Academic literature on the topic 'Taiwan Strait crises'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Taiwan Strait crises.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Journal articles on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"
Kastrati, Bilbil. "Taiwan strait dispute." SEEU Review 11, no. 2 (December 1, 2015): 69–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/seeur-2015-0029.
Full textPandit, Priyanka. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954-1958." Strategic Analysis 44, no. 3 (May 3, 2020): 285–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1767912.
Full textXIAO, RUPING, and HSIAO-TING LIN. "Inside the Asian Cold War Intrigues: Revisiting the Taiwan Strait crises." Modern Asian Studies 52, no. 6 (July 10, 2018): 2109–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x16000706.
Full textLi, Xiaobing. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 by Pang Yang Huei." Twentieth-Century China 45, no. 2 (2020): E—14—E—15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tcc.2020.0013.
Full textPollack, Jonathan D. "THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA IN 2003: All Quiet on the Eastern Front?" Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (January 2004): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.1.1.
Full textNORRIS, WILLIAM. "The Socialization of China’s Assertiveness: Examining Waltz’s Neorealist Mechanism of “Socialization” in China’s Regional Security Relations." Issues & Studies 55, no. 04 (December 2019): 1940009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1013251119400095.
Full textFravel, M. Taylor. "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes." International Security 30, no. 2 (October 2005): 46–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228805775124534.
Full textFredman, Zach. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958. By Pang Yang Huei. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019. xviii, 317 pp. ISBN: 9789888208302 (cloth)." Journal of Asian Studies 79, no. 1 (February 2020): 261–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911819002390.
Full textBeckley, Michael. "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts." International Security 39, no. 4 (April 2015): 7–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00197.
Full textLiu, Tony. "Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958 Pang Yang Huei Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019 xviii + 317 pp. $55.00 ISBN 978-988-8208-30-2." China Quarterly 241 (February 11, 2020): 285–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741019001450.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"
Lee, Tieh-Shang. "Crisis in the Taiwan Strait an assessment of the conflict crisis between China and Taiwan /." online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium, 2007. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3259950.
Full textBi, Jianhai. "The PRC leadership succession and Taiwan policymaking: A case study of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Political Science, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/4346.
Full textWalker, Fraser Cameron. "“A Difficult Dinner Companion”: Canadian-American Relations During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954-1955." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/39471.
Full textKuo, Ru-dar, and 郭儒達. "The study of U.S. Decision-making toward 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57657442145822559427.
Full text中國文化大學
中國大陸研究所
91
This study focuses on U.S. decision-making during 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 1990-91 Persian Gulf Crisis was added into the thesis for compare analysis. This study uses "Diplomatic Decision-making Model" and "Crisis Management Decision-making Model" which obtains through deductive method to examine the above three cases. Reaches the conclusion that 1995 decision-making fits the "Diplomatic Model" and 1996/Persian Gulf Crisis fits the "Crisis Management Model". This study also tries to measure how four variables-internal environment, bureacratic system, the core policy makers and external environment affect the outcome of policy.
Chen, Guo-Huei, and 陳國暉. "An Assessment of the Credibility of U.S. deterrence to China in the Taiwan Strait -Focusing on the 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait Crises." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17321024059991860977.
Full text國立臺灣大學
國家發展研究所
98
The goal of the study is to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China in the Taiwan Strait, particular focusing on the 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait Crises. The analytical framework of this study is to devise a test of the credibility of the U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Firstly, to use words and action-dimension to analyze the U.S. deterrence to China''s determination, and to test Washington’s determination to defend Taiwan''s security. Secondly, to use this framework to test China’s perception, and to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence. This study employs this framework to explore the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China during 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait crises. We find that although United States did not show the same strong determination to deter China in the 1999 as that in 1996, China did perceive the U.S. determination eventually and took action to maintain the status quo. However, this study finds that during the most period of time China did not perceive the U.S. determination due to her unacceptable loss of Taiwan as Beijing’s core interests and American strategy of gradual escalation. The use of dual deterrence and reassurance by the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait is able to reduce the sense of insecurity of Beijing and help resolve the problem of perception. This study therefore concludes that if the U.S. continues to resist supporting Taiwan independence, and opposing the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue, while Taiwan does not provoke Beijing, the credibility of American deterrence to China will be assured.
Chien, Nai-Wen Chang, and 張簡乃文. "The Decision-making Process of U.S. Foreign Policy toward Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77172962646753695702.
Full text淡江大學
美洲研究所碩士班
102
The paper laid the foundation on Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models-the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure to explore the formulation of U.S. foreign policy during the two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s. In order to make the analysis more comprehensive, I also adopted the comparative analysis method to present the evolution of the decision-making process of the two Crises. By doing so, I established three hypotheses from the theory and applied them in the two case studies to verify application of the theory. When these offshore islands were under heavy attack in the first Strait Crisis, whether or not the U.S. should defend these offshore islands for Taiwan was “ a horrible dilemma” to the Eisenhower administration and put the U.S. in a difficult situation to deal with due to its extensive political implications. On the one hand, the U.S. was unwilling to run the risk of waging war with Communist China or even Soviet Union. On the other hand, it did not want to lose its prestige because of staying out of the Strait conflict. Considering all the courses of actions, the U.S. attempted to resolve the Crisis by passing the dilemma to the U.N, signing the Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and concluding the Formosa Resolution with Taiwan in exchange for ROC’s acceptance of the U.N. arrangement and withdrawal from Tachens. When the second Crisis occurred in 1958, with nearly one third of ROC troops stationed on the islands, the dilemma therefore was not to intervene or not but how to intervene to suit U.S. best interest. The Eisenhower administration decided to provide escort operation for safety landing of ROC’s supplies. Although the Eisenhower administration did not take military actions in the event of both Strait Crises, utilization of nuclear weapons as well as military actions were widely discussed and prepared. Various organizations had tried to have their proposals of military actions adopted by President Eisenhower so that they could stand out their organizational values. In particular, the employment of nuclear weapons was seriously considered under the ”Massive Retaliation Strategy.” While in the 1958 Crisis, the posture of Eisenhower administration toward utilization of atomic weapons became relatively conservative in light of the Soviets progress of its nuclear weapons. The overall policy of Eisenhower administration did undergo some changes; nevertheless, the adjustments all served U.S. best interests.
Lan, Yu-Chen, and 藍於琛. "Small State''s Foreign Policy under the Balance of Power and Interdependence: Taiwan''s Survival Strategy in Taiwan Strait Crises(1954-55, 1958, 1996)." Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/55391176407252125865.
Full textYu, Ming-feng, and 游銘豐. "The Decision-making Process of U.S. Policy toward Off-shore Islands in 1950s: With Focus on the Two Off-Shore Islands Crises in Taiwan Strait." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62430566099755354265.
Full text淡江大學
美國研究所
93
With the occurrence of the two offshore-island crises in the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War Era, the whole world suddenly fixed attention on the previously unknown offshore islands lying off the coast of Mainland China. During these crises, the U.S. repeatedly warned the PRC, and moved forward with the signing of a mutual defense treaty and a joint communiqué with the ROC. When the tensions escalated, the U.S. assisted in evacuating the Dachens and passed the Taiwan Strait Resolution, which provided a legal basis for U.S. assistance in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Besides, U.S. leaders announced the possible use of atomic weapons should that become necessary to defend Quemoy, and sent a huge armada of warships to the Taiwan Strait. For some time, it seemed as if the U.S. was ready to fight in defense of the offshore islands, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait was near breaking point. To determine whether the U.S. was truly willing to defend the offshore islands, this thesis applies the Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) and Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as discussed in the decision-making theory developed by Dr. Graham Allison, a well-known scholar at Harvard University. It also adopts the comparative analysis method to examine the evolution of U.S. decision-making process, and the reasons behind, in the interest of making a comprehensive view of U.S. policy with regard to the offshore islands, and in realizing the real essence of U.S. policy towards China in the 1950s. Findings of this thesis show that in the first crisis, the U.S. was in fact not willing to fight for the defense of the offshore islands. However, because of the insistence on the policy of “massive retaliation,” the U.S. was forced to be involved. And in the second crisis, the U.S. again got involved in the defense of the offshore islands in a limited manner because the ROC had stationed more than a third of its army on the offshore islands. This made the defense of offshore islands closely related to the morale of the ROC and, therefore, to the defense of Taiwan. By comparing the decision-making processes adopted during the two offshore-island crises, it is evident from the findings of this study that U.S. policy toward the offshore islands was changeable. The evolution of domestic and international situations, and the extent of impendence of the crises, all contributed to changes in U.S. policy towards the offshore islands. Furthermore, it was found out that the process of maximizing the interests of individual organizations and the result of interaction between government department secretaries and the President also influenced the results of decision-making. Regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it was obvious that U.S. leaders had different views during the two crises. Since the USSR had made a great progress with nuclear weapons after the mid-1950s, the doctrine of “massive retaliation” was seriously doubted because it relied heavily on the power of nuclear weapons to deter the Communists. Besides, since the U.S.-U.S.S.R relationship had moved toward détente after the mid-1950s, the arms race also began to ease. This explains why President Eisenhower had seriously considered using nuclear weapons to deter the PRC in the first crisis, but refused the use of nuclear weapons in the early days of the second crisis. Interestingly, instead of using nuclear weapons for defending the offshore islands, the U.S. had deployed a huge armada of warships in the Taiwan Strait, which gave the strong impression of U.S. determination to fight in defense of the offshore islands. Finally, the offshore-island crises made the U.S. reconsider its policy toward China seriously. In order to defuse the dangerous situation in the offshore islands, which many feared would lead to World War III, the U.S. did its utmost to prevent the ROC from attacking Mainland China and dragging the U.S. into war with the PRC as a way to retake the mainland. The U.S. also maneuvered a “two-Chinas” proposal in an effort to cause a permanent state of division across the Taiwan Strait and then keep the strategic offshore defense line on the Pacific perimeter intact for a long time.
zhang, zei guong, and 鄭傑光. "TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57845508761522056461.
Full textChang, Mao-Chun, and 張貿鈞. "Inspecting Taiwan Strait Conflict Through Crisis Management Perspective:A Case of 1996 Crisis." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2kaya3.
Full text國立中興大學
國際政治研究所
99
The world becomes well connected with the trend of globalization. By the improvement of information technology, the pros and cons of globalization are either directly or indirectly affecting nations. As for relation between People’s Republic of China and Republic of China, which involve several tensional, occasional and random conflicts with politic, economy, culture, society, military and member issue in them. With internal and external circumstances, the researcher was motivated to do the research of safety of Taiwan Straits bases on owing certification of project management and the background of crisis management. Researcher wishes to expertise his specialties by doing this thesis to provide crisis prevention and management, solutions and opportunities of Taiwan Straits. This thesis is based on case studies, by conducting crisis management to analyze the possibilities of conflict in Taiwan Straits. This thesis can be increased credibility by conducting missile crisis in 1996 to bring crisis management into research method, and can be considered as a reference for government. Thus, we can conclude as below: A. When crisis occurred, there were many serious and negative effects. The main causes are misjudgments, miscommunications and misplacements by different departments, which is needed to be taken seriously and corrected in the future. B. Base on the analysis of missile crisis in 1996, in the different period (potential, outbreak, extensional and solution) reactions of Republic of China government are deeply valued as reference. C. Both government of People’s Republic of China and Republic of China should construct mutual trust system to strengthen communication to avoid unnecessary conflicts.
Books on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"
Strait talk: United States-Taiwan relations and the crisis with China. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Find full textStrait talk: United States-Taiwan relations and the crisis with China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Find full textQinghong, Chen, ed. Tai hai wei ji guan li yan jiu = Crisis management across Taiwan straits. Beijing Shi: Jin cheng chu ban she, 2010.
Find full textQinghong, Chen, ed. Tai hai wei ji guan li yan jiu = Crisis management across Taiwan straits. Beijing Shi: Jin cheng chu ban she, 2010.
Find full textJinmen da zhan: Tai hai feng yun zhi li shi chong yan = Crisis of the Taiwan strait. Taibei Shi: Zhongguo zhi yi chu ban she, 2000.
Find full textUnited States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. foreign policy : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, March 14, 1996. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1996.
Find full textUnited States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. foreign policy : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, March 14, 1996. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1996.
Find full textUnited States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Acknowledging the positive role of Taiwan in the current Asian financial crisis and affirming the support of the American people for peace and stability on the Taiwan Strait and security for Taiwan's democracy: Markup before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, second session, on H. Con. Res. 270, May 21, 1998. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1998.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"
Friedman, Edward. "America’s Pivots to Asia and the Taiwan Strait Crises." In The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations, 55–75. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137360779_4.
Full textShepperd, Taryn. "1995–96: The Taiwan Strait Crisis." In Sino-US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action, 43–80. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137317728_3.
Full textMoore, Gregory J. "The Roles of Misperceptions and Perceptual Gaps in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996." In China in the Twenty-First Century, 171–94. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230607378_9.
Full textHuei, Pang Yang. "A Stillness at Taiwan Strait." In Strait Rituals, 9–47. Hong Kong University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5790/hongkong/9789888208302.003.0002.
Full textHuei, Pang Yang. "Introduction." In Strait Rituals, 1–8. Hong Kong University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5790/hongkong/9789888208302.003.0001.
Full text"THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES (1954–55 AND 1958)." In The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy, 51–56. Anthem Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvndv98k.14.
Full textTan, Qingshan. "The United States Factor in Cross-Strait Crises." In Sources of Conflict and Cooperation in the Taiwan Strait, 127–47. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812707314_0008.
Full text"Taiwan Strait Crisis." In Strait Talk, 213–30. Harvard University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1pncpw2.24.
Full textHuei, Pang Yang. "Outbreak of the Crisis." In Strait Rituals, 80–115. Hong Kong University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5790/hongkong/9789888208302.003.0004.
Full text"THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions." In Across the Taiwan Strait, 139–72. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315022833-15.
Full textReports on the topic "Taiwan Strait crises"
Roy, Denny. Taiwan Strait Update: Crisis Deferred. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada445098.
Full textChiang, Chun W. Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada415086.
Full text