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Journal articles on the topic 'The Punisher'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 13 February 2022

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1

Kuwabara, Ko, and Siyu Yu. "Costly Punishment Increases Prosocial Punishment by Designated Punishers: Power and Legitimacy in Public Goods Games." Social Psychology Quarterly 80, no. 2 (May 24, 2017): 174–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0190272517703750.

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A classic problem in the literature on authority is that those with the power to enforce cooperation and proper norms of conduct can also abuse or misuse their power. The present research tested the argument that concerns about legitimacy can help regulate the use of power to punish by invoking a sense of what is morally right or socially proper for power-holders. We tested this idea in a laboratory experiment using public goods games in which one person in each group was selected to be a “designated punisher” who could give out material punishment that was either costly or costless to the punisher. Results show that costly punishment is perceived as more legitimate (proper) than costless punishment and that designated punishers engaged in more proper (“prosocial”) punishment and less abusive (“antisocial”) punishment when punishment was costly. These results highlight the importance of legitimacy in both motivating and regulating the enforcement of cooperation.

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2

Milinski, Manfred, and Bettina Rockenbach. "Punisher pays." Nature 452, no. 7185 (March 2008): 297–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/452297a.

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3

Ozono, Hiroki, and Motoki Watabe. "Reputational benefit of punishment: Comparison among the punisher, rewarder, and non-sanctioner." Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science 3, no. 2 (August 28, 2012): 21–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5178/lebs.2012.22.

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Many researchers have suggested that a sanctioning system is necessary to achieve cooperation in a large society. Sanctioning others, however, is costly, raising the question of what exactly is the adaptive advantage of sanctioning. One possible answer is that sanctioners get reputational benefit. While the reputational benefits accruing to punishers and nonpunishers have been compared in previous studies, in the present study we directly compared the reputational benefit of punisher, rewarder, and non-sanctioner. We conducted a scenario experiment in which participants were asked to play several games, such as the Ultimatum Game, Dictator Game, and Chicken Game with punisher, rewarder, and non-sanctioner. While in previous studies, punishers have gotten better reputational benefit as providers of resources than have non-sanctioners, we found that punishers received worse reputations than did rewarders or non-sanctioners in all games used in our experiment. These results suggest that reputational benefits change according to what kind of sanction individuals can exercise.

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4

Bone, Jonathan, Antonio S. Silva, and Nichola J. Raihani. "Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties." Biology Letters 10, no. 7 (July 2014): 20140388. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2014.0388.

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Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.

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5

Stephens, Murdoch. "Pākehā as Punisher." Counterfutures 4 (September 1, 2017): 185. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/cf.v4i0.6410.

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An reflection on the tendency of Pākehā to act as ‘punishers’ in conversation—people who monopolise conversation so much that the person being spoken to feels as if they’re enduring a punishment.

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6

Milošević, Milan. "Idea of exploitation in comic books : The Punisher." Kultura, no. 165 (2019): 121–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/kultura1965121m.

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7

Miller, Stephen J. "Relationships With the Punisher." Psychoanalytic Psychology 21, no. 3 (2004): 402–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0736-9735.21.3.402.

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8

Johnson, Dominic. "Why God is the best punisher." Religion, Brain & Behavior 1, no. 1 (February 2011): 77–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2153599x.2011.558714.

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9

Santika, Dwi. "The Translation Strategy of Slang Expression in Comic Entitled The Punisher." Buletin Al-Turas 21, no. 1 (January 28, 2020): 127–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/bat.v21i1.3830.

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Abstraks Penelitian ini membahas tentang strategi penerjemahan ungkapan bahasa slang dalam sebuah komik yang berjudul The Punisher. Komik ini diterjemahkan dari bahasa Inggris ke dalam bahasa Indonesia oleh Hindi R. Ibrahim. Adapun tujuan dari penelitian ini antara lain: pertama, untuk mengidentifikasi jenis-jenis ungkapan bahasa slang yang ada dalam komik The Punisher. Kedua untuk menjelaskan strategi penerjemahan ungkapan bahasa slang dalam komik The Punisher. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif. Sebagai alat pengumpul data, peneliti melakukan beberapa hal, antara lain: membaca komik The Punisher dalam bahasa Inggris dan Indonesia; menandai ungkapan bahasa slang dan menyeleksinya untuk diklasifikasi berdasarkan jenis dan strategi penerjemahannya menurut teori yang ada dalam beberapa sumber. Hasil temuan penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa terdapat empat tipe ungkapan bahasa slang dalam hasil terjemahan komik The Punisher, identifikasi-kelompok, kreatifitas, privasi, dan sekresi, (informalitas dan intimasi, vulgaritas dan ofensif). Adapun strategi penerjemahannya antara lain, penghalusan, secara literal, dan kompensasi stilistika.---Abstract In this research, the researcher concerns with translation study, that is, the translation strategy of slang expression in comic entitled The Punisher translated by Hindi R. Ibrahim. The objectives of the research are: (1) to identified the type of slang expression based on its function used in the target language, (2) to describe slang translation strategy applied in the translation. The researcher uses qualitative descriptive method in order to reach objectives of the research. The researcher employs herself to collect data; by reading the comic and its translation, marking the slang expressions, classifying, selecting and analyzing them based on the type of slang theory and slang translation strategy theory which are taken from some relevant references. Findings of this research show that: first, the four types of slang expression are used in source language \nc\udegroup-identification and creativity, privacy and secrecy, informality and intimacy, andvulgarity and offensiveness; second, all strategies applied in the translation they are literal softening, literal translation and stylistic compensation.

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10

Montesinos, Monica S., Zuxin Chen, and Samuel M. Young. "pUNISHER: a high-level expression cassette for use with recombinant viral vectors for rapid and long term in vivo neuronal expression in the CNS." Journal of Neurophysiology 106, no. 6 (December 2011): 3230–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/jn.00713.2011.

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Fast onset and high-level neurospecific transgene expression in vivo is of importance for many areas in neuroscience, from basic to translational, and can significantly reduce the amount of vector load required to maintain transgene expression in vivo. In this study, we tested various cis elements to optimize transgene expression at transcriptional, posttranscriptional, and posttranslational levels and combined them together to create the high-level neuronal transgene expression cassette pUNISHER. Using a second-generation adenoviral vector system in combination with the pUNISHER cassette, we characterized its rate of onset of detectable expression and levels of expression compared with a neurospecific expression cassette driven by the 470-bp human synapsin promoter in vitro and in vivo. Our results demonstrate in primary neurons that the pUNISHER cassette, in a recombinant adenovirus type 5 background, led to a faster rate of onset of detectable transgene expression and higher level of transgene expression. More importantly, this cassette led to highly correlated neuronal expression in vivo and to stable transgene expression up to 30 days in the auditory brain stem with no toxicity on the characteristics of synaptic transmission and plasticity at the calyx of Held synapse. Thus the pUNISHER cassette is an ideal high-level neuronal expression cassette for use in vivo for neuroscience applications.

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11

ARAMENDIA, MIGUEL, and QUAN WEN. "FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES." International Game Theory Review 16, no. 04 (December 2014): 1450011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919891450011x.

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In repeated games, equilibria requiring threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing a deviator hurts all the others. When all the punishers suffer from carrying out a punishment in the continuation, it would be in their best interest to forgive the deviation. Taking this line of reasoning into consideration, we introduce the forward-looking principle for subgame perfect equilibrium such that there must be, at least, one punisher who benefits in the continuation by carrying out the punishment. We show that this principle generally reduces payoffs that may arise from equilibrium. We characterize the payoffs that can be supported by subgame perfect equilibrium with forward-looking principle.

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12

Roos, Patrick, Michele Gelfand, Dana Nau, and Ryan Carr. "High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1776 (February 7, 2014): 20132661. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.2661.

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As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.

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13

Santos, Miguel dos, Daniel J. Rankin, and Claus Wedekind. "The evolution of punishment through reputation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 278, no. 1704 (August 18, 2010): 371–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.1275.

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Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been sufficiently explored yet in order to explain the evolution of costly punishment. Here, we first show analytically that punishment can lead to long-term benefits if it influences one's reputation and thereby makes the punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions. Then, in computer simulations, we incorporate up to 40 more complex strategies that use different kinds of reputations (e.g. from generous actions), or strategies that not only include punitive behaviours directed towards defectors but also towards cooperators for example. Our findings demonstrate that punishment can directly evolve through a simple reputation system. We conclude that reputation is crucial for the evolution of punishment by making a punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions, and that experiments investigating the beneficial effects of punishment in humans should include reputation as an explicit feature.

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14

Rumph, Robin, Chris Ninness, Glen McCuller, James Holland, Todd Ward, and Tiffany Wilbourn. "Stimulus Change: Reinforcer or Punisher? Reply to Hursh." Behavior and Social Issues 16, no. 1 (May 2007): 47–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/bsi.v16i1.463.

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15

Donaldson, Daniel M., Henrik Holtmann, Julia Nitschke, Cihat Karadag, Richard Bostelmann, Benno Hartung, Lan Li, and Athanasios K. Petridis. "The banality of head injury in The Punisher." Lancet Neurology 20, no. 7 (July 2021): 509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1474-4422(21)00160-5.

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16

Fehr, A., and B. E. Beckwith. "Water Misting: Treating Self-Injurious Behavior in a Multiply Handicapped, Visually Impaired Child." Journal of Visual Impairment & Blindness 83, no. 5 (May 1989): 245–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0145482x8908300519.

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A water mist was employed as a punisher to reduce head hitting in a multiply handicapped, visually impaired child. A multiple baseline across four situations (lunch, breakfast, industrial arts class, and residential hall) was used to evaluate the effects of water misting on head hitting as well as on appropriate behaviors. The results indicated that water mist alone was effective in reducing the frequency of head hits during meals, but that the other two situations required the addition of primary reinforcers or stimulus control or both to reduce the frequency of head hitting. These results suggest a need to consider the setting and task requirements in evaluating a mild punisher to reduce self-injurious behavior.

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17

Alexaki, Marirena. "Icons as punishers. Two narrations from the Vaticanus gr. 1587 manuscript (BHG 1390 f)." Byzantinische Zeitschrift 114, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 35–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bz-2021-9003.

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Abstract The Iconoclastic controversies of the Byzantine Era have provided a rich literary tradition of miracle narrations regarding the various magical aspects of the icon. The second period of Iconoclasm however seems to have given rise to a lesser prominent motif of the earlier traditions, namely that of the icon-agent acting as active punisher against its transgressor. The current article explores the development of this motif after a concise survey of the history of icon-miracle narrations, their representative texts and their role in liturgical practice. The starting point of the study were two previously unedited byzantine texts from the manuscript Vaticanus gr. 1587, testifying unique stories of icons as punishers. Finally, these stories are also perfect examples of the rich historical information popular narrations can provide on a topographical and prosopographical level regarding the era within which they were produced.

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18

Peng, Constance Y., Philip Jean-Richard-dit-Bressel, Sophia Gilchrist, John M. Power, and Gavan P. McNally. "Phasic inhibition of dopamine neurons is an instrumental punisher." Behavioral Neuroscience 135, no. 3 (June 2021): 415–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bne0000445.

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19

Zaibert, Leo. "The Fitting, the Deserving, and the Beautiful." Journal of Moral Philosophy 3, no. 3 (2006): 331–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468106071229.

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AbstractPunishment is punishment even if it is not (perceived by the punisher to be) deserved. But punishment which is not (perceived by the punisher to be) fitting is not punishment. This paper explores the differences between desert and fittingness, and argues that incorporating fittingness into thedefinition of punishment is not problematic, whereas incorporating desert in such definition is, in contrast, infamously problematic. The main difference between these two notions turns on the interesting differences between two types of normativity. Fittingness is exclusively concerned with aesthetic normativity, whereas desert is more directly concerned with moral normativity. When something is fitting, then it is, to an extent, intrinsically good, and, to an extent, it is also beautiful. The notion of fittingness has largely been ignored in discussions of punishment, yet it helps us better to understand the phenomenon of punishment, and in particular the thorny relationship between this phenomenon and desert.

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20

Rumph, Robin, Chris Ninness, Glen McCuller, James Holland, Todd Ward, and Tiffany Wilbourn. "Stimulus Change: Reinforcer or Punisher? Reply to Ellis and Magee." Behavior and Social Issues 16, no. 1 (May 2007): 50–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/bsi.v16i1.462.

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21

Lie, Celia, and Brent Alsop. "STIMULUS DISPARITY AND PUNISHER CONTROL OF HUMAN SIGNAL-DETECTION PERFORMANCE." Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 93, no. 2 (March 2010): 185–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jeab.2010.93-185.

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22

Grieco, Daniela, Marco Faillo, and Luca Zarri. "Enforcing cooperation in public goods games: Is one punisher enough?" Journal of Economic Psychology 61 (August 2017): 55–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2017.03.007.

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23

Nakamaru, Mayuko, and Yoh Iwasa. "The coevolution of altruism and punishment: Role of the selfish punisher." Journal of Theoretical Biology 240, no. 3 (June 2006): 475–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.011.

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24

Bowles, Samuel, Robert Boyd, Sarah Mathew, and Peter J. Richerson. "The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (January 31, 2012): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x1100118x.

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AbstractExperiments are not models of cooperation; instead, they demonstrate the presence of the ethical and other-regarding predispositions that often motivate cooperation and the punishment of free-riders. Experimental behavior predicts subjects' cooperation in the field. Ethnographic studies in small-scale societies without formal coercive institutions demonstrate that disciplining defectors is both essential to cooperation and often costly to the punisher.

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25

Durand, V. Mark, Daniel B. Crimmins, Marie Caulfield, and Jill Taylor. "Reinforcer Assessment I: Using Problem Behavior to Select Reinforcers." Journal of the Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps 14, no. 2 (June 1989): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/154079698901400203.

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We tested the hypothesis that knowledge of the variables controlling problem behavior could be used to select reinforcers. Students with severe developmental disabilities who exhibited frequent aggression, self-injury, and/or tantrums participated in the study. One group (N = 7) was assessed to engage in problem behavior maintained by social attention, and the second group (N = 7) was assessed to engage in problem behavior maintained by escape from unpleasant situations. A combined multiple baseline and alternating treatments design demonstrated that (a) praise was a reinforcer for the group with attention-maintained behavior and appeared to serve as a punisher for the students with escape-maintained behavior, (b) a procedural “time-out” was a reinforcer for the latter group, and (c) problem behavior was lowest when students with attention-maintained problem behavior were praised and students with escape-maintained problem behavior received the procedural time-out. This study suggests that stimuli that are functionally related to problem behavior (e.g., social attention, escape from tasks) can be used effectively as reinforcers. These findings further emphasize the need to individually select reinforcers because, for some individuals, a presumably positive consequence such as social praise can serve as a punisher.

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26

Verriden, Amanda L., and Eileen M. Roscoe. "An evaluation of a punisher assessment for decreasing automatically reinforced problem behavior." Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis 52, no. 1 (September 20, 2018): 205–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jaba.509.

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27

El Zein, Marwa, Chloe Seikus, Lee De-Wit, and Bahador Bahrami. "Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation." Wellcome Open Research 4 (February 13, 2020): 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/wellcomeopenres.15474.2.

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Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making their decision as part of a group as compared to alone. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish or not to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus take more time to punish others, and to make their mind on whether to punish or not when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

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28

Nakamaru, Mayuko, and Yoh Iwasa. "Corrigendum to “The coevolution of altruism and punishment: Role of the selfish punisher”." Journal of Theoretical Biology 245, no. 1 (March 2007): 193–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.12.013.

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29

Spadaro, Alessandra. "Punish and Be Punished?" Journal of International Criminal Justice 18, no. 1 (January 29, 2020): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqz059.

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Abstract Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, military commanders can be found criminally responsible for having failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinates. Focusing on the duty of commanders of organized armed groups to punish the war crimes committed by their subordinates, this article enquires whether the commanders’ duty is subject to any limit under international law. By analysing the imposition of disciplinary and criminal measures, including prosecution in armed group courts and detention, the article argues that a commander cannot fulfil their duty to punish through unlawful measures and can only be required to take punitive measures which are not themselves illegal or criminal under international law. Otherwise, the commander would face a paradoxical choice: not punish their subordinates and be punished for having failed to do so or punish them and nonetheless be punished for having done so through illegal or criminal measures. Courts should be mindful of this when holding an individual responsible for failing to take certain punitive measures pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility.

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30

Leonov, Ivan S., and Dorota Walczak. "MOTIF OF THE ICON IN THE STORY BY BORIS SPOROV “MONK-THE SAVIOR”." Vestnik slavianskikh kul’tur [Bulletin of Slavic Cultures] 58 (2020): 245–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.37816/2073-9567-2020-58-245-257.

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The paper discusses the nature and role of the icon`s motif in Boris Sporov’s story “Monk-The Savior”. It analyzes artistic parameters allowing to attribute this work to missionary prose (the evolution of a hero, a combination of crisis and choice-situations, the specifics of a false choice), focusing on the complex spiritual path of a person overcoming moral crisis and taking the path of reconciliation with God. The author explores the inner world of story`s main character, Ivan Korovin, displays his gradual refusal to protest against the Divine Providence, which is made possible through the knowledge of basics of icon painting. The study results in revealing that, at the first stage, the image of Christ the Punisher dominates the character’s consciousness, which is reflected in Ivan`s iconographic images of the Savior made without hands. At a later stage, the face of Christ the Punisher acquires a new shade — Christ the Sufferer, which partly draws together the hero, who had undergone moral and physical pain, and his Creator. Salvation through iconography is not a new motif to the Russian literature: B. F. Sporov remains here within the framework of the established tradition. The paper also establishes ideological and artistic parallels between the story “Monk-The Savior” and the works of Russian classical literature (Nikolai Gogol, Fyodor Dostoevsky), as well as the cinematography (Andrei Tarkovsky’s film “Andrei Rublev”).

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31

Safronova, Ludmila, and Elmira Zhanysbekova. "Mythological realism of Anatoly Kim as a construct of the schism." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 2 (November 30, 2018): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3091.

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The article, in the psychoanalytic and cognitive aspect explores the principle of constructing the poetics of a grotesque novel by Anatoly Kim “Centaur settlement”. The novel is based on the connection of the incompatible, the synthesis of contradictions, characteristic of the schizophrenic schism: namely, mythological realism, man/beast, nomad/agriculturist, hysteria/obsession, the Christian archetype of God – the punisher/rescuer, etc. The appeal to the author’s myth has the function of neutralizing oppositions, “escaping into health” – to a holistic worldview of a person and society.

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32

El Zein, Marwa, Chloe Seikus, Lee De-Wit, and Bahador Bahrami. "Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation." Wellcome Open Research 4 (September 20, 2019): 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/wellcomeopenres.15474.1.

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Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making a collective rather than an individual decision. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

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33

Egas, Martijn, and Arno Riedl. "The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275, no. 1637 (January 15, 2008): 871–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2007.1558.

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Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent findings suggest that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism maintaining cooperation among humans. We experimentally explore the boundaries of altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by varying both the cost and the impact of punishment, using an exceptionally extensive subject pool. Our results show that cooperation is only maintained if conditions for altruistic punishment are relatively favourable: low cost for the punisher and high impact on the punished. Our results indicate that punishment is strongly governed by its cost-to-impact ratio and that its effect on cooperation can be pinned down to one single variable: the threshold level of free-riding that goes unpunished. Additionally, actual pay-offs are the lowest when altruistic punishment maintains cooperation, because the pay-off destroyed through punishment exceeds the gains from increased cooperation. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that punishment decisions come from an amalgam of emotional response and cognitive cost–impact analysis and suggest that altruistic punishment alone can hardly maintain cooperation under multi-level natural selection. Uncovering the workings of altruistic punishment as has been done here is important because it helps predicting under which conditions altruistic punishment is expected to maintain cooperation.

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34

Guo, Daoyan, Hong Chen, and Ruyin Long. "What Role Should Government Play in the Personal Carbon Trading Market: Motivator or Punisher?" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 11 (May 29, 2019): 1905. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16111905.

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With increasing downstream carbon emissions, the implementation of a personal carbon trading scheme is urgently required. In order to facilitate the progress, government departments are supposed to adopt a motivating or punitive policy to make guidance for downstream carbon emissions reduction. This study determined and verified the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of government departments and individuals whose carbon emissions exceeded the initial carbon allowance (CEEICA individuals) by using the evolutionary game and numerical simulation methods, respectively. The findings show that the ESS of government departments is always a punitive policy during the variation of strategies of CEEICA individuals. The ESS of CEEICA individuals is an active plan when the added cost (the difference between emissions reduction cost and trading earning) is less than the carbon tax; otherwise, it is a passive plan. Furthermore, the rate of convergence can be significantly influenced by the probabilistic distances between initial strategies and the ESSs. On the basis of these findings, this study suggested implementing a “punishment first, motivation-supplemented” policy, and developing a stable operational mechanism for a personal carbon trading market.

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Lax, Ruth F. "A Variation on Freud's Theme in “A Child is Being Beaten”—Mother's Role: Some Implications for Superego Development in Women." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 40, no. 2 (April 1992): 455–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000306519204000207.

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Clinical material is presented leading to a discussion of beating fantasies which varies from Freud's model. Analysis shows that the fantasied role girls assign to mother as the punisher in the oedipal drama is equivalent to the fantasied role boys ascribe to father as castrator. For both sexes, castration anxiety spurs the internalization of parental prohibitions, the repression of oedipal wishes, and the subsequent structuralization of the superego. Mother establishes the “oedipal law” for the girl analogously to father's doing the same for the boy. The role that such fantasies play in the formation of the female superego is examined.

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Reed, Phil, and Toshihiko Yoshino. "Effect of contingent auditory stimuli on concurrent schedule performance: An alternative punisher to electric shock." Behavioural Processes 78, no. 3 (July 2008): 421–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2008.02.013.

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Suleiman, Ramzi, and Yuval Samid. "Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered." Games 12, no. 3 (August 1, 2021): 63. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12030063.

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Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

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Belor, Jordan A., and Timothy D. Peters. "Critical legal spectatorship and the affect of violence: a cultural legal reading of Netflix’s The Punisher." Law and Humanities 14, no. 2 (July 2, 2020): 160–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17521483.2020.1821987.

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Salvy, Sarah-Jeanne, James A. Mulick, Eric Butter, Rita Kahng Bartlett, and Thomas R. Linscheid. "Contingent electric shock(SIBIS) and a conditioned punisher eliminate severe head banging in a preschool child." Behavioral Interventions 19, no. 2 (March 30, 2004): 59–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bin.157.

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Zeki, S., O. R. Goodenough, and Oliver R. Goodenough. "Responsibility and punishment: whose mind? A response." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 359, no. 1451 (November 29, 2004): 1805–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2004.1548.

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Cognitive neuroscience is challenging the Anglo-American approach to criminal responsibility. Critiques, in this issue and elsewhere, are pointing out the deeply flawed psychological assumptions underlying the legal tests for mental incapacity. The critiques themselves, however, may be flawed in looking, as the tests do, at the psychology of the offender. Introducing the strategic structure of punishment into the analysis leads us to consider the psychology of the punisher as the critical locus of cognition informing the responsibility rules. Such an approach both helps to make sense of the counterfactual assumptions about offender psychology embodied in the law and provides a possible explanation for the human conviction of the existence of free will, at least in others.

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Freeman, Kevin B., Jennifer E. Naylor, Thomas E. Prisinzano, and William L. Woolverton. "Assessment of the kappa opioid agonist, salvinorin A, as a punisher of drug self-administration in monkeys." Psychopharmacology 231, no. 14 (January 31, 2014): 2751–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00213-014-3436-2.

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Kendal, Jeremy, Marcus W. Feldman, and Kenichi Aoki. "Cultural coevolution of norm adoption and enforcement when punishers are rewarded or non-punishers are punished." Theoretical Population Biology 70, no. 1 (August 2006): 10–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2006.01.003.

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Lewisch, Peter. "Altruistic Punishment: The Golden Keystone of Human Cooperation and Social Stability?" Analyse & Kritik 42, no. 2 (November 1, 2020): 255–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2020-0011.

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Abstract ‘Altruistic punishment’ (i.e., costly punishment that serves no instrumental goal for the punisher) could serve, as suggested by the pertinent experimental literature, as a powerful enforcer of social norms. This paper discusses foundations, extensions, and, in particular, limits and open questions of this concept-and it does so mostly based on experimental evidence provided by the author. Inter alia, the paper relates the (standard) literature on negative emotions as a trigger of second party punishment to more recent experimental findings on the phenomenon of ‘spontaneous cooperation’ and ‘spontaneous punishment’ and demonstrates its (tight) emotional basis. Furthermore, the paper discusses the potential for free riding on altruistic punishment. While providing valuable insights into the understanding of social order, ‘altruistic punishment’ is thus not the golden keystone of social stability.

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Traulsen, Arne, Torsten Röhl, and Manfred Milinski. "An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 279, no. 1743 (July 4, 2012): 3716–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.0937.

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Punishment can stabilize costly cooperation and ensure the success of a common project that is threatened by free-riders. Punishment mechanisms can be classified into pool punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by a paid third party, (e.g. a police system or a sheriff), and peer punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by peers. Which punishment mechanism is preferred when both are concurrently available within a society? In an economic experiment, we show that the majority of subjects choose pool punishment, despite being costly even in the absence of defectors, when second-order free-riders, cooperators that do not punish, are also punished. Pool punishers are mutually enforcing their support for the punishment organization, stably trapping each other. Our experimental results show how organized punishment could have displaced individual punishment in human societies.

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Altmann, Eliska. "Entre playas y distopías: Río de Janeiro, ex ciudad capital, y la recepción cinematográfica." Todas as Artes Revista Luso-Brasileira de Artes e Cultura 3, no. 3 (2020): 40–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.21747/21843805/tav3n3a3.

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Based on the reception of four Brazilian films, the article tries to identify imaginations about the city of Rio de Janeiro through a dystopian lens typical of our day. The comparative analysis involves “critical-cinematographic” practices that conceive a sociocritical reading assuming that social elements are found in the works themselves, and are also external to them. The criticism of the following films will be verified: Rio fantasia [Rio Fantasy] (1957), by Watson Macedo, and Rio, 40 graus [Rio, 40 degrees] (1955), by Nelson Pereira dos Santos; Rio, verão & amor [Rio, summer & love] (1966) and El Justicero [The Punisher] (1967), of the same directors, consecutively. The documents will highlight dystopian aspects both in the works and in their readings, as well as in the social configurations of the time in a temporal relationship with Brazil today

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Eriksson, Kimmo, Pontus Strimling, Per A. Andersson, Mark Aveyard, Markus Brauer, Vladimir Gritskov, Toko Kiyonari, et al. "Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment." Management and Organization Review 13, no. 4 (November 10, 2017): 851–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mor.2017.42.

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ABSTRACTViolators of cooperation norms may be informally punished by their peers. How such norm enforcement is judged by others can be regarded as a meta-norm (i.e., a second-order norm). We examined whether meta-norms about peer punishment vary across cultures by having students in eight countries judge animations in which an agent who over-harvested a common resource was punished either by a single peer or by the entire peer group. Whether the punishment was retributive or restorative varied between two studies, and findings were largely consistent across these two types of punishment. Across all countries, punishment was judged as more appropriate when implemented by the entire peer group than by an individual. Differences between countries were revealed in judgments of punishers vs. non-punishers. Specifically, appraisals of punishers were relatively negative in three Western countries and Japan, and more neutral in Pakistan, UAE, Russia, and China, consistent with the influence of individualism, power distance, and/or indulgence. Our studies constitute a first step in mapping how meta-norms vary around the globe, demonstrating both cultural universals and cultural differences.

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Schlaepfer, Alain. "The emergence and selection of reputation systems that drive cooperative behaviour." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 285, no. 1886 (September 5, 2018): 20181508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.1508.

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Reputational concerns are believed to play a crucial role in explaining cooperative behaviour among non-kin humans. Individuals cooperate to avoid a negative social image, if being branded as defector reduces pay-offs from future interactions. Similarly, individuals sanction defectors to gain a reputation as punisher, prompting future co-players to cooperate. But reputation can only effectively support cooperation if a sufficient number of individuals condition their strategies on their co-players' reputation, and if a sufficient number of group members are willing to record and transmit the relevant information about past actions. Using computer simulations, this paper argues that starting from a pool of non-cooperative individuals, a reputation system based on punishment is likely to emerge and to be the driver of the initial evolution of cooperative behaviour. However, once cooperation is established in a group, it will be sustained mainly through a reputation mechanism based on cooperative actions.

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Hosen, Mohammed Rabiul, Qian Li, Yangyang Liu, Andreas Zietzer, Katharina Maus, Philip Goody, Shizuka Uchida, et al. "CAD increases the long noncoding RNA PUNISHER in small extracellular vesicles and regulates endothelial cell function via vesicular shuttling." Molecular Therapy - Nucleic Acids 25 (September 2021): 388–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.omtn.2021.05.023.

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Sasaki, Tatsuya, and Satoshi Uchida. "The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280, no. 1752 (February 7, 2013): 20122498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2498.

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The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, ‘second-order’ freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation or group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders from eroding the social immune system.

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Asgharpourmasouleh, Ahmadreza, Atiye Sadeghi, and Ali Yousofi. "A Grounded Agent-Based Model of Common Good Production in a Residential Complex: Applying Artificial Experiments." SAGE Open 7, no. 4 (October 2017): 215824401773759. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244017737592.

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The present research addressed the problem of common good production referring to a real-world problem in an urban residential complex in Mashhad city, Iran. The residential complex includes four blocks showing different rates of success in the common good production. Analyzing the qualitative field data, using grounded theory framework, we distinguished seven different strategies among residents: vandal, robber, cheater, abider, cooperator, compensator, and punisher. The other main agents’ property that seems to be determining in the production of common good is their desirability for them which we quantified it referring to a couple of personal variables. The outputs of the qualitative phase of research let us to design an agent-based model in computer to apply some artificial experiments and find ways for promoting the situation. The results showed that some specific minor changes in agent combinations can make a great difference in the outcomes and solve the complex of cooperation.

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