Relevant bibliographies by topics / The Malayan Emergency

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'The Malayan Emergency'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 7 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "The Malayan Emergency"

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Ramakrishna, Kumar. "‘Transmogrifying’ Malaya: the impact of Sir Gerald Templer (1952–54)." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 32, no. 1 (February 2001): 79–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463401000030.

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This article rebuts recent attempts to diminish Sir Gerald Templer's role in the Malayan Emergency. It contends that the revisionists overlook the decisive psychological impact of Templer's Malayan sojourn. Fundamentally, through very deliberate words and deeds, he gave both government and Malayans confidence that the communists could and would be beaten.
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HACK, KARL M. "The Malayan Emergency." Twentieth Century British History 4, no. 3 (1993): 302–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/4.3.302.

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Greer, Bill. "THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY." Asian Affairs 43, no. 1 (March 2012): 106–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2012.642508.

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Sulaiman, Nor Ibrahim. "HELICOPTERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960." Journal of Nusantara Studies (JONUS) 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2017): 188. http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol2iss2pp188-197.

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Helicopter as an instrument of war in counter insurgency warfare in Malaysia had its origin during the Malayan emergency 1948-1960. Three helicopters, the Dragonfly, made an entry into Malaya in March 1950 at the request of the Commander-in-Chiefs Committee of the Far East Land Forces on 8 March 1949. The primary role of these helicopters then was for casualty evacuation of wounded troops sustained during operations against the communist terrorists (CTs). Their ability to operate from unprepared areas expanded their roles as an ideal platform for air mobility of troops, supplies, and search and rescue. The flexibility of transporting the troops made the CTs no longer invincible in their own safe havens. More importantly, the morale of the troops was kept high knowing that they would be evacuated fast for medical treatment in the event they were wounded. This article discusses the roles of helicopter during the Malayan emergency. Most of the references are records from the Royal Air Force (RAF), books, and online information. This paper highlights the contributions of helicopters towards the successful ending of the emergency. Keywords: Counter insurgency, Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces, communist terrorists, Malayan emergency, Royal Air Force helicopter squadronsCite as: Sulaiman, N.I. (2017). Helicopters as an instrument of war during the Malayan emergency 1948-1960. Journal of Nusantara Studies, 2(2), 188-197.
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Hack, Karl. "“Iron Claws on Malaya”: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (March 1999): 99–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400008043.

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This article addresses the historiography of the Malayan Emergency (1948–60). It does so by challenging two archetypal works on the conflict: those of Anthony Short and Richard Stubbs. These argue the Emergency was locked in stalemate as late as 1951. By then, a “population control” approach had been implemented — the so-called Briggs Plan for resettling 500,000 Chinese squatters. The predominantly Chinese nature of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) had also ensured that most Malays — who constituted nearly half the 1950 population of five million — opposed the revolt. The several thousand strong Communist-led guerrillas thus laboured under severe limitations.
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WHITE, NICHOLAS J. "Capitalism and Counter-insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57." Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 1 (February 1998): 149–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x98002996.

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Contemporary critics argued that counter-insurgency in Malaya represented more than the defeat of militant communism. Britain's campaign against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was seen as resulting from British government collaboration with British capitalists to maintain profits at the expense of the legitimate aspirations of Malayan workers. More recently, it has been argued that the declaration of the emergency in June 1948 was a pre-emptive strike intended to ‘resolve the problem of political control’ and prevent the ‘radical nationalist forces organized around the MCP’ from gaining a nation-wide following. According to this view, government strategy was to ‘manage nationalism’ and ‘control’ decolonization so as to preserve the position of British capital in Malaya. For marxists, the emergency is seen as part of the process of establishing ‘neo-colonialism’. Even for less determinist models, the general complicity between British government and British business in colonial counter-insurgency campaigns is apparently clear. In primary-producing territories like Malaya, the harmony of interests between ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ officials and unofficials (centred on the City of London) ensured that after 1945 ‘coercion tended to be the first resort of policy’. The majority of scholarly output on the emergency has focused on official and guerrilla strategies leaving aside the role of business interests. As a result, the relationship between British business and British government has not been explored in depth. The present article seeks to fill this historiographical gap by reassessing official and commercial interaction in politically disturbed Malaya.
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Comber, Leon. "The Malayan special branch on the Malayan–Thai frontier during the Malayan emergency (1948–60)." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (February 2006): 77–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520600568352.

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Chin, Low Choo. "The repatriation of the Chinese as a counter-insurgency policy during the Malayan Emergency." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 45, no. 3 (September 3, 2014): 363–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463414000332.

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During the Malayan Emergency, British High Commissioner Henry Gurney pushed the policy of repatriating to China thousands of ‘alien’ Chinese detainees suspected of supporting the Malayan Communist Party's guerrilla war. This article traces the stages of this controversial policy, which, despite obstacles, remained a key counter-insurgency strategy until 1953. But the policy ignored the civil war in China and risked jeopardising Sino–British relations. When China closed its ports, the British administration put forth more desperate proposals to continue repatriation, often in the face of Foreign Office objections, ranging from negotiations with the PRC, to dumping deportees on the coast of China, and even approaching the Formosan government. Yet, while the Chinese were the target of both harsh early counter-insurgency techniques and communist violence, when the faltering repatriation policy was replaced by the mass resettlement of ‘squatters’ in Malaya itself, the Chinese were given a path to citizenship, changing their political future and that of the nation.
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Burton, Michael. "THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY: A SUBALTERN'S VIEW." Asian Affairs 42, no. 2 (July 2011): 251–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2011.571366.

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HING, LEE KAM. "A Neglected Story: Christian missionaries, Chinese New Villagers, and Communists in the Battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ in Malaya, 1948–1960." Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 6 (April 22, 2013): 1977–2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x12000741.

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AbstractDuring the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the colonial authorities resettled an estimated half a million rural dwellers, mainly Chinese, from the fringe of the jungle, to cut them off from contact with armed members of the Malayan Communist Party. The re-location led to political alienation among many resettled in the nearly 500 New Villages. Winning their support against the insurgency therefore was urgent. At this juncture, foreign missionaries were forced to leave China following the communist takeover in October 1949. Many of these missionaries were Chinese-speaking with medical or teaching experience. The High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, and his successor, Sir Gerald Templer, invited these and other missionaries to serve in the New Villages. This paper looks at colonial initiatives and mission response amidst the dynamics of domestic politics and a changing international balance of power in the region.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "The Malayan Emergency"

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Bortree, James R. "Information operations during the Malayan emergency." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2006. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/06Jun%5FBortree.pdf.

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Thesis (M.S. in Information Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006.
Thesis Advisor(s): Hy Rothstein. "June 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-77). Also available in print.
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Arditti, Roger Christopher. "'Our Achilles' heel' : interagency intelligence during the Malayan emergency." Thesis, Brunel University, 2016. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/12842.

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The Malayan Emergency is often considered the defining paradigm for a successful counter-insurgency campaign. The effective collection and management of intelligence by Special Branch dominates this paradigm. However, the intelligence architecture during Emergency was much more complicated than the simple Special Branch-Army nexus upon which existing studies focus. Other components of the intelligence included the Malayan Security Service (MSS), Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), the Joint Intelligence Committee / Far East (JIC/FE), the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Army, and the mainstream police. Each component adapted to the challenge of insurgency in different ways – the civilian elements faring far worse than the military. Britain struggled to adapt to the post-war intelligence challenges in the Far East. Key intelligence components and capabilities were constituted in haste with overlapping and ambiguous remits. Consequently, there was bitter infighting at a number of levels, particularly between the various civilian intelligence agencies. In contrast, the Army and RAF demonstrated an instinctive ability to work in a ‘joint’ environment from the very beginning of the Emergency. In particular, the RAF took a leading role in creating a joint theatre-level intelligence apparatus which included establishment of a Joint Operations Room in Kuala Lumpur and the Joint Intelligence Photographic Intelligence Committee / Far East. However, the military were unable to provide the comprehensive human intelligence or strategic leadership necessary to make the broader apparatus effective. This could only come once the apparatus led by the civil agencies – chiefly the uniformed police as well as Special Branch – had learnt to adapt to the demands of waging a counter-insurgency campaign. Given that the British intelligence organisations had learnt to function in a joint manner during the Second World War, it is remarkable how much had apparently been forgotten in the three years preceding the outbreak of the Communist 1 AIR 20/7777, Report on the Emergency in Malaya, from April 1950 to November 1951, by Sir Harold Briggs. insurgency in Malaya and how long it took to create an effective method of coordinating intelligence during subsequent Emergency.
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Nagl, John A. "British and American army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.339868.

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Ramakrishna, Kumar. "A matter of confidence : propaganda of word and deed in the Malayan emergency June 1948 - December 1958." Thesis, Boston Spa, U.K. : British Library Document Supply Centre, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.368810.

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Zarougui, Mohamed. "Propaganda and psychological warfare in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare : the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960." Thesis, University of Reading, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.315537.

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Bollag, Manuel. "British and French servicemen in the Malayan Emergency and the Indochina War, 1945-960 : experience and memory." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2011. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/british-and-french-servicemen-in-the-malayan-emergency-and-the-indochina-war-19451960(5927d127-4d52-46f1-917c-395a77e179d9).html.

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Between 1945 and 1960 the British and French governments sent thousands of regular and conscript soldiers to Malaya and Indochina. There, assisted by locally-raised troops and units from other parts of the British Commonwealth and the French Union (or the former empires respectively), they attempted to suppress communist-inspired insurgencies. This thesis examines responses of British and French army personnel, both male and female, to these conflicts, the territories and local communities. It begins with an analysis of the forces’ composition and the international context they operated in. It then asks whether soldiers labelled the conflicts as local disturbances, wars of decolonisation or Cold War theatres. In parallel, it inquiries if they saw their enemies as bandits, nationalists or communist agents. The last two chapters investigate military views on centres of population, infrastructure, environment and peoples, or rather, the extent to which they occupied soldierly minds. Behind this scrutiny lies an attempt to identify imperial affinities, pre-conceived colonial images and pronouncements on Britain’s and France’s imperial records. In scrutinising these issues the thesis seeks to verify the often-cited, but insufficiently supported, claim that Britain’s and France’s armed forces were strongly linked and attached to the colonial empires through conquest, policing and defence. More specifically, the project seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature in regard to military reactions to the end of empires. It does so through a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, drawing from and feeding into imperial, military, political, social, European and Southeast Asian history. The project has relied to a large extent on oral sources. Careful consideration has therefore been given to the ways, in which events have been remembered, how this memory has been shaped over the decades and how it compares to academic studies.
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Elmgren, Alexander. "Taktik i Malaya konflikten kopplat till Kilcullens 28 artiklar : En undersökning om Kilcullens tillämpbarhet på den taktiska nivån i Malayakonflikten 1948-1960." Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-2736.

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Upprorsbekämpning på taktisk nivå är problematiskt därför att konflikter som kräver sådanbekämpning, alltid är unika. Det finns inte heller någon generell teori som leder tillframgång.Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka ifall Kilcullens 28 artiklar går att tillämpa på denlyckade upprorsbekämpningen i Malaya.Metoden som användes är kvalitativ textanalys av britternas taktiska doktrin underkonflikten, the conduct of anti-terrorist operations in Malaya (ATOM), utifrån Kilcullens 28artiklar. Även artiklar skrivna av officerare och soldater under konflikten har använts för attge stöd till påståenden samt för att belysa ifall britterna faktiskt följde sin taktiska doktrineller ej.Resultatet visar att det inte går att applicera Kilcullens teori på britternas taktiska agerande iMalaya. Endast 10 av 28 artiklar var applicerbara.Författaren drar slutsatsen att Kilcullens 28 artiklar möjligen inte är användbara somgenerella riktlinjer för handlingsalternativ på taktisk nivå. Författaren lyfter emellertid att flerstudier på andra konflikter behövs för att fastställa påståendet.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) on the tactical level is difficult because these conflicts are alwaysunique and there is no theory that generally leads to victory.The purpose of this study is to analyze if there is a resemblence between Kilcullens 28articles and the succesful COIN of the brittish security forces in the Malayan emergency.The method that has been used is the qualitativ analysis of documens. The main documentthat has been analyzed is ATOM, the brittish tactical doctrine during the emergency. Articlesthat have been written during the emergency, 1948-1960, by officers and soldiers, have beenused to to elucidate if the brits actually followed their tactical doctrine or not.The author concludes that Kilcullens 28 articles might not be useful as general guidelines foraction at the tactical level. The author highlights, however, that more studies on otherconflicts are needed to establish the claim.
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Yadi, Mohd Zakaria. "Malaysian emergencies : anthropological factors in the success of Malaysia's counterinsurgency /." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Dec%5FNAME.pdf.

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Ismail, Roslina. "Malaysian economic development and the emergence of environmental foreign policy, 1874-1982." Thesis, Keele University, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.530770.

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Fernando, Joseph Milton. "The emergence of the alliance and the making of Malaya's independence constitution, 1948-1957." Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.481772.

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Books on the topic "The Malayan Emergency"

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Andrew, Herbert. Who won the Malayan emergency? Singapore: Graham Brash, 1995.

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Malaysia, United Engineers, ed. The Malayan Emergency revisited, 1948-1960. Kuala Lumpur: Jointly published by AMR Holding [and] Yayasan Pelajaran Islam, 2006.

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The Malayan emergency: The Commonwealth's wars, 1948-1966. London: Routledge, 1991.

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R, Thambipillay. The Malayan Police Force in the emergency, 1948-1960. Ipoh, Perak Darul Ridzuan, Malaysia: R. Thambipillay, 2003.

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1935-, Mackay Donald, ed. The domino that stood: The Malayan emergency, 1948-1960. Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2004.

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Donald, Mackay. The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60: The domino that stood. London: Brassey's, 1997.

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Suppressing insurgency: An analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

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Postgate, Malcolm. Operation Firedog: Air support in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960. London: H.M.S.O., 1992.

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Hearts and minds in guerilla warfare: The Malayan emergency, 1948-1960. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004.

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Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare: The Malayan emergency, 1948-1960. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989.

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Book chapters on the topic "The Malayan Emergency"

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Swift, John. "The Malayan Emergency." In The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Cold War, 32–33. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230001183_15.

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Arifin, Azmi. "From Malayan Union to Malayan Emergency." In Malaysia and the Cold War Era, 144–80. New York : Routledge, 2020.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429455186-5.

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Low, Choo Chin. "The Malayan Emergency and the desinicization of the Malayan Chinese." In Chineseness and the Cold War, 45–60. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003211976-4.

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Gregorian, Raffi. "FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50." In The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in the Far East, 1947–1954, 51–76. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230287167_4.

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Gregorian, Raffi. "Manpower, the Strategic Reserve, and the Malayan Emergency, 1950–54." In The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in the Far East, 1947–1954, 165–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230287167_8.

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Hack, Karl. "Using and Abusing the Past: The Malayan Emergency as Counterinsurgency Paradigm." In The British Approach to Counterinsurgency, 207–42. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137284686_7.

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Siver, Christi. "Enemies or Friendlies? British Military Behavior Toward Civilians During the Malayan Emergency." In Military Interventions, War Crimes, and Protecting Civilians, 57–89. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77691-0_4.

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Arditti, Roger C. "Intelligence Prior to the Declaration of Emergency." In Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya, 87–114. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_5.

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Arditti, Roger C. "Introduction." In Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya, 1–15. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_1.

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Arditti, Roger C. "Status Quo Ante." In Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya, 17–40. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_2.

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Conference papers on the topic "The Malayan Emergency"

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Zakaria, Wahida, and Umi Kalsom Yusof. "Survey on crowd behaviour evacuation modelling during emergency event." In 2015 9th Malaysian Software Engineering Conference (MySEC). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mysec.2015.7475194.

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Dorasamy, Magiswary, Murali Raman, Saravanan Muthaiyah, and Maniam Kaliannan. "Knowledge Management Systems for emergency managers: Malaysian perspective." In 2011 International Conference on Semantic Technology and Information Retrieval (STAIR). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/stair.2011.5995804.

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Othman, M. N. M., and H. Haron. "Implementing game artificial intelligence to decision making of agents in emergency egress." In 2014 8th Malaysian Software Engineering Conference (MySEC). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mysec.2014.6986036.

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Ismail, Noorilham. "Emergency In Malaya And Reaction Of The United States, 1948-1960." In International Conference on Humanities. European Publisher, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2020.10.02.49.

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Hamid, A. H. A., M. Z. A. Rozan, S. Deris, R. Ibrahim, W. S. W. Abdullah, A. A. Rahman, and M. N. M. Yunus. "Analyzing and sense making of human factors in the Malaysian radiation and nuclear emergency planning framework." In ADVANCING NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING FOR SUSTAINABLE NUCLEAR ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: Proceeding of the International Nuclear Science, Technology and Engineering Conference 2015 (iNuSTEC2015). AIP Publishing LLC, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4940104.

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Ismail, Shahrinaz, and Mohd Sharifuddin Ahmad. "Emergence of personal knowledge networks in agent-mediated PKM processes: A qualitative analysis in Malaysian context." In 2012 International Conference on Computer & Information Science (ICCIS). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccisci.2012.6297215.

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Tung, Aaron, Wanarun Wanarunwong, and Pattaramon Vuttipittayamongkol. "Critical Review of the Thai and Malaysian Decommissioning Landscapes." In Offshore Technology Conference. OTC, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4043/31132-ms.

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Abstract As the wave of oil and gas decommissioning activities begins across Thailand and Malaysia, issues related to the management of oil and gas decommissioning activities also begin to take shape, appearing in the form of disputes (Tanakasempipat 2019), schedule delays (Zainal Abidin and Mahasan 2019), scope creeps (Xu et al. 2019; Yap 2018), and cost overruns (Yusof, Ros and Omar 2018). One avenue to overcome the issues related to the management of oil and gas decommissioning activities in Thailand and Malaysia, is to enhance project managers’ understanding of the Thai and Malaysian oil and gas decommissioning landscape. Therefore, a research involving semi-structured interviews with 20 industrial representatives was conducted over the period of 2019 and 2020. This paper presents the findings from the research, detailing the regulatory structure and process, the supply chain and research capabilities, the operator's planning and execution behaviours for oil and gas decommissioning, and public stakeholders’ behaviours towards oil and gas decommissioning activities. The research findings will be presented in the form of a list of considerations, which project managers can utilize when managing future oil and gas decommissioning activities in Thailand and Malaysia. In addition, emergent research findings will also be summarized as a list recommendations for legislative and regulatory government bodies in order to further enhance the effectiveness of current regulatory arrangements.
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