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1
Lee, Tieh-Shang. "Crisis in the Taiwan Strait an assessment of the conflict crisis between China and Taiwan /." online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium, 2007. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3259950.
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Bi, Jianhai. "The PRC leadership succession and Taiwan policymaking: A case study of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Political Science, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/4346.
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The close connections and interactions between the Taiwan crisis and succession politics, and Taiwan policy and informal politics, demonstrated that the PRC politics were not fully institutionalised. Military-driven politics played a major role, but succession politics constituted the centre of Chinese informal politics. This leadership succession problem provided the military with the opportunities to greatly influence Beijing's decision-making on events in the Taiwan Strait. The military's influence was significant largely because political control was weakened by the struggle for succession. This process was facilitated by the importance of informal politics in the PRC. In this sense, the PRC provocation of the Taiwan crisis can be largely attributed to the military's leverage in the leadership succession struggle. Although other informal political factors contributed to Beijing's Taiwan policy and decisions to launch war-games, the struggle for succession was the most important factor acting on Taiwan policy and influencing the lead-up to the Taiwan crisis. Thus, the Taiwan crisis was due to a series of internal domestic elements of which the succession crisis was the key.
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Walker, Fraser Cameron. "“A Difficult Dinner Companion”: Canadian-American Relations During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954-1955." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/39471.
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During the opening decade of the Cold War, Canada, under the leadership of Liberal Prime
Minister Louis St. Laurent and Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson,
experienced a heightened sense of influence on global affairs, often described as the “Golden
Age of Canadian Diplomacy.” This state of affairs led Canada to believe that it could punch
above its weight and subsequently influence the United States of America’s foreign policy.
Using the First Taiwan Strait Crisis as a microcosm of this “Golden Age”, understanding
America’s behaviour during the crisis, and Canada’s involvement throughout, brings into
question the validity of Canada’s grand influence and tempers the idea that Canada could
significantly influence America’s policies.
Beginning with the memoirs and biographies of the diplomats of the 1950s and then juxtaposing sources from the Canadian Department of External Affairs and American State Department, this thesis demonstrates that Canada did not play a significant part in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. This is an odd result, considering that this crisis, which could have had devastating consequences for Canada if it had expanded from just the Offshore Islands, was a perfect opportunity for a country that was supposedly experiencing a Golden Age to flex its diplomatic clout. This thesis suggests that perhaps Canada’s inflated sense of self, which has persisted in the national conscience, can be attributed to the exaggerated importance the 1950s diplomats gave to themselves.
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Kuo, Ru-dar, and 郭儒達. "The study of U.S. Decision-making toward 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57657442145822559427.
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碩士中國文化大學
中國大陸研究所
91
This study focuses on U.S. decision-making during 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 1990-91 Persian Gulf Crisis was added into the thesis for compare analysis. This study uses "Diplomatic Decision-making Model" and "Crisis Management Decision-making Model" which obtains through deductive method to examine the above three cases. Reaches the conclusion that 1995 decision-making fits the "Diplomatic Model" and 1996/Persian Gulf Crisis fits the "Crisis Management Model". This study also tries to measure how four variables-internal environment, bureacratic system, the core policy makers and external environment affect the outcome of policy.
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Chen, Guo-Huei, and 陳國暉. "An Assessment of the Credibility of U.S. deterrence to China in the Taiwan Strait -Focusing on the 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait Crises." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17321024059991860977.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
國家發展研究所
98
The goal of the study is to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China in the Taiwan Strait, particular focusing on the 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait Crises. The analytical framework of this study is to devise a test of the credibility of the U.S. deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Firstly, to use words and action-dimension to analyze the U.S. deterrence to China''s determination, and to test Washington’s determination to defend Taiwan''s security. Secondly, to use this framework to test China’s perception, and to assess the credibility of the U.S. deterrence. This study employs this framework to explore the credibility of the U.S. deterrence to China during 1996 and 1999 Taiwan Strait crises. We find that although United States did not show the same strong determination to deter China in the 1999 as that in 1996, China did perceive the U.S. determination eventually and took action to maintain the status quo. However, this study finds that during the most period of time China did not perceive the U.S. determination due to her unacceptable loss of Taiwan as Beijing’s core interests and American strategy of gradual escalation. The use of dual deterrence and reassurance by the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait is able to reduce the sense of insecurity of Beijing and help resolve the problem of perception. This study therefore concludes that if the U.S. continues to resist supporting Taiwan independence, and opposing the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue, while Taiwan does not provoke Beijing, the credibility of American deterrence to China will be assured.
6
Chien, Nai-Wen Chang, and 張簡乃文. "The Decision-making Process of U.S. Foreign Policy toward Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77172962646753695702.
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碩士淡江大學
美洲研究所碩士班
102
The paper laid the foundation on Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models-the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure to explore the formulation of U.S. foreign policy during the two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s. In order to make the analysis more comprehensive, I also adopted the comparative analysis method to present the evolution of the decision-making process of the two Crises. By doing so, I established three hypotheses from the theory and applied them in the two case studies to verify application of the theory. When these offshore islands were under heavy attack in the first Strait Crisis, whether or not the U.S. should defend these offshore islands for Taiwan was “ a horrible dilemma” to the Eisenhower administration and put the U.S. in a difficult situation to deal with due to its extensive political implications. On the one hand, the U.S. was unwilling to run the risk of waging war with Communist China or even Soviet Union. On the other hand, it did not want to lose its prestige because of staying out of the Strait conflict. Considering all the courses of actions, the U.S. attempted to resolve the Crisis by passing the dilemma to the U.N, signing the Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and concluding the Formosa Resolution with Taiwan in exchange for ROC’s acceptance of the U.N. arrangement and withdrawal from Tachens. When the second Crisis occurred in 1958, with nearly one third of ROC troops stationed on the islands, the dilemma therefore was not to intervene or not but how to intervene to suit U.S. best interest. The Eisenhower administration decided to provide escort operation for safety landing of ROC’s supplies. Although the Eisenhower administration did not take military actions in the event of both Strait Crises, utilization of nuclear weapons as well as military actions were widely discussed and prepared. Various organizations had tried to have their proposals of military actions adopted by President Eisenhower so that they could stand out their organizational values. In particular, the employment of nuclear weapons was seriously considered under the ”Massive Retaliation Strategy.” While in the 1958 Crisis, the posture of Eisenhower administration toward utilization of atomic weapons became relatively conservative in light of the Soviets progress of its nuclear weapons. The overall policy of Eisenhower administration did undergo some changes; nevertheless, the adjustments all served U.S. best interests.
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Lan, Yu-Chen, and 藍於琛. "Small State''s Foreign Policy under the Balance of Power and Interdependence: Taiwan''s Survival Strategy in Taiwan Strait Crises(1954-55, 1958, 1996)." Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/55391176407252125865.
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Yu, Ming-feng, and 游銘豐. "The Decision-making Process of U.S. Policy toward Off-shore Islands in 1950s: With Focus on the Two Off-Shore Islands Crises in Taiwan Strait." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62430566099755354265.
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碩士淡江大學
美國研究所
93
With the occurrence of the two offshore-island crises in the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War Era, the whole world suddenly fixed attention on the previously unknown offshore islands lying off the coast of Mainland China. During these crises, the U.S. repeatedly warned the PRC, and moved forward with the signing of a mutual defense treaty and a joint communiqué with the ROC. When the tensions escalated, the U.S. assisted in evacuating the Dachens and passed the Taiwan Strait Resolution, which provided a legal basis for U.S. assistance in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Besides, U.S. leaders announced the possible use of atomic weapons should that become necessary to defend Quemoy, and sent a huge armada of warships to the Taiwan Strait. For some time, it seemed as if the U.S. was ready to fight in defense of the offshore islands, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait was near breaking point. To determine whether the U.S. was truly willing to defend the offshore islands, this thesis applies the Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) and Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as discussed in the decision-making theory developed by Dr. Graham Allison, a well-known scholar at Harvard University. It also adopts the comparative analysis method to examine the evolution of U.S. decision-making process, and the reasons behind, in the interest of making a comprehensive view of U.S. policy with regard to the offshore islands, and in realizing the real essence of U.S. policy towards China in the 1950s. Findings of this thesis show that in the first crisis, the U.S. was in fact not willing to fight for the defense of the offshore islands. However, because of the insistence on the policy of “massive retaliation,” the U.S. was forced to be involved. And in the second crisis, the U.S. again got involved in the defense of the offshore islands in a limited manner because the ROC had stationed more than a third of its army on the offshore islands. This made the defense of offshore islands closely related to the morale of the ROC and, therefore, to the defense of Taiwan. By comparing the decision-making processes adopted during the two offshore-island crises, it is evident from the findings of this study that U.S. policy toward the offshore islands was changeable. The evolution of domestic and international situations, and the extent of impendence of the crises, all contributed to changes in U.S. policy towards the offshore islands. Furthermore, it was found out that the process of maximizing the interests of individual organizations and the result of interaction between government department secretaries and the President also influenced the results of decision-making. Regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it was obvious that U.S. leaders had different views during the two crises. Since the USSR had made a great progress with nuclear weapons after the mid-1950s, the doctrine of “massive retaliation” was seriously doubted because it relied heavily on the power of nuclear weapons to deter the Communists. Besides, since the U.S.-U.S.S.R relationship had moved toward détente after the mid-1950s, the arms race also began to ease. This explains why President Eisenhower had seriously considered using nuclear weapons to deter the PRC in the first crisis, but refused the use of nuclear weapons in the early days of the second crisis. Interestingly, instead of using nuclear weapons for defending the offshore islands, the U.S. had deployed a huge armada of warships in the Taiwan Strait, which gave the strong impression of U.S. determination to fight in defense of the offshore islands. Finally, the offshore-island crises made the U.S. reconsider its policy toward China seriously. In order to defuse the dangerous situation in the offshore islands, which many feared would lead to World War III, the U.S. did its utmost to prevent the ROC from attacking Mainland China and dragging the U.S. into war with the PRC as a way to retake the mainland. The U.S. also maneuvered a “two-Chinas” proposal in an effort to cause a permanent state of division across the Taiwan Strait and then keep the strategic offshore defense line on the Pacific perimeter intact for a long time.
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zhang, zei guong, and 鄭傑光. "TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57845508761522056461.
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Chang, Mao-Chun, and 張貿鈞. "Inspecting Taiwan Strait Conflict Through Crisis Management Perspective：A Case of 1996 Crisis." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2kaya3.
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碩士國立中興大學
國際政治研究所
99
The world becomes well connected with the trend of globalization. By the improvement of information technology, the pros and cons of globalization are either directly or indirectly affecting nations. As for relation between People’s Republic of China and Republic of China, which involve several tensional, occasional and random conflicts with politic, economy, culture, society, military and member issue in them. With internal and external circumstances, the researcher was motivated to do the research of safety of Taiwan Straits bases on owing certification of project management and the background of crisis management. Researcher wishes to expertise his specialties by doing this thesis to provide crisis prevention and management, solutions and opportunities of Taiwan Straits. This thesis is based on case studies, by conducting crisis management to analyze the possibilities of conflict in Taiwan Straits. This thesis can be increased credibility by conducting missile crisis in 1996 to bring crisis management into research method, and can be considered as a reference for government. Thus, we can conclude as below: A. When crisis occurred, there were many serious and negative effects. The main causes are misjudgments, miscommunications and misplacements by different departments, which is needed to be taken seriously and corrected in the future. B. Base on the analysis of missile crisis in 1996, in the different period (potential, outbreak, extensional and solution) reactions of Republic of China government are deeply valued as reference. C. Both government of People’s Republic of China and Republic of China should construct mutual trust system to strengthen communication to avoid unnecessary conflicts.
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PA, Chang-Hung, and 巴長泓. "The Study of Crisis Management in Taiwan : The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 and The SARS Crisis of 2003." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71190652889614290957.
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碩士國立中興大學
國際政治研究所
95
In the post-cold war era, the world has shifted focus from traditional safety conflict to non-traditional safety one. Taiwan, in addition to facing military threats from People’s Republic of China, is now confronted with non-traditional interior challenges. Therefore, it is imperative for the government and the public to reach a consensus on establishing the national security mechanism. The study aims to examine the effectiveness of the current crisis-managing mechanism and to reveal the operation of crisis management in the government. The researcher adopts the three-phase crisis-management model by Nunamaker and examines 1996 cross-strait crisis and 2003 SARS outbreak in the pre-crisis phase, the crisis phase, and the post-crisis phase. The researcher also compares the similarities and differences of crisis management between the 1996 cross-strait crisis and 2003 SARS outbreak. Through reviewing relevant literatures and examining the cases, the researcher provides comments on the current crisis management mechanism and aims to improve it. It is found out that the integrity of crisis management mechanism and the public’s crisis awareness are both key to the effectiveness of crisis management. Finally, the researcher proposes the following strategies to enhance the quality of crisis management：(1) establishing integrate crisis management mechanism. (2) sketching emergency response plan, and standardizing operation procedure, (3) intensifying crisis training, and fostering crisis-managing abilities, (4) ameliorating Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, (5) strengthening communication channels, and establishing press spokesman system, (6) constructing information-exchange network, (7) cultivating citizens’ crisis awareness, and (8)setting crisis-recovery and feedback mechanism.
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Chia-pin, Lee, and 李嘉賓. "The U.S. Decision-Making Process of 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/00452199937763598337.
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碩士淡江大學
美國研究所
90
Base on U.S. government newly declassified documents and cross-strait high-ranked commanders who had ever battled in second “Quemoy-Matsu Crisis” recently published so-called oral history and memoirs in few years, this thesis main purpose therefore is aimed to revisit and reexamine the decision-making process of U.S. government in 1958 crisis through Graham Allison’s three decision-making models and Glenn Snyder’s protector matrix of asymmetrical game theory. Secondly, this thesis also attempted to set up an explanatory framework for U.S. government alternative intervening model while cross-straits erupt conflict. Under the consideration of American own interest, author found that, Eisenhower administration inclined to promote GRC withdrawing from offshore islands much more aggressive in calm period than in crisis escalation. American was used to play two kinds of role in crisis in turn. But all went into the same destination of either maintaining or returning to “status quo” no matter she being a protector against PRC in defensive or a balancer in offensive position. The U.S. government optimal strategy to Taiwan and Offshore Islands was keeping cross-straits Chinas’ counter-payoff on dynamic Equilibrium in according with crisis situation evolution. Meanwhile, applied to scholastic “limited war” study approach, the thesis tried to account for what Communist China fade out its shelling to offshore Islands without amphibious landing and how Eisenhower Administration successfully persuaded GRC partially withdraw military deployment from Quemoy and Matsu. This thesis argues that U.S.-PRC-GRC of each party leader hold their self-restraint in force was the major factor of not resulted in brink of nuclear war. To sum and last, author presented three viewpoints in conclusion. First, U.S. government fated to lose advantages on their military instrument derived from her “strategic ambiguity” policy toward Taiwan. Second, both cross-straits leaders intended to grab their individual political interests through war and would like to detect U.S. government willingness of intervention. Third, the authorization of nuclear weapons hold on president’s totally controlled and the State Department took charge of all crisis management was essential and responsible.
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Hsu, Pofeng, and 徐柏峰. "Crisis Management: Case Study of the 1995-96 Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70194561358261416572.
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Sun, Shao-Cheng, and 孫紹正. "The U.S. Government Decision-Making Process of 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04172561312600693571.
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博士淡江大學
美洲研究所博士班
98
Although there is a large number of publications of 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, only very few theoretical studies adopted theory-confirming case studies in order to verify hypotheses about official declassified archives. This dissertation attempts to do so. Taking into consideration that the US security commitments to Taiwan played a crucial role in the survival of Taiwan, the aim of this study is to explore President Eisenhower’s interests and the organizational stances of his administration, as well as the participants’ competition regarding the decision-making processes during the aforementioned crisis, being the main objective the finding of the patterns and essence of the actual concerns of US leaders in such processes. This dissertation attempts to verify three main hypotheses derived from decision-making theory, and focuses on the decision-making process of the Eisenhower administration. In order to do so, this study tries to answer the following questions: (1) what were the objectives, alternatives, and choices that Eisenhower –in his leading role as US head of state– had during the crisis? (2) what were the stances and debates between the US State Department and the Department of Defense in dealing with the crisis? (3) How did participants of the action channels utilize their bargaining skills and interacted with Eisenhower to compete their proposals? First, adopting the point of view of the Rational Actor Model, this study tried to demonstrate that Eisenhower –based on the US national interests– chose those proposals that, made by the leading bureaucrats of his administration, represented with higher interests and lower costs. In the beginning, Eisenhower considered that publicly stating the US intention of defending Quemoy was too costly and was, therefore, unwilling to make the Newport Statement. But the US military intervention was to eventually be decided by President Eisenhower alone, which he finally agreed to do. It shows that Eisenhower’s evaluation of proposals was flexible and influenced by both the domestic and international environment. Second, from the Organizational Behavior Model, Eisenhower apparently preferred the State Department’s proposals. Thus, the Department of Defense started to adjust its previously strong-arm methods. For instance, the Department of Defense proposed “close-in escort for Taiwan’s vessels” and “the use of nuclear weapons” proposals, which were both rejected by Eisenhower. He assessed that these proposals were too risky and costly. Soon after that, the Department of Defense altered its plans to meet Eisenhower’s expectations. It indicates that an organization may alter its proposals based on the President’s acceptance in order to meet his mindset. Third, from the Government Politics Model, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was master-minded in nurturing relations with the President. He also narrowed the number of participants involved in the decision-making processes. Thus, others were unable to affect the outcome. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray were newly appointed. It was difficult for them to offer creative and feasible suggestions. The Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles emphasized that his organization could only provide intelligence, but not get involved in policy making. Consequently, his influence in the action channel was limited. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining’s attitude toward the crisis was tough in the beginning. After Twining learned that Eisenhower had determined to use the least cost in maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, his attitude started to lean toward the President’s side. It showed that John Dulles was good at highlighting his importance within the action channel. He then gained an upper hand in the decision-making process. In comparing with other participants, some of them were not familiar with the cross-strait issues and still others’ opinions diverged from the President’s stance. Therefore, their role in the decision-making process became less effective. Finally, the findings of the research are as follows: (1) Eisenhower preferred low-cost proposals; (2) If the crisis fell into the responsibility of a particular organization, proposals from this organization would be more favourably considered by the President; (3) If participants’ proposals wanted to be accepted, they needed to include the President’s ideas; (4) The decision of defending the offshore islands would be made by the President; (5) Eisenhower was not going to use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy;(6) Eisenhower achieved his objectives through the leading bureaucrats; and (7) US/China/Taiwan were seeking their national interests in dealing with the offshore islands crisis. To conclude, this study proves that the Eisenhower administration handled the crisis mainly through its assessment of the cost of proposals, the capability of organizations, and competitions among participants. Despite most scholars believe that Eisenhower had willingly made efforts to defend Quemoy, this study has found that, actually, it was just the opposite case. In fact, Eisenhower had no desire to defend Quemoy. When the Department of Defense suggested military counter-measures in the defense of offshore islands, such measures were turned down by Eisenhower. He also assigned his leading bureaucrats to diminish the crisis at the US expense, but Eisenhower remained the key person behind the scene. Thus, the main theme of this dissertation is that as Eisenhower used his influence on agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Defense on the one hand and the Secretary of State Dulles on the other to maximize the national interests of the United States, he successfully prevented further escalation of the Quemoy crisis.
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Huang, Chien-yun, and 黃倩雲. "The U.S. Decision Making Process During 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis." Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52114942000828518567.
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碩士淡江大學
美國研究所
84
Based on the Rational Actor Paradigm formulated by Graham T. Allison, and the Cognitive Model offered by Alexander L. George, Robert Jervis, John D. Steinbruner, and Jack L. Snyder, the author studies the U.S. decision-making process during 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis. There are five chapters in the thesis. In Chapter One, the author explains her research motives, purposes and approaches. She also explains the limitations she has faced during the process of the research. In the first section of Chapter Two, the author describes the definition of crisis as well as reviews the theoretical studies concerning the crisis behavior. In the second and third sections, the author analyzes respectively the Rational Actor Paradigm and the Cognitive Model. In Chapter Three, the author explains the U.S. decision- making process during 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis in terms of the Rational Actor Model. Besides, she subjects the chosen options to the tests of the strategies for crisis management constructed by Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing in order to prove the rational choice is value- maximizing. In the first section of Chapter Four, the author explores the misperceptions American policymakers held toward the Communist China. In the second section, the author points out the role of the cognitive principles of management of incon- sistency in structuring the decisionmakers'' conception of their environment under conditions of uncertainty. In the third section, the author highlights how the decisionmakers resort to defensive psychological modes of coping with the emotional stress of being confronted by crisis situation. In Chapter Five, the author concludes by stating the theories- testing results in the case of U.S. decision-making process during 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
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Chen, Yu-Ming, and 陳鈺明. "The U.S. Decision-Making Process in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/89210897734985521082.
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碩士淡江大學
美國研究所碩士班
94
The main purpose is the U.S. Decision-Making Process in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The study case is analyzed by political scientists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in their books “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis” In Rational Actor Model, the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China in order to persuade the Republic of China accept the cease-fire proposal to United Nations. In Organizational Behavior Model, it shows that organizational behavior is often dominated by the organizational culture however the culture doesn''t necessarily lower the possibility of the policy option to be adopted as a policy. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson proposed to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China which is made the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles adopted. In Governmental Politics Model, it reveals that policy makers have to control the action channel to take the bargaining advantages and to persuade the final decision maker successfully. The Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had the full trust of the President Eisenhower, and he had a significant influence on the formulation of the decision. And the main theme is the U.S. government didn’t intervene the China civil war because off-shore islands, but the U.S. was involved in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis due to the variation of the international situation.
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Fu, Chao-Lin, and 符兆麟. "The Root Cause of the Military Crisis in the Taiwan Strait（1995─1996）." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73456856961590026775.
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碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班
95
Though the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait during 1995-1996 has passed, it is not the only crisis in the past ten years. Conflicts often happen and no one can guarantee that a conflict in the future will not become a war. After the 11th ROC presidential election in 2004, the relationship between both sides of the Taiwan Strait and America brought forth a series of dramatic changes. Mainland China used to hold military exercises with a low profile. But exercises that were held from July to December 1995 were completely different. Mainland China gave those exercises great publicity in order to threaten Taiwan. In March 1996, Mainland China launched missiles in the area of the in Taiwan Strait close to two main cities of Taiwan, and held military exercises twice.Since 1949, Mainland China and Tainwan have had military crisis in 1954,1955 and 1958.Afterwards,peace has been maintained between the two sides for close to forty years.Now,due to the new threat from Mainland China ,the two sides are on the verge of another military crisis. We believe that Mainland China had two purposes to hold military exercises. First, they wanted to influence of Taiwan independence. Second,they wanted to warn the U.S government insist on a one China policy, and show the ability of the modern PLA. Based on the exercises during 1995-96, the analysis of the factors of the military crisis in the Taiwan strait is the purpose of this study.
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Su, Cynthia, and 蘇嫻雅. "An Analysis of Taiwan Nespapers'' Reports towards 1996 Missile Crisis across The Taiwan Straits." Thesis, 1998. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28118249824558872568.
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Su, Cynthia, and 蘇嫻雅. "An Analysis of Taiwan Nespapers' Reports towards 1996 Missile Crisis across The Taiwan Straits." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/fqz534.
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Hsieh, Ju-Che, and 謝如哲. "The Preventive Deplomacy and U.S. policy toward Taiwan ─A case study of Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/47750970410270459810.
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碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所
91
Title of Thesis: The Preventive Deplomacy and U.S. Polcy toward Taiwan ─A case study of Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 Total pages:207 Key word: Pretentive Deplomacy, Deterrence, Intervention, Collective Security, Confidence Building Measures, Conflict. Name of Institute: Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategy Studies, Tamkang University Graduate date:June 2003 Degree conferred: Master of Laws Name of student:Ju-Che. Hsieh Advisor: Alexander C. Hwang Ph.D. 謝如哲 Abstract: In 1996 the crisis of Mainland China and Taiwan happened as well as a unique thought aspect of “special relationship state to state” in 1999 had been broken, a very dangerous situation of above two areas had been taken place, furthermore one of the most emergent time-points of Taiwan Strait between Mainland China and Taiwan had been radically breeding. Chinese Communist had been sharply gone up, U.S. Government and Parliament had planned and dispatched troops to the Taiwan Strait to make his rounds in future. Moreover, the government in Taiwan should face this problem and deal with this more and more difficult status in diplomatic predicament. I made clear this “preventive diplomacy” viewpoint and examined the U.S. policy to Taiwan in details at that time, which is included six chapters and three important contents, the first chapter is the introduction, the second chapter is the background and meanings of preventive diplomacy; the third, fourth and fifth chapter are the major parts of this thesis, the sixth chapter is the conclusion. The first chapter is the introduction, I pointed out apparently, in the past fifty pears, as the end of the second world war, cold war had been prepared and cold war started urgently between free and democracy team- group and centralized communist team- group in the world. These three crises had been occurred of Mainland China and Taiwan, the “preventive diplomacy” played an essential role in this process, in the meanwhile, I explained their measures, methods and effective results. The main body is from three chapter to five chapter, first of all, I expressed in words “Three communiqués and one Act” affected Taiwan’s situation, explored the establishment of diplomatic relationship of U.S. and Mainland China, found out a serious diplomacy strike of embarrassment increasingly in Taiwan. In the middle period of seventies, the compromise of U.S. represented NATO and Russian Union represented Warsaw Treaty Organization had been operating step by step. The international situation got steady gradually, both parties thought about to reduce hostility and avoid western and eastern war in a large scale, even more worse than that, the possibility of nuclear war outbreak highly, and thus the concept of “confidence building measures” had been come up slowly. The sixth chapter showed the inspection of usage and efficiency of preventive diplomacy in the reality world. The democracy of Taiwan Government had been developed integrally. Chinese Communist Government had been completed and formed as the head of the military equipment of Northern Asian Area. The traditional thought of Chinese Communist Government has been faced a new adjustment and regulation. With an encouragement results and new discovery of this research, I sincerely offered an another brand new thought way between the relations of Mainland China and Taiwan.
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Liu, Fu Jeieh, and 劉富傑. "U.S Foreign Policy Toward Chinese Nowadays- The Study of Taiwan Strait Crisis in March 1996." Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30859322437269922463.
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Chu, Yun-Shan, and 朱韻珊. "From the Taipei Riot to the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis: the establishment of the Taiwan-U.S. Relations in the 1950s." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/fksgjr.
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碩士國立政治大學
國家發展研究所
107
The United States had cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan for 40 years, but today, Taiwan is still greatly influenced by the United States on the different levels. In the 1950s, Taiwan had experienced the policy change from the United States after Korean War, and PRC provoked a threat of the two Taiwan Straits crises, which caused Taiwan to face a military and political crisis. In the meantime, the United States intervened defense through the Aid to China and Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. Although it had guarded Taiwan, it had also suppressed KMT government’s plan-“Counterattack against the mainland”. The contradictory emotion between Taiwan and the United States are manifested by the Taipei Riot conflict. Taiwan-U.S. Relations had been established through the dramatic changes and developments in this era. In 1957, the judgement of the US military triggered the dissatisfaction of the Taiwan people. As a result, it occurred a mass movement the smashed the US embassy, which is called Taipei Riot. The incident showed contradictions and tensions between Taiwan and the United States. However, when the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out in the next year, the United States still provided convoy support to against the PRC’s offensive immediately. The international interaction is quite complicated and can not be asserted by a single event. Therefore, this thesis is try to outline a more complete image of Taiwan-U.S. Relations, through the comparison and link between the Taipei Riot and the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. On the face of it, the Taiwan-U.S. Relations seems solid, but it may imply suspicion and contradiction.
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Lee, Bor-Tsang, and 李柏蒼. "A study of the potential root causes of the military crises in Taiwan Straits（1949-1999）." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/34713639755358075782.
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碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班
94
China has never renounced the use of force to unite with Taiwan since 1949 when the KMT government retreated to the island.China’s use of artillery shelling,missile testing,and constant landing exercises have made Taiwan one of the most likely places for military conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.Taiwan’s security is not only decided by the interaction of the two governments across the Strait,but also the international relations in the region,especially the US’s policy being the major external factor. There were four major military crises between 1949 and 1999,which could have Triggered off military conflicts.This thesis tries to reveal the true causes of those crises by examining the domestic/international factors,and cross-strait interactions. I draw conclusions from my research that the four crises were all connected to the US’s interests in the region.The US hopes to maintain peace and opposes any military actions by the two sides.Any attempt to decide Taiwan’s future through non-peaceful means is a threat to the stability in the West-Pacific region.In the same way,Taiwan’s act toward independence,which is sure to create more serious confrontations,can also hurt the interests of both China and the US.Currently,the US plays a peacemaking role,and it’s policy of opposing Taiwan independence and China’s use of force against the island has successfully reduced the chance of military conflict across the strait.
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Yu-Ting, Chao, and 趙祐廷. "The Position of America Toward Taiwan During the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Based on the Reports in the New York Times." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/00363731360480250300.
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碩士國立臺南大學
文化與自然資源學系碩士班
104
Between the end of World War II and the termination of America and R.O.C., the relationship of America and Taiwan seems to be intimate. But the position of America toward Taiwan is not consistent. This research adopt both quality and quantity methods to discuss the position of America toward Taiwan and other country’s perception of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which are based on reports related to the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis in the New York Times. The result shows that diplomacy, politics, and military affairs are the most concern above all the reports. And most contents of report are neither negative nor passive. During the earlier stage of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the position of America toward Taiwan is not consistent. The Democratic Party refused to assist Taiwan based on four reasons: fear of loss in business profit, prevention of war, international prestige of Taiwan, and confusion of Chiang Kai-shek’s purpose. During this period, most aids from America are finance and short-term send of vessel. Meanwhile, America frequently met with P.R.C and other countries, which most countries were against. During the later stage of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, America tried to ensure international prestige of Taiwan by refutation and public opinion with other countries, which are more supportive. Compared with the earlier stage, other countries’ perception of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis turned to be neutral or undeclared from opposed.
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Jen, Hai-Chuan, and 任海傳. "The Creation of CBMs Across the Taiwan Strait — A Case Study of Cooperation on Cracking Down Crimes." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43131506761722912529.
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碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所
91
“Confidence-Building Measures”(CBMs) is aimed at effectively decreasing hostility and conflicts among countries, alleviating tension, clearing up uncertainty, promoting peaceful and secure regional/global military relation, stabilizing regional/global political situations, and pursuing economic prosperity and affluence. Over the past decades, Taiwan and China have unilaterally accumulated some experience on the implementation of “CBMs”, each based on their strategic goals respectively. However, because of their different views on the “One-China” ideology and the armament race, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are unable to break the political deadlock. This has hindered the trade exchange between the two sides, and has made significant impact on the set up of a mutual trusting mechanism between China and Taiwan. Building a Military CBMs system that is shared by both sides of the Taiwan Strait is especially difficult, and both sides are facing a great challenge in this regard. The main theme of this thesis argues that, under the common consensus that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are in pursuance of national security and demand what is in their best interests, China and Taiwan should first leave aside their political disputes, and then work on promoting cooperation on cracking down crimes such as drug crimes, organized crimes, and money-laundrying. This will effectively prevent non-traditional security threats, which have disturbed Cross-strait Relations, and, furthermore, resolve the dispute between the two sides. Thus, a mutual trusting and cooperation model can be constructed to foster novel and feasible thoughts. This thesis is divided into six chapters. The introduction includes motivations and purpose of writing this thesis, its structure, constraints, as well as the definitions for terminologies. Chapter Two talks about the definition of “CBMs”, its origin and classification. Past implementations of CBMs are also included in Chapter two. Chapter Three looks at the attitude adopted by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait towards “CBMs”, its implementation and challenges. Chapter Four centers on the framework of cooperation between the two sides on cracking down crimes, forms of cross-regional crimes, and possible development trends on the Cooperation on cracking down crimes between the two sides. Chapter Five focuses on the Cooperation on cracking down drug crimes between the two sides, the impact of crimes on qualitative changes and quantitative changes of human and national security, and its future trend. A proposal is also put forward to discuss on how the cooperation on cracking down drug crimes can be thought as a foundation to gradually construct feasible models to build confidence and establish communication between Taiwan and China. This can then be extended to the construction of military and political mutual trusting mechanism, hoping to decrease hostility and erroneous judgments, and, thus, to avoid conflicts or war. Chapter Six is the conclusion, which includes some reflections on previous chapters, and recommendations. This hopefully will leave readers fruit for thought, and could serve as a reference for relevant authorities in their policy-making process. Due to globalization, every nation is pursuing “Human Security” and “Integrated Security”; this is an inevitable trend. Cross-strait Relations are changeable, but erroneous judgments should not be the cause to provoke conflict or war. Therefore, how to narrow the difference between the two sides, avoid conflicts, and cooperate to crack down drug crimes, when the possibility of establishing a Military CBMs is little, should be the keys to resume the dialogue between the two sides. European “CBMs” experience is not totally applicable to the interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, but its process could serve as an excellent blueprint for Taiwan and China in breaking the deadlock and in the pursuit of peace. If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can build up a mutual trusting relation rationally, Taiwan and China can then slowly construct non-militarily and non-political cooperation models based on their consensus. This will speed up the establishment of a mutual trusting mechanism to prevent non-traditional security threats. In the short, medium and long run, this relation will foster practical cooperation and positive interactions, which will effectively open up communication between the two sides step by step; thus, erroneous judgments or other risks that are aroused by mistrust can be lessened. As a result, a reciprocal, mutual trusting, mutual beneficial, peaceful and win-win situation can be created. This will pave the way to end the hostile status between China and Taiwan, and this is what the people of the two sides are hoping for.
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Chou, Chi-Ying, and 周岐盈. "The study of the development of PRC’s Taiwan policy－start off with three times cross strait crisis." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8sygw2.
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碩士淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
106
Since the partition between the two sides of the strait, the mainland claimed to have been the sole legitimate representative of China and denied the sovereignty of the Republic of China, and did not abandon the "liberation by force" policy. The military conflicts or tensions often occur between two sides of Taiwan Strait, In 1987, the ROC government began to allow visits to China and it did increasing frequency of non-governmental exchanges, the tensions between the two sides have gradually eased. In order to negotiate with China on operational issues without compromising the government''s position on denying the other side''s legitimacy, The non-governmental institution "Straits Exchange Foundation" and the "Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits" have even held formal meetings and consultations for the first time. However, in 1995, former president Lee made speeches at Cornell University referred to the "Republic of China." In 1999, he proposed the "two states theory." Also in the second presidential election in 2000, the DDP achieved the first political party rotation. The ROC government shifted away from its commitment to the one China policy and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan. And in 2002, former President Chen’s of "Taiwan, China, and one country on one side," caused China''s strong attention, and the re-election of Chen in 2004, and cross-strait relationship fell to a low point. In 2016, the DPP captured landslide victories. There is bound to have an impact on cross-strait policy of the PRC. How will PRC adjust their Taiwan policy in the face of the variables in the development of cross-strait relations. It is relatively tight or relatively relaxed? Should be the focus of attention. In this paper, through literature analysis, to explore PRC’s Taiwan policy, throughout each generation, analysis on Internal and External Environment, and Taiwan''s political situation, etc., to observe and analyze how the PRC’s Taiwan policy development will be when the new government starts to rule in Taiwan.
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Chao, Kuei-Kuang, and 趙桂光. "Jump Risk Resulted From The cross-strait Crisises Impact to Taiwan Stock and Foreign Exchange Markets." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/10402256072604852316.
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碩士淡江大學
財務金融學系碩士班
93
This paper includes two Jump-diffusion models ARJI and GARCH-constant jump to discuss the abnormal jumping status and irregular reactions when Taiwan stock market and foreign exchange market encounter the cross-strait crisises. Through models jump frequency and jump range are computed to demonstrate if the cross-strait crisises will have prominent influence on stock index and exchange rate, and the results of real practice are stated as following: (1) Certify through Schwarz Criterion and Likelihood Ratio test, it is found that ARJI model fits the data better than GARCH-constant jump model. (2) The cross-strait crisises increase the possibility for stock index and exchange rate to jump. Since variation induced by jumping process is higher than that by diffusion process, the importance of jumping process becomes apparently during the period of the cross-strait crisises. This finding could be provided as a reference for option pricing and hedging strategy of investors. (3) As for the variation induced by jumping process, the stock market jumping variation of main market induced during the cross-strait crisises is higher than that of OTC market. All is because main market has payment and securities netting system. (4) During the cross-strait crisises, the jumping frequency and jumping range variant of exchange rate is decreased. Therefore, the reaction of jumping frequency and jumping rage comparing to stock market is moderate. (5) In conclusion, we suggest investors could hedge by using derivative products during the cross-strait crisises in order to minimize the loss of their investment portfolio when encounter political or economic conflicted events.
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"The essence of civil-military relations in post-Deng China: explaining the 1996 Taiwan straits crisis." 1998. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5889743.
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by Chau Ho Wai.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-140).
Abstract also in Chinese.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.iv
LIST OF TABLES --- p.v
ABBREVIATIONS --- p.vi
CHAPTER
Chapter ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1
Chapter 1.1 --- The Question: How the civil-military relations evolved during the post-Deng era?
Chapter 1.2 --- The Case of the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis
Chapter 1.3 --- Framework: Allison's Model of Decision-Making
Chapter 1.4 --- Data and Organization
Chapter TWO --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.11
Chapter 2.1 --- Non-Communist Regimes
Chapter 2.2 --- Communist Regimes
Chapter 2.3 --- Post-Communist World
Chapter 2.4 --- Military Politics in China
Chapter THREE --- INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF PLA: FROM DENG TO POST-DENG ERA --- p.34
Chapter 3.1 --- PLA in the Deng Era
Chapter 3.2 --- PLA in the Post-Deng Era
Chapter 3.3 --- "Professionalization, Differentiation and Institutionalization"
Chapter FOUR --- ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS OF PLA IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS --- p.64
Chapter 4.1 --- The War Games and the Policy Handle
Chapter 4.2 --- Employing the Organizational Process Model
Chapter 4.3 --- Organizational Interests and Demands of the PLA
Chapter 4.4 --- Information Processing of the PLA
Chapter 4.5 --- Resource Acquisitions of the PLA
Chapter FIVE --- BRINGING THE PLA INTERESTS INTO GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS --- p.100
Chapter 5.1 --- Employing the Governmental Politics Model
Chapter 5.2 --- Perspectives of Jiang Zemin and PLA on the Taiwan Question
Chapter 5.3 --- Political Pulls and Hauls in the Taiwan Straits Crisis
Chapter 5.4 --- Legitimacy and Leadership Succession
Chapter SIX --- CONCLUSION --- p.126
Chapter 6.1 --- Summary of Findings
Chapter 6.2 --- Prospects of Future Research
BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.134
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Gottardi, Andrea Giovanni, and 安德烈. "The effects of Military Professionalism on Chinese civil-military relations - The case of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qsv998.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
政治學研究所
102
Abstract Among various trends in Chinese Party-Army relations, professionalization of the People Liberation Army’s officer corps has received particular attention from scholars in the last decades. Most of the related scholarly research has been focused mainly on the institutional and organizational trends, as well as counter-trends, of the PLA professionalization reforms. Pioneering works like those of Ellis Joffe and Harlan Jencks, as well as more recent endeavors of younger scholars like James Mulvenon, succeeded in giving shape to a general consensus in this field. That is, the basic tension between professionalism and politicization in the Chinese officer corps is one of the main key trends and fundamental aspects of civil-military relations in mainland China, even more than it was for other communist countries. This paper starts from this basic assumption, and tries to explore the more political and sociological effects of the structural professionalization of the PLA’s officer corps. The first aim of this paper is to review carefully the meaning of military professionalism and the process of professionalization (as well as counter-trends associated with it ) that took place in the PLA at the macroscopic or organizational level during different political and historical phases in China. Attention will be given to those characteristic features and unique events in the Chinese political scene that at different times delayed or facilitated this process. The second aim is to probe the effects or these reforms on the sociological aspect of military professionalization, mainly professional corporatness and political role of the senior officer corps, in terms of military political power. The more empirical part of this research involves the case study of the 1995-1996 cross-strait crisis, from the perspective of the Chinese military establishment and its involvement in the decision-making process. The main finding of this paper is that professionalization at the macro-level has had profound consequences at the micro-level, enhancing PLA’s espirit de corps as a professional group, and causing a shift in the Chinese officer corps’ political role. Such shift is in part in line with the Huntingtonian concept of “Political Neutrality” at the domestic level, but entails also increased corporate pressure capabilities at other levels as described by sociologists of civil -military relations such as Benght Abrahamsson and Morris Janowitz.
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Chen, Mei-rong, and 陳美容. "The study of Sun Tzu's Art of War on Diplomatic Strategy: A case of Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29043294172353866811.
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碩士南華大學
國際暨大陸事務學系亞太研究所碩士班
96
According to the affection of globalization, national actions of the politics, economic and culture are gradually advanced, for the more the information and conveyance are gradually developing. Therefore it is more important for the affairs of the world affected by diplomacy. Before the fight of war over diplomacy may avoid a sanguinary war, and may get the interests of economic or politic what we should deserve. It is beneficial for diplomacy actions by strategy from“ Art of War by Sun-Tzu”. Therefore the “ Art of War by Sun-Tzu”is not only lead how to generalship, but also a thesaurus for diplomatic policy. This research is trying to discussing the diplomatic strategy of“the Art of War by Sun-Tzu”, and example for the crisis of Taiwan Strait in 1996, to expect for the ends of double-win by “to subdue the enemy without fighting”which from the Sun Tzu''s art of war.
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Zhong, Mengbai. "Decoding the meaning of media events democratization, reunification, and representation--a comparative content analysis of the Taiwan Strait crisis coverage /." 1999. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/45220332.html.
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Yang, Jung-Hua, and 楊容驊. "A Study of Applying Grey Theory on Constructing the Measure for Predicting the Conflict and Crisis Across the Taiwan Strait." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/80126009156514660148.
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碩士國防管理學院
國防決策科學研究所
90
Abstract Although the relationships between Taiwan and PRC are complex and uncertain, however the conflicts between both sides of strait are always the most concerned issues. As a matter of fact, PRC is eagerly willing to enhance its omni invasion abilities against Taiwan in order to enlarge the effect of “to accelerate reunion by force”. Repeatedly, they emphasize the principle of “rather lose tremendous of armed forces then a bit of soil” and announce that they “never exclude the possibility of solving Taiwan issue by force” constantly. While facing up to the rough situations of military conflict, the accident conflict probabilities are increased. Therefore, under the consideration of national security, how to supervise and control crises, what is the proper method to analysis them and the effectiveness of crises measurement have become concerning issues for decision making staffs. Consequently, constructing an early warning system for crises to supervise military conflict possibilities between both sides of strait by a measurable indication constantly and working out prevention measures is an effective solution for releasing the tensions between both sides of strait. Thus, that is the major reason for this research to construct an early warning indication table immediately. Before and during the formation of any crises or conflicts, basically, some hints will be revealed. The best way to eliminate a conflict is to prevent it from formation rather than waiting for its happening. Therefore, the focal point of this research is to analysis the affection scale of decision factors to PRC when conflicts happened between both sides of strait. This research applies “The Gray System Theory” as a measurable research tool to sum up their principles as well as consideration factors for launching a military invasion. Furthermore, in this thesis, a comprehensive crisis early warning indication table is designed to analysis the military threatens from PRC. Thus, Figures out some clues while their decision factors affect crises characters so as to provide decision units with increasing tension information and searching for response options. This will be an important reference to analysis and supervise crises prediction between both sides of strait, in addition, to enhance national security and development.
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Lee, Chih-Te, and 李志德. "A Case Study on Development of China''s“Local War Under High-Tech Conditions"--- Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 and 1996." Thesis, 2000. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97570797664236153700.
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碩士淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所
88
Pofessor Niou, Xian-zhong remarked the 20th century “a war century": 50 years in "hot war" and 50 years in "cold war". Especially under the shadow of nuclear weapon, strategists have been forced to rethink the relation of war and politics. U.S. strategist Robert Osgood thought "Politics first" the first rule of modern war. Under the "limited purpose" of policy, the use of power should be "just" equal to the political purpose. In the evolution of war machine, a new style of war was formed after the development of “precision weapon” in the 1960s. This new style was usually named “High-tech war”. In China, after the end of cold war, the policy makers acknowledged the increasing of “local conflicts” which were subjected to the power relations of oppositional countries and the issues involved such conflicts usually transferred into “small war” rather than “total war”. In China’s point of view, Taiwan Strait are the “hot spots” of local war in the future. On the other hand, evolution from “people’s war” to “people’s war under high-tech condition” after the 1990s, china’s military strategy is “local war under high-tech condition”. Base on the discussion of “local war”, ”high-tech war” and ”China’s local war under high-tech condotion”, the thesis raises a new model to analyse the conflict between Taiwan and China. This model took a part of Herman’s 44 ladders and transferred into 4 ladders. Each ladder has different political purpose and military aim. This essay also used five variables to analyse both sides’ military strategies: “lasting time”, “war area”, “commanding system”, “levels of operations” and “risk control”. By the new model, this essay tried to analyse the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 and 1996. This essay also tried to find the both sides’ political puposes and military aims in the crisis.
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Lin, Chen-Yao, and 林振耀. "Research on the Performance of the Police in Taiwan after Signing“Cross-Strait Cooperation In Combating Crimes And Judicial Assistance Agreement”." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70784021995019540752.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
國家發展研究所
102
Abstract Despite judicial and police authorities across Taiwan strait intended to enhance cooperation in fighting cross-border crime before 2009, the political factors and the uncertainty of high-level personnel have led the cooperation subject to individual discretion and case-by-case basis, failing to establish institutional mechanism. On April 26, 2009, after signing "Cross-strait Cooperation of Combating Crimes and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement" (hereinafter referred to as the agreement), there has been a breakthrough but also arises a series of challenge in combating cross-border crimes. After more than four years’ practice, the implementation of the agreement wins strong support from cross-strait governments and the people. Within the scope of the agreement, this study focuses on the four aspects of crime fighting including "information exchange", "investigation assistance," “joint taskforce” and "criminal deportation." In addition, six contents of mutual legal assistance were analyzed in this study including "document delivery service," "investigation and evidence preservation, " " transference of criminal evidence and stolen goods"," referee notary "," humanitarian visiting" and " deportation of fugitives and suspects." This study explores the effectiveness and challenges of the agreement implementation which mostly applied on "joint crime fighting" and "mutual legal assistance." Accordingly, in order to implement mutual authentication between theory and practice, the researcher analyzed the data gathered from police aut horities, particularly from Criminal Investigation Bureau and interviewed nine police officers who have practical experiences. The findings are: 1. Joint Crime Fighting: Taiwan’s Criminal Investigation Bureau is the most effective agency among all law enforcements to implement the agreement. It is more effective on the aspects of criminal intelligence exchange, high-profile case solving, and investigation assistance. But both governments still have different viewpoints or stands pending for further settlement. 2. Mutual Legal Assistance: the impact of humanitarian visiting and the delivery of documents are very significant. There has been a breakthrough on the investigation and evidence preservation, criminal evidences and stolen goods’ transference, referee notary and deportation of suspects. However, there is plenty room for negotiation due to the difference of political, judicial, prosecution systems. 3. The two governments across Taiwan strait need to strengthen cooperation mechanism in order to actively combat major cross-border criminal case. 4. Two sides have to set aside the political and legal differences in order to establish a mutual legal assistance platform, installing contact points and deploying liaison officers.
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Wu, Chiu-Yi, and 吳秋宜. "A Study on a Mechanism of Cross-Strait Collaboration for Fighting Cross-Border Crimes under Globalization―The Cases of Tele fraud Crimes Among Taiwan, Mainland-China and Philippines." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/36192812978726034609.
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碩士國立中興大學
國家政策與公共事務研究所
103
Since the exchange between mainland China and Taiwan, smuggling, drug traffic, money laundering, human traffic and telecom fraud overrun across border. After Jinmen Agreement was signed by both sides in 1990, crime across border of both sides still increased for close exchange which contributed to the Crime Fighting and Mutual Judicial Agreement of Both Sides of The Taiwan Straits signed between Taiwan Strait Exchange Foundation and Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits on April 26th, 2009 to build institutional mechanism to commonly fight crimes to cope with cross border crimes. However, it was actually still affected by political sovereignty disputes of Taiwan and Mainland China. Besides, it still remained coordination, execution and limitation in information exchange, investigation and evidence collection, criminal investigation system, contact channel and agreement articles. Moreover, cross border crimes of both sides have been inclined to be international with the trend of globalization under the investigation of governments of both sides and spread to surrounding countries, especially Southeast Asian countries which impacted current cooperation model of fighting crimes of both sides. Taking telecom fraud crime of both sides as an example, it has overrun in Taiwan and mainland China and spread to surrounding countries. After investigation by governments of both sides, it has transferred to Southeast Asian countries where government ignores and people have low awareness so that they can continue such fraud. After Crime Fighting and Mutual Judicial Agreement of Both Sides of The Taiwan Straits was signed, related units have cooperated with Southeast Asian countries for many times to wipe out telecom fraud groups and made mechanism to commonly fight cross-border crimes changed. Based on telecom fraud cross-border crime cases and in-depth interview, this study explored 1. limitation of Crime Fighting and Mutual Judicial Agreement of Both Sides of The Taiwan Straits, 2. channels and models of cross-border crimes fighting of current both sides of cross straits and Southeast Asian countries; 3. factors of telecom fraud crimes spreading from Mainland China to Southeast Asian countries; 4. prominent questions of practical application in case study; 5. dilemma of current both sides and Southeast Asian countries fighting telecom fraud cases; 6. opportunities and challenges of cooperation between both sides and Southeast Asian countries fighting cross-border telecom fraud crimes. It is found that mechanism of fighting cross-border crimes of both sides in globalization can enhance and amend agreement to fight crimes of both sides in third place, widely build official and non-official connection channels between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries, enhance sending liaison officer function, join hands to build multiple fighting cross-border crime mechanism with Southeast Asian countries, deeply research cross-border crime causes, legalize investigation and evidence collection procedure of each country, carry out unit-to-unit case cooperation and promote signing official judicial mutual agreement.
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Hung, Pei-Lun, and 洪培倫. "The Agreement on Cross-Strait Cooperation in Combating Crimes and Mutual Legal Assistance between Taiwan and China―A Case Study of Repatriating Taiwanese Prisoners." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97t354.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
國家發展研究所
105
The patterns of cross-strait exchanges increase gradually owing to its frequent economic activities and changes of cross-strait relations. However, it triggers many legal disputes and cross-border crimes due to its lack of cooperation in combating crimes and mutual legal assistance between Taiwan and China. As a result, China has become a so called “paradise” for those Taiwanese prisoners who tried to hide and evade their criminal responsibilities. However, a new page of the cross-straits cooperation in combating crimes and mutual legal assistance has turned when an Agreement on Cross-Strait Cooperation in Combating Crimes and Mutual Legal Assistance between Taiwan and China has been signed on April 26th, 2009. Only a few study shed a light on repatriating Taiwanese prisoners with empirical analysis of factors affecting repatriation. Thus this study aims to discussing the potential factors, in which affect China’s authorities in repatriating Taiwanese prisoners. This study focus on estimate whether “affecting factor” plays the key role in succeeding repatriate Taiwanese prisoners, and the influence degree of “general level” and “individual level” variables. This study uses the concepts of “Social Capital Theory” and "Social Harm Theory" to examine “general level” and “individual level” variables. Furthermore, this study also adopts several approaches including historical approach, empirical study approach, and institution study approach respectfully to examine the situation of Taiwan authorities in repatriating Taiwanese prisoners with the following research methods: literature discussion method, secondary data method, comparative analysis method, and survey research method. Finally, the findings of the study reveal which “affecting factors” are related to the successful cases of Taiwanese prisoners’ repatriation. Moreover, this study also points out the main predicament in the issue of Taiwanese prisoner repatriation from the author’s point of view. In hope for increasing the success rate of prisoner repatriation, the author also suggests several policies as references for further discussion as well as for those related authorities in Taiwan.
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KAO, KUN-HUI, and 高坤輝. "A Research on Preventing Crimes of China Mainland′s Female Entry into Taiwan by Shame Marriage to Commit Prostitution with Analyzing Administrative Law of Cross-strait." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05461103328002648181.
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