Academic literature on the topic 'Terrorist organizations – Nigeria'

Terrorism financing has become a threat to humanity and democracy in Africa. Most terrorist organizations in Africa need money to carry out their massacre activities, which threatens African democracy, political stability, and economic development. The wave of terrorism activities and terrorism financing in Africa have remained a major cause for concern. The pervasive widespread of terrorist attacks seem to have defile all situations. Apparently, in Nigeria, terrorist attack reports have become a daily menu. The lethal killings by Boko Haram in Nigeria can be likened to the era of the Nigerian Civil war. This paper therefore, compares and contrasts the terrorism financing vis-à-vis the nascent democracy in Africa with a focus on Nigerian cases of Boko Haram. Terrorism financing misrepresents democratic growth and economic development in Africa, which brought about a rise in terrorist widespread and negative financial growth and progress in Nigeria and Africa. The multi-dimensional of terrorist financing has brought difficulties to trace terrorist funds due to legitimize illegal sourcing of funds to terrorist accounts. The paper finds that the current wave of terrorism financing have made African democracy unstable and pathetically feeble.
 Keywords: Terrorism, financing, security, democracy

Suicide terrorism has been on the rise in most parts of the world after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Ghana as a country is yet to experience any acts of terrorism but recent events in some parts of Northern Nigeria, Kenya, and Somalia and in the Arabian Peninsula have given policymakers a great concern. Some African Muslims with ties to radical Islamic organizations have embraced this phenomenon as a means of settling their grievances. This article attempts to examine the phenomenon of suicide terrorism from the perspectives of Muslims in Northern Ghana. The paper discusses some of the rationale behind the phenomenon and various efforts that have been made to address the psychology behind the phenomenon. It was established that individual psychopathology alone is not the only reason for suicide terrorism but intertwined with other social conditions. In order to develop the appropriate responses and policies to protect the people, there is the need to understand these social conditions. It concludes by discussing the reason why adopting combative approach to the issue has not worked and recommends the use of economic development as well as cultural integration in changing the psychology behind the phenomenon.Keywords: suicide terrorism, psychopathology, homegrwon terrorists; lonewolf terrorists

Among issues of the US-Africa summit in August 2014 the problem of religious extremism in Africa was most important. In that context Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram plays a significant role. Kidnapping by Boko Haram militants of about 200 schoolgirls in April 2014 added oil to the fire. This action increased the fears of international community about possible linkage between Boko Haram and foreign Al Qaeda-like terrorist organizations. Initially, the group emerged as a local movement of devout Muslims in Northern Nigeria. But eventually it became a very radical militant Salafi-Jihadist group with ambitious goal to build an Islamic state in Nigeria. As is well-known, Nigerian population is divided not only into relatively rich South and poor North, but also into Christian and Muslim communities. As a result of sectarian clashes in Nigeria, thousands people lost their lives. The sectarian violence in this country is connected in part with the Islamist revolt of 1999 (“Sharia conflict”), after adoption of Sharia law in several Northern Nigerian states. Ethnic-religious violence in Nigeria is connected in particular with the British colonial heritage, but also with current serious social-economic problems (including the unemployment, corruption, cruelty of security services, unbalanced national economy etc.). From some point of view Nigeria may be considered even as a “failed state” because its federal government cannot control the whole territory of the country. While some southern regions are under control of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta militants, some areas in northern states are controlled by Islamists of Boko Haram and other radical groups. It's possible to say that Boko Haram has created its own “state within the state”. Boko Haram's ideology is anti-Western and anti-secular. It supports the revival of “pure” Islamic traditional values. Denying any inter-communion with the Western world, above all, the group claims against corrupted – from its point of view – Nigerian authorities and Muslim establishment (local version of the Islamist "Close Enemy"). An issue of the Boko Haram's engagement to global Jihadist movement is rather unclear. On one hand, ideologically, the group is very close to other Islamist groups (e.g. Al Qaeda and its branches in Maghreb, Somalia and Arabic Peninsula). But on the other hand, Boko Haram prefers to act against domestic (Nigerian) targets with very rare exclusions (for instance, an explosion of UN building in the capital-city Abuja). It must be clear that some attempts to find links between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda's network reflect the interest of Nigeria's authority to win international support for its struggle against local Islamist radicals. But it is impossible to ignore the information about logistical and operational links between Nigerian militants and such terrorist organizations as “Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb” or Somalian “Al Shaabab” (not to speak of common ideological agenda). It is necessary to point out that factional splits inside of Boko Haram (e.g. the emergence of the militant group “Ansaru”) make the picture more complex. Actually, the Boko Haram constitutes a danger primarily for Nigeria and potentially for neighboring countries. But considering the current evolution of the group, there is a great danger of further radicalization and internationalization of its activities both at local and regional (and maybe global) levels.

The first part of this article provides an overview of the development of entrenched armed conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa which continue or have resurfaced in 2016. The author (JVdB) aims to expose the underlying causes and nature of the violent contestation by drawing of the works of C. T. Call in order to break open the black box of ‘failed states’ and analyze their legitimacy, capacity and security gaps separately. In addition the author will provide short scenarios of how these conflicts are likely to evolve in the short and medium-term and which (structural) factors will dominate these trends. The second part of this article (by JR) mainly aims at presenting the basic preconditions for the activities of the major terrorist organizations in Africa. With emphasis on the importance of the north-east and north-west regions of this continent in context of terrorist threats. Hence the initial focus was put on Somalia, which as a permanent fragile state remains under the increased influence of the Jihadist organization Al Shabaab, which is an organization with a high potential for increased capacity in the coming years. Next, was sketched out the situation in Egypt, considering, in essence, the activity of the so-called Islamic State in Sinai Peninsula. In this Analysis it also pointed to the intricate internal situation in modern Libya after so-called Arab Spring and international military intervention, where, despite earlier appearances, the terrorist threat was too much positioned, mostly by comprised to the internal conflict between the different Libyan political parties. Finally, efforts were made to illustrate the current terrorist activity in the Mali area, highlighting the importance of Al Qaeda branch AQIM and the situation in Nigeria where Boko Haram group operates.

Political instability is growing in sub-Saharan Africa. The situation has left the Sahelian countries increasingly vulnerable to insecurity resulting from armed conflicts, terrorist activities, illicit trafficking and related organized crime, ecological crisis, «resource» wars and the like. These new global and regional challenges superimposed on traditional factors, provoking conflicts (social polarization, widespread corruption, coupled with the inability of the involved governments to deliver basic services, weak administration and other). At the same time, chronic political instability is a direct result of the lack of institutionalized political dialogue, of national consensus on strategy of national security and, also, because of the continuing unwillingness of the ruling elites to engage in the development of peripheral areas. Crises in Mali and Nigeria have clearly demonstrated the «fragility» of sub-Saharan states in the face of these threats. The scale of problems in the Sahel is so great that the United Nations has proposed a new conceptual and organizational approach to their solution. Nowhere is the development–security nexus more evident than in the Sahel. Major emphasis is placed on integrated and coordinated implementation of measures in the field of security and development in the region and regional and interregional cooperation among Sahelian, West African and Maghreb states. The UN declares a top priority of “partner peacekeeping", which is based on the cooperation of the UN as the main actor with international regional organizations – the EU, AU, ECOWAS, financial institutions and donor countries as well as other bilateral partners. Currently, ensuring a coherent and mutually supportive peacekeeping of the UN and the AU becomes most urgent issue for the organizations, since the relations between them are characterized by mistrust and tension.

This paper is geared toward analyzing the patterns and dynamics of the Boko Haram attacks and the challenges they caused to the country's security. The report uses the assumptions of the instrumental approach, which states that the purpose of terrorism is to bring about insecurity in an actor's environment. The pattern of terrorism follows an action-reaction process. Thereby it responds to what Government does. It also utilizes the data collected from secondary sources and qualitatively analyses it. The paper discovered that Boko Haram, a proscribed international terrorist organization, is continuously posing serious security challenges to Nigeria that have resulted in the loss of over 30.000 lives and the destruction of public and private properties worth billions of US dollars. The group has committed itself to asymmetric warfare. Since its re-emergence, it had tried to mimic and adopt the tactics and strategies of global Salafist movements, which manifested in armed assaults, bombings, and abductions. The paper recommended that a comprehensive approach be adopted that would take care of both kinetic and non-kinetic measures to end the menace of terrorism in Nigeria. Training and retraining of security personnel on asymmetric warfare are required to balance the increasing adaptability of the terrorists.

Abstract Boko Haram is no regular terrorist organization; although not as widely-known as the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has been declared the deadliest terror group of 2014. Fortunately, the organization seems to currently be on the run; and the successes of the Nigerian government in countering it have been founded on a timely understanding of its modus operandi. This paper represents an inventory and an analysis of the main tactics employed by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon during the spike of its insurgence, between the years 2009-2014. Acknowledging these tactics in a timely manner did not only contribute in a significant manner to the present defeat of Boko Haram, as it may also be of use to governments from other countries in anticipating and efficiently thwarting future terrorist plots.

This study uses a systems dynamic approach to understand how the attacks conducted by Boko Haram influence the group’s growth. Boko Haram originated in the early 2000s under Muhammad Yusuf, but the group did not become known for its violence until 2009 (Oftedal, 2013). In 2013, the United States designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (U.S. Department of State, 2013). The Nigerian government’s efforts to eliminate the group’s influence in northern Nigeria and neighboring countries has not been successful. As Africa enters the world spotlight, the need for curbing the influence of Boko Haram strengthens. The system dynamics modeling process provides a method of understanding the relationships within the underlying structures that drive the scope of influence of Boko Haram, including organizational growth, media coverage, and attack efficacy. A formalized system dynamics model provides a basis for policy recommendations to counteract the group’s efforts.

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity.
 Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

With the evolving problems of terrorism in Nigeria and the formation of numerous new terrorist groups, insurgency in Nigeria has escalated, making it one of the most terrorized countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This study looked critically at the effects of the strategies applied in the attempt to fight terrorism and how these strategies have affected insurgency in Nigeria. The background of the study gives an insight on the evolution of terrorist groups in Nigeria, their mode of operation, effects on citizens and the Nigerian economy, as well as the operations of counterterrorist agencies. The qualitative research method was used for this study. Critical theory and resource dependence theory were applied, and data were obtained through face-to-face and telephone interviews with 7 stakeholders. Detailed recommendations are made to aid counterterrorist agencies in developing and applying additional and effective workable strategies in their fight against terrorism. Policies in Nigeria were recommended that may discourage terrorism initiations and center the focus of youth towards nation-building. Social problems were identified connecting young people as the primary causes of terrorism in Nigeria. Solid recommendations in this direction have been provided to ensure youths across the country who form a vulnerable population and are the targets of terrorist sect recruitment are protected and provided with effective tools to prevent their conscription, while engaging them positively in becoming knowledgeable and self-reliant citizens.

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts of International Relations in the Faculty of Humanities Department of International Relations, Johannesburg 2017<br>The growing role of Private Military Companies (P.M.C) has led to a magnitude of security concerns internationally. Due to their past reputation, P.M.Cs have been demonised by the international community in the form of scholars as well as journalists, as their personnel have been misunderstood for mercenaries (De Nevers 2009). It is therefore important to clarify the difference between contractors and mercenaries. However due to the growth of different actors and security threats, Private Military Companies have emerged as an effective alternative solution in engaging non-traditional threats in the international arena, a role states have increasingly failed in. Private Military Companies have become more successful in applying counterinsurgency tactics due to their structural setup, skills and expertise as well as technological advancement and understanding of warfare. This has led to an increase in reliance from states including the United States, Angola, and more recently Nigeria. Through the examination of the Nigerian case study, the thesis paper aims to understand how the P.M.C (S.T.T.E.P) was able to apply its COIN tactics effectively in combating Boko Haram. It is important to examine the Nigerian case study as P.M.C success could possibly be used to combat the proliferation of terrorist manoeuvres such as Al-Shabaab. The Nigerian case is also important as it displays how S.T.T.E.P working together with the N.D.F could strengthen their COIN campaign against Boko Haram.<br>XL2018

Maritime piracy—like civil war, terrorism, and organized crime—is a problem of weak states. Surprisingly, though, pirates do not operate in the least-governed areas of weak states. Pirate Lands addresses this puzzle by explaining why some coastal communities experience more pirate attacks in their vicinity than others. Pirates do well in places where elites and law enforcement can be bribed, but they also need access to functioning roads, ports, and markets. Using statistical analyses of cross-national and subnational data on pirate attacks in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Somalia, the authors detail how governance at the state and local levels explains the location of maritime piracy. Pirate Lands employs geospatial tools to rigorously measure how local political capacity and infrastructure affect maritime piracy. The authors find that pirates operate in areas where local governance is weak enough to incentivize collusion among pirates and local authorities yet strong enough to ensure that infrastructure and markets are sufficiently developed to permit the organization of sustained piracy. Interviews with former pirates, community members, and maritime security experts based on field research in Indonesia and Nigeria complement the quantitative findings. Pirate Lands offers the first comprehensive, social scientific account of maritime piracy.

Currently in Nigeria, different crimes ranging from ethnic clashes, domestic violence, burglary, financial fraud, kidnapping, pipe-line vandalism, and random killings by terrorist organizations, to mention a few, continue to plague the country. The conventional system of intelligence and crime record have failed to live up to the expectations as a result of limited security personnel, deficiency in effective information technology strategies, and infrastructures for gathering, storing, and analyzing data for accurate prediction, decision support, and prevention of crimes. There is presently no information system in Nigeria that provides a central database that is capable of storing the spatial distribution of various acts of terrorism based on the location where the crime is committed. This chapter presents the design of an information system that can be used by security agents for the storage and retrieval of criminal acts of terrorism in order to provide improved decision support regarding solving and preventing criminal acts of terrorism in Nigeria using modern technologies.