Journal articles: 'Tax agent'

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Mittone, Luigi, Matteo Ploner, and Eugenio Verrina. "When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance." Social Choice and Welfare 57, no. 3 (April 7, 2021): 591–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01325-y.

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AbstractWe experimentally test the effect of aggressive audit strategies on tax compliance. Taxpayers first go through a phase of audits managed by a human tax agent who is requested to follow a rule imposed by a fair random device. However, the tax agent can freely decide to break the rule and over-inspect. Afterward, taxpayers are exposed to a genuinely random audit process governed by an algorithm, which makes compliance a strategically dominated option. We find that taxpayers are generally over-inspected by the human tax agents and react to this with nearly full compliance. Our main result is that these high levels of compliance also persist when controls are implemented by the algorithm. This suggests that tax authorities can use aggressive audit strategies to raise and sustain tax compliance.

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Kim, Jin Hoe. "A Study on Improvement of Tax Agent Legal System－Compared with the Japanese Tax Agent Legal System－." Korean Journal of Taxation Research 37, no. 1 (March 31, 2020): 63–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.35850/kjtr.37.1.03.

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Lima, F. W. S. "Tax evasion dynamics and nonequilibrium Zaklan model with heterogeneous agents on square lattice." International Journal of Modern Physics C 26, no. 03 (February 25, 2015): 1550035. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183115500357.

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In this paper, we use the version of the nonequilibrium Zaklan model via agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations to study the problem of the fluctuations of the tax evasion on a heterogeneous agents community of honest and tax evaders citizens. The time evolution of this system is performed by a nonequilibrium model known as majority-vote model, but with a different probability for each agent to disobey the majority vote of its neighbors.

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LIMA, F. W. S., and GEORG ZAKLAN. "A MULTI-AGENT-BASED APPROACH TO TAX MORALE." International Journal of Modern Physics C 19, no. 12 (December 2008): 1797–808. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183108013357.

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We embed the behavior of tax evasion into the standard two-dimensional Ising model. In the presence of an external magnetic field, the Ising model is able to generate the empirically observed effect of tax morale, i.e., the phenomenon that in some countries tax evasion is either rather high or low. The external magnetic field captures the agents' trust in governmental institutions. We also find that tax authorities may curb tax evasion via appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Our results are robust for the Barabási–Albert and Voronoi–Delaunay networks.

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Kim, Jin-Sep. "Analysis of the Tax Consciousness of a Taxpayer and a Tax Agent." Journal of the Korea Contents Association 8, no. 10 (October 28, 2008): 142–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5392/jkca.2008.8.10.142.

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Pratama, Gilang, and Wahyu Widarjo. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax Aggressiveness." Journal of Economics, Finance and Accounting Studies 4, no. 2 (March 23, 2022): 35–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32996/jefas.2022.4.2.3.

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This study aims to analyze the effect of corporate social responsibility on tax aggressiveness. Agency theory is used to explain the relationship between corporate social responsibility variables and tax aggressiveness. The relationship between principal and agent has different interests. The agent has more information than the principal, so opportunistic actions may occur by agents through tax aggressiveness; furthermore, agents use corporate social responsibility to hide these opportunistic actions. The research sample used is the annual financial statements of mining companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2020. The results of the analysis of 96 samples show that corporate social responsibility has a negative and significant effect on tax aggressiveness. This means that the higher the company carries out corporate social responsibility activities, the smaller the company is willing to take tax aggressiveness actions. This shows that companies tend to avoid tax aggressiveness and comply more with applicable tax regulations to improve the company's image as obedient taxpayers. Although corporate social responsibility is bound by regulations, companies do not take advantage of it in terms of aggressive tax practices. Furthermore, the company shows a tendency to enforce the government's plan in terms of tax revenue along with the company's long-term goals. This study expands the focus of the literature on developed economies by examining the relationship between corporate social responsibility and corporate tax aggressiveness in an emerging Asian economic setting, namely Indonesia. It is also an empirical study that focuses on mining companies in Indonesia.

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Mohamad, Azhar, Mohd Hasrol Zakaria, and Zarinah Hamid. "Cash economy: tax evasion amongst SMEs in Malaysia." Journal of Financial Crime 23, no. 4 (October 3, 2016): 974–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-05-2015-0025.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between tax evasion and certain demographic factors such as location, engagement of tax agent, size and type of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) industry in Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach In this study, using proprietary tax audit data from the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) on the 2011 tax returns of SMEs, the authors run a multiple regression analysis to examine the impact of location, agent, type of industry, size of enterprise and type of tax evasion on SMEs’ tax evasion in Malaysia. Findings The authors find that tax evasion among SMEs in Malaysia is the highest when the business is located in a suburban environment and has no tax agent. Tax evasion is also influenced by the size of the SME (micro or medium). Originality/value This study gives insight that the IRBM can use to aid its collection department in profiling SMEs that have a higher tendency to evade paying tax.

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Viégas De Rosis, Carlos Henrique, and Marco Aurélio De Mesquita. "Application of Agent Based Simulation to analyze the impact of tax policy on soybean supply chain." Brazilian Journal of Operations & Production Management 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 193–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.14488/bjopm.2018.v15.n2.a3.

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This work seeks to explore and demonstrate the use of Agent Based Simulations (ABS) in modelling and simulating supply chains. Such methodology was applied to develop a model to evaluate the impact of current tax policies in soy supply chain in Brazil. The model brought interesting insights on how the country’s current tax structure induces logistics and tributary trade-offs, therefore generating a suboptimal grain distribution. This is accomplished by going through the conception and implementation of an Agent Based Model. First there is the definition and delimitation of the main agents acting upon soy’s supply chain, such as producers, trader and consumers. Those agents then have their behaviors studied and translated into programable patterns. Finally, the model considers the environmental interactions with the mentioned players, including the effects of infrastructure capacities, transportation costs, storage costs and tax legislation. After quantitative and behavioral validation, the simulation is then able to mimic the actual allocation of corn, soy and soymeal productions in their respective supply chains. This would allow inferring how the system could work in different tax conditions, thus quantifying the tributary impact in terms of congestions, idle infrastructure and delays. The analysis of such results points out that a path dependant tax system may induce agents to opt for inefficient logistic solutions, if such alternatives are cheaper when taking taxes into account. From those simulations it is possible to conclude that there are opportunities for supply chain efficiency gains in the design of a new tax policy.

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Monsenego, Jérôme. "The Independent Agent Exception and Group Membership." Intertax 46, Issue 12 (December 1, 2018): 944–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/taxi2018102.

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This article considers the independent agent exception to the dependent agent permanent establishment rule in income tax treaties. The author analyses the impact of group membership on the availability of the independent agent exception under the 2014 and 2017 versions of Article 5(6) the OECD Model Tax Convention. Whereas the 2014 version did not explicitly take into consideration group membership for the application of the independent agent exception, the 2017 update marks a shift in policy as the quasi-exclusivity of the action of an agent on behalf of closely related enterprises now excludes the independent agent exception. After analysing in depth the Commentary on the two versions of Article 5(6) of the OECD Model, the policy reasons justifying this shift are investigated, in particular the possible presumption of tax avoidance that seems to be pinned on multinational enterprises. The author emphasises how the change brought to Article 5(6) relates to the lower threshold for a dependent agent PE under the new Article 5(5), the general principles of transfer pricing, and the additional guidance for the attribution of profits to permanent establishments. The author concludes that the change brought to Article 5(6) is mostly one of principle, but that to the extent that this amendment has a material effect on the taxation of multinational enterprises, it expresses more a tax policy concern than a need to prevent tax avoidance.

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Plummer, Elizabeth. "The Effects of Protest Format and Agent Use on Residential Appeals Adjustments." Journal of the American Taxation Association 37, no. 1 (December 1, 2014): 205–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/atax-50990.

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ABSTRACT This study examines how protest format and use of an agent affect the magnitude of the adjustments obtained in property tax appeals. The sample includes all single-family residential properties in Harris County, Texas for which a property tax protest was filed in 2010 or 2011 (n = 290,022). A protest can be settled in one of three formats: electronically (only when an agent is not used), an informal hearing, or a formal hearing. Because an owner's decision to use an agent is voluntary, I use a two-stage estimation process to help control for potential selection bias. The first-stage probit model is used to generate the predicted probability that an owner will use an agent, while the second-stage Tobit regression models the appeals adjustment as a function of protest format, agent use, control variables, and the selection-bias variable. Empirical results show that when an owner does not use an agent, appeals adjustments for electronic settlements are smaller than for informal settlements, and appeals adjustments for informal settlements are smaller than for formal settlements. When an agent is used, results show the opposite: appeals adjustments for informal settlements are greater than for formal settlements. Results also show that appeals adjustments are smaller when an agent is used compared with owners representing themselves, regardless of whether the hearing is formal or informal. Results are generally consistent with agency problems whereby property tax agents accept suboptimal appeals adjustments. Results from the first-stage probit model provide evidence on factors that affect the likelihood that an owner will use an agent.

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Reinganum, Jennifer F., and Louis L. Wilde. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework." Journal of Public Economics 26, no. 1 (February 1985): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0.

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Huang, Kuo-Fen, Ching-Hsiang Lin, Ching-Hui Wu, and Hong-Da Wang. "Tax agent ad litem's impact on estate and gift tax cases of administrative litigation." Asia Pacific Management Review 23, no. 2 (June 2018): 86–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apmrv.2017.09.001.

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Barro, Jorge A. "Distributional Impacts of State and Local Tax Policy in a Heterogeneous-agent Model." Public Finance Review 47, no. 6 (September 8, 2019): 971–1001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142119866530.

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This article presents a dynamic heterogeneous-agent life-cycle model with housing demand to evaluate the economic implications of reforming US state and local personal tax structures. Because of the extensive reliance of state and local governments on income, sales, and property tax revenue, those three taxes are explicitly modeled to generate a baseline and varied to evaluate alternative policy proposals. The results of the model show that the sales tax burden falls evenly across the distribution of income earners, while the property tax burden falls more heavily on the highest income earners. By design, the model’s income tax is progressive, so the tax burden shares rise with income. Results also show that the property tax generally improves utilitarian social welfare relative to income and sales taxation, but the magnitude of these gains depends on the availability of a state and local tax deduction on federal income taxes.

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Klenert, David, Linus Mattauch, Ottmar Edenhofer, and Kai Lessmann. "INFRASTRUCTURE AND INEQUALITY: INSIGHTS FROM INCORPORATING KEY ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT HOUSEHOLD HETEROGENEITY." Macroeconomic Dynamics 22, no. 4 (August 1, 2016): 864–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100516000432.

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We study the impacts of investment in public capital on equity and efficiency. Taking into account stylized facts on wealth accumulation, we model agent heterogeneity through differences in saving behavior, income source and time preference. We find that in the long run, public investment is Pareto-improving and that it reduces inequality in wealth, welfare, and income at the same time, if it is financed by a capital tax. Consumption tax financing is also Pareto-improving but distribution-neutral. Only for labor tax financing, a trade-off between equity and efficiency occurs. Additionally, we find that agents differ in their preferred tax rates.The results for capital and labor tax financing are valid for both, the case of decreasing and constant returns to accumulable factors.

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Yum, Minchul. "GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM FEEDBACK REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF LABOR TAXES." Macroeconomic Dynamics 24, no. 8 (March 22, 2019): 2012–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100519000087.

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A higher labor tax rate increases the equilibrium real interest rate and reduces the equilibrium wage in a heterogeneous-agent model with endogenous savings and indivisible labor supply decisions. I show that these general equilibrium (GE) adjustments, in particular of the real interest rate, reinforce the negative employment impact of higher labor taxes. However, the representative-agent version of the model, which generates similar aggregate employment responses to labor tax changes, implies that GE feedback is neutral. The cross-country panel data reveal that the negative association between labor tax rates and the extensive margin labor supply is significantly and robustly weaker in small open economies where the interest rate is less tightly linked to domestic circumstances. This empirical evidence supports the transmission mechanism of labor tax changes for employment in the heterogeneous-agent model.

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Daniel, Betty C. "Tax Timing and Liquidity Constraints: A Heterogeneous-Agent Model." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25, no. 2 (May 1993): 176. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2077835.

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Cui, Lijie, and Chuandong Lin. "Lattice–Gas–Automaton Modeling of Income Distribution." Entropy 22, no. 7 (July 17, 2020): 778. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22070778.

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A simple and effective lattice–gas–automaton (LGA) economic model is proposed for the income distribution. It consists of four stages: random propagation, economic transaction, income tax, and charity. Two types of discrete models are introduced: two-dimensional four-neighbor model (D2N4) and D2N8. For the former, an agent either remains motionless or travels to one of its four neighboring empty sites randomly. For the latter, the agent may travel to one of its nearest four sites or the four diagonal sites. Afterwards, an economic transaction takes place randomly when two agents are located in the nearest (plus the diagonal) neighboring sites for the D2N4 (D2N8). During the exchange, the Matthew effect could be taken into account in the way that the rich own a higher probability of earning money than the poor. Moreover, two kinds of income tax models are incorporated. One is the detailed taxable income brackets and rates, and the other is a simplified tax model based on a fitting power function. Meanwhile, charity is considered with the assumption that a richer agent donates a part of his income to charity with a certain probability. Finally, the LGA economic model is validated by using two kinds of benchmarks. One is the income distributions of individual agents and two-earner families in a free market. The other is the shares of total income in the USA and UK, respectively. Besides, impacts of the Matthew effect, income tax and charity upon the redistribution of income are investigated. It is confirmed that the model has the potential to offer valuable references for formulating financial laws and regulations.

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LLACER, TONI, FRANCISCO J. MIGUEL, JOSÉ A. NOGUERA, and EDUARDO TAPIA. "AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE: AN APPLICATION TO THE SPANISH CASE." Advances in Complex Systems 16, no. 04n05 (August 2013): 1350007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219525913500070.

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In this paper, we present a new agent-based model for the simulation of tax compliance and tax evasion behavior (SIMULFIS). The main novelties of the model are the introduction of a "behavioral filter approach" to model tax decisions, the combination of a set of different mechanisms to produce tax compliance (namely rational choice, normative commitments and social influence), and the use of the concept of "fraud opportunity use rate" (FOUR) as the main behavioral outcome. After describing the model in detail, we display the main behavioral and economic results of 1,920 simulations calibrated for the Spanish case and designed to test for the internal validity of SIMULFIS. The behavioral outcomes show that scenarios with strict rational agents strongly overestimate tax evasion, while the introduction of social influence and normative commitments allows to generate more plausible compliance levels under certain deterrence conditions. Interestingly, the relative effect of social influence is shown to be ambivalent: it optimizes compliance under low and middle deterrence conditions, but not when deterrence is made harder. Finally, SIMULFIS economic outcomes are broadly in line with theoretical expectations, thus supporting the reliability of the model.

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Shin, Ji-Hye and 김태완. "User Satisfaction and Quality of Tax Service according to the Ethics of The Tax Agent." Tax Accounting Research ll, no. 58 (December 2018): 97–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.35349/tar.2018..58.005.

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Petit, Gillian, Lindsay M. Tedds, David Green, and Jonathan Rhys Kesselman. "Policy Forum: Re-Envisaging the Canada Revenue Agency—From Tax Collector to Benefit Delivery Agent." Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne 69, no. 1 (April 2021): 99–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.1.pf.petit.

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In Canada, the tax system is not used just to raise revenue; it is also an important instrument for achieving various social policy objectives. As a result, the tax system has become closely intertwined with the income support system; it now serves as the delivery mechanism for many key income support benefits. As a benefit administration tool, the tax system has advantages, but it is also problematic. First, it relies on self-assessment, which means that the onus is on individual taxfilers to provide complete and accurate information to the government on the income taxes that they owe. However, persons who have no tax liability are not legally required to file tax returns, and therefore many may not do so. In the context of benefit delivery, the reliance on self-assessment risks missing many individuals who are eligible to receive income benefits. Second, individuals generally file a self-assessed tax return only once a year. As a result, the tax system could not respond to the dramatic in-year income shocks that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. We identify ways to modernize Canada's tax system and make it more responsive and streamlined for the purposes of benefit delivery. Reforms such as pre-filled tax forms and real-time reporting could greatly improve the ability of the Canada Revenue Agency to deliver income benefits, and the ability of the federal and provincial governments to meet social objectives, including those set out in Canada's and the provinces' poverty reduction strategies.

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Sharma, Raghav. "Attribution of Profits to a Dependent Agent Permanent Establishment: An Analysis of the Indian Approach." Intertax 37, Issue 8/9 (August 1, 2009): 493–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/taxi2009049.

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This article critically examines the rulings of the Bombay High Court and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Mumbai) in SET Satellite Pte. Ltd. v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (International Taxation) and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. v. Director of Income Tax, Mumbai. In light of this, the attempt is to find out whether Indian courts treat dependent agent and permanent establishment (PE) as the same taxable entity and what profits are attributable to the PE of a non-resident enterprise in case the dependent agent is remunerated at an arms’ length standard.

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Wan, Xiang Yu, and Peng Jia. "An Agent-Based Simulation Model of the Economy: An Empirical Study of Negative Income Tax System in a Transition Economy." Advanced Materials Research 204-210 (February 2011): 718–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.204-210.718.

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In this paper, we present an agent-based computer simulation model to analyze the dynamic relationship between economic growth and income difference in a transition economy and to evaluate the empirical effects of negative income tax system. Micro agents in the economy form the economic networks and enable the economy to evolve forward through the intelligential evolutionary system and mutual interactions between the agents. Based on the logical reasons of the transition economy, the model finally gives the results of the simulation: when the economy finishes rapid transition and enters into stable development, by implementing negative income tax system, government can effectively decrease income difference while at the same time maintain rapid economic growth.

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Warbrick, Colin, Dominic McGoldrick, and Colin Warbrick. "II. Unrecognised States and Liability for Income Tax." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45, no. 4 (October 1996): 954–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589300059807.

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The object of this short note is to draw attention to a decision of the Special Commissioners of Inland Revenue (the Commissioners) which deals with the liability for income tax of officials of an unrecognised State.1 Section 321 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (the Taxes Act) provides exemption from liability for income tax for foreign consuls in the United Kingdom and for “an official agent in the United Kingdom for any foreign state, not being … a Commonwealth citizen”. An “official agent” is a person, other than a consul, “who is employed on the staff of any consulate, official department or agency of a foreign state”.

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Korobow, Adam, Chris Johnson, and Robert Axtell. "An Agent–Based Model of Tax Compliance with Social Networks." National Tax Journal 60, no. 3 (September 2007): 589–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2007.3.16.

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Bloomquist, Kim M. "A Comparison of Agent-Based Models of Income Tax Evasion." Social Science Computer Review 24, no. 4 (November 2006): 411–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894439306287021.

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Lima, F. W. S. "Tax Evasion and Multi-Agent-Based Model on Various Topologies." Reports in Advances of Physical Sciences 01, no. 02 (June 2017): 1730001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s242494241730001x.

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In this work, we use Monte-Carlo simulations to study the control of the fluctuations for tax evasion in the economics model proposed by [G. Zaklan, F. Westerhoff and D. Stauffer, J. Econ. Interact. Coordination. 4 (2009) 1; G. Zaklam, F.W.S. Lima and F. Westerhofd, Physica A 387 (2008) 5857.] via a nonequilibrium model with two states ([Formula: see text]) and a noise [Formula: see text] proposed for [M. J. Oliveira, J. Stat. Phys. 66 (1992) 273] and known as Majority-Vote model (MVM) and Sánchez–López-Rodríguez model on communities of agents or persons on some topologies as directed and undirected Barabási–Albert networks and Erdös–Rényi random graphs, Apollonian networks, directed small-world networks and Stauffer–Hohnisch–Pittnauer networks. The MVM is applied around the noise critical [Formula: see text] to evolve the Zaklan model.

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Hashimzade, Nigar, Gareth D. Myles, Frank Page, and Matthew D. Rablen. "The use of agent-based modelling to investigate tax compliance." Economics of Governance 16, no. 2 (November 23, 2014): 143–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-014-0151-8.

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Hokamp, Sascha, and Michael Pickhardt. "Income Tax Evasion in a Society of Heterogeneous Agents – Evidence from an Agent-based Model." International Economic Journal 24, no. 4 (December 2010): 541–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10168737.2010.525994.

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Cai, Qiang, Luca Cerioni, and Xiaorong (Sharron) Li. "New Taxing Right in the Unified Approach: Old Wine in a New Bottle." Intertax 48, Issue 11 (October 1, 2020): 956–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/taxi2020098.

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The OECD’s ‘Unified Approach’ (UA) features new taxing rights allocated to market jurisdictions irrespective of the existence of physical presence. While this new taxing right is intended to address tax challenges of a new economic pattern, i.e. the digitalization of the economy, these authors note that similar challenges already existed even before the era of digitalization, particularly with respect to the attribution of profit to the dependent agent permanent establishment (DAPE). The authorized OECD approach (AOA), which hinges the profit attributable to a DAPE upon the significant people function performed by the dependent agent (DA), has been heavily criticized. In this regard, the UA provides a more reasonable and simplified solution: the source state is entitled to tax at least a portion of the residual profit made by the non-resident enterprise from the business undertaken in that state through the DAPE regardless of the extent of the functions performed by the DA enterprise. This approach has indeed already been implemented by certain countries in their domestic tax practice regarding the DAPE profit attribution, albeit couched in traditional transfer-pricing terms. At the same time, these domestic tax practice on the DAPE profit attribution may enlighten the improvement to the UA that has been criticized for its complexity and uncertainty. Tax challenges of the digitalization of the economy, unified approach, new taxing right, dependent agent permanent establishment, profit attribution to a dependent agent permanent establishment, authorized OECD approach, benefit principle, destination-based transfer pricing methods

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Sobiech, Agnieszka, and Maciej Sobiech. "Taxation of the agent in the logistics model based on dropshipping." Doradztwo Podatkowe - Biuletyn Instytutu Studiów Podatkowych 6, no. 286 (June 30, 2020): 10–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.2623.

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In recent years, we have observed the development of a logistics model based on the so-called drop shipping. The role of the online store comes down to take orders and send them to the supplier, which carries out the shipment of the goods to the customer. The agent is easier to reach customers, often domestic consumers. The article presents dropshipping models on the market and related tax eff ects in goods and services tax.

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Shinkareva, O. V., and S. A. Kormacheva. "Receiving a social tax deduction on personal income tax through an employer: amendments to the Tax Code of the Russian Federation." Buhuchet v zdravoohranenii (Accounting in Healthcare), no. 7 (June 21, 2021): 25–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/med-17-2107-03.

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Article analyzes changes which the employers performing functions of the tax agent on an income tax will face since the beginning of 2022. Changes have been made to the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, which not only expand the range of social tax deductions, but also in some cases change the format of interaction between the employer and the employee, which he decided to receive a social tax deduction for personal income tax. The peculiarities of obtaining various types of social tax deductions through the employer, changes that will come into force in 2022 in this area, as well as the necessary documents are disclosed on the basis of which the employer provides the employee with social tax deductions.

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LI, Hongquan, Gang Cheng, and Shouyang Wang. "Transaction tax, heterogeneous traders and market volatility." Kybernetes 44, no. 5 (May 5, 2015): 757–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-10-2014-0223.

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Purpose – The securities transaction tax (STT) has been theoretically considered as an important regulation device for decades. However, its role and effectiveness in financial markets is still not well understood both theoretically and empirically. By use of agent-based modeling method, the purpose of this paper is to present a new artificial stock market model with self-adaptive agents, which allows the assessment of the impacts from various levels of STTs in distinctive market environments and thus a comprehensive understanding of the effects of STTs is achieved. Design/methodology/approach – In the model, agents are allowed to employ the strategies used by the following five types of investors: contrarians, random traders, momentum traders, fundamentalists and exit strategy holders. Specifically, the authors start with the investigation of the dynamics of a tax free benchmark market; then the patterns of market behaviors and the behaviors of various types of investors are discussed with different levels of STTs in markets with mild and high fluctuations. Findings – The simulation results consistently show that a moderate transaction tax does contribute to market stabilization in terms of reducing market volatility while with a price of mild decrease of market efficiency and liquidity. The findings suggest that a balance between market stability and efficiency could be reached if regulatory authorities introduce STTs to markets discreetly. Originality/value – This paper enriches the comprehensive understanding of the effects of STT, and gives good explanation about the controversy between Tobin’s proponents and anti-Tobin group.

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Koltchin, Sergey P., and Georgy A. Suzdalsky. "PECULIARITIES OF TAX ACCOUNTING AND CALCULATION OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX OF YANDEX.TAXI DRIVERS." EKONOMIKA I UPRAVLENIE: PROBLEMY, RESHENIYA 3, no. 11 (2021): 191–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.36871/ek.up.p.r.2021.11.03.030.

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The article examines the features of tax accounting and the calculation of personal income tax associated with the problem of taxation of the income of drivers of the Yandex.Taxi aggregator service, a step-by-step algorithm for the operation of the online taxi ordering system, identifies problems associated with the responsibility of the participants in the process, as well as with the occurrence of situations when the income of drivers is not taxed. As a result, it is concluded that it is necessary to oblige Yandex.Taxi LLC at the legislative level to conclude an employment contract with drivers and act as a tax agent in respect of the income they receive in order to increase tax control over the completeness of the calculation and payment of personal income tax, as well as to clearly define the boundaries of liability of the participants in the process online taxi ordering.

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Pickhardt, Michael, and Goetz Seibold. "Income tax evasion dynamics: Evidence from an agent-based econophysics model." Journal of Economic Psychology 40 (February 2014): 147–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.01.011.

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Biswas, Rongili, Carla Marchese, and Fabio Privileggi. "Firm’s tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection." Journal of Economics 110, no. 2 (October 6, 2012): 125–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0306-4.

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Bloomquist, Kim. "Tax Compliance as an Evolutionary Coordination Game: An Agent-Based Approach." Public Finance Review 39, no. 1 (September 8, 2010): 25–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142110381640.

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Quesada, Francisco J. Miguel, Eduardo Tapia, Toni Llàcer, and José A. Noguera. "Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model." Revue française de sociologie 55, no. 4 (2014): 765. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rfs.554.0765.

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Clemente, Felippe, and Viviani Silva Lírio. "Tax evasion in Brazil: the case of specialists." Journal of Economic Studies 45, no. 2 (May 14, 2018): 401–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jes-11-2016-0247.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to use the instrumental game theory to understand the behavior of the front agents tax evasion and tax authority in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach In order to analyze the taxpayer’s behavior before the Brazilian tax system and tax actions aimed at reducing tax evasion, the authors developed a theoretical model based on the payoffs of Graetz et al. (1986) and increased with situations proposed by Siqueira (2004), Lipatov (2006) and Oliveira (2011). Findings Considering the cases with and without specialists, the main results show that in high dropout situation, penalize taxpayers with high fines or deprivations of liberty may not be as effective. Another result of the analysis is that the audit and inspection costs played an important role in driving the equilibrium system. Research limitations/implications One limitation of this study is to consider how the exogenous tax authorities earnings (Federal Revenue of Brazil and Federal Police) and not as a function of the goals and certain enforcement policies for each public body. Practical implications The authors suggest the following policy: investing in tax inspectors and unbureaucratic the authorities of the cost structure become a more effective tool to combat non-compliance with tax obligations that the intensity of the penalties imposed by the act of evading. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature insofar as it models for the first time, using game theory, the behavior of the evading agent and the tax authority in Brazil.

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Dae Jin, Kim. "The Choice of Local Governments under Two Principals: The Case of Tax Hike Policy of South Korea Noncompliance of Local Governments to Tax Hike Policy." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 23, no. 1 (August 31, 2008): 181–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps23108.

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The Korean central government introduced a package of tax hikes on real estate in order to achieve tax levy equity. This remarkable tax innovation, however, resulted in conflicts between the cnetral government, residents, and local governments, which were followed by area-wide tax competitions among the local governments in the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA). This study analyzes the property tax resistance of the SMA using the form model approach to the principal and agent. It is assumed in the study that residents, local governments, and the central government have a divided principal-agent relationship. With several descriptive analyses and some data for the case, however, the theoretical model gives a logical explanation for the behaviors of residents, local governments, and the central government in the short-term tax resistance. That is, under short-term conditions, local governments tend to respond to residents' request for tax cuts, dependent upon their fiscal independence and neighboring local jurisdictions' decision-making on property tax cuts. The pattern of the property tax cuts over time implies that local government's elected officials may be very sensitive to their re-election. Further, it provides long-term prediction for the behavior of the three actors, dependent upon institutional change. When the information on institutional change is perfect, or the uncertainty is removed in the institutional change, they ultimately reaach the Nash equilibrium. Finally, it is fair to say that the formal model contributes to this study by complementing the lack of empirical data/precedent literatures, and clarifies the causality between the factors of interest.

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月旦會計實務研究編輯部, 月旦會計實務研究編輯部. "代理人幫助他人逃漏稅捐之法律責任." 月旦會計實務研究 47, no. 47 (November 2021): 079–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.53106/252260962021110047009.

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V. E., Rodygina. "Responsibility of Tax Agent: the History of Filling the Gap in the Law." Rossijskoe pravosudie, no. 10 (September 27, 2021): 105–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.37399/issn2072-909x.2021.10.105-109.

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The article deals with the issue of releasing a tax agent from liability in case of late transfer to the budget of withheld amounts of personal income tax, in particular, the position of higher courts, the impact of the latter on the elimination of gaps in the law and amendments to the legislation of the Russian Federation on taxes and fees, as well as the importance of the legal positions of the Сonstitutional Court of the Russian Federation in modern difficult economic conditions.

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Rizzi, Dino. "Tax Evasion Indices and Profiles." Public Finance Review 45, no. 6 (February 12, 2017): 771–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142117691602.

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The aim of this article is to adapt definitions and tools currently used in the economic literature on poverty to individual data on tax evasion. The article presents composite indices and profiles of tax evasion based on the three I’s of tax evasion: incidence, intensity, and inequality, following the approach of Shorrocks’s study and Jenkins and Lambert’s study that proposed the three I’s of poverty. In the field of tax evasion, one stream of literature produces a potentially large amount of individual microdata using tax benefit and agent-based models: the article enriches the analysis offered by these models with indices that take into account the entire distribution of taxpayer evasion rates. Particularly, the article presents a new composite index of tax evasion that incorporates a concentration index of individual tax evasion rates. A final section shows a sensitivity analysis of tax evasion indices and profiles through numerical simulations.

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LIMA, F. W. S. "TAX EVASION DYNAMICS AND ZAKLAN MODEL ON OPINION-DEPENDENT NETWORK." International Journal of Modern Physics C 23, no. 06 (June 2012): 1250047. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183112500477.

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Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the problem of the fluctuations of tax evasion in a community of honest citizens and tax evaders by using the version of the nonequilibrium Zaklan model proposed by Lima (2010). The studied evolutionary dynamics of tax evasion are driven by a non-equilibrium majority-vote model of M. J. Oliveira, with the objective to attempt to control the fluctuations of the tax evasion in the observed community in which citizens are localized on the nodes of the Stauffer–Hohnisch–Pittnauer networks.

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Forster, Martin David, Victor Moreno, Valentina Boni, Eva Guerra, Andres Poveda, Rebecca Kristeleit, Carmen Maria Kahatt, et al. "Activity of lurbinectedin (PM01183) as single agent and in combination in patients with endometrial cancer." Journal of Clinical Oncology 35, no. 15_suppl (May 20, 2017): 5586. http://dx.doi.org/10.1200/jco.2017.35.15_suppl.5586.

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5586 Background: Lurbinectedin (L) is a new anticancer drug that blocks trans-activated transcription, induces DNA double-strand breaks and modulates the tumor microenvironment. Advanced endometrial cancer (EC) is an unmet medical need. Methods: Activity in EC patients was reviewed in 3 trials: a phase IB study of lurbinectedin combined with doxorubicin (L+DOX), a phase I study of PM combined with paclitaxel (L+TAX) and a phase II single-agent basket trial (L). Baseline characteristics, safety and efficacy were analyzed. Results: 97 patients were evaluated: 34 (2 cohorts) with L+DOX, 11 with L+TAX and 52 with L. Median age was similar in the 3 studies. Endometrioid was the most frequent histology. Median (range) of prior chemotherapy lines for advanced disease was: L+DOX, 1(0-2); L+TAX, 2(1-3); L, 1(0-2). Responses were observed in the 3 studies (see table). Main adverse event was myelosuppression (grade 3-4 neutropenia/thrombocytopenia/febrile neutropenia: L+DOX Cohort A, 94%/26%/40%; L+DOX Cohort B, 79%/10%/16%; L+TAX, 54%/0%/0%; L, 33%/6%/6%). Non-hematological toxicity was mostly grade 1-2: fatigue, nausea and vomiting, and transaminase increase. Conclusions: Lurbinectedin is active as single agent and in combination in patients with advanced EC, with remarkable activity in terms of response rate, duration of response and PFS when combined with doxorubicin. Safety was acceptable in L+DOX Cohort B, L+TAX and L, and myelosuppression was well managed. Clinical trial information: NCT01970540. [Table: see text]

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Amusa, HA. "A macroeconomic approach to estimating effective tax rates in South Africa." South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 7, no. 1 (July 23, 2004): 117–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v7i1.1432.

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Using data contained in South Africa's national accounts and revenue statistics, this paper constructs time-series of effective tax rates for consumption, capital income, and labour income. The macroeconomic approach allows for a detailed breakdown of tax revenue accruing to general government and the corresponding aggregate tax bases. The methodology used also yields effective rate estimates that can be considered as being consistent with tax distortions faced by a representative economic agent within a general equilibrium framework. Correlation analysis reveals that savings (as a percentage of GDP) is negatively correlated with both capital income and labour income tax rates. Investment (as a percentage of GDP) is positively correlated with the capital income tax rate, an outcome suggestive of the direct relationship between volatile capital inflows into South Africa and capital tax revenue

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Eden, Maya. "Excessive Financing Costs in a Representative Agent Framework." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 8, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 215–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20140147.

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This paper highlights a pecuniary externality that results in excessive financing costs. Firms borrow to finance purchases of an inelastically supplied input, bidding up its price. Since higher input prices necessitate more debt obligations, this leads to an increase in intermediation costs. A quantitative interpretation of the model suggests that it is optimal to tax financial intermediation by increasing the borrowing rate by 3 percentage points. (JEL E13, E44, G21, G32, H21, H25)

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Amiri-Kordestani, L., I. Jawed, J. Wilkerson, W. D. Stein, S. E. Bates, S. M. Swain, and A. T. Fojo. "Determining the rate of tumor growth and decay in patients with metastatic breast cancer as an early efficacy endpoint: A study assessing ixabepilone efficacy." Journal of Clinical Oncology 29, no. 27_suppl (September 20, 2011): 246. http://dx.doi.org/10.1200/jco.2011.29.27_suppl.246.

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246 Background: Early efficacy assessment in drug development should help find new cancer therapies. We have developed a novel method to analyze tumor response to therapy by quantifying the rate of tumor regression (d) and growth (g). We have shown g is slower when pts are on effective therapy and that g correlates with survival (Stein et al, Oncologist 2008). We utilized this method to evaluate a phase III trial of capecitabine (CAP) ± IXA in second line therapy (Tomas et al, JCO 2007) and a three-cohort phase II trial in second and subsequent lines of therapy in pts with MBC consisting of (1) Daily X 5 IXA given to taxane (TAX)-naïve patients (Denduluri et al, JCO 2007); (2) Daily X 5 IXA in pts previously treated with TAX (Low et al, JCO 2005); and (3) Daily X 3 IXA in pts previously treated with TAX (Denduluri et al, Invest New Drug 2007). Methods: Using tumor measurements assessed by RECIST and a two-phase mathematical equation we determined d and g. Results: In the phase III study g was superior to PFS identifying a significant difference between the arms very early—before the 200th pt had enrolled. In an individual patient the g values could be estimated as early as the 3rd evaluation, long before tumor growth was observed clinically. IXA + CAP in second line (g = 0.0018) was more effective than CAP (g = 0.0023) at reducing g, and more effective (p=0.0085) than single agent IXA in the Phase II study (g = 0.0027). Single agent IXA was comparably effective (p=0.814) in reducing the g of tumors previously exposed to a TAX (g = 0.0032) as in reducing the g of TAX-naïve tumors (g = 0.0035), consistent with its development as an agent active in TAX-refractory disease. Unlike differences in g, the d of single agent IXA (0.118) was comparable to that of IXA+CAP (0.0074) suggesting differences were primarily driven by effect on the growth of residual tumor. Conclusions: Unlike PFS, an incremental measure of efficacy, g is a continuous variable and can more accurately assess differences between treatments. Because calculations of g are indifferent to assessment intervals, estimating a tumor’s g allows comparison of efficacy across trials.

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Lemoine, Francene J., Diane R. Wycuff, and Susan J. Marriott. "Transcriptional Activity of HTLV-I Tax Influences the Expression of Marker Genes Associated with Cellular Transformation." Disease Markers 17, no. 3 (2001): 129–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2001/263567.

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Human T cell leukemia virus type I (HTLV-I) has been identified as the etiologic agent of adult T cell leukemia (ATL). HTLV-I encodes a transcriptional regulatory protein, Tax, which also functions as the viral transforming protein. Through interactions with a number of cellular transcription factors Tax can modulate cellular gene expression. Since the majority of Tax-responsive cellular genes are important regulators of cellular proliferation, the transactivating functions of Tax appear to be necessary for cellular transformation by HTLV-I. Gaining a complete understanding of the broad range of genes regulated by Tax, the temporal pattern of their expression, and their effects on cell function may identify early markers of disease progression mediated by this virus.

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H. P., H. P. "The Theoretical Aspects of the Functioning of the System of Personal Income Taxation." Business Inform 12, no. 515 (2020): 389–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2020-12-389-394.

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The publication outlines theoretical aspects of the system of personal income taxation and determines that individuals and the tax agent are the paramount actors in certain synergistic relations of the institutional system elements. The state of formation of the revenue part of the Consolidated Budget of Ukraine was researched. Monitoring the formation of the revenue part of the consolidated budget is a set of methods for identifying and assessing the causes and signs that may lead to an increase in the tax culture of personal income tax payers and, at the same time, to increase the revenue part of the budget. The study of the structure of the tax determined that income in the form of wages and income tax, which is paid by the tax agent on income in the form of wages, dominate with great advantage and indicate the urgency of changing the policy of the State and in the minds of taxpayers oward their diversification. The fiscal pressure of income tax on taxpayers is analyzed. The tax burden should also take into account the cost of social benefits received, and therefore local self-government bodies should have information on the amount of taxes paid by one person or one employee and their dynamics in the future. A forecast of the tax burden on payment of tax to local budgets is carried out. It is proved that local self-government bodies should have not only a sufficiently predicted, but also an ever-growing amount of income tax, which requires urgent reform of the current taxation system. Ways to improve the system of personal income taxation are proposed. The author singles out the main stages of the strategy for reforming the personal income taxation system and the strategic goal: obtaining maximum revenues to the budget with an acceptable tax burden on the taxpayer. A set of factors of influence and differences between the taxation system of Ukraine and those established in other countries is formed.

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Wang, Huan, and Wenyi Huang. "On the Study of a Single-Period Principal-Agent Model with Taxation." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020 (March 27, 2020): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5401591.

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This paper investigates a single-period principal-agent model with moral hazard. In the model, we implement bonus tax for the agent and analyze the effect of loss aversion by comparing with the results by Dietl et al. (2013). The existence and uniqueness of the optimal contracting problem are proved. Through an example, concrete illustrations of how loss aversion affects the compensation package are given. It is shown that although the agent’s efforts reduce, the fixed salary and marginal bonus paid by principal are increasing with the tax rate if the agent’s risk aversion and shocks in the economy are small. When the effect of loss aversion is sufficiently large, the curve of fixed salary is nonmonotonic, and the complementarity between fixed salary and marginal bonus disappears.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Tax agent'

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