Journal articles on the topic 'Terrorism Civil defense'

In March 1995, Japanese terrorists released nerve gas on the Tokyo subway, causing eleven deaths and more than 5,000 injuries. Although terrorists have sought to acquire chemical/biological (C/B) agents in the past, and a few have employed them on a small scale, the Tokyo attack was the first large-scale terrorist use of a lethal chemical agent against unarmed civilians, weakening a long-standing psychological taboo. This tragic incident has therefore drawn worldwide attention to the emerging threat of chemical/biological terrorism. Despite significant technical hurdles associated with the production and delivery of C/B agents, such weapons are within the reach of terrorist groups that possess the necessary scientific know-how and financial resources. This article proposes a C/B counterterrorism strategy based on preemption and civil defense, and recommends several short-term and longer-term policy options for mitigating this emerging threat.

AbstractA terrorism movement has been active in Spain during the last 20 years, with a painful number of victims. Civil Defense is in charge of the coordination of all the structures that are implicated in a terrorist incident. There are three typical patterns of attacks: (1) individual attacks; (2) group attacks; and (3) mass attacks. The individual attacks are done with guns, usually 9 mm, fired from a short distance; victims die from serious intracranial damage. Collective attacks are done using explosives under vehicles, tramp bombs, or “bomb vehicles;” victims are of different severity with wounds, burns, and blast injuries. With mass attacks with “bomb vehicles” in buildings or crowded public places, the numbers of victims are elevated and produce brutal social consequences.Emergency Medical Services integrated in to “Civil Defense” try to minimize the damage by initializing treatment on-scene and with the rapid provision of definitive care. During the last year, post-traumatic stress disorder treatment groups have been providing care to the victims and personnel. Chemical or biological weapons have not been used, although this is a great concern to the authorities.

AbstractThe Republic of Bulgaria is one of the smallest countries in southeastern Europe and has little experience with terrorist acts. During the past 20 years, only nine terrorism-related events have been recorded in Bulgaria, and no unconventional weapons have been used. Factors contributing to terrorism in Bulgaria have been: (1) Communist Party domination of the government and political process from 1944 to 1989; (2) ethnic and religious conflicts between the Bulgarian Orthodox Christian majority and the Turkish Muslim minority from 1983 to 1987; and (3) the relatively high level of organized crime after the Communist regime ended in 1990.The structure and function of the Disaster Relief System in Bulgaria not only are focused on the prevention of terrorism, but also on preparedness for the emergency response to terrorism-related events. Institutional components of the Disaster Relief System structure responsible for the emergency response to terrorism-related events include: (1) the Government of Bulgaria; (2) the State Agency for Civil Protection with 28 regional directorates; (3) the Ministry of Health with five national hospitals, 28 regional hospitals, and 28 EMS systems; (4) the Ministry of Defense with special military units for response to unconventional terrorist events, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; (5) the Ministry of Internal Affairs with 28 police departments, 28 fire departments, and specialized anti-terrorist units; and (6) the Bulgarian Red Cross.A major future challenge in Bulgaria is the prevention of terrorism through political stability, economic prosperity, ethnic and religious tolerance, and more effective measures against organized criminal activities. A related challenge will be to improve the level of preparedness of all components of Disaster Relief.

AbstractThe Republic of Bulgaria is one of the smallest countries in southeastern Europe and has little experience with terrorist acts. During the past 20 years, only nine terrorism-related events have been recorded in Bulgaria, and no unconventional weapons have been used. Factors contributing to terrorism in Bulgaria have been: (1) Communist Party domination of the government and political process from 1944 to 1989; (2) ethnic and religious conflicts between the Bulgarian Orthodox Christian majority and the Turkish Muslim minority from 1983 to 1987; and (3) the relatively high level of organized crime after the Communist regime ended in 1990.The structure and function of the Disaster Relief System in Bulgaria not only are focused on the prevention of terrorism, but also on preparedness for the emergency response to terrorism-related events. Institutional components of the Disaster Relief System structure responsible for the emergency response to terrorism-related events include: (1) the Government of Bulgaria; (2) the State Agency for Civil Protection with 28 regional directorates; (3) the Ministry of Health with five national hospitals, 28 regional hospitals, and 28 EMS systems; (4) the Ministry of Defense with special military units for response to unconventional terrorist events, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; (5) the Ministry of Internal Affairs with 28 police departments, 28 fire departments, and specialized anti-terrorist units; and (6) the Bulgarian Red Cross.A major future challenge in Bulgaria is the prevention of terrorism through political stability, economic prosperity, ethnic and religious tolerance, and more effective measures against organized criminal activities. A related challenge will be to improve the level of preparedness of all components of Disaster Relief.

The potential threat of chemical and biological terrorism is sufficient to warrant an ongoing investment in improved intelligence collection and civil defense as a prudent insurance policy, but not on the massive scale advocated by some publicists and federal officials.

Resumen: Este ensayo es una reflexión sobre el terrorismo, mostrando su evolución a través de la historia y su exacerbación actual, señalando además que el terrorismo de Estado, a pesar de ser la forma más mortífera, tiende a ser públicamente aceptada. De igual forma, enfatiza que el ataque a las Torres Gemelas se ha utilizado para justificar ataques preventivos, torturas y hasta la suspensión de la protección legal a prisioneros, y se pregunta cuál debe ser la política pública para combatir el terrorismo de una manera ética, mostrando por qué la solución del mal menor propuesta por Michael Ignatieff es sólo un viejo truco argumentativo y no conduce a cambios reales. Por ello, se insiste en el diálogo como forma de garantizar el reconocimiento de la diversidad, la defensa de los derechos civiles y el fortalecimiento de la democracia. Finalmente, se analizan diversos aspectos del militarismo, mostrando las relaciones de esta tendencia con el género y especí- ficamente con la masculinidad. Palabras clave: ética, terrorismo, militarismo, masculinidad, género Abstract: This essay reflects on terrorism, showing its evolution throughout history and its present-day exacerbation, also pointing out that terrorism on the part of the State, in spite of being the most deadly form, tends to be accepted by the public. Likewise, it stresses the way the 9/11 attack has been used to justify preemptive attacks, torture and even the suspension of political protection to prisoners, and asks what type of public policy must be used to fight terrorism in an ethical manner, showing why Michael Ignatieff’s proposal of the lesser evil is only an old argumentative trick and leads to no real changes. Therefore, there is an insistence on dialogue as the way to guarantee the recognition of diversity, the defense of civil rights and the strengthening of democracy. Finally, diverse aspects of militarism are analyzed, showing the relations between this tendency and gender, specifically with masculinity.Key words: ethics, terrorism, militarism, masculinity, gender

Individual Protection of Aircraft as an Essential Factor of Flying in Conflict Zones and Terrorist Threat Areas The paper presents ground-to-air weapon threats for aircraft, especially regarding man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and the methods for reducing the threats. Polish participation in military conflicts along with international terrorism result in increasing threats for aircraft. The conducted analysis result in efforts for providing individual protection of aircraft and new countermeasures. Employment of these systems on military aircraft contributes to improved flight safety in threat areas, however expensiveness of individual protection systems make them uncommon on civil aircraft.

The United States adopted a policy of de-hyphenation in its relations with India and Pakistan in the post-09/11 period which continued to be operational in the period 2005-2015. This policy apparently meant that the United States would deal each of the two South Asian adversaries, India and Pakistan. The main reason for this phenomenon was that the policy-makers in the US saw India as a heavy-weight to counter the rising economic, political and military power of China in Asia. Pakistan could not be fitted in this strategic calculus. The United States changed its previous position on Kashmir and instead of calling for resolving this issue according to the United Nations resolutions, it stressed on bilateral negotiations. Similarly, the United States endorsed Indian stance that Pakistan was backing terrorist outfits that perpetrated acts of terrorism in India. Strategic partnership between The US and India extended cooperation in civil nuclear technology, missile defense, space technology and defense production. No such cooperation could be extended to Pakistan. Permanent membership in the UN Security Council for India was endorsed despite Pakistan’s objections.

India-France relations in the post-Cold War era are very cordial. As early as the 1980s, France wished to give greater scope to its relations with India. Relations between India and France have traditionally been close and friendly. With the establishment of strategic partnerships in 1998, there has been significant progress in all areas of bilateral cooperation through regular high-level exchanges at the Head of State/Head of Government levels and growing cooperation and exchanges including in strategic areas such as defense, counter-terrorism, nuclear energy, and space. France was the first country with which India agreed on civil nuclear cooperation following the waiver given by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, enabling India to resume full civil nuclear cooperation with the international community

Preparedness for bioterrorist attacks and early recognition of specific agents are essential for public health. Emergency departments may play an important role in this field. The large spectrum of bioterrorism involves not only disastrous terrorism with mass casualties, but also microevents using low technology but producing civil unrest, disruption, disease, disabilities, and death. It aims not only to cause mortality and morbidity, but also to lead to social and political disruption. Preparedness appears to be the most potent defense against possible bioterrorist events. In this article, we aim to create awareness against biological agents and underline the importance of emergency departments in this public health problem.

Can states afford to protect human rights when facing a terrorist threat? Contemporary academic literature suggests that the answer to this question is no, concluding that states that afford their citizens basic political rights and civil liberties leave themselves more exposed to terrorist attacks (Piazza 2008; Wade and Reiter 2007; Pape 2003; Eubank and Weinberg 1994). American policymakers seem to agree. Both the Bush and Obama administrations regard the curtailment of physical integrity rights as a necessary element of effective counterterrorism policy. The Bush administration responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with policies permitting indefinite detention, extraordinary rendition, use of physically abusive interrogation practices, and increased and largely unchecked surveillance and wiretapping of suspected terrorists. Although it banned abusive interrogation and announced plans to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama administration has maintained the practice of wiretapping, reserved the option of rendition, and dramatically increased unmanned drone attacks against suspected terrorists in Pakistan, which often results in civilian casualties. Both presidents have claimed that these policies are necessary to keep Americans safe from terrorism (Hosenball 2009; “Bush Defends Policy on Terror Detainees” 2005).

Abstract Terrorism is an old phenomenon in human civilization. Terminologically, it comes from Latin, but this scourge also fully manifested itself in Roman civilization, throughout its history. This study seeks to fill a bibliographic gap on this criminal phenomenon, most studies of it starting with the Middle Ages, without any reference to Ancient Rome, which is unfair, especially since Rome was confronted with this phenomenon, which it defined terminologically and to which it responded with the necessary force, thus transforming its defence policy. The first forms of terrorism emerged in Rome during the Kingdom, when, at the beginning of its political organization, Rome faced numerous terrorist manifestations, especially from outside the Roman state. The Gauls were, at the beginning of the Republic, genuine agents of terrorism in Rome through their plundering expeditions that caused real terror. Etruscan pirates were terrorists, too, for the Roman trade, the struggle of the plebeians and their withdrawal with barricades in order to obtain political rights meant real political terror at that time, then Spartacus’ revolt and his march which spread terror throughout Rome, the civil wars which bled Rome became genuine forms of internal terrorism, especially because of the assassination of Roman state leaders, as well as the corruption masterly unmasked by Cicero. The forms of external terrorism were also present, the most notorious episode being the Punic wars, in particular the war of Hannibal, the most effective terrorist for Rome, the Dacians’ plundering expeditions in the Roman garrisons in Moesia, the battles with the Parthians and the Britons are as many forms of the terrorism that Rome faced during its history, which compelled it into creating new forces capable of responding to this new way of fighting. We believe that the Praetorian Guard, with all its units, was the most effective counter-terrorist force in combating the terrorist phenomenon strongly manifested in Rome. Therefore Rome, knowing the phenomenon, defined it most precisely, a definition that still applies today.

Problem. Active scientific, theoretical and practical activities in developing strategies and tactics for combating terrorism are at the center of attention of law, political science, psychology, sociology, as well as other branches of science. At the same time, the pedagogical problem with regard to determining the specificity of vocational training and ensuring the readiness future civil servants to perform professional tasks in the field of antiterrorist activity is not sufficiently studied. The main result of the educational process of higher education institutions should not be the system of knowledge, skills and abilities itself, but the readiness for modern intellectual, social-legal, communicative, informational practices that will provide the ability and ability to use a set of knowledge of the chosen specialization, basic knowledge from different directions, including legal training, including in the field of antiterrorist activity. Goal. Identify innovative forms and methods of training and ensure the readiness of future civil servants to carry out their professional tasks in the field of antiterrorist activity. Methods. The research methods were chosen: theoretical ones - the study of psychological and pedagogical and legal literature on the problem under study, the processing of documents and normative materials in order to clarify the content of vocational training and to ensure the readiness of civil protection officers to professional fulfillment of tasks in the field of antiterrorist activity; multicriteria system analysis and problem-oriented synthesis to determine the leading definitions of research and the theoretical substantiation of pedagogical innovations in the training of civil defense officers for professional accomplishment of tasks in the field of antiterrorist activity, in particular ICT tools, problem educational technologies, ICT; empirical - pedagogical observation, questionnaires, interviews, interviews, expert assessment methods, testing, pedagogical modeling, forecasting for the purpose of studying and diagnosing the state of readiness of civil protection officers for professional implementation of tasks in the field of antiterrorist activity. Results. Professional training and ensuring the readiness of civil servants to perform their professional tasks in the field of antiterrorist activity should take place in a coherent educational process using innovative approaches in the educational process. Such training becomes more realistic and purposeful, subject to the use of problematic educational technologies. The most effective of their components are the following groups of methods of innovation training, with the use obligatory ICT tools: modeling; designing; research. Important part of the process of training civil servants and ensuring their readiness to carry out professional tasks in the field of counter-terrorism activities is the practical elaboration of crisis situations during the command-and-control game. In connection with this, an algorithm of command-and-control game is developed, which includes the following stages: molding - formation of the working group of the command-staff team; preparatory - preparation for the command-staff game; the main thing is to conduct a command-and-control game; the final is an analysis of the command-and-control game, the definition of the overall assessment and evaluation of each participant in the team-based game.

In this article, which was delivered as the Alan G. Ingham Memorial Lecture to the 37th annual conference of the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport, I extend Ingham’s ideas regarding sport as civic ritual and combine it with my own work on the relationship between sport and the increasing militarization of US cities in the post 9/11 era. I suggest that militarized civic rituals have now become an ever-present feature of urban life and represent a troubling new conflation between military and civilian discourses and practices employed through sport, specifically the NFL and the Super Bowl. The term “citizen soldier” is used here to provoke thought about the role of “ordinary” citizens in this context where domestic security telescopes down from the highest levels of the US Department of Defense to the micropersonal. Legally equated with a soldier at war, the NFL fan’s call of duty is received through a mobile phone application, everyday citizens recruited to assist, in the name of patriotism, in terrorism prevention. This blurs legal and operational separations between intelligence-gathering and citizenship and further collapses civilian-military boundaries suggesting a changed notion of duty for all of us.Dans cet article, qui a été présenté en tant que Conférence Commémorative Alan G. Ingham au 37ème Congrès Annuel de la Société Nord-Américaine de Sociologie du Sport, je prolonge les idées d’Ingham sur le sport vu comme un rituel civique et je les combine avec mon propre travail sur la relation entre le sport et l’augmentation de la militarisation des villes américaines dans la période post 11 septembre. Je suggère que des rituels civiques militarisés sont maintenant devenus des composants omniprésents de la vie urbaine et qu’ils représentent un nouvel amalgame troublant entre les discours civils et militaires et les pratiques employées dans le sport, plus spécifiquement dans la NFL et au Super Bowl. Le terme de « soldat citoyen » est utilisé ici pour provoquer une réflexion sur le rôle des citoyens « ordinaires » dans ce contexte où la sécurité intérieure s’interpénètre des plus hauts niveaux du Département Américain de la Défense au niveau micro-individuel. Légalement assimilé à un soldat en guerre, l’appel du devoir du fan de la NFL est reçu sur une application de téléphone portable, les citoyens ordinaires sont recrutés pour aider, au nom du patriotisme, à la prévention du terrorisme. Cela brouille la séparation légale et opérationnelle entre les services de renseignements et la citoyenneté, et, en outre, anéantie les frontières entre le civil et le militaire, suggérant une nouvelle notion du devoir pour nous tous.

In 2000, a new Terrorism Act, incorporating the broadest ever definition of terrorism and giving police and prosecutors freedom to arrest almost anyone involved in some way with refugee solidarity work, was passed. Then, on 29 March 2001, under the first order made under the Act, twenty-one organisations were proscribed through provisions which allow for the banning of organisations which the home secretary believes are involved in terrorism, or promote or encourage terrorism.1 As refugee communities began mobilising against the law, and particularly its Proscribed Organisations Order, Liz Fekete asked the civil rights lawyer Gareth Peirce, who has defended those accused of terrorist offences for over two decades, to examine the historical and political context of this the latest addition to the UK’s anti-terrorist legislation.

An early-2008 Foreign Policy index found that 88% of active and retired American servicemen and women agree that the war in Iraq has stretched the United States military dangerously thin. Another 60% think that the US military today is weaker than it was five years ago. 74% of those surveyed hold low regards for the civilian leadership expressing that civilian policymakers set unreasonable goals for the US military to accomplish. With current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan serving as backdrops, these inflections serve as the basis of a much-needed conversation on the evolving roles and responsibilities of civilian and military agencies in the post-conflict environment. The immediate solutions to the military’s frustrations have been logical if not only reactionary or temporary stopgaps. If the military is stretched too thin, then expand it. Over the next five years there will be substantial increases in the Army and Marine Corps by as much as over 90,000 troops. If the military is weakening, then strengthen it. The President’s 2008 defense budget pushes defense spending to levels not seen since the Reagan Administration, bringing with it a slew of new military hardware meant to keep the US military on the cutting edge of technology and flexible in the face of emerging threats. If the military is lacking comprehensive training and doctrine to combat insurgencies, then revise doctrine. In December 2007, the US Army and Marine Corps revamped their Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the first time in over two decades either service had published a field manual devoted to counterinsurgency.3 The next President of the United States will face a dynamic range of transnational threats that will likely make us rethink the way modern wars are fought. From terrorism and counterinsurgency to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, from illicit trafficking of drugs, people, and guns back to traditional conventional warfare with rising superpowers such as China and Russia, the United States must maintain a variety of diplomatic and military responses at its disposal. As emerging threats in the twenty-first century appear to be rooted at the nexus of security and development, a single-sided military solution cannot fully resolve a multi-dimensional problem. There is a need to develop a more comprehensive civil-military approach to combating terrorism, insurgency, and asymmetric warfare, something that has not fully materialized on the strategic or on the operational level. In order to do this, there is a need to tear down the stereotypes and reintroduce the hippie (statesmen) to the snake-eater (soldier).

The article aims at studying the reasons for the new way of looking at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the Italian political world: the mutual recognition of Israel and the Vatican, the visit to Jerusalem by the leader of the formerly fascist party, Mr. Gianfranco Fini, and the beginnings of a movement of interest towards the Jewish State also within the political left. From a historical viewpoint, anti-Semitism in Italy found its origins in the Church's attitude toward the ‘deicide people’. Beginning with WWI, to this position was added the worry that the Holy Places might fall under Jewish control. From those times dates the Holy See's evermore manifest liking for the Arab populations of Palestine. Nowadays the line of conduct of the Church has as its basic objective the defense of Christian minorities in the Middle East, and for this reason it maintains dialogues with all actors in the region. The weight of the Church influenced also the attitude of the Italian State, even though from its inception the latter had to make adjustments because of other international requirements. This multiple subordination caused the different republican governments to always keep an official equidistant stance among the conflicting parties in the Near East. Behind this apparent neutrality, however, the feelings of benevolence for the Arab countries and the Palestinians have gradually intensified. Italian leaders have been trying to conduct a Mediterranean policy on the borders of the Western alliance, and their feelings have been oriented in consequence. During the 1970s, the governments went as far as to conclude a secret pact with Palestinian terrorists, to avoid terror acts on the Peninsula in exchange for some freedom of action. And in the mid-eighties the Craxi government did not hesitate to challenge the US in order to guarantee the continuity of that line of conduct. On that occasion Craxi, speaking in Parliament, compared Arafat to Mazzini. The end of the Yalta-established order has modified the traditional data of Italian foreign policy. However, the increased attention paid to Israel has also other causes: the changed attitude of the Church after the civil war and the Syrian occupation in Lebanon, events which both caused difficulties for the consistent Christian minorities; the hope that the Oslo process could reward the Italian ‘clear-sightedness’; last, but not least, the quarrelsome internal politics that make the Palestine conflict a mirror of the Roman conflicts. Lastly, the article connects the recent goodwill for Israel with the threats of Islamic terrorism in Italy. A political opinion trend would revisit the Middle Eastern conflict as the upturned perspective of a ‘clash of civilizations’ already existent nowadays. And a possible act of terrorism in Italy might give to this opinion a mass basis.

UK Defence Medical Services’ personnel have experienced an intense exposure to patients injured during war over the last decade and a half. As some bitter lessons of war surgery were relearned and innovative practices introduced, outcomes for patients impr oved consistently as experience accumulated. The repository of many of the enduring lessons learnt at the Role 4 echelon of care remain at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB), with the National Health Service and Defence Medical Services personnel who treated the returning casualties. On 22 May 2017, a terrorist detonated an improvised explosive device at the Manchester Arena, killing 22 and wounding 159 people. In the aftermath of the event, QEHB was requested to provide support to the Manchester clinicians and teleconferencing and then two clinical visits were arranged. This short report describes the nature of the visits, outlines the principles of Military Aid to the Civil Authority and looks to the future role of the Defence Medical Services in planning and response to UK terrorism events.

<p align="justify">Terrorism, rooted in radical movement post 9/11 event in the United States, began to grow rapidly also in Indonesia. Radical movements, especially those based on religion, evolved into terrorist movements that threaten state security and defense. Civic education is part of the implementation of state defense and security system. Radicalism, both as a movement and an ideology or a growing notion among Indonesians, is a threat to the state, that has a non-conventional nature. Therefore, civic education can be a program that can change people’s culture to put the love of the nation and the country as the main thing, thereby preventing the development of radical movements and ideology in Indonesia. The elements of religiosity (religion) can also play an important role in counteracting the threat of radicalism if it is integrated into the civic education curriculum. This paper will look at how civic education program can be used as a means of preventing the threat of radicalism in Indonesia.</p>

The place and role of meteorological service for solving problems of population protection against the impact of natural disasters, technological accidents and modern means of destruction (fires, explosions, and terrorist actions) are considered. The shortcomings of the calculation technique and the radar method considered for computing of average wind and explosion (nuclear object accident) power are shown. The ways for solving this problem are developed. The importance and relevance of solving problems related to meteorological service for headquarters of the Civil Defense and the Ministry of Emergency Situations are emphasized, including the necessity of problem solving due to implementation of automatical data computation for meteorological service, development and installation of high-speed meteorological data processing facilities. Proposals to improve the collection, processing and analysis of meteorological and upper-air data required for prediction and assessment of radiation and biological (bacteriological) environment in order to protect the population and the troops are presented.

AbstractThe Republic of South Africa lies at the southern tip of the African continent. The population encompasses a variety of races, ethnic groups, religions, and cultural identities. The country has had a turbulent history from early tribal conflicts, colonialisation, the apartheid period, and postapartheid readjustment.Modern terrorism developed mainly during the apartheid period, both by activities of the state and by the liberation movements that continued to the time of the first democratic elections in 1994, which saw South Africa evolve into a fully representative democratic state with equal rights for all.Since 1994, terrorist acts have been criminal-based, evolving in the Cape Town area to political acts, largely laid at the feet of a predominantly Muslim organisation, People against Gangsterism and Drugs, a vigilant organisation allegedly infiltrated by Muslim fundamentalists. Along with this, has been terrorist activities, mainly bombings by disaffected members of white, right-wing groups.In the apartheid era, a Draconian series of laws was enacted to suppress liberation activities. After 1994, most of these were repealed and new legislation was enacted, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001; this legislation allows the government to act against terrorism within the constraints of a democratic system. Disaster management in South Africa has been largely local authority-based, with input from provincial authorities and Civil Defence. After 1994, attempts were made to improve this situation, and national direction was provided. After 11 September 2001, activity was increased and the Disaster Management Act 2002 was brought into effect. This standardized disaster management system at national, provincial, and local levels, also facilites risk assessment and limitation as well as disaster mitigation.The potential still exists for terrorism, mainly from right wing and Muslim fundamentalist groups, but the new legislation should stimulate disaster management in South Africa to new and improved levels.

<span>La Jurisprudencia del Consejo de Estado comienza a mostrar una tendencia novedosa y muy criticada, en materia de declaratoria de responsabilidad del Estado por actos de terrorismo. Este artículo muestra la primera tendencia en la cual ya se está condenando al Estado, previo el lleno de unos requisitos que deben acompañar al acto terrorista. El principio general del derecho que expresa: "todo aquel que cause un daño a otro debe repararlo" permite deducir que la persona que ocasionó un perjuicio a otro incurre en una responsabilidad civil o penal y está en la obligación de resarcir el daño causado. Los funcionarios que no cumplen debidamente sus obligaciones incurren en responsabilidad la cual puede ser de diferente naturaleza: disciplinaria, penal, civil, política, patrimonial. En este ensayo se analizan éstas responsabilidades y sus diversas consecuencias, así como el aspecto legal de la defensa judicial del Estado.</span>

The democratically elected President of Liberia was between 1997 and 2004 also the country’s ‘Chief Patron of Sport’. Enjoying tennis more than team games, the one-time President, Charles Taylor, realized that the electorate’s enthusiasm for the game of football meant that the game could be a useful vehicle with which to associate. As well as funding the salaries of the national ‘Lone Star’ football team, Taylor also sponsored a football team in the national league drawn from his personal militia known as the ‘Anti-Terrorist Unit’ (ATU). Prone to random murder by night, the same players, out of their recognizable uniform and in match kit, respected the rules of the game and the position of the referee. Others seeking the same sporting enjoyment were, when on the field of play in 2003, captured and forced to join the Presidential militia when rebel forces sought to overthrow Taylor. Players of another team – mainly children – were killed mid-match when a rocket-propelled grenade – origins contested – landed in their midst. The Liberian nation’s most famous citizen and one-time FIFA World Footballer of the Year, George Weah, twice fled the country in terror, once when threatened by the forces of the President, and again years later when an angry mob of irate football supporters blamed him for their national football team’s failure to qualify for the World Cup Finals. There was no shortage of incidents in Liberia in the aforementioned years that could be classed as ‘terrorist’ and indeed terrifying; sporting practice at times exemplified the alternatives available to conflict, yet at other times it accentuated the fault lines in what BBC political journalist Fergal Keane famously called Africa’s ‘basket case’.

Australia has been a ?lucky country?, using Donald Horne?s term from the 1960s, but without his sense of irony. Yet our world is changing fast. The 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney provided a time for national celebration. However, before the Games it was not widely known that defence and civil authorities had been working quietly to prepare for any terrorist or bioterrorist incident.

The author presents the de-classified preliminary findings of the European Commission funded FP7 research project PRIME, dealing with the extremism, radicalization and lone-actor terrorism (also known as “lone wolf terrorism”). The Article provides the partial results of the research devoted to the preparation of portfolio of lone actor extremism counter-measures requirements based on the findings of the review of existing counter-measures used to defend against lone actor extremist events. The Article concludes with a list of recommendations, which shall be considered in order to prevent, interdict and mitigate the threat of lone actor extremism and terrorism and to support public security and safety. These recommendations are based on the extensive consultations with law-enforcement and security services practitioners and Subject Matter Experts of the PRIME Project domain, representing a wide range of areas (police, intelligence, border protection, military, government, civil defence, non-governmental organizations, and the academic community) and different jurisdictions and law practices (several countries of Europe, United States, Canada, India, Japan, Georgia, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand).

Greece not a militant democracy – Constitution rejects party bans – Challenge posed by neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn – Preference for a procedural approach – Not as passive as previously thought – Proactive use of regular law – Golden Dawn charged for being a criminal organisation disguised as a political party – Questions about the political timing of the trial – Importance of judiciary independence – Why not a terrorist organization – Suspension of party funding and other restrictions against Golden Dawn – Actions by state institutions as opposed to local and civil society – How to distinguish between procedural- and militant-democratic initiatives – Political rights of convicted party leaders – Benefits and risks of procedural model

In order to repel external aggression and stabilize the economic and socio-political situation in the country in 2014, the legal regime of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) was enacted. Subsequently, the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Eastern Ukraine in April 2018 was renamed the Expanded Anti-Terrorist Operation within the Joint Forces (JFO) Operation. The issue of the responsibility of Ukraine for the damage caused to businesses by public authorities or their officials during the ATO/JFO has become relevant. Today in this above mentioned area there are serious deficiencies of the regulatory and legal support, as well as practical implementation, which complicates the mechanisms of compensation to entrepreneurs affected by the ATO/JFO. The paper shows the results of research on the compensation for damage caused to entrepreneurs by the state of Ukraine during the hostilities and/or other measures related to the law enforcement, as well as the defense of subjective civil rights of the participants in civil relations. The provisions of articles 1166 and 1167 of the Civil Code of Ukraine are analyzed in determination of grounds for liability and other provisions of paragraph 1, chapter 82 of the Civil Code of Ukraine depending on the circumstances under which the damage was caused. The civil liability of military servants during the service and combat missions is discussed and considered. It is proved that the structural subdivision of the Military Forces of Ukraine is responsible for causing damages during the service and combat missions. The particular attention is paid to the consideration of the practice of application of the current legislation of Ukraine in the area of compensation for damage caused by Ukraine to entrepreneurs. As a result of the study, the following conclusions were made. Under present conditions, the responsibility of Ukraine for damage caused to entrepreneurs by the delict of public authorities or their officials remains clearly unresolved at the regulatory level. The need to supplement the articles 1173 and 1174 of the Civil Code of Ukraine by the provision that clearly defines that the damage is reimbursed by the state of Ukraine is claimed. Key words: rights, guarantee, legal liability, institute of responsibility, reparation, state.

Organizational issues of the interdepartmental application of telemedicine technologies in the provision of medical care to patients are considered. The most significant provisions of the concept of interdepartmental application of telemedicine technologies in the organization and provision of medical care to patients in critical conditions are presented. In addition, data on telemedicine consultations on federal districts of the Russian Federation performed by the federal level of health care in 2017 are shown, the frequency of emergency telemedicine consultations is revealed depending on the disease profile of patients or the specialty of a consulting physician. Prospects for the further introduction of telemedicine technologies into daily practical activities and the possibility of their adaptation to crisis situations and military conflicts are substantiated. It has been established that in various natural disasters, accidents, catastrophes, terrorist acts and during military conflicts with a large number of victims, successful organization of medical care and medical evacuation is possible only when combined with the efforts of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of internal affairs and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters. Thus, the adequate development of telemedicine systems will increase the level of their rational and effective interdepartmental use for the benefit of saving people as Russia’s human capital.

Introduction. At the present stage of development of Ukraine, the task is to improve the defense capability of the state, to reform the Armed Forces and other military formations in accordance with the latest requirements and taking into account the experience gained during the anti-terrorist operation, as well as to develop the defense-industrial complex, which is necessary to maximally meet the needs of the Armed Forces. The success of these tasks depends to a large extent on adequate financial support, which is based on the state budget expenditures. Therefore, the issues of the dynamics and structure of these expenditures and the identification of regular tendencies in the field of defense financing are urgent, especially in the face of ongoing aggression by the Russian Federation. The purpose of the article is to study the tendencies of financial support of defense needs at the expense of the state budget of Ukraine, to substantiate on this basis the ways of improving the financing of national defense needs of the country. Results. The article deals with the dynamics and structure of expenditures of the state budget of Ukraine for defense from the point of view of their functional, economic and programmatic systematization. The current trends in the implementation of these expenditures have been identified and the problems in this area have been highlighted. Conclusions. The ways of overcoming the negative tendencies in the field of financing of national security and defense in Ukraine through improvement of budget planning, improvement of state management in the sphere of defense, increase of efficiency of financial control, formation of civil control, use of public-private partnership in the field of defense, attraction of foreign investments defense complex, ensuring transparency in the activities of military management bodies, implementation of the best foreign experience the financing needs of the defense.

The invocation of necessity as a defence for acts of civil disobedience has raised questions about the rule of law and legal certainty. The rise of radical environmental activism in the context of climate change warrants an inquiry into the scope and limitations of the defence in Canada. This paper argues that the defence of necessity significantly increases legal flexibility in Canadian environmental law. To some extent, the defence may thus enhance the law’s resilience to socio-ecological changes. However, the defence could also render the law flexible to such an extent that positive norms might lose their prescriptive value in certain circumstances. In particular, as the link connecting human activity, climate change, and consequent damage to the environment becomes clearer, there is a greater likelihood of environmental activists successfully invoking necessity to defend illegal acts aimed at curbing environmental degradation. In other words, necessity may offer a defence against the enforcement of legal frameworks de facto authorizing catastrophic environmental destruction. The prescriptive value of those legal frameworks could be critically diminished, and the resilience of the law as a normative framework may be threatened.

Abstract Australia is deeply connected to the ocean. A uniquely large island nation with a long coastline and few close neighbours, Australia benefits from an immense maritime domain, the third largest in the world. However, with relatively few maritime enforcement resources and an extreme dependence on sea bourne trade, maritime enforcement Australia faces an extremely difficult task in monitoring and ensuring compliance with national laws throughout its maritime jurisdiction. We highlight current threats to Australia’s marine environment including protection of natural resources, piracy, terrorism and illegal arrivals, and examine Australia’s capabilities, legislation and approach to combating these risks. Essential to Australia’s strategy is collaboration across domestic civil and defence agencies, use of innovative approaches and technologies, and regional and international partnerships through creative agreements and treaties.

The armed rebellion of Deputy Defense Minister Abduhalim Nazarzoda in September 2015 was a critical moment in the post-war history of Tajikistan. The rebellion, which the government blamed on the Islamic Renaissance Party, formed the justification for the Supreme Court to classify the party as a terrorist organization and arrest its leadership. While the government framed the events as a coup attempt, supported by the IRPT, the narrative had inconsistencies and Nazarzoda had been loyal to the state since the end of the civil war. Using the ideas of Carl Schmitt, who argued that sovereignty lies in the ability of a strong executive to monopolize decision-making, define when there is an emergency, and how to resolve it. In this case, president Rahmon used the the sense of emergency and threat created by the “coup” attempt to dismantle the IRPT and then have himself legally declared “Leader of the Nation.”

It is so important to consider the passive defense problem in any places there have been attacks by varies kinds of military threats and terrorists. It is certain that social security is related to overcoming on these perils and protection from country. Vital facilities are one of examples that should be protected. Vital facilities include roads, bridges, transmission lines, and telecom and media network. With attention to the intense dependent to export and transmit of oil and gas and with consideration of this point that many places are full of gas and oil resource, the protection of these lines is very important. In recent years, occurrence of varies kinds of terrorist accidents in relation to important structures in all the world causes that the explosion loads have special attention. Explosion can generate much damage with vibration in vast soil media. Thus, it is important to predict the dynamic impact load and its treatment response. With attention to regardable development of numerical methods in recent decades, it is possible to investigate the explosion effects on surface and underground structures. In this research, the newest applied method modeling of the explosion phenomenon has been investigated and comprehensive information has been earned. In this investigation, problem of explosion wave’s propagation effects on buried pipes simulated by ABAQUS/CAE 6.10-1 was studied based on the finite element method. Surface explosion effects on gas buried pipe lines and their dynamic response have been investigated depending on properties and their characteristics. The variation of buried pipe depth effects and variation effects in soil properties around pipe in different cases has been considered, and the results are here. The results showed that in buried pipes under surface explosions, displacements, major stresses, and strains decrease in clay, dense, and loose sands with increase of buried depth. These results obtain that because of increase of closuring of pipes in soil when internal friction angle increases for a kind of soil, the stress on pipe rim will decrease also. It was also observed that the pipe performance in clay and loose sands is better than that in compacted sand, respectively.

AbstractGeorge Herbert Mead's advocacy of innovative social reform was not a distinct endeavor unrelated to his pragmatist social philosophy. In fact, the convergence of social philosophy and social reform is discernable in Mead's analysis of social settlements: an analysis that led him to conclude that settlements were indispensable social organizations for promoting cooperative living and civic progress within America's emerging industrial municipalities. For Mead, the settlement was the only social organization capable of understanding the immigrant's world and explaining that world to the nonimmigrant. In 1908, Mead wrote a letter to theChicago Record Heraldendorsing the work of social settlements. He composed the letter during an era when the violent actions of some political extremists (i.e., anarchists) seemed to encourage many native-born citizens to regard all immigrants as nascent terrorists and to treat organizations created to assist immigrants, such as settlements, with distrust and hostility.Most unfortunately, theChicago Record Heraldrefused to publish Mead's letter. This article describes the historical circumstances that prompted Mead to write a letter in defense of settlements; it then reprints the original letter in its entirety, with annotations; and, it concludes by briefly noting the letter's significance in relation to Mead's other writings about social settlements.

La presente investigación comparó en función a la edad cronológica, estado civil, género y tipo de ocupación las Disposiciones Psicológicas ante los estados de emergencia de origen natural y social de 776 sujetos de Lima, cuyo tamaño de error muestral fue del 0.05, con un nivel de confianza del 0.95. La información acerca de las disposiciones psicológicas se obtuvo mediante una escala ordinal. Los datos se analizaron con el análisis de varianza para datos ordinales de una, dos y tres vías según los cruces de las variables. Las variables arriba señaladas no influyen sobre las Disposiciones Psicológicas y se puede afirmar que las reacciones de las personas son comunes en cuanto a la conservación tanto de la vida como de la integridad física. Los desastres de origen natural tales como terremotos, tsunamis e incendios son los que generan más temor en la población; el lugar preferido en caso de ocurrencia es el hogar, o volver a él a cualquier costo. Consideran a Defensa Civil, a la Cruz Roja y a los Bomberos como efectivos en la ayuda, pero esto no llega en su totalidad a los afectados y que los datos se reducen mediante la prevención. Con respecto a los desastres de origen social tales como el terrorismo, las pandillas juveniles y los asaltos a mano armada, producen mucho temor, y la reacción ante ellos es correr hacia un lugar seguro, dar la voz de alarma y hacer la denuncia respectiva.

AbstractThis study explores the influence of a government’s ideology on linguistic representation in a news agency that characterizes itself as independent. It focuses on the coverage of the Syrian civil war as reported by the Iranian news agency Fars, addressing the discursive constructions of anti-government powers in relevant online reports released between 2013 and 2015. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran was a major regional ally of the Syrian government, we questioned the extent to which ideological independence could be expected during a politically critical time frame. Taking a corpus-based linguistic approach, the study explores the semantic macrostructures representing the opposition as well as the lexical clusters and keywords characterizing the news discourse. The findings indicate that Fars’ representation of the Syrian Revolution was, to some extent, biased, despite its claimed independence of the government’s political stance. It excluded the Sunni social actors, suppressed the Islamic faction identity of the rebels and depicted the uprising as a war against foreign-backed militants. The rebels were stereotyped in terms of terrorism and non-Syrians. In addition, the analysis reveals Fars’ tendency to emphasize the power of the government, depicting it as the defender of the Arab land and foregrounding the discourse of international conspiracy against Syria. The results of this work project the dimension of media bias caused by the underpinning political perspective of media institutions.

AbstractResidents of a community who are intentionally exposed to a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological agent (including medical first-responders and other civil defense personnel who live in that community) will exhibit a spectrum of psychological reactions that will impact the management of the incident. These reactions will range from a variety of behaviors of normal people under abnormal circumstances that either will help or hinder efforts to contain the threatening agent, deliver medical care, and reduce the morbidity, mortality, and costs associated with the disaster, to the development of new, or exacerbation of preexisting, mental disorders.Anticipating the decisions that people will make and actions they will take as the crisis develops is hindered by the limited number of previous disasters that bear crucial similarities to a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction. Such actions, therefore, could serve as models to predict community reactions. One result of a study that attempted to fill in these gaps suggested that medical first-responders and their spouses/significant others may require separately crafted information and advice to reduce the potential for disharmony within the family that could affect job performance during the crisis.For those persons who exhibit emotional lability or cognitive deficits, evaluation of their psychiatric signs and symptoms may be more difficult than imagined, especially with exposure to nerve agents. Appreciation of these difficulties, and possession of the skill to sort through them, will be required of those assigned to triage stations. The allocation and utilization of mental health resources as the incident unfolds will be the responsibility of local consequence managers; these managers should be aware of the results of a recently-held workshop that attempted to reach consensus among experts in disaster mental health, based on the peer-reviewed literature, on the efficacy and safety of various approaches to early psychological interventions for victims of mass trauma and disasters.Thus, psychological factors are likely to be significant in the management of a terrorist incident that involves an agent of mass destruction. Emergency medical workers with managerial responsibilities, whether limited in scope or community-wide, should be aware of these factors, and should train to handle them through effective risk communication as part of their planning and preparation.

Em 15 de fevereiro de 2006, der Bundesverfassungsgericht instado a se pronunciar acerca da denominada Lei sobre Segurança Aérea – Luftsicherheitsgesetz, ou LuftSiG – diploma normativo promulgado em janeiro de 2005 com a finalidade de regular o abate de aeronaves civis que, controladas por seqüestradores, pudessem vir a ser utilizadas como arma, reproduzindo o modus operandi dos terroristas que derrubaram as torres do World Trade Center, no inesquecível 11 de setembro de 2001 nova-iorquino. A segurança da nação, mais uma vez, foi utilizada como mote para negar aplicação a direitos fundamentais, em especial, o direito à vida e à dignidade da pessoa humana (cláusula geral dos direitos da personalidade). De acordo com a LuftSiG, os interesses de eventuais inocentes ocupantes da aeronave sequestrada foram relegados, em nome da segurança nacional, a um segundo plano. Os ocupantes das aeronaves passíveis de abate, afirmou o Tribunal não poderem ser transformados em objetos de direito, não só no confronto com criminosos como também perante o Estado, que se veria legalmente autorizado a considerá-los como seres inanimados e desprovidos de direitos, como sujeitos. Consoante a disposição do artigo 14, III, da LuftSiG, o Estado estaria autorizado a dispor, unilateralmente, da vida dos passageiros seqüestrados, sem que a estes fosse oferecida qualquer oportunidade de resistência. Tendo por esteio a proteção à dignidade humana, valor plasmado no artigo 1º da Lei Fundamental, entendeu-se possível afastar argumentos que, em defesa da validade da Lei sobre Segurança Aérea, procuravam fazer crer, por exemplo, que o embarque em uma aeronave traria consigo o consentimento implícito com o sacrifício da própria vida na eventualidade do seqüestro e uso do avião como arma. Reafirmando o papel garantidor do Estado, defendeu o Bundesverfassungsgericht o dever que àquele assiste de proteger igualmente a vida de todas as pessoas, merecendo, este valor fundamental, o mesmo grau de proteção, independentemente de sua duração. Nada autoriza o Estado a agir como os criminosos que pretende combater; a tarefa de defender os direitos mais essenciais da sociedade não pode ser afastada, nem mesmo diante da necessidade de combater o terrorismo.

RESUMEN:El objetivo del artículo es aproximarnos a la controvertida biografía del comisario Manuel Brabo Portillo. El trabajo está basado en fuentes primarias y secundarias. El método utilizado es empírico. En el imaginario del mundo sindicalista revolucionario, Brabo Portillo era el policía más odiado, la reencarnación de la cara más turbia del Estado. Fue, así mismo, un espía alemán relacionado con el hundimiento de barcos españoles, el asesinato del empresario e ingeniero Barret y el primer jefe de los terroristas vinculados a la patronal barcelonesa. La conflictividad que afectó a España en el período de la Primera Guerra Mundial es fundamental para entender los orígenes del terrorismo vinculado al pistolerismo, que marcó la historia político social española del primer tercio del siglo XX.PALABRAS CLAVE: Brabo Portillo, pistolerismo, espionaje, sindicalismo, Primera Guerra Mundial.ABSTRACT:The objective of the article is an approach to the controversial biography of Police Chief Manuel Brabo Portillo. The work is based on primary and secondary sources. The method used is empirical. In the imagery of the revolutionary syndicalist world, Brabo Portillo was the most hated policeman, the reincarnation of the murkiest face of the state. He was also a German spy connected with the sinking of Spanish ships, the murder of businessman and engineer Josep Barret and the first head of the terrorists linked to Barcelona employers. 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En la presente edición, el lector encontrará dos líneas temáticas: Seguridad Regional, narcotráfico y nuevas amenzas; y, Escenarios alternativos de construcción de poder. Seguridad Regional, narcotráfico y nuevas amenzas Abirmos esta edición, con el artículo: “La diplomacia para la seguridad en el posicionamiento estratégico de Colombia en el ámbito de la paz y la seguridad regional: reflexiones desde el concepto de diplomacia de defensa” de Vicente Torrijos y Juan David Avella, mediante el cual, se evaluán tanto, la pertinencia práctica, como los desafíos de la nueva estrategia colombiana de inserición en el Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica, protagonizando escenarios polémicos en el ámbito de la paz y la seguridad regional y global en un futuro próximo. Analizan los objetivos y alcances de la diplomacia para la seguridad del país a la luz del concepto de diplomacia de defensa. “¿Tabú o pragmatismo? El dilema de López Obrador frente al narcotráfico”, es el artículo de Esteban Arratia Sandoval y Aldo Garrido Quiroz, quienes destacan el llamado electoral de AMLO, a aministiar personas involucradas en el narcotráfico para finalizar su lucha armada, haciendo uso de herramientas clásicas de un proceso de paz: desmovilización, reintegración y justicia transicional. Los autores desde un enfoque cualitativo resaltan las limitaciones de la propuesta, concuyéndola como una mera estrategia de contención de daños, dado que, no busca modificar la escala del mercado ilícito sino modelar su comportamiento. “La Guerra Urbana en Rio de Janeiro: De las Unidades de Policía Pacificadora a la Militarización (2008-2018)” de Carolina Sampó, Ludmila Quiros y Jessica Petrino, ubica a Río de Janeiro entre las ciudades brasileras más violentas por la dinámica de las organizaciones criminales y las políticas de seguridad implementadas para combatirlas entre los años 2008 y 2018. Sostienen que desde 2014 se vive una Guerra Urbana, donde confluyen organizaciones criminales, milicias y fuerzas estatales. Situación de inseguridad que, aunque parece concentrada en las favelas, afecta a la totalidad de la población civil. El análisis cualitativo, que también echa mano de datos cuantitativos, retiñe una alta frecuencia del uso de la violencia y, una visibilidad que pasó, de ser baja a media. “Un subcomplejo regional de seguridad contra el narcotráfico por vías marítimas: caso Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica y Panamá” de Luis Fabian Armijos Samaniego y Ricardo Medina, interpreta la formación del subcomplejo a nivel marítimo, luego de la firma de los acuerdos de la Convemar de 2016. Sustentándose en la teoría de complejos regionales de seguridad y los procesos de securitización, enfatizan que, a pesar que existe una cooperación bilateral robusta entre los Estados analizados, el proceso de formación del subcomplejo para una cooperación multilateral, se encuentra aún en un sitial embrionario, si se analizan las capacidades navales y los niveles de captura policial de narcóticos de cada país, a través de una metodología cualitativa con enfoque de rastreo histórico causal, apoyado en datos de fuentes abiertas, entrevistas, discursos y documentos oficiales, con el objetivo de interpretar el proceso de securitización de la problemática. El turno ahora para el artículo: “Inovação e Tomada de Decisão em Defesa: considerações introdutórias ao planejamento baseado em capacidades” de Luiz Maurício de Andrade da Silva, Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon, Rubens Nunes y Fábio Sahm Paggiaro, quienes investigan en las áreas de administración y economía del sector defensa, fundamentándose en la capacidad de las estrategias de base, es decir, atendiendo aspectos de microeconomía y ahorros de los costes de transacción. El artículo esta acompañado de un marco de referencia de necesidades estratégicas de defensa en Brasil, relativos a sus intereses nacionales. Siguiendo con: “América Latina y el desafío de la planificación basada en capacidades. Aportes preliminares desde la experiencia de Chile” de Gonzalo Álvarez Fuentes y Margarita Figueroa Sepúlveda, muestra las transformaciones que en el contexto estratégico, caracterizadas por la emergencia de amenazas no tradicionales, la interdependencia y la incertidumbre, han propiciado el cambio en los modelos de planificación de la defensa. Varios países, principalmente pertenecientes a la OTAN, han transitado desde el modelo tradicional de planificación basado en amenazas hacia el nuevo modelo de planificación basado en capacidades. En América Latina, solo unos cuantos países han iniciado este tránsito, que implica numerosos requerimientos y desafíos para su puesta en funcionamiento. Chile, que ha iniciado el proceso, sostiene que su implementación requiere de condiciones organizacionales y presupuestarias para una efectiva operacionalización, así como una mayor coordinación entre los diversos organismos del Estado. “Narcotráfico en América del Sur más allá del bloque andino: los casos de Argentina y Brasil” de Mariano Bartolomé y Vicente Mario Ventura Barreiro, estudia la cadena del narcotráfico en América del Sur en cuanto la Seguridad Internacional contemporánea. Alejándose de los estudios tradicionales centrados en los paises cocaleros, para analizar la situación, poco conocida, en Brasil y Argentina, contribuyendo a la actualización del Estado del Arte, desde estas dos naciones con marcada potenciaidad de consumo e insersión de estos mercados en ultramar. Usando una metodología deductiva de método cualitativo con niveles de análisis descriptivo y explicativo. Las conclusiones revelan elementos clave en materia de criminalidad: en el caso argentino, la vulnerabilidad de su frontera norte, por donde ingresan las drogas ilegales; respecto a Brasil, las preocupantes perspectivas que ofrece el grupo PCC que se encamina a constituirse en la entidad criminal más relevante del Cono Sur. Ahora, el artículo: “Reconciliation perspectives in Colombia: characterizing the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC” de Andres Eduardo Fernandez Osorio y Rocio del Pilar Pachon Pinzon, parte del acuerdo de paz de 2016 entre Farc y Estado, analizando la oposición, negatividad y resistencia de la población, fundamentándose en la inexistencia de literatura aclaratoria de los contenidos. Basado en la Matriz de Acuerdos de Paz de la Universidad de Notre Dame, explora algunas de las críticas generalizadas al comparar este acuerdo con otros, en 31 países. Los hallazgos clave sugieren que el acuerdo estudiado es el más extenso y el segundo más complejo firmado desde 1989, y su esencia puede clasificarse en cinco grupos diferentes de disposiciones. El análisis estadístico sugiere que su crítica más significativa, su complejidad, es el principal factor que obstaculiza el nivel de implementación esperado y, por lo tanto, su estabilidad debería garantizarse mediante la exploración de estrategias inventivas para obtener apoyo popular y legitimidad. El autor Jose Julio Fernandez Rodríguez, presenta: “El encuentro entre seguridad y derechos humanos: actualidad y problemas”, donde analiza de forma crítica los aspectos de la relación entre seguridad y derechos humanos, tanto desde un sentido dialéctico como desde un punto de vista complementario. Para precisar estas cuestiones también se efectúa un pequeño abordaje del tema de los límites de los derechos o del principio de proporcionalidad. Asimismo, el estudio se completa con diversas precisiones sobre las situaciones excepcionales y sobre la suspensión de derechos. De lo que se trata es de alcanzar soluciones equilibradas que siendo eficaces mantengan la calidad del sistema democrático. “Disensos e imprecisiones del concepto terrorismo: cuestionamientos a los enfoques teóricos tradicionales” de Eduardo Andrés Hogde, postula que las indefiniciones conceptuales del terrorismo – que dan paso a una serie de imprecisiones que dificultan su comprensión según los estudiosos- deben ser releídas, pues en realidad son los mismos autores quienes han establecido los elementos mínimos para comprender este fenómeno: el terrorismo se manifiesta en ataques violentos y deliberados contra civiles, perpetrados por grupos pequeños, y con importantes efectos públicos y psicológicos. Para comprobar esta hipótesis, contrasta algunas de las obras más reconocidas y citadas por la comunidad académica experta en terrorismo. Finalizamos con: “El binomio seguridad desarrollo: Algunas aproximaciones interpretativas” de John Sebastian Zapata Callejas, realiza una reconstrucción teórico-conceptual del binomio seguridad y desarrollo desde un par de marcos interpretativos basados alrededor de dos corrientes explicativas, una primera orientada al accionar internacional; y, una segunda, que busca mostrar los ejes articuladores del binomio en la contemporaneidad, el desarrollo humano y la seguridad humana. En este orden, el texto se va a dividir en cuatro momentos: una introducción que sirva como carta de navegación a la problemática; un desarrollo binomio seguridad- desarrollo desde la lógica del accionar internacional; una interpretación del binomio en la lógica de sus discursos articuladores modernos: el desarrollo humano y la seguridad humana; y, finalmente, se ofrecen las conclusiones. Escenarios alternativos de construcción de poder El novedoso artículo: “Ciberfeminismo: emergencia y características del feminismo online en Corea del Sur” de Bárbara Bavoleo y Desirée Chaure, estudia los grupos feministas online de Corea del Sur con el objetivo de contextualizar su emergencia, analizar sus características y evaluar sus acciones a nivel cultural y político. Los datos se recolectaron por mapeo y selección de sitios web, información periodística y literatura especializada y se procesaron los resultados en función de cinco dimensiones de análisis: características de los miembros de grupos ciberfeministas, tipos de colaboración, temas de interés, modalidades de la acción y posicionamiento con respecto a la comunidad LGBT. Se constató que dicho feminismo, se compone casi exclusivamente de mujeres estudiantes y profesionales; con tipos de espacio online y offline; abordando temas “sensibles” e información de difícil acceso; con una modalidad de acción entre activa (manifestaciones, uso de mirroring) y pasiva (clubs de lectura, traducciones de textos feministas), aunque prevalece la primera; y cuyo posicionamiento con respecto a la comunidad LGBT se separa entre apoyo e inclusión de sus demandas en la lucha feminista y rechazo por considerar que sólo las mujeres son sujeto de su debate. Finalizando esta primera edición del año 2019, dejamos a vuestra consideración, el artículo: “Las áreas marinas protegidas como asunto de política internacional: el escenario de la Comisión para la Conservación de los Recursos Vivos Marinos Antárticos” de Cristian Lorenzo, Ana Seitz y Diego Navarro, en el cual se analiza con una metodología cualitativa perspectiva inductiva, los documentos y materiales publicados por la CCRVMA y Reino Unido, Estados Unidos y Nueva Zelanda, por considerarlos influenciadores de la creación del área manina protegida, dentro del contexto de los efectos del calentamiento global en la geopolítica antártica. Esperando que la presente edición sea de su mayor gusto y utilidad.

Total war is involving all national components such as citizens, territories and national resources in order to defend territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national security from any threats. One of these threats is the act of terrorism which endangers the unity, sovereignty and security of the nation. Acts of terrorism are carried out to create a terror with ideological, political and religious motives and are carried out in vital objects of the state, the environment, and public facilities. One of the vital objects of a country that is prone to acts of terrorism is an airport, which is a place for various activities such as the movement of aircraft, people and goods. Moreover, an airport is a very important infrastructure in supporting the national defense. In this study, the researcher took Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport, Makassar, as the research site considering that several large cases of terrorism and radicalism have occurred in the South Sulawesi region. The objective of this study is to analyze the total war strategy carried out in the Sultan Hasanuddin Airport area as an effort to prevent acts of terrorism at the airport as a vital national object. The research method used is qualitative. The data have been collected from interviews, observations and literature study. The results of this research are in preventing terrorism, a total war strategy that is implemented has three components, including the ‘ends,’ which could prevent the acts of terrorism in Sultan Hasanuddin Airport and strengthen the national defense. The ‘means’ which is manifested in all national components, both government and private agencies, military, police and civil society, as well as facilities and infrastructure. The ‘ways’ which is the intelligence operations, strengthening cooperation between the military and civilians, strengthening synergy between ministries / agencies, training, counseling, completing security tools to prevent acts of terrorism.

The very rarity of these situations makes the legislation all the more important. Samuel Buffone, lawyer for Isabel Letelier On September 21, 1976, former Chilean Ambassador and Minister Orlando Letelier drove to his job in Washington, DC, in his Chevelle, accompanied by his coworkers, Ronni Moffitt and Michael Moffitt. As the Chevelle veered off Massachusetts Avenue into Sheridan Circle, the bottom of the car exploded upward, blowing off Letelier's legs and killing him within minutes. A short time after that, at George Washington Hospital, Ronni Moffitt died from a severed carotid artery. Michael Moffitt, sitting in the back, survived with minor injuries. Most observers of the brutal dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, which had overthrown Marxist President Salvador Allende in 1973 and jailed and then exiled Letelier, Allende's defense minister, pinned the crime on the Chilean despot, and the Departments of Justice and State came to the same conclusion within a few years. The assassination remains to this day the only instance of state-sponsored terrorism in Washington. In the 1970s and 1980s, it spawned several criminal lawsuits in the United States and Chile, the most important of which was not settled until 1995, and remnants of which continue to this day. In Chile, the case also inspired a wave of legal activism against impunity for human rights violations.

Therefore, this unit as a component of the gendarmerie is built on the principle of a military unit. The gendarmerie, one of the few state institutions in France, has been in existence for over 200 years and has a status as DOI: 10.32370/IA_2021_03_07 a significant component of the country's armed forces and is an extremely important part of the police system. The gendarmerie is subordinated to the Ministry of Defense (on the authority of the Main Directorate), and on the ground - to the command of military districts. At the same time, the gendarmerie is at the operational disposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. Significant autonomy within the Armed Forces allows the gendarmerie to combine military functions with purely police and administrative ones. The difference between police and gendarmerie is that the police are civilian civil servants. They can wear civilian clothes and trade union and political freedoms. Gendarmes also have the status of servicemen and military ranks, always in uniform, not entitled to strike and are responsible for violations in accordance with military charters - from guardians to dismissal from service (for example, for the use of alcohol "in the performance of official duties" the gendarme is threatened arrest for up to 30 days). The need for the creation of the Austrian Special Forces was conditioned by the urgency of taking measures to ensure the safety of the flow of emigrants of Jewish nationality from the former USSR since in autumn 1973 against them was committed serious terrorist act. Special unit "Cobra" enters the warehouse of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and has got a double subordination: through direct combat engagement to the head of public safety, and in relation to personnel issues and logistics - the central command of the gendarmerie of the Austrian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Among the well-known British Special Political Service (Special Air Service, or SAS) is probably the best counterterrorism unit. Its component - Special Projects (SP) team - the main anti-terrorist squad. The Special Air Service and its Counter Revolutionary Warfare Squadron (CRW) unit, the Antirevolutionary Military Squadron, were founded in 1942. The feature of training SAS servicemen is to teach each soldier to possess all methods and means of combating terrorism. To achieve this, SAS trains all of its squadron through training cycles. Acquired skills are improved later in the SP-team's combat duties. The main thing in the work is the maximum approximation of training sessions to a real combat situation in the conduct of operations on the release of hostages, in the role of which are civilians. Anti-terrorist training of SAS and the development of practical measures for the release of hostages is facilitated by the fact that high-ranking members of the British Government, including the Prime Minister, are personally involved in it.

Indonesia has a diversity of ethnic groups, as well as the various religions practiced by its people. The impact of the development of the global and regional strategic environment. Indonesia also cannot remove the influence of the development of ideologies from outside which threatens the unity of the state. The research currently being carried out is to determine the extent to which state policy programs regarding state defense can be implemented in universities in Indonesia. This is interesting given the vulnerability of students to be influenced by radical understandings currently developing. Researchers analyzed the implementation of this state defense policy using the theory of Gerorge Edward III, which analyzes the focus under study using factors, Communication, Resources, Disposition and Bureaucratic Structure. The results of the research show that the state defense policy that has been implemented so far still needs to be further improved, so far the state defense program with the civic education model is only carried out at the beginning when students enter university. Furthermore, no more citizenship programs were found. the related entities also have not found the best model so that the state defense program can be integrated and interactive. The recommendation from the current research is that state defense in universities needs to be optimized again, considering that several cases were found to involve students from high schools. Students are the nation's human resource which is very valuable to determine this nation in the future. Policies on national defense, especially the state defense program in higher education, must receive serious attention from the government, so that the younger generation, especially students, can avoid radicalism and terrorism.

<p><strong>Abstrak – </strong>Terorisme, yang berakar dari gerakan-gerakan radikal pasca peristiwa 9/11 di Amerika<strong> </strong>Serikat, mulai berkembang pesat juga di Indonesia. Gerakan radikal, terutama yang berlandaskan agama, berkembang menjadi gerakan teror yang mengancam keamanan dan pertahanan negara. Bela negara adalah bagian dari penyelenggaraan sistem pertahanan dan keamanan negara. Radikalisme, baik sebagai gerakan maupun ideologi atau paham yang berkembang di tengah masyarakat Indonesia, adalah ancaman bagi negara yang bersifat non-konvensional. Untuk itu, bela negara dapat menjadi program yang dapat mengubah budaya masyarakat agar menempatkan cinta bangsa dan negara sebagai hal yang terutama, dengan demikian dapat mencegah berkembangnya gerakan dan ideologi radikal di Indonesia. Unsur-unsur religiusitas (agama) juga dapat berperan penting dalam menangkal ancaman radikalisme jika diintegrasikan ke dalam kurikulum bela negara. Tulisan ini akan melihat bagaimana program bela negara dapat digunakan sebagai sarana mencegah ancaman radikalisme di Indonesia.</p><p><strong>Kata Kunci : </strong>bela negara, radikalisme, dan pertahanan negara</p><p> </p><p><strong><em>Abstract – </em></strong><em>Terrorism, rooted in radical movement post 9/11 event in the United States, began to grow<strong> </strong>rapidly also in Indonesia. Radical movements, especially those based on religion, evolved into terrorist movements that threaten state security and defense. Civic education is part of the implementation of state defense and security system. Radicalism, both as a movement and an ideology or a growing notion among Indonesians, is a threat to the state, that has a non-conventional nature. Therefore, civic education can be a program that can change people’s culture to put the love of the nation and the country as the main thing, thereby preventing the development of radical movements and ideology in Indonesia. The elements of religiosity (religion) can also play an important role in counteracting the threat of radicalism if it is integrated into the civic education curriculum.This paper will look at how civic education program can be used as a means of preventingthe threat of radicalism in Indonesia.</em></p><p><strong><em>Keywords: </em></strong><em>civic education, radicalism, and state defense</em></p>

This article addresses the refusal of US policy, between 2016 and 2017, to resettle Syrian refugees from the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011 and has forced millions of Syrians to migrate to neighboring countries or to the West. Thus, the hypothesis defended is that the terrorist attacks by Islamic radicals in the US contributed to the increase of prejudice and generalization regarding Arabs and Muslims and, therefore, the Syrian refugees would be conceived as probable threats to the national security. In order to verify this, we present a bibliographical review confirmed by some secondary descriptive data on the perception of the American society on the Syrian and Muslim refugees. The work of Said (1993) on Orientalism, as well as the writings of Huntington (1993, 1997) on the Clash of Civilizations, are used as theoretical reference. Finally, it is concluded that the US refusal to resettle Syrian refugees is mainly due to traumas related to Arabs and Muslims, as well as national security concerns, albeit unfounded.

On 23 August 2005, John Howard, then Prime Minister, called together Muslim ‘representatives’ from around the nation for a Muslim Summit in response to the London bombings in July of that year. One of the outcomes of the two hour summit was a Statement of Principles committing Muslim communities in Australia to resist radicalisation and pursue a ‘moderate’ Islam. Since then the ill-defined term ‘moderate Muslim’ has been used in both the political and media discourse to refer to a preferred form of Islamic practice that does not challenge the hegemony of the nation state and that is coherent with the principles of secularism. Akbarzadeh and Smith conclude that the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘mainstream’ are used to describe Muslims whom Australians should not fear in contrast to ‘extremists’. Ironically, the policy direction towards regulating the practice of Islam in Australia in favour of a state defined ‘moderate’ Islam signals an attempt by the state to mediate the practice of religion, undermining the ethos of secularism as it is expressed in the Australian Constitution. It also – arguably – impacts upon the citizenship rights of Australian Muslims in so far as citizenship presents not just as a formal set of rights accorded to an individual but also to democratic participation: the ability of citizens to enjoy those rights at a substantive level. Based on the findings of research into how Australian Muslims and members of the broader community are responding to the political and media discourses on terrorism, this article examines the impact of these discourses on how Muslims are practicing citizenship and re-defining an Australian Muslim identity. Free Speech Free speech has been a hallmark of liberal democracies ever since its defence became part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Australian Constitution does not expressly contain a provision for free speech. The right to free speech in Australia is implied in Australia’s ratification of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 19 of which affirms: Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The ultimate recent endorsement of free speech rights, arguably associated with the radical free speech ‘open platform’ movement of the 1960s at the University of California Berkeley, constructs free speech as essential to human and civil liberties. Its approach has been expressed in terms such as: “I reject and detest XYZ views but will defend to the utmost a person’s right to express them”. An active defence of free speech is based on the observation that, unless held to account, “[Authorities] would grant free speech to those with whom they agree, but not to minorities whom they consider unorthodox or threatening” (“Online Archives of California”). Such minorities, differing from the majority view, do so as a right accorded to citizens. In very challenging circumstances – such as opposing the Cold War operations of the US Senate Anti-American Activities Committee – the free speech movement has been celebrated as holding fast (or embodying a ‘return’) to the true meaning of the American First Amendment. It was in public statements of unpopular and minority views, which opposed those of the majority, that the right to free speech could most non-controvertibly be demonstrated. Some have argued that such rights should be balanced by anti-vilification legislation, by prohibitions upon incitement to violence, and by considerations as to whether the organisation defended by the speaker was banned. In the latter case, there can be problems with excluding the defence of banned organisations from legitimate debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Sinn Fein was denounced in the UK as the ‘political wing of the IRA’ (the IRA being a banned organisation) and denied a speaking position in many forums, yet has proved to be an important party in the eventual reconciliation of the Northern Ireland divide. In effect, the banning of an organisation is a political act and such acts should best be interrogated through free speech and democratic debate. Arguably, such disputation is a responsibility of an involved citizenry. In general, liberal democracies such as Australia do not hesitate to claim that citizens have a right to free speech and that this is a right worth defending. There is a legitimate expectation by Australians of their rights as citizens to freedom of expression. For some Australian Muslims, however, the appeal to free speech seems a hollow one. Muslim citizens run the risk of being constructed as ‘un-Australian’ when they articulate their concerns or opinions. Calls by some Muslim leaders not to reprint the Danish cartoons depicting images of the Prophet Mohammed for example, met with a broader community backlash and drew responses that, typically, constructed Muslims as a threat to Australian cultural values of freedom and liberty. These kinds of responses to expressions by Australian Muslims of their deeply held convictions are rarely, if ever, interpreted as attempts to curtail Australian Muslims’ rights to free speech. There is a poor fit between what many Australian Muslims believe and what they feel the current climate in Australia allows them to say in the public domain. Positioned as the potential ‘enemy within’ in the evolving media and political discourse post September 11, they have been allocated restricted speaking positions on many subjects from the role and training of their Imams to the right to request Sharia courts (which could operate in parallel with Australian courts in the same way that Catholic divorce/annulment courts do). These social and political restrictions lead them to question whether Muslims enjoy citizenship rights on an equal footing with Australians from the broader community. The following comment from an Australian woman, an Iraqi refugee, made in a research interview demonstrates this: The media say that if you are Australian it means that you enjoy freedom, you enjoy the rights of citizenship. That is the idea of what it means to be Australian, that you do those things. But if you are a Muslim, you are not Australian. You are a people who are dangerous, a people who are suspicious, a people who do not want democracy—all the characteristics that make up terrorists. So yes, there is a difference, a big difference. And it is a feeling all Muslims have, not just me, whether you are at school, at work, and especially if you wear the hijab. (Translated from Arabic by Anne Aly) At the same time, Australian Muslims observe some members of the broader community making strong assertions about Muslims (often based on misunderstanding or misinformation) with very little in the way of censure or rebuke. For example, again in 2005, Liberal backbenchers Sophie Panopoulos and Bronwyn Bishop made an emotive plea for the banning of headscarves in public schools, drawing explicitly on the historically inherited image of Islam as a violent, backward and oppressive ideology that has no place in Western liberal democracy: I fear a frightening Islamic class emerging, supported by a perverse interpretation of the Koran where disenchantment breeds disengagement, where powerful and subversive orthodoxies are inculcated into passionate and impressionable young Muslims, where the Islamic mosque becomes the breeding ground for violence and rejection of Australian law and ideals, where extremists hijack the Islamic faith with their own prescriptive and unbending version of the Koran and where extremist views are given currency and validity … . Why should one section of the community be stuck in the Dark Ages of compliance cloaked under a veil of some distorted form of religious freedom? (Panopoulos) Several studies attest to the fact that, since the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Islam, and by association Australian Muslims, have been positioned as other in the political and media discourse (see for example Aly). The construct of Muslims as ‘out of place’ (Saniotis) denies them entry and representation in the public sphere: a key requisite for democratic participation according to Habermas (cited in Haas). This notion of a lack of a context for Muslim citizenship in Australian public spheres arises out of the popular construction of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Australian’ as mutually exclusive modes of being. Denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as political citizens, Australian Muslims must pursue alternative communicative spaces. Some respond by limiting their expressions to closed spheres of communication – a kind of enforced silence. Others respond by pursuing alternative media discourses that challenge the dominant stereotypes of Muslims in Western media and reinforce majority-world cultural views. Enforced Silence In closed spheres of discussion, Australian Muslims can openly share their perceptions about terrorism, the government and media. Speaking openly in public however, is not common practice and results in forced silence for fear of reprisal or being branded a terrorist: “if we jump up and go ‘oh how dare you say this, rah, rah’, he’ll be like ‘oh he’s going to go off, he’ll blow something up’”. One research participant recalled that when his work colleagues were discussing the September 11 attacks he decided not to partake in the conversation because it “might be taken against me”. The participant made this decision despite the fact that his colleagues were expressing the opinion that United States foreign policy was the likely cause for the attacks—an opinion with which he agreed. This suggests some support for the theory that the fear of social isolation may make Australian Muslims especially anxious or fearful of expressing opinions about terrorism in public discussions (Noelle-Neumann). However, it also suggests that the fear of social isolation for Muslims is not solely related to the expression of minority opinion, as theorised in Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence . Given that many members of the wider community shared the theory that the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in 2001 may have been a response to American foreign policy, this may well not be a minority view. Nonetheless, Australian Muslims hesitated to embrace it. Saniotis draws attention to the pressure on Australian Muslims to publicly distance themselves from the terrorist attacks of September 11 and to openly denounce the actions of terrorists. The extent to which Muslims were positioned as a threatening other was contingent on their ability to demonstrate that they too participated in the distal responses to the terrorist attacks—initial pity for the sufferer and eventual marginalisation and rejection of the perceived aggressor. Australian Muslims were obliged to declare their loyalty and commitment to Australia’s ally and, in this way, partake in the nationalistic responses to the threat of terrorism. At the same time however, Australian Muslims were positioned as an imagined enemy and a threat to national identity. Australian Muslims were therefore placed in a paradoxical bind- as Australians they were expected to respond as the victims of fear; as Muslims they were positioned as the objects of fear. Even in discussions where their opinions are congruent with the dominant opinion being expressed, Australian Muslims describe themselves as feeling apprehensive or anxious about expressing their opinions because of how these “might be taken”. Pursuing alternative discourses The overriding message from the research project’s Muslim participants was that the media, as a powerful purveyor of public opinion, had inculcated a perception of Muslims as a risk to Australia and Australians: an ‘enemy within’; the potential ‘home grown terrorist’. The daily experience of visibly-different Australian Muslims, however, is that they are more fearing than fear-inspiring. The Aly and Balnaves fear scale indicates that Australian Muslims have twice as many fear indicators as non-Muslims Australians. Disengagement from Western media and media that is seen to be influenced or controlled by the West is widespread among Australian Muslims who increasingly argue that the media institutions are motivated by an agenda that includes profit and the perpetuation of a negative stereotype of Muslims both in Australia and around the globe, particularly in relation to Middle Eastern affairs. The negative stereotypes of Muslims in the Australian media have inculcated a sense of victimhood which Muslims in Australia have used as the basis for a reconstruction of their identity and the creation of alternative narratives of belonging (Aly). Central to the notion of identity among Australian Muslims is a sense of having their citizenship rights curtailed by virtue of their faith: of being included in a general Western dismissal of Muslims’ rights and experiences. As one interviewee said: If you look at the Channel Al Jazeera for example, it’s a channel but they aren’t making up stories, they are taping videos in Iraqi, Palestine and other Muslim countries, and they just show it to people, that’s all they do. And then George Bush, you know, we hear on the news that George Bush was discussing with Tony Blair that he was thinking to bomb Al Jazeera so why would these people have their right to freedom and we don’t? So that’s why I think the people who are in power, they have the control over the media, and it’s a big political game. Because if it wasn’t then George Bush, he’s the symbol of politics, why would he want to bomb Al Jazeera for example? Amidst leaks and rumours (Timms) that the 2003 US bombing of Al Jazeera was a deliberate attack upon one of the few elements of the public sphere in which some Western-nationality Muslims have confidence, many elements of the mainstream Western media rose to Al Jazeera’s defence. For example, using an appeal to the right of citizens to engage in and consume free speech, the editors of influential US paper The Nation commented that: If the classified memo detailing President Bush’s alleged proposal to bomb the headquarters of Al Jazeera is provided to The Nation, we will publish the relevant sections. Why is it so vital that this information be made available to the American people? Because if a President who claims to be using the US military to liberate countries in order to spread freedom then conspires to destroy media that fail to echo his sentiments, he does not merely disgrace his office and soil the reputation of his country. He attacks a fundamental principle, freedom of the press—particularly a dissenting and disagreeable press—upon which that country was founded. (cited in Scahill) For other Australian Muslims, it is the fact that some media organisations have been listed as banned by the US that gives them their ultimate credibility. This is the case with Al Manar, for example. Feeling that they are denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as equal political citizens, Australian Muslims are pursuing alternative communicative spaces that support and reinforce their own cultural worldviews. The act of engaging with marginalised and alternative communicative spaces constitutes what Clifford terms ‘collective practices of displaced dwelling’. It is through these practices of displaced dwelling that Australian Muslims essentialise their diasporic identity and negotiate new identities based on common perceptions of injustice against Muslims. But you look at Al Jazeera they talk in the same tongue as the Western media in our language. And then you look again at something like Al Manar who talks of their own tongue. They do not use the other media’s ideas. They have been attacked by the Australians, been attacked by the Israelis and they have their own opinion. This statement came from an Australian Muslim of Jordanian background in her late forties. It reflects a growing trend towards engaging with media messages that coincide with and reinforce a sense of injustice. The Al Manar television station to which this participant refers is a Lebanese based station run by the militant Hezbollah movement and accessible to Australians via satellite. Much like Al Jazeera, Al Manar broadcasts images of Iraqi and Palestinian suffering and, in the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, graphic images of Lebanese casualties of Israeli air strikes. Unlike the Al Jazeera broadcasts, these images are formatted into video clips accompanied by music and lyrics such as “we do not fear America”. Despite political pressure including a decision by the US to list Al Manar as a terrorist organisation in December 2004, just one week after a French ban on the station because its programming had “a militant perspective with anti-Semitic connotations” (Jorisch), Al Manar continued to broadcast videos depicting the US as the “mother of terrorism”. In one particularly graphic sequence, the Statue of Liberty rises from the depths of the sea, wielding a knife in place of the torch and dripping in blood, her face altered to resemble a skull. As she rises out of the sea accompanied by music resembling a funeral march the following words in Arabic are emblazoned across the screen: On the dead bodies of millions of native Americans And through the enslavement of tens of millions Africans The US rose It pried into the affairs of most countries in the world After an extensive list of countries impacted by US foreign policy including China, Japan, Congo, Vietnam, Peru, Laos, Libya and Guatamala, the video comes to a gruelling halt with the words ‘America owes blood to all of humanity’. Another video juxtaposes images of Bush with Hitler with the caption ‘History repeats itself’. One website run by the Coalition against Media Terrorism refers to Al Manar as ‘the beacon of hatred’ and applauds the decisions by the French and US governments to ban the station. Al Manar defended itself against the bans stating on its website that they are attempts “to terrorise and silence thoughts that are not in line with the US and Israeli policies.” The station claims that it continues on its mission “to carry the message of defending our peoples’ rights, holy places and just causes…within internationally agreed professional laws and standards”. The particular brand of propaganda employed by Al Manar is gaining popularity among some Muslims in Australia largely because it affirms their own views and opinions and offers them opportunities to engage in an alternative public space in which Muslims are positioned as the victims and not the aggressors. Renegotiating an ‘Othered’ Identity The negative portrayal of Muslims as ‘other’ in the Australian media and in political discourse has resulted in Australian Muslims constructing alternative identities based on a common perception of injustice. Particularly since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the ensuing “war on terror”, the ethnic divisions within the Muslim diaspora are becoming less significant as Australian Muslims reconstruct their identity based on a notion of supporting each other in the face of a global alliance against Islam. Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia. This causes problems, however, since religious identity has no place in the liberal democratic model, which espouses secularism. This is particularly the case where that religion is sometimes constructed as being at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy; namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. This problematic creates a context in which Muslim Australians are not only denied their heterogeneity in the media and political discourse but are dealt with through an understanding of Islam that is constructed on the basis of a cultural and ideological clash between Islam and the West. Religion has become the sole and only characteristic by which Muslims are recognised, denying them political citizenship and access to the public spaces of citizenship. Such ‘essentialising practices’ as eliding considerable diversity into a single descriptor serves to reinforce and consolidate diasporic identity among Muslims in Australia, but does little to promote and assist participatory citizenship or to equip Muslims with the tools necessary to access the public sphere as political citizens of the secular state. In such circumstances, the moderate Muslim may be not so much a ‘preferred’ citizen as one whose rights has been constrained. Acknowledgment This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. References Akbarzadeh, Shahram, and Bianca Smith. The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media (The Age and Herald Sun Newspapers). Melbourne: Monash University, 2005. Aly, Anne, and Mark Balnaves. ”‘They Want Us to Be Afraid’: Developing Metrics of the Fear of Terrorism.” International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 6 (2007): 113-122. Aly, Anne. “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42.1 (2007): 27-40. Clifford, James. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. London: Harvard UP, 1997. Haas, Tanni. “The Public Sphere as a Sphere of Publics: Rethinking Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere.” Journal of Communication 54.1 (2004): 178- 84. Jorisch, Avi. J. “Al-Manar and the War in Iraq.” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5.2 (2003). Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion.” Journal of Communication 24.2 (1974): 43-52. “Online Archives of California”. California Digital Library. n.d. Feb. 2008 < http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt1199n498/?&query= %22open%20platform%22&brand=oac&hit.rank=1 >. Panopoulos, Sophie. Parliamentary debate, 5 Sep. 2005. Feb. 2008 < http://www.aph.gov.au.hansard >. Saniotis, Arthur. “Embodying Ambivalence: Muslim Australians as ‘Other’.” Journal of Australian Studies 82 (2004): 49-58. Scahill, Jeremy. “The War on Al-Jazeera (Comment)”. 2005. The Nation. Feb. 2008 < http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051219/scahill >. Timms, Dominic. “Al-Jazeera Seeks Answers over Bombing Memo”. 2005. Media Guardian. Feb. 2008 < http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/nov/23/iraq.iraqandthemedia >.

Photograph by Gonzalo Echeverria (2010)Declaring War Soon after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration described its new grand strategy: the “Global War on Terror”. This underpinned the subsequent counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Media pundits quickly applied the Global War on Terror label to the Madrid, Bali and London bombings, to convey how Al Qaeda’s terrorism had gone transnational. Meanwhile, international relations scholars debated the extent to which September 11 had changed the international system (Brenner; Mann 303). American intellectuals adopted several variations of the Global War on Terror in what initially felt like a transitional period of US foreign policy (Burns). Walter Laqueur suggested Al Qaeda was engaged in a “cosmological” and perpetual war. Paul Berman likened Al Qaeda and militant Islam to the past ideological battles against communism and fascism (Heilbrunn 248). In a widely cited article, neoconservative thinker Norman Podhoretz suggested the United States faced “World War IV”, which had three interlocking drivers: Al Qaeda and trans-national terrorism; political Islam as the West’s existential enemy; and nuclear proliferation to ‘rogue’ countries and non-state actors (Friedman 3). Podhoretz’s tone reflected a revival of his earlier Cold War politics and critique of the New Left (Friedman 148-149; Halper and Clarke 56; Heilbrunn 210). These stances attracted widespread support. For instance, the United States Marine Corp recalibrated its mission to fight a long war against “World War IV-like” enemies. Yet these stances left the United States unprepared as the combat situations in Afghanistan and Iraq worsened (Ricks; Ferguson; Filkins). Neoconservative ideals for Iraq “regime change” to transform the Middle East failed to deal with other security problems such as Pakistan’s Musharraf regime (Dorrien 110; Halper and Clarke 210-211; Friedman 121, 223; Heilbrunn 252). The Manichean and open-ended framing became a self-fulfilling prophecy for insurgents, jihadists, and militias. The Bush Administration quietly abandoned the Global War on Terror in July 2005. Widespread support had given way to policymaker doubt. Why did so many intellectuals and strategists embrace the Global War on Terror as the best possible “grand strategy” perspective of a post-September 11 world? Why was there so little doubt of this worldview? This is a debate with roots as old as the Sceptics versus the Sophists. Explanations usually focus on the Bush Administration’s “Vulcans” war cabinet: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who later became Secretary of State (Mann xv-xvi). The “Vulcans” were named after the Roman god Vulcan because Rice’s hometown Birmingham, Alabama, had “a mammoth fifty-six foot statue . . . [in] homage to the city’s steel industry” (Mann x) and the name stuck. Alternatively, explanations focus on how neoconservative thinkers shaped the intellectual climate after September 11, in a receptive media climate. Biographers suggest that “neoconservatism had become an echo chamber” (Heilbrunn 242) with its own media outlets, pundits, and think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and Project for a New America. Neoconservatism briefly flourished in Washington DC until Iraq’s sectarian violence discredited the “Vulcans” and neoconservative strategists like Paul Wolfowitz (Friedman; Ferguson). The neoconservatives' combination of September 11’s aftermath with strongly argued historical analogies was initially convincing. They conferred with scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington and Victor Davis Hanson to construct classicist historical narratives and to explain cultural differences. However, the history of the decade after September 11 also contains mis-steps and mistakes which make it a series of contingent decisions (Ferguson; Bergen). One way to analyse these contingent decisions is to pose “what if?” counterfactuals, or feasible alternatives to historical events (Lebow). For instance, what if September 11 had been a chemical and biological weapons attack? (Mann 317). Appendix 1 includes a range of alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events which occurred. Collectively, these counterfactuals suggest the role of agency, chance, luck, and the juxtaposition of better and worse outcomes. They pose challenges to the classicist interpretation adopted soon after September 11 to justify “World War IV” (Podhoretz). A ‘Two-Track’ Process for ‘World War IV’ After the September 11 attacks, I think an overlapping two-track process occurred with the “Vulcans” cabinet, neoconservative advisers, and two “echo chambers”: neoconservative think-tanks and the post-September 11 media. Crucially, Bush’s “Vulcans” war cabinet succeeded in gaining civilian control of the United States war decision process. Although successful in initiating the 2003 Iraq War this civilian control created a deeper crisis in US civil-military relations (Stevenson; Morgan). The “Vulcans” relied on “politicised” intelligence such as a United Kingdom intelligence report on Iraq’s weapons development program. The report enabled “a climate of undifferentiated fear to arise” because its public version did not distinguish between chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (Halper and Clarke, 210). The cautious 2003 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) report on Iraq was only released in a strongly edited form. For instance, the US Department of Energy had expressed doubts about claims that Iraq had approached Niger for uranium, and was using aluminium tubes for biological and chemical weapons development. Meanwhile, the post-September 11 media had become a second “echo chamber” (Halper and Clarke 194-196) which amplified neoconservative arguments. Berman, Laqueur, Podhoretz and others who framed the intellectual climate were “risk entrepreneurs” (Mueller 41-43) that supported the “World War IV” vision. The media also engaged in aggressive “flak” campaigns (Herman and Chomsky 26-28; Mueller 39-42) designed to limit debate and to stress foreign policy stances and themes which supported the Bush Administration. When former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey’s claimed that Al Qaeda had close connections to Iraqi intelligence, this was promoted in several books, including Michael Ledeen’s War Against The Terror Masters, Stephen Hayes’ The Connection, and Laurie Mylroie’s Bush v. The Beltway; and in partisan media such as Fox News, NewsMax, and The Weekly Standard who each attacked the US State Department and the CIA (Dorrien 183; Hayes; Ledeen; Mylroie; Heilbrunn 237, 243-244; Mann 310). This was the media “echo chamber” at work. The group Accuracy in Media also campaigned successfully to ensure that US cable providers did not give Al Jazeera English access to US audiences (Barker). Cosmopolitan ideals seemed incompatible with what the “flak” groups desired. The two-track process converged on two now infamous speeches. US President Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech included a line from neoconservative David Frumm about North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an “Axis of Evil” (Dorrien 158; Halper and Clarke 139-140; Mann 242, 317-321). Powell’s presentation to the United Nations included now-debunked threat assessments. In fact, Powell had altered the speech’s original draft by I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, who was Cheney’s chief of staff (Dorrien 183-184). Powell claimed that Iraq had mobile biological weapons facilities, linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Mohamed El-Baradei, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Institute for Science and International Security all strongly doubted this claim, as did international observers (Dorrien 184; Halper and Clarke 212-213; Mann 353-354). Yet this information was suppressed: attacked by “flak” or given little visible media coverage. Powell’s agenda included trying to rebuild an international coalition and to head off weather changes that would affect military operations in the Middle East (Mann 351). Both speeches used politicised variants of “weapons of mass destruction”, taken from the counterterrorism literature (Stern; Laqueur). Bush’s speech created an inflated geopolitical threat whilst Powell relied on flawed intelligence and scientific visuals to communicate a non-existent threat (Vogel). However, they had the intended effect on decision makers. US Under-Secretary of Defense, the neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, later revealed to Vanity Fair that “weapons of mass destruction” was selected as an issue that all potential stakeholders could agree on (Wilkie 69). Perhaps the only remaining outlet was satire: Armando Iannucci’s 2009 film In The Loop parodied the diplomatic politics surrounding Powell’s speech and the civil-military tensions on the Iraq War’s eve. In the short term the two track process worked in heading off doubt. The “Vulcans” blocked important information on pre-war Iraq intelligence from reaching the media and the general public (Prados). Alternatively, they ignored area specialists and other experts, such as when Coalition Provisional Authority’s L. Paul Bremer ignored the US State Department’s fifteen volume ‘Future of Iraq’ project (Ferguson). Public “flak” and “risk entrepreneurs” mobilised a range of motivations from grief and revenge to historical memory and identity politics. This combination of private and public processes meant that although doubts were expressed, they could be contained through the dual echo chambers of neoconservative policymaking and the post-September 11 media. These factors enabled the “Vulcans” to proceed with their “regime change” plans despite strong public opposition from anti-war protestors. Expressing DoubtsMany experts and institutions expressed doubt about specific claims the Bush Administration made to support the 2003 Iraq War. This doubt came from three different and sometimes overlapping groups. Subject matter experts such as the IAEA’s Mohamed El-Baradei and weapons development scientists countered the UK intelligence report and Powell’s UN speech. However, they did not get the media coverage warranted due to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics. Others could challenge misleading historical analogies between insurgent Iraq and Nazi Germany, and yet not change the broader outcomes (Benjamin). Independent journalists one group who gained new information during the 1990-91 Gulf War: some entered Iraq from Kuwait and documented a more humanitarian side of the war to journalists embedded with US military units (Uyarra). Finally, there were dissenters from bureaucratic and institutional processes. In some cases, all three overlapped. In their separate analyses of the post-September 11 debate on intelligence “failure”, Zegart and Jervis point to a range of analytic misperceptions and institutional problems. However, the intelligence community is separated from policymakers such as the “Vulcans”. Compartmentalisation due to the “need to know” principle also means that doubting analysts can be blocked from releasing information. Andrew Wilkie discovered this when he resigned from Australia’s Office for National Assessments (ONA) as a transnational issues analyst. Wilkie questioned the pre-war assessments in Powell’s United Nations speech that were used to justify the 2003 Iraq War. Wilkie was then attacked publicly by Australian Prime Minister John Howard. This overshadowed a more important fact: both Howard and Wilkie knew that due to Australian legislation, Wilkie could not publicly comment on ONA intelligence, despite the invitation to do so. This barrier also prevented other intelligence analysts from responding to the “Vulcans”, and to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics in the media and neoconservative think-tanks. Many analysts knew that the excerpts released from the 2003 NIE on Iraq was highly edited (Prados). For example, Australian agencies such as the ONA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Defence knew this (Wilkie 98). However, analysts are trained not to interfere with policymakers, even when there are significant civil-military irregularities. Military officials who spoke out about pre-war planning against the “Vulcans” and their neoconservative supporters were silenced (Ricks; Ferguson). Greenlight Capital’s hedge fund manager David Einhorn illustrates in a different context what might happen if analysts did comment. Einhorn gave a speech to the Ira Sohn Conference on 15 May 2002 debunking the management of Allied Capital. Einhorn’s “short-selling” led to retaliation from Allied Capital, a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and growing evidence of potential fraud. If analysts adopted Einhorn’s tactics—combining rigorous analysis with targeted, public denunciation that is widely reported—then this may have short-circuited the “flak” and “echo chamber” effects prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The intelligence community usually tries to pre-empt such outcomes via contestation exercises and similar processes. This was the goal of the 2003 NIE on Iraq, despite the fact that the US Department of Energy which had the expertise was overruled by other agencies who expressed opinions not necessarily based on rigorous scientific and technical analysis (Prados; Vogel). In counterterrorism circles, similar disinformation arose about Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons research after its sarin gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system on 20 March 1995 (Leitenberg). Disinformation also arose regarding nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors in the 1990s (Stern). Interestingly, several of the “Vulcans” and neoconservatives had been involved in an earlier controversial contestation exercise: Team B in 1976. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assembled three Team B groups in order to evaluate and forecast Soviet military capabilities. One group headed by historian Richard Pipes gave highly “alarmist” forecasts and then attacked a CIA NIE about the Soviets (Dorrien 50-56; Mueller 81). The neoconservatives adopted these same tactics to reframe the 2003 NIE from its position of caution, expressed by several intelligence agencies and experts, to belief that Iraq possessed a current, covert program to develop weapons of mass destruction (Prados). Alternatively, information may be leaked to the media to express doubt. “Non-attributable” background interviews to establishment journalists like Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward achieved this. Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange has recently achieved notoriety due to US diplomatic cables from the SIPRNet network released from 28 November 2010 onwards. Supporters have favourably compared Assange to Daniel Ellsberg, the RAND researcher who leaked the Pentagon Papers (Ellsberg; Ehrlich and Goldsmith). Whilst Elsberg succeeded because a network of US national papers continued to print excerpts from the Pentagon Papers despite lawsuit threats, Assange relied in part on favourable coverage from the UK’s Guardian newspaper. However, suspected sources such as US Army soldier Bradley Manning are not protected whilst media outlets are relatively free to publish their scoops (Walt, ‘Woodward’). Assange’s publication of SIPRNet’s diplomatic cables will also likely mean greater restrictions on diplomatic and military intelligence (Walt, ‘Don’t Write’). Beyond ‘Doubt’ Iraq’s worsening security discredited many of the factors that had given the neoconservatives credibility. The post-September 11 media became increasingly more critical of the US military in Iraq (Ferguson) and cautious about the “echo chamber” of think-tanks and media outlets. Internet sites for Al Jazeera English, Al-Arabiya and other networks have enabled people to bypass “flak” and directly access these different viewpoints. Most damagingly, the non-discovery of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction discredited both the 2003 NIE on Iraq and Colin Powell’s United Nations presentation (Wilkie 104). Likewise, “risk entrepreneurs” who foresaw “World War IV” in 2002 and 2003 have now distanced themselves from these apocalyptic forecasts due to a series of mis-steps and mistakes by the Bush Administration and Al Qaeda’s over-calculation (Bergen). The emergence of sites such as Wikileaks, and networks like Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya, are a response to the politics of the past decade. They attempt to short-circuit past “echo chambers” through providing access to different sources and leaked data. The Global War on Terror framed the Bush Administration’s response to September 11 as a war (Kirk; Mueller 59). Whilst this prematurely closed off other possibilities, it has also unleashed a series of dynamics which have undermined the neoconservative agenda. The “classicist” history and historical analogies constructed to justify the “World War IV” scenario are just one of several potential frameworks. “Flak” organisations and media “echo chambers” are now challenged by well-financed and strategic alternatives such as Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya. Doubt is one defence against “risk entrepreneurs” who seek to promote a particular idea: doubt guards against uncritical adoption. Perhaps the enduring lesson of the post-September 11 debates, though, is that doubt alone is not enough. What is needed are individuals and institutions that understand the strategies which the neoconservatives and others have used, and who also have the soft power skills during crises to influence critical decision-makers to choose alternatives. Appendix 1: Counterfactuals Richard Ned Lebow uses “what if?” counterfactuals to examine alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events that occurred. The following counterfactuals suggest that the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror could have evolved very differently . . . or not occurred at all. Fact: The 2003 Iraq War and 2001 Afghanistan counterinsurgency shaped the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 grand strategy. Counterfactual #1: Al Gore decisively wins the 2000 U.S. election. Bush v. Gore never occurs. After the September 11 attacks, Gore focuses on international alliance-building and gains widespread diplomatic support rather than a neoconservative agenda. He authorises Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and works closely with the Musharraf regime in Pakistan to target Al Qaeda’s muhajideen. He ‘contains’ Saddam Hussein’s Iraq through measurement and signature, technical intelligence, and more stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Minimal Rewrite: United 93 crashes in Washington DC, killing senior members of the Gore Administration. Fact: U.S. Special Operations Forces failed to kill Osama bin Laden in late November and early December 2001 at Tora Bora. Counterfactual #2: U.S. Special Operations Forces kill Osama bin Laden in early December 2001 during skirmishes at Tora Bora. Ayman al-Zawahiri is critically wounded, captured, and imprisoned. The rest of Al Qaeda is scattered. Minimal Rewrite: Osama bin Laden’s death turns him into a self-mythologised hero for decades. Fact: The UK Blair Government supplied a 50-page intelligence dossier on Iraq’s weapons development program which the Bush Administration used to support its pre-war planning. Counterfactual #3: Rogue intelligence analysts debunk the UK Blair Government’s claims through a series of ‘targeted’ leaks to establishment news sources. Minimal Rewrite: The 50-page intelligence dossier is later discovered to be correct about Iraq’s weapons development program. Fact: The Bush Administration used the 2003 National Intelligence Estimate to “build its case” for “regime change” in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Counterfactual #4: A joint investigation by The New York Times and The Washington Post rebuts U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United National Security Council, delivered on 5 February 2003. Minimal Rewrite: The Central Intelligence Agency’s whitepaper “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (October 2002) more accurately reflects the 2003 NIE’s cautious assessments. Fact: The Bush Administration relied on Ahmed Chalabi for its postwar estimates about Iraq’s reconstruction. Counterfactual #5: The Bush Administration ignores Chalabi’s advice and relies instead on the U.S. State Department’s 15 volume report “The Future of Iraq”. Minimal Rewrite: The Coalition Provisional Authority appoints Ahmed Chalabi to head an interim Iraqi government. Fact: L. Paul Bremer signed orders to disband Iraq’s Army and to De-Ba’athify Iraq’s new government. Counterfactual #6: Bremer keeps Iraq’s Army intact and uses it to impose security in Baghdad to prevent looting and to thwart insurgents. Rather than a De-Ba’athification policy, Bremer uses former Baath Party members to gather situational intelligence. Minimal Rewrite: Iraq’s Army refuses to disband and the De-Ba’athification policy uncovers several conspiracies to undermine the Coalition Provisional Authority. AcknowledgmentsThanks to Stephen McGrail for advice on science and technology analysis.References Barker, Greg. “War of Ideas”. PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2007. ‹http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/newswar/video1.html› Benjamin, Daniel. “Condi’s Phony History.” Slate 29 Aug. 2003. ‹http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/pagenum/all/›. Bergen, Peter L. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al Qaeda. New York: The Free Press, 2011. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. 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