Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Syndicated Loan'

Business Administration
Ph.D.
The syndicated loan is become more and more important for firm's financing. We study three important aspects of loan syndication: the lead arranger's reputation effect on syndicated loan pricing, the switching behavior for repeat syndicate loans and the effect of country-specific bank-firm ownership structure on syndicated loan pricing and bank-firm relationship of repeat loans. The first chapter analyzes the reputation effect of the lead arranger on syndicated loan pricing, based on a sample of loan facilities to non-financial U.S. firms over the 1994-2006 period. Theory suggests that the reputation/spread relationship should generally be positive because more reputable lenders usually employ more costly loan screening and monitoring techniques and therefore must be compensated with a higher spread. After controlling for endogeneity in lender-borrower matching, the empirical results show that the reputable arrangers charge a "reputation premium" for monitoring and due diligence, and the commitment against extracting the information rent from borrowers. The results also show that the less-reputable arrangers offer a "reputation discount", since the market competition from both the loan market and bond market makes it more difficult for less reputable arrangers to sustain the reputation mechanism. In addition, the reputation effect on pricing becomes less significant when the borrower enters a repeat loan relationship with a prior or existing lender. Finally, the study finds that the arranger's reputation can reduce the lead share retained by the lead arranger in its loan portfolio, which serves as evidence that reputation also mitigates the information asymmetry between the lead arranger and participant banks. The second chapter analyzes the switching behavior for two types of repeat loans: migrating loans that remain within the same bank reputation class and loans migrating to a different reputation class. The theoretical literature argues that banks (lenders) and firms (borrowers) benefit from entering into a relationship-lending arrangement. In the syndicated loan market, however, it is very common for repeat loans to switch from one bank to another. We present a model that establishes conditions for implementing empirical investigations relating to relationship lending and the characteristics of the separating equilibrium in the loan market. Using explanatory variables describing firms, loans, and loan syndicates, we find that lending within the high quality bank sector reveals evidence that is consistent with relationship lending. That is, some firms forego longer maturity loans and less oversight to remain with their original lender. A similar finding does not hold for repeat lending in the lower quality bank sector. Regarding loans that migrate in either direction between the high and low quality banking sectors, firm risk is the most important determinant. Relatively riskier firms move down to lower quality lenders while relatively safer firms move up to higher quality lenders. The third chapter investigates the determinants of loan pricing and repeat loan relationship for a sample of 6,180 non-U.S.. firm-loan observations for the period 1998-2007. This paper focuses on the relation between a country-specific governance indicator and country-specific bank-firm ownership structures on loan pricing and the management of a lending relationship between the syndicate bank and firm. We evaluate the relationship between country-specific bank ownership structure and the main characteristics of loan, which are mainly measured by loan pricing and loan switching decision. The paper examines three interrelated questions: 1.How is loan pricing affected by country-specific bank-firm ownership structure? 2. Does country-specific bank-firm ownership structure influence the decision to switch lenders in the repeat loan market? 3. Is country-specific bank-firm ownership structure more important for a borrower to migrate to a higher reputation lender than to a lower reputation lender? We use loan-characteristic, bank-characteristic, and firm-characteristic variables as well as country-specific corruption and country-specific bank-firm ownership structure variables to explore the effect on loan pricing and loan-switching decisions. Using logistic regression analysis, we find that loan switching is less likely for firms when the bank controls the firm, especially in the case of a bank-controlled firm borrows from a low reputation syndicated loan lender. However, when the firm controls a local bank, there is no impact on the firm's switching decision in the syndicated loan market. The bank-controlling firm is as likely to switch as a firm that does not control a bank even though the firm is more opaque to the financial market. Our results suggest that in the international syndicated loan market, the bank-firm relationship is partly shaped by country-specific characteristics and information asymmetry of firms to the financial market. These chapters explores the bank and firm behavior in the syndicated loan market and make the contribution to the literature by offering further knowledge and deeper understanding about the bank-firm relationship and behavior in the loan syndication structure.
Temple University--Theses

Der erste Artikel analysiert den Einfluss von CDS Handel auf Kreditsyndizierung. Theoretisch können CDS sowohl positive wie auch negative Effekte haben. Auf der einen Seite sind CDS flexiblere Risikomanagement-Instrumente als Kredit Verkäufe. Auf der andern Seite kann ein Kreditgeber nicht glaubhaft versichern einen Kreditnehmer zu überwachen, wenn Kreditrisiko anonym mit CDS abgelegt werden kann (moral hazard). Wir finden, dass Kreditgeber signifikant höhere Anteile an Krediten halten, wenn CDS auf das Fremdkapital des Kreditnehmers gehandelt werden. Wir finden keine Evidenz für moral hazard. Der zweite Artikel untersucht den Einfluss von Manager Optimismus auf die Verwendung von performance-abhängigen Vertragsklauseln in Kreditverträgen (PSD). Gegeben ihrer verzerrten Erwartungen über die zukünftige Performance der Firma könnten optimistische Manager PSD als günstige Finanzierungsmöglichkeit ansehen. Wir finden, dass optimistische Manager mehr PSD nutzen und schlechter nach der Ausgabe von PSD performen als rationale Manager. Der dritte Artikel untersucht, ob PSD genutzt werden kann um hold-up Probleme in langfristigen Kreditbeziehungen zu verringern. Wir finden, dass PSD mehr in Hausbankbeziehungen genutzt wird – insbesondere wenn der Kreditnehmer wenig alternative Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten besitzt. Des Weiteren finden wir einen Substitutionseffekt zwischen der Stärkte von Finanz-Covenants und der Nutzung von PSD. Diese Resultate stützen die Hypothese, dass PSD genutzt wird um hold-up Probleme zu mindern.
The first paper analyzes the impact of credit default swap (CDS) trading on loan syndication. Theoretically, CDS can have both positive and negative effects. One the one hand, CDS are a flexible risk management tool and can therefore replace loan sales (risk management). On the other hand, lenders can no longer credibly commit to monitor a borrower if laying off credit risk anonymously via CDS is possible making loan sales costly (moral hazard). We find that lenders retain significantly higher shares of loans once CDS are actively traded on a borrower’s debt. We find no evidence for moral hazard. The second paper examines the impact of managerial optimism on the inclusion of performance-pricing provisions in debt contracts (PSD). Given their upwardly biased expectations about the firm''s future cash flow, optimistic managers may view PSD as a relatively cheap form of financing. We find that optimistic managers are more likely to issue PSD. Consistent with their biased expectations, firms with optimistic managers perform worse than firms with rational managers after issuing PSD. The third paper examines if PSD is used to reduce hold- up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. Further, we find a substitution effect between the use of PSD and the tightness of financial covenants. This result also supports our hypothesis that hold-up concerns motivate the use of PSD.

This work undertakes the first comprehensive theoretical assessment of syndicated loans. It is shown that syndicated and bilateral (single lender) loans should be good substitutes in meeting a borrower's financing requirements, but that syndicated loans are more complex and impose additional risks to the parties in the way they are arranged. The existing explantions of loan syndication - that they are hybrids of private bank loans and public debt instruments, that syndication is a portfolio management tool, and that loans are syndicated where they are too large to be provided bilaterally - are unable to substantially explain both the nature of syndicated loans and practice in the loan markets. A rigorous new explanation is developed, which shows that syndication reduces the rate of lending costs, so that the return to the loan originator is greater, and the borrower's cost of financing is lower, where a loan is syndicated rather than provided bilaterally. This explanation is shown to hold in competitive loan markets and to be consistent with the observation that syndicated loans are generally larger than other loans. Incidental to this new explanation, new expressions of the return to a bank from providing a loan on a bilateral basis and from originating a syndicated loan are also developed. New algorithms are also developed for determining the distribution of the commitments from syndicate participants and thus the originator's final hold, the amount it must lend itself, where the loan is underwritten. This provides, for the first time, a rigorous basis for assessing the expected return, and the risk, for the originator of a given syndicated loan. Finally, empirical testing finds that a bank's observed lending history is significant to its decision to participate in a new syndicated loan but that predictions of participation, which are fundamental inputs into the final hold algorithms, based on this information have relatively little power. It follows that there is competitive advantage to loan originators that have access to other, private information on potential participants' lending intentions.

This work undertakes the first comprehensive theoretical assessment of syndicated loans. It is shown that syndicated and bilateral (single lender) loans should be good substitutes in meeting a borrower's financing requirements, but that syndicated loans are more complex and impose additional risks to the parties in the way they are arranged. The existing explantions of loan syndication - that they are hybrids of private bank loans and public debt instruments, that syndication is a portfolio management tool, and that loans are syndicated where they are too large to be provided bilaterally - are unable to substantially explain both the nature of syndicated loans and practice in the loan markets. A rigorous new explanation is developed, which shows that syndication reduces the rate of lending costs, so that the return to the loan originator is greater, and the borrower's cost of financing is lower, where a loan is syndicated rather than provided bilaterally. This explanation is shown to hold in competitive loan markets and to be consistent with the observation that syndicated loans are generally larger than other loans. Incidental to this new explanation, new expressions of the return to a bank from providing a loan on a bilateral basis and from originating a syndicated loan are also developed. New algorithms are also developed for determining the distribution of the commitments from syndicate participants and thus the originator's final hold, the amount it must lend itself, where the loan is underwritten. This provides, for the first time, a rigorous basis for assessing the expected return, and the risk, for the originator of a given syndicated loan. Finally, empirical testing finds that a bank's observed lending history is significant to its decision to participate in a new syndicated loan but that predictions of participation, which are fundamental inputs into the final hold algorithms, based on this information have relatively little power. It follows that there is competitive advantage to loan originators that have access to other, private information on potential participants' lending intentions.

Syndicated loans are a common debt financing format for large corporations in general. For those situated in Germany—with its bank-based financial system—such loans play a vital role. Given the multibillion volumes raised annually, the pricing of syndicated loans is economically significant, with its levels, structure, and determination having attracted the interest of researchers around the world. A critical review of the existing worldwide literature of syndicated loan pricing revealed notable gaps, including an almost complete absence of studies on the German corporate market. The overall research aim was to address this gap by exploring and analysing the “hidden drivers” of banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an enriched understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying processes and decisions. Adopting a pragmatist research paradigm, I chose a sequential mixed-methods approach, with a limited quantitative analysis preceding an extensive qualitative study. The first stage of the research was designed to evaluate the availability of reliable quantitative pricing data in the public domain—this being the main data source for the clear majority of extant studies. I found the availability and quality of pricing data for the German corporate market to be extremely limited, particularly in comparison to that available relating to the U.S. market. There was clearly much that remained unexplained; hence, primary research was required to illuminate syndicated loan pricing and the decision processes that contribute to it. The main element of the qualitative study was a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a sample of bank lending professionals and key informants. The purpose of these interviews was to explore the complex realities of syndicated lending through the eyes and experiences of the people involved and to interpret the socially constructed phenomena surrounding the pricing of German corporate syndicated loans. The study succeeded in revealing and substantiating important and to date hidden phenomena concerning numerous dimensions of syndicated lending in general and pricing in particular. An explanation was developed for the relative opacity of the German corporate syndicated loan market. The study enabled significant enhancements to the understanding of the concept of pricing and its complex and interwoven elements. More broadly, a new and richer perspective was developed of syndicated lending as a behavioural phenomenon, involving a complex interplay of relationships and strategies, and involving individuals and departments within banks, between banks as members of the syndicate, and between lenders and borrowers. The insights gained informed the development of a comprehensive model of the pricing elements of syndicated lending and their determinants. This research is the first to conduct and produce an in-depth study of the internal workings of syndicated corporate lending in the German market and a study that does not rely on secondary data that are at best incomplete. It has resulted in many rich and original insights and a conceptualisation of syndicated lending that differs radically from the classical understanding of lender-borrower relationships as founded on theories of asymmetric information. The research presented here, therefore, makes significant contributions to the literature, in helping to close notable gaps in the banking and financial intermediation literature.

A loan deal is often composed of several components (for example, a 3-year revolving loan, a 10-year secured senior term loan, and a 5-year subordinated term loan). The division of a deal into two or more components, each with different risk characteristics, is called tranching. This study recognizes the importance of tranching and establishes tranching as an integral component of a syndicated loan structure. In the first essay, we present a model to explain the economic value of tranching and show that riskier firms are more likely to take loans with multiple tranches. Therefore, the average credit spread on syndicated loans with multiple tranches is higher than that on nontranched loans. However, after accounting for the risk characteristics of a tranched loan, we show that a given tranche of a multi-tranche loan, on average, has a lower credit spread than an otherwise similar loan that is not part of a multi-tranche loan. We also show that the benefits of tranching accrue primarily to borrowers with speculative debt ratings. Prior studies have found an abnormal stock return of 100 to 150 basis points for firms that announce they have borrowed funds from a bank. Despite some conflicting evidence (Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Thomas and Wang, 2004; Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel, 2006), the literature tends to interpret this positive bank loan announcement effect as the markets response to the mitigation of information asymmetry regarding the borrowing firm caused by the certification role of the lending banks who act as quasi-insiders. In the second essay, we document that a strong selection bias exists in prior studies. We show that less than a quarter of the loans made by banks are ever announced by borrowing firms and the loans that are announced are systematically different from loans that are never announced by the firms. Firms with low debt ratings, firms with zero or negative profits but positive interest expense, firms that take large loans in relation to their assets base, firms with little analyst following, and firms with high forecasted EPS growth are more likely to announce their loans. We show that while there was a positive announcement effect over the period 1987 to 1995, loan announcements elicited zero or negative returns in the last ten years as the mix of companies announcing loans changed over time.

There are four primary objectives of this study. First, it examines the association between the disclosure of the Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs), as a proxy for the internal control quality, and information asymmetry (IA) in the secondary loan market. Second, it identifies which types of ICDs exacerbate conditions of information asymmetry in the secondary loan market. Third, it investigates whether firms that remediate or take corrective actions to address ICDs lead to a reduction in information asymmetry in the market. Finally, it examines the effect of the loan specific characteristics such as debt covenants, credit rating and number of lenders (syndication) in the secondary loan market on the association between ICDs and IA. Results suggest that firms that disclose ICDs have significant positive association with IA and that ICDs reported under section 302 have significant positive association with IA. Although results on the association between the severity rank of ICDs by using Internal Control Material Weaknesses (ICMWs) as a proxy and IA are not supported, the use of Company Level (CL) internal control as a proxy for the severity rank of ICDs shows a significant positive association with IA. Overall, firms that remediate their ICDs have significant negative association with IA. Overall, there is a statistical negative association between the interaction term of ICDs and number of lenders (syndication) and IA. Same negative significant association is documented between the interaction term of ICDs and credit rating, and IA and the interaction term of ICDs and debt covenants and IA. The latter result suggests that the secondary loan market unique characteristics mitigate the negative consequences of the disclosure of ICDs and reduce the information asymmetry between lender and multiple arrangers. My results are consistent with prior studies’ (Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007 a,b; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008), which suggest that firms with reported ICDs are generally small, poor performing, financially weaker, and characterized by higher market risk than firms with effective internal control system.

La thèse a pour objectif d’examiner la nature des informations fournies sur les transactions liées dans le cadre des normes comptables internationales IAS 24. Dans le chapitre 1, nous étudions si les actionnaires des banques d’Etat anticipent qu’il existe un risque d’expropriation, risque qu’ils sont prêts à accepter si un soutien de l’Etat est apporté en cas de difficultés financières. Nous travaillons pour cela sur des données de banques et de firmes emprunteuses indonésiennes dans la mesure où il y a une forte présence des banques d’Etat en Indonésie et que le risque d’expropriation est institutionnellement élevé. Nos résultats mettent en évidence que les actionnaires des banques d’Etat anticipent effectivement qu’il y a un risque qu’ils soient expropriés, mais qu’ils acceptent ce risque en échange du soutien que l’Etat apportera à la banque en cas de risque de défaut. Ce résultat est encore plus renforcé si la firme qui a emprunté est elle aussi une firme dont l’actionnaire le plus important est l’Etat. Dans le chapitre 2, nous étudions comment les créanciers tarifient le risque lié aux transactions liées effectuées par un emprunteur. Nous utilisons pour cela des données de crédit sur les opérations de syndicationen Asie et des données collectées dans les rapports annuels sur les transactions liées(RPTs)des firmes emprunteuses qui nous permettent de différencier les transactions relevant d’un comportement d’expropriation(detrimentalRPTs)de celles relevant d’un soutien financier(beneficialRPTs). Nous nous concentrons sur les firmes asiatiques qui présentent pour la plupart une structure de l’actionnariat pyramidal avec un fort risque d’expropriation, mais également la possibilité de bénéficier d’un soutien financier du groupe en cas de difficultés financières. Notre étude empirique met en évidence que les créanciers exigent un taux de crédit plus élevé pour les emprunteurs ayant un niveau plus élevé de detrimentalRPTs, ainsi que pour les firmes ayant un niveau plus élevé de beneficialRPTs. Ce dernier résultat, qui peut paraître contre intuitif, suggère que les créanciers anticipent qu’un soutien apporté aujourd’hui par les actionnaires ultimes peut être fait pour ménager la possibilité de mieux exproprier demain. Le troisième chapitre vient compléter ce travail en étudiant si les créanciers structurent différemment le syndicat en fonction de l’importance des transactions liées (detrimental ou beneficialRPTs).Nos résultats montrent qu’il y a un plus grand nombre de prêteurs dans le syndicat si l’emprunteur a un niveau plus élevé de detrimentalRPTs, alors qu’on observe au contraire la présence d’un moins grand nombre de prêteurs si les beneficialRPTssont plus élevées. Ces résultats suggèrent que les créanciers ajustent la structure du syndicat en fonction du risque d’expropriation
This thesis aims to provide an answer to the question what information conveyed by the disclosure of related party transaction under IAS 24. In the first chapter we investigate whether shareholders rationally anticipate expropriation but are willing to accept it in exchange for higher expectations ofgreater stability andgovernmentsupport during financial distress. We focus our empirical research on this chapter on Indonesia where the legal institution is widely considered as a weak. We findthat shareholders of government bank indeed rationally expect being expropriated but are willing to accept this in exchange for specific government support in the case of financial distress. This reaction is consistent if the borrowing firms is also government owned. In the second chapter we take a different perspective by investigating how the creditor perceived the information conveyed in the related party transactions in the syndicated loan market and set the price base on the information. We extent ouranalysis by taking into account both detrimental and beneficial RPT and focus our analysis on East Asian firms where the pyramidal ownership exists. Our finding shows that creditor set a higher price for borrower with high detrimental and beneficial RPT indicating that even though receiving propping can be beneficial, it may preserve a future option for the ultimate owner to expropriate the firms. Third chapter compliments the analysis by looking into how creditor set the syndicated loan structure based on the information of detrimental and beneficial RPT from the borrowing firms. The finding shows that there is a less concentration of syndicated structure if the borrower has high level of detrimental RPT while high concentration of syndicated structure ifthe borrower has high level of beneficial RPT. This indicates that creditor adjust the structure to be able to perform extensive monitoring and due diligence when the borrower is prone to expropriation. Our findings therefore provide an evidence that RPT disclosure under IAS 24 is valuable to determine the risk of expropriation that the firms face and to understand the nature of expropriation. Therefore, our evidences support the decision from regulators to limit related party transactions and to improve the transparency on RPT disclosure in order to improve the protection for investors and creditors

Le crédit est indispensable au bon fonctionnement de l’économie. Il existe sous différentes formes (financement participatif, émission obligataire, etc.). L’une des plus répandues reste le crédit bancaire, et lorsque ce crédit est dispensé par au moins deux établissements financiers, il s’agit d’un « crédit syndiqué » qui répond à une certaine organisation collective. C’est dans ce contexte qu’un « agent du crédit » assure l’administration du crédit. En fonction du droit applicable, il peut être un « agent » (droit anglais) ou encore un « mandataire » (droit français). De surcroît, ces financements étant généralement pourvus de sûretés et de garanties il est fréquent de constater l’intervention d’un « agent des sûretés ». Ce dernier agit comme un véritable « gardien » des sûretés et des garanties dont bénéficient les parties financières en garantie de la bonne exécution des obligations des emprunteurs au titre des documents de financement. Son rôle est donc crucial
Credit is essential for the smooth functioning of the economy. It is existing in various forms (crowdfunding, bond issuance, etc.). One of the most widespread is the bank loan, and when this credit is provided by at least two financial institutions, it is a "syndicated loan" that has to fulfil a certain collective organization. It is in this context that a "facility agent" ensures the administration of loan. Depending on the applicable law, it may be an « agent » (English law) or a « mandataire » (French law). Moreover, as these financings are generally provided with security and guarantees, it is frequent to observe the intervention of a "security agent". The latter acts as a "guardian" of the security and guarantees the financial parties are benefiting from as guarantee of the proper performance of borrowers' obligations under the finance documents. Its role is therefore crucial

L'opération de crédit "Schuldscheindarlehen" est apparue dans le paysage bancaire et financier allemand au milieu du XIXème siècle. Son essor, au cours des dernières décennies, rend plus que jamais pertinente la question de sa qualification juridique en droit français. L'opération se présentant comme un prêt de nature syndiquée, aux participations cessibles selon des voies simplifiées, est généralement perçue par les financiers comme un outil efficace de financement de l'économie, véritable troisième voie capable de concurrencer la syndication de crédit et l'emprunt obligataire. L'étude des actes juridiques ayant a priori une fonction centrale dans l'opération (Partie I) met en exergue plusieurs spécificités. La possibilité laissée à un large éventail d'investisseurs (banques, compagnies d'assurance, fonds d'investissement) de participer au contrat de prêt favorise la levée massive des fonds, dans le respect d'un cadre juridique fortement standardisé et allégé. Les reconnaissances de dette (Schuldschein) qui sont émises par l'emprunteur au moment de la formation du contrat de prêt, dont on a pu penser qu'elles participaient à la circulation des créances, ne revêtent pas la qualification de titres financiers en droit allemand, ce qui exclut a fortiori qu'elles soient le support des participations. Ce n'est en revanche pas le cas des accords de cession, qui grâce à leur standardisation et aux règles civilistes de cession de créance de droit allemand plus légères qu'en droit français, contribuent sensiblement à la fongibilité et la négociabilité des créances. Il est soutenu que le "Schuldscheindarlehen" est une opération de crédit sui generis pouvant être décrite comme "quasi-obligataire" (quasi-négociable, quasi-fongible). Au regard du droit français, c'est avec le prêt à bons de caisses nominatifs qu'elle paraît présenter le plus de connivences, sans pour autant être parfaitement assimilable.L'étude des services éventuellement fournis par l'intermédiaire financier (Partie II), lors de la phase de formation de l'opération, comme arrangeur-placeur de participations, et/ou lors de son exécution, comme animateur de marché et/ou agent payeur et/ou fiduciaire, révèle leur contribution respective pour une gestion plus rationnelle et plus efficace de l'opération, qui bénéficie à la liquidité des participations et à la diminution des coûts. Le recours aux produits dérivés et/ou structurés a, en outre, permis de donner récemment naissance à des opérations pour des montants plus petits et des durées plus courtes, rendant accessible aux PME cette source de financement, dans un cadre juridique et des structures d'accompagnement à la solidité éprouvée par plusieurs années de pratique. Si ces mécanismes sont largement connus en droit français et peuvent être employés lors d'une syndication de crédit ou un emprunt obligataire, néanmoins, l'analyse met en évidence que le "Schuldscheindarlehen" peut être utilisé en droit allemand comme structure juridique de base à la titrisation de créances (CDO), en lieu et place d'une émission obligataire. Par ailleurs, les participations sont éligibles aux refinancements sur le marché monétaire, ce qui contribue à rendre l'opération plus attrayante pour les investisseurs. D'autres aspects (p. ex. sûretés, procédures collectives) sont analysés dans l'étude afin de donner une vue aussi complète et actuelle que possible de l'opération
The credit transaction "Schuldscheindarlehen" appeared in the German banking and financial landscape in the middle of the nineteenth century. Its growth during recent decades makes the question of its legal classification under French law more relevant than ever. The transaction operates as a loan of syndicated nature, with relatively simple ways of transferring participations, and is generally perceived by financiers as an effective tool for financing the real economy. It is a competitive option to financing by way of syndicated loan or bond issue. The analysis of legal documents with a priori a central role in the operation (Part I) highlights several specific features of the operation. The possibility given to a wide range of investors such as banks, insurance companies, and investment funds to participate in the loan agreement promotes massive fundraising within a highly standardized and streamlined legal framework. The debt certificates "Schuldschein" issued by the borrower at the time of the formation of the loan agreement, which were expected to be part of the circulation of debts, are not classified as securities under German law. A fortiori, this excludes them from being used in support of any claims. However, this is not the case for assignment agreements. Assignment agreements contribute significantly to the fungibility and transferability of the participations, owing to their standardization and to German civil law rules of assignment of claims, which are less constraining than French law rules. It is argued in the study that the "Schuldscheindarlehen" is a sui generis form of credit that can be described as "quasi-bond" (quasi-negotiable, quasi-fungible). Under French law the strongest resemblance is with the participation loan “prêt à bons de caisse nominatifs”, without being identical. The analysis of services provided by the financial intermediary (Part II), during the formation phase of the operation -as an arranger-underwriter of the participations, and/or during the running phase, as a market maker and/or a paying agent and/or a trustee- points out their respective contributions to a more rational and efficient management. This favours the liquidity of the participations and decreases the costs. Moreover, the use of derivatives and/or structured products has given birth recently to operations for smaller amounts and shorter durations, making this source of funding accessible to SMEs within a legal framework and support structures, developed by many years of practice. Although these mechanisms are widely known in French law and can be applied to syndicated loan or bond issue, the analysis highlights that "Schuldscheindarlehen" can also be used under German law as the legal structure of a debt securitization (CDO), in lieu of a bond issue. In addition, its participations are eligible for refinancing in the European money market, which helps to make the operation more attractive to investors. Other aspects such as collateral, and insolvency are analyzed in the study in order to give as full and updated a picture of the operation as possible
Das Kreditgeschäft "Schuldscheindarlehen" bildete sich im deutschen Banken- und Finanzwesen in der Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts heraus. Das Wachstum der letzten Jahrzehnte macht nun mehr denn je die Frage seiner rechtlichen Einordnung im französischen Recht relevant. Die Operation stellt sich als Darlehen von syndizierter Natur dar, mit Beteiligungen, die in vereinfachter Weise übertragbar sind, wird in der Regel von Finanziers als ein wirksames Instrument für die Finanzierung der Realwirtschaft und präsentiert eine sinnvolle dritte Weise, die ohne Bedenken mit der Kreditsyndizierung und der Anleihe konkurrieren kann. Die Analyse der Rechtsgeschäfte mit einer a priori zentralen Rolle in der Operation (Part I) hebt mehrere Besonderheiten hervor. Die Möglichkeit, die einer Vielzahl unterschiedlichster Investoren (Banken, Versicherungen, Investmentfonds) gegeben ist, sich am Darlehensvertrag zu beteiligen, fördert eine massive Mittelbeschaffung, innerhalb eines rechtlich hoch standardisiert und gestrafften Rahmens. Die Schuldscheine, die durch den Kreditnehmer zum Zeitpunkt der Entstehung des Darlehensvertrags ausgestellt werden, von denen man hätte denken können, dass sie als eine Verbriefungsart der Forderung angesehen werden könnten, werden im deutschen Recht nicht als Wertpapiere eingestuft. A fortiori sind sie als Grund der Beteiligungenverkehrsfähigkeit ausgeschlossen. Dieses ist jedoch nicht der Fall der Abtretungsvereinbarungen, die einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Fungibilität und Übertragbarkeit der Beteiligungen, aufgrund ihrer Standardisierung und den deutschen zivilrechtlichen Vorschriften der Abtretung von Ansprüchen, die einfacher als mit dem französischen Recht vereinbar sind, leisten. Es wird in der Studie argumentiert, dass das "Schuldscheindarlehen" eine Kreditform sui generis darstellt, die als "Quasi-Anleihe" (quasi-verhandelbar, quasi-fungibel) beschrieben werden kann. Im französischen Recht, scheint es dem Darlehen "prêt à bons de caisse nominatifs" zu ähneln, ohne jedoch vollständig assimilierbar zu sein. Die Analyse von Dienstleistungen durch Finanzvermittler geleistet (Part II), während der Entstehungsphase der Operation, als Arrangeur-Underwriter der Beteiligungen, und/oder während der laufenden Phase, als Market Maker und/oder Zahlstelle und/oder Treuhänder, weist darauf hin, ihre jeweiligen Beiträge zu einer rationelleren und effizienteren Verwaltung des Geschäftes, die der Liquidität der Beteiligungen zugute kommt und die Kosten senkt. Außerdem hat unter anderem der Einsatz von Derivaten und/oder strukturierten Produkten zur Entstehung von Operationen mit kürzeren Laufzeiten und kleineren Beträgen geführt, was diese Finanzierungsquelle zugänglich für KMU gemacht hat, in Bezug mit einem rechtlichen Rahmen und unterstützenden Strukturen, die seit mehreren Jahren Praxiserfahrung bewähren. Wenn diese Mechanismen häufig im französischen Gesetz bekannt sind und bei einer Kreditsyndizierung oder einer Anleihe angewendet werden, zeigt jedoch die Analyse, dass das "Schuldscheindarlehen" nach deutschem Recht auch als rechtliche Struktur einer Verbriefung (CDO) anstelle einer Anleihe verwendet wird. Darüber hinaus sind die Beteiligungen zur Refinanzierung auf dem europäischen Geldmarkt zulässig, was die Operation für Investoren attraktiver macht. Andere Aspekte (z.B. Sicherheiten, Insolvenzen) werden in der Studie analysiert, um ein möglichst vollständiges und aktuelles Bild von der Operation zu geben

Dans les deux premiers articles de cette thèse, nous explorons les réactions des marchés financiers aux annonces de fusions et acquisitions dans deux contextes différents. Nous nous intéressons en premier lieu, à la régulation des marchés de fusions et acquisitions par la Commission Européenne. Nous nous attachons à déterminer si la Commission Européenne présente toujours des comportements protectionnistes depuis la mise en place de la nouvelle régulation en 2004. Nos résultats suggèrent effectivement que la Commission Européenne agissait de façon protectionniste avant 2004 mais que ce phénomène disparait ensuite et même plus tôt, en 2002. Dans le second article de la présente thèse, nous testons la possible extension à long-terme de l’effet de certification dont bénéficient les entreprises lors de l’obtention d’un crédit syndiqué. Nous souhaitons déterminer si la certification bancaire concerne le projet financé spécifiquement ou plutôt la qualité de l’équipe dirigeante de l’entreprise. Pour cela, nous comparons les réactions des investisseurs à l’annonce d’opérations de fusion et acquisition mises en œuvre par des entreprises américaines avant et après l’annonce de l’obtention d’un prêt syndiqué. S’il existe un effet de long-terme de la certification bancaire, les réactions des investisseurs devraient être plus positives après l’octroi du crédit. Nos résultats ne supportent pas cette hypothèse et nous concluons que la certification bancaire concerne plus particulièrement le projet financé en lui-même. Ayant constaté l’importance de la qualité des données pour la réalisation d’études empiriques en finance, nous comparons, dans un troisième article, deux bases de données de fusions et acquisitions : SDC et Zephyr. Il apparait que ces bases présentent des différences notoires tant au niveau de la présentation que du contenu des données qui peuvent, dans certains cas, entrainer des différences de résultats lors d’analyses économétriques
We study market reactions to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements in different contexts in two papers. First, we explore the regulation of M&A markets by the European Commission. Our aim is to determine whether the European Commission has still protectionist tendencies towards European firms since the implementation of the new regulation in 2004. Our results confirm that the European Commission presented protectionist behaviors before the new regulation was set in place but this phenomenon does not appear anymore after 2004 and even before, from 2002. In the second paper, we test long-term effect of lender certification. We want to determine if lender certification relates to the financed project only or also sends a good signal about the quality of the management team of the firm. We compare market reaction to M&A announcements for operations carried out by US firms before and after the obtaining of a syndicated loan. If there is a long-term effect of lender certification, market reaction to M&A announcements should be more positive after the loan has been granted. Our results do not support this hypothesis and we conclude that lender certification relates to the financed project only. Since we noticed the great importance of data quality in empirical studies in finance, we compare in the third paper, two M&A databases: SDC and Zephyr. It appears that these databases present noticeable differences in the presentation as well as in the content of data provided which may lead, in some cases, to different results in empirical analysis

This thesis explores the micro-structure of the market for syndicated loans from the demand and supply side and aims to provide a detailed micro-economic analysis. The focus is on the determinants of loan pricing to both developing and industrialised countries. Particular attention is paid to the characteristics of both lenders and borrowers. The thesis comprises four papers. Paper 1 defines key concepts and provides a historical outlook on the international market for syndicated loans since the late 1970s. Paper 2 analyses in an extensive risk-return framework the determinants of the pricing of syndicated credits granted to developing country borrowers between 1993 and 2001. It concludes that risk is properly reflected in loan pricing, although the effect of purely micro-economic price determinants is in several instances weaker when variables reflecting macro-economic conditions in borrowers' countries are also introduced into the model. Analysis of market structure allows us to make inferences about the effects of bank market power and perceived risk concentration in syndicated lending to developing country borrowers. Paper 3 extends the second one in a first attempt to our knowledge to analyse the determinants of the pricing of developing and industrialised country loans and bonds taken together in the 1990s. On average, we find that developing country bonds have been riskier than developing country loans and industrialised country loans riskier than industrialised country bonds. We analyse how spill-over effects may have taken place from one market segment to the other in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. We also compare market access and structure on the respective market segments. We find that banks and investors may have exercised their market power to the greatest extent or that the penalising effect of higher perceived risk concentration may have been most pronounced in the case of bank loans being made to developing country borrowers. Paper 4 is the first of its kind to investigate the effects of bank characteristics on the structure and pricing of syndicated loans at an international level, using a unique dataset. We show that the pricing of loans is likely to be lower as banks participating in those loans become less liquidity-constrained or better capitalised, or enjoy a regulatory advantage. The relationship between bank characteristics and loan pricing generally appears to be stronger in the case of senior banks than of junior banks. This confirms the stronger pricing power of senior banks when arranging loans, while junior participants tend to act more as price takers. Contrary to the existing literature we find evidence of senior banks offloading larger shares of riskier loans in a potentially opportunistic way to outsider junior banks with little knowledge of the borrower. They also tend to hold higher portions of loans they arrange when they are better capitalised. In addition, as information about the borrower becomes less transparent, junior banks rely more on the reputation of the senior bank, to determine their level of commitment, than when borrower information is widely available to the public.

Alors que le début de la crise de l'euro a relancé le débat sur l’interdépendance du risque decrédit et la relation dette bancaire-dette souveraine, l’importance du secteur réel est négligéedans l’élaboration des mesures de relance de la croissance économique dans la zone euro. Cettethèse se concentre sur ces questions au sein de la zone euro. D’abord, nous évaluons les effets«spillover» de la crise souveraine sur le coût de crédit des entreprises non financières enprésence des mesures d’austérité (Chapitre-I). Nos résultats indiquent un effet significatif de ladette publique sur le coût des prêts. En outre, en période de crise, les mesures d’austéritéimpactent significativement le coût de crédit tandis qu’avant la crise, on note une petite illustrationde la demande agrégée de Keynes. Ensuite, nous montrons que les fonctions traditionnelles desbanques, notamment celle de création de liquidité fragilisent le secteur souverain (Chapitre-II). Enparticulier, nous montrons que le risque de liquidité des banques agit comme un canal depropagation de l'incertitude vers les sociétés non financières et inversement. Enfin, nousexaminons la dynamique du risque de crédit sur la dette souveraine, les entreprises et lesbanques (Chapitre-III). Nos résultats montrent qu’il existe un risque de contagion sur les secteurset les marchés financiers de l’union monétaire. Par ailleurs, les résultats des simulations dechocs de primes de risque des pays «noyaux» de la zone euro confirment l’existence d’effetsindirects sur le reste de la zone. De plus, nous constatons un phénomène de fuite desinvestisseurs vers les valeurs refuges
The onset of euro crisis has rekindled the policy debate regarding credit risk interdependenceamong sovereign-bank nexus. In this vein, the importance of real sector is overlooked whileformulating corrective measures for the recovery of economic growth in EMU. This thesispresents a study that examined these issues in euro zone. First, we evaluate spillover effect ofeuro crisis on borrowing cost of non-financial firms in presence of austerity measures (Chapter-I).Our results suggest significant effect especially where creditor rights protection are weak. Inaddition during recent crisis, results indicate presence of credibility channel due to austeritymeasures whereas; there is slight indication of aggregate demand channel before crisis. Second,we find traditional function of bank’s liquidity creation as a significant conduit of sovereign distressto real sector (Chapter-II). Particularly, our main finding shows that bank liquidity risk acts as aconduit which propagates uncertainty towards non-financial firms and re-channels it back torespective government. Finally, we examine cross-market credit risk dynamics among sovereignbank-firm nexus to identify presence of contagion during euro crisis period (Chapter-III). Ourresults report grave evidence of credit risk contagion across sectors and member states incorresponding financial markets in EMU. Moreover like peripheral countries, simulation results toshock in core countries risk premia strongly provide evidence of contagion towards remainingeuro zone

Šiuo metu, kai rinkos atsigauna po daugybę neigiamų pasekmių sukėlusios finansų krizės bei ilgai trukusios recesijos, atsigavimo procesą be jokios abejonės spartina didelių investicinių ir kitų projektų, kuriems reikalingos sindikuotos paskolos, įgyvendinimas, taigi sindikuotos paskolos yra svarbus veiksnys skatinantis ekonomikos raidą tiek pasauliniu tiek teritoriniu mastu. Po finansų krizę įtakojusio ir rinkas sudrebinusio vieno iš didžiausių JAV bankų „Lehman Brothers“ bankroto susvyravo pasitikėjimas bankais, o kartu ir pačių bankų pasitikėjimas vienas kitu. Bankai tapo daug atsargesni tarpusavio santykiuose skolindami lėšas vienas kitam, sudarydami kitus sandorius ir bendradarbiaudami. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad sindikuotų paskolų atveju kreditoriumi yra sindikatas, kurio nariai dažniausiai yra atskiri bankai, skolinantys pagal tą pačią kreditavimo sutartį, sindikuotų paskolų teikimas tapo sudėtingesnis, nes visų pirma baiminamasi situacijos kai kuris nors iš bankų tampa nemokus. Taigi sudarant ir įgyvendinant sindikuotų paskolų sandorius be jau egzistavusių probleminių aspektų pastaruoju metu atsirado ir naujų, kurie taip pat reikalauja detalaus tyrimo. Didžiąją dalį sindikuotų paskolų teikia tarptautiniai bankų sindikatai formuojami iš skirtingų valstybių bankų, atsižvelgiant į tai ir siekiant sumažinti tokių sandorių sudarymo laiko ir lėšų kaštus yra rengiamos pavyzdinės sindikuotų bankų paskolų sutartys. Tokias sutartis rengia Paskolų Rinkos Asociacija (angl. Loan... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]
Syndicated loan is a financial contract, which is very common in international market and is used to finance large loans in amounts of several hundred millions and a significant proportion run into billions. The essence of syndication is that two or more banks agree to make loans to a borrower on common terms governed by a single agreement between all parties. In Lithuania syndicated loan agreements are not very common and there are no special laws regarding this kind of contracts. Considering this situation syndicated loan contracts are regulated by the common rules established in Lithuanian Civil Code, lawyers preparing the syndicated loan agreements also use the recommendations provided by The Loan Market Association. The Association has recommended forms of syndicated facility agreements and there are user guides from the point of view of both lenders and borrowers. The purpose of this paper is to analyze substantial peculiarities of syndicated loan agreements, main problems that parties to the contract are facing while in the stages of organizing the syndicate and later making this syndicated loan mechanism work. Main problems discussed in this paper are bank manager liability and status attracting creditors to the syndicate and framing it with the syndicated loan agreement. This paper also discusses clawback clause, pro rata sharing and other most common theoretical and practical problems concluding the syndicated loan agreement and bringing it to life.

This thesis examines the impact of announcements of syndicated loans on the share prices of borrowing firms. I use a sample of 5,465 loan observations reported in the International Financing Review Platinum database to study this impact. Event study methodology is used. My overall results show significantly positive wealth effects on the borrowing firms. However, when I partition my data set into revolving credit agreements, term loans and hybrid loans, I find that the results are driven primarily by revolving credit agreements. I also observe that the size of the event window plays an important role in identifying the wealth effects for the borrowers. A five-day event window (-2, +2) shows share price response to revolving credit announcements to be significantly positive. A three-day event window (-1, +1) reveals that announcements are statistically positive for revolving credit agreements and statistically negative for term loan announcements. My results are consistent with previous studies in this area. I also distinguish between financial press announcements and information provider (IFR) announcements to cater for the potential for reporting bias. I find that both the IFR and financial press announcements are significant for the five-day window, but only the financial press results are significant for the three-day window. My study is unique in that I differentiate the impact of different sources of information on the market reaction to borrower share price. In addition to the examination of the wealth effect, I also use the structure of the loans to examine the uniqueness of bank loans and their ability to provide financial slack. Specifically, I examine whether revolving credit loans or term loans or hybrid loans make bank loans unique and their ability to provide financial slack. I observe that out of the three structures of bank loan, only revolving credit loans allow the borrower to more precisely match the funds acquired with the firm’s investment needs and to market time by borrowing at times when financing costs are attractive. Revolving credit loans are positively valued by the market both initially and over the longer term. Bank loans reduce information asymmetry, but the renegotiation characteristics of revolving credit loans allow borrowers to exploit changes in the interest rate environment, thus providing support for the market timing theory of capital structure. In contrast to puzzling results of previous studies, I present evidence of long-term positive performance following bank loans.

This thesis examines the impact of announcements of syndicated loans on the share prices of borrowing firms. I use a sample of 5,465 loan observations reported in the International Financing Review Platinum database to study this impact. Event study methodology is used. My overall results show significantly positive wealth effects on the borrowing firms. However, when I partition my data set into revolving credit agreements, term loans and hybrid loans, I find that the results are driven primarily by revolving credit agreements. I also observe that the size of the event window plays an important role in identifying the wealth effects for the borrowers. A five-day event window (-2, +2) shows share price response to revolving credit announcements to be significantly positive. A three-day event window (-1, +1) reveals that announcements are statistically positive for revolving credit agreements and statistically negative for term loan announcements. My results are consistent with previous studies in this area. I also distinguish between financial press announcements and information provider (IFR) announcements to cater for the potential for reporting bias. I find that both the IFR and financial press announcements are significant for the five-day window, but only the financial press results are significant for the three-day window. My study is unique in that I differentiate the impact of different sources of information on the market reaction to borrower share price. In addition to the examination of the wealth effect, I also use the structure of the loans to examine the uniqueness of bank loans and their ability to provide financial slack. Specifically, I examine whether revolving credit loans or term loans or hybrid loans make bank loans unique and their ability to provide financial slack. I observe that out of the three structures of bank loan, only revolving credit loans allow the borrower to more precisely match the funds acquired with the firm's investment needs and to market time by borrowing at times when financing costs are attractive. Revolving credit loans are positively valued by the market both initially and over the longer term. Bank loans reduce information asymmetry, but the renegotiation characteristics of revolving credit loans allow borrowers to exploit changes in the interest rate environment, thus providing support for the market timing theory of capital structure. In contrast to puzzling results of previous studies, I present evidence of long-term positive performance following bank loans.

This thesis examines the impact of announcements of syndicated loans on the share prices of borrowing firms. I use a sample of 5,465 loan observations reported in the International Financing Review Platinum database to study this impact. Event study methodology is used. My overall results show significantly positive wealth effects on the borrowing firms. However, when I partition my data set into revolving credit agreements, term loans and hybrid loans, I find that the results are driven primarily by revolving credit agreements. I also observe that the size of the event window plays an important role in identifying the wealth effects for the borrowers. A five-day event window (-2, +2) shows share price response to revolving credit announcements to be significantly positive. A three-day event window (-1, +1) reveals that announcements are statistically positive for revolving credit agreements and statistically negative for term loan announcements. My results are consistent with previous studies in this area. I also distinguish between financial press announcements and information provider (IFR) announcements to cater for the potential for reporting bias. I find that both the IFR and financial press announcements are significant for the five-day window, but only the financial press results are significant for the three-day window. My study is unique in that I differentiate the impact of different sources of information on the market reaction to borrower share price. In addition to the examination of the wealth effect, I also use the structure of the loans to examine the uniqueness of bank loans and their ability to provide financial slack. Specifically, I examine whether revolving credit loans or term loans or hybrid loans make bank loans unique and their ability to provide financial slack. I observe that out of the three structures of bank loan, only revolving credit loans allow the borrower to more precisely match the funds acquired with the firm's investment needs and to market time by borrowing at times when financing costs are attractive. Revolving credit loans are positively valued by the market both initially and over the longer term. Bank loans reduce information asymmetry, but the renegotiation characteristics of revolving credit loans allow borrowers to exploit changes in the interest rate environment, thus providing support for the market timing theory of capital structure. In contrast to puzzling results of previous studies, I present evidence of long-term positive performance following bank loans.

Diese Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen auf die Realwirtschaft in drei unabhängigen Kapiteln. Kapitel 1 klassifiziert die geografische Diversifikation einer Großzahl von Banken, anhand deren international syndizierten Kreditportfolios. Ergebnisse zeigen ein höheres Kreditangebot durch diversifizierte Banken während Bankenkrisen die sich in Kreditnehmerländern ereignen. Dieses relativ stabilere Kreditangebot führt zu höherem Investitions- und Beschäftigungswachstum von Unternehmen. Eine weiterführende Unterteilung von Banken anhand derer Nationalität zeigt eine Rangfolge auf: diversifizierte inländische Banken erweisen sich als die stabilste und ausländische Banken mit geringer Diversifikation als die instabilste Finanzierungsquelle. In Kapitel 2 analysiere ich die Rolle der industriellen Spezialisierung von Banken in der Transmission von Finanzierungsshocks. Anhand der Ergebnisse schützen Banken Unternehmen die Teil ihrer spezialisierten Industrien sind vor der Bankenkrise und reduzieren ihre Kreditvergabe hingegen am stärksten an Industrien, in welchen sie weniger spezialisiert sind. Darüber hinaus finde ich Evidenz für Übertragungseffekte durch reduzierte Kreditvergabe auch in Nicht-Krisenländern. Dieser Übertragungseffekt ist jedoch gedämpft für Unternehmen aus spezialisierten Industrien. Kapitel 3 untersucht die Effekte von Bankenrettungen in Europa auf die globalen Kreditströme. Gerettete Banken weisen einen höheren Anstieg des Anteils an inländischen Unternehmen in der Kreditvergabe auf als nicht-gerettete Banken. Das negative Kreditangebot für ausländische Unternehmen führt zu einer Verringerung des Absatz- und Beschäftigungswachstums. Im inländischen Markt hingegen führt die Bankenrettung zu einer Verzerrung der Kreditallokation, hin zu größeren und weniger innovativen Unternehmen. Darüber hinaus dokumentiere ich eine stärkere politische Einflussnahme, da Kontrollrechte im Zuge der Bankenrettung an die Regierung übertragen werden.
This thesis investigates the effect of banking crises on real economic outcomes in three independent chapters. In chapter one, I classify a large sample of banks according to the geographic diversification of their international syndicated loan portfolio. Results show that diversified banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower countries. The positive loan supply effects lead to higher investment and employment growth for firms. Further distinguishing banks by nationality reveals a pecking order: diversified domestic banks are the most stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are the most fickle. In chapter two, I show that banks' industry specialization determines how banks transmit funding shocks during banking crises to borrowers and how they spill over to non-crisis countries. Results show that banks insulate their main industries from the banking crisis while they reduce lending most to their non-main industries. Moreover, I provide evidence on spillover effects, as banks hit by a banking crisis in one borrower country reduce lending to firms in non-crisis countries. However, this contagion effect is significantly weaker for firms in banks' main industries. In chapter three, I examine the effect of government support for European banks, such as recapitalizations on financial integration and firm outcomes. Results show that bailout banks increase their home bias in lending by a quarter more than non-bailout banks. In turn, the negative loan supply effect on discriminated foreign firms translates into lower sales and employment growth. In the home market, government support distorts credit allocation by shifting lending to larger, safer and less innovative firms. Moreover, I document that politicians gain influence over banks by transferring control rights to the government as part of the support scheme.

Evidence shows that nonbanks, which are now significant participants in the corporate loan market, exploit information gained from lending to trade in public securities. In the first essay, I examine whether these institutions use loan-based information to facilitate merger and acquisition (M&A) deals. I find that firms are more likely to become targets if they borrow from nonbanks rather than banks. Borrowing from a larger number of nonbanks or from those with a sizeable client network also enhances a firm’s acquisition prospects. When nonbanks gain more information about borrowers through loan amendments or multiple loans, the impact of nonbank lending grows stronger. I also identify three channels that might allow nonbanks to exploit loan-based information in the M&A market. In the second essay, I focus on the difference in covenant structure between nonbank loans and bank loans. Previous studies show that loans to riskier borrowers are more likely to have stronger financial covenants in order to mitigate agency problems and conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders. Interestingly, I find that nonbanks loans have fewer, less restrictive financial covenants than commercial banks, all else equal. Although the prior literature shows that banks play an active role in corporate governance following covenant violations, I find that nonbanks are less likely to intervene in borrowers’ decision making in similar circumstances. Nonbank borrowers are significantly more likely than bank clients to experience severe financial distress.

This diploma thesis focuses on syndicated loans. It analyzes mostly the development of syndicated loans during last years from different points of view. Special attention is given to the syndicated loan market in Europe and USA. At the beginning of this paper, it is proved, that syndicated loans are important source of corporate financing. Most important characteristics of syndicated loans are mentioned after that. The chapter three deals with pricing of syndicated loans in the theoretical way. Next chapter concerns with trading of syndicated loans in secundary market in the USA. After that, syndicated loans are given to the relevance to credit derivates. Next chapter analyzes different asspects of the development of syndicated loans during last years. The chapter seven empirically proves the impact of financial crisis on syndicated loans market. There is also a comparison of spreads on syndicated loans market in Europe and USA. Last chapter focuses on the relationship between syndicated loans and GDP.

Синдикативне кредитування зародилося у 60-х роках минулого століття і в останньому десятиріччі набуло значного розвитку. Так, якщо у 90-х роках обсяг світового ринку синдикативного кредитування складав близько 1,0 трлн. дол. США, у 2004 році – 2,6 трлн. дол. США, то вже у 2014 році на ринку відбулось 10479 угод, завдяки яким було залучено близько 4,7 трлн. дол. США.

The objective of the thesis is to analyze numerous project financing possibilities in the Czech Republic. The thesis introduces the framework of project finance, together with its definition and fundamental characteristics. Furthermore it aims to identify the issues of risk analysis and risk management. The final section of the thesis provides an overview of the current global project finance trends and identifies the situation in the Czech Republic. Additionally, the thesis includes a case study of the first Czech energy finance project - ECKG Kladno.

Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht in welchem Ausmaß Manager Optimismus finanzielle Entscheidungen von Unternehmen beeinflusst. Der erste Teil der Dissertation analysiert den Einfluss von Optimismus auf die Ausgabe von Fremdkapital. Optimistische Manager überschätzen die zukünftigen Erfolgsaussichten ihrer Firma. Daher könnten sie Verträge bevorzugen, die die Kuponzahlungen an die zukünftige Entwicklung des Kreditrisikos koppeln (sogenannte PSD Verträge). Diese Hypothese wird empirisch bestätigt. Ein weiteres Ergebnis der empirischen Analysen ist, dass in Firmen mit optimistischen Managern die Kreditqualität nach Ausgabe von PSD sinkt. Der zweite Teil untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Manager Optimismus und Spekulation mit Finanzderivaten in Unternehmen. Optimistische Manager, die ihre Fähigkeiten generell überschätzen, könnten irrtümlicherweise denken, dass sie mit Hilfe von Derivaten in der Lage sind den Markt zu schlagen und abnormale Renditen zu erzielen. Die Studie untersucht Derivatetransaktionen von Goldproduzenten in Nordamerika. Diese Industrie ist besonders interessant durch die ausführliche Ausweisung der Derivatepositionen und durch das klare Exposure zum Goldpreisrisiko. Das Ergebnis der Studie bestätigt die Hypothese dass optimistische Manager in größerem Ausmaß spekulieren und mit den Spekulationen letztendlich Verluste produzieren. Der letzte Teil der Arbeit untersucht die Auszahlungspolitik von Firmen mit optimistischen Managern. Optimistische Manager überschätzen durch ihre verzerrte Wahrnehmung den Wert der Firma und sollten daher eher zu Aktienrückkäufen als zu Dividendenzahlungen neigen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse der Arbeit bestätigen diese Voraussage. Optimistische Manager ersetzen Dividenden mit Aktienrückkäufen, das absolute Niveau der Auszahlungen unterscheidet sich jedoch nicht zwischen Firmen mit optimistischen und rationalen Managern.
This work analyses the impact of managerial optimism on financial policies of firms. The first part investigates the effect of optimism on debt contract design. Optimistic managers overestimate the credit quality of their firms and should be more likely to issue debt contracts that link coupon payments to the future credit risk of their firms (PSD contracts). This prediction is confirmed empirically. Further, firms with optimistic managers that issue PSD experience future deteriorations in their credit quality. The second part analyses the relation between managerial optimism and corporate speculation with financial derivatives. Optimistic managers overestimate their abilities and should be more likely to time markets because they believe that they have superior market timing abilities. The study uses data on North American gold producers because these firms disclose detailed data on their derivative positions and have a clear exposure to the gold price. The empirical results confirm the prediction that optimistic engage in more speculation with financial derivatives and that the cash flow resulting from speculation is lower relative to firms with rational managers. The last past analyses the relation between managerial optimism and a firm’s payout policy. As a consequence of their biased beliefs, optimistic managers perceive their firm’s equity as undervalued and should therefore be more likely to prefer share repurchases over cash dividends. The empirical analyses confirm this prediction: Firms with optimistic managers use more share repurchases relative to firms with rational managers. However, the total amount of payouts does not differ between firms with optimistic and rational managers.

La gestion du risque est un sujet primordial au niveau d’une entreprise et au niveau de l’Etat. Cette thèse investigue ce thème au travers de trois essais empiriques. Le premier essai s’intéresse à la gestion du risque de change par les entreprises. Les résultats montrent que les Fusions & Acquisitions transfrontalières offrent une couverture opérationnelle contre le risque de change. De plus, cette technique de couverture crée de la valeur pour les actionnaires. La baisse de l’exposition au risque de change (en valeur absolue) est positivement associée avec les rentabilités anormales cumulées (CAR) pour les acquéreurs. Le deuxième et le troisième essai se concentrent sur la gestion du risque au niveau de l’État - le plan de sauvetage (dit « plan Paulson ») pendant la crise financière récente aux États-Unis. Le deuxième essai confirme dans un premier temps l’effet positif du plan sur les CAR et la réduction des probabilités de défaut pour les banques participantes autour de son annonce initiale. Pourtant, l’effet du plan n’est pas neutre au sein des banques : les grands joueurs ont été les gagnants. Le dernier essai analyse les effets de bord du plan Paulson sur les pratiques d’octroi de prêts. Nos résultats révèlent qu’il y a un effet de bord positif et significatif de l’intervention gouvernementale sur la maturité des prêts syndiqués pendant la période postérieure à la crise, de 2010 à 2012. Néanmoins, cet impact positif n’apparaît pas pour la taille des prêts syndiqués. En somme, cette thèse empirique met en lumière d’une part les moyens efficaces d’une gestion du risque de change pour les entreprises, comme par exemple la couverture opérationnelle, et ses implications positives pour les actionnaires des acquéreurs, et d’autre part les résultats attendus d’une intervention de l’Etat, comme celle du plan Paulson, les effets de bord et les effets hétérogènes entre les établissements financiers
The risk management is a crucially important topic at firm and country level. This thesis investigates this subject across three empirical essays. The first essay is interested in firm’s currency risk management. The results show that the cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions offer an operational hedging to the currency risk. Moreover, this hedging creates value for acquirers’ shareholders. The decrease in currency risk exposure (in absolute value) is positively associated with acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The second and the third essay concentrate on the risk management at country level - the bailout plan (the Paulson plan) during the recent financial crisis in United States. The second essay in a first step confirms the positive effect of the plan on bank participants’ CAR and on the decrease of default probability around the plan’s initial announcement. Nevertheless, the effect of the plan is not neutral among banks and big players were the winners. The last essay analyzes the Paulson plan’s spillover effect on the loan supply. Our results reveal that there is a positive and significant spillover effect of the government intervention on syndicated loans’ maturities during the post-crisis period from 2010 to 2012. However, this positive impact is not found for the size of syndicated loans. In sum, this empirical thesis from one side sheds light on the efficient ways of firm’s currency risk management, such as the operational hedging, and its positive effect for acquirers’ shareholders; from another side for the country-level government intervention, it highlights the Paulson plan’s spillover effect on syndicated loans and the heterogeneous impact among financial institutions

La gestion du risque est un sujet primordial au niveau d’une entreprise et au niveau de l’Etat. Cette thèse investigue ce thème au travers de trois essais empiriques. Le premier essai s’intéresse à la gestion du risque de change par les entreprises. Les résultats montrent que les Fusions & Acquisitions transfrontalières offrent une couverture opérationnelle contre le risque de change. De plus, cette technique de couverture crée de la valeur pour les actionnaires. La baisse de l’exposition au risque de change (en valeur absolue) est positivement associée avec les rentabilités anormales cumulées (CAR) pour les acquéreurs. Le deuxième et le troisième essai se concentrent sur la gestion du risque au niveau de l’État - le plan de sauvetage (dit « plan Paulson ») pendant la crise financière récente aux États-Unis. Le deuxième essai confirme dans un premier temps l’effet positif du plan sur les CAR et la réduction des probabilités de défaut pour les banques participantes autour de son annonce initiale. Pourtant, l’effet du plan n’est pas neutre au sein des banques : les grands joueurs ont été les gagnants. Le dernier essai analyse les effets de bord du plan Paulson sur les pratiques d’octroi de prêts. Nos résultats révèlent qu’il y a un effet de bord positif et significatif de l’intervention gouvernementale sur la maturité des prêts syndiqués pendant la période postérieure à la crise, de 2010 à 2012. Néanmoins, cet impact positif n’apparaît pas pour la taille des prêts syndiqués. En somme, cette thèse empirique met en lumière d’une part les moyens efficaces d’une gestion du risque de change pour les entreprises, comme par exemple la couverture opérationnelle, et ses implications positives pour les actionnaires des acquéreurs, et d’autre part les résultats attendus d’une intervention de l’Etat, comme celle du plan Paulson, les effets de bord et les effets hétérogènes entre les établissements financiers
The risk management is a crucially important topic at firm and country level. This thesis investigates this subject across three empirical essays. The first essay is interested in firm’s currency risk management. The results show that the cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions offer an operational hedging to the currency risk. Moreover, this hedging creates value for acquirers’ shareholders. The decrease in currency risk exposure (in absolute value) is positively associated with acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The second and the third essay concentrate on the risk management at country level - the bailout plan (the Paulson plan) during the recent financial crisis in United States. The second essay in a first step confirms the positive effect of the plan on bank participants’ CAR and on the decrease of default probability around the plan’s initial announcement. Nevertheless, the effect of the plan is not neutral among banks and big players were the winners. The last essay analyzes the Paulson plan’s spillover effect on the loan supply. Our results reveal that there is a positive and significant spillover effect of the government intervention on syndicated loans’ maturities during the post-crisis period from 2010 to 2012. However, this positive impact is not found for the size of syndicated loans. In sum, this empirical thesis from one side sheds light on the efficient ways of firm’s currency risk management, such as the operational hedging, and its positive effect for acquirers’ shareholders; from another side for the country-level government intervention, it highlights the Paulson plan’s spillover effect on syndicated loans and the heterogeneous impact among financial institutions

碩士
中國文化大學
國際貿易學系碩士班
98
After the near collapse of the global financial system, recession and credit de-terioration have increase banks’ liquidity and default risk. However, banks can adjust its loan concentration to decrease liquidity and default risk. This study analyzed the differences of loan concentration on syndicated loan and non-syndicated loan market during financial crisis period. The sample period is between 2006 and 2009. By using Tobit regression model for empirical analysis, this study investigates the loan con-centration effects and the relation between loan concentration and the other factors that determine loan approval. Empirical results suggest that after the financial crisis, the loan concentration is significantly different in syndicated loan market and non-syndicated loan market. Moreover, the other factors that determine loan approval, such as collateral, borrower reputation and spread have substantial effects on the banks’ loan decisions. The results also reveal that the asymmetric information factors are playing quite a significant role before and after financial crisis. While more transparent of the asymmetric information and more banks loan concentrated, banks will increase their screening and monitoring standard of loans. On the contrary, while asymmetric information exists, banks will diversify loan portfolios to avoid the li-quidity and default risk.

archives@tulane.edu
This dissertation studies the downside of lending relationship. In particular, it examines external impacts of distressed bank loans on the lending banks and other borrowing firms. The banks, on average, lose almost 1 % of their total market value, and the effect spills over to other loan syndicate members. The distress news also impacts the banks' related borrowers, who experience seven-day mean cumulative abnormal returns of -0.31 % for each distress announcement. Distress externalities are worse when the bank is more exposed to the bad loan, and for borrowers that are more relationship dependent. Future lending business is also negatively affected, as loan rates rise by 67 BP following large distress damage, and lenders are less likely to retain existing relationship borrowers.
1
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碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
98
This paper explores how information asymmetry between lead arrangers and participant lenders affects syndicated loan pricing. The model shows that the optimal loan spread is higher in regimes with informative signal and lower creditor rights protection. Using global syndicated loan data from 1982 to 2009, I show that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.

碩士
世新大學
財務金融學研究所(含碩專班)
100
The syndicated loans is very important long-term sources of funds for Taiwanese companies(even government), especially the large loans. It is not a single bank can offer and undertake the risks.Due to the overseas fund-raising tool, such as the rapid development of overseas depositary receipts - such as ADR, TDR, etc., overseas corporate bonds, coupled with domestic stock and bond markets to flourish, making the enterprise financing pipeline from indirect finance to direct finance trends. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the company decides its financing way, especially in the way of syndicated loans. The difference financing way have different risks,we want to known whether the risk will be affect the loan condiction .When the funds are used in high-risk decisions,whether a bank would impose more stringent on lending case, such as to require more collateral to ensure that the interests of the bank. Using OLS (ordinary least squares) the least squares method to analyze and the study period is 1992-2010.The syndicated loan is a complete end in Taiwan. A total valid samples are 3073, including Corporate Finance 1460; Refinancing1188 ; Leveraged buyout 40; Project Finance 357; Backup 28. Empirical results show that if the funds are used in high-risk decisions like leveraged buyout, the bank is more stringent lending conditions for this syndicated loan. On the low-risk like refinancing, because the company is repay the old loans, the bank will more relaxed on this syndicated loan.

Research Doctorate - Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
This thesis presents three empirical studies on the effect of trust on various terms of syndicated loan contracts. The three studies combined provide a comprehensive assessment of the role of trust, accumulated through CSR performance, in determining loan spreads, loan size, covenant restrictions, and the structure and composition of the lending syndicate. The three empirical studies address the following research questions respectively; How does a borrower’s trust affect the price terms of loan contracts?; How does a borrower’s trust affect the covenant terms of its loan contracts?; How does borrower and lead lender trust affect the structure of the lending syndicate? The first study determines the effect of a firm’s trust on the costs of external debt. The results of an international sample of syndicated bank loans find a context-dependent value of trust in determining loan pricing. Specifically, firms from high trust countries benefit more from firm-level trust accumulation by receiving lower loan spreads. Additionally, the value of trust for loan spreads is increased during a financial crisis. The study provides further evidence that higher trust also enables borrowers to receive larger loans. The relationship between trust and loan terms is influenced by the extent of information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender. The study extends the literature on firm-level determinants of loan contract terms by quantifying the benefits of trust, as a form of firm-soft information, on external financing outcomes. The second study investigates the effect of trust on the non-price terms of loan contracts, specifically the covenant restrictions. Covenants are included in loan contracts as formal monitoring and control devices for lenders. The results show that higher firm-level trust reduces covenant restrictions in syndicated loan contracts around the world. The relationship between trust and covenant intensity is stronger for firms with a higher level of information asymmetry and in countries with transactional banking systems. Additionally, firm-level trust reduces the performance covenant restrictions and has no impact on capital covenant restrictions. The study has implications for borrowers globally. The results indicate that firm-level informal monitoring, as indicated by the firms accumulated level of trust, reduces the need for formal covenant restrictions in the loan contract. Additionally, the results suggest that firm-level trust plays an important role in mitigating the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, resulting in less restrictive loan contracts. The final empirical study examines the effect of trust on loan syndicate structure. The structure of the lending syndicate is an important component of syndicated loans that can significantly affect a firm’s access to finance. Loan syndicates present a degree of adverse selection and moral hazard information asymmetry between both the borrower and the lead arranger, and between the lead arranger and participant lenders. The results in this study favour a borrower quality and risk-diversification view of trust in influencing lead share retention – borrower trust is related to more concentrated lending syndicates as less risk diversification is required across the lending syndicate. Borrower trust is also related to a larger number of lenders, and a greater likelihood of foreign lender participation in the lending syndicate. The study also assesses the role of lead lender trust and shows that higher lead lender trust enables lead lenders to syndicate out larger portions of the loan. The results of this study provide insight into the role of both the borrowers’ and the lenders’ built trust in facilitating access to private debt through the syndicated loan market.

by Chow Ho Wai.
Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-51).
ABSTRACT --- p.ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii
LIST OF EXHIBITS --- p.v
LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi
PREFACE --- p.vii
CHAPTERS
Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1
Definition of Syndicated Loans --- p.1
Definition of Pricing --- p.2
Project Objectives --- p.2
Project Scope --- p.3
Chapter II. --- KEY ELEMENTS OF SYNDICATED LOAN MARKET --- p.4
Benefits to Borrowers --- p.4
Benefits to Lenders --- p.6
Types of Syndicated Facilities --- p.11
Titles and Roles --- p.12
Principal Terms and Conditions --- p.14
Hong Kong Market Characteristics --- p.16
Chapter III. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.22
Literature Review --- p.22
Model --- p.24
Sample Data --- p.27
Analytical Methods --- p.29
Chapter IV. --- EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS --- p.32
Significant Independent Variables --- p.32
Loan Pricing Model --- p.34
Chapter V. --- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.35
APPENDICES --- p.39
BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.50

博士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
104
This study investigates issues regarding bank loan disclosures by using syndicated data from 1986 to 2015. Our preliminary results show that most of syndicated loan contracts do not disclose bank allocation (loan shares among banks), and disclosure levels varied among loan purposes, loan type and countries. This implies that loan disclosures have strategic concerns. By constructing new indices of bank loan disclosures, we also investigate why some firms voluntarily disclosure more information about their loan condition. Results show that firms’ risk of loan purpose, bank relationship, lead bank reputation, legal of origin, firms’ size, borrower market competition and regulatory change affect firms’ disclosure policies. We also find that more detailed loan disclosures lead to reduction on cost of bank loans.

碩士
南台科技大學
會計資訊系
92
This thesis demonstrates some empirical evidence on syndicated loan announcement and the determinants of the proportion of the loan sold to participant banks in the event of syndication. We utilize a market model of event study to analyze the data on 130 individual syndicated loan transactions from 1994 to 2003 made by banks to the listed companies in Taiwan. In addition, a multiple regression model was built to analyze the determinants of the abnormal returns and the proportion of the loan sold to participant banks in the event of syndication. We find that excess returns of announced loan are positive associated with after Asia’s financial distress, borrowers with high fixed-asset ratio and negative associated with many syndicated arrangers. Arrangers sell larger proportions of syndicated loans with cash facility, big size to participant banks, and sell smaller proportions of syndicated loans with secured, many syndicated arrangers, high delinquency rate of arrangers to participant banks.

碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
107
In this paper, I examine whether and how a firm’s disclosure quality of financial statements is associated with the terms of loan contracts. Following the parsimonious disclosure quality measure (DQ) constructed by Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015) which captures the disaggregation level of accounting line items, I find that banks provide higher spreads and more stringent non-price terms to firms with lower DQ. Moreover, I examine the effect of DQ on legal traditions of common law and civil law, I find that firms providing less disaggregated financial statements receive unfavorable loan spreads in countries of civil law origins. Additional analyses reveal that borrowers with low DQ receive unfavorable loan spreads, smaller loan amounts, and shorter maturities when foreign banks are involved in lending. Besides, I find that the size of syndicate becomes larger when lending to borrowers with lower DQ. To conclude, my findings suggest that the incremental information in DQ is valuable to banks in determining loan contract terms.

碩士
國立高雄第一科技大學
金融營運所
95
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of the announcement of syndicated loan on stockholders’ wealth using the event study. Our sample includes 116 announcement events listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange during 1999-2006. The data come from the major message and information of the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The empirical results show that there is no significant difference on the affection of stock price after announcing the syndicated loan information. News might be presented by the mass media and parties before companies borrowing money carry on important investment plan and during companies borrowing money transact the syndicated loan. The affection presents on stock price gradually. There is no large space reacting on company stock price until united important message announcement to syndicated loan behaviors standardized by Taiwan Stock Exchange.

碩士
朝陽科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
100
Following the syndicated loan market increasingly grow, she has turn out to be the one of large international capital market and significant importance in the firm financing. This paper mainly explores the relationship between lead banks and participation banks in the syndicated loan facility, especially, whether the past association impacts the future relation. The major empirical results show that participation banks tend to invest the syndicated loans lead by a bank possesses established past association.

碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106
In the past decade, there has been a tremendous wave of interest in the field of textual analysis. However, researchers have concentrated on the relationship between textual sentiment expression and the equity market. There has thus far been relatively little research into the debt market. It is my purpose in this study to investigate whether corporation-expressed textual sentiment affects the features of the syndicated loan. Using a sample of U.S. borrowers in the syndicated loan market, the results show that negative textual sentiment expressed in 10-K filings is positively associated with loan spreads and the probability of loans being secured, while negatively associated with loan amounts and maturity. Moreover, I find that negative sentiment is positively associated with the probability of covenant violation. To conclude, this study may be of importance in exploring the association between textual sentiment expression and debt contract terms, as well as in providing borrowers with a better understanding of how lenders respond to their sentimental expression in 10-K filings.

碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
98
Using a sample of more than 23,000 syndicated tranches to borrowers from 63 countries for the 1982-2009 period, we test the influence of the supply and demand side effects on loan spread. Our results show that supply side effect leads to a significant lower spread, but in some countries with higher appetite of institutional investors, such as U.S. and Spain, these results do not hold. We find that the negative effect above mentioned on spread will be significant for firms whose original loan spread is much higher; i.e., firms with serious financial constraint or low investment opportunity.

碩士
銘傳大學
財務金融學系碩士在職專班
95
Following the liberalization and internationalization of the global economic and financial environment, corporate investment not only crosses borders but also demands greater amounts of funds. In addition to its own assets and raising funds in the capital market to supply part of its working capital, a corporation’s demand for funds primarily relies on bank loans. However, the credit risk arising from the enormous capital demand can not be undertaken merely by one single bank. Hence, international syndicated loans made by jointly-funding banks from different countries have become the main approach to overseas fund-raising by large corporations world-wide. Due to the excessive competition in the domestic financial market, the banks in Taiwan have encountered difficulties in operation. Therefore, most of them actively participate in offshore business, such as the international syndicated loan market, to decentralize the source of profits. As domestic banks have become more and more well-known in the market of international syndicated loans, globally-noted arrangers have gradually increased their interest in inviting Taiwanese banks to participate in, or jointly lead, the arrangement, and the types of syndicated loans are constantly changing. Nevertheless, on account of different inducements in the international syndicated loan market, domestic participants sometimes have to sign a contract with fronting banks to join syndicated loans in the mode of sub-participation. The loan agreements of sub-participation, unlike normal lending contracts, often raise doubts about rights and obligations in the departments of law or crediting management. Their hesitation eventually results in the loss of advantageous moments and business opportunities. This study will focus on the analysis of sub-participation first, and then explore, as well as clarify, related questions in individual cases according to different inducements of sub-participation of international syndicated loans. The inducements can be classified as follows: 1. Avoid taxes: The competition in the international syndicated loan market has multiplied borrowers’ fund-raising channels. In addition, the interest rates of main international currencies, such as American dollars, have been gradually rising. These factors have discouraged borrowers to bear the taxes resulting from participants’ gains of interest. In order to succeed in organizing syndicated loans, arrangers usually engage in sub-participation to avoid taxes arising from syndicated loans, and to encourage participation as the countries of participants and borrowers do not have any tax conventions. 2. Reinforce credibility: International strategic or planned syndicated loans are often arranged. When international financial organizations serve as arrangers and fronting banks to organize syndicated loans, it can strengthen the trust and concern of participants; furthermore, the low risk weight in the risk measurement represents a positive significance in the whole bank operation. 3. Other factors: a. Arrangers can transfer all or part of their syndicated loans by replacing alienation with sub-participation in order to reacquire borrowers’ credit line to organize new syndicated loans. This will effectively reduce loan amounts without making a negative impression on borrowers. b. In the regulation of loan agreements, participants have to obtain borrowers’ approval. Sub-participation, however, will prevent the situation where borrowers do not agree to the participation. c. Loan agreements state that borrowers only undertake the taxes of the originating banks. Hence, participants in the secondary market can save taxes through sub-participation. d. If borrowers’ countries restrain the qualification of overseas participants, borrowers can avoid the restraint through fronting banks.

碩士
逢甲大學
保險所
95
The frequency and severity of catastrophic losses continue to show an upward tendency, and the traditional reinsurance market does not have the sufficient capacity for catastrophic risks. The situation encourages the insurance industry to seek the instruments of alternative risk transfer, which can transfer catastrophic risks to the huge capital market. This study combined syndicated loan with catastrophic risk to form the standby syndicated loan, in which a party with a risk exposure pays the premium to financial institution, thus receiving the promise of syndicated loan. When catastrophic losses happened and attached the point, financial institutions must approve loans to a party with a risk exposure according to the agreed loan terms in contract. In order to show the completed concept of standby syndicated loan, this study first introduces the trade processes and design for the contract, then simulates the premium by Monte Carlo simulation and Visual Basic. The simulated results accord with the positive relationship between expected loss amounts and premiums and the negative relationship between loan interests and premiums. The simulated premium can be considered for further use in pricing the contract of standby syndicated loan.