To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 33 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
LU, CHUN-CHOU, and 呂春綢. "AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “THE INSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND INDEPENDENT SUPERVISORS” AND PERFORMANCE." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26848774821780713857.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
92
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market have required all new listed corporations to employ at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor since February 22, 2002. Although prior research hasdemonstrated some good influences from independent directors, still the effectiveness of the new requirements is subject to testing. This thesis aims to analyze the association between a firm’s performance and the setting of independent directors and supervisors. New listing corporations in 2002 meeting certain criteria are included as the research sample. Empirical results have shown that companies with independent directors and supervisors are generally found to have significantly positive performance. However, the proportion of institutional director & supervisors is found to have a significant negative relationship with company’s performance. Implications may be drawn that institutional investors are likely to be short-term investors. Regarding the quality of independence of directors & supervisors, they are generally higher than the dependent director ＆supervisor. This approves that the independent director & supervisor institution can upgrade the ability and the quality of the whole board of directors（supervisors）. In regard to the independent side, between those dependent director & supervisor, the highest proportion of not matching the requirement of independent director ＆ supervisor is those holding, directly or indirectly, more than 10﹪ of the company’s market share, or the first 10th holders. The conclusion shows that our corporations are generally highly overlap with the ownership and the authorization of operation. In terms of the form of independent director & supervisor the combinations of two independent directors and one supervisor are the most common situation in the experimental group, while the combinations of zero independent director& supervisor comprise most of the controlled group. On the voluntary setting-up of independent director& supervisor, companies are inclined to set up the independent supervisor voluntarily. It may be due to that the supervisor’s function is to check and review after the corporate issue, instead of getting involved in corporation’s decision from the beginning. According to the above results, there are few suggestions to the domestic institution of independent director & supervisor: 1. The government must accelerate its legislation regarding the setting of independent directors and independent supervisors to all the listed companies. 2. Raising the independent proportions of director and supervisors gradually.3.The requirement of independent board members should apply to all publishes.4.After the system works for a while, the supervisor function can be reexamined 5.There should be other subordinate systems to help the execution of the new requirement. 6.Buliding appropriate market mechanism to restore market function and maintain appropriate market order.
2
Lo, Chun-Yi, and 羅君儀. "The Relationship between Independent Director and Independent Supervisor on Lending Rates of Financial Institutions." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54647625389185587604.
Full textAbstract:
碩士世新大學
財務金融學研究所(含碩專班)
97
There are still many listed corporation are family-owned companies. In order to enhance the corporate governance systems, the Government requested the public offering companies should hire more than two independent directors and more than one independent supervisor. This regulation means that independent director institution can help the companies improve the information disclosure and transparency, making the financial statement can reflect the real situation. The financial institutions sometimes do the credit examination based on the financial statement and the field visit. The independent monitoring system may influence the lending rate of corporate loans. This study uses the public information of listed companies from Dec, 2005 to Jun, 2008 to analyze the relationship between the establishment of independent director institution and lending rate and the set of independent director or supervisor would have different extent of influence to the credit conditions, like the lending terms and secured or not. Our empirical results show that listed companies of set independent director institution can get the lower lending rate from the financial institution. The set of independent director institution have great influence on the short term lending, but no difference on the secured lending or unsecured lending. The companies of set independent director only can obtain the lower lending rate than the companies of set independent supervisor. The result of sensitivity analysis shows that the establishment of independent director institution makes many control variants more sensitive to the lending rate. The result is same with the anticipated direction. About the other variants, positive, statistically significant correlations were found between the number of loans, the debt ratio and the lending rate. The firm sizes, ROE, risk-free rate have negative, statistically significant correlations with lending rate.
3
Chi, Pang-Tsan, and 紀邦燦. "The researches on the voluntarily election of independent directors/independent supervisors and on the market responses to announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08995041955787638861.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
92
On October 2001, the Legislature Yuan passed the amendment of Company Law. According to the new version of Company Law, it is not necessary that directors and supervisors of a company are also shareholders of it. The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (“TSEC”) and the Republic of China GreTai Securities Market (“GTSM”) then amended the criteria for review of securities listings and the securities exchange criteria governing review of securities traded on Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) markets, which requires that companies applying initially for listing of its stock before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC markets before February 25, 2002 shall elect independent directors/independent supervisors. At the same time, TSEC and GTSM also jointly adopt the” Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies.” TSEC and GTSM hoped to put the system of independent directors/independent supervisors into practice totally by these two ways and realize the objective of the Competent Authority: making 2002 “the Year of Corporate Governance.” It is important for policy making to refer relative native researches at the trial step of the system of independent directors/independent supervisors. This thesis, therefore, tries to find characteristics of companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors voluntarily(that is, companies applying for listing before February 22, 2002 or trading securities at OTC market before February 25, 2002 ) and observe the market responses to announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon empirically. By doing so can we realize the benefit of this system to Taiwan and make some suggestion to policy makers. First of all, this thesis uses the data of the amount of independent directors/independent supervisors of companies of Taiwan Economic Journal Co. (TEJ) as proxy for dependent variable: companies elect independent directors/independent supervisors or not, and uses the companies’ financial data of TEJ as independent variables. Binary logistic regression model is used to analyze the relation among the dependent variable and independent variables. Secondly, this thesis computes the abnormal returns resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon. These announcements are found in the Market Observation Post System. Finally, multiple regression model is used to analyze the relation among the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and several explanation variables. The research findings are as follows: I.Companies that elect independent directors/independent supervisors have higher proportion of insider shareholdings, lower ratio of long-term debt to total assets, smaller firm size, larger growth opportunities, higher possibility of issuing stock in cash or debt in the future, worse operating performance, larger amount of supervisors, and higher ratio of receivables to total assets. Companies that belong to electronic industry are more likely to elect independent directors/independent supervisors than others. II.The abnormal returns resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon almost are negative. III.For companies that have higher degree of concentrated shareholding structure, smaller amount of supervisors, and larger firm size, the CARs resulting from announcements of companies about electing independent directors/independent supervisors soon are larger. If these announcements occurred with announcements of affairs about the meeting of shareholders, the CARs are larger, too.
4
Wang, Kuo-Chuan, and 王國權. "A study on the relationship of independent directors, independent supervisors, and earning management." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05014302602314919121.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
95
The government and the academic have both realized recently the importance of corporate governance. The issue of establishing independent directors and independent supervisors becomes the focus of the debates. The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship of independent directors, independent supervisors, and earning management. 601samples were selected from the listed companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in 2003-2005. Final empirical evidences show that: 1.The scale of the board of directors and supervisors is positively associated with the degree of earning management. 2.The percentage of independent directors and independent supervisors is significantly negatively associated with the degree of earning management. 3.The companies whose independent directors and independent supervisors with financial background have the lower degree of earning management. 4.The existence of other jobs held by independent directors and supervisors is positively associated with the degree of earning management. 5.The independent directors and supervisors are concerned whether companies do engaged in upward earning management.
5
Ku-Yun, Hung. "Do Independent Directors and Supervisors Help Firm's Financial Performance?" 2005. http://www.cetd.com.tw/ec/thesisdetail.aspx?etdun=U0001-0906200511135700.
Full text
6
Tsai, Shih-Chiang, and 蔡世強. "The Determinants of Ratio of Independent Directors and Supervisors." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76347899105860591375.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中國文化大學
會計研究所
94
Recently, corporate governance is the most talked-about issue. The board plays an important role in internal control of corporate governance system. To integrate the structure of board, the independent directors and supervisors is one of main design. Taiwan Securities Trading Counter and Securities Market enforce that initial public offerings must set up at least two independent directors, one independent supervisor since February, 2002. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of independent directors and supervisors’ ratio. And expect that board size, growth opportunities, business performance, debt ratio, stock holding ratio of the directors and supervisors and firm size will influence the ratio of independent directors and supervisors . The research data are collected from 553 SEC listed companies in 2002 to 2004. Final observation values is 1,659. The empirical result shows that the relationship between growth opportunity and ratio of independent directors and supervisors is significant positive. The ratio of independent directors and supervisors is significant positively related to business performance and significant negatively related to firm size. The board size, debt ratio and stock holding ratio of the directors and supervisors are not significant related to the ratio of independent directors and supervisors. And the ratio of independent directors and supervisors which is set up voluntarily and involuntary has significant difference.
7
You, Kai-ti, and 游鎧笛. "On the Relationship Between Independent Directors and Corporate Supervisors." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67525752746351683718.
Full textAbstract:
碩士逢甲大學
會計所
97
In order to reinforce corporate governance, Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) require that, initial public offering companies should install at least two independent directors and at least one independent supervisor from 2002/2/22(25). Moreover, from 2007 onward, financial enterprises and non-financial listed companies with more than 50 billion in capital ought to institute independent directors in their corporate constitutions. However, not all circles agree on the coexistence of independent directors and supervisors because the former might overlap the functions of the latter. True, some people think that since companies around the world are following American/British enterprises, it is necessary to institute independent directors in order to be “internationalized.” But those who oppose hold that one can also resort to the betterment of supervising systems to reinforce corporate governance. Hence, this study explores how supervisors influenced independent directors in Taiwan’s listed companies (2002~2006). The following factors are found conducive to the supervising effects of independent directors: the ratio of supervisors, supervisors and managers holding stocks, foreign corporations with shares, chairman of the board as general manager, operation performance, debt ratio, and family-run enterprises. One can also notice that independent directors and stock-holding directors are able to displace each other. These findings show how independent directors interact with independent supervisors in corporate governance, and they may hopefully contribute to the making of corporate decisions.
8
Nguyen, Hoang-Dung, and 阮黃勇. "Affiliation of Independent Directors and Independent Supervisors with Current Audit Firm and Financial Reporting Quality." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88066154137988154775.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
102
This research aims to investigate whether the presence of affiliated independent directors or independent supervisors affects accruals-based earnings management of Taiwanese listed companies. Independent directors/supervisors are “affiliated” if they previously assumed an auditing position at their current company’s audit firm. Independent directors/supervisors are “unaffiliated” if they possess auditing experience, but never worked for their company’s current audit firm. Using a sample of 3,887 firm-years over the period of 2008 – 2012 and four measures of discretionary accruals to estimate earnings quality, this study finds that the presence of unaffiliated independent directors/supervisors is positively associated with earnings quality. Affiliated independent directors/supervisors are also found to have positive impact on earnings quality, after controlling for endogeneity using the difference-on-difference and instrumental variable approach. By classifying unaffiliated and affiliated independent directors/supervisors into seven different “profiles” based on their affiliation relationship with their company’s current audit firm and their highest audit position ever held, this study aims to investigate whether specific “combinations” of affiliation type and audit experience (including staff, manager, and partner) affect earnings quality and whether these effects are significantly different from each other. Results indicate that the profile of independent directors/supervisors affiliated as audit staff and having audit partner experience is positively associated with positive performance-included discretionary accruals, and this impact is significantly different with the other affiliated and unaffiliated independent director/supervisor profiles. On the other hand, even though the three profiles of unaffiliated independent directors/supervisors, including unaffiliated audit staff, unaffiliated audit manager, and unaffiliated audit partner, are all positively linked with earnings quality, this study does not detect any significant difference among these relationships.
9
Hung, Ku-Yun, and 洪顧紜. "Do Independent Directors and Supervisors Help Firm''s Financial Performance?" Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/95549935624812927493.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
93
Many commentators believe that the higher the percentage of independent directors and supervisors, the better the financial performance of firms. A competent authority in Taiwan requested that newly listed companies should hire independent directors and supervisors after February 22nd, 2002. However, the empirical results in this paper challenge the conventional point of view on this topic in the literature. And in addition, this study finds that the promulgation of the 2002 regulation has brought with it some negative effects. First, the results of this study suggest that the percentage of independent directors and supervisors has a nonlinear relationship with firm performance. Second, the empirical findings of this study show that, affected by the new regulation, some bad companies that didn’t have to follow the new regulation will still voluntarily hire independent directors and supervisors in order to prevent investors from discovering their true quality. Finally, in this paper, we also find that the quality of the independent directors and supervisors is very important for firm performance and should be requested more completely and strictly to make sure that the monitoring mechanism of the firm really works.
10
李介閔. "A Study of the Association between Busy Independent Directors and Busy Independent Supervisors and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83586472205371493110.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
96
For a long time, there are several discussions on busy independent directors or busy independent supervisors (i.e., those holding too many directorships). The dispute is that such independent directors and supervisors are distracted by several directorships and therefore cannot perform their governance responsibility. This study investigates whether a firm with busy independent directors or busy independent supervisors has an effect on the quality of its publicly released financial information. By using performance-match discretionary accruals as the proxy of the earnings management, I examine the association between busy independent directors and supervisors and earnings management. The empirical results show that firm’s earnings management has a positive effect with busy independent directors, and also find that income increasing earnings management is positively associated with busy independent directors. This implies that the busy independent directors do not proved to be a very competent monitoring role.
11
Hung, Chi-Hsing, and 洪啟翔. "Internal-Independent Directors and Supervisors and Empirical Study of Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05542931795367892304.
Full textAbstract:
碩士清雲科技大學
國際企業管理研究所
100
This study uses statistical methods to establish an early- warning models to predict may occur to the probability of financial crisis. Empirical analysis, and further whether the implementation of corporate governance, independent directors and supervisors whether to set the internal classification to identify the significant variables affecting corporate performance, and to improve corporate performance. The empirical results show that the "independent directors and supervisors is not set corporate performance indicators of financial structure, solvency, management ability, profitability, cash flow and corporate governance indicators; set insider independent directors and supervisors affect the company''s performance the major indicators of financial structure, profitability, cash flow and corporate governance indicators; to increase the internal retention ratio can improve company profitability; as soon as possible to replace the accountant, attach importance to the supervision of external accountants, can improve corporate governance and company performance; set of independent directors and supervisors, an appropriate increase in the debt ratio and return on total assets (ROA), can improve the financial structure to improve profitability. Therefore, the empirical value and managerial implications of this study in corporate governance, financial risk management and financial forecasting.
12
WU, YU-HSING, and 吳毓星. "A Study of Independent Directors and Supervisors, CPAs and Financial Crisis." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76740959780961255212.
Full textAbstract:
博士中國文化大學
國際企業管理學系
105
This study is to investigate if the relationship between the independent board of directors and supervisors, the certified public accountants, and financial crisis have something to do with the management of a company and its financial crisis. And a company whose CEO is working double duties as president and general manager would or would not exert impact on company's financial crisis is also being explored. We employed the Financial Early Warning Model on samples taken from 146 public companies in Taiwan leisure industry. The study reveals that the relationship between the independent board of directors and supervisors , CPAs and the financial crisis is negatively correlated despite of the fact that whether or not a company's CEO working double duties. This study demonstrates the importance and Irreplaceability of roles the board of directors and supervisors play in a company.
13
Jhuang, Jyun-Ming, and 莊峻銘. "Association among Independent Directors (Supervisors), Corporate information transparency and Firm value." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/dx44nh.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
92
After Enron scandal, issues on corporate governance are gradually getting more and more attention. Introducing independent directors (supervisors) and enhancing corporate information transparency have become two imperative topics. In this study, two objectives are raised: (1) to examine the effect of independent directors and independent supervisors on corporate information transparency; (2) to examine the effect of independent directors (supervisors) and corporate information transparency on firm value. The data was gathered from those firms listed on Stock Exchange of Taiwan in 2002. After deleting the omitted data, our final sample consists 553 observations. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), path analysis and t test as well as M-W test are used to analyze our data sets. The results indicate that independent directors and independent supervisors indeed facilitate firms to enhance information transparency. It also shows that both the independent directors and the corporate information transparency are significantly relevant to firm value. The other finding is the proportion of independent directors has the most impact on the firm value. Although independent supervisors don’t have any direct impact on the firm value, they can increase firm value indirectly by their positive impact on their corporate information transparency.
14
He, Shing-Fang, and 何幸芳. "The Effect of Independent Directors and Supervisors on Performance and Earnings Informativeness." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/74719094685595815956.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
金融研究所
91
Many famous companies such as Enron and Xerox were suffered from accounting scandals in the world since 1998, investors have losed their credits to financial reports and this appeared the importance of corporate governance. This study examines the effect on performance and earnings informativeness if those companies that listed in SEC and OTC in Taiwan emploies independent directors and supervisors voluntarily. The research data are collected from 641 SEC and 375 OTC listed companies in 2001. The empirical study shows that if company has higher value, higher ROA, higher ROE, higher stock holding ratio of the directors(supervisors) and lower assets from 1999 to 2001, it will like to emlopy independent directors and supervisors voluntarily. We also find that if the ratio of the independent directors and supervisors and the number of the independent supervisors is higher, the compnay will have higher value in 2002. Adopting the method developed by Fan and Wong (2002), we find those companise that employ independent directors and supervisors will have higher accounting earnings informativeness. When investors believe that credibility and transparencey of company’s financial reports, they will prefer to pay premium to buy stock and stock price will rise. In a word, employing independent directors and supervisors can make investors to believe that company’s corporate governance will be better. The better corporate gvoernance will be more earnings informativeness and investors will have more confidence to company’s financial reports.
15
Chan, Li-hua, and 詹麗華. "Attendances and Continuous Education of Independent Directors and Supervisors and Earnings Quality." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35964245041695010046.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東吳大學
會計學系
100
For the effects of independent directors and supervisors on corporate earnings quality, previous studies primarily focus on the issues of how many numbers of directorships held by independent directors and supervisors. In this study, the discretionary accrual is used as a proxy of earnings quality to examine whether attendances and continuing professional education of independent directors and supervisors can improve corporate earnings quality, and therefore reduce earnings management. Data includes 1,148 TWSE/GTSM listed corporations in the year of 2009. The empirical results show that no significant relationship between both attendances and continuing professional education of independent directors and supervisors and earnings quality. Independent directors and supervisors may get involved in and understood policies and operation of the listed corporations only when they attend board meetings and the frequency of board meetings within each year are too low, so that the difference between high attendance rate and low attendance rate is actually minor. Thus the above results deviate from expectations. Continuing professional education encouraged by the government, not forced, may not have substantive effects.
16
郭麗雪. "The effect of mandatory independent directors and supervisors on IPOs offer price." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43262464151175344590.
Full text
17
Huang, Huan-song, and 黃煥崧. "A Study on Corporate Governance and Declaration Date of Independent Directors and Supervisors." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/89182443524418133230.
Full textAbstract:
碩士銘傳大學
財務金融學系碩士在職專班
102
This paper explored five aspects regarding corporate governance, especially focusing on the major responsibility of the Board. The issue that the members of the Board must be obliged by Law of Independent Directors and Supervisors implemented on 1 January 2006 has provoked much discussion in recent years. It is hoped that this exploration could benefit the future development of listed enterprises and companies. Fueled by the re-election of the directors and supervisors, the battle for chips is bound to be broken out. The triennial re-election of directors and supervisors, the quiet entry of speculative buying, and the well preparation of domestic and foreign legal persons and entrepreneurs, all made Directors and Supervisors Re-election Concept Stock jump to the short-term strength group, such as power of attorney shareholding limit. With all these forces fighting overtly and covertly for the management of the company, the subject of re-election of directors and supervisors has signs of early germination. The introduction to corporate governance can be divided into two aspects, namely promoting what is beneficial and abolishing what is harmful. The former can strengthen the effectiveness of strategy management and ensure the correct direction of the company strategy; and the latter requests listed companies to have independent directors and supervisors to monitor the managers through transparent real-time information to ensure the interests of outside shareholders and creditors as well as other interests of other stakeholders, in pursuit of fairness and competition to enhance business performance and strengthen company’s value. The Empiricalresults of this research are as follows: 1.Event Study. Sampling on seven stocks of independent directors and supervisors, the study explored the share-price volatilities and the average abnormal return differences in three days both before and after the day; it turned out by ANOVA that the significances were both higher than 0.1 for that data of that day and three days before and after that day between the group, while the average abnormal return had no difference. 2.ANOVA on five attributes of corporate governance. 1). For the education qualification higher than postgraduate, the comparison and assessment of the rights of shareholders, the stakeholders interests, the information disclosure and transparency, and the responsibility of the Board differed significantly, while the fair treatment to all shareholders had no significant difference. 2). For the position higher than manager, the comparison and assessment of the rights of shareholders, the information disclosure and transparency, and the responsibility of the Board differed significantly, while the fair treatment to all shareholders and interests of stakeholders had no significant difference.
18
Fu, Huei-Chen, and 傅慧貞. "The Effect of the Independent Directors and Supervisors and Their Compensation on Abnormal Accruals." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14610649945495338524.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
94
The introduction of independent directors/supervisors arises from the enactment enforced on February 22, 2002 by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market. This enactment requires all new listed firms to employ at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor for the improvement of the corporate governance in Taiwan. This study is aimed at examining whether the compensation of directors/supervisors fosters firm’s earnings management behavior ,and on the contrary, the introduction of independent directors/supervisors can restrain firm’s earnings management behavior. The empirical results are summarized as follows: 1. The absolute abnormal accruals are significantly negative-associated with the average compensation of directors and supervisors It is quite obvious that more compensation can make directors and supervisors ignore their duty of constrain firm’s earnings management behavior. 2. Compared to listed firms without the independent directors/supervisors, listed firms with the independent directors/supervisors have more absolute abnormal accruals. It evidences that the independent directors and independent supervisor not only strengthen their functionality in improving the operation of business, but also supervise the firm’s earnings management behaviors.
19
Jia-Ci, Chen, and 陳珈琪. "The Relationship between Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Supervisors and Corporate Social Responsibility." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78052332114843911704.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中原大學
會計研究所
104
More and more dishonest events were disclosed in recent years. Except for profitability, whether a company take the responsibility for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) become a concerning issue. There were quite a few of literature study in whether corporations enforce CSR or not. However, few of them study in relevance between Board of Dircectors and CSR. The study focus on whether having independent directorsband supervisors with experienced expertise background may be one of the key points that lead to the higher probability for company to perform CSR. Due to CSR is dummy variable, I use logit regression in this article. On the other hand, Besides, the reason that whether companies decide to hire a independent supervisors with experienced expertise background maybe one of the factors of perform CSR, Heckman Two-Stage are used for controling endogeneity. The results show that when companies'' independent supervisors are industry experts, companies are able to increase the probability of exercising CSR.
20
LEE, CHIN-LUNG, and 李金龍. "THE STUDY ABOUT THE DETERMINANT FACTORS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND SUPERVISORS’ VOLUNTARY TURNOVER IN TAIWAN." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26719273154134817560.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
95
In order to improve corporate governance and protect investors, on February 22, 2002, the Security Exchange Commission decreed that for any company to be publicly listed or traded over the counter, its Board of Directors should have at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor before IPO applications. After the system implemented, the independent directors and supervisors continually resigned their positions voluntarily. Therefore the effect of the independent directors and supervisors can’t be attained completely. The main purpose of this study is to examine, based on three prospects: corporate governance, financial crisis prediction and economic incentive, the factors of independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover. It will be helpful to the government to construct wonderful related systems. At the same time, it will be also helpful to investors, companies which employ independent directors and supervisors, independent directors and supervisors who were employed or will be employed to make a better decision. The study uses Logit regression model to analyze the determinant factors of independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover in Taiwan. The samples include 70 independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover in public companies and 70 matching samples from January 2003 to March 2007. Independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover is as dependent variable. The factors of independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover are analyzed from corporate governance, financial crisis prediction and economic incentive. It is constructed 16 hypothesizes and 16 independent variables. Size of company is considered controlling variable. The three variables are made of the model of the study. The study is expected that independent directors and supervisors will demit voluntarily to avoid the juridical responsibilities and protect their fame or consider economic incentive when they faced the risks and pressures or insufficient economic incentive. The outcomes of this research indicate that independent directors and supervisors will tend to demit voluntarily because of CEOS’ voluntary turnover, higher related party transaction ratio, higher debt ratio and lower pay of independent directors and supervisors.
21
Shih, Chenhsun, and 施振勳. "The Relationship between Accounting Speciality of Independent Directors and Supervisors, Earnings Management and Operating Performance." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/40980890547527875747.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
100
Since 2000, financial scandals have kept happening in our country, it showed that we are lack of the legislation on corporate governing. Now, the government has tried to strengthen the legislature. They modify requirement of the IPOs in 2002, and set up the rule of independent director and audit committee in 2006 in order to improve the legislation on corporate governing and the economic development of Taiwan. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between accounting specialist of the independent directors and supervisors, earnings management and operating performance. The samples came from companies with at least one independent director and supervisor between 2006 and 2010. The results show that the independence of directors and supervisors isn’t significantly relation to earnings management, while it is significantly positive correlation to operating performance. This shows that independent directors and supervisors can offer professional suggestion and upgrade the operating performance of companies. The Board that has at least one independent director or supervisor with accounting specialist has significantly negative correlation with earnings management. It shows that the independent directors and supervisors who have accounting specialty can use their specialized knowledge to supervise the companies well. In addition, this study separated independent directors and supervisors who have accounting background into three different working fields, auditing fields, CFO fields and academic fields. The independent directors and supervisors came from auditing fields have significantly negative correlation with earnings management, it shows that independent directors and supervisors came from auditing fields could use their professional knowledge and work experience to reduce the level of earnings management.
22
鐘巧蓉. "Busy Compensation Committee, The Proportion of Independent Directors and Supervisors, Family Businesses and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/58396023533914479125.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
102
This paper investigates the relationship among busy compensation committee, proportion of independent directors and supervisors, family businessesand positive earnings management. Since compensation committee is mandatory setting in Taiwan in 2011, a sample of the listed and the Gre-Tai companies in Taiwan in 2011 is used in the analysis and further examines the earnings management activities in 2012. The results show that busy compensation committee, the proportion of independent directors andsupervisors can effectively reduce the manipulation behavior of executives. The results also reveal that family businessesis positively correlated to positive earnings management which indicates that family businesseshas weaker corporate governance.
23
Chuang, Yi Jui, and 莊貽如. "The Study on the Relationship between the Independent Directors and Supervisors and the Firm Performance." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/dmk4n6.
Full textAbstract:
碩士長榮大學
經營管理研究所
97
The legalization of the systems of independent directors and supervisors was put into practice in Taiwan on January 1, 2007, but those systems should be set up for the new OTC listed companies in 2002 according to the provisions of the laws. As a matter of fact, the systems of independent directors and supervisors have been implemented in Taiwan for many years. In addition to the introduction the of the accounting and financial professionals in operating a business for better rationalization and specialization, the systems of independent directors and supervisors provide the company more effective management as well as the rights and interests of the investors better protection without any conflict of interests arising, since those systems have no direct stake in the company. First of all, this study analyzed empirically the relationship between the firm performance and the companies with or without the setting of independent directors and supervisors under the selection of the OTC listed companies during 2004 to 2006. On the other hand, the firm performances between the former and the later settings of the independent directors and supervisors of the OTC listed companies during 2003 to 2007 are also analyzed empirically. Finally, this study analyz the relationship of the firm performance of the OTC listed companies among the ownership shares, the pledged shares, and the remuneration of the independent directors and supervisors during 2004 to 2006 respectively. The empirical analysis of this study is based on the methods of the mixed design ANOVA and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test by SPSS. The empirical results of this study are as follows: 1.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those without the setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors is superior to those without the setting of independent directors and supervisors. 2.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with the later setting of independent directors and supervisors are significantly higher than those with the former setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with the later setting of independent directors and supervisors is superior to those with the former setting of independent directors and supervisors. 3.There is no significant differences in the ROA, ROE and EPS among the companies with the ownership share of the setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance and the ownership share of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors are irrelevant. 4.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with high pledged share percentage of the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those with low pledged share percentage. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with high pledged share percentage is worse than those with low pledged share percentage. 5.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with high reward of the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those with low remuneration. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with high remuneration is superior to those with low reward.
24
Chen, Cheng-hung, and 陳政宏. "Board attributes、firm performance、the directors and supervisor's background and market reaction to announcement of independent directors and supervisors." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21872118859602462737.
Full textAbstract:
碩士開南管理學院
財務金融系碩士班
93
Recently, there were quite a number of accounting scandals and financial fraudulence in US and Taiwan. Therefore, the government hope to enhance corporate governance mechanism. They enforce that initial public offerings must set up at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor since February, 2002. The major of this study investigates the independent of director announcement effect that can improve investor's confidence and produce abnormal return which can increase the value of the company and shareholder. The research data were collected by 94 companies which were announced recruiting independent director between 2002 to 2004. Using the event studying get independent director announcement effects, the difference of independent directors and independent supervisor, the effects of industry, the number of independent directors and independent directors' background. As a result, the announcement of director could produce abnormal return, but the technology industry did not significantly positive, the number of independent directors were no more 2 people. Depending on the independent and professional directors are more useful in corporate. Finally, using multiple regression model test the factor of abnormal return from the effects of independent director. Using the character of the board, the performance of corporation, development and the directors get more other jobs. In conclusion, if the company has the higher stock holding ratio of the directors(supervisors), the higher stock holding ratio of the institutional investors have, higher percentage of the shares as collateral by the board of directors, the lower corporate performance in the earlier, the CEO can not be the chair man, the directors get fewer other jobs, it will get positive abnormal return.
25
Yi-Ying, Chen, and 陳怡瑩. "The Research of the Relationship between Independent Directors and Supervisors’ Form Attribute and Investors’ Investment Behavior." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14310896888200249369.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中國文化大學
國際企業管理研究所
93
By deriving documents and sending questionnaires, this study empirically examines the relationship between independent directors and supervisors’ form attribute and investors’ investment behavior. Total 500 questionnaires were sending, and returned 308 questionnaires were effective. This study main conclusion includes: 1. The relationship between independent directors/supervisors’ independent character and investors’ investment behavior is positive. 2. The relationship between independent directors/supervisors’ specialized ability and the educational background and investors’ investment behavior is positive. 3. There’s no relationship between independent directors/supervisors’ policy decision ability and investors’ investment behavior. 4. The relationship between independent directors/supervisors’ level of effects contribution and investors’ investment behavior is positive. 5. The influence of investment motivation in the relationship between independent directors/supervisors’ form attribute and investors’ investment behavior is existential. 6. The influence of information source in the relationship between independent directors/supervisors’ form attribute and investors’ investment behavior is not existential.
26
Lu, Ching-Ting, and 呂靜婷. "The influence of Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Supervisors on Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk Index." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71427196684182347179.
Full textAbstract:
碩士中原大學
會計研究所
104
This paper researches the effect of industry expertise of independent directors and supervisors on Taiwan corporate credit risk index(TCRI). According to regulatory requirements, the company must set up an independent directors and supervisors or audit committee to supervise management, but there is no specific requirements about their identity or background. In this article we added conditions of industry experts to observe the overall company influence. The study collected research data from 2009 to 2014 of the listed companies in Taiwan. TCRI and the other related data came from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ).We used Heckman''s two-stage method to explore the relationship between industry experts and credit rating. The exogenous variableare number of part-time and training hours of independent directors and supervisors. The first stage which we estimated IMR through Logit model, and the results of the first stage were then used in Ordered Logit to test the hypothesis. The empirical results show that the independent directors and supervisors who has professional background with relevant industry experience that might have better effect of board oversight in company. And at the same time, it can reduce earnings restatement or earnings management. Thus it can strengthen the quality and reliability of financial statements and the external investors will enhance confidence in the company. Due to professional advice which provided by industry experts that credit rating agency will give the company a better score. This article will help government make regulations in the future or when companies hire independent directors and supervisors, they will consider their relevant work experience.
27
Hsiao, Chung-Chih, and 蕭瓊枝. "The Effect of the Independent Directors / Supervisors System and Their Compensations on Firm Performance in Taiwan." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16874626797929797067.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
94
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (Gretai Securities Market) has required all new listed firms to employ at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor since February 22(25), 2002. Although this system is inspired by other countris’ regulations, whether such new system is suitable and brings about positive benefit for Taiwan domestic business culture is subject to testing. Moreover, prior research has focused on the effect of the board structure on firm performance, or the effect of the board compensation on firm performance, none has studied the impact of these two factors on firm performance, so this study is aimed at analyzing the association between firm performance and the independent directors and supervisors system and their compensations. The Sample firms of this study are the TSE and OTC listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2002 to 2004. This study examines whether the setting of independent directors and supervisors induce the better firm performance, and the board compesation have better effect on firm performance to prompt the strength of supervision function and then induce the positive benefit on firm performance based on agent cost reduction consideration. The empirical results can be summarized as follows: 1.The setting of independent directors and supervisors really induce the better firm performance. 2.The more board compesation, the better firm performance. 3.The empirical finding that the more board compesation, the better firm performance is more profound in firms with independent directors compared to firms without independent directors and supervisors.
28
Tseng, Chu-Hui, and 曾琡惠. "The Determinants of the Directorships Held by Independent Directors and Supervisors and the Impact of Directorships on Firm Performance." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68070982639431008857.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立交通大學
財務金融研究所
95
In 2006, in order to improve the corporate governance systems and enhance its market competitive capabilities, The Security Exchange Commission (TSEC) decreed that for publicly listed companies, the Board of Directors should have at least two independent directors and can not hold less than 1/3 of the total directorships. To avoid worsening the quality of supervising, TSEC stipulated that the independent directors should not hold more than three independent directorships of other publicly listed companies. The main purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of the directorships held by independent directors and the relation between the firm performance and directorships held by independent directors. In this study, the sample is the electronic industry with at least one independent director and one independent supervisor in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate (TSEC) and Over-the-Counter market (OTC) from 2003 to 2005. Our empirical results show: 1. Independent directors with the qualification of experts ,masters or top managers in other companies and average firm size are significantly positively associated with the number of directorships they hold. Average past performance of the firms for which independent directors serve is significantly negatively associated with the number of directorships they hold. 2. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors is significantly negatively associated with firm performance. 3. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of non-independent of supervisor on firm performance. 4. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of powerful managers on firm performance. 5. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of the deviation of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights from voting rights on firm performance.
29
Chien, Yan-Fen, and 簡燕芬. "An Empirical Study of the Effects of Industry Competitiveness, Litigation Risk and Independent Directors (Supervisors) on the Audit Fee." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/09787880749249972623.
Full textAbstract:
碩士朝陽科技大學
會計所
98
This study investigates the relation among industry competitiveness, litigation risk and independent directors/supervisors on the audit fee. It focuses on TSEC-listed and GTSM-traded companies for seven years from 2002 to 2008. The empirical results show five key findings. First, industry competitiveness has a negative and significant impact on business performance and positive on the audit fee . This implies that the audit fee for firms in highly competitive industries will be higher than firms in lowly competitive industries. Second, independent directors/supervisors have significant positive relationships with EPS and ROA, then reduce the audit fee. Third, this result refers to CPA will have higher litigation risk when the firms with lowly EPS and ROA or highly debt ratio. It implies CPA will adopt more efficient audit procedures to reduce his / her litigation risk. Adopting more efficient audit procedures will increase the audit cost, then increase the audit fee. Forth, the result shows that there is significant positive relationship between the financial storm in Taiwan and the audit fee. It means that CPA will assess the impact of economic climate on the audit risk. Finally, the firms in the information technology industry will have significant higher audit fee. The reason is the firms in the information technology industry have more complexity of operating the organization than others, then lead to increase audit risk and the audit fee. In summary, if a firm is in highly competitive industry, or it has low ROA and high debt ratio, it maybe has higher audit fee. The independent director/supervisors system is an assistant mechanism in the corporate governance. It will have significant impact on the audit fee.
30
Huang, Xiu-Feng, and 黃秀鳳. "A Study on the Relationship among Ownership Structure, Independent Directors/Supervisors, Corporate Performance and Earnings Management of Taiwanese Business Groups." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16094381030304781278.
Full textAbstract:
碩士朝陽科技大學
會計所
98
The situation which business groups often build up the inter-corporate networks in order to facilitate control and internal coordination among its business units causes a serious problem of lacking supervision in its operating. The previous literatures rarely investigate how independent directors and independent supervisors with professional ability will influence on business groups in Taiwan. In this study, we focus on that compare to non-business groups, whether having more independent directors and independent supervisors with professional ability within business groups will reduce the motivation for earnings management during 2002-2008. At the same time, we consider the effect of business performance on earnings management. The results will be helpful for the development of corporate governance. We collected data for background of independent directors and independent supervisors from Market Observation Post System, Independent directors / Independent supervisors Registry of SFI and Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). The empirical results show four key results. First, compare to the non-business groups, business performance in business groups is significant negative with the earnings management. Second, either in business groups or in non-business groups, independent supervisors present significant negative influence on earnings management. Third, either in business groups or in non-business groups, independent directors present significant positive influence on earnings management. Finally, the independent directors/independent supervisors with professional ability within business groups has been found to have significant positive influence on earnings management.
31
蔡忠君. "A study on the retest for the operating performance of a firm after independent directors and supervisors participating on the listed companies." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/53563669615884955944.
Full textAbstract:
碩士義守大學
財務金融學系
92
This article refers to the overseas company to govern the system and the domestic research scholar''s literature, in addition under scholar''s commentary and the suggestion, asked the volume way does the real diagnosis research. However regarding has appoints exterior trustee to go on the market on transport business of achievements the listed company whether have the influence, how moreover appoints the social image good specialty exterior trustee, all is this research important research topic. However, after goes on the market on the listed company to join the function and the function which exterior trustee increases, this research also will perform by the objective method to analyze the self-criticism. Angle governs which on the company, sets up outside board member is for guarantees the social populace rights and interests. After company day by day large-sized, the stockholder''s rights disperse the result, cause the company to manage and financial risk from stock and to the staff, the supplier, and the consumer and so on, and based on this, the European and American industry advanced countries implements outside board member system. After performs the Asian finance storm, not the perfect financial overseeing system also receives the international value, thus in the international comparison and appraisal increasingly emphasized the company transparent degree, will construct outside board member system to be helpful to our country enterprise promotes the international image, this also for our country governmental agency main legislation goal. This research mails asked the volume way in view of went on the market on the listed company to have appoints outside board member, the affiliation can publicize the information observation station by the card time the material release to ask the volume, and will recycle the material will narrate statistical, the overlapping analysis, the single factor variation number analysis and the T examination, will confirm supposition this research, and will draw the following conclusion: 1.This research thought works as between the board of directors component member identity and the company more independent, is easier to display the direction surveillance function, which manages to the company, the company value should be able to promote, to conform to the assumption one. 2.When outside board member more specialized, is easier to display the instruction, which manages to the company, the company value should be able to promote, to conform to the assumption two. 3.When outside board member decision-making strength is bigger, and then the company will manage the achievements to become is being connected, will conform to the assumption three. 4.When outside board member are more to company''s understanding, then the company manages the achievements to reveal the correlation, conforms to the assumption four.
32
LI, YONG-KUN, and 李永堃. "A Study of the Corporate Governance on Two-Tier and Unitary Boards of Corporation: Focusing on Independence of Independent Directors and Supervisors." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qgk4ra.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北大學
法律學系一般生組
105
There are many issues about corporate governance, if we want to create a better corporate governance, this thesis hold that we have to improve the independence of independent directors and supervisors. Thus, this thesis will bring up some ways to improve the independence of independent directors and supervisors. First, this thesis will interpret the corporate governance systems on two-tier and unitary boards of corporation, and introduce the classical countries where their two-tier or unitary boards of corporation, then summarize in some propositions. Second, this thesis will focus on the rule of independence of independent directors and supervisors and sum up some ways to improve their independence. In addition, if we want to improve independence of independent directors and supervisors, the independence after their elected is important as well. Therefore, this thesis will show why we have to require their independence from duty of loyalty and how the Taiwan regulations requires, so that we can review their independence. Finally, this thesis will conclude that we can review their independence after election and some amendment about their conditions to be a candidate. This thesis intent to improve independence of independent directors and supervisors through these conclusions.
33
Tseng, Fa-Hao, and 曾發鎬. "A paper to discuss the corporate characteristics and operating performance for Companies that changed their independent directors and supervisors. – Quoting electronic industry as an example." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/47475459310556860103.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
95
This study looks at typical corporate characteristics of companies that have voluntary changes in independent directors and supervisors. How Company performance changes before and after movement of independent directors and supervisors. Further, is there any distinctive difference in corporate characteristics and performance between companies that can find replacement for independent directors and supervisors and companies that cannot find replacement? This study aims to identify factors that influence changes in independent directors and supervisors and how Companies may be affected by their ability to find replacements to fill up vacant positions. Based on statistical analysis and empirical investigation, the following conclusion can be drawn: 1. Companies that recorded changes in their independent directors and supervisors often have poor corporate performance and financial structure comparing to other Companies. 2. Company performance is generally better before occurrence of any changes in independent directors and supervisors. 3. For Companies that can fill up vacancies for their independent directors and supervisors, they generally display better performance comparing to companies that cannot do so. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Independent Director, Independent Supervisor, Operating Performance.