Journal articles on the topic 'Television broadcasting of campaign debates'

AbstractSince 2002, US communication-based foreign policies have resulted in the launch of two high-profile international broadcasting stations — Radio Sawa and al-Hurra television — as well as other failed ventures such as the 'Shared Values' documentary campaign and the Hi Arabic youth magazine. These policies have, at best, delivered mixed results as a form of public diplomacy for the United States. The principal objective of this article is to illuminate how governing beliefs about public diplomacy might have mitigated its success, by identifying the implicit policy imagination revealed in policy arguments. This article investigates the discursive imagination behind US international broadcasting programmes and how public debate outlines an 'argument formation' for US foreign-policy rhetoric. Three episodes of policy argument between 2001 and 2005 are assessed as demonstrative of a rhetorically constructed policy imagination that prompted a broadcasting strategy that was incompatible with the communicative norms of its targeted foreign audience.

For some considerable time, prime-time television debate programmes have been under threat from commercialisation of broadcasting, voter apathy, the rise of infotainment, and competition from new media technologies. In spite of this, in 2012 the two main terrestrial channels once again produced new, lengthy, prime-time programmes designed especially for the presidential campaign. The aim of this article is to examine the role played by these programmes in a changed media landscape and to seek to explain the survival of the genre. It is argued that it is their conservative nature, combined with a modicum of ‘modernisation’, which enables them to occupy a strategic position within the spectrum of media outlets. While assessing their impact on the electoral outcome is a precarious business, it is clear that in 2012 they have contributed to a reversal in the fortunes and status of the two main channels, TF1 and F2.

On 17 September 2014, eight years after the 5 December 2006 coup, Fiji held a General Election under repressive laws curtailing freedom of expression and the media, government accountability and the judiciary. A notable number of 248 candidates aspired for the 50 parliamentary seats under the 2013 Constitution and an Electoral Decree released a few months prior to elections. In an atmosphere of lavish campaign advertisements on billboards, public transport vehicles and the print and television news media by the post-coup Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama’s political party FijiFirst, recently activated political parties struggled to have their voices heard. Two daily media companies—the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation and the Fiji Sun—displayed bias towards the FijiFirst party by providing them with excessive and preferential coverage and portraying other parties in a negative light; other media organisations attempted to give fairer coverage. The debate heated up amid crackdowns by police on ‘trouble-makers’ vandalising FijiFirst posters. The country headed for the polls as celebrations marked the release of 45 Fijian soldiers held hostage by Al-Nusra in the Golan Heights. Amid complaints by five political parties, the election was declared ‘free and fair’ by the Electoral Commission. This article, through analysis of media materials, campaigning, polling and results calculations, contends that the elections only satisfied part of the international criteria for ‘free and fair elections’.

This article analyses the campaign to establish terrestrial digital children's public service broadcasting in Australia. It finds that the development of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's digital children's channel (ABC3), an initiative initially embraced somewhat opportunistically, enabled an expansion strategy for the public service broadcaster that ultimately helped determine the shape of its current digital channel portfolio. Contrasting the collective and divergent interpretations of future audience behaviours and needs developed by the Australian Children's Television Foundation (ACTF) and the ABC, it argues that both organisations developed strategies and made policy decisions that were influential in conditioning the current digital television ecology.

In mass communication, one of the most influential media in forming public opinion is television. This study aims to determine and analyze: the form of political broadcasts on local television and network station systems in Makassar City; and the application of P3SPS in political broadcasts on local television and network systems in Makassar City. The assessment approach uses media studies, research studies focus more on the phenomenon of online media with a focus on the application of values and ethics of journalists, also related to the process of making news, disseminating news and performance, access to news and practice in dismissing hoax news. Informants involved in this study, such as: Television Media workers in Makassar City; Experts or Media Practitioners in Makassar City; and government authorities such as the KPID of Makassar City. The form of political broadcasts on local television and the network station system in Makassar City consists of three, namely political news, political dialogue and political advertising. The application of P3SPS in political broadcasts on local television and network systems in Makassar City is carried out according to procedure. During the open campaign process in broadcasting, there were violations that were violated by broadcasters.

Popular factual entertainment has changed the face of broadcasting in Australia. Where once dramas, long-running serials and current affairs programs filled prime-time scehdules, we now have docu-soaps such as Popstars, and reality gameshows like Big Brother. While some have expressed concern about this shift to light entertainment in factual programming, it can be argued that such programs have brought a new audience to non-fiction and revitalised debates concerning the real. This paper examines some of the current trends in popular factual entertainment programming, considers their innovations and explores why they are so compelling.

Abstract One of the most used theories in the research of political debates is the functional theory of campaign discourse. However, the theory has been criticized for being too culturally limited. In the present article, a Finnish presidential debate is analyzed from the perspective of functional theory. The goal is to critically evaluate the applicability of functional theory to the analysis of Finnish political campaigning. The results show that a Finnish presidential debate differs in many ways from an American presidential debate. The study shows how strongly the culture is reflected in political television debates and how important it is to take account of the cultural perspective in the development of a theory.

The regulation of national broadcasting is a forum for the official expression of a country's media priorities. Sweden has consistently attempted to prevent foreign broadcasters from establishing themselves in the Swedish mediasphere. Subsequently, wherever a non-Swedish broadcaster has demonstrated market demand for a media product not available in Sweden, the government has attempted to create a Swedish equivalent to meet public demand and prevent the loss of audience share to non-Swedish broadcasters. This dynamic is especially clear in terms of the introduction of commercial broadcasting. Sweden was the last country in Western Europe to license a commercial television station, in 1992. This case study addresses the accommodation of the historically socialist government to the demands for commercial broadcasting, and the policy debates which informed these deliberations. It is argued that one reason for the Swedish government resisting commercial television was an opposition to the country's further integration within global capitalism, regardless of the fact that Swedish technology has helped the expansion of transnational broadcasting systems.

The increasing presence of sport broadcasting on public service broadcasters in Indonesia is driven by a mixture of interests. It may serve as a tool for education and entertainment as well as for increasing awareness of ‘symbolic nationalism’. Sport can also be used as a soft political campaign in the electoral system or even for pragmatic business purposes. This article assesses the sport broadcasting histories and policies of two Indonesian public service broadcasters: Radio of the Republic of Indonesia, and Television of the Republic of Indonesia. It assesses two political periods: the authoritarian period (1966–1998) and the transition towards a more liberal system (1998-present). Furthermore, this article critically examines both the political and economic interests behind the mediated sport policy. In addition, it intends to fill the gap in studies on sport policy, specifically public service broadcaster sport programming in transitional states. This study found that a change in the political structure resulted in unstable policies of sport broadcasting in Indonesian public broadcasters.

In relation to media policy, children's television is ‘special’ on a number of levels. The ways in which childhood is constructed and defined are complex and often contradictory; the state of children's television can be used as a barometer of the broader media policy climate; and the subject of children's television has mobilised strong, active and ‘successful’ interest groups. The following discussion is based on analysis of the introduction, development and trajectory of children's television policy and production practices in Australia from the 1945 ‘List of Principles to Govern Children's Programs' (radio) to the debates, issues and policy initiatives raised in the Australian Commonwealth Government Productivity Commission Inquiry into Broadcasting in 1999.

Abstract The main aim of this article is to analyze the social circulation of discourses on non-hegemonic cultural practices, in particular, on what is called “trash TV”, and how they are connected to struggles over cultural and social hierarchies. To do so, it takes a specific event as starting point: the injunction that the CNMC (the Spanish broadcasting regulatory body) filed against Mediaset (a commercial TV operator) to adjust the contents of Sálvame Diario (a celebrity gossip program frequently associated with “trash TV”) to the requirements of what is known as the “child protection time slot”. This paper uses constructionist framing to analyze how this event was discussed by different social actors. Our analysis shows that while the CNMC and the press painted the conflict as a legal issue, Sálvame and social media users focused their discussion on the social acceptability of celebrity gossip media and their viewers (specifically working-class women).

This article provides an overview of the current state of and future prospects for children's television in the Federal Republic of Germany. It begins with a brief description of current television provision for children, and of children's viewing patterns, and it suggests that views of children's relations with the medium are heavily influenced by social class. The article goes on to describe the structural features of broadcasting and of media regulation in Germany, paying particular attention to the federal structure and the balance between public and private. The implications of this situation for children's programming are then analysed, with particular attention paid to the heavy regulation of advertising on free-to-air channels, and the need to protect children's slots in the context of a general move towards specialist channels. The article concludes by outlining the terms of recent public debates about the social purpose and quality of children's television.

Since 2013 there has been an explosion of a new genre of factual programming on British television that centres on the everyday lives of people claiming benefits. The emergence of Factual Welfare Television (FWT) has coincided with intensifying public and political debates about poverty and the British welfare state, and has proved a deeply controversial and contested genre. While programme-makers have argued that FWT fulfils a public service mandate to inform audiences, critics have accused producers of making inaccurate, provocative and unethical television. Sociological enquiries into FWT have focused on the representations within these programmes and audience reception, arguing that these contribute to hardening anti-welfare sentiment. This article presents a complementary and urgent line of enquiry into FWT, locating it squarely within the conditions of its production by including questions of cultural labour, diversity in the workforce, and increasing competition and deregulation within broadcasting. We argue that market logics governing broadcasting discipline cultural workers and contribute to the production of reductive and stigmatising representations of social class and poverty. In doing so, we offer new insights into relationships between television production, representation and – consequently – consumption.

This article tackles the evolution of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation international distribution strategies at the intersection of the contemporary television landscape, by providing a context and definition for Canadian content (CanCon) rules, so as to consider more recent debates on the positioning of foreign streaming services in Canada in relation to existing broadcasting companies. The aim is to problematize media policies, by outlining the present state of the debate and updating the conversation to include global streaming TV players. Key questions are explored, such as whether CanCon rules are outdated forms of cultural protectionism or still represent viable answers to the risks of media imperialism.

The main objective of the study was to analyse the particularities of transition from terrestrial to digital format of the television in Ukraine. This objective was accomplished with the help of the following research methods: the method of analysis was applied to select the subjects of digitalization and to determine their role in the overall process; historical method was used to reconstruct the chronological order of events in transition to the digital television in Ukraine and in the world; the method of analogy was applied to determine the prospects of digital broadcasting development in Ukraine. Results and Conclusions. The process of transition from analogue to digital format of television in Ukraine has been lasting for 10 years. This is due to some problems at the state level (the conflict in competences of the responsible state agencies, the lack of a single decision-making centre, the lack of influence on the monopoly provider), at the TV content market (the unfounded costs of territory coverage with analogue signal, the lack of digital broadcasting licenses for many regional and local channels), and at the service provider’s level (the monopoly position of the existing provider, the absence of grounded calculation for territory coverage by the current national network). This set of problems leads to ambiguity in digital television perception within the domestic market, and costs Ukraine in its international public image due to failure to fulfil the Geneva 2006 agreement. The new relationships and patterns in transition from terrestrial to digital format of the television broadcasting in Ukraine were discovered in this study. It is grounded that the coordinated and efficient work of responsible state agencies is needed to solve the existing problems and to implement transition to digital broadcasting in Ukraine. The construction of alternative digital networks and the licensing of new digital networks providers are also needed, as well as the state assistance in providing digital TV devices to vulnerable groups of population and proper information campaign of the need to transit to digital TV.

This paper examines a set of ‘new television’ projects and their relationship to existing understandings of the object of television. The rise of online video-sharing has been surrounded by discourse about the decline of broadcast television's role for content delivery and advertising revenue. Amidst discussions of ‘piracy’ and debates about new audience measurement techniques and user-generated content, official and unofficial platforms for the distribution of television content have emerged. Some of these sites — like ‘internet TV’ projects such as the Participatory Culture Foundation's Miro TV player — have positioned themselves directly in opposition to television itself, orienting themselves as alternatives or replacements for the broadcast-and-cable-delivered-to-your-set experience. Others — such as CBS's Innertube — attempt to reapply network logics to the online space. Interrogating how the term ‘television’ succeeds or fails to describe these services helps to contextualise the object of television itself, as well as exploring the insights new services provide into audiencehood, national broadcasting and the community-forming roles television has traditionally played.

Public broadcast stations in the USA are often dependent on effective fundraising for their survival. Raising money from audiences has become an important avenue through which those non-profit broadcasting organizations build their budgets. Listener/viewer support of these stations has plateaued or declined in recent years. As a result, it may help to examine how psychology theories might be used to inform our understanding of public donation behaviour. This case study involving 983 US public broadcasting donors explored the potential for using the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) to model their donation intentions from three perspectives: ( a) public broadcasting donors in general, ( b) public radio donors, and ( c) public television donors. Additionally, an extended model of the TPB incorporating guilt was tested. Results suggested that not all factors of the traditional TPB contributed to the donation intentions for the different modes of public broadcasting. The addition of guilt to the model increased the explanatory power of the TPB model. Findings indicate the TPB could be a useful tool for understanding the behaviour of donors to non-profit or public broadcasting organizations and has the potential to inform campaign strategies and message development.

The year 2017 was an intense electoral year in Chile, both parliamentary and presidential. In this context, by using computer intelligence, an interdisciplinary team conducted a collection and volumetric analysis of over 3 million Twitter messages belonging to users that mentioned, at least once, any of the presidential candidates, both in the first and second voting round. Our goal was focused on analyzing the relationship between traditional media (radio and television) and Twitter, probing user interactions during the broadcast of live political shows, with emphasis on presidential debates. For this purpose, we carried out a volumetric analysis of all mentions in social media during the broadcast of live political shows to characterize the digital attention of the audience, under different parameters. Our results show that there is high user interest in the digital debate regarding presidential debates, a positive correlation between traditional media and Twitter during the broadcast of live political shows, and that, also, the latter trigger social media; furthermore, we verify the double screen phenomenon made possible by mobile platforms.

This research focus on Subang Regency, West Java Province. This research objective is to knowing, discuss, and descripting about society appreciation of President/Vice President debates on television. This research using descriptive analytical with quantitative approach and supported by qualitative approach, the data collection technique using questionnaire, depth interview, literature study, and observation at research location. The result, majority of respondent classified as productive ages who has a fairy high political sensitivity. The agree and have need of President/VP debates show at television, although the debates show have a short running time, but the effect can increase the knowledge and insight about 2014 election, and can grow awareness and political maturity, can knowing the figure and debates topic to needed by society, include the work program and political appointments, knowing political image, popularity and capability of President/VP candidates. To popularity, closely related with electability but not can get the electability automatically, because one of candidate not have the popularity but they have the electability. Therefore the debates show need to be scheduled, not only at during campaign season, can be scheduled out of campaign season yet. 
 Keyword: appreciation, debates candidate, popularity, electability
 
 ABSTRAK
 Penelitian ini berfokus di Kabupaten Suang, Provinsi Jawa Barat. Penelitian ini bertujuan adalah untuk mengetahui, membahas dan mendeskripsikan tentang apresiasi masyarakat terhadap acara debat Capres/Cawapres melalui televisi. Penelitian ini sifatnya deskriptif analitis dengan pendekatan kuantitaif ditunjang kualitatif yang dipusatkan di Kabupaten Subang Jawa Barat. Teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui penyebaran angket, wawancara mendalam, studi kepustakaan dan pengamatan langsung di lapangan. Hasilnya, sebagian besar responden tergolong usia produktif yang memiliki kepekaan terhadap dunia politik cukup tinggi. Mereka setuju dan perlu dengan acara debat Capres/Cawapres melalui televisi, alasannya walaupun acara debat waktunya pendek, tapi efek (manfaat) nya dapat meningkatkan pengetahuan dan wawasan tentang Pilpres 2014, serta dapat menumbuhkan kesadaran dan kedewasaan berpolitik. Kemudian dapat mengetahui figur dan tema debat yang dibutuhkan masyarakat, termasuk di dalamnya program kerja dan janji politik. Selanjutnya mengetahui pula tentang citra politik, popularitas dan kapabilitas, popularitas dan elektabilitas Capres/Cawapres. Untuk popularitas erat sekali kaitannya dengan elektabilitas, tapi tidak otomatis memperoleh elektabilitas, sebab yang memiliki popularitas tidak otomatis memperoleh elektabilitas, sebab kenyatannya ada yang tidak memiliki popularitas tapi memperoleh elektabilitas. Untuk itu acara debat perlu diagendakan, tidak hanya diselenggarakan pada musim kampanye pilpres, tapi juga dapat dilaksanakan di luar musim kampanye.
 Kata kunci : apresiasi, debat kandidat, popularitas, elektabilitas

The representation of the dominant gender-based discourse on television inevitably affects children’s perceptions of masculinity and femininity. Gender blindness, the embodiment of gender hierarchy in which gender differences are exaggerated and attributed to natural differences between men and women, is inevitably used in the media, especially in children’s broadcasting. This study aims to reveal the gender blindness in children’s television on Turkey’s only thematic children’s television stations Minika GO and Minika Cocuk’, focusing on all local productions aired in 2020. Stuart Hall’s conceptualization of representation debates and text analysis expressed as constructing the meaning world of relationships and collective culture, guided the study. The representations are conveyed to the audience through the narration of the story in the animations, the plots of the story, the presentation of male and female characters, the use of space and images. In the cartoons, the frequency of female and male characters appearing on the screen, the physical appearance of the characters, their behavioral characteristics, and the spatial presentation in the stories were searched. As a result, it is possible to say that male and female characters are depicted unequally in all the themes studied in animations resulting in gender blindness.

The German federal interstate treaties, as the regulatory framework for public service media (PSM), have recently been under reform. The starting point of the amendments is the so-called ZDF decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court from the 25th of March, 2014. The Federal Constitutional Court was confronted with the question of whether the composition of the broadcasting council in the second biggest public service broadcasting station in Germany, the ZDF (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, Second German Television), is compliant with the constitution. This resulted in reforms of numerous regulatory regimes in several German federal states. This article compares the decision-making process related to the WDR (Westdeutscher Rundfunk, West-German Broadcasting) (whose legislator is Northrhine-Westfalia) and the ZDF (whose legislator is Rhineland-Palatinate), the two biggest PSM broadcasters in Germany. In the case of these two German federal states, this paper strives to provide insight into the strategies of the state chancellery, the responsible legislative authorities, to negotiate a new regulatory framework. The paper also discusses the issue of the “implied audience” during the negotiations and civil society’s participation in media policy debates and media governance. The analysis is based on a systematization of the citizen and the consumer in media policy. This working hypothesis assumes that the implied image of the audience differs in the two federal states. The negotiations in Rhineland-Palatinate can be described as ambivalent in terms of how it understood the audience, whereas Northrhine-Westfalia rather addressed the audience as citizens. The study suggests that the ZDF decision created a momentum for broader media policy debates in Germany, which has long been a neglected issue, both in civil society and media regulation – as well as in communication studies.

This paper draws on extended life story oral history interviews with scientists who, beginning in the 1980s, turned to writing popular books, making radio and television programmes and taking to the stage for public lectures and debates, with relations between science and religion often a key topic: Peter Atkins, Nicholas Humphrey, Steve Jones, John Polkinghorne, Russell Stannard and Lewis Wolpert. I show that these interviews capture aspects of motivation and experience missed in much existing work on popular science. Stressing historical and individual particularity, I argue that what these scientists say about their decisions, aims and rewards should make us question a strong tendency in recent scholarship both to regard popular science as part of scientific work in general, and also to read the outcomes of popular science – such as advocacy for science or the promotion of certain theories – as the motivations for its production.

Airing on Joongang Tongyang Broadcasting Company (JTBC), a South Korean television network, Non Summit represents multiculturalism on the small screen through light-hearted, loosely structured debates between eleven men from different nations that is moderated by three Korean hosts. This study approaches the show’s representation of multinational, homosocial masculine friendship and commentary as a text that advances the goals of damunhwa, a locally specific articulation of multiculturalism. Non Summit does this by constructing a normative ideal of a cosmopolitan citizen who espouses liberal progressive values and appreciation for superficial multicultural difference. The ideal, which the show associates with the West, is occasionally ruptured through fleeting moments when non-Western members challenge Western superiority and Koreanness, however, the ruptures are patched through the show’s policing of difference through shared, heteronormative masculinity and homosocial friendship.

Abstract Danish television has been able to produce a remarkable number of successful primetime dramas over the last years from Forbrydelsen (The Killing, DR 2007-12) to Herrens Veje (Ride upon the Storm, DR 2017-). Many of them are Nordic Noir crime dramas, yet the list also includes political thrillers and family dramas. This article briefly summarizes main reasons for the prolific production environment at public service broadcaster Danmarks Radio (DR). Some of the exceptional circumstances of Danish television demonstrate why the relatively small country was able to produce shows that found devoted audiences around the world. While the DR production framework has received much attention, this article takes a closer look at narrative composition, issues of characterization and the presentation of themes. Analyzing the first episodes of Borgen (DR 2010-13) and Herrens Veje, the article proposes that it is specifically the combination of multiperspectivity of the leading protagonists and how their life is linked to wider cultural, social and political debates, that can be identified as one main outcome of the fruitful collaboration between DR and various creative personnel. While both shows adhere to the main characteristics of complex serial drama as identified by Jason Mittel and Trisha Dunleavy, there are also some noticeable differences, including their strong public service ethos, their unusual Danish settings, the avoidance of transgressive protagonists, character-centred storylines and their slow, indulgent pace.

The purpose of this study is to identify the readability and simplicity of Donald J. Trump’s speech in his media interviews and debates during the 2016 US presidential primary campaign. A total of 10 interviews and debates broadcast on different television networks were analyzed using three of the most commonly used readability formulas: Flesch–Kincaid, Simple Measure of Gobbledygook (SMOG), and Gunning-Fog. The analysis revealed that a fourth- to fifth-grade level of education (9- to 11-year-olds) is required to understand Trump’s language. In total, 10 additional interviews and debates of other candidates in the presidential election of 2016, from both the Republican and the Democratic parties, were analyzed, using the same readability formulas, in order to shed additional light on Trump’s results. This analysis showed that the average score of all the other candidates was at a ninth-grade level (14- to 15-year-olds). Furthermore, the study reveals that Trump’s sentences and words were significantly shorter and less complex than those of any other candidate. This study suggests that Trump uses low readability and simplicity of language as a rhetorical strategy to gain popularity, in accordance with the trend of anti-intellectualism.

In the early 2000s, a new form of multicultural television drama began to emerge in the UK, exploring contemporary gang life within Britain's black communities. A notable example of this ‘black urban crime’ genre is Top Boy, screened by the UK's leading multicultural public service broadcaster, Channel 4, in 2011 and 2013. This article produces an analysis, drawing on sociological and media studies perspectives, and through historicisation and contextualisation, that seeks to understand the fascination of the black urban crime genre for programme-makers, broadcasters and audiences in the contemporary British mediascape. It locates Top Boy at the intersection of complex media relations and modes of production that are themselves intertwined with political, legislative and cultural agendas tied to post-multiculturalist and neoliberal tendencies within public service broadcasting frameworks. The article suggests that black urban crime narratives do not advance understandings of the organisational structure of urban gangs or drug-related crime that are so central to these texts, nor do they offer a progressive contribution to contemporary debates or the representation of black criminality.

Drawing on interviews with key stakeholders – regulators, editors, party spin-doctors and politicians – supported by a systematic content analysis of television news during the 2015 UK General Election, this study makes an intervention into debates about how impartiality is understood and interpreted. Contrary to recent scholarly interpretations about ‘due impartiality’ being applied with some degree of quantitative precision – a stop-watch approach to balance – according to key stakeholders we interviewed the regulation of UK election news should be viewed as a qualitative judgement about the editorial merit of particular issues, parties or leaders throughout the campaign. Overall, we argue that the United Kingdom has moved from a political system shaping impartiality in recent years towards more of a news value–driven system reliant on editorial judgements. This raises, in our view, serious questions about the accountability of editorial decisions and how impartiality is safeguarded. News values, after all, are not politically neutral and – as our content analysis demonstrates – can lead to parties with a minor status gaining more coverage than some major parties. In order to remain relevant to regulatory and industry debates in journalism, we conclude by suggesting scholars should pay closer attention to how key stakeholders interpret and apply media policy.

This study examines the relationships of exposure and attention to various news media, including the Internet, with information learned about the issue positions of candidates George Bush and John Kerry, interest in the 2004 election campaign, and intention to vote among a random sample of adult residents of Indiana who were interviewed by telephone in October 2004. The results are compared with our previous studies of the 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 U.S. presidential elections. In general, our studies suggest that attention to television news, televised debates, and now Internet news are important predictors, or at least correlates, of voter learning of candidate issue positions and voter interest in the election campaigns. These findings contradict the hypothesis that increased news media use leads to increased voter apathy and alienation from the political process.

A discussion paper released by the New Zealand Law Commission just before the end of 2011 looked into how well the regulatory framework governing the NZ media was working, and concluded that change was needed. Currently complaints must be made first to the publication or broadcaster concerned. Only if the complainant is dissatisfied with the outcome is there a right of appeal to the self-regulatory Press Council, for print media, or, for radio and television, to the statutory Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA). The commission’s recommendation is for a new single regulator created by statute to which all complaints about ‘news media’ would be directed. Unlike the Press Council or the BSA, the new regulator could intervene without any complaint being laid and—possibly—even before a story is published where there are concerns about the methods the journalist used to gather information. And, importantly, online media would be included. But debate about the issues in New Zealand have been rather muted compared to the Australian and British debates.

This study discusses to examine the phenomenon of political communication during the presidential and vice-presidential elections in 2019. From cases that occur during the campaign period, there are often symptoms of lack of argumentation, lack of credibility, and lack of ability to communicate through debate. This research uses The Functional Debate Campaign theory stated by William, L. Benoit. It is including the use of research methods and analytical techniques developed by Benoit. From the results of this study it is known that all candidates for President and Vice President mostly direct their political discourse into policy rather than turn up their characters, but in conveying their political messages still have shortcomings from verbal and nonverbal aspects. Whereas in terms of functional strategy it is considered to be sufficient because it has used several techniques, but it has not been evenly displayed by all candidates. There is also a weakness that appears in all candidates seen from the debate strategy which is less able to build good acclaim to build election by candidates by trying to attack and defend when attacked. The implications of the research on this candidate's debate, show that the use of candidate debates on television as a political communication forum was attracted the media and voters, however, it has not yet an ideal primary means for voters to see the credibility and capability of the prospective leader.

This article analyses how in the main political talk show on television in Spain, La Sexta Noche, the main themes of the European agenda were silenced or conditioned by the themes of the national, regional and local agenda during the last European elections. The media debate was oriented towards an analysis of the results of national elections and the campaign for regional and local elections that allowed for a greater spectacle, thanks to the shock effect of such polarized ideologies and the trivialization of national politics. This research has studied all the shows of the programme broadcast as of the national elections on 28th April 2019 up until the European elections held on 26th May 2019, analysing the main topics covered and the kind and tone of discourses made. Due to the fact that controversial political issues are preferred to more relevant ones in order to generate a spectacle and bigger audiences, the results indicate that the political talk show analysed contributes to the trivialization of debates and the impoverishment of public space, aided by formal elements inherent in the infotainment genre.

Despite repeated failures by the former Valencian television network — Canal 9 [Channel 9] — to live up to its public broadcasting duties, the station’s closure in 2013 still came as a shock. The step by the regional government (then run by the Conservative Partido Popular — PP) had a huge public impact, depriving Valencians of their public TV network at a stroke. That is why Valencian society had high hopes when a new public media platform — Punt Mèdia — was launched. Among other things, politicians and broadcasters needed to show that a more even-handed, professional approach could be taken to media reporting. The 2019 Regional Elections were a wonderful opportunity to prove this. On the one hand, it was a chance to usenew audiovisual methods to better convey political information to citizens. On the other hand, it gave the network and its masters the chance to renounce the shameless political partisanship that had so marred Canal 9’s history. This paper looks at the extent to which these goals were attained. It does so by examining À Punt's coverage of the election. Specifically, we focused on political interviews with candidates, and on the electoral debates. Various methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, were used. We found that both the form and depth of news stories were fairly balanced. Nevertheless, the network showed a surprising lack of ambition despite À Punt’s stated aspiration to be Valencia’s leading TV station.

Al Jazeera (AJ) has been a defining feature in developing news media in the Middle East and beyond. The satellite-broadcasting network has played a leading role in bringing stories and perspectives that other international media do not always cover, if at all. More importantly, it has been a champion for democracy and human rights in the Middle East, thereby provoking the ire of Arab autocratic rulers, which went to great length to silence the Qatar-based television news network. The latest Gulf Crisis, in which four countries (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt) blockaded Qatar in July 2017, is another attempt to silence this media institution and peg back the region to the pre-Arab Spring era. The anti-Qatar quartet issued an ultimatum of 13 demands to be fulfilled within ten days. The list included paying reparations, shutting down Al Jazeera, curbing bilateral relations with Iran, closing a Turkish military base, and submitting to monthly external compliance checks. However, the crisis could be a blessing in disguise for Qatar and the network in its campaign for greater freedom of expression in the Middle East. This article analyses the crisis from a media political economy perspective.

The introduction of the mandatory Digital Addressable System (DAS) with strict, phase-wise deadlines for different provinces within India has compelled us to reconsider not only the television apparatus itself but also broadcast policies, television industry, content and reception. The introduction of DAS can be posited within a series of similar public policies starting from the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) project in 1975 to the more recent Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) or Aadhaar project and Digital India campaign, all folded into the developmental rhetoric of the welfare state. The rollout of DAS provides the site to explore the relationship between the government, neo-liberal market and digital technologies that underscores the contradictions which are constitutive of modernity, and invests in the study of the neo-liberal cultural sites of statist intervention. Within this conceptual framework, this article would focus on West Bengal as a case in point to read the implementation of mandatory DAS both as a site of hegemonic projects embodying promises of neo-liberal development and of the incongruities that are inherent in them. While the union government claimed that any cable television service provider who does not switch to digital signal within deadline can be penalized and the equipment confiscated, the state Government said that they would launch an agitation if analogue cable signals were blacked out after the deadline for cable digitalization and thus, the deadline was extended for several months. The confrontation over cable digitalization in West Bengal offers a site to explore in what way, contrary to its typical image of a fully automated digital ecosystem of governance, as the modern states would like to conceive, it is loaded with internal contradiction. My inquiry moves across a range of discursive locations and registers, aiming to explore in what way various local stakeholders negotiate in this policy implementation? How does DAS help theorization of a changing relationship between the market, digital technology and the developmental modern? While raising these questions, this article would try to explore in what way DAS can be located within the historical trajectory of techno-cultural rhetoric of public policy and how it invests in the shifting political economy of broadcasting in India.

Considering a range of recent BBC TV programme anniversaries, this article analyses how the BBC has utilised different modes or zones of ‘liveness’ to promote the value of public service television via ‘event’ TV. Such anniversary events strategically collapse together the ‘hyper-ephemeral’ (having to be there) with the ‘anti-ephemeral’ (commemorating TV history), as longer term audience memories of public service television’s trustworthiness and durability are evoked. Contra scholarly debates which have positioned media anniversaries simply as a matter of (hyper-)commodification, I address Doctor Who’s 50th, Casualty’s 30th, Match of the Day’s 50th and EastEnders’ 30th anniversary as each shaping a sense of remembered ‘public service ephemera’. Through this process, audiences’ recollections of past programmes, and their integration with memories of everyday life, are articulated with emotional attachments to the BBC, thus making an affective case for the British Broadcasting Corporation’s cultural legitimation. Very different types of TV that we might not usually think to analyse side-by-side – flagship, returning, and soap dramas, along with sports coverage – can all work coherently as programme brands to defend the BBC’s cultural standing, without surrendering to what’s been termed ‘BBC nostalgia’, and while simultaneously bidding to colonise second-screen ‘digital flows’ circulating around TV premieres.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of politicians’ facial attractiveness on their online popularity as reflected in audience engagement with their Facebook posts during the 2015 Israeli election campaign. Design/methodology/approach Using Israel’s 2015 election campaign as the case study, the authors analyzed all messages posted (n=501) on 33 politicians’ official Facebook pages during the week leading to Election Day. Findings The results demonstrate that audiences do engage more with posts of the more facially attractive politicians. These posts generated more shares, more comments and more participants in their discussions – but not more likes – relative to posts of less attractive politicians. These effects became even stronger when the posts were accompanied by one or more visual image, and remained significant even after controlling for other engagement predictors, such as a politician’s gender, seniority or the timing of a post’s publication. Social implications The findings emphasize the importance of attractive looks for politicians. The findings highlight that attractive politicians’ posts attract more attention, allowing them to better spread their ideas. Thus, politicians should aim to post aesthetic images and visuals to promote better engagement with their ideas on social media. Originality/value The study expands our understanding of online presentations of politicians, focusing on the effect of politicians’ facial attractiveness on their online popularity. Recent studies have demonstrated that physically attractive politicians enjoy more and better media attention on television news, but not in non-visual media such as radio and newspapers. This effect has not been examined in the social media environment, a central arena for today’s political debates and one that involves many visual messages.

Cholera, which was unknown in Africa south of the Sahara, became an identifiable disease in South Africa in 1919. In the 1970's, 5 cases were diagnosed in people coming into South Africa from countries to the north. Instructions regarding Cholera surveillance were circulated in 1979 following an outbreak in Maputo. There was no evidence of any case of cholera acquired in South Africa before September 1980. Within 12 days, there were 23 proven cases ofVibrio cholera, El Tor biotype, among Africans who obtained drinking water from an irrigation canal off the Crocodile River midway between Nelspruit and Kaapmuiden. Five hundred forty-six cases had been identified by the end of February 1981 and more are expected.On 13 October 1980, a team of health officials collected at Nelspruit to coordinate measures to contain the epidemic. They included chlorination of the irrigation canal, water surveillance of local rivers by sampling or leaving Moore pads in situ, increasing the number of staff and strengthening equipment at local laboratories, educating local medical and nursing staff in patient management and providing adequate stocks of intravenous fluids and tetracycline. Patients' contacts were traced, their homes inspected, their water supply sources and means of sewage disposal checked and the public educated in cholera prevention. There were regular press statements, radio talks, television programs and the broadcasting of educational leaflets to warn the population to take precautions. It was decided not to hold a mass immunization campaign nor to administer preventive antibiotics.

Voter turnout in local elections (pilkada) is a participation indicator. The local election in 2015 was different from the local elections pre-2015, as the local election in 2015 was held simultaneously. Regional electoral commissions (KPUD) gave candidates campaign facilities like posters, banners, and debates with the other candidates on local television. This socialisation was expected to increase voter turnout. The purpose of this research to ascertain the level of voter turnout in the local election held in 2015 in Lamongan, and whether it is increasing or declining.KPUD has a new role not only to do with socialisation, but KPUD must also print campaign props in line with the fairness principles. The research methods used in this study were a survey and multistage random sampling for the sampling technique. The voter turnout in the 2015 local election was just 60.47% lower than the voter turnout of the 2014 legislative election(Pileg) that reached 71%. In the local election, the emotional bond between the voters and candidates is more powerful than that in a legislativeelection, but in the Lamongan local election 2015, it was not positively correlated. There are two main factors that influence the decrease of voter turnout. First, is the material orientation of the voters (sangu). If they do not get“Sangu”, they will not vote and they prefer to work in the fields. Voters thought that leaving their job for the election should get them substitution money. Second, was the indication of cartel politics, embracing all political parties in Lamongan Regency, for them to support the same candidate who was still on duty, namely Fadeli, and two other candidates. The level of voter turnout is influenced by the material orientation of the voters and cartel politics.

The news media are often accused of reporting politics in a too narrow and consensual way, excluding certain perspectives and issues that might better reflect the public’s agenda. This study lends weight to this argument by not only demonstrating the party political focus of UK election coverage but also in the misleading way public opinion was, at times, represented. Analysing 6647 items and/or stories in the largest ever content analysis study of 4613 sources across five first- and second-order election campaigns in the United Kingdom, it comprehensively tracks how citizens and journalists appear in television news, as well as developing a finely grained, qualitative assessment of how public opinion was represented during the 2017 election campaign. Overall, the study found that political parties received the most amount of airtime, but in some election campaigns members of the public appeared in coverage more often than politicians. However, they were mostly granted limited airtime to articulate their views in vox pops. During the 2017 election campaign, the study found the editorial construction of public opinion in vox pops and live journalistic two-ways was shaped by a relatively narrow set of assumptions made by political journalists about the public’s ideological views rather than consulting more objective measures of public opinion. So, for example, voters were portrayed as favouring more right- than left-wing policies despite evidence to the contrary. The use of citizens as sources is theorised as serving the pre-conceived narratives of journalists rather than reflecting a representative picture of public opinion. The study reinforces and advances academic debates about journalists and citizen-source interactions. More accurately engaging with people’s concerns, it is concluded, will help move broadcasters beyond the narrow set of assumptions that typically serve their narratives of political coverage.

The goal of the research was to analyse the development of the idea of the public service broadcasting (PSB) in Lithuania as one of Post-Soviet countries that restored its independence in 1990. The Lithuanian case serves in revealing the great variety of ways to interpret the idea of the PSB, the possibilities to manipulate various notions, and the way the fate of the PSB can be affected by politicians and competing business groups. In this research we distinguished the following stages of the PSB concept formation in Lithuania: the first debates (the development of legislative basis), and attempts of influence – the so-called depoliticisation, decommercialisation, and optimization. In order to achieve it, we analysed the Lithuanian legislation and its amendments, parliamentary discussions, and press publications. We also compared the Lithuanian PSB concept with the Western perception. It was concluded that despite of the official declarations about further limiting the interference with the national service broadcaster, there actually were the attempts of influence and politicisation. Politicisation by depoliticising. In pursuit of changing the Lithuanian Radio and Television (LRT) management the procedure of LRT Council formation was changed in 1996-1997: representatives were delegated by 15 creative and public organisations. The principles of public organisations selection have been criticised. Politicisation by de-commercialising. In 2000-2002, the LRT was criticised because of its commercialisation and non-performance of its mission. It was intended to develop a special funding system whereby the LRT should submit the Seimas with a funding plan and evidences justifying that the anticipated programmes are in compliance with the national mission. Introduction of such amendments could pose a risk of direct political interference with the LRT management and formation of the programme content. Politicisation by optimising. In 2009-2010 the attempts were made to radically reform the LRT management. The criticism related to linkage of the LRT Council members mandate with the political calendar, possibility of recalling the Council members by the delegating institutions and organisations, and the right of the Seimas Committee to approve or reject the strategy of the LRT programming. In 2014, a new financing model of the LRT has been developed, following which the LRT in 2015 discontinued broadcasting the commercial ads (except for certain established cases). The LRT financing is known in advance and calculated on the basis of the budget revenue and excise duty collection results of a preceding calendar year.

Abstract Background Early recognition of stroke symptoms and immediate response is necessary to ensure timely access to treatment of stroke. However, many individuals fail identify symptoms of stroke or delay in seeking medical attention. The Irish Heart Foundation launched the “Act Fast” campaign which included three waves of broadcasting on national television and radio, throughout 2010 and 2011. Stroke awareness campaigns may have the potential to influence behaviour and response to stroke. Methods A non-experimental, descriptive, quantitative, cross-sectional study was conducted. The Stroke Action Test (STAT)1 was used to investigate how participants would respond to specific symptoms of stroke. A convenience sample (n=89) of older adults attending an outpatient clinic in a university teaching hospital completed the questionnaire. The mean age of respondents was 79.6 years (SD =9.3). Results Just 4.5% (n=4) of respondents identified what all 4 letters of FAST represent. Overall, 48% (n=43) of respondents recognised all 6 symptoms of stroke and 100% (n=89) recognised at least 2 symptoms of stroke as per STAT. The stroke symptom most frequently recognised was sudden numbness of the face, arm or leg at 99% (n=88). The stroke symptom least frequently recognised was sudden trouble seeing in one or both eyes at 56% (n=50). Despite this 81% (n=64) of respondents would not respond appropriately to 50% of symptoms of stroke described in the STAT. 52% (n=46) of respondents identified irregular heart beat as a risk factor for stroke. Finally, 29% (n=26) of respondents had heard of thrombolysis while just 2% (n=2) had heard of thrombectomy. Conclusion Awareness of stroke symptoms does not necessarily influence response to stroke in older adults. Future stroke awareness campaigns should consider FAST2 which speaks to treatment (thrombolysis or thrombectomy) as well as time.

Introduction Television has become more and more restricted within the past few years. Rating systems and "family programming" have taken over the broadcast networks, relegating violent programming, often some of the most cutting edge work in television, to pay channels. There are very few people willing to stand up and say that viewers -- even young children -- should be able to watch whatever they want, and that viewing acts of violence can actually result in more mature, balanced adults. Jib Fowles is one of those people. His book, The Case For Television Violence, explores the long history of violent content in popular culture, and how its modern incarnation, television, fulfils the same function as epic tragedy and "penny dreadfuls" did -- the diverting of aggressive feelings into the cathartic action of watching. Fowles points out the flaws in studies linking TV violence to actual violence (why, for example, has there been a sharp decline in violent crime in the U.S. during the 1990s when, by all accounts, television violence has increased?), as well as citing overlooked studies that show no correlation between viewing and performing acts of violence. The book also demonstrates how efforts to censor TV violence are not only ineffective, but can lead to the opposite result: an increase in exposure to violent viewing as audiences forsake traditional broadcast programming for private programming through pay TV and videocassettes. The revised excerpt below describes one of the more heated topics of debate -- the V-Chip. Television Violence and You Although the antiviolence fervor crested in the US in the first half of the 1990s, it also continued into the second half. As Sissela Bok comments: "during the 1990s, much larger efforts by citizen advocacy groups, churches, professional organizations, public officials, and media groups have been launched to address the problems posed by media violence" (146). It continues as always. On the one side, the reformist position finds articulation time and again; on the other side, the public's incessant desire for violent entertainment is reluctantly (because there is no prestige or cachet to be had in it) serviced by television companies as they compete against each other for profits. We can contrast these two forces in the following way: the first, the antitelevision violence campaign, is highly focussed in its presentation, calling for the curtailment of violent content, but this concerted effort has underpinnings that are vague and various; the second force is highly diffused on the surface (the public nowhere speaks pointedly in favor of violent content), but its underpinnings are highly concentrated and functional, pertinent to the management of disapproved emotions. To date, neither force has triumphed decisively. The antiviolence advocates can be gratified by the righteousness of their cause and sense of moral superiority, but violent content continues as a mainstay of the medium's offerings and in viewers' attention. Over the longer term, equilibrium has been the result. If the equilibrium were upset, however, unplanned consequences would result. The attack on television violence is not simply unwarranted; it carries the threat of unfortunate dangers should it succeed. In the US, television violence is a successful site for the siphoning off of unwanted emotions. The French critic Michel Mourlet explains: "violence is a major theme in aesthetics. Violence is decompression: Arising out of a tension between the individual and the world, it explodes as the tension reaches its pitch, like an abscess burning. It has to be gone through before there can be any repose" (233). The loss or even diminishment of television violence would suggest that surplus psychic energy would have to find other outlets. What these outlets would be is open to question, but the possibility exists that some of them might be retrogressive, involving violence in more outright and vicious forms. It is in the nation's best interest not to curtail the symbolic displays that come in the form of television violence. Policy The official curbing of television violence is not an idle or empty threat. It has happened recently in Canada. In 1993, the Canadian Radio- Television and Telecommunications Commission, the equivalent of the Australian Broadcasting Authority or of the American FCC, banned any "gratuitous" violence, which was defined as violence not playing "an integral role in developing the plot, character, or theme of the material as a whole" (Scully 12). Violence of any sort cannot be broadcast before 9 p.m. Totally forbidden are any programs promoting violence against women, minorities, or animals. Detailed codes regulate violence in children's shows. In addition, the Canadian invention of the V-chip is to be implemented, which would permit parents to block out programming that exceeds preset levels for violence, sexuality, or strong language (DePalma). In the United States, the two houses of Congress have held 28 hearings since 1954 on the topic of television violence (Cooper), but none has led to the passage of regulatory legislation until the Telecommunications Act of 1996. According to the Act, "studies have shown that children exposed to violent video programming at a young age have a higher tendency for violent and aggressive behavior later in life than children not so exposed, and that children exposed to violent video programming are prone to assume that acts of violence are acceptable behavior" (Section 551). It then requires that newly manufactured television sets must "be equipped with a feature designed to enable viewers to block display of all programs with a common rating" (Telecommunications Act of 1996, section 551). The V-chip, the only available "feature" to meet the requirements, will therefore be imported from Canada to the United States. Utilising a rating system reluctantly and haltingly developed by the television industry, parents on behalf of their children would be able to black out offensive content. Censorship had passed down to the family level. Although the V-chip represents the first legislated regulation of television violence in the US, that country experienced an earlier episode of violence censorship whose outcome may be telling for the fate of the chip. This occurred in the aftermath of the 1972 Report to the Surgeon General on Television and Social Behavior, which, in highly equivocal language, appeared to give some credence to the notion that violent content can activate violent behavior in some younger viewers. Pressure from influential congressmen and from the FCC and its chairman, Richard Wiley, led the broadcasting industry in 1975 to institute what came to be known as the Family Viewing Hour. Formulated as an amendment to the Television Code of the National Association of Broadcasters, the stipulation decreed that before 9:00 p.m. "entertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by a general family audience should not be broadcast" (Cowan 113). The definition of "inappropriate programming" was left to the individual networks, but as the 1975-1976 television season drew near, it became clear to a production company in Los Angeles that the definitions would be strict. The producers of M*A*S*H (which aired at 8:30 p.m.) learned from the CBS censor assigned to them that three of their proposed programs -- dealing with venereal disease, impotence, and adultery -- would not be allowed (Cowan 125). The series Rhoda could not discuss birth control (131) and the series Phyllis would have to cancel a show on virginity (136). Television writers and producers began to rebel, and in late 1975 their Writers Guild brought a lawsuit against the FCC and the networks with regard to the creative impositions of the Family Viewing Hour. Actor Carroll O'Connor (as quoted in Cowan 179) complained, "Congress has no right whatsoever to interfere in the content of the medium", and writer Larry Gelbert voiced dismay (as quoted in Cowan 177): "situation comedies have become the theater of ideas, and those ideas have been very, very restricted". The judge who heard the case in April and May of 1976 took until November to issue his decision, but when it emerged it was polished and clear: the Family Viewing Hour was the result of "backroom bludgeoning" by the FCC and was to be rescinded. According to the judge, "the existence of threats, and the attempted securing of commitments coupled with the promise to publicize noncompliance ... constituted per se violations of the First Amendment" (Corn-Revere 201). The fate of the Family Viewing Hour may have been a sort of premoniton: The American Civil Liberties Union is currently bringing a similar case against proponents of the V-chip -- a case that may produce similar results. Whether or not the V-chip will withstand judicial scrutiny, there are several problematic aspects to the device and any possible successors. Its usage would appear to impinge on the providers of violent content, on the viewers of it, and indeed on the fundamental legal structure of the United States. To confront the first of these three problems, significant use of the V- chip by parents would measurably reduce the audience size for certain programmes containing symbolic violence. Little else could have greater impact on the American television system as it is currently constituted. A decrease in audience numbers quickly translates into a decrease in advertising revenues in an advertising system such as that of the United States. Advertisers may additionally shy away from a shunned programme because of its loss of popularity or because its lowered ratings have clearly stamped it as violent. The decline in revenues would make the programme less valuable in the eyes of network executives and perhaps a candidate for cancellation. The Hollywood production company would quickly take notice and begin tailoring its broadcast content to the new standards. Blander or at least different fare would be certain to result. Broadcast networks may begin losing viewers to bolder content on less fastidious cable networks and in particular to the channels that are not supported and influenced by advertising. Thus, we might anticipate a shift away from the more traditional and responsible channels towards the less so and away from advertising-supported channels to subscriber-supported channels. This shift would not transpire according to the traditional governing mechanism of television -- audience preferences. Those to whom the censored content had been destined would have played no role in its neglect. Neglect would have transpired because of the artificial intercession of controls. The second area to be affected by the V-chip, should its implementation prove successful, is viewership, in particular younger viewers. Currently, young viewers have great license in most households to select the content they want to watch; this license would be greatly reduced by the V-chip, which can block out entire genres. Screening for certain levels of violence, the parent would eliminate most cartoons and all action- adventure shows, whether the child desires some of these or not. A New York Times reporter, interviewing a Canadian mother who had been an early tester of a V-chip prototype, heard the mother's 12-year-old son protesting in the background, "we're not getting the V-chip back!" The mother explained to the reporter, "the kids didn't like the fact that they were not in control any longer" (as quoted in DePalma C14) -- with good reason. Children are losing the right to pick the content of which they are in psychological need. The V-chip represents another weapon in the generational war -- a device that allows parents to eradicate the compensational content of which children have learned to make enjoyable use. The consequences of all this for the child and the family would be unpleasant. The chances that the V-chip will increase intergenerational friction are high. Not only will normal levels of tension and animosity be denied their outlet via television fiction but also so will the new superheated levels. It is not a pleasant prospect. Third, the V-chip constitutes a strong challenge to traditional American First Amendment rights of free speech and a free press. Stoutly defended by post-World War II Supreme Courts, First Amendment rights can be voided "only in order to promote a compelling state interest, and then only if the government adopts the least restrictive means to further that interest" (Ballard 211). The few restrictions allowed concern such matters as obscenity, libel, national security, and the sometimes conflicting right to a fair trial. According to legal scholar Ian Ballard, there is no "compelling state interest" involved in the matter of television violence because "the social science evidence used to justify the regulation of televised violence is subject to such strong methodological criticism that the evidence is insufficient to support massive regulatory assault on the television entertainment industry" (185). Even if the goal of restricting television violence were acceptable, the V-chip is hardly "the least restrictive means" because it introduces a "chilling effect" on programme producers and broadcasters that "clearly infringes on fundamental First Amendment rights" (216). Moreover, states Ballard, "fear of a slippery slope is not unfounded" (216). If television violence can be censored, supposedly because it poses a threat to social order, then what topics might be next? It would not be long before challenging themes such a feminism or multiculturalism were deemed unfit for the same reason. Taking all these matters into consideration, the best federal policy regarding television violence would be to have no policy -- to leave the extent of violent depictions completely up to the dictates of viewer preferences, as expertly interpreted by the television industry. In this, I am in agreement with Ian Ballard, who finds that the best approach "is for the government to do nothing at all about television violence" (218). Citation reference for this article MLA style: Jib Fowles. "Television Violence and You." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.1 (2000). [your date of access] <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/0003/television.php>. Chicago style: Jib Fowles, "Television Violence and You," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3, no. 1 (2000), <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/0003/television.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Jib Fowles. (2000) Television Violence and You. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(1). <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/0003/television.php> ([your date of access]).

ResumenEl poder que la televisión ejerce sobre la arena política no ha pasado desapercibido en el ámbito académico ni socio-político. Su presencia en los procesos políticos es constante, fruto de las posibilidades comunicativas que este medio ofrece en la contienda electoral. El marketing político utiliza la televisión cada vez con mayor asiduidad para dirigirse al electorado a través de uno de los componentes más característicos de las campañas televisadas: los debates electorales. Este artículo tiene como objetivo estudiar la relación existente entre televisión y política en la actualidad, centrándose en el caso particular de los debates electorales televisados. Se ha estudiado el fenómeno del debate electoral desde el punto de vista audiovisual, mediante el análisis de un caso concreto: los debates electorales entre los candidatos a la presidencia de gobierno española que han tenido lugar en 2008. Con esta finalidad, se ha analizado la estructura narrativa de los mismos para valorar las diferencias y similitudes en ambos debates.AbstractThe power that television exerts on the political arena has not remained undetected neither in the academic nor the socio-political fields. Their presence in the political processes is constant, the result of the communicative possibilities that this medium offers in the electoral contest. The political marketing uses television with increasing regularity in order to reach the electorate through one of the most characteristic components of the television campaign: the electoral debates. This article aims to explore the relationship between television and politics at present, focusing on the particular case of televised election debates. The phenomenon of electoral debate has been studied from the audiovisual point of view, through the analysis of a specific case: the election debates between candidates for president of the Spanish government that had taken place in 2008. With this aim, their narrative structure has been analysed in order to observe the differences and similarities between both debates.Palabras claveElecciones; Televisión; Campaña; Comunicación política; Imagen; Vídeo-política.KeywordsElections; Television; Campaign; Political communication; Image; Video-politics.

Background Despite Canada’s policies on multiculturalism, there continues to be a dearth of minorities on Canadian television screens, in part because the idea of multiculturalism has long been contested.Analysis This article describes the term’s competing meanings by examining the debates about Bill C-40, which became the Broadcasting Act, between its introduction in Parliament in October 1989 and its passage into law in February 1991.Conclusions and implications These debates had three areas of focus: the former act’s national unity clause, the expansion of ideas of multiculturalism, and the tools of implementation. Ultimately, the relevant clauses in the Broadcasting Act left the term “multicultural” open to such a wide range of interpretations that they could be implemented without effecting a meaningful change.Keywords Multiculturalism; Broadcasting Act; Broadcasting policy; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications CommissionContexte Malgré les politiques canadiennes de multiculturalisme, il y a peu de minorités à la télévision canadienne, en partie parce que l’idée de multiculturalisme est disputée.Analyse Le présent article décrit les sens contradictoires du terme en se penchant sur les débats sur le projet de loi C-40, qui devint la La sur la radiodiffusion, entre octobre 1989 (quand il fut introduit dans la Chambre des communes) et février 1991 (quand il fut adopté).Conclusion et implications Ces débats étaient axés sur trois thèmes : la clause sur l’unité nationale dans l’ancienne Loi, l’élargissement de l’idée de multiculturalisme, et les outils de la mise en œuvre de la politique multiculturelle. Cette analyse révèle que les clauses pertinentes de la Loi sur la radiodiffusion permettaient un si grand éventail d’interprétations qu’elles pouvaient être mises en œuvre sans effectuer de changement réel.Mots clés Multiculturalisme; Loi sur la radiodiffusion; Politiques de la radiodiffusion; Société Radio-Canada; Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes

AbstractThe three-year (2012–2015) AHRC-funded research project Make Me Laugh: Creativity in the British Television Comedy Industry worked with writers, producers, directors and other industry personnel to map the productions they work on and follow their labor as they move from one job to another and strive to maintain a career. This article draws on interview material from this project to investigate the ways in which comedy workers negotiate the maintenance of their creativity within economic, cultural and industrial contexts such as policy, funding, and the whims of broadcasters and production companies. It argues that while such contexts are evident for all cultural production, there are specifics of the comedy sector because of humor’s relationships with the social role of broadcasting. It therefore highlights the specificity of comic creative labor, contributing to ongoing Humor Studies debates focused on the particularities of comedy as a category.

The 1995 landmark judgment of Supreme Courtdeclaring air waves as public property brought private players into the business of broadcasting. Globalization and Economic liberalization brought in foreign players into the Indian television industry, leading to proliferation in the number of English, Hindi and other vernacular channels. Cut throat competition gave way to the ‘nation wants to know’ style of high pitch polarized debates, heated arguments and sensational stories, replacing the yester year style of straight forward television news presentation. Terms like ‘Breaking News’, Flash’, or ‘Exclusive’ have lost their sanctity today. In the present era of hash tag revolution, Prosumers (a discursive word coined to denote the online users who are both producers and consumers of news) are gradually replacing mere consumers. News reporting and consumption have become instantaneous as never before due to smart phone and 4G revolution. Given such competition from cyber media, TV news presentation style has become more pressing, dramatic, research based, experimental, dynamic and many a times opinionated as well. The paper strives to analyze the changes in News presentation style in Indian TV news channels and studies the television viewing patterns of the people in Jaipur city.

Abstract This article examines changes in casting practices which have begun to put black, Asian, and minority ethnic actors more regularly on British screens and in more significant parts. In the context of calls for improving BAME involvement at all levels of the film and television industry, I look in particular at how colour-blind casting has begun to have an impact on British cinema. The article looks initially at how calls for the campaign for changes entwine with the British tradition of public service broadcasting and examines the socially conscious criteria for casting introduced by the BBC and the BFI in 2016. I suggest that some of the ambiguous expectations of audiences in relation to colour-blind casting are similar to the potentially contradictory aspirations placed on institutions which receive public funding. In order to examine these issues in some detail, I draw on textual and paratextual analysis to demonstrate how frames of reference for understanding new approaches to casting can be found in recent period adaptations, a British genre strongly associated with whiteness by actors and critics. The examples discussed span the decade: Wuthering Heights (Arnold, 2011), Lady Macbeth (Oldroyd, 2016), and Mary Queen of Scots (Rourke, 2018). The analysis demonstrates that while casting for the public good is becoming more common it nevertheless remains a complicated and controversial strategy.

Party politics across Central and Eastern Europe has become less structured. Many of the divides that anchored political competition have waned in recent years, weakening the attachment of voters to the existing palette of parties and making them more likely to be attracted to new and non-traditional electoral vehicles. But for such parties to succeed at the ballot box, they need to be able to frame elections and campaign effectively. Drawing on data from a specially commissioned survey, we find that the success of Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) led by Igor Matovič in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Slovakia owed much to the crafting of an anti-corruption appeal combined with an effective campaign. Both mobilization and conversion of voters, particularly through television and the leaders’ debates, in the months leading up to election day ensured OĽaNO won a quarter of the vote. OĽaNO stands in stark contrast to other parties whose leaders failed to craft as effective a message, miscalculated the impact of electoral rules and in some cases were unable to distance themselves enough from their past actions. The success of OĽaNO underlines that themes related to anti-corruption and good governance have become central to party politics and political contestation. More broadly, the election and its aftermath continued a general trend of forward movement of voters from old parties to new to newer still, indicating the churn of party politics in Slovakia is likely to continue.

Introduction Negative stereotyping of alternative diets such as veganism and other plant-based diets has been common in Australia, conventionally a meat-eating culture (OECD qtd. in Ting). Indeed, meat consumption in Australia is sanctioned by the ubiquity of advertising linking meat-eating to health, vitality and nation-building, and public challenges to such plant-based diets as veganism. In addition, state, commercial enterprises, and various community groups overtly resist challenges to Australian meat-eating norms and to the intensive animal husbandry practices that underpin it. Hence activists, who may contest not simply this norm but many of the customary industry practices that comprise Australia’s meat production, have been accused of promoting a vegan agenda and even of undermining the “Australian way of life”.If veganism meansa philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is possible and practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals. (Vegan Society)then our interest in this article lies in how a stereotyped label of veganism (and other associated attributes) is being used across Australian public spheres to challenge the work of animal activists as they call out factory farming for entrenched animal cruelty. This is carried out in three main parts. First, following an outline of our research approach, we examine the processes of stereotyping and the key dimensions of vegan stereotyping. Second, in the main part of the article, we reveal how opponents to such animal activist organisations as Animals Australia attempt to undermine activist calls for change by framing them as promoting an un-Australian vegan agenda. Finally, we consider how, despite such framing, that organisation is generating productive public debate around animal welfare, and, further, facilitating the creation of new activist identifications and identities.Research ApproachData collection involved searching for articles where Animals Australia and animal activism were yoked with veg*n (vegan and vegetarian), across the period May 2011 to 2016 (discussion peaked between May and June 2013). This period was of interest because it exposed a flare point with public discord being expressed between communities—namely between rural and urban consumers, farmers and animal activists, Coles Supermarkets (identified by The Australian Government the Treasury as one of two major supermarkets holding over 65% share of Australian food retail market) and their producers—and a consequent voicing of disquiet around Australian identity. We used purposive sampling (Waller, Farquharson, and Dempsey 67) to identify relevant materials as we knew in advance the case was “information-rich” (Patton 181) and would provide insightful information about a “troublesome” phenomenon (Emmel 6). Materials were collected from online news articles (30) and readers’ comments (167), online magazines (2) and websites (2) and readers’ comments (3), news items (Factiva 13), Australian Broadcasting Commission television (1) and radio (1), public blogs (2), and Facebook pages from involved organisations, specifically Australia’s National Farmers’ Federation (NFF, 155 posts) and Coles Supermarkets (29 posts). Many of these materials were explicitly responsive to a) Animals Australia’s Make It Possible campaign against Australian factory farming (launched and highly debated during this period), and b) Coles Supermarket’s short-lived partnership with Animals Australia in 2013. We utilised content analysis so as to make visible the most prominent and consistent stereotypes utilised in these various materials during the identified period. The approach allowed us to code and categorise materials so as to determine trends and patterns of words used, their relationships, and key structures and ways of speaking (Weerakkody). In addition, discourse analysis (Gee) was used in order to identify and track “language-in-use” so as to make visible the stereotyping deployed during the public reception of both the campaign and Animals Australia’s associated partnership with Coles. These methods enabled a “nuanced approach” (Coleman and Moss 12) with which to spot putdowns, innuendos, and stereotypical attitudes.Vegan StereotypingStereotypes creep into everyday language and are circulated and amplified through mainstream media, speeches by public figures, and social media. Stereotypes maintain their force through being reused and repurposed, making them difficult to eradicate due to their “cumulative effects” and influence (Harris and Sanborn 38; Inzlicht, Tullett, Legault, and Kang; Pickering). Over time stereotypes can become the lens through which we view “the world and social reality” (Harris and Sanborn 38; Inzlicht et al.). In summation, stereotyping:reduces identity categories to particular sets of deeds, attributes and attitudes (Whitley and Kite);informs individuals’ “cognitive investments” (Blum 267) by associating certain characteristics with particular groups;comprises symbolic and connotative codes that carry sets of traits, deeds, or beliefs (Cover; Rosello), and;becomes increasingly persuasive through regulating language and image use as well as identity categories (Cover; Pickering; Rosello).Not only is the “iterative force” (Rosello 35) of such associative stereotyping compounded due to its dissemination across digital media sites such as Facebook, YouTube, websites, and online news, but attempts to denounce it tend to increase its “persuasive power” (29). Indeed, stereotypes seem to refuse “to die” (23), remaining rooted in social and cultural memory (Whitley and Kite 10).As such, despite the fact that there is increasing interest in Australia and elsewhere in new food norms and plant-based diets (see, e.g., KPMG), as well as in vegan lifestyle options (Wright), studies still show that vegans remain a negatively stereotyped group. Previous studies have suggested that vegans mark a “symbolic threat” to Western, conventionally meat-eating cultures (MacInnis and Hodson 722; Stephens Griffin; Cole and Morgan). One key UK study of national newspapers, for instance, showed vegans continuing to be discredited in multiple ways as: 1) “self-evidently ridiculous”; 2) “ascetics”; 3) having a lifestyle difficult and impossible to maintain; 4) “faddist”; 5) “oversensitive”; and 6) “hostile extremists” (Cole and Morgan 140–47).For many Australians, veganism also appears anathema to their preferred culture and lifestyle of meat-eating. For instance, the NFF, Meat & Livestock Australia (MLA), and other farming bodies continue to frame veganism as marking an extreme form of lifestyle, as anti-farming and un-Australian. Such perspectives are also circulated through online rural news and readers’ comments, as will be discussed later in the article. Such representations are further exemplified by the MLA’s (Lamb, Australia Day, Celebrate Australia) Australia Day lamb advertising campaigns (Bembridge; Canning). For multiple consecutive years, the campaign presented vegans (and vegetarians) as being self-evidently ridiculous and faddish, representing them as mentally unhinged and fringe dwellers. Such stereotyping not only invokes “affective reactions” (Whitley and Kite 8)—including feelings of disgust towards individuals living such lifestyles or holding such values—but operates as “political baits” (Rosello 18) to shore-up or challenge certain social or political positions.Although such advertisements are arguably satirical, their repeated screening towards and on Australia Day highlights deeply held views about the normalcy of animal agriculture and meat-eating, “homogenizing” (Blum 276; Pickering) both meat-eaters and non-meat-eaters alike. Cultural stereotyping of this kind amplifies “social” as well as political schisms (Blum 276), and arguably discourages consumers—whether meat-eaters or non-meat-eaters—from advocating together around shared goals such as animal welfare and food safety. Additionally, given the rise of new food practices in Australia—including flexitarian, reducetarian, pescatarian, kangatarian (a niche form of ethical eating), vegivores, semi-vegetarian, vegetarian, veganism—alongside broader commitments to ethical consumption, such stereotyping suggests that consumers’ actual values and preferences are being disregarded in order to shore-up the normalcy of meat-eating.Animals Australia and the (So-Called) Vegan Agenda of Animal ActivismGiven these points, it is no surprise that there is a tacit belief in Australia that anyone labelled an animal activist must also be vegan. Within this context, we have chosen to primarily focus on the attitudes towards the campaigning work of Animals Australia—a not-for-profit organisation representing some 30 member groups and over 2 million individual supporters (Animals Australia, “Who Is”)—as this organisation has been charged as promoting a vegan agenda. Along with the RSPCA and Voiceless, Animals Australia represents one of the largest animal protection organisations within Australia (Chen). Its mission is to:Investigate, expose and raise community awareness of animal cruelty;Provide animals with the strongest representation possible to Government and other decision-makers;Educate, inspire, empower and enlist the support of the community to prevent and prohibit animal cruelty;Strengthen the animal protection movement. (Animals Australia, “Who Is”)In delivery of this mission, the organisation curates public rallies and protests, makes government and industry submissions, and utilises corporate outreach. Campaigning engages the Web, multiple forms of print and broadcast media, and social media.With regards to Animals Australia’s campaigns regarding factory farming—including the Make It Possible campaign (see fig. 1), launched in 2013 and key to the period we are investigating—the main message is that: the animals kept in these barren and constrictive conditions are “no different to our pets at home”; they are “highly intelligent creatures who feel pain, and who will respond to kindness and affection – if given the chance”; they are “someone, not something” (see the Make It Possible transcript). Campaigns deliberately strive to engender feelings of empathy and produce affect in viewers (see, e.g., van Gurp). Specifically they strive to produce mainstream recognition of the cruelties entrenched in factory farming practices and build community outrage against these practices so as to initiate industry change. Campaigns thus expressly challenge Australians to no longer support factory farmed animal products, and to identify with what we have elsewhere called everyday activist positions (Rodan and Mummery, “Animal Welfare”; “Make It Possible”). They do not, however, explicitly endorse a vegan position. Figure 1: Make It Possible (Animals Australia, campaign poster)Nonetheless, as has been noted, a common counter-tactic used within Australia by the industries targeted by such campaigns, has been to use well-known negative stereotypes to discredit not only the charges of systemic animal cruelty but the associated organisations. In our analysis, we found four prominent interconnected stereotypes utilised in both digital and print media to discredit the animal welfare objectives of Animals Australia. Together these cast the organisation as: 1) anti-meat-eating; 2) anti-farming; 3) promoting a vegan agenda; and 4) hostile extremists. These stereotypes are examined below.Anti-Meat-EatingThe most common stereotype attributed to Animals Australia from its campaigning is of being anti-meat-eating. This charge, with its associations with veganism, is clearly problematic for industries that facilitate meat-eating and within a culture that normalises meat-eating, as the following example expresses:They’re [Animals Australia] all about stopping things. They want to stop factory farming – whatever factory farming is – or they want to stop live exports. And in fact they’re not necessarily about: how do I improve animal welfare in the pig industry? Or how do I improve animal welfare in the live export industry? Because ultimately they are about a meat-free future world and we’re about a meat producing industry, so there’s not a lot of overlap, really between what we’re doing. (Andrew Spencer, Australian Pork Ltd., qtd. in Clark)Respondents engaging this stereotype also express their “outrage at Coles” (McCarthy) and Animals Australia for “pedalling [sic]” a pro-vegan agenda (Nash), their sense that Animals Australia is operating with ulterior motives (Flint) and criminal intent (Brown). They see cultural refocus as unnecessary and “an exercise in futility” (Harris).Anti-FarmingTo be anti-farming in Australia is generally considered to be un-Australian, with Glasgow suggesting that any criticism of “farming practices” in Australian society can be “interpreted as an attack on the moral integrity of farmers, amounting to cultural blasphemy” (200). Given its objectives, it is unsurprising that Animals Australia has been stereotyped as being “anti-farming”, a phrase additionally often used in conjunction with the charge of veganism. Although this comprises a misreading of veganism—given its focus on challenging animal exploitation in farming rather than entailing opposition to all farming—the NFF accused Animals Australia of being “blatantly anti-farming and proveganism” (Linegar qtd. in Nason) and as wanting “to see animal agriculture phased out” (National Farmers’ Federation). As expressed in more detail:One of the main factors for VFF and other farmers being offended is because of AA’s opinion and stand on ALL farming. AA wants all farming banned and us all become vegans. Is it any wonder a lot of people were upset? Add to that the proceeds going to AA which may have been used for their next criminal activity washed against the grain. If people want to stand against factory farming they have the opportunity not to purchase them. Surely not buying a product will have a far greater impact on factory farmed produce. Maybe the money could have been given to farmers? (Hunter)Such stereotyping reveals how strongly normalised animal agriculture is in Australia, as well as a tendency on the part of respondents to reframe the challenge of animal cruelty in some farming practices into a position supposedly challenging all farming practices.Promoting a Vegan AgendaAs is already clear, Animals Australia is often reproached for promoting a vegan agenda, which, it is further suggested, it keeps hidden from the Australian public. This viewpoint was evident in two key examples: a) the Australian public and organisations such as the NFF are presented as being “defenceless” against the “myopic vitriol of the vegan abolitionists” (Jonas); and b) Animals Australia is accused of accepting “loans from liberation groups” and being “supported by an army of animal rights lawyers” to promote a “hard core” veganism message (Bourke).Nobody likes to see any animals hurt, but pushing a vegan agenda and pushing bad attitudes by group members is not helping any animals and just serves to slow any progress both sides are trying to resolve. (V.c. Deb Ford)Along with undermining farmers’ “legitimate business” (Jooste), veganism was also considered to undermine Australia’s rural communities (Park qtd. in Malone).Hostile ExtremistsThe final stereotype linking veganism with Animals Australia was of hostile extremism (cf. Cole and Morgan). This means, for users, being inimical to Australian national values but, also, being akin to terrorists who engage in criminal activities antagonistic to Australia’s democratic society and economic livelihood (see, e.g., Greer; ABC News). It is the broad symbolic threat that “extremism” invokes that makes this stereotype particularly “infectious” (Rosello 19).The latest tag team attacks on our pork industry saw AL giving crash courses in how to become a career criminal for the severely impressionable, after attacks on the RSPCA against the teachings of Peter Singer and trying to bully the RSPCA into vegan functions menu. (Cattle Advocate)The “extremists” want that extended to dairy products, as well. The fact that this will cause the total annihilation of practically all animals, wild and domestic, doesn’t bother them in the least. (Brown)What is interesting about these last two dimensions of stereotyping is their displacement of violence. That is, rather than responding to the charge of animal cruelty, violence and extremism is attributed to those making the charge.Stereotypes and Symbolic Boundary ShiftingWhat is evident throughout these instances is how stereotyping as a “cognitive mechanism” is being used to build boundaries (Cherry 460): in the first instance, between “us” (the meat-eating majority) and “them” (the vegan minority aka animal activists); and secondly between human interest and livestock. This point is that animals may hold instrumental value and receive some protection through such, but any more stringent arguments for their protection at the expense of perceived human interests tend to be seen as wrong-headed (Sorenson; Munro).These boundaries are deeply entrenched in Western culture (Wimmer). They are also deeply problematic in the context of animal activism because they fragment publics, promote restrictive identities, and close down public debate (Lamont and Molnár). Boundary entrenching is clearly evident in the stereotyping work carried out by industry stakeholders where meat-eating and practices of industrialised animal agriculture are valorised and normalised. Challenging Australia’s meat production practices—irrespective of the reason given—is framed and belittled as entailing a vegan agenda, and further as contributing to the demise of farming and rural communities in Australia.More broadly, industry stakeholders are explicitly targeting the activist work by such organisations as Animals Australia as undermining the ‘Australian way of life’. In their reading, there is an irreconcilable boundary between human and animal interests and between an activist minority which is vegan, unreasonable, extremist and hostile to farming and the meat-eating majority which is representative of the Australian community and sustains the Australian economy. As discussed so far, such stereotyping and boundary making—even in their inaccuracies—can be pernicious in the way they entrench identities and divisions, and close the possibility for public debate.Rather than directly contesting the presuppositions and inaccuracies of such stereotyping, however, Animals Australia can be read as cultivating a process of symbolic boundary shifting. That is, rather than responding by simply underlining its own moderate position of challenging only intensive animal agriculture for systemic animal cruelty, Animals Australia uses its campaigns to develop “boundary blurring and crossing” tactics (Cherry 451, 459), specifically to dismantle and shift the symbolic boundaries conventionally in place between humans and non-human animals in the first instance, and between those non-human animals used for companionship and those used for food in the second (see fig. 2). Figure 2: That Ain’t No Way to Treat a Lady (Animals Australia, campaign image on back of taxi)Indeed, the symbolic boundaries between humans and animals left unquestioned in the preceding stereotyping are being profoundly shaken by Animals Australia with campaigns such as Make It Possible making morally relevant likenesses between humans and animals highly visible to mainstream Australians. Namely, the organisation works to interpellate viewers to exercise their own capacities for emotional identification and moral imagination, to identify with animals’ experiences and lives, and to act upon that identification to demand change.So, rather than reactively striving to refute the aforementioned stereotypes, organisations such as Animals Australia are modelling and facilitating symbolic boundary shifting by building broad, emotionally motivated, pathways through which Australians are being encouraged to refocus their own assumptions, practices and identities regarding animal experience, welfare and animal-human relations. Indeed the organisation has explicitly framed itself as speaking on behalf of not only animals but all caring Australians, suggesting thereby the possibility of a reframing of Australian national identity. Although such a tactic does not directly contest this negative stereotyping—direct contestation being, as noted, ineffective given the perniciousness of stereotyping—such work nonetheless dismantles the oppositional charge of such stereotyping in calling for all Australians to proudly be a little bit anti-meat-eating (when that meat is from factory farmed animals), a little bit anti-factory farming, a little bit pro-veg*n, and a little bit proud to consider themselves as caring about animal welfare.For Animals Australia, in other words, appealing to Australians to care about animal welfare and to act in support of that care, not only defuses the stereotypes targeting them but encourages the work of symbolic boundary shifting that is really at the heart of this dispute. 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