity of the environment; – Self-esteem and social status: the desire for high self-esteem, which necessarily includes elements of awareness of the role of “me” in the transformation of the world, in achieving harmonious unity with nature; – Communicative resources of the individual: a desire to interact with other people about the vital values that environmental activity is filled with because of its social and personal benefits (the popularity of various options for the “green” campaign in the West eloquently illustrates this). Today shows that it is not necessary to rely only on the consciousness and responsibility of citizens in the formation of a reasonable attitude to nature. The above positions and attitudes become that internal foundation on which a careful attitude of man to nature can be nurtured. In our opinion, the image of the planet’s environmental defender, the Swedish schoolgirl G. Thunberg, is often used today by foreign media and politicians precisely in con-nection with his (image) ability to encourage even poorly informed young people to appropriate behavior. The demonstrations and demonstrations held in defense of G. Thunberg's positions in many European countries have convincingly confirmed this.

The subject of the study is the decrypted telegrams of Swedish diplomatic missions sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Kingdom K. Wallenberg, intercepted by the special services of the General Staff of the Russian Army at the end of 1915-1916. Sweden, while remaining a formally neutral power, nevertheless not only closely followed the events on the fronts of the First World War, but also conducted active trade and provided transit services to both Germany and Russia, deriving huge economic benefits from this situation. The documents of this period mainly cover the events in the Balkans, where the allied forces of the Entente tried to deploy the so-called Salonika (Macedonian) front to help the Serbian army and to divert enemy forces from other fronts. Based on the methods of historicism and systematic research, the reports of diplomats who informed their leadership about the events around Thessaloniki, about the situation and actions of the allied forces and the troops of the Central Powers, about the further intentions of the opposing forces, about the fate of Serbia and Montenegro, express assessments and opinions on specific issues and the prospects for the development of the war. Since there were supporters of both the Entente and the Austro-German bloc in the Swedish elite, the following conclusions can be drawn from the documents under consideration. They allow us to assess the range of issues of the most interest to Swedish diplomats and the Swedish government, as well as the degree of their awareness, the quality of information sources and the level of understanding of the content of the events taking place. These documents are very important for clarifying Sweden's position during the First World War. Since there were supporters of both the Entente and the Austro-German bloc in the Swedish elite, it can be understood from the documents under consideration that during this period it became increasingly obvious to Swedish diplomats that despite all the difficulties, including in the Balkans, the preponderance of the Entente countries was more likely. Most of the analyzed archival materials are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

Africa occupies a special position in the foreign policies of the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. In spite of their limited capacities, lack of colonial ties with Africa, or any significant economic interests in Africa, the Nordic countries have attained a relatively high profile, especially in Southern Africa. After Finland and Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, Africa assumed an even greater level of foreign policy significance for the Nordic countries. Most notable in this regard is Finland’s assumption in 1999 of the EU presidency, a position that makes Finland responsible for the negotiations over the continuation of the EU’s Lomé Convention with 71 countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. It is in this context that this article assesses Nordic perceptions of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy toward Africa. It is important to note, however, that there is no one monolithic “Nordic perspective.” The opinions and approaches documented in policy papers or informal statements by individual civil servants following African affairs can widely vary. People working with development cooperation, for example, tend to be more recipient-oriented than those looking at Africa from a more general foreign policy point of view. The tradition of outspoken human rights policy still differentiates Norwegian and Swedish approaches from the cautious policy of Finland. Yet behind these different tones, one can distinguish common premises stemming from the many similarities of the Nordic countries and their conscious efforts to generate coherent, coordinated foreign policies toward Africa.

This paper presents the apparition of modern sport in Ethiopia: in the schools, the military institutions and, as far as football is concerned, in clubs. The foundation of the first local football teams coincides with the raise of the first expressions of an Ethiopian national feeling on the occasion of confrontations against “foreign”, and later Erytrean, teams. After World War II, and through the action of Ydneqatchew Tessema, the first sport institutions of the country are founded. Athletics, which is not yet the vector of the Ethiopian sport nationalism, grows mostly after 1947 with the help of the Swedes. Yet, among the Ethiopian sports of that period, athletics remains in the backstage, restricted to the schools grounds and the military barracks. In accordance with the opinions of the time on the aptitudes of Black people, Ethiopian athletics concentrate then on sprint, and not on long distance races.

AbstractGame-based learning (GBL) is an emerging field reaching new contexts. Research has reported about students’ rich use of digital games and the learning potential of GBL in traditional school subjects. Digital games have been tested as educational tools in various subjects in Swedish schools during the last decade, in areas such as teaching and learning of history and foreign languages. However, there is a lack of detailed research on attitudes toward the use of GBL in history education.Main aim of the study was to examine and discuss attitudes toward an increased use of digital games in formal history education. Earlier studies have analysed students’ opinions and preferences, but this study has a focus on the teacher perspective and on which design factors are important if digital games should be an alternative for self-learning in history education. The research approach has been qualitative cross-sectional study where secondary school teachers have answered questionnaires with open-ended questions on their view of didactics and the use of GBL in formal education. All selected respondents are registered as professional secondary school history teachers. Furthermore, teachers have described their own gaming habits and their game design preferences.Findings show that a majority of the informants have good knowledge about digital games with historical setting and also a positive attitude toward an increased use of GBL. Secondary school teachers also have a tradition of using various media in their teaching and learning activities and there are neither any regulations against an increased use of digital games. An important aspect of history education, where digital games might not the first choice, is in the description of the main changes and influence of a historical époque. Authors’ recommendation is to use games that can enable tangential learning where the gaming sessions could be seen as appetisers for further and deeper learning.

The results of previous demographic research according to the ethnic characteristics of the population clearly point to the need for caution when using data from official ethnostatistics. Censuses and vital statistics form a quantitative basis for calculating ethno-demographic indicators whose interpretations can directly affect the creation of public policies aimed at the legal, political, economic and general social position, not only of members of minority ethnic groups, but also of the entire population. Although census ethnostatistics has been suspended in a large number of developed countries, there is a noticeable increase in interest in quantitative research on popu¬lation demographic characteristics relating to ethnicity. On the other hand, in countries that already have developed census ethnostatistics, there is reasonable doubt about the quality of the data, which leads to a review of the census methodology, starting with definitions and statistical categorisations, and ending with the methods of data collection and publication. So far, the results of population surveys according to ethnic characteristics provide enough space for various interpretations of the data because censuses often represent much more than a statistical record of social reality. This is especially noticeable in statistical categorisations based on ethnic characteristics, assigning censuses a significant role in constructing this reality that additionally reinforces the existing population divides. The collection of statistical data on the ethnic characteristics of the population of Serbia has a long tradition, primarily due to the historically inherited heterogeneous ethnic structure. In censuses during the first half of the 19th century, data on ethnic characteristics were collected only spo¬radically, but after Serbia had gained independence in 1878, ethnostatistics became one of the most important factors in political and overall social activity. Although a direct question about national (then ethnic) affiliation first appeared in the 1866 census, the opinion quickly prevailed that it was strongly influenced by the subjective understanding of ethnic identity, which was often equated with citizenship at that time. That is why language was given priority over ethno-national affiliation because, in addition to being of key importance for the creation of ethno-cultural and national identity, it also proved to be a statistically more objective indicator. From then until today, the ethnic structure of Serbia has changed significantly, but the motives for data collection have remained the same because the ethnostatistical census methodology at that time (as well as today) was based primarily on primor¬dial understandings of ethnicity. According to the current census methodology, it is possible to collect data on three ethno-cultural characteristics of the population: national affiliation (in the ethnic sense), mother tongue and religion. The obtained data can be considered a simple quantification of the subjective declaration of the population according to the ethno-identity concept. The citizenship characteristic in the Serbian census has the status of a legal rather than an ethnic category. The official ethnosta¬tistical nomenclatures used in the 2011 census included 45 modalities of nationality, regionally determined, as well as the group category “other nationalities”; and 36 modalities of the mother tongue, with the group category “other languages”. On the other hand, early statistical documentation points to the conclusion that, in Serbia, there was also an interest in data on the presence of foreigners who, like ethnic minorities, were viewed through the prism of “others”. During the 19th century, censuses periodically contained the question of “subservience”, which can be considered a forerunner of the modern interpretation of citizenship. During the Yu¬goslav phase of census statistics, the record of foreigners was an integral part of all eight censuses, and has remained so in all Serbian censuses from 2002 until today. According to the current census methodology, the Republic of Serbia intends to record permanently settled foreigners, foreigners granted temporary residence, asylum seekers and migrants without established status. The main aim of this research is to clarify the relationship between recording foreigners in Serbia and methodological solutions for collecting data on the ethnic characteristics of the population. Although the official ethnostatistical methodology in Serbia focuses primarily on obtaining data on “ethnic nationality”, the statistical nomenclature by nationality also includes mo¬dalities such as Belgians, French, Danes, Swedes, Italians, Swiss, Finns, Norwegians, and Chinese, whose national identification is mainly determined by the criterion of citizenship rather than ethnic identity. This means that the same group contains data on ethnicity based on two different theoretical understandings of ethnic identity. The statistical classification of the population by nationality gradually expanded after the Second World War. Since the 1981 census, there have been national modalities whose ethnicity is difficult to determine using the methodology applied, which casts doubt on the quality of the data and further complicates their usability. Obtained by the method of crossing data on citizenship, nationality and language affiliation, among other things, the research results show that a certain number of foreigners exercised the right not to declare their nationality. Therefore, the group of undeclared, undecided and unknown includes a relatively large number of citizens of Austria, China, Denmark, Switzerland, France and Great Britain. In these countries, data on ethnicity are not collected at all or are collected according to different definitions of nationality. Following immigration trends in the last inter-census period, it is realistic to expect that the next census will face a problem of ethnic identification of foreign citizens, especially immigrants from countries where ethnicity is understood differently. The presented research results show that the existing ethnostatistical census methodology hampers demographic research of foreigners in Serbia, but also reopens the dilemma of re-examining the quality and use of official ethnostatistical data, especially in the domain of public policies.

Sverige blev medlem i Europeiska unionen (EU) i januari 1995. Medlemskapet har förändrat förutsättningarna för den svenska demokratin i flera hänseenden. Den här artikeln behandlar medlemskapets effekter på svenska konstitutionella förhållanden, inklusive relationen mellan de centrala statsorganen. Därefter diskuteras de svenska partierna och den allmänna opinionens förhållningssätt till EU. Den allmänna opinionen har över tid utvecklats i en betydligt mer EU-positiv riktning. Det gäller dock inte frågor om ytterligare fördjupning av EU eller svensk anslutning till euron. Frågan om hur Sverige samarbetar med andra medlemsstater lyfts fram. Sveriges samarbete med länder i den geografiska närheten är omfattande. Bland de sakfrågor som Sverige har prioriterat som EU-medlem finns konkurrenskraft och den inre marknaden, klimat- och miljöpolitik, de grundläggande värderingarna samt EU:s utvidgning och utrikespolitik. Sverige har varit mindre entusiastiskt över ökade medel till EU:s budget, starkare gemensam social- och arbetsmarknadspolitik, ökad överstatlighet och stärkt försvarssamarbete. De breda framtidsfrågorna, inklusive frågor om institutionell reform, har sällan mötts av större intresse i Sverige. I ljuset av den nu pågående diskussionen om utvidgning och reform av EU vore det rimligt om dessa frågor fick större plats i den svenska debatten. Abstract in English:Sweden and the EU: From Reluctant to Commited EuropeanSweden became a member of the European Union (EU) in January 1995. Membership has affected the conditions for Swedish democracy in several respects. This article deals with the effects of membership on Swedish constitutional arrangements, including the executive-parliamentary relationships. This is followed by a discussion of the role of Swedish political parties and the development of public opinion towards the EU. Over time, public opinion has developed in a much more pro-EU direction. However, this does not apply to questions of further deepening of the EU or to Sweden’s accession to EMU. The issue of how Sweden cooperates with other Member States is highlighted. Sweden’s cooperation with countries in the geographical vicinity is extensive. Issues that Sweden has prioritised as an EU member include competitiveness and the internal market, climate and environmental policy, fundamental values, and the EU’s enlargement and foreign policy. Sweden has been sceptical of an increased EU budget, stronger common social and labour market policies, increased supranationalism and strengthened defence cooperation. Issues concerning the future of the EU, including questions of institutional reform, have rarely been met with greater interest in Sweden. In the light of the current discussion on enlargement and reform of the EU, it would seem logical for these issues to be given greater prominence in the Swedish debate.

When doing cultural history research, the researcher can come across already established opinions of what the history is in a field. Aitologies, lists of heroes and masters, turning point anecdotes and written histories are present as more or less taken for granted within a community. This is a convenient starting-point and background material for a researcher, but can also hide more than it shows by confirming contemporary definitions, power relations, inclusions and exclusions. As an example, I analyse tendencies within Swedish Jazz History by going through interviews made at the Centre for Swedish Folk Music and Jazz Research. A conventional attitude would be to accept the collection as fairly representative: the most important musicians have been interviewed and there is a good sample across different decades. However, in a reading “against the grain” by the use of Katherine Galloway Young’s concepts of Taleworld, storyrealm and interview situation, the interviews stand forward as negotiations of what jazz styles, what musicians and what qualities should be included in the Swedish jazz field and what is to be left out. In this case, foreign born musicians and women musicians are marginalized in Swedish jazz history, as well as styles that can seem to be too commercial. The musicians chosen are either stars, or witnesses to the stars. Working against the grain of the emic Swedish Jazz history is to problematize what has been outdefined and how, to ask counterfactual questions on what could have happened if other discourses had dominated, and reflect on new questions to ask, new definitions of the research object, and the need for new and/or revised documentation.

IT have indeed merged: new empirical data”, Vol 7, No 1 (2017) “Business intelligence, big data andtheory” and Vol 6, No 3 (2016) “What role does technology play for intelligence studies at the start of the21st century?”. Special issues have looked at the problem of IT failures in relation to business intelligence:“How companies succeed and fail to succeed with the implementation of intelligence systems”, Vol 7, No3 (2017) and “How companies work and fail to work with business intelligence, Vol 7, No 2 (2017). Duringthe past years companies have indeed learned from their failures. Maybe this phase was inevitable as apart of growing up. We see the same development on e-commerce sites: they mostly work well now, butdidn’t just a few years ago. A certain difference between countries still exists, but the industry is gettingthere. Closely related to failures of implementation are user perspectives on business intelligencesystems, which have resulted in numerous research articles. A well-cited article by Adamala and Cidrin(2011) led to the development of several models and theories as presented, for example, in Vol 6, No 2(2016) entitled “User perspectives on business intelligence”.The focus in JISIB is always technology. It is more a question of which aspect of technology we focuson. In this issue, it is social media or social media intelligence. The paper by Gioti and Ponis entitled“Social business intelligence: Review and research directions” is a literature review exploring the newdirection of social business intelligence (SBI), where social media meets BI. The last paper is entitled“Business intelligence for social media interaction in the travel industry in Indonesia”. The authors,Yulianto, Girsang and Rumagit propose a way to develop a data warehouse to analyze data from socialmedia, such as likes, comments and sentiment, applied to the travel industry in Indonesia.Another aspect of the journal maintains the tradition of intelligence studies in general. Intelligencestudies must always be broad to be relevant and not to miss important pieces. Specialization is a necessityand a curse at the same time. Vol 6, No 1 (2016) in entitled “The width and scope of intelligence studiesin business”. A part of this width and critique has involved self-reflection. Thus earlier articles in JISIBoften discussed methods. Case studies (by country or industry) were always a favorite. In Vol 4, No 3(2014) JISIB continued this tradition of publishing case studies. In Vol 3, No 2 (2013), the whole issue isdedicated to one country; Brazil. Analyzing patents analysis has also been a frequent and reoccurringtopic. In this issue both of these directions are represented. The third article is entitled “Investigating thecompetitive ıntelligence practices of Peruvian fresh grapes exporters,” written by Bisson, Mercedes, andTong. The authors suggest a number of changes for Peruvian grapes exporters to become morecompetitive based on a CI approach.The fourth paper by Shaikh and Singhal entitled “An analysis of ip management strategies of ictcompanies based on patent filings” tries to identify the strategies of five US and Indian IT companies byanalyzing their patents. The first paper by Nuortimo is entitled “Measuring public acceptance withopinion mining: The case of the energy industry with long-term coal R&D investment projects” and ispart of his dissertation in science communication at the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Oulu.The paper shows how opinion mining can be used effectively, and was one of a series presented at the ICIConference in Bad Nauheim this year. Many of the earlier papers in JISIB came directly from academicor practitioners’ conferences. In Vol 2, No 1 (2012) it said: “The journal works in symbioses with a numberof conferences. It relies heavily on the contributions of scientific papers presented at these conferences,in particular for these first issues. Among these we would in particular like to mention the more scholarlyconferences, like VSST, ECIS, ICTICTI and SIIE. In the near future we also hope to receive contributionsJournal of Intelligence Studies in BusinessVol. 8, No 2 (2018) p. 4-5Open Access: Freely available at: https://ojs.hh.se/from INOSA and ECKM. We also receive support from members in the more professional conferencesrelated to Intelligence Studies like ICI and SCIP” (p. 4). And Vol 3, No 3 (2013): “The journal continuesto draw mainly on articles presented at academic conferences on topics related to competitive intelligence.In 2013 SCIP organized a first conference in South Africa, under the leadership of ASA du Toit, thejournal’s editor for Africa.”. And in Vol 2, No 3 (2012): “Most contributions continue to come from the bestpapers from a number of conferences related to Intelligence Studies. Two out of five articles come fromECKM 2012, which was held 6-7 September in Cartagena, Spain.” And in Vol 2, No 2 (2012) echoed asimilar sentiment. Today the number of conferences has been reduced for different reasons, which it takestoo long to get into here and now.The last group of articles worth mentioning is opinion pieces. These are non-empirical articles. Todaythey are less frequent, but at the beginning they served another role, as pointed out in Vol 4, No 1 (2014):“In this issue of JISIB we have admitted a large number of opinion pieces. Opinion pieces are importantto allow for a broader perspective of the field in terms of policies, adaptions of CI in foreign countries andgeneral interest in the form of debates. It also shows the normative qualities that are present in anysocial science discipline”. At the very beginning it was also made clear that the goal was always to berelevant for practitioners. Thus in Vol 1, No 1 (2011) we read: “The final aim of the journal is to be of useto practitioners. We are not interested in theory for the sake of theory, and we do not want to publishsolutions to small problems which will have no real impact in the intelligence field.”. With your help wetry to keep with that goal.As always, we would above all like to thank the authors for their contributions to this issue of JISIB.Thanks to Dr. Allison Perrigo for reviewing English grammar and helping with layout design for allarticles and to the Swedish Research Council for continuous financial support. A special congratulationgoes to Rainer Michaeli for having taken the ICI conference to its 10th anniversary. Well done, and thankyou for the ongoing cooperation.

AbstractIn this article we explore how Swedish citizens perceive security threats, and how threat perceptions overlap with ideology, trust and demographics. The results show that concerns over security threats are foremost connected to an authoritarian outlook. In addition, four typical groups of security orientations were identified. On the one end of the spectrum, we found one group with anti-immigrant, anti-feminist and anti-egalitarian opinions and low confidence in media and institutions. At the other end, we identified a group dominated by women with university degrees, who believe in egalitarian tolerance and display trust in societal institutions. Even though the findings are in line with previous research on the radical right globally, we were intrigued by the existence of a clearly defined group of respondents that oppose feminism to the extent that it is even seen as a security threat. This is particularly striking given that Sweden is thought of as one of the most equal countries in the world, with a government pursuing a feminist foreign policy.

This variable describes how a war is framed in a news article. It suggests what interpretation or perspective on a war is promoted through a news item (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2008; Entman, 1993). In general, there are two approaches to framing: Deductive frame analyses measure the presence of frames that were derived from prior research or small pilot studies, whereas inductive frame analyses derive the frames from the actual material itself. As such, the frames measured in inductive analyses tend to be case-specific and can rarely be used for other conflict cases and material (cf. Matthes & Kohring, 2008). In deductive frame analyses, however, a set re-occurring frames has been identified and operationalized. They have been measured in the coverage of a variety of wars and in news items that were published in different media organizations (e.g. Carpenter, 2007; Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005, 2008). These frames and their operationalizations will be described in the following example. Field of application/theoretical foundation: Frame analyses is grounded in the framing approach that describes a media frame as the result of a journalistic process of selecting some aspects of a given social reality and making them more salient in a given text (Entman, 1993). As such, framing is often measured to analyze how a war is portrayed in the news. In doing so, scholars mainly aim to identify media bias that for example can be the result of ethnocentrism, the editorial line, political influences or the predominant journalism culture (Baden, 2014; Jungblut, 2020; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Consequentially, media frames are often regarded as the result of a specific working environment and are thus often conceptualized as a dependent variable (e.g. Carpenter, 2007; Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005, 2008). Alternatively, media frames can be understood as the independent variable if a study seeks to unravel whether the media holds an impact on the public opinion on a given war (e.g. Edy & Meirick, 2007). References/combination with other methods of data collection: Frames that have repeatedly been identified in content analytical research have also been used in experimental research designs to unravel if the media portrayal of a war shapes how the audience thinks about this particular war (e.g. Iyengar & Simon, 1993). Similarly, scholars have also combined content analyses with multiple waves of surveys to analyze whether the media, for example, influences the public support for conflict interventions (e.g. Edy & Meirick, 2007). Sample operationalization: Please indicate which of these frames is present in the text. In each article, multiple frames can be present at the same time. Frame Description Measurement Military Conflict Frame There is an emphasis on the military conflict/action among individuals, groups, or institutions 0 = frame is absent 1 = frame is present Human Interest Frame There is an emphasis on the human participants in the event 0 = frame is absent 1 = frame is present Violence of War Frame There is an emphasis on injuries/causalities and the destruction or aftermath caused by war 0 = frame is absent 1 = frame is present Anti-War Protest Frame There is an emphasis on the opposition to war 0 = frame is absent 1 = frame is present Media Self-Reference Frame There is an emphasis on the news media and their reporting of war 0 = frame is absent 1 = frame is present Responsibility Frame There is an emphasis on the party/person responsible for the event, issue, or problem 0 = frame is absent 1 = frame is present Diagnostic Frame There is an emphasis on what caused the event or problem 0 = frame is absent 1 = frame is present Information on Carpenter, 2007 Author: Serena Carpenter Research question/research interest: Portrayal of the Iraq War in Elite and Non-Elite newspapers Object of analysis: Two elite newspapers (New York Times & Washington Post) and four non-elite newspapers (San Antonio Express News, Roanoke Times, News Tribune and Columbus Dispatch) Timeframe of analysis: The study analyzes the framing in three phases: Invasion Phase (March 20, 2003, to May 1, 2003), final two months of the presidential campaign (September 1, 2004, to November 2,2004) & period from the first Iraqi election to the Iraqi National Assembly's vote to approve a cabinet (January 30, 2005, to April 28, 2005) Info about variable Variable name/definition: Deductive conflict frame Level of analysis: Article Values: 0 = absent, 1= present (for each of the described frames) Scale: binary (nominal) Realiability: Scott's pi > 0.86 References Baden, C. (2014). Constructions of violent conflict in public discourse. Conceptual framework for the content & discourse analytic perspective (within WP5, WP6, WP7, & WP8). INFOCORE Working Paper 2014/10. http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Conceptual-Paper-MWG-CA_final.pdf Carpenter, S. (2007). US elite and non-elite newspapers' portrayal of the Iraq War: A comparison of frames and source use. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 84(4), 761-776. doi:10.1177/107769900708400407 Dimitrova, D. V., & Strömbäck, J. (2005). Mission accomplished? Framing of the Iraq War in the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States. International Communication Gazette, 67(5), 399-417. https://doi.org/10.1177/0016549205056050 Dimitrova, D. V., & Strömbäck, J. (2008). Foreign policy and the framing of the 2003 Iraq War in elite Swedish and US newspapers. Media, War & Conflict, 1(2), 203-220. doi:10.1177/1750635208090957 Edy, J. A., & Meirick, P. C. (2007). Wanted, dead or alive: Media frames, frame adoption, and support for the war in Afghanistan. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 119-141. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00332_4.x Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51-58. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1993). News coverage of the Gulf crisis and public opinion: A study of agenda-setting, priming, and framing. Communication research, 20(3), 365-383. doi:10.1177/009365093020003002 Jungblut, M. (2020). Strategic Communication and its Role in Conflict News: A Computational Analysis of the International News Coverage on Four Conflicts. Springer Nature. Matthes, J., & Kohring, M. (2008). The content analysis of media frames: Toward improving reliability and validity. Journal of Communication, 58(2), 258-279. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00384.x Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D. (2014). Mediating the message in the 21st century: a media sociology perspective (Third edition. ed.). Routledge.

IntroductionPrevious aesthetic research has set its main focus on visual and auditory, primarily music, stimuli with only a handful of studies exploring the aesthetic potential of linguistic stimuli. In the present study, we investigate for the first time the effects of personality traits on phonaesthetic language ratings.MethodsTwenty-three under-researched, “rarer” (less learned and therefore less known as a foreign language or L2) and minority languages were evaluated by 145 participants in terms of eroticism, beauty, status, and orderliness, subjectively perceived based on language sound.ResultsOverall, Romance languages (Catalan, Portuguese, Romanian) were still among the top six erotic languages of the experiment together with “Romance-sounding,” but less known languages like Breton and Basque. Catalan and Portuguese were also placed among the top six most beautiful languages. The Germanic languages (Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic) were perceived as more prestigious/higher in terms of status, however to some degree conditioned by their recognition/familiarity. Thus, we partly replicated the results of our earlier studies on the Romance language preferences (the so-called Latin Lover effect) and the perceived higher status of the Germanic languages and scrutinized again the effects of familiarity/language recognition, thereby calling into question the above mentioned concepts of the Latin Lover effect and the status of Germanic languages. We also found significant effects of personality traits (neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness) on phonaesthetic ratings. Different personality types appreciated different aspects of languages: e.g., whereas neurotics had strong opinions about languages' eroticism, more conscientious participants gave significantly different ratings for status. Introverts were more generous in their ratings overall in comparison to extroverts. We did not find strong connections between personality types and specific languages or linguistic features (sonority, speech rate). Overall, personality traits were largely overridden by other individual differences: familiarity with languages (socio-cultural construals, the Romanization effect—perceiving a particular language as a Romance language) and participants' native language/L1.DiscussionFor language education in the global context, our results mean that introducing greater linguistic diversity in school and universities might result in greater appreciation and motivation to learn lesser-known and minority languages. Even though we generally prefer Romance languages to listen to and to study, different personality types are attracted to different language families and thus make potentially successful learners of these languages.

Social media companies like to claim the world. Mark Zuckerberg says Facebook is “building a global community”. Twitter promises to show you “what’s happening in the world right now”. Even Parler claims to be the “global town square”. Indeed, among the fungible aspects of digital culture is the promise of geographic fungibility—the interchangeability of location and national provenance. The taglines of social media platforms tap into the social imagination of the Internet erasing distance—Marshall McLuhan’s global village on a touch screen (see fig. 1). Fig. 1: Platform taglines: YouTube, Twitter, Parler, and Facebook have made globality part of their pitch to users. Yet users’ perceptions of geographic fungibility remain unclear. Scholars have proposed forms of cosmopolitan and global citizenship in which national borders play less of a role in how people engage with political ideas (Delanty; Sassen). Others suggest the potential erasure of location may be disorienting (Calhoun). “Nobody lives globally”, as Hugh Dyer writes (64). In this article, I interrogate popular and academic assumptions about global political spaces, looking at geographic fungibility as a condition experienced by users. The article draws on interviews conducted with Twitter users in the Scandinavian region. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark offer an interesting contrast to online spaces because of their small and highly cohesive political cultures; yet these countries also have high Internet penetration rates and English proficiency levels, making them potentially highly globally connected (Syvertsen et al.). Based on a thematic analysis of these interviews, I find fungibility emerges as a key feature of how users interact with politics at a global level in three ways: invisibility: fungibility as disconnection; efficacy: fungibility as empowerment; and antagonism: non-fungibility as strategy. Finally, in contrast to currently available models, I propose that online practices are not characterised so much by cosmopolitan norms, but by what I describe as fungible citizenship. Geographic Fungibility and Cosmopolitan Hopes Let’s back up and take a real-life example that highlights what it means for geography to be fungible. In March 2017, at a high-stakes meeting of the US House Intelligence Committee, a congressman suddenly noticed that President Donald Trump was not only following the hearing on television, but was live-tweeting incorrect information about it on Twitter. “This tweet has gone out to millions of Americans”, said Congressman Jim Himes, noting Donald Trump’s follower count. “16.1 million to be exact” (C-SPAN). Only, those followers weren’t just Americans; Trump was tweeting to 16.1 million followers worldwide (see Sevin and Uzunoğlu). Moreover, the committee was gathered that day to address an issue related to geographic fungibility: it was the first public hearing on Russian attempts to interfere in the 2016 American presidential race—which occurred, among other places, on Twitter. In a way, democratic systems are based on fungibility. One person one vote. Equality before the law. But land mass was not imagined to be commutable, and given the physical restrictions of communication, participation in the public sphere was largely assumed to be restricted by geography (Habermas). But online platforms offer a fundamentally different structure. Nancy Fraser observes that “public spheres today are not coextensive with political membership. Often the interlocutors are neither co-nationals nor fellow citizens” (16). Netflix, YouTube, K-Pop, #BLM: the resources that people draw on to define their worlds come less from nation-specific media (Robertson 179). C-SPAN’s online feed—if one really wanted to—is as easy to click on in Seattle as in Stockholm. Indeed, research on Twitter finds geographically dispersed networks (Leetaru et al.). Many Twitter users tweet in multiple languages, with English being the lingua franca of Twitter (Mocanu et al.). This has helped make geographic location interchangeable, even undetectable without use of advanced methods (Stock). Such conditions might set the stage for what sociologists have envisioned as cosmopolitan or global public spheres (Linklater; Szerszynski and Urry). That is, cross-border networks based more on shared interest than shared nationality (Sassen 277). Theorists observing the growth of online communities in the late 1990s and early 2000s proposed that such activity could lead to a shift in people’s perspectives on the world: namely, by closing the communicative distance with the Other, people would also close the moral distance. Delanty suggested that “discursive spaces of world openness” could counter nationalist tendencies and help mobilise cosmopolitan citizens against the negative effects of globalisation (44). However, much of this discourse dates to the pre-social media Internet. These platforms have proved to be more hierarchical, less interactive, and even less global than early theorists hoped (Burgess and Baym; Dahlgren, “Social Media”; Hindman). Although ordinary citizens certainly break through, entrenched power dynamics and algorithmic structures complicate the process, leading to what Bucher describes as a reverse Panopticon: “the possibility of constantly disappearing, of not being considered important enough” (1171). A 2021 report by the Pew Research Center found most Twitter users receive few if any likes and retweets of their content. In short, it may be that social media are less like Marshall McLuhan’s global village and more like a global version of Marc Augé’s “non-places”: an anonymous and disempowering whereabouts (77–78). Cosmopolitanism itself is also plagued by problems of legitimacy (Calhoun). Fraser argues that global public opinion is meaningless without a constituent global government. “What could efficacy mean in this situation?” she asks (15). Moreover, universalist sentiment and erasure of borders are not exactly the story of the last 15 years. Media scholar Terry Flew notes that given Brexit and the rise of figures like Trump and Bolsonaro, projections of cosmopolitanism were seriously overestimated (19). Yet social media are undeniably political places. So how do we make sense of users’ engagement in the discourse that increasingly takes place here? It is this point I turn to next. Citizenship in the Age of Social Media In recent years, scholars have reconsidered how they understand the way people interact with politics, as access to political discourse has become a regular, even mundane part of our lives. Increasingly they are challenging old models of “informed citizens” and traditional forms of political participation. Neta Kligler-Vilenchik writes: the oft-heard claims that citizenship is in decline, particularly for young people, are usually based on citizenship indicators derived from these legacy models—the informed/dutiful citizen. Yet scholars are increasingly positing … citizenship [is not] declining, but rather changing its form. (1891) In other words, rather than wondering if tweeting is like a citizen speaking in the town square or merely scribbling in the margins of a newspaper, this line of thinking suggests tweeting is a new form of citizen participation entirely (Bucher; Lane et al.). Who speaks in the town square these days anyway? To be clear, “citizenship” here is not meant in the ballot box and passport sense; this isn’t about changing legal definitions. Rather, the citizenship at issue refers to how people perceive and enact their public selves. In particular, new models of citizenship emphasise how people understand their relation to strangers through discursive means (Asen)—through talking, in other words, in its various forms (Dahlgren, “Talkative Public”). This may include anything from Facebook posts to online petitions (Vaughan et al.) to digital organising (Vromen) to even activities that can seem trivial, solitary, or apolitical by traditional measures, such as “liking” a post or retweeting a news story. Although some research finds users do see strategic value in such activities (Picone et al.), Lane et al. argue that small-scale acts are important on their own because they force us to self-reflect on our relationship to politics, under a model they call “expressive citizenship”. Kligler-Vilenchik argues that such approaches to citizenship reflect not only new technology but also a society in which public discourse is less formalised through official institutions (newspapers, city council meetings, clubs): “each individual is required to ‘invent themselves’, to shape and form who they are and what they believe in—including how to enact their citizenship” she writes (1892). However, missing from these new understandings of politics is a spatial dimension. How does the geographic reach of social media sites play into perceptions of citizenship in these spaces? This is important because, regardless of the state of cosmopolitan sentiment, political problems are global: climate change, pandemic, regulation of tech companies, the next US president: many of society’s biggest issues, as Beck notes, “do not respect nation-state or any other borders” (4). Yet it’s not clear whether users’ correlative ability to reach across borders is empowering, or overwhelming. Thus, inspired particularly by Delanty’s “micro” cosmopolitanism and Dahlgren’s conditions for the formation of citizenship (“Talkative Public”), I am guided by the following questions: how do people negotiate geographic fungibility online? And specifically, how do they understand their relationship to a global space and their ability to be heard in it? Methodology Christensen and Jansson have suggested that one of the underutilised ways to understand media cultures is to talk to users directly about the “mediatized everyday” (1474). To that end, I interviewed 26 Twitter users in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. The Scandinavian region is a useful region of study because most people use the Web nearly every day and the populations have high English proficiency (Syvertsen et al.). Participants were found in large-scale data scrapes of Twitter, using linguistic and geographic markers in their profiles, a process similar to the mapping of the Australian Twittersphere (Bruns et al.). The interviewees were selected because of their mixed use of Scandinavian languages and English and their participation in international networks. Participants were contacted through direct messages on Twitter or via email. In figure 2, the participants’ timeline data have been graphed into a network map according to who users @mentioned and retweeted, with lines representing tweets and colours representing languages. The participants include activists, corporate consultants, government employees, students, journalists, politicians, a security guard, a doctor, a teacher, and unemployed people. They range from age 24 to 60. Eight are women, reflecting the gender imbalance of Twitter. Six have an immigrant background. Eight are right-leaning politically. Participants also have wide variation in follower counts in order to capture a variety of experiences on the platform (min=281, max=136,000, median=3,600, standard deviation=33,708). All users had public profiles, but under Norwegian rules for research data, they will be identified here by an ID and their country, gender, and follower count (e.g., P01, Sweden, M, 23,000). Focussing on a single platform allowed the interviews to be more specific and makes it easier to compare the participants’ responses, although other social media often came up in the course of the interviews. Twitter was selected because it is often used in a public manner and has become an important channel for political communication (Larsson and Moe). The interviews lasted around an hour each and were conducted on Zoom between May 2020 and March 2021. Fig. 2: Network map of interview participants’ Twitter timelines. Invisibility: The Abyss of the Global Village Each participant was asked during the interview how they think about globality on Twitter. For many, it was part of the original reason for joining the platform. “Twitter had this reputation of being the hangout of a lot of the world’s intellectuals”, said P022 (Norway, M, 136,000). One Swedish woman described a kind of cosmopolitan curation process, where she would follow people on every continent, so that her feed would give her a sense of the world. “And yes, you can get that from international papers”, she told me, “but if I actually consumed as much as I do on Twitter in papers, I would be reading papers and articles all day” (P023, Sweden, F, 384). Yet while globality was part of the appeal, it was also an abstraction. “I mean, the Internet is global, so everything you do is going to end up somewhere else”, said one Swedish user (P013, M, 12,000). Users would echo the taglines that social media allow you to “interact with someone half a world away” (P05, Norway, M, 3,300) but were often hard-pressed to recall specific examples. A strong theme of invisibility—or feeling lost in an abyss—ran throughout the interviews. For many users this manifested in a lack of any visible response to their tweets. Even when replying to another user, the participants didn’t expect much dialogic engagement with them (“No, no, that’s unrealistic”.) For P04 (Norway, F, 2,000), tweeting back a heart emoji to someone with a large following was for her own benefit, much like the intrapersonal expressions described by Lane et al. that are not necessarily intended for other actors. P04 didn’t expect the original poster to even see her emoji. Interestingly, invisibility was more of a frustration among users with several thousand followers than those with only a few hundred. Having more followers seemed to only make Twitter appear more fickle. “Sometimes you get a lot of attention and sometimes it’s completely disregarded” said P05 (Norway, M, 3,300). P024 (Sweden, M, 2,000) had essentially given up: “I think it’s fun that you found me [to interview]”, he said, “Because I have this idea that almost no one sees my tweets anymore”. In a different way, P08 (Norway, F) who had a follower count of 121,000, also felt the abstraction of globality. “It’s almost like I’m just tweeting into a void or into space”, she said, “because it's too many people to grasp or really understand that these are real people”. For P08, Twitter was almost an anonymous non-place because of its vastness, compared with Facebook and Instagram where the known faces of her friends and family made for more finite and specific places—and thus made her more self-conscious about the visibility of her posts. Efficacy: Fungibility as Empowerment Despite the frequent feeling of global invisibility, almost all the users—even those with few followers—believed they had some sort of effect in global political discussions on Twitter. This was surprising, and seemingly contradictory to the first theme. This second theme of empowerment is characterised by feelings of efficacy or perception of impact. One of the most striking examples came from a Danish man with 345 followers. I wondered before the interview if he might have automated his account because he replied to Donald Trump so often (see fig. 3). The participant explained that, no, he was just trying to affect the statistics on Trump’s tweet, to get it ratioed. He explained: it's like when I'm voting, I'm not necessarily thinking [I’m personally] going to affect the situation, you know. … It’s the statistics that shows a position—that people don't like it, and they’re speaking actively against it. (P06, Denmark, M, 345) Other participants described their role similarly—not as making an impact directly, but being “one ant in the anthill” or helping information spread “like rings in the water”. One woman in Sweden said of the US election: I can't go to the streets because I'm in Stockholm. So I take to their streets on Twitter. I'm kind of helping them—using the algorithms, with retweets, and re-enforcing some hashtags. (P018, Sweden, F, 7,400) Note that the participants rationalise their Twitter activities through comparisons to classic forms of political participation—voting and protesting. Yet the acts of citizenship they describe are very much in line with new norms of citizenship (Vaughan et al.) and what Picone et al. call “small acts of engagement”. They are just acts aimed at the American sphere instead of their national sphere. Participants with large followings understood their accounts had a kind of brand, such as commenting on Middle Eastern politics, mocking leftist politicians, or critiquing the media. But these users were also sceptical they were having any direct impact. Rather, they too saw themselves as being “a tiny part of a combined effect from a lot of people” (P014, Norway, M, 39,000). Fig. 3: Participant P06 replies to Trump. Antagonism: Encounters with Non-Fungibility The final theme reflects instances when geography became suddenly apparent—and thrown back in the faces of the users. This was often in relation to the 2020 American election, which many of the participants were following closely. “I probably know more about US politics than Swedish”, said P023 (Sweden, F, 380). Particularly among left-wing users who listed a Scandinavian location in their profile, tweeting about the topic had occasionally led to encounters with Americans claiming foreign interference. “I had some people telling me ‘You don't have anything to do with our politics. You have no say in this’” said P018 (Sweden, F, 7,400). In these instances, the participants likewise deployed geography strategically. Participants said they would claim legitimacy because the election would affect their country too. “I think it’s important for the rest of the world to give them [the US] that feedback. That ‘we’re depending on you’” said P017 (Sweden, M, 280). As a result of these interactions, P06 started to pre-emptively identify himself as Danish in his tweets, which in a way sacrificed his own geographic fungibility, but also reinforced a wider sense of geographic fungibility on Twitter. In one of his replies to Donald Trump, Jr., he wrote, “Denmark here. The world is hoping for real leader!” Conclusion: Fungible Citizenship The view that digital media are global looms large in academic and popular imagination. The aim of the analysis presented here is to help illuminate how these perceptions play into practices of citizenship in digital spaces. One of the contradictions inherent in this research is that geographic or linguistic information was necessary to find the users interviewed. It may be that users who are geographically anonymous—or even lie about their location—would have a different relationship to online globality. With that said, several key themes emerged from the interviews: the abstraction and invisibility of digital spaces, the empowerment of geographic fungibility, and the occasional antagonistic deployment of non-fungibility by other users and the participants. Taken together, these themes point to geographic fungibility as a condition that can both stifle as well as create new arenas for political expression. Even spontaneous and small acts that aren’t expected to ever reach an audience (Lane et al.) nevertheless are done with an awareness of social processes that extend beyond the national sphere. Moreover, algorithms and metrics, while being the source of invisibility (Bucher), were at times a means of empowerment for those at a physical distance. In contrast to the cosmopolitan literature, it is not so much that users didn’t identify with their nation as their “community of membership” (Sassen)—they saw it as giving them an important perspective. Rather, they considered politics in the EU, US, UK, Russia, and elsewhere to be part of their national arena. In this way, the findings support Delanty’s description of “changes within … national identities rather than in the emergence in new identities” (42). Yet the interviews do not point to “the desire to go beyond ethnocentricity and particularity” (42). Some of the most adamant and active global communicators were on the right and radical right. For them, opposition to immigration and strengthening of national identity were major reasons to be on Twitter. Cross-border communication for them was not a form of resistance to nationalism but wholly compatible with it. Instead of the emergence of global or cosmopolitan citizenship then, I propose that what has emerged is a form of fungible citizenship. This is perhaps a more ambivalent, and certainly a less idealistic, view of digital culture. It implies that users are not elevating their affinities or shedding their national ties. Rather, the transnational effects of political decisions are viewed as legitimate grounds for political participation online. This approach to global platforms builds on and nuances current discursive approaches to citizenship, which emphasise expression (Lane et al.) and contribution (Vaughan et al.) rather than formal participation within institutions. Perhaps the Scandinavian users cannot cast a vote in US elections, but they can still engage in the same forms of expression as any American with a Twitter account. That encounters with non-fungibility were so notable to the participants also points to the mundanity of globality on social media. Vaughan et al. write that “citizens are increasingly accustomed to participating in horizontal networks of relationships which facilitate more expressive, smaller forms of action” (17). The findings here suggest that they are also accustomed to participating in geographically agnostic networks, in which their expressions of citizenship are at once small, interchangeable, and potentially global. References Asen, Robert. "A Discourse Theory of Citizenship." Quarterly Journal of Speech 90.2 (2004): 189–211. Augé, Marc. Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. Trans. John Howe. London: Verso, 1995. Beck, Ulrich. The Cosmopolitan Vision. Trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity, 2006. Bruns, Axel, et al. "The Australian Twittersphere in 2016: Mapping the Follower/Followee Network." Social Media + Society 3.4 (2017): 1–15. Bucher, Taina. "Want to Be on the Top? Algorithmic Power and the Threat of Invisibility on Facebook." New Media & Society 14.7 (2012): 1164–80. 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"The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory." British Journal of Sociology 57.1 (2006): 25–47. Dyer, Hugh C. Coping and Conformity in World Politics. Routledge, 2009. Flew, Terry. "Globalization, Neo-Globalization and Post-Globalization: The Challenge of Populism and the Return of the National." Global Media and Communication 16.1 (2020): 19–39. Fraser, Nancy. "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World." Theory, Culture & Society 24.4 (2007): 7–30. Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P, 1991 [1962]. Kligler-Vilenchik, Neta. "Alternative Citizenship Models: Contextualizing New Media and the New ‘Good Citizen’." New Media & Society 19.11 (2017): 1887–903. Lane, Daniel S., Kevin Do, and Nancy Molina-Rogers. "What Is Political Expression on Social Media Anyway? 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Photograph by Gonzalo Echeverria (2010)The Screen would light up. They would feel a thrill of satisfaction. But the colours had faded with age, the picture wobbled on the screen, the women were of another age; they would come out they would be sad. It was not the film they had dreamt of. It was not the total film each of them had inside himself, the perfect film they could have enjoyed forever and ever. The film they would have liked to make. Or, more secretly, no doubt, the film they would have liked to live. (Perec 57) Over the years that I have watched and thought about Jean-Luc Godard’s films I have been struck by the idea of him as an artist who works with the moving image and perhaps just as importantly the idea of cinema as an irresolvable series of problems. Most obviously this ‘problematic condition’ of Godard’s practice is evidenced in the series of crises and renunciations that pepper the historical trace of his work. A trace that is often characterised thus: criticism, the Nouvelle Vague, May 1968, the Dziga Vertov group, the adoption of video, the return to narrative form, etc. etc. Of all these events it is the rejection of both the dominant cinematic narrative form and its attendant models of production that so clearly indicated the depth and intensity of Godard’s doubt in the artistic viability of the institution of cinema. Historically and ideologically congruent with the events of May 1968, this turning away from tradition was foreshadowed by the closing titles of his 1967 opus Week End: fin de cinema (the end of cinema). Godard’s relentless application to the task of engaging a more discursive and politically informed mode of operation had implications not only for the films that were made in the wake of his disavowal of cinema but also for those that preceded it. In writing this paper it was my initial intention to selectively consider the vast oeuvre of the filmmaker as a type of conceptual project that has in some way been defined by the condition of doubt. While to certain degree I have followed this remit, I have found it necessary to focus on a small number of historically correspondent filmic instances to make my point. The sheer size and complexity of Godard’s output would effectively doom any other approach to deal in generalities. To this end I am interested in the ways that these films have embodied doubt as both an aesthetic and philosophical position. There is an enduring sense of contentiousness that surrounds both the work and perceived motives of the filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard that has never come at the cost of discourse. Through a period of activity that now stretches into its sixth decade Godard has shaped an oeuvre that is as stylistically diverse as it is theoretically challenging. This span of practice is noteworthy not only for its sheer length but for its enduring ability to polarise both audiences and critical opinion. Indeed these opposing critical positions are so well inscribed in our historical understanding of Godard’s practice that they function as a type of secondary narrative. It is a narrative that the artist himself has been more than happy to cultivate and at times even engage. One hardly needs to be reminded that Godard came to making films as a critic. He asserted in the pages of his former employer Cahiers du Cinema in 1962 that “As a critic, I thought of myself as a filmmaker. Today I still think of myself as a critic, and in a sense I am, more than ever before. Instead of writing criticism, I make a film, but the critical dimension is subsumed” (59). If Godard did at this point in time believe that the criticality of practice as a filmmaker was “subsumed”, the ensuing years would see a more overt sense of criticality emerge in his work. By 1968 he was to largely reject both traditional cinematic form and production models in a concerted effort to explore the possibilities of a revolutionary cinema. In the same interview the director went on to extol the virtues of the cine-literacy that to a large part defined the loose alignment of Nouvelle Vague directors (Chabrol, Godard, Rohmer, Rivette, Truffaut) referred to as the Cahiers group claiming that “We were the first directors to know that Griffiths exists” (Godard 60). It is a statement that is as persuasive as it is dramatic, foregrounding the hitherto obscured history of cinema while positioning the group firmly within its master narrative. However, given the benefit of hindsight one realises that perhaps the filmmaker’s motives were not as simple as historical posturing. For Godard what is at stake is not just the history of cinema but cinema itself. When he states that “We were thinking cinema and at a certain moment we felt the need to extend that thought” one is struck by how far and for how long he has continued to think about and through cinema. In spite of the hours of strict ideological orthodoxy that accompanied his most politically informed works of the late 1960s and early 1970s or the sustained sense of wilful obtuseness that permeates his most “difficult” work, there is a sense of commitment to extending “that thought” that is without peer. The name “Godard”, in the words of the late critic Serge Daney, “designates an auteur but it is also synonymous with a tenacious passion for that region of the world of images we call the cinema” (Daney 68). It is a passion that is both the crux of his practice as an artist and the source of a restless experimentation and interrogation of the moving image. For Godard the passion of cinema is one that verges on religiosity. This carries with it all the philosophical and spiritual implications that the term implies. Cinema functions here as a system of signs that at once allows us to make sense of and live in the world. But this is a faith for Godard that is nothing if not tested. From the radical formal experimentation of his first feature film À Bout de soufflé (Breathless) onwards Godard has sought to place the idea of cinema in doubt. In this sense doubt becomes a type of critical engine that at once informs the shape of individual works and animates the constantly shifting positions the artist has occupied. Serge Daney's characterisation of the Nouvelle Vague as possessed of a “lucidity tinged with nostalgia” (70) is especially pertinent in understanding the way in which doubt came to animate Godard’s practice across the 1960s and beyond. Daney’s contention that the movement was both essentially nostalgic and saturated with an acute awareness that the past could not be recreated, casts the cinema itself as type of irresolvable proposition. Across the dazzling arc of films (15 features in 8 years) that Godard produced prior to his renunciation of narrative cinematic form in 1967, one can trace an unravelling of faith. During this period we can consider Godard's work and its increasingly complex engagement with the political as being predicated by the condition of doubt. The idea of the cinema as an industrial and social force increasingly permeates this work. For Godard the cinema becomes a site of questioning and ultimately reinvention. In his 1963 short film Le Grand Escroc (The Great Rogue) a character asserts that “cinema is the most beautiful fraud in the world”. Indeed it is this sense of the paradoxical that shadows much of his work. The binary of beauty and fraud, like that of faith and doubt, calls forth a questioning of the cinema that stands to this day. It is of no small consequence that so many of Godard’s 1960s works contain scenes of people watching films within the confines of a movie theatre. For Godard and his Nouvelle Vague peers the sale de cinema was both the hallowed site of cinematic reception and the terrain of the everyday. It is perhaps not surprising then he chooses the movie theatre as a site to play out some of his most profound engagements with the cinema. Considered in relation to each other these scenes of cinematic viewing trace a narrative in which an undeniable affection for the cinema is undercut by both a sense of loss and doubt. Perhaps the most famous of Godard’s ‘viewing’ scenes is from the film Vivre Sa Vie (My Life to Live). Essentially a tale of existential trauma, the film follows the downward spiral of a young woman Nana (played by Anna Karina) into prostitution and then death at the hands of ruthless pimps. Championed (with qualifications) by Susan Sontag as a “perfect film” (207), it garnered just as many detractors, including famously the director Roberto Rosellini, for what was perceived to be its nihilistic content and overly stylised form. Seeking refuge in a cinema after being cast out from her apartment for non payment of rent the increasingly desperate Nana is shown engrossed in the starkly silent images of Carl Dreyer’s 1928 film La Passion de Jeanne d’Arc (The Passion of Joan of Arc). Godard cuts from the action of his film to quote at length from Dreyer’s classic, returning from the mute intensity of Maria Faloconetti’s portrayal of the condemned Joan of Arc to Karina’s enraptured face. As Falconetti’s tears swell and fall so do Karina’s, the emotional rawness of the performance on the screen mirrored and internalised by the doomed character of Nana. Nana’s identification with that of the screen heroine is at once total and immaculate as her own brutal death at the hands of men is foretold. There is an ominous silence to this sequence that serves not only to foreground the sheer visual intensity of what is being shown but also to separate it from the world outside this purely cinematic space. However, if we are to read this scene as a testament to the power of the cinematic we must also admit to the doubt that resides within it. Godard’s act of separation invites us to consider the scene not only as a meditation on the emotional and existential state of the character of Nana but also on the foreshortened possibilities of the cinema itself. As Godard’s shots mirror those of Dreyer we are presented with a consummate portrait of irrevocable loss. This is a complex system of imagery that places Dreyer’s faith against Godard’s doubt without care for the possibility of resolution. Of all Godard’s 1960s films that feature cinema spectatorship the sequence belonging to Masculin Féminin (Masculine Feminine) from 1966 is perhaps the most confounding and certainly the most digressive. A series of events largely driven by a single character’s inability or unwillingness to surrender to the projected image serve to frustrate, fracture and complexify the cinema-viewing experience. It is however, a viewing experience that articulates the depth of Godard’s doubt in the viability of the cinematic form. The sequence, like much of the film itself, centres on the trials of the character Paul played by Jean-Pierre Léaud. Locked in a struggle against the pop-cultural currents of the day and the attendant culture of consumption and appearances, Paul is positioned within the film as a somewhat conflicted and ultimately doomed romantic. His relationship with Madeleine played by real life yé-yé singer Chantal Goya is a source of constant anxiety. The world that he inhabits, however marginally, of nightclubs, pop records and publicity seems philosophically at odds with the classical music and literature that he avidly devours. If the cinema-viewing scene of Vivre Sa Vie is defined by the enraptured intensity of Anna Karina’s gaze, the corresponding scene in Masculin Féminin stands, at least initially, as the very model of distracted spectatorship. As the film in the theatre starts, Paul who has been squeezed out of his seat next to Madeleine by her jealous girlfriend, declares that he needs to go to the toilet. On entering the bathroom he is confronted by the sight of a pair of men locked in a passionate kiss. It is a strange and disarming turn of events that prompts his hastily composed graffiti response: down with the republic of cowards. For theorist Nicole Brenez the appearance of these male lovers “is practically a fantasmatic image evoked by the amorous situation that Paul is experiencing” (Brenez 174). This quasi-spectral appearance of embracing lovers and grafitti writing is echoed in the following sequence where Paul once again leaves the theatre, this time to fervently inform the largely indifferent theatre projectionist about the correct projection ratio of the film being shown. On his graffiti strewn journey back inside Paul encounters an embracing man and woman nestled in an outer corner of the theatre building. Silent and motionless the presence of this intertwined couple is at once unsettling and prescient providing “a background real for what is being projected inside on the screen” (Brenez 174). On returning to the theatre Paul asks Madeleine to fill him in on what he has missed to which she replies, “It is about a man and woman in a foreign city who…”. Shot in Stockholm to appease the Swedish co-producers that stipulated that part of the production be made in Sweden, the film within a film occupies a fine line between restrained formal artfulness and pornographic violence. What could have been a creatively stifling demand on the part of his financial backers was inverted by Godard to become a complex exploration of power relations played out through an unsettling sexual encounter. When questioned on set by a Swedish television reporter what the film was about the filmmaker curtly replied, “The film has a lot to do with sex and the Swedish are known for that” (Masculin Féminin). The film possesses a barely concealed undertow of violence. A drama of resistance and submission is played out within the confines of a starkly decorated apartment. The apartment itself is a zone in which language ceases to operate or at the least is reduced to its barest components. The man’s imploring grunts are met with the woman’s repeated reply of “no”. What seemingly begins as a homage to the contemporaneous work of Swedish director Ingmar Bergman quickly slides into a chronicle of coercion. As the final scene of seduction/debasement is played out on the screen the camera pulls away to reveal the captivated gazes of Madeleine and her friends. It finally rests on Paul who then shuts his eyes, unable to bear what is being shown on the screen. It is a moment of refusal that marks a turning away not only from this projected image but from cinema itself. A point made all the clearer by Paul’s voiceover that accompanies the scene: We went to the movies often. The screen would light up and we would feel a thrill. But Madeleine and I were usually disappointed. The images were dated and jumpy. Marilyn Monroe had aged badly. We felt sad. It wasn't the movie of our dreams. It wasn't that total film we carried inside ourselves. That film we would have liked to make. Or, more secretly, no doubt the film we wanted to live. (Masculin Féminin) There was a dogged relentlessness to Godard’s interrogation of the cinema through the very space of its display. 1963’s Le Mépris (Contempt) swapped the public movie theatre for the private screening room; a theatrette emblazoned with the words Il cinema é un’invenzione senza avvenire. The phrase, presented in a style that recalled Soviet revolutionary graphics, is an Italian translation of Louis Lumiere’s 1895 appraisal of his new creation: “The cinema is an invention without a future.” The words have an almost physical presence in the space providing a fatalistic backdrop to the ensuing scene of conflict and commerce. As an exercise in self reflexivity it at once serves to remind us that even at its inception the cinema was cast in doubt. In Le Mépris the pleasures of spectatorship are played against the commercial demands of the cinema as industry. Following a screening of rushes for a troubled production of Homer’s Odyssey a tempestuous exchange ensues between a hot-headed producer (Jeremy Prokosch played by Jack Palance) and a calmly philosophical director (Fritz Lang as himself). It is a scene that attests to Godard’s view of the cinema as an art form that is creatively compromised by its own modes of production. In a film that plays the disintegration of a relationship against the production of a movie and that features a cast of Germans, Italians and French it is of no small consequence that the movie producer is played by an American. An American who, when faced with a creative impasse, utters the phrase “when I hear the word culture I bring out my checkbook”. It is one of Godard’s most acerbic and doubt filled sequences pitting as he does the implied genius of Lang against the tantrum throwing demands of the rapacious movie producer. We are presented with a model of industrial relations that is both creatively stifling and practically unworkable. Certainly it was no coincidence that Le Mépris had the biggest budget ($1 million) that Godard has ever worked with. In Godard’s 1965 film Une Femme Mariée (A Married Woman), he would once again use the movie theatre as a location. The film, which dealt with the philosophical implications of an adulterous affair, is also notable for its examination of the Holocaust and that defining event’s relationship to personal and collective memory. Biographer Richard Brody has observed that, “Godard introduced the Auschwitz trial into The Married Woman (sic) as a way of inserting his view of another sort of forgetting that he suggested had taken hold of France—the conjoined failures of historical and personal memory that resulted from the world of mass media and the ideology of gratification” (Brody 196-7). Whatever the causes, there is a pervading sense of amnesia that surrounds the Holocaust in the film. In one exchange the character of Charlotte, the married woman in question, momentarily confuses Auschwitz with thalidomide going on to later exclaim that “the past isn’t fun”. But like the barely repressed memories of her past indiscretions, the Holocaust returns at the most unexpected juncture in the film. In what starts out as Godard’s most overt reference to the work of Alfred Hitchcock, Charlotte and her lover secretly meet under the cover of darkness in a movie theatre. Each arriving separately and kitted out in dark sunglasses, there is breezy energy to this clandestine rendezvous highly reminiscent of the work of the great director. It is a stylistic point that is underscored in the film by the inclusion of a full-frame shot of Hitchcock’s portrait in the theatre’s foyer. However, as the lovers embrace the curtain rises on Alain Resnais’s 1955 documentary Nuit et Brouillard (Night and Fog). The screen is filled with images of barbed wire as the voice of narrator Jean Cayrol informs the audience that “even a vacation village with a fair and a steeple can lead very simply to a concentration camp.” It is an incredibly shocking moment, in which the repressed returns to confirm that while memory “isn’t fun”, it is indeed necessary. An uncanny sense of recognition pervades the scene as the two lovers are faced with the horrendous evidence of a past that refuses to stay subsumed. The scene is all the more powerful for the seemingly casual manner it is relayed. There is no suspenseful unveiling or affected gauging of the viewers’ reactions. What is simply is. In this moment of recognition the Hitchcockian mood of the anticipation of an illicit rendezvous is supplanted by a numbness as swift as it is complete. Needless to say the couple make a swift retreat from the now forever compromised space of the theatre. Indeed this scene is one of the most complex and historically layered of any that Godard had produced up to this point in his career. By making overt reference to Hitchcock he intimates that the cinema itself is deeply implicated in this perceived crisis of memory. What begins as a homage to the work of one of the most valorised influences of the Nouvelle Vague ends as a doubt filled meditation on the shortcomings of a system of representation. The question stands: how do we remember through the cinema? In this regard the scene signposts a line of investigation that would become a defining obsession of Godard’s expansive Histoire(s) du cinéma, a project that was to occupy him throughout the 1990s. Across four chapters and four and half hours Histoire(s) du cinéma examines the inextricable relationship between the history of the twentieth century and the cinema. Comprised almost completely of filmic quotations, images and text, the work employs a video-based visual language that unremittingly layers image upon image to dissolve and realign the past. In the words of theorist Junji Hori “Godard's historiography in Histoire(s) du cinéma is based principally on the concept of montage in his idiosyncratic sense of the term” (336). In identifying montage as the key strategy in Histoire(s) du cinéma Hori implicates the cinema itself as central to both Godard’s process of retelling history and remembering it. However, it is a process of remembering that is essentially compromised. Just as the relationship of the cinema to the Holocaust is bought into question in Une Femme Mariée, so too it becomes a central concern of Histoire(s) du cinéma. It is Godard’s assertion “that the cinema failed to honour its ethical commitment to presenting the unthinkable barbarity of the Nazi extermination camps” (Temple 332). This was a failure that for Godard moved beyond the realm of doubt to represent “nothing less than the end of cinema” (Brody 512). In October 1976 the New Yorker magazine published a profile of Jean Luc Godard by Penelope Gilliatt a writer who shared the post of film critic at the magazine with Pauline Kael. The article was based on an interview that took place at Godard’s production studio in Grenoble Switzerland. It was notable for two things: Namely, the most succinct statement that Godard has made regarding the enduring sense of criticality that pervades his work: “A good film is a matter of questions properly put.” (74) And secondly, surely the shortest sentence ever written about the filmmaker: “Doubt stands.” (77)ReferencesÀ Bout de soufflé. Dir. Jean Luc Godard. 1960. DVD. Criterion, 2007. Brenez, Nicole. “The Forms of the Question.” For Ever Godard. Eds. Michael Temple, James S. Williams, and Michael Witt. London: Black Dog, 2004. Brody, Richard. Everything Is Cinema: The Working Life of Jean-Luc Godard. New York: Metropolitan Books / Henry Holt & Co., 2008. Daney, Serge. “The Godard Paradox.” For Ever Godard. Eds. Michael Temple, James S. Williams, and Michael Witt. London: Black Dog, 2004. Gilliat, Penelope. “The Urgent Whisper.” Jean-Luc Godard Interviews. Ed. David Sterritt. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998. Godard, Jean-Luc. “Jean-Luc Godard: 'From Critic to Film-Maker': Godard in Interview (extracts). ('Entretien', Cahiers du Cinema 138, December 1962).” Cahiers du Cinéma: 1960-1968 New Wave, New Cinema, Reevaluating Hollywood. Ed. Jim Hillier. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986. Histoires du Cinema. Dir. and writ. Jean Luc Godard. 1988-98. DVD, Artificial Eye, 2008. Hori, Junji. “Godard’s Two Histiographies.” For Ever Godard. Eds. Michael Temple, James S. Williams, and Michael Witt. London: Black Dog, 2004. Le Grand Escroc. Dir. Jean Luc Godard. Perf. Jean Seberg. Film. Ulysse Productions, 1963. Le Mépris. Dir. Jean Luc Godard. Perf. Jack Palance, Fritz Lang. 1964. DVD. Criterion, 2002. La Passion de Jeanne d’Arc. Dir. Carl Theodor Dreyer. Film. Janus films, 1928. MacCabe, Colin. Godard: A Portrait of the Artist at 70. London: Bloomsbury, 2003. Masculin Féminin. Dir. and writ. Jean Luc Godard. Perf. Jean-Pierre Léaud. 1966. DVD. Criterion, 2005. Nuit et Brouillard. Dir Alain Resnais. Film. Janus Films, 1958. Perec, Georges. Things: A Story of the Sixties. Trans. David Bellos. London: Collins Harvill, 1990. (Originally published 1965.) Sontag, Susan. “Godard’s Vivre Sa Vie.” Against Interpretation and Other Essays. New York: Picador, 2001. Temple, Michael, James S. Williams, and Michael Witt, eds. For Ever Godard. London: Black Dog, 2004. Une Femme Mariée. Dir. and writ. Jean Luc Godard. Perf. Macha Meril. 1964. DVD. Eureka, 2009. Vivre Sa Vie. Dir. and writ. Jean Luc Godard. Perf. Anna Karina. 1962. DVD. Criterion, 2005. Week End, Dir. and writ. Jean Luc Godard. 1967. DVD. Distinction Series, 2005.

IntroductionNordic mythology, also known as Norse mythology, is a term used to describe Medieval creation myths and tales of Gods and otherworldly realms, told and retold by Northern Germanic and Scandinavian tribes of the ninth century AD (see for example Gaiman).I discuss a new type of Nordic mythology that is being created through popular culture, social media, books, and television shows. I am interested in how contemporary portrayals of the Nordic countries has created a kind of mythological place called Scandinavia, where things, people, and ideas are better than in other places.Whereas the old myths portray a fierce warrior race, the new myths create a utopian Scandinavia as a place that is inherently good; a place that is progressive and harmonious. In the creation of these new myths the underbelly of the North is often neglected, producing a homogenised representation of a group of countries that are in actuality diverse and inevitably imperfect.ScandimaniaGenerally the term Scandinavia always refers to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. When including Finland and Iceland, it is more accurate to refer to the five as the Nordic countries. I was born and grew up in Denmark. My observations are skewed towards a focus on Denmark, rather than Scandinavia as a whole. Though I will use the term Nordic and Scandinavia throughout the article, it is worth noting that these definitions describe a group of countries that despite some commonalities are also quite different in geography, and culture.Whether we are speaking strictly of Scandinavia or of the Nordic countries as a whole, one thing is certain: in recent years there has been a surge of popularity in all things Nordic. Scandinavian design has been popular since the 1950s, known for its functionality and simplistic beauty, and globalised through the Swedish furniture chain IKEA. Consequently, Nordic interior design has become a style widely praised and emulated, as has Nordic fashion, architecture, and innovation.The fact that Scandinavian people are often represented as being intelligent and beautiful adds to the notion of stylish and aesthetically pleasing ideals. This is partly why sperm from Danish sperm donors is the most sought after and widely distributed in the world: perhaps prospective parents find the idea of having a baby of Viking stock appealing (Kale). Nordic countries are also known for their egalitarian societies, which are described as “the holy grail of a healthy economy and society” (Cleary). These are countries where the collective good is cherished. Tax rates are high (in Denmark between 55 per cent and 60 per cent of income), which leads to excellent welfare systems.In recent years other terms have entered the collective Western vocabulary. New Nordic Cuisine describes a trend that has taken the culinary world by storm. This term refers to food that is created with seasonal, local, and foraged ingredients. The emphasis being a renewed connection to nature and old ways. In 2016 the Danish word hygge was shortlisted by the Oxford Dictionary as word of the year. A word, which has no direct English translation, it means “a quality of cosiness and comfortable conviviality that engenders a feeling of contentment or well-being (regarded as a defining characteristic of Danish culture)”. Countless books were published in the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, explaining the art of hygge. Other Scandinavian words are now becoming popular, such as the Swedish lagom, meaning “just enough”.In the past two years, the United Nations’ World Happiness Report listed Denmark and Norway as the happiest places on earth. Other surveys similarly put the Nordic countries on top as the most prosperous places on earth (Anderson).Mythologies and Discursive FormationsThe standard definition of myth is a “traditional story, especially one concerning the early history of a people or explaining a natural or social phenomenon, and typically involving supernatural beings or events.” Or “A widely held but false belief or idea” (Oxford Dictionaries, Myth).During what became known as the “discursive turn”, both Barthes and Foucault expanded the conception of myth by placing it within a wider socio-political and historical contexts of power and truth. “Discursive formations” became a commonly accepted way of describing a cluster of ideas, images, and practices that define particular “truths” within a given cultural context (Hall 6). In other words, myths serve specific purposes within given socio-cultural constructions.I argue that the current idolisation of Scandinavia is creating a common global narrative of a superior society. A mythical place that has “figured it out”, and found the key to happiness. The mythologised North is based on an array of media stories, statistics, reports, articles, advertising, political rhetoric, books, films, TV series, exhibitions, and social media activity. These perpetuate a “truth” of the Nordic countries as being especially benign, cultured, and distinguished. The Smiling PolicemanIn his well-known essay Myth Today, Barthes analyses an image of a North African boy in uniform saluting the French flag on the front cover of a magazine. Barthes argues that by analysing the semiotic meaning of the image in two stages, one can identify the “myth”.The first level is the signifiers (what we see), a dark skinned boy, a uniform, a raised arm, a flag. The signified is our recognition of these as a North African boy raising his arm to the French flag. The second level of interpretation is the wider context in which we understand what we see: the greatness of France is signified in the depiction of one of her colonial subjects submitting to and glorifying the flag. That is to say, the myth generated by the image is the story of France as a great colonial and military nation.Now take a look at this image, which was distributed the world over in newspapers, online media, and in turn social media (Warren; Kolff). This image is interesting because it epitomises much of what is believed about Scandinavia (the new myths). If we approach the image through the semiotic lens of Barthes, we firstly describe what is seen in the picture (signifiers): a blonde policeman, a girl of dark complexion, a road in the countryside, a van in the distance, and some other people with backpacks on the side of the road. When we put these elements together in context, we understand that the image to be depicting a Danish policeman, blonde, smiling and handsome, playing with a Syrian refugee girl on an empty Danish highway, with her fellow refugees behind her.The second level of interpretation (the myth) is created by combining the elements into a story: A friendly police officer is playing with a refugee girl, which is unusual because policemen are commonly seen as authoritarian and unfriendly to illegal immigrants. This policeman is smiling. He is happy in his job. He is healthy, good-looking, and compassionate.This fits the image of Scandinavian men as good fathers (they have paternity leave, and often help equally with child rearing). The image confirms that the happiest people on earth would of course also have happy, friendly policemen. The belief that the Scandinavian social model is one to admire would appear to be endorsed.The fact that this is in a rural setting with green landscapes adds further to the notion of Nordic freshness, naturalness, environmentalism, and food that comes from the wild. The fact that the policeman is well-groomed, stylish, well-built, and handsome reinforces the notion that Scandinavia is a place of style and taste, where the good Viking gene pool produces fit and beautiful people.It makes sense that in a place with a focus on togetherness and the common good, refugees are also treated well. Just as the French image of a dark-skinned boy saluting the French flag sent out messages of French superiority, this image sends out messages of inherent Nordic goodness in a time where positive images of the European refugee crisis are few and far between.In a discursive discussion, one asks not only what meanings does this image convey, but why is this image chosen, distributed, shared, tweeted, and promoted over other images? What purpose does its proliferation serve? What is the historical context in which it is popularised? What is the cultural imagination/narrative that is served? In the current often depressing socio-political situation in Europe, people like to know that there is a place where compassion and play exists.Among other news stories of death, despair, and border protection, depictions of an idealised North can help calm anxieties by implying the existence of a place that is free of conflict. Jakob Stougaard-Nielsen writes:The flood of journalistic and popular ethnographic explorations of the Nordic region in the UK is an expression, perhaps, of a search for a lost sense of identity, a nostalgic longing for an imagined past society more in tune with pre-Thatcherite welfarist values, by way of consuming, appropriating and exoticising proximate cultural identities such as the now much hyped Danish or Nordic utopias. (Nordic Noir, 6)In The Almost Nearly Perfect People, British writer Michael Booth wonders: “one thing in particular about this new-found love of all things Scandinavian … which struck me as particularly odd: considering all this positive PR, and with awareness of the so-called Nordic miracle at an all-time high, why wasn’t everyone flocking to live here [in Denmark]?” (7).In actuality not many people in the West are interested in living in the Nordic countries. Rather, as Barbara Goodwin writes: “utopias hold up a mirror to the fears and aspirations of the time in which they were written” (2). In other words, in an age of anxiety, where traditional norms and stabilities are shifting, to believe that there is a place where contemporary societies have found a way of living in happiness and togetherness provides a sense of hope. People are not flocking to live in Scandinavia because it is not in their interests to have their utopian ideals shattered by the reality that, though the North has a lot to offer, it is inevitably not a utopia (Sougaard-Nielsen, The Truth Is).UnderbellyParadoxically, in recent years, Scandinavia has become well known for its “Nordic Noir” crime fiction and television. In the documentary TV series Scandimania, British TV personality Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall travels through Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, exploring the culture, scenery, and food. He finds it curious that Denmark has become so famous for its sombre crime series, such as The Killing and The Bridge, because it seems so far removed from the Denmark he experiences riding around the streets of Copenhagen on his bike.Fearnley-Whittingstall ponders that one has to look hard to find the dark side of Denmark, and that perhaps it does not actually exist at all. This observation points to something essential. Even though millions of viewers worldwide have seen shows such as The Killing, which are known for their dark story lines, bleak urban settings, complex but realistic characters, progressive gender equality, and social commentary, the positive mythologising of Scandinavia remains so strong that it engenders a belief that the underbelly shown in Nordic Noir is perhaps entirely fictional.Stougaard-Nielsen (see also Pitcher, Consuming Race) argues that perhaps the British obsession with Nordic Noir (and this could be applied to other western countries) can be attributed to “a more appropriate white cosmopolitan desire to imagine rooted identities in an age of globalisation steeped in complex identity politics” (Nordic Noir, 8). That is to say that, for a segment of society which feels overwhelmed by contemporary multiculturalism, there may be a pleasure in watching a show that is predominantly populated by white Nordic protagonists, where the homes and people are stylish, and where the Nordic model of welfare and progressive thinking provides a rich identity source for white people as a symbolic point of origin.The watching/reading of Nordic Noir, as well as other preoccupations with all things Nordic, help build upon a mythological sense of whiteness that sets itself apart from our usual notions of race politics, by being an accepted form of longing for the North of bygone ages: a place that is progressive, moral, stylish, and imbued with aspirational ways of living, thinking, and being (Pitcher, Racial Politics).The image of the Danish police officer and the refugee girl fits this ideal of a progressive society where race relations are uncomplicated. The policeman who epitomises the Nordic ideal is in a position of power, but this is an authority which is benevolent. The girl is non-threatening in her otherness, because she is a child and female, and therefore does not fit the culturally dreaded Muslim/terrorist stereotype. In this constellation the two can meet beautifully.The reality, of course, is that the race relations and issues surrounding immigration in Denmark, and in other Nordic countries, are as complicated and often messy and hateful as they are in other countries. In Sweden, as Fearnley-Whittingstall touches upon in Scandimania, there are escalating problems with integration of the many new Swedes and growing inequalities in wealth. In Norway, the underlying race tensions became acutely topical in the aftermath of the 2011 massacre, where right-wing extremist Anders Breivik killed 77 people. Denmark has one of the harshest anti-immigration laws in Europe, laws that are continuously being tightened (Boserup); and whenever visiting Denmark I have been surprised to see how much space and time discussions about immigration and integration take up in the news and current affairs.If we contrast the previous image with the image above, taken within a similar timeframe on the same Danish highway, we can see the reality of Danish immigration policies. Here we are exposed to a different story. The scene and the location is the same, but the power dynamics have shifted from benign, peaceful, and playful to aggressive, authoritarian, and conflict ridden. A desperate father carries his daughter, determined to march on towards their destination of Sweden. The policeman is pulling his arm, attempting to detain the refugees so that they cannot go further, the goal being to deport the Syrians back to their previous place of detention, just over the border in Germany (Harticollis). While the previous image reflects the humanity of the refugee crisis, this image reflects the politics, policies, and to a large extent public opinion in Denmark, which is not refugee-friendly. This image, however, was not widely distributed, partly because it feeds into the same depressing narrative of an unsolvable refugee crisis seen so often elsewhere, and partly because it does not fit into the narrative of the infallible North. It could not be tweeted with the hashtag #Humanity, nor shared on Facebook with a smiley face and liked with an emoji heart.Another image from Denmark, in the form of a politically funded billboard, shows that there are deep-seated tendencies within Danish society that want to promote and retain a Denmark which adheres to its traditional values and ethnic whiteness. The image was displayed all over the country, at train stations, bus stops, and other public spaces when I visited in 2016. It was issued by Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People’s Party); a party which is anti-immigration and which was until recently the country’s second largest party. The title says “Our Denmark”, while the byline cleverly plays with the double meaning of passe på: it can mean “there is so much we need to take care of”, but also “there is so much we need to beware of.” In other words, the white working-class family needs to take care of their Denmark, and beware of anyone who does not fit into this norm. Though hugely contested and criticised (Cremer; see a counter-reaction designed by opponents below), the fact that thinly veiled anti-immigration propaganda can be so readily distributed speaks of an underbelly in Danish society that is not made of the dark murder mysteries in The Killing, but rather of a quietly brewing distain for the foreigner that reigns within stylishly designed living rooms. ConclusionMyths are stories cultures tell and retell until they form a belief system that becomes a natural part of our collective narrative. For Barthes, these stories were intrinsically connected to our understanding of language and our ability to read images, films, artifacts, and popular culture more generally. To later cultural theorists, the notion of discursive formations expands this understanding, to see myth within a broader network of socio-political discourses placed within a certain place and time in history. When connected, small narratives (images, advertising, film, music, news stories, social media sharing, scientific evidence, etc.) come together to form a common narrative (the myth) about how things are and should be in relation to a particular topic. The culminating popularity of numerous Nordic themes (Nordic television/film, interior design, fashion, cuisine, architecture, lifestyle, sustainability, welfare system, school system, gender equality, etc.) has created a grand narrative of the Nordic countries as a type of utopia: one that shows the rest of the world that an egalitarian society of togetherness and progressive innovation is possible. This mythologisation serves to quell anxieties about the flux and uncertainty of contemporary times, and may also serve to legitimise a yearning for a simple, benign, and progressive whiteness, where we imagine Nordic families sitting peacefully at their beechwood dining tables, candles lit, playing board games. 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