Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Tamil Eelam'

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were branded as the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in January of 2008. The Tamil Tigers are held responsible for perfecting the use of suicide bombers, inventing the suicide belt, being the first to use women in suicide attacks, and killing nearly 4,000 people in the one year prior to 2008. The LTTE is the only terrorist organization to have assassinated two world leaders, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. They were also the first to acquire air power and their strike on Sri Lanka’s World Trade Center was the largest terrorist assault before the September 11 attacks in 2001. It took the government of Sri Lanka over thirty years to rid the country of this powerful terrorist group. This paper will investigate what caused the fall of the Tamil Tigers. In my second chapter, I will evaluate the policies and military strategies adopted by the government. My third chapter will look at the role of international actors in the conflict and their effects. Lastly, in my fourth chapter, I will examine key mistakes made by the LTTE that may have led to its own demise. In chapter five, I will analyze three possible causes for the defeat of the LTTE and what was the most significant in bringing its fall. It will also include its potential for replication in other countries and effects on foreign policy moving forward.

This thesis develops a biopolitical perspective on Western states’ longstanding opposition to the formation of a Tamil state (Tamil Eelam) in the northeastern parts of the island of Sri Lanka (Ceylon). It does so by adopting and applying the concept of biopolitics as developed by Michel Foucault in the 1970s. Foucault used the idea of biopolitics to explain power relations and to consider peace through the matrix of war. He was especially interested in using this to understand power relations that emerged in the eighteenth century and especially in terms of the tensions between military confrontation and commercial expansion. This thesis adopts and applies the idea of biopolitics to the concept of liberal peace and its core principle, the security of global commerce, to offer a new interpretation of the rationale behind the opposition of Western states to the Tamil demand for political independence and their collaboration in Sri Lanka’s biopolitical transformation of the island into a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocracy. As practitioners of the biopolitics of liberal peace, Western states have waged wars and collaborated in the wars of their Southern counterparts, allowing populations, including liberalised ones, to be killed, condoning the subversion of civil liberties, human rights and other democratic freedoms, including the right to selfdetermination of nations, that they simultaneously promote. The thesis explores the extent to which the collaboration of the West with the Sri Lankan state’s racist policies and counterinsurgency efforts is a continuation of the colonial policies of the British Empire in Ceylon. In developing a biopolitical perspective on the liberal state-building practices of the British Empire in colonial Ceylon, Sri Lanka’s adoption of the same practices, and the West’s own efforts to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle, the thesis explores the ways that power relations produce the effects of battle, and thus the way that peace becomes a means of waging war. When the power relations of law, finance, politics, and diplomacy produce the effects of battle, they become ways of waging war by other means. As well as being a thesis on Western policy in the war in Sri Lanka, the work is therefore also to some extent an attempt to see how far Foucault’s work on biopolitics might be pushed and developed and thus, at the same time, an attempt to turn the Foucauldian focus to an area thus far unexplored by those who have sought to engage with Foucault’s work.

The central hypothesis of this study is that terrorist organizations choose to use females as suicide bombers not only as tactical innovation but also to “signal” or send a message to various audiences. In order to meet the research objectives of this study, two terrorist organizations—the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Chechen Separatists or those individuals associated with the Chechen Resistance—are examined in detail from their inception through 2013 using a structured focused comparison methodology. Evidence is found to support both of the studies’ main hypotheses. First, female suicide bombers are used by terrorist organizations because they are a 1) tactical advantage, and 2) to “signal” or send a message to various audiences. Their “entertainment” or shock value maximizes the psychological punch intended for delivery to a variety of audiences. These two reasons are not mutually exclusive but are colored by contextual considerations unique to each case. While deliberation was given to a variety of socio-political factors unique to each organization—such as popular support for suicide attacks perpetrated by females, indication of rival terrorist organizations, counterterrorism and political events that may have affected the terrorist organizations’ preference for females—insight into the operational characteristics surrounding individual suicide attacks was central in highlighting patterns in the organizational use of female suicide bombers. Those patterns are consistent across both cases and suggest that when females’ use is explained by the tactical innovation model, they are used overwhelmingly in suicide attacks where getting closer to intended targets—usually defined as security and political targets—matter. In contrast, suicide attacks explained by the signaling model are characterized by their novelty usually representing a deviation from terrorist organizations’ operational norms—deemed operational suicide attack anomalies in this study—characterized many times as “only” suicide attacks, “firsts [of that kind of],” or the most spectacular suicide attacks carried out by the organization.

The entire nation paid a high price militarily, politically, economically and socially during the twenty-six-year-old conflict in Sri Lanka. However, May 18, 2009, marked a significant milestone in the written history of Sri Lanka. The three-year-long Humanitarian Operation conducted by the Sri Lankan Security Forces to liberate civilians from the cruel clutches of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorists ended, assigning a total military defeat to the LTTE. As a nation, Sri Lanka is now facing the daunting task of a range of challenges in the post-war era. Above all, much effort is needed to heel the scars of the conflict and to build the Sri Lankan identity. Though the war is over, the remnants of the LTTE may pose a considerable security challenge. Amongst them are many surrendered combatants of the LTTE who are being rehabilitated and absorbed into the society. Sacred responsibility lies with the government in rehabilitating ex-combatants is to ensure a long-term, results-oriented process. Considering the highly sensitive status quo of the issue at the aftermath of its conflict, the Sri Lankan government needs to contribute its share to rebuild the nation. Therefore, this thesis dwells on testing the benchmarks expected by the Sri Lankan government in carrying out this process and the outcome so far, in meeting the said contesting national requirement in comparison to other cases in the world. In this sense, the question arises as to how the programs of reintegration can be successful, and what potential problems could arise in the process of reintegration. Therefore, this thesis attempts to identify the questions of the Sri Lankan case in comparison to other cases, in understanding how de-radicalization and re-integration evolved in these countries, and how they reached the benchmarks by overcoming weaknesses and lapses.

This study scrutinizes the drug-terrorism nexus critically with intent to conceive possible remedies for the problem. The vast turnover of the global illicit drug industry constitutes the largest portion of organized crime enterprises' income. Different circles have argued that these enterprises are not the sole actors of the drug business, but terrorist groups, whose ultimate aim is a political change rather than financial strength, also profit from the “business.” The controversial nature of the problem fuelled heated debates and requires an in depth and impartial analysis, which was the main subject of the current study. At the first stage, three different cases, the PKK, the LTTE, and the SL, were studied either to prove or deny the alleged phenomenon. The sampled groups' ideology, structure, and operations helped understand the motives pushing the organizations into the ‘business.' Subsequently, several recommendations capturing vital issues both in countering terrorism and breaking terrorism-drugs link were spelled out.

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Throughout much of the 25-year Sri Lankan conflict, attention has focused on the confrontation between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. The views of the country¿s Muslims, who are 8 per cent of the population and see themselves as a separate ethnic group, have largely been ignored. Understanding their role in the conflict and addressing their political aspirations are vital if there is to be a lasting peace settlement. Muslims need to be part of any renewed peace process but with both the government and LTTE intent on continuing the conflict, more immediate steps should be taken to ensure their security and political involvement. These include control of the Karuna faction, more responsive local and national government, improved human rights mechanisms and a serious political strategy that recognises minority concerns in the east. At least one third of Muslims live in the conflict-affected north and east and thus have a significant interest in the outcome of the war. They have often suffered serious hardship, particularly at the hands of the Tamil rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since 1990 Muslims have been the victims of ethnic cleansing, massacres and forced displacement by the insurgents. The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) was a disappointment to many Muslims. They had no independent representation at the peace talks, and many feared that any agreement that gave the LTTE exclusive control of the north and east, even in a federal arrangement, would be seriously detrimental to their own interests. Despite talks between Muslim leaders and the LTTE, they continued to suffer violent attacks. Since the resumption of large-scale military action in mid-2006, Muslims have again been caught up in the fighting in the east. Dozens have been killed and thousands displaced. They have also come into conflict with a new, pro-government Tamil paramilitary group, the Karuna faction. Memories of LTTE oppression are still fresh, and rancorous disputes with Tamils over land and resources remain potent in the east. Muslim political leaders have often been divided, representing different historical experiences and geographical realities as well as personal and political differences. Muslims in the east and north ¿ who have been fundamentally affected by the conflict ¿ often have very different views from those who live in the south among the Sinhalese. Nevertheless, there is consensus on some key issues and a desire to develop a more united approach to the conflict. Muslims have never resorted to armed rebellion to assert their political position, although some have worked with the security forces, and a few were members of early Tamil militant groups. Fears of an armed movement emerging among Muslims, perhaps with a facade of Islamist ideology, have been present since the early 1990s, but most have remained committed to channelling their frustrations through the political process and negotiating with the government and Tamil militants at different times. There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue, particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists. There is increasing interest among some Muslims in more fundamentalist versions of Islam, and there have been violent clashes between ultra-orthodox and Sufi movements. This kind of violence remains limited and most Muslims show considerable tolerance to other sects and other faiths. Nevertheless, the conflict is at least partly responsible for some Muslims channelling their frustrations and identity issues into religious disputes. Muslim peace proposals have tended to be reactive, dependent on the politics of the major Tamil and Sinhalese parties. Muslim autonomous areas in the east are being pursued but seem unlikely to be accepted by the present government. Muslims are concerned about Colombo¿s plans for development and governance in the east, which have not involved meaningful consultation with ethnic minorities and do not seem to include significant devolution of powers to local communities. In the longer term, only a full political settlement of the conflict can allow historical injustices against the Muslims to be addressed and begin a process of reconciliation. The LTTE, in particular, needs to revisit the history of its dealings with the Muslims if it is to gain any credibility in a future peace process in which the Muslims are involved. Only an equitable settlement, in which Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim community concerns are adequately addressed, can really contain the growing disillusionment among a new generation of Sri Lankan Muslims.

Superficial information of the civil wars in Aceh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka creates the idea that both conflicts were in similar situations when they were hit by the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. It thus seems surprising that in the wake of the tsunami, the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia signed a peace agreement, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka returned to war. This thesis aims to explore what factors related to the tsunami contributed to this difference and whether rational choice theory can serve as an explanation for this difference. In order to find out, I conducted a qualitative comparative case study though the analysis of secondary documents. The results suggest that the factors that contributed to the difference can be divided into four broad themes: (1) the timing of the tsunami and thus the pre-disaster context; (2) the geographical situation and with that, the military impact; (3) the types of guerilla groups, including their abilities to rule, their access to financial capital and their strategic; (4) the role of the international community, which can be further divided into firstly, the geopolitical relevance of these countries, and secondly, internationalization, community engagement and separating the tsunami and conflict. I believe that rational choice theory explains the difference in outcome between the two conflicts very well. This theory assumes that people, given the circumstances, and in view of all the possible options, will act in line with the option that is expected to satisfy them most and minimize their losses. Applying this theory to the case studies of Aceh and Sri Lanka following the tsunami, it was appealing for the Free Aceh Movement to settle, but this was not the case for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. As a result, the former chose to sign a peace agreement with the Government of Indonesia, whereas the latter chose to continue its fight against the Government of Sri Lanka.

The Tamil Tigers were one of the most organized, focused, and influential organizations in Asian politics during the last three decades. Throughout the existence of the organization, the goal of the LTTE was to establish a separate Tamil state – Tamil Eelam - comprising the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka where Tamil-speaking populations were dense. The Sri Lankan civil war, which ended in May of 2009, claimed tens of thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of residents, and impeded the economic well-being of Sri Lanka. This thesis employs the operational code analysis as a way to better understand the character, behaviour, and norms of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. An additional purpose of this thesis is to test the utility of this model in the case of a terrorist organization such as the LTTE. The Operational Code Analysis framework was premiered by Nathan Leites in his two-part study of the Bolshevik Party, and was subsequently revived and re-imagined by a number of academics. The iteration of the Operational Code framework used in this thesis is a qualitative analysis which is comprised of ten questions: five ‘philosophical’ and five ‘instrumental’. This examination reveals that while this model has much to offer in analyzing this terrorist organization, it is in some ways a flawed method of exposition. However, the model produces unexpected insights about the stated beliefs of the LTTE.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2001.
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Thesis (M.A.)--York University, 2007. Graduate Programme in Interdisciplinary Studies.
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This thesis examines the production of Tamil youth in the state of Canada as threats, extremists, radicals, terrorists, and as subjects to be engaged in de-politicized humanitarian discourses of reconciliation and peace. By drawing attention to the exclusion of Tamils from rights in legal proceedings, the positioning of youth protesters as harbingers of a multicultural 'crisis,' and the role of education in securing Canada's response to the MV Sun Sea as a 'humanitarian' project, I argue that the targeting Tamils is not only integral to Sri Lanka's ongoing genocide, but is also crucial to the Canadian state's project of white settler colonialism. In examining the law, media and education as sites of racial management in the 'War on Terror' and its globalized counter-terrorism regime I identify the targeting of Tamil diaspora youth as a necessary racial logic for the legitimacy of the Canadian state in an era of official multiculturalism.

The thesis (A)symmteric dynamics of the conflict in Sri Lanka is an attempt to apply the theoretical concept of asymmetric conflicts and asymmetric warfare to the empirical case of the conflict in Sri Lanka and to figure out whether or not the asymmetric nature of the relationship between the sides of the conflict was the cause of the conflict's long term persistence and incapability of finding a durable solution to the conflict . In order to do so, the author first introduced the theoretical framework itself and highlighted the most significant features which were furthermore employed as the tool for the following analysis. On this basis the conflict in Sri Lanka was set into the theoretical framework and relevant asymmetries between the two counterparts - the Sri Lankan government/army and the organization of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - were identified. As the next step, the author tried to embrace the variable dynamics of the conflict in terms of relevant asymmetries and also symmetries which came to being within the course of the conflict. Since the symmetric situation is deemed to be more advantageous for finding the solution to a conflict, the author focused on the impact of the "symmetrization" on the prospects for the solution to the Sri Lankan conflict. However, the final findings...