Academic literature on the topic 'The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors'
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Journal articles on the topic "The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors"
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Рыманов, Александр, and Aleksandr Rymanov. "IMPROVEMENT OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS INSTITUTION IN BANKING SECTOR." Russian Journal of Management 5, no. 2 (July 25, 2017): 151–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/article_5953b8db3cec15.68188967.
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The article deals with problems of the institution of independent directors in the banking sector. The author analyses the activities of the independent directors, the requirements of regulators, stock exchanges to participation of independent directors on the Board of Directors (supervisory boards) of the banks. It is noted that the presence of independent directors in the Board of Directors (Supervisory Board) increases the objectivity of decisions. However, it is not feasible to perform the requirements of the banks on the high proportion of independent directors at the expense of excessive force. Analyzed international experience of independent directors in the banking sector, testifies to the ambiguous role of independent directors in various jurisdictions. National experiences of independent directors according to Sberbank and the rules of the Moscow Exchange presents on the application of uniform mandatory approach to participation of independent directors in the supervisory boards. It is proposed that the feasibility of increasing the participation of independent directors in the deliberations of the supervisory boards of banks.
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Hopt, Klaus J. "Corporate Governance of Banks and Financial Institutions: Economic Theory, Supervisory Practice, Evidence and Policy." European Business Organization Law Review 22, no. 1 (March 2021): 13–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40804-020-00201-z.
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AbstractBanks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis, confirms this. Banks practicing good corporate governance in the traditional, shareholder-oriented style fared less well than banks having less shareholder-prone boards and less shareholder influence. The special governance of banks and other financial institutions is firmly embedded in bank supervisory law and regulation. Most recently there has been intense discussion on the purpose of (non-bank) corporations. For banks stakeholder governance and, more particularly, creditor or debtholder governance is more important than shareholder governance. The implications of this for research and reform are still uncertain. A key problem is the composition and qualification of the board. The legislative task is to enhance independent as well as qualified control. The proposal of giving creditors and even supervisors a special seat in the board is not convincing. Other important special issues of bank governance are for example the duties and liabilities of bank directors in particular as far as risk and compliance are concerned, but also the remuneration paid to bank directors and senior managers or key function holders. Claw-back provisions, either imposed by law or introduced by banks themselves, exist already in certain countries and are beneficial. Much depends on enforcement, an understudied topic.
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BILOPOLYI, V., and M. SKLADANOVSKA. "OPTIMIZATION OF THE PROCESS OF ADAPTATION OF A STUDENT TO A HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION." Ukrainian Journal of Civil Engineering and Architecture, no. 2 (August 23, 2021): 20–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.30838/j.bpsacea.2312.270421.20.747.
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Formulation of the problem. The problem of adaptation of students to institutions of higher education in our time is of great scientific and practical importance. The breakdown of dynamic stereotypes during the transition from the school system to higher education, the change in living conditions for nonresident students, a new social environment − all this accompanies the freshman and requires the formation of psychological mechanisms of adaptation of the personality of yesterday's schoolchild to new conditions of life and activity. The purpose of the research: determination of the structural components of the adaptation process, determination of the main directions of optimization of the adaptation process, creation of a multifunctional model of the student's adaptation process to the university. Conclusions. The main goal of optimizing the process of adaptation of a student to the university is to create conditions for the development, self-improvement and disclosure of the creative potential of the student's personality. So, we see the same ways of solving the indicated problems: psychological and pedagogical training of the supervisors of student groups; introduction of innovative technologies in the pedagogical process; improving the psychological and pedagogical qualifications of the teaching staff of a higher educational institution; work with gifted youth, development of students' creativity in the learning process; development of student initiative and self-government; psychological support of methodological and educational work in a higher educational institution; psychological support for the development of the student's personality in the learning process: mastering the skills of independent work, communication skills, disclosing the psychological characteristics of the development of one's creative potential, solving personal problems.
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Wang, Margaret. "Independent directors? Supervisors? Who should monitor China’s boards?" Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 2 (2006): 142–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p15.
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After the collapse of a number of well-known companies such as Enron and WorldCom, there has been much debate over this is the most effective model of corporate governance in monitoring the board of directors from misconduct: the Anglo-American model of independent directors or the German model of supervisory boards. Most countries have chosen to adopt one either the Anglo-American or the German model. However, the People’s Republic of China (“China”) has adopted both models of corporate governance. This paper seeks to explore the differences between the two models as they apply in China. Further, it examines the challenges which these two models face with regard to their implementation. Finally, an evaluation will be made to ascertain whether the two models encounter the same problems and whether either or both of these two models would be able to effectively monitor Chinese boards.
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Garas, Samy Nathan, and Chris Pierce. "The independence of the Shari’a supervisory board in the Islamic financial institutions of the GCC countries." Corporate Board role duties and composition 6, no. 2 (2010): 20–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv6i2art2.
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Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) are governed by two boards: the Board of Directors (BoD) and the Shari’a Supervisory Board (SSB). The SSB is a panel of Shari’a scholars who act independently from other governance organs. This paper discriminates between dependent SSBs and independent SSBs by using twenty one variables, which are classified into three groups: the implementation of governance best practices, the recruitment of SSB members, and the relationship between the SSB members and other governance organs. This study is one of the first studies that provide empirical results about the SSB independence. Nevertheless, the research focuses exclusively on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and excludes the other countries where Shari’a supervision might have different forms. The study has developed a hypothesis, which was tested by a questionnaire. Data was collected from 76 Shari’a Supervisory Boards, 73 Boards of Directors, and 59 shareholders of IFIs in the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) during 2009. The discriminant analysis has been used in identifying both dependent and independent SSBs. The paper finds five variables relevant in discriminating the two groups. These variables are the incentives provided to the SSB; the average remuneration to the SSB members; the existence of the policy of penalties for violating the code of conduct; the relation between the SSB members and the BoD; and the role of executive management in recruiting SSB members.
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Feng, Liu. "The Impact of Governance Mechanism of Financial Listed Companies on the Pay and the Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Executives." International Journal of Business and Management 13, no. 3 (February 25, 2018): 233. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v13n3p233.
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The corporate governance mechanism is very important to solve the principal-agent problem effectively. Based on the particularity of the financial industry, this paper uses the panel data of 45 listed companies in China's financial industry from 2007 to 2015, the empirical results show that the degree of ownership concentration, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board and the independent directors proportion have a significant negative impact on executive pay, and the size of the board of supervisors has no marked impact on executive pay. The degree of ownership concentration has a significant positive impact on the pay-performance sensitivity, and the duality of CEO and chairman of the board, the independent directors proportion and the size of the board of supervisors have a significant negative impact on the pay-performance sensitivity. For the listed companies in the financial sector, they should pay attention to the executive pay disclosure system, the board of supervisors governance mechanism and the independent director system. We can use the degree of ownership concentration to improve the pay-performance sensitivity, and make corporate governance more effective.
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Асекритова and Svetlana Asekritova. "Features of organization related to students’ independent work on graphics chair." Geometry & Graphics 1, no. 2 (July 25, 2013): 27–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/783.
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The questions of students’ independent work organization within the limits of their graphic training in high education institution and in connection with requirements related to Federal State Educational Standards of new generation are considered in this paper. The possible problems arising for students and their supervisors of studies at participation in the computer academic competitions are designated.
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Alam, Md Kausar, and Muhammad Shahin Miah. "Independence and effectiveness of Shariah supervisory board of Islamic banks: evidence from an emerging economy." Asian Review of Accounting 29, no. 2 (January 28, 2021): 173–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ara-01-2020-0005.
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PurposeThe main objective of the study is to ascertain the level of independence and the effectiveness of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) members of Islamic banks in Bangladesh. This is because only SSB members are empowered to oversee and certify the overall business functions of Islamic banks.Design/methodology/approachThis paper implements qualitative case research approach to explore the research objective in the context of Bangladesh. We applied purposeful and snowball sampling tactics for selecting respondents. By using a semi-structured questionnaire and face-to-face interviews, we collect data from SSB members, central bank executives and experts in Islamic banking and Shariah governance.FindingsThe study finds that majority Islamic banks' SSB's positions are similar to the Board of Directors (BOD) of the banks. Next, this study finds that in recruiting/selecting SSB members, some banks do not follow the guidelines of the central bank. This study finds mixed evidence regarding the independence of the members of the SSB. Most of the respondents opined that SSBs do not have power; in some cases, members of SSB are not independent and seeming powerless as BOD selects and recruits them. In contrast, they are dependent on management in respect of strategy implementation.Research limitations/implicationsThe study significantly contributed to the national and global regulatory bodies by identifying an important governance determinant of Islamic banks that is the independence of SSB members, which is highly important for both Shariah functions, and to enhance the trust level of the stakeholders. This study makes a theoretical contribution by documenting the violation of stakeholder theory and agency theory in recruiting SSB members by BOD's choice. The lack of SSB members' independence has an impact on Shariah legitimacy of the Islamic banks which is contradictory with the notion of legitimacy theory. This study recommends the central bank to ensure the independence of the SSB and central bank should take initiatives to develop an environment for the Islamic banking sector.Originality/valueThis study extends the literature of corporate governance relating to Islamic banking and financial institutions. More specifically, this paper explores the necessity of independence of members of the monitoring body (here SSB), an important constituent of governance, to ensure high-quality governance and transparency in reporting to increase diverse stakeholders' trust/confidence. The absence of independence of SSB in performing their functions contradicts with the agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theory, which is inconsistent with global evidence, that demands further investigations.
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Abdel-Azim, Mohamed Hassan, and Sabah Soliman. "Board of directors’ characteristics and bank performance: Evidence from the Egyptian banking sector." Journal of Governance and Regulation 9, no. 4 (2020): 116–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgrv9i4art10.
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This paper examines the impact of the board of directors’ characteristics on bank performance in an Egyptian context. Board of directors’ size and composition diversity in terms of gender, nationality, and independence are used as proxies for the board of directors’ characteristics. Bank performance is measured using the return on assets as an accounting-based profitability indicator besides stock return volatility as a market-based performance indicator while controlling for the bank, regulatory and country-specific characteristics. Regression analysis is performed for a sample of 21 Egyptian banks covering the period from 2012 till 2018. The results show that banks with large boards including a high proportion of female and foreign directors achieve higher performance. Also, the higher is the proportion of independent directors, the lower is the performance, which contradicts with the agency theory proponents. Most importantly, the findings provide empirical evidence that market-based performance indicators react negatively to females’ directorship, while the opposite is found with independent directors as reflected in the positive market reaction. The findings are highly relevant since improved financial performance is one of the key objectives of bank supervisors and regulators to sustain economic growth.
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Riyani, Dinna. "The Effect of Corporate Governance, Leverage, and Liquidity on Islamic Social Reporting (ISR) Disclosure in Islamic Commercial Banks in Indonesia." Indonesian Accounting Review 8, no. 2 (December 27, 2018): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.14414/tiar.v8i2.1628.
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Islamic Social Reporting is the standard index of performance reporting in sharia-based companies. This index was born on the basis of reporting standards based on AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions). The objective of this research was to knowing the extent of Corporate Governance, leverage dan liquidity of Islamic Social Reporting Disclosure (ISR). The independent variables were used in this study is The Board of Comisionner, The Board of Directors, The Audit Comitte, Sharia Supervisory Boad, leverage and liquidity, while the dependent variable is the ISR disclosure. Samples were taken by using census sampling technique. The final sample as many as 12 islamic bank in Indonesia on 2012-2016. Data analysis method of the data used in this research is descriptive analysis, classical assumption test, and multiple linear regression using SPSS 23 for windows. The results of this study showed that The Board of Comisionner and liquidity has effect ISR disclosure. The Board of Directors, The Audit Comitte, Sharia Supervisory Boad, leverage does not affect the ISR disclosure.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors"
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LU, CHUN-CHOU, and 呂春綢. "AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “THE INSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND INDEPENDENT SUPERVISORS” AND PERFORMANCE." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26848774821780713857.
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碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
92
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market have required all new listed corporations to employ at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor since February 22, 2002. Although prior research hasdemonstrated some good influences from independent directors, still the effectiveness of the new requirements is subject to testing. This thesis aims to analyze the association between a firm’s performance and the setting of independent directors and supervisors. New listing corporations in 2002 meeting certain criteria are included as the research sample. Empirical results have shown that companies with independent directors and supervisors are generally found to have significantly positive performance. However, the proportion of institutional director & supervisors is found to have a significant negative relationship with company’s performance. Implications may be drawn that institutional investors are likely to be short-term investors. Regarding the quality of independence of directors & supervisors, they are generally higher than the dependent director ＆supervisor. This approves that the independent director & supervisor institution can upgrade the ability and the quality of the whole board of directors（supervisors）. In regard to the independent side, between those dependent director & supervisor, the highest proportion of not matching the requirement of independent director ＆ supervisor is those holding, directly or indirectly, more than 10﹪ of the company’s market share, or the first 10th holders. The conclusion shows that our corporations are generally highly overlap with the ownership and the authorization of operation. In terms of the form of independent director & supervisor the combinations of two independent directors and one supervisor are the most common situation in the experimental group, while the combinations of zero independent director& supervisor comprise most of the controlled group. On the voluntary setting-up of independent director& supervisor, companies are inclined to set up the independent supervisor voluntarily. It may be due to that the supervisor’s function is to check and review after the corporate issue, instead of getting involved in corporation’s decision from the beginning. According to the above results, there are few suggestions to the domestic institution of independent director & supervisor: 1. The government must accelerate its legislation regarding the setting of independent directors and independent supervisors to all the listed companies. 2. Raising the independent proportions of director and supervisors gradually.3.The requirement of independent board members should apply to all publishes.4.After the system works for a while, the supervisor function can be reexamined 5.There should be other subordinate systems to help the execution of the new requirement. 6.Buliding appropriate market mechanism to restore market function and maintain appropriate market order.
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Lo, Chun-Yi, and 羅君儀. "The Relationship between Independent Director and Independent Supervisor on Lending Rates of Financial Institutions." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54647625389185587604.
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碩士世新大學
財務金融學研究所(含碩專班)
97
There are still many listed corporation are family-owned companies. In order to enhance the corporate governance systems, the Government requested the public offering companies should hire more than two independent directors and more than one independent supervisor. This regulation means that independent director institution can help the companies improve the information disclosure and transparency, making the financial statement can reflect the real situation. The financial institutions sometimes do the credit examination based on the financial statement and the field visit. The independent monitoring system may influence the lending rate of corporate loans. This study uses the public information of listed companies from Dec, 2005 to Jun, 2008 to analyze the relationship between the establishment of independent director institution and lending rate and the set of independent director or supervisor would have different extent of influence to the credit conditions, like the lending terms and secured or not. Our empirical results show that listed companies of set independent director institution can get the lower lending rate from the financial institution. The set of independent director institution have great influence on the short term lending, but no difference on the secured lending or unsecured lending. The companies of set independent director only can obtain the lower lending rate than the companies of set independent supervisor. The result of sensitivity analysis shows that the establishment of independent director institution makes many control variants more sensitive to the lending rate. The result is same with the anticipated direction. About the other variants, positive, statistically significant correlations were found between the number of loans, the debt ratio and the lending rate. The firm sizes, ROE, risk-free rate have negative, statistically significant correlations with lending rate.
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Chi, Pang-Tsan, and 紀邦燦. "The researches on the voluntarily election of independent directors/independent supervisors and on the market responses to announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08995041955787638861.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
92
On October 2001, the Legislature Yuan passed the amendment of Company Law. According to the new version of Company Law, it is not necessary that directors and supervisors of a company are also shareholders of it. The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (“TSEC”) and the Republic of China GreTai Securities Market (“GTSM”) then amended the criteria for review of securities listings and the securities exchange criteria governing review of securities traded on Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) markets, which requires that companies applying initially for listing of its stock before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC markets before February 25, 2002 shall elect independent directors/independent supervisors. At the same time, TSEC and GTSM also jointly adopt the” Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies.” TSEC and GTSM hoped to put the system of independent directors/independent supervisors into practice totally by these two ways and realize the objective of the Competent Authority: making 2002 “the Year of Corporate Governance.” It is important for policy making to refer relative native researches at the trial step of the system of independent directors/independent supervisors. This thesis, therefore, tries to find characteristics of companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors voluntarily(that is, companies applying for listing before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC market before February 25, 2002 ) and observe the market responses to announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon empirically. By doing so can we realize the benefit of this system to Taiwan and make some suggestion to policy makers. First of all, this thesis uses the data of the amount of independent directors/independent supervisors of companies of Taiwan Economic Journal Co. (TEJ) as proxy for dependent variable: companies elect independent directors/independent supervisors or not, and uses the companies’ financial data of TEJ as independent variables. Binary logistic regression model is used to analyze the relation among the dependent variable and independent variables. Secondly, this thesis computes the abnormal returns resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon. These announcements are found in the Market Observation Post System. Finally, multiple regression model is used to analyze the relation among the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and several explanation variables. The research findings are as follows: I.Companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors have higher proportion of insider shareholdings, lower ratio of long-term debt to total assets, smaller firm size, larger growth opportunities, higher possibility of issuing stock in cash or debt in the future, worse operating performance, larger amount of supervisors, and higher ratio of receivables to total assets. Companies that belong to electronic industry are more likely to elect independent directors/independent supervisors than others. II.The abnormal returns resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon almost are negative. III.For companies that have higher degree of concentrated shareholding structure, smaller amount of supervisors, and larger firm size, the CARs resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon are larger. If these announcements occurred with announcements of affairs about the meeting of shareholders, the CARs are larger, too.
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Wang, Kuo-Chuan, and 王國權. "A study on the relationship of independent directors, independent supervisors, and earning management." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05014302602314919121.
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碩士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
95
The government and the academic have both realized recently the importance of corporate governance. The issue of establishing independent directors and independent supervisors becomes the focus of the debates. The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship of independent directors, independent supervisors, and earning management. 601samples were selected from the listed companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in 2003-2005. Final empirical evidences show that: 1.The scale of the board of directors and supervisors is positively associated with the degree of earning management. 2.The percentage of independent directors and independent supervisors is significantly negatively associated with the degree of earning management. 3.The companies whose independent directors and independent supervisors with financial background have the lower degree of earning management. 4.The existence of other jobs held by independent directors and supervisors is positively associated with the degree of earning management. 5.The independent directors and supervisors are concerned whether companies do engaged in upward earning management.
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Ku-Yun, Hung. "Do Independent Directors and Supervisors Help Firm's Financial Performance?" 2005. http://www.cetd.com.tw/ec/thesisdetail.aspx?etdun=U0001-0906200511135700.
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Tsai, Shih-Chiang, and 蔡世強. "The Determinants of Ratio of Independent Directors and Supervisors." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76347899105860591375.
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碩士中國文化大學
會計研究所
94
Recently, corporate governance is the most talked-about issue. The board plays an important role in internal control of corporate governance system. To integrate the structure of board, the independent directors and supervisors is one of main design. Taiwan Securities Trading Counter and Securities Market enforce that initial public offerings must set up at least two independent directors, one independent supervisor since February, 2002. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of independent directors and supervisors’ ratio. And expect that board size, growth opportunities, business performance, debt ratio, stock holding ratio of the directors and supervisors and firm size will influence the ratio of independent directors and supervisors . The research data are collected from 553 SEC listed companies in 2002 to 2004. Final observation values is 1,659. The empirical result shows that the relationship between growth opportunity and ratio of independent directors and supervisors is significant positive. The ratio of independent directors and supervisors is significant positively related to business performance and significant negatively related to firm size. The board size, debt ratio and stock holding ratio of the directors and supervisors are not significant related to the ratio of independent directors and supervisors. And the ratio of independent directors and supervisors which is set up voluntarily and involuntary has significant difference.
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You, Kai-ti, and 游鎧笛. "On the Relationship Between Independent Directors and Corporate Supervisors." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67525752746351683718.
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碩士逢甲大學
會計所
97
In order to reinforce corporate governance, Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) require that, initial public offering companies should install at least two independent directors and at least one independent supervisor from 2002/2/22(25). Moreover, from 2007 onward, financial enterprises and non-financial listed companies with more than 50 billion in capital ought to institute independent directors in their corporate constitutions. However, not all circles agree on the coexistence of independent directors and supervisors because the former might overlap the functions of the latter. True, some people think that since companies around the world are following American/British enterprises, it is necessary to institute independent directors in order to be “internationalized.” But those who oppose hold that one can also resort to the betterment of supervising systems to reinforce corporate governance. Hence, this study explores how supervisors influenced independent directors in Taiwan’s listed companies (2002~2006). The following factors are found conducive to the supervising effects of independent directors: the ratio of supervisors, supervisors and managers holding stocks, foreign corporations with shares, chairman of the board as general manager, operation performance, debt ratio, and family-run enterprises. One can also notice that independent directors and stock-holding directors are able to displace each other. These findings show how independent directors interact with independent supervisors in corporate governance, and they may hopefully contribute to the making of corporate decisions.
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Nguyen, Hoang-Dung, and 阮黃勇. "Affiliation of Independent Directors and Independent Supervisors with Current Audit Firm and Financial Reporting Quality." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88066154137988154775.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
102
This research aims to investigate whether the presence of affiliated independent directors or independent supervisors affects accruals-based earnings management of Taiwanese listed companies. Independent directors/supervisors are “affiliated” if they previously assumed an auditing position at their current company’s audit firm. Independent directors/supervisors are “unaffiliated” if they possess auditing experience, but never worked for their company’s current audit firm. Using a sample of 3,887 firm-years over the period of 2008 – 2012 and four measures of discretionary accruals to estimate earnings quality, this study finds that the presence of unaffiliated independent directors/supervisors is positively associated with earnings quality. Affiliated independent directors/supervisors are also found to have positive impact on earnings quality, after controlling for endogeneity using the difference-on-difference and instrumental variable approach. By classifying unaffiliated and affiliated independent directors/supervisors into seven different “profiles” based on their affiliation relationship with their company’s current audit firm and their highest audit position ever held, this study aims to investigate whether specific “combinations” of affiliation type and audit experience (including staff, manager, and partner) affect earnings quality and whether these effects are significantly different from each other. Results indicate that the profile of independent directors/supervisors affiliated as audit staff and having audit partner experience is positively associated with positive performance-included discretionary accruals, and this impact is significantly different with the other affiliated and unaffiliated independent director/supervisor profiles. On the other hand, even though the three profiles of unaffiliated independent directors/supervisors, including unaffiliated audit staff, unaffiliated audit manager, and unaffiliated audit partner, are all positively linked with earnings quality, this study does not detect any significant difference among these relationships.
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Hung, Ku-Yun, and 洪顧紜. "Do Independent Directors and Supervisors Help Firm''s Financial Performance?" Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/95549935624812927493.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
93
Many commentators believe that the higher the percentage of independent directors and supervisors, the better the financial performance of firms. A competent authority in Taiwan requested that newly listed companies should hire independent directors and supervisors after February 22nd, 2002. However, the empirical results in this paper challenge the conventional point of view on this topic in the literature. And in addition, this study finds that the promulgation of the 2002 regulation has brought with it some negative effects. First, the results of this study suggest that the percentage of independent directors and supervisors has a nonlinear relationship with firm performance. Second, the empirical findings of this study show that, affected by the new regulation, some bad companies that didn’t have to follow the new regulation will still voluntarily hire independent directors and supervisors in order to prevent investors from discovering their true quality. Finally, in this paper, we also find that the quality of the independent directors and supervisors is very important for firm performance and should be requested more completely and strictly to make sure that the monitoring mechanism of the firm really works.
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李介閔. "A Study of the Association between Busy Independent Directors and Busy Independent Supervisors and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83586472205371493110.
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碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
96
For a long time, there are several discussions on busy independent directors or busy independent supervisors (i.e., those holding too many directorships). The dispute is that such independent directors and supervisors are distracted by several directorships and therefore cannot perform their governance responsibility. This study investigates whether a firm with busy independent directors or busy independent supervisors has an effect on the quality of its publicly released financial information. By using performance-match discretionary accruals as the proxy of the earnings management, I examine the association between busy independent directors and supervisors and earnings management. The empirical results show that firm’s earnings management has a positive effect with busy independent directors, and also find that income increasing earnings management is positively associated with busy independent directors. This implies that the busy independent directors do not proved to be a very competent monitoring role.
Book chapters on the topic "The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors"
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Boitan, Iustina A. "Systemic Financial Institutions' Corporate Governance Features." In Corporate Governance Models and Applications in Developing Economies, 64–82. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-9607-3.ch004.
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Several international and European regulatory and supervisory authorities, such as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the European Banking Authority or the European Central Bank, are increasingly emphasizing that the structure of banks' managing bodies is a key driver of future financial stability and ask for reviews of existing skills, competencies, and expertise in order to cope with the newest economic, social, and technological challenges. The chapter subscribes to these views and aims at investigating two research directions: 1) whether there are resemblances in large, systemic banks' management board structure and 2) whether systemic banks' financial performance is determined by the management board's features (board size, number of women in the board, number of independent members). The empirical approach relies on several complementary methods (descriptive statistics, cluster analysis, panel regression) to reveal dominant board features in a sample of 29 European systemic banks, over a time frame of 11 years.
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Lee, Ruben. "What Is the Most Efficient Governance Structure?" In Running the World's Markets. Princeton University Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691133539.003.0009.
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This chapter analyzes what is the optimal governance model for market infrastructure institutions using the broad goal of efficiency as the main yardstick to compare different models. Three fundamental elements of governance are examined: an organization's ownership structure, its profit mandate, and its board composition. The chapter is composed of four sections. The first section outlines the archetypal ownership and mandate models that may be adopted by a market infrastructure institution. The second section identifies and discusses the pivotal factors that affect the relative efficiency of the different ownership and mandate models. The third section discusses two issues of fundamental importance to market infrastructure institutions' boards: the roles such boards should undertake, and the merits and difficulties of having independent directors or user directors on these boards. The last section encapsulates these discussions and presents key lessons about how to choose the optimal ownership structure and mandate for a market infrastructure institution.
Conference papers on the topic "The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors"
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Wang Shi-quan and Liu Jin-yan. "The Market for Controlling Rights, Independent Directors System and Supervisory Board Governance - A New View Based on Comparative Institutional Analysis." In 2006 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2006.314003.
Full textReports on the topic "The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors"
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Sembler, Jose Ignacio, Ana María Linares, Clara Schettino, Nathaniel Russell, Stephany Maqueda, Lina Pedraza, Melanie Putic, Thaís Soares Oliveira, and Alejandro Ahumada. Evaluation of the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (MICI) 2021. Inter-American Development Bank, March 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003215.
Full textAbstract:
This evaluation is in response to a request from the Boards of Executive Directors of the IDB and IDB Invest for OVE to independently examine the MICI policy and its implementation pursuant to the requirement established in the respective policies of each institution. The aim of this evaluation is to inform the Boards of Executive Directors of the IDB and IDB Invest on the extent to which, under its current policy framework, the MICI has been effective and efficient in (i) resolving the complaints it receives concerning environmental and social impacts of projects due to alleged noncompliance with the IDB Group's environmental and social safeguards policies and standards; and (ii) promoting institutional learning with regard to environmental and social safeguards and standards and their implementation in IDB Group projects. In addition, the evaluation is aimed at reporting on the mechanism's accessibility to requesters and the extent to which the MICI has performed its duties independently, objectively, impartially, and transparently.