Academic literature on the topic 'Taiwan Strait crises'

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Journal articles on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"

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Kastrati, Bilbil. "Taiwan strait dispute." SEEU Review 11, no. 2 (December 1, 2015): 69–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/seeur-2015-0029.

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Abstract The end of the Cold War resulted in a diffusion of the level of threat worldwide and concluded the system of bipolarity in the world. Beside the European continent, where the rivalries were at the highest level, the consequences of the end of the Cold War were especially visible in North-East Asia. A decrease of military activities of Russia and China, and the retreat of the USA from the region, give way for improvement of political and economical relations between the countries of the region. The end of hostilities produced by the Cold War no doubt have relaxed relations between countries in the region and opened ways for a new more peaceful co-existence. However, this does not mean that the region is not vulnerable to some of the hot spots such as North Korea, Spratly Parcels and especially Taiwan Strait. The latter is considered to be the most dangerous potential Asian zone of crisis in the twenty-first century. The East Asian countries such as China, Japan and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries are the world’s most growing economies and, at the same time, leaders in military acquisition; therefore, the potential for conflict and crises is current and real. This article examines one of these hot spots, namely the Taiwan Strait dispute, and assesses the possibility of this issue leading to a war between China, the USA and Japan. In order to have a clear view of the dispute the author will reveal some data in the introduction and then will explore relations, conflicts and interests between China, the USA and Japan vis-à-vis Taiwan and assess the risk that these countries might be drawn in potential war over the Taiwan Strait.
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Pandit, Priyanka. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954-1958." Strategic Analysis 44, no. 3 (May 3, 2020): 285–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1767912.

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XIAO, RUPING, and HSIAO-TING LIN. "Inside the Asian Cold War Intrigues: Revisiting the Taiwan Strait crises." Modern Asian Studies 52, no. 6 (July 10, 2018): 2109–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x16000706.

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AbstractThis article revisits the issue of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War. Benefitting from archival materials only recently made available, specifically Chiang Kai-shek's personal diaries, CIA declassified materials, Taiwanese Foreign Ministry files, and rare publications from the Contemporary Taiwan Collection at the Library of the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, this research examines the cloud of suspicion surrounding the secret contacts between Taipei and Beijing leading up to and during the 1958 offshore islands crisis, elucidating how such a political tête-à-tête, and the resultant tacit consensus over the status of the islands, gradually brought about an end to the conflict between Taiwan and Communist China. In hindsight, the crises over the offshore islands along China's southeast coast momentarily brought the United States closer to war with Communist China, while putting the relationship between Taipei and Washington to a serious test. The end result, however, was that, while these isles were technically embedded in the unfinished civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, they provided, ironically, an opportunity for secret communications and, ultimately, a kind of détente between the two supposedly deadly enemies across the Taiwan Strait. A close examination of the details of these crises, along with their attendant military, political, and diplomatic complexities, reveals an amazing amount of political intrigue at both the local and international levels that has not been fully realized until now.
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Li, Xiaobing. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 by Pang Yang Huei." Twentieth-Century China 45, no. 2 (2020): E—14—E—15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tcc.2020.0013.

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Pollack, Jonathan D. "THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA IN 2003: All Quiet on the Eastern Front?" Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (January 2004): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.1.1.

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Abstract U.S.-Asian relations in 2003 appeared on the cusp of major change. The Bush administration (preoccupied by far more pressing challenges in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia) sought to deflect potential crises in Korea and the Taiwan Strait, while also hoping to tether regional states to the new American security agenda. Although nearly all Asian states voiced assent for U.S. efforts to counter international terrorism, this support often reflected practical realities, not a deeper congruence of interests with Washington's. The path ahead for the United States in Asia remained unsettled, with crises deferred rather than resolved.
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NORRIS, WILLIAM. "The Socialization of China’s Assertiveness: Examining Waltz’s Neorealist Mechanism of “Socialization” in China’s Regional Security Relations." Issues & Studies 55, no. 04 (December 2019): 1940009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1013251119400095.

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This is a study of learning and socialization in China’s foreign security policy, examining how China has at times been more assertive and in other instances has taken a more accommodating approach in its foreign security policy behavior. This paper argues that China has been “socialized” by its international security environment by exploring Kenneth Waltz’s theoretical mechanism of the “socialization” of states in the international system. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the early 2000s, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai crises from 2012 to 2015, and the South China Sea in the mid-1990s are all instances in which China has employed force only to suffer strategically. This has eventually led to a less confrontational posture and contributed to the pursuit of a more cooperative engagement strategy with both Southeast Asia (from 1998 to 2008) and Taiwan ([Formula: see text]2006–2016). Variations in China’s assertiveness can be explained by the combination of domestic politics and signals from China’s international security environment.
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Fravel, M. Taylor. "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes." International Security 30, no. 2 (October 2005): 46–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228805775124534.

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Since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, scholars and policymakers have become increasingly concerned about China's territorial ambitions. Yet China has also used peaceful means to manage conficts, settling seventeen of its twenty-three territorial disputes, often with substantial compromises. This article develops a counterintuitive argument about the effects of domestic confict on foreign policy to explain China's behavior. Contrary to the diversionary war hypothesis, this argument posits that state leaders are more likely to compromise in territorial disputes when confronting internal threats to regime security, including rebellions and legitimacy crises. Regime insecurity best explains China's pattern of compromise and delay in its territorial disputes. China's leaders have compromised when faced with internal threats to regime security, including the revolt in Tibet, the instability following the Great Leap Forward, the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen upheaval, and separatist violence in Xinjiang.
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Fredman, Zach. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958. By Pang Yang Huei. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019. xviii, 317 pp. ISBN: 9789888208302 (cloth)." Journal of Asian Studies 79, no. 1 (February 2020): 261–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911819002390.

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Beckley, Michael. "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts." International Security 39, no. 4 (April 2015): 7–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00197.

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A large literature assumes that alliances entangle the United States in military conflicts that it might otherwise avoid. Since 1945, however, there have been only five cases of what might be characterized as U.S. entanglement—the 1954 and 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, the Vietnam War, and the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s—and even these cases are far from clear-cut. U.S. entanglement is rare because the United States, as a superpower with many allies, is capable of exploiting loopholes in alliance agreements, sidestepping commitments that seriously imperil U.S. interests, playing the demands of various allies off of each other, and using alliances to deter adversaries and allies from initiating or escalating conflicts.
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Liu, Tony. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 Pang Yang Huei Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019 xviii + 317 pp. $55.00 ISBN 978-988-8208-30-2." China Quarterly 241 (February 11, 2020): 285–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741019001450.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"

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Lee, Tieh-Shang. "Crisis in the Taiwan Strait an assessment of the conflict crisis between China and Taiwan /." online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium, 2007. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3259950.

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Bi, Jianhai. "The PRC leadership succession and Taiwan policymaking: A case study of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Political Science, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/4346.

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The close connections and interactions between the Taiwan crisis and succession politics, and Taiwan policy and informal politics, demonstrated that the PRC politics were not fully institutionalised. Military-driven politics played a major role, but succession politics constituted the centre of Chinese informal politics. This leadership succession problem provided the military with the opportunities to greatly influence Beijing's decision-making on events in the Taiwan Strait. The military's influence was significant largely because political control was weakened by the struggle for succession. This process was facilitated by the importance of informal politics in the PRC. In this sense, the PRC provocation of the Taiwan crisis can be largely attributed to the military's leverage in the leadership succession struggle. Although other informal political factors contributed to Beijing's Taiwan policy and decisions to launch war-games, the struggle for succession was the most important factor acting on Taiwan policy and influencing the lead-up to the Taiwan crisis. Thus, the Taiwan crisis was due to a series of internal domestic elements of which the succession crisis was the key.
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Walker, Fraser Cameron. "“A Difficult Dinner Companion”: Canadian-American Relations During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954-1955." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/39471.

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During the opening decade of the Cold War, Canada, under the leadership of Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, experienced a heightened sense of influence on global affairs, often described as the “Golden Age of Canadian Diplomacy.” This state of affairs led Canada to believe that it could punch above its weight and subsequently influence the United States of America’s foreign policy. Using the First Taiwan Strait Crisis as a microcosm of this “Golden Age”, understanding America’s behaviour during the crisis, and Canada’s involvement throughout, brings into question the validity of Canada’s grand influence and tempers the idea that Canada could significantly influence America’s policies. Beginning with the memoirs and biographies of the diplomats of the 1950s and then juxtaposing sources from the Canadian Department of External Affairs and American State Department, this thesis demonstrates that Canada did not play a significant part in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. This is an odd result, considering that this crisis, which could have had devastating consequences for Canada if it had expanded from just the Offshore Islands, was a perfect opportunity for a country that was supposedly experiencing a Golden Age to flex its diplomatic clout. This thesis suggests that perhaps Canada’s inflated sense of self, which has persisted in the national conscience, can be attributed to the exaggerated importance the 1950s diplomats gave to themselves.
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Kuo, Ru-dar, and 郭儒達. "The study of U.S. Decision-making toward 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57657442145822559427.

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碩士
中國文化大學
中國大陸研究所
91
This study focuses on U.S. decision-making during 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 1990-91 Persian Gulf Crisis was added into the thesis for compare analysis. This study uses "Diplomatic Decision-making Model" and "Crisis Management Decision-making Model" which obtains through deductive method to examine the above three cases. Reaches the conclusion that 1995 decision-making fits the "Diplomatic Model" and 1996/Persian Gulf Crisis fits the "Crisis Management Model". This study also tries to measure how four variables-internal environment, bureacratic system, the core policy makers and external environment affect the outcome of policy.
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Chen, Guo-Huei, and 陳國暉. "An Assessment of the Credibility of U.S. deterrence to China in the Taiwan Strait -Focusing on the 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait Crises." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17321024059991860977.

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碩士
國立臺灣大學
國家發展研究所
98
The goal of the study is to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China in the Taiwan Strait, particular focusing on the 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait Crises. The analytical framework of this study is to devise a test of the credibility of the U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Firstly, to use words and action-dimension to analyze the U.S. deterrence to China''s determination, and to test Washington’s determination to defend Taiwan''s security. Secondly, to use this framework to test China’s perception, and to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence. This study employs this framework to explore the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China during 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait crises. We find that although United States did not show the same strong determination to deter China in the 1999 as that in 1996, China did perceive the U.S. determination eventually and took action to maintain the status quo. However, this study finds that during the most period of time China did not perceive the U.S. determination due to her unacceptable loss of Taiwan as Beijing’s core interests and American strategy of gradual escalation. The use of dual deterrence and reassurance by the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait is able to reduce the sense of insecurity of Beijing and help resolve the problem of perception. This study therefore concludes that if the U.S. continues to resist supporting Taiwan independence, and opposing the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue, while Taiwan does not provoke Beijing, the credibility of American deterrence to China will be assured.
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Chien, Nai-Wen Chang, and 張簡乃文. "The Decision-making Process of U.S. Foreign Policy toward Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77172962646753695702.

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碩士
淡江大學
美洲研究所碩士班
102
The paper laid the foundation on Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models-the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure to explore the formulation of U.S. foreign policy during the two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s. In order to make the analysis more comprehensive, I also adopted the comparative analysis method to present the evolution of the decision-making process of the two Crises. By doing so, I established three hypotheses from the theory and applied them in the two case studies to verify application of the theory. When these offshore islands were under heavy attack in the first Strait Crisis, whether or not the U.S. should defend these offshore islands for Taiwan was “ a horrible dilemma” to the Eisenhower administration and put the U.S. in a difficult situation to deal with due to its extensive political implications. On the one hand, the U.S. was unwilling to run the risk of waging war with Communist China or even Soviet Union. On the other hand, it did not want to lose its prestige because of staying out of the Strait conflict. Considering all the courses of actions, the U.S. attempted to resolve the Crisis by passing the dilemma to the U.N, signing the Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and concluding the Formosa Resolution with Taiwan in exchange for ROC’s acceptance of the U.N. arrangement and withdrawal from Tachens. When the second Crisis occurred in 1958, with nearly one third of ROC troops stationed on the islands, the dilemma therefore was not to intervene or not but how to intervene to suit U.S. best interest. The Eisenhower administration decided to provide escort operation for safety landing of ROC’s supplies. Although the Eisenhower administration did not take military actions in the event of both Strait Crises, utilization of nuclear weapons as well as military actions were widely discussed and prepared. Various organizations had tried to have their proposals of military actions adopted by President Eisenhower so that they could stand out their organizational values. In particular, the employment of nuclear weapons was seriously considered under the ”Massive Retaliation Strategy.” While in the 1958 Crisis, the posture of Eisenhower administration toward utilization of atomic weapons became relatively conservative in light of the Soviets progress of its nuclear weapons. The overall policy of Eisenhower administration did undergo some changes; nevertheless, the adjustments all served U.S. best interests.
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Lan, Yu-Chen, and 藍於琛. "Small State''s Foreign Policy under the Balance of Power and Interdependence: Taiwan''s Survival Strategy in Taiwan Strait Crises(1954-55, 1958, 1996)." Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/55391176407252125865.

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Yu, Ming-feng, and 游銘豐. "The Decision-making Process of U.S. Policy toward Off-shore Islands in 1950s: With Focus on the Two Off-Shore Islands Crises in Taiwan Strait." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62430566099755354265.

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碩士
淡江大學
美國研究所
93
With the occurrence of the two offshore-island crises in the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War Era, the whole world suddenly fixed attention on the previously unknown offshore islands lying off the coast of Mainland China. During these crises, the U.S. repeatedly warned the PRC, and moved forward with the signing of a mutual defense treaty and a joint communiqué with the ROC. When the tensions escalated, the U.S. assisted in evacuating the Dachens and passed the Taiwan Strait Resolution, which provided a legal basis for U.S. assistance in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Besides, U.S. leaders announced the possible use of atomic weapons should that become necessary to defend Quemoy, and sent a huge armada of warships to the Taiwan Strait. For some time, it seemed as if the U.S. was ready to fight in defense of the offshore islands, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait was near breaking point. To determine whether the U.S. was truly willing to defend the offshore islands, this thesis applies the Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) and Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as discussed in the decision-making theory developed by Dr. Graham Allison, a well-known scholar at Harvard University. It also adopts the comparative analysis method to examine the evolution of U.S. decision-making process, and the reasons behind, in the interest of making a comprehensive view of U.S. policy with regard to the offshore islands, and in realizing the real essence of U.S. policy towards China in the 1950s. Findings of this thesis show that in the first crisis, the U.S. was in fact not willing to fight for the defense of the offshore islands. However, because of the insistence on the policy of “massive retaliation,” the U.S. was forced to be involved. And in the second crisis, the U.S. again got involved in the defense of the offshore islands in a limited manner because the ROC had stationed more than a third of its army on the offshore islands. This made the defense of offshore islands closely related to the morale of the ROC and, therefore, to the defense of Taiwan. By comparing the decision-making processes adopted during the two offshore-island crises, it is evident from the findings of this study that U.S. policy toward the offshore islands was changeable. The evolution of domestic and international situations, and the extent of impendence of the crises, all contributed to changes in U.S. policy towards the offshore islands. Furthermore, it was found out that the process of maximizing the interests of individual organizations and the result of interaction between government department secretaries and the President also influenced the results of decision-making. Regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it was obvious that U.S. leaders had different views during the two crises. Since the USSR had made a great progress with nuclear weapons after the mid-1950s, the doctrine of “massive retaliation” was seriously doubted because it relied heavily on the power of nuclear weapons to deter the Communists. Besides, since the U.S.-U.S.S.R relationship had moved toward détente after the mid-1950s, the arms race also began to ease. This explains why President Eisenhower had seriously considered using nuclear weapons to deter the PRC in the first crisis, but refused the use of nuclear weapons in the early days of the second crisis. Interestingly, instead of using nuclear weapons for defending the offshore islands, the U.S. had deployed a huge armada of warships in the Taiwan Strait, which gave the strong impression of U.S. determination to fight in defense of the offshore islands. Finally, the offshore-island crises made the U.S. reconsider its policy toward China seriously. In order to defuse the dangerous situation in the offshore islands, which many feared would lead to World War III, the U.S. did its utmost to prevent the ROC from attacking Mainland China and dragging the U.S. into war with the PRC as a way to retake the mainland. The U.S. also maneuvered a “two-Chinas” proposal in an effort to cause a permanent state of division across the Taiwan Strait and then keep the strategic offshore defense line on the Pacific perimeter intact for a long time.
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zhang, zei guong, and 鄭傑光. "TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57845508761522056461.

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Chang, Mao-Chun, and 張貿鈞. "Inspecting Taiwan Strait Conflict Through Crisis Management Perspective:A Case of 1996 Crisis." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2kaya3.

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碩士
國立中興大學
國際政治研究所
99
The world becomes well connected with the trend of globalization. By the improvement of information technology, the pros and cons of globalization are either directly or indirectly affecting nations. As for relation between People’s Republic of China and Republic of China, which involve several tensional, occasional and random conflicts with politic, economy, culture, society, military and member issue in them. With internal and external circumstances, the researcher was motivated to do the research of safety of Taiwan Straits bases on owing certification of project management and the background of crisis management. Researcher wishes to expertise his specialties by doing this thesis to provide crisis prevention and management, solutions and opportunities of Taiwan Straits. This thesis is based on case studies, by conducting crisis management to analyze the possibilities of conflict in Taiwan Straits. This thesis can be increased credibility by conducting missile crisis in 1996 to bring crisis management into research method, and can be considered as a reference for government. Thus, we can conclude as below: A. When crisis occurred, there were many serious and negative effects. The main causes are misjudgments, miscommunications and misplacements by different departments, which is needed to be taken seriously and corrected in the future. B. Base on the analysis of missile crisis in 1996, in the different period (potential, outbreak, extensional and solution) reactions of Republic of China government are deeply valued as reference. C. Both government of People’s Republic of China and Republic of China should construct mutual trust system to strengthen communication to avoid unnecessary conflicts.
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Books on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"

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Tai hai wei ji: Taiwan strait crisis. Taibei Shi: Guo shi guan, 2014.

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Strait talk: United States-Taiwan relations and the crisis with China. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008.

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Strait talk: United States-Taiwan relations and the crisis with China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.

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Qinghong, Chen, ed. Tai hai wei ji guan li yan jiu = Crisis management across Taiwan straits. Beijing Shi: Jin cheng chu ban she, 2010.

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Qinghong, Chen, ed. Tai hai wei ji guan li yan jiu = Crisis management across Taiwan straits. Beijing Shi: Jin cheng chu ban she, 2010.

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Jinmen da zhan: Tai hai feng yun zhi li shi chong yan = Crisis of the Taiwan strait. Taibei Shi: Zhongguo zhi yi chu ban she, 2000.

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Ghost month. New York: Soho Press, Inc., 2014.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. foreign policy : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, March 14, 1996. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1996.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. foreign policy : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, March 14, 1996. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1996.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Acknowledging the positive role of Taiwan in the current Asian financial crisis and affirming the support of the American people for peace and stability on the Taiwan Strait and security for Taiwan's democracy: Markup before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, second session, on H. Con. Res. 270, May 21, 1998. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1998.

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Book chapters on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"

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Friedman, Edward. "America’s Pivots to Asia and the Taiwan Strait Crises." In The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations, 55–75. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137360779_4.

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Shepperd, Taryn. "1995–96: The Taiwan Strait Crisis." In Sino-US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action, 43–80. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137317728_3.

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Moore, Gregory J. "The Roles of Misperceptions and Perceptual Gaps in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996." In China in the Twenty-First Century, 171–94. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230607378_9.

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Huei, Pang Yang. "A Stillness at Taiwan Strait." In Strait Rituals, 9–47. Hong Kong University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5790/hongkong/9789888208302.003.0002.

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The genesis of the Taiwan Straits Crises could be traced to 1950 when President Harry S. Truman positioned the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent hostilities between the PRC and the ROC. In order to understand the origins and making of the contest over control of the Taiwan Strait, it is important to deal with the major developments in the foreign relations of the US, PRC and ROC from 1950 to April 1954. As the ROC was the most directly affected party right from the start, how the Taiwan Strait issue played out in Taiwan will also be examined.
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Huei, Pang Yang. "Introduction." In Strait Rituals, 1–8. Hong Kong University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5790/hongkong/9789888208302.003.0001.

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This chapter sets out the aims of this book, stating the main lines of inquiry. Next, a brief “state of the field” assessment on the historical problem of the Taiwan Strait crises will be made. It will examine how a reevaluation is pertinent with the availability of new sources and how such a new appraisal speaks about the deeper trends of historical questions of Sino-US relations. This is followed by a short content review and a discussion of the usage of Chinese and US sources.
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"THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES (1954–55 AND 1958)." In The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy, 51–56. Anthem Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvndv98k.14.

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Tan, Qingshan. "The United States Factor in Cross-Strait Crises." In Sources of Conflict and Cooperation in the Taiwan Strait, 127–47. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812707314_0008.

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"Taiwan Strait Crisis." In Strait Talk, 213–30. Harvard University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1pncpw2.24.

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Huei, Pang Yang. "Outbreak of the Crisis." In Strait Rituals, 80–115. Hong Kong University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5790/hongkong/9789888208302.003.0004.

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Abstract:
On 3 September 1954, China launched a massive artillery bombardment on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, triggering the first crisis. This attack prompted the US to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan on 2 December 1954. China also courted neutralist countries in Asia in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. This chapter focuses on the Geneva reverberations especially on developments in July and August 1954, which led to the eruption of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. How China, the US and Taiwan acted following the outbreak of this crisis will be the next point of scrutiny.
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10

"THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions." In Across the Taiwan Strait, 139–72. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315022833-15.

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Reports on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"

1

Roy, Denny. Taiwan Strait Update: Crisis Deferred. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada445098.

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2

Chiang, Chun W. Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada415086.

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