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1
K. Armstrong, Charles. "Trends in the Study of North Korea." Journal of Asian Studies 70, no. 2 (May 2011): 357–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911811000027.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Il can be criticized for many failings, but if one of his goals has been keeping his country in the global media spotlight, he has been wildly successful. Of course, North Korea gets this international attention for all the wrong reasons: military provocations, a clandestine nuclear program, a bankrupt economy, an atrocious record on human rights, and an eccentric if not deranged leadership. Some of the accusations leveled against North Korea in the Western media and popular press may have a basis in fact, others are more questionable. But until recently, substantive knowledge of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was notable mainly for its absence. Before the 1990s, little was written about the DPRK beyond official North Korean propaganda and its opposite, anti-North Korean propaganda from the South. Much of this has changed, both because of new sources of information (including material from North Korea's former communist allies), but more importantly because of the growing interest in the subject after South Korean democratization in the late 1980s and the first US-North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s.
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Cha, Victor D. "The North Korea Question." Asian Survey 56, no. 2 (March 2016): 243–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.2.243.
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The North Korean state under a young and unproven leader faces severe challenges. The regime will not change because of a leadership transition or because of the West’s hope of reform. It could crack because its ideology is at odds with the country’s incremental societal change.
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Ren, Xiao. "Managing volatile asymmetry: China’s emergence from the Korean dilemma." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23, no. 2 (January 9, 2021): 337–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148120980159.
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Among the most complicated issues in contemporary Chinese foreign policy is that of the Korean Peninsula and North Korea in particular. Critics have long complained, often internally, that China dare not use, and did not know how to use, the leverage it possessed. Why was this the case given that the relationship with North Korea is an asymmetric one with China the much more powerful side? Has China managed this asymmetry better more recently, and why? This article tries to address these questions. The relationship changed significantly in recent years when the Xi Jinping leadership decided to take unprecedented measures. Those actions have been consequential. China has emerged from being embarrassed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile development to re-establishing itself as central to Korean and Northeast Asian security.
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Min, Woo-Jun, and Sukhee Han. "Economic sanctions against North Korea: The pivotal role of US–China cooperation." International Area Studies Review 23, no. 2 (March 19, 2020): 177–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2233865920901896.
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At the beginning of 2018, North Korea halted its long-range nuclear- and ballistic-missile development programs and announced that it was willing to denuclearize. Soon afterwards, it reached out to countries including the US, China and South Korea. This sudden change in behavior marked the end of six years of extreme isolation under Kim Jong-un’s leadership. To explain why North Korea decided to reach out when it did, the present study examines the 2006–2018 economic sanctions levied on North Korea under the US maximum-pressure policy, carried out partly in cooperation with China. The findings suggest that economic sanctions were ineffective between 2006 and 2016 for two reasons: the lack of cooperation between the US and China, and China’s policy of assisting North Korea. In 2006–2016, China and North Korea had shared values and high volumes of trade; there were no clear signs of cooperation between the US and China. However, as trade between China and North Korea began to decrease in late 2017 and early 2018, there were signs of cooperation between the US and China, and changes in North Korean behavior. North Korea came to the negotiating table largely to lift the economic sanctions, which were strengthened by cooperation between the US and China. Increased economic pressure compelled North Korea to normalize its relations with the US, China and South Korea.
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Denisov, V. "Home Policy Changes in North Korea and its Possible Impac t on the Situation in North-East Asia." Journal of International Analytics, no. 4 (December 28, 2015): 110–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2015-0-4-110-117.
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The article describes main events in the political life of North Korea after Kim Chen-In rise to power, his struggle with military leadership and attempts to strengthen the role of North Korea Labour Party accompanied by further indoctrination of the people. Main problems of economic development and the prospect of market regulation implementation are being assessed. Instability of the regime and attempts of South Korea, Japan and US pressurize North Korea along with nuclear problem being far from settlement is considered as one of main geopolitical threats in the North-East Asia.
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Shin, Gi-Wook, and David Straub. "The Evolving Sino-American Relationship and the Korea Problem." China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 01, no. 02 (July 2015): 223–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2377740015500116.
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Distrust between the United States and China continues to grow in Northeast Asia. Among many contributing factors, the North Korea issue is one of the most important, as illustrated by the controversy over the possible deployment of the United States' THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. Thus, resolving or mitigating the Korea problem, a significant goal in its own right to both the United States and China, is also essential to reducing U.S.-PRC strategic distrust. China and the United States share long-term interests vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula. The question is how its resolution might be achieved. U.S. efforts to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs by offering incentives and imposing sanctions have failed, and Chinese attempts to encourage Pyongyang to adopt PRC-style economic reforms have not fared much better. With Washington, Beijing, and Pyongyang unlikely to change their approaches, the hope for any new initiative must rest with Seoul. South Korea's special relationships with the North, the United States, and the PRC, along with its status as a dynamic middle power, give it the potential to play a larger leadership role in dealing with North Korea. In doing so, South Korea should consult with the United States and China on a long-term strategy for inter-Korean reconciliation that would, for now, finesse the nuclear issue. Such a strategy would require U.S. and Chinese support of the South Korean leadership in addressing the Korea problem. The process of working together with Seoul to formulate and implement this strategy would allow both powers to ensure that their long-term interests on the peninsula are respected. Although there is no guarantee that such an effort will succeed, the worsening situation on and around the Korean peninsula and the U.S. and PRC's lack of progress all argue for this new approach, as do the potential benefits to the U.S.-PRC relationship.
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Cha, Young Koo, and Taeho Kim. "Prospects for Political Change and Leadership Succession in North Korea." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 3, no. 2 (December 1991): 207–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163279109464263.
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Cha, Young Koo, and Taeho Kim. "Prospects for Political Change and Leadership Succession in North Korea." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 3, no. 2 (December 1991): 272–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163279109464274.
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Ishiyama, John. "Assessing the leadership transition in North Korea: Using network analysis of field inspections, 1997–2012." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 2 (April 27, 2014): 137–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.04.003.
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This paper examines changes in the in the composition of the North Korean elite from 1997 to 2012, a particularly tumultuous period in the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Specifically, the paper assesses the changing composition of the leadership networks around both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, using data from the entourages that accompanied the great leaders on their “on the spot guidance” inspection tours. The paper finds that there have been significant changes in the leadership elite since the succession of Kim Jong Un. The paper offers some observations regarding the implications these changes have on the receptivity of the regime to a normalization of relations with the West and future economic and political reform.
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Ishiyama, John, and Taekbin Kim. "Authoritarian survival strategies and elite churn: The case of North Korea." International Area Studies Review 23, no. 2 (June 2020): 160–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2233865920920740.
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How do autocrats interact with authoritarian elites? This is a question that has gained increasing scholarly attention over the past decade. In this article, using the case of North Korea we develop a set of theoretical expectations for “elite churn” or changes in the composition of the elite (either in terms of promotions, demotions, or new entrants) resulting from moving around elites from office to office (or “elite shuffle”) and bringing in new elites. We test a number of theoretical expectations derived from the existing literature on elite management in autocracies and then examine these expectations using a panel data set of 351 members of the North Korean elite from 1948–2017. Taking into account leadership characteristics, threats to the regime (both internal and external), external opportunities, and structural factors, we find that the explanation for elite churn in North Korea is very leader specific, and is much more pronounced under Kim Jong Un than his predecessors. This suggests that Kim Jong Un’s position was much more tenuous than his father’s and grandfather’s and likely continues to be so.
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Kang, David C., David Leheny, and Victor D. Cha. "Dialogue about Elections in Japan and South Korea." Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 2 (May 2013): 233–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911813000478.
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The year 2012 was fascinating for domestic politics and international relations in Northeast Asia. Perhaps most notably, every country in the region experienced a change of leadership. China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan all saw new leaders begin their tenure. In addition, regional relations took a turn for the worse, with numerous countries engaging in territorial and maritime disputes, disagreeing over interpretations of their shared histories.
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Yoon, Jeongran. "“Victory over Communism: South Korean Protestants’ Ideas about Democracy, Development, and Dictatorship, 1953–1961”." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 24, no. 2-3 (September 12, 2017): 233–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02402016.
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This article complicates the traditional narrative of anti-Communist Christians in Korea, examining the history of anti-communism among them in light of their claims to support democracy and development. Changes in Christian thinking in Korea followed the end of formal fighting in the Korean War. The conflict transformed Korea’s post-colonial history into a developmental struggle, pitting communism versus capitalism in a deadly battle. From the mid-1950s, South Korean Protestants saw the struggle as a competition between two systems, not simply one to eradicate the North Korean regime. From this new perspective, they began condemning political injustice and corruption under President Syngman Rhee. The contradictions in the ideas of Christians were partly embodied in their support for the civil uprising that would topple the Rhee regime, but also in their endorsement of Park Chung-hee’s military takeover in 1961. South Korean Protestants assisted the coup’s central leadership and helped a totalitarian regime come to power. This paradoxical aspect within Korean Protestant history is closely tied to the unique characteristics of its anti-communism and how it evolved after the Korean War.
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Wallace, Robert Daniel. "North Korea and diversion: A quantitative analysis (1997–2011)." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 2 (May 9, 2014): 147–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.04.004.
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In this research I propose that the concept of diversionary theory provides at least a partial explanation for North Korea’s conflict activities. I examine and analyze the country’s data on diplomatic and military activities from 1997 to 2011 and argue that North Korea’s domestic conditions influence its willingness to engage in external conflict. I also examine the impact of such external influences as UN sanctions, leadership changes in the region, national capacities of the US, South Korea and Japan, and strategic military exercises on DPRK-initiated conflicts. This study provides insight into the activities of this reclusive state and also demonstrates useful techniques that can be applied to analyze other similarly closed nations. The findings suggest that there are identified links between internal conditions and the Kim regime’s aggressive actions between 1997 and 2011 in support of the diversionary argument. Concurrently, there is less evidence that North Korea’s hostile diplomatic and military activities are based on external pressures.
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Struye de Swielande, Tanguy. "The Biden Administration: An Opportunity to Affirm a Flexible and Adaptive American World Leadership." World Affairs 184, no. 2 (June 2021): 130–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00438200211014643.
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The article develops a strategic framework to redefine American international leadership under the Biden administration. While the decline of the American-led order is not a new trend, it has been accelerated under the Trump administration, which focused on domestic policies and left the global stage in disarray. The challenges are many for the new president, and many pressures can already be felt. Biden’s administration is under high expectations to stabilize the international system and deal with the many issues that the world faces: economic recovery, COVID-19, climate change, cybersecurity, and relations with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, to name but a few. Yet, while the Biden presidency is—wrongly—understood as “U.S. back to normal,” the international stage has evolved. The article thus argues that restoring American world leadership means modifying that leadership and adapting it to the new reality. Building on management theories and the English School of international relations theories, the research presents a theoretical framework for reinventing and reconstructing a new form of leadership. It then applies the resulting strategic design to the Biden administration’s objectives and policies in the form of seven strategic recommendations. Ultimately, the article explains how the United States can remain world leader by acknowledging the current global situation and adopting a pragmatic vision of international affairs.
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Womack, Brantly. "International Crises and China's Rise: Comparing the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 2017 Global Political Crisis." Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, no. 4 (2017): 383–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pox015.
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Abstract The profound political uncertainties in international politics created by developments in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and North Korea (DPRK) are similar in some respects to the economic uncertainties created by the global financial crisis of 2008. In both crises there is a sudden and general awareness of vulnerability, and it is unclear how long the current uncertainty will last. With the election of Donald Trump, the United States is again at the centre of a global crisis. China is again the least vulnerable of the major states. Everyone including China is disadvantaged by the current political crisis. However, in relative terms China stands to gain, as it did in 2008. The relative change in international relationships will be most obvious in Asia. The focus here is on the cycle of uncertainty that characterizes both crises. However, the effects of the current political crisis are likely to contrast with the effects of the earlier economic crisis. From 2008 to 2014, other countries were worried about their own economies and about the world economy in general, and also about what China’s arrival as a regional and global economic power might mean for them. Meanwhile, American leadership under Obama seemed less assertive, while China appeared to be more assertive. By contrast, in 2015, China’s economy had already entered a ‘new normal’ of slower economic growth, while its consolidated political leadership supports multilateral globalization. American political leadership is unpredictable in both general strategic terms and in terms of crisis management. Just as the world needed the economic lift provided by China in 2008, it now needs the political reassurance of stability that China appears to provide. However, the United States may find it difficult to adjust to the shift in political influence.
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Hayes, Peter, and Roger Cavazos. "North Korea in 2014." Asian Survey 55, no. 1 (January 2015): 119–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.1.119.
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In 2014, North Korea neither overcame its isolation due to its nuclear weapons and hostile geostrategic posture nor reformed its economy. Kim Jong Un learned on the job, consolidated his leadership, avoided military risk, and opened new channels to South Korea, Japan, and Russia to reduce dependence on China.
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Armstrong, Charles K. "North Korea in 2016." Asian Survey 57, no. 1 (January 2017): 119–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.1.119.
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Kim Jong Un further consolidated his leadership position at the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party in May, the first congress since 1980. Pyongyang conducted two nuclear tests and made advances in missile delivery, eliciting strong sanctions resolutions from the UN Security Council, first in March and again in November.
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Beck, Peter M. "North Korea in 2011." Asian Survey 52, no. 1 (January 2012): 65–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.1.65.
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Abstract North Korea underwent a seemingly seamless leadership transition from father to son in the midst of a struggling economy and widespread hunger. The North drew even closer to China but also reached out to the United States and Russia for the first time in several years. Meanwhile, inter-Korean relations remained in a deep freeze.
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Lee, Hong Yung. "North Korea in 2012." Asian Survey 53, no. 1 (January 2013): 176–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2013.53.1.176.
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Thus far, North Korea appears to have made a successful transition of power to the third generation of Kims, installing the 28-year-old Kim Jong Un as the country's supreme leader. However, due to the diminishing legitimacy of multiple generations of inherited leadership, Kim Jong Un must deliver what North Korea needs most, namely, economic development. Kim has promised to give it priority, but structural (political, economic, and social) constraints do not allow him much room to maneuver.
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Koh, Dae-Won. "Dynamics of Inter-Korean Conflict and North Korea's Recent Policy Changes: An Inter-Systemic View." Asian Survey 44, no. 3 (May 2004): 422–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.3.422.
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This study examines, from an inter-systemic perspective, North Korea's recent economic and foreign policy changes. It shows that despite North Korea's comparative failure, its leadership has neither been fully disillusioned about the feasibility of the system-maintaining alternative nor found a way to reform its system without breaking it down.
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Pye, Lucian W., and Adrian Buzo. "The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea." Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999): 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20049429.
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Robel, Ronald R. "The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea." History: Reviews of New Books 27, no. 4 (January 1999): 181–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1999.10528523.
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Kim, Min-hyung. "South Korea’s Strategy toward a Rising China, Security Dynamics in East Asia, and International Relations Theory." Asian Survey 56, no. 4 (July 2016): 707–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.4.707.
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This article contends that South Korea’s behaviors toward China since 1992 can be fully understood when the structural variables of the strategic environment—i.e., economic interdependence, the US-centered hub-and-spoke system, and the North Korean threat—are combined with the domestic variable of Seoul’s leadership change and its perception of threat.
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Kim, Hong Nack. "China's Policy Toward North Korea Under the Xi Jinping Leadership." North Korean Review 9, no. 2 (September 1, 2013): 83–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.3172/nkr.9.2.83.
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Mukherjee, Bhaswati. "A Strategic Essay: Dynamics between a Super President, a Military Alliance and an Intrastate Entity." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 74, no. 3 (August 21, 2018): 290–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974928418785479.
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The emerging dynamics between President Trump, NATO and EU promises to constitute a fascinating new narrative of the changing contours of the international order in this millennium. President Trump has completely reversed American policy towards NATO. As a businessman, Trump has made it clear that henceforth US funding and support would be linked to the US getting a ‘good deal’ from its NATO partners. NATO had earlier anchored itself to the benchmark goal that 2% of a country’s GDP should go to defence spending. President Trump is yet to establish close and friendly relations either with NATO Secretary General or leaders of NATO Member States. Trump’s public embrace of autocratic rulers has caused resentment within NATO. On CSDP the earlier European approach was to lean heavily on the Americans to fund NATO. The friction between the goals of NATO and CSDP increased under the Trump Presidency because of Trump’s insistence on burden sharing of resources and funds among NATO Member States. The CSDP and NATO have overlapping mandates which could be complicated in crisis situations. An independent CSDP remains the core issue causing friction. The U.S. and other non EU weapons producing countries (chiefly Norway and soon the U.K.) also believe that CSDP is manipulating the rules of defence procurement in favour of companies based on EU soil. Is the US justified in attacking CSDP? Many EU Member States believe that protecting European defence industries is a small price to pay for ensuring that a NATO under American leadership not get involved in small regional wars, as an example, in Francophone Africa. Brexit is casting a long shadow. EU and NATO would need to realign themselves from a strategic perspective. NATO and the EU need to prepare for a strategic scenario post Brexit. Following Brexit, 80 percent of NATO defence spending will come from non-EU members. This would shift the onus of decision making within NATO away from the EU. One of the greatest challenges for NATO and the EU is America’s new narrative on Iran and North Korea. EU and NATO are slowly waking up to the new reality that there will be no “business as usual”. If NATO’s military deterrence loses its credibility, this will undermine the credibility of both EU and NATO and endanger international peace and security. What could the EU and NATO do next? Are there any “low hanging fruits” that could be picked in the near future? The EU and NATO understand that there can be no ‘business as usual’. The new global narrative on security would depend on how NATO and EU respond to America’s changed narrative. A timely response is the need of the hour.
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Lim, Jae-Cheon. "North Korea's Hereditary Succession." Asian Survey 52, no. 3 (May 2012): 550–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.3.550.
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Abstract Focusing on the early stage, this paper compares the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il succession with the Kim Jong Il-Kim Jong Un succession. Analyzing their differences and similarities, the study attempts to provide a better understanding of the leadership formation of Kim Jong Un, who now rules North Korea.
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Armstrong, Charles K. "Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (review)." Korean Studies 23, no. 1 (1999): 142–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ks.1999.0013.
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Shin, Gi-Wook, and Rennie J. Moon. "South Korea in 2016." Asian Survey 57, no. 1 (January 2017): 103–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.1.103.
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President Park faced a leadership crisis after revelations that she relied on a confidant with no official position for key decision-making in state affairs. Heavy industry met with serious financial difficulties, and a strong anti-corruption law was enacted. North Korea tested more nuclear weapons and missiles. Controversy over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense strained South Korea’s relations with China.
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Park, Kyung-Ae. "NORTH KOREA IN 2003: Pendulum Swing between Crisis and Diplomacy." Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (January 2004): 139–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.1.139.
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Abstract The two most pressing problems that faced North Korea in 2003 were how to resist pressure on nuclear issues from the international community and how to cope with a crippled economy. For the former, North Korea demonstrated superficial flexibility by participating in multilateral talks but, in substance, persisting in its demands. For the latter, the country showed substantive flexibility by stepping up economic reform, recruiting young, reform-minded new faces into the leadership, and pushing for economic cooperation with the South.
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Ullah, Aman, Waseem Ishaque, and Muhammad Usman Ullah. "UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA RAPPROCHEMENT: AVERTING A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST." Global Political Review 2, no. 1 (December 30, 2017): 81–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2017(ii-i).09.
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The situation in the Korean Peninsula has generally remained uncertain since the time of the Korean war. President Trumps proverbs of fire and fury, Rocket Man and now a valuable partner are gradual transformations, which have been appreciated by the world at large, yet fragility and lack of trust among the key contenders North Korea (DPRK), USA and South Kora may lead to strategic miscalculation and undo the process of confidence-building. The efforts of Russia and China are commendable as these are contributing to a stable environment; however, the world is witnessing these developments with cautious optimism due to the impulsive nature of opposing leaders. On an optimistic note, Chairman Kim and President Trump want to move forward for a reasonable settlement. The leadership on both sides, the global players and regional organizations will have to work for hand in gloves for sustainable peace as failure is the worst option.
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Callahan, Mary P. "The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan and the Koreas. By Dennis Van Vranken Hickey. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 280p. $55.00." American Political Science Review 96, no. 3 (September 2002): 688–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402220377.
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This book is a detailed study of recent changes in security threats and defense forces in China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. The author argues that East Asia is in the midst of an arms race “of unprecedented scale” (p. 231). The major threats (“flashpoints”) in the region are the tensions between North and South Korea, the conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China over the future of Taiwan, and the competing claims to oil and other natural resources in the South China Sea. The range and character of these threats have not changed appreciatively in recent years, but what has changed are capabilities of militaries to project power, threaten neighbors, and destabilize the region.
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Denisov, Valeriy. "Prospects for North Korean Regime and the Interests of Russia." Journal of International Analytics, no. 1-2 (March 28, 2019): 16–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2019-0-1-2-16-26.
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The paper deals with the dynamics of home and foreign policy of North Korea under Kim Jong-un leadership, especially in last several years. Analyzed are new trends in and prospects for the development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context of North Korea transformation into a full-fledged nuclear state. The author considers the return to party-centered political system (instead of total militarization under Kim Jong-il) as well as cautious economic reforms including introduction of some market mechanisms and attempts aimed at formation of basics of innovative economics. Factors hampering the development of the country, in particular, various economic sanctions, are also discussed, as well as prospects for diplomatic dialogue of North Korea with countries on North-East Asia. Contact between the leaders of North Korea and the USA are touched upon. The problem of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is critically considered. In conclusion, possible directions of cooperation between Russia and North Korea are outlined.
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Jung, Minsoo. "Bibliometric Investigation on Preventive Medicine in North Korea." Health Care Manager 32, no. 3 (2013): 253–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/hcm.0b013e31829d7763.
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Kim, Jih-Un. "China’s quarter-century struggle with a nuclear North Korea with a focus on its strategic calculation." Asian Education and Development Studies 8, no. 3 (July 8, 2019): 319–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aeds-09-2018-0152.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to describe how China’s approach to a nuclear North Korea has changed and find key variables that explain the changes. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts the traditional qualitative method, referring to different types of reliable and authoritative Chinese and English scholars, books and articles. Findings Although China has accumulated distrust of North Korea and reprimanded the regime for its nuclear program, it has never ignored the strategic value or balance – especially vis-à-vis the USA – the neighboring country provides for it. And for that matter, it has been keen to prevent North Korea from bypassing it and getting closer to the USA. With this strategic calculation in mind, China has mostly made gestures in implementing the UN sanctions against North Korea, though not always. Originality/value This paper proves that China’s strategic calculation has been a constant key variable that explains its approach toward a nuclear North Korea since the inception of the issue in the early 1990s.
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Liu, Zhongmin. "Criminal state: understanding narcotics trafficking networks in North Korea." Journal of Financial Crime 26, no. 4 (October 7, 2019): 1014–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-08-2018-0085.
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Purpose In North Korea, illicit activities directly or implicitly supported by the North Korean Government are an integral part of the nation’s survival strategies. This study aims to discuss how North Korea directs its national power and resources to facilitate narcotics trafficking activities and how the role of North Korean State in the narcotics trafficking network has changed over time since the 1970s. Design/methodology/approach Analysis of narcotics trafficking in North Korea has primarily involved a review of secondary data, including previous academic research in this field, news articles, circumstantial and forensic evidence, seizure data and defector testimony. Findings This paper argues that prior to 2000, North Korea was systematically and directly engaged in narcotics production and distribution. The nation state could be regarded as a form of “criminal sovereignty”, because the sovereign state is itself criminal. However, in the post-2000s, North Korea’s Government began to gradually withdraw from narcotics trafficking, creating space for various non-state actors – such as criminal syndicates, private traders and local officials – to enter the once-monopolistic network. De-centralisation of narcotics trafficking network in North Korea suggests that the state’s criminal sovereignty may be gradually eroding and the pattern of state criminalisation in North Korea may be transforming. Originality/value This paper draws on theories concerning state criminalisation to understand the changing dynamics of narcotics trafficking network in North Korea.
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Bennett, Bruce W., and Jennifer Lind. "The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements." International Security 36, no. 2 (October 2011): 84–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00057.
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In North Korea, the upcoming leadership transition in the Kim Jong-il regime will be a precarious time for the Kim family's hold on power. A collapse of the North Korean government could have several dangerous implications for East Asia, including “loose nukes,” a humanitarian disaster, a regional refugee crisis, and potential escalation to war between China and the United States. To respond to a collapse and these problems, neighboring countries may perform several military missions to stabilize North Korea. These include the location and securing of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, stability operations, border control, conventional disarmament, and combat/deterrence operations. Assuming that collapse occurs in a relatively benign manner, military missions to stabilize North Korea could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops. If collapse occurs after a war on the peninsula, or if it sparks civil war in North Korea, the number of missions—and their requirements—would grow. Because of the size and complexity of these missions, and because of the perils associated with mismanaging them, advance and combined planning is essential. Combined planning should include those actors (e.g., China, South Korea, and the United States) that could otherwise take destabilizing action to protect their own interests.
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Jung, Kyungja, and Bronwen Dalton. "Rhetoric Versus Reality for the Women of North Korea: Mothers of the Revolution." Asian Survey 46, no. 5 (September 2006): 741–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.5.741.
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The role and status of women in North Korea have changed in recent years. Reports suggest that women, more than men, have become active players in emerging capitalist processes, particularly those centered on local markets, thus creating new opportunities for themselves and new challenges for the regime.
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Stock, Thomas. "North Korea’s Marxism-Leninism: Fraternal Criticisms and the Development of North Korean Ideology in the 1960s." Journal of Korean Studies 24, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 127–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/21581665-7258081.
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Abstract During the 1960s, as the Sino-Soviet conflict raged on, North Korea, for the first time in its history, officially began to reject the USSR’s ideological leadership and instead tread its own path under the slogan of self-reliance. As a result, those forces aligned with the Soviet Union, especially East Germany, heavily criticized North Korea’s new ideological path. Drawing on the East German archives, this study seeks to understand the nature of fraternal criticisms and their implications for the development of North Korean ideology in the 1960s. Scholars typically stress North Korean ideology’s departure from Marxism-Leninism, sometimes suggesting a departure as early as the 1950s. The present study, based on a thorough reading of archival documents and North Korean materials, challenges such portrayals, arguing that North Korea remained in the Marxist-Leninist tradition even while contesting Soviet orthodoxy. Developments in North Korean ideology were far more gradual than is usually assumed, building on what came before. These developments were by no means revolutionary or removed from the global intellectual environment. The Soviets and East Germans could understand North Korean heterodoxy and engage with it in Marxist-Leninist terms, just as North Korea did with Soviet Marxism-Leninism—there was no fundamental ideological split.
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Clemens, Walter C. "North Korea's Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence." Journal of East Asian Studies 10, no. 1 (April 2010): 127–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800003246.
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Soviet and East European documents provide significant revelations about the interactions of North Korea and its allies. First, they show Pyongyang's longstanding interest in obtaining nuclear technology and probably nuclear weapons. Second, they reveal that North Korea's leadership consistently evaded commitments to allies on nuclear matters—particularly constraints on its nuclear ambitions or even the provision of information. Third, North Korea's words and deeds evoked substantial concerns in Moscow and other communist capitals that Pyongyang, if it obtained nuclear weapons, might use them to blackmail its partners or risk provoking a nuclear war. When aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not forthcoming, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sought to bypass Moscow and obtain assistance from the Kremlin's East European clients and, when that proved fruitless, from Pakistan. The absence of international support reinforced the logic of self-reliance and “military first,” pushing North Korea to pursue an independent line with respect to its nuclear weapons. These patterns cannot be extrapolated in a linear way, but they surely suggest reasons for caution by those hoping to engage North Korea in a grand bargain.
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Zhihua, Shen. "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East." Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (May 2000): 44–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/15203970051032309.
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After initially insisting on the peaceful reunification of Korea, Josif Stalin suddenly decided in early 1950 to give North Korean leader Kim Il Sung permission to invade South Korea. Documents from the Russian archives and materials published in China help explain this abrupt shift in Stalin's position. They show that Stalin carefully assessed the likely American reaction and mistakenly concluded that North Korean forces would quickly seize South Korea, giving the United States no opportunity to respond. The documents also reveal that Stalin's attitude toward Korea was strongly influenced by Sino-Soviet relations in 1949–1950, particularly his desire to maintain Soviet privileges on Chinese territory and his concern that Beijing would challenge Moscow's leadership of the international Communist movement. Stalin believed that a North Korean invasion of the South would greatly strengthen the Soviet Union's leverage vis-a-vis China.
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Dalvinder Singh Grewal. "Leadership qualities needed in pandemics: a critical analysis." Journal of Management and Science 10, no. 1 (February 20, 2020): 12–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.26524/jms.2020.2.
Full textAbstract:
Globally, the pandemic caused by COVID-19, has put in brakes to activities in the entire world. As on 3 July 2020 world has 34,45,519 cases affected by virus and a death toll of 2,42,623. Except few countries like Nepal, Bhutan,Vietnam and North Korea almost all other countries are affected. The death toll varies from country to country; US having the maximum 65,960 deaths while Nepal, Bhutan, Vietnam. North Korea do not have any deaths so far.The control under certain conditions has been the most important factor in a nation and the strategies adopted by the leaders have played the crucial role. In China itself, it was controlled with a heavy hand. In India too the control has been very significant for low number of affected and deaths.The leadership qualities such as deep vision, formation of strategies, timely decision making, control of manpower, health administration, lockdowns,curfew and financial aspects to ensure minimum damage to men andeconomy. He has to maintain strict discipline to ensure lockdowns and curfews and also have to keep in mind the needs of the lower strata. He has multifarious task for which he has to select suitable persons to manage the affair and control. This paper does the critical analysis of the leadership qualities needed in pandemics and the strategizing, decision making and effective application of the decisions.
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Hwang, Eun Kyoung, Han Gil Choi, and Jang Kyun Kim. "Seaweed resources of Korea." Botanica Marina 63, no. 4 (August 27, 2020): 395–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bot-2020-0007.
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AbstractKorea has a long history of utilizing seaweeds, as the country has a high biodiversity of seaweeds. The abundance and composition of seaweed species have changed over the past decades due to climate change and anthropogenic influences. Some species showed a significant extension of their distribution range to the north while some species declined. Some areas have even become barren ground. Korea has put extensive effort into restoring the seaweed resources in these deforested areas. Korea is one of the most advanced countries in the World in terms of seaweed aquaculture. However, the aquacultured species are mostly limited to three genera, Saccharina, Undaria and Pyropia/Porphyra, which represent 96% of the entire seaweed production in the country. Korea has developed highly advanced cultivation technologies as well as various cultivars using breeding and hybridization technologies for these species. There has also been considerable effort in developing environmentally sustainable aquaculture systems using seaweed cultivation (e. g. integrated multi-trophic aquaculture, nutrient bioextraction and biofloc). This study discusses the current status and challenges of the above mentioned topics in detail. In addition, the present study encourages South and North Korean scientists to collaborate in the study of seaweed resources at the border of these two countries.
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Sutter, Robert. "The United States and Asia in 2005: Managing Troubles, Sustaining Leadership." Asian Survey 46, no. 1 (January 2006): 10–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.1.10.
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Deepening American preoccupations with other problems at home and abroad saw Bush administration policy toward Asia generally continue along established paths and remain secondary in U.S. policy priorities. The administration stepped up high-level exchanges with Asian counterparts, showed some flexibility over North Korea, and resisted domestic pressures for a tougher China policy.
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Lee, Yusin. "Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S." Energies 12, no. 10 (May 18, 2019): 1895. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12101895.
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This study analyzes the political viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project. This analysis demonstrates that North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016 changed the dynamic of the project. Before the test, when inter-Korean relations were good, South Korea and Russia could make efforts to secure political support for the project. However, after the fourth nuclear test, this was no longer the case. As North Korea’s nuclear power status became more evident, this nuclear problem began to have profound implications for U.S. security. In response, Washington not only led the UN Security Council to impose very severe sanctions against North Korea, but also placed its own sanctions on the country. These sanctions began to contain provisions that could prevent the implementation of the pipeline project. In addition to these sanctions, the U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017 over its intervention in the U.S. election and aggression against Ukraine also contained clauses that could hamper it. Therefore, unless the U.S. lifts or eases all of these sanctions, South Korea and Russia are unwilling to take any concrete actions to secure political support for the RNS pipeline project. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the U.S. now holds the most important key to its political viability.
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Hwang, Soonhee. "A Systematic Review of Self-leadership Related Research Trends in Korea －Focusing on Education Field." Korean Association of General Education 15, no. 4 (August 31, 2021): 233–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.46392/kjge.2021.15.4.233.
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According to the rapidly changing social structure and the characteristics of the times, the paradigm has changed from leadership to ‘self-leadership’. In existing organizations and teams, if leaders exert influence on team members to achieve organizational goals and improve performance, those members now have more opportunities to make decisions and to solve complex problems by themselves. Indeed, in recent years much attention has been paid to self-leadership. Not surprisingly then, there has been a good deal of domestic research on self-leadership, especially in the field of nursing. However, to date there is no research analyzing previous related research into the field of education. This study aims to analyze the research trends of self-leadership with a focus on domestic research in the education field, and to suggest implications for future research. For this purpose, 191 domestic research papers (academic articles published since 2005) were collected using the Academic Research Information Service and the National Assembly Library Search Service. All 191 research papers have been reviewed and classified according to analytical criteria, such as year of publication, research method, research field, research subjects and related variables. Our findings show that firstly, related research on self-leadership has been growing since 2005. Secondly, there was more research conducted using the quantitative method compared to research that made use of other research methods. Thirdly, concerning the subjects of study, university students were studied more than other groups of elementary, middle and high school students. Fourthly, regarding the analysis results on self-leadership related factors, 84.9% of the research involved diverse correlates. Based on these findings, it is necessary to continue studying self-leadership using various research methods, as well as to examine this research from diverse perspectives. Also, suggestions were made regarding self-leadership education designed within career education with a special focus on the various characteristics of the learners, along with lifelong education, in order to improve the self-leadership curriculum.
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KIM, TAEWOO. "Actualized Stigma: The historical formation of anti-Americanism in North Korea." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 3 (April 5, 2017): 543–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x15000396.
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AbstractDuring the Open Port period and Japanese colonial period (1876–1945), Koreans generally had a positive image of the United States. This positive view of the United States held by Koreans persisted until after liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. The United States was a ‘liberator’ that saved the Koreans, and was viewed as ‘a cooperator’ with whom Korea was to solve its national task of establishing a new country. However, the concept of ‘American imperialist warmonger’ had begun to be promoted in North Korea from 1948–49. It was a concept advanced by the Soviet Union and the North Korean leadership. The negative image of the United States, which spread throughout North Korea from the early years of the Cold War, was merely a perplexing stigma lacking substantiated grounds. However, the experiences of the Korean War actualized the image of the United States as a ‘warmonger’ in the hearts of the North Korean people. Alleged indiscriminate aerial bombings, mass slaughters, sexual assaults, and arson attacks against Korean civilians became the most important reason for the expansion of intense sentiment. Anti-Americanism began to be systemized and routinized in every aspect of North Korean life after the Korean War.
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McEachern, Patrick. "Interest Groups in North Korean Politics." Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (August 2008): 235–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800005312.
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North Korea is often characterized as some form of highly centralized rule: totalitarian, posttotalitarian, corporatist, or personalistic. This article argues that much of the confusion around understanding North Korea's actions stems from misplaced models. Much of the current thinking on North Korea's politics does not account for the limited institutional plurality in the system. The article documents how the state's political institutions have changed since the country's founding and highlights the formal and informal roles of each major bureaucracy today. The Korean Workers Party and the role of Juche have declined, but the National Defense Commission and “military-first politics” have not taken their place as reigning supreme. Rather the interaction between the Korean Workers Party, military, and cabinet helps explain and moderate policy outcomes.
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Azis, Emmi, Sirwanti Azizul Marwah, and Dian Riani Said. "Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Melalui Pengembangan Ekowisata Pasir Putih Kawasan Goa Janji Desa Mallari Kabupaten Bone Sulawesi Selatan." Celebes Abdimas: Jurnal Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat 2, no. 2 (November 1, 2020): 58–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.37541/celebesabdimas.v2i2.433.
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In the modern era, the leadership values and processes that must be passed by someone to become a leader has been changed. The evolution of mind and social life has changed the paradigm of modern humans in the view of the concept of leadership. To be a leader, a person must speak and train himself to have the character, abilities or qualities that should be owned by leaders. The Students who manage intra-school organizations (OSIS) are one of the forerunners of future leaders in the future and have an interest in driving change in their respective schools so that they become better. As a form of caring in building a leadership model that has integrity, Indonesia College of Economics conducts leadership training and coaching for OSIS administrators in SMA & SMK Negeri as well as the private sector in North Jakarta. The method used in this training consisted of lecture activities, question and answer sessions, discussion of case studies, by explaining the basic concepts of visionary leadership, participative leadership styles, change leadership and how to make decisions correctly. After this training, it is hoped that the student council officials will possess and demonstrate leadership motivation skills that are ready to challenge and can inspire students in their respective school environments.
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Ramaditya, Muhammad, Syahrul Effendi, and Faris Faruqi. "Pelatihan Kepemimpinan Dan Pembinaan Untuk Meningkatkan Kemampuan Para Pengurus OSIS SMA Dan SMK Negeri Di Jakarta Utara." Celebes Abdimas: Jurnal Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat 2, no. 2 (November 1, 2020): 72–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.37541/celebesabdimas.v2i2.446.
Full textAbstract:
In the modern era, the leadership values and processes that must be passed by someone to become a leader has been changed. The evolution of mind and social life has changed the paradigm of modern humans in the view of the concept of leadership. To be a leader, a person must speak and train himself to have the character, abilities or qualities that should be owned by leaders. The Students who manage intra-school organizations (OSIS) are one of the forerunners of future leaders in the future and have an interest in driving change in their respective schools so that they become better. As a form of caring in building a leadership model that has integrity, Indonesia College of Economics conducts leadership training and coaching for OSIS administrators in SMA & SMK Negeri as well as the private sector in North Jakarta. The method used in this training consisted of lecture activities, question and answer sessions, discussion of case studies, by explaining the basic concepts of visionary leadership, participative leadership styles, change leadership and how to make decisions correctly. After this training, it is hoped that the student council officials will possess and demonstrate leadership motivation skills that are ready to challenge and can inspire students in their respective school environments.
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Ivanov, A. Yu. "The Problem of Defining the Contemporary Border between the DPRK and China." Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies 34 (2020): 90–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/2073-3380.2020.34.90.
Full textAbstract:
When the Communist Party came to power in China and the People's Republic of China was established, the new Chinese leadership began to take steps to improve relations with North Korea. Immediately after the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), China and the DPRK entered into a number of agreements and treaties designed to strengthen the ties between the two states that embarked on the path of socialist development. One of the key agreements between China and North Korea was the conclusion of the “Border Treaty” in 1962, which became the guarantor of stability and security on the shared border; it also resolved previous border disputes between the two states. Making certain territorial concessions in the demarcation of the border the Chinese leadership acquired a reliable ally in conditions when China found itself in international isolation. At the same time, some South Korean politicians and scientists taking an interest in the “Border Treaty” concluded between the China and the DPRK expressed mixed views regarding the Sino-North Korean borders. They believed that the national interests of the Korean people were infringed upon by the demarcation of the border between China and the DPRK.