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Radmilovic, Vuk. "Strategic Legitimacy Cultivation at the Supreme Court of Canada: Quebec Secession Reference and Beyond." Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, no. 4 (December 2010): 843–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423910000764.
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Abstract. While the last few decades have witnessed increased political significance of the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court has also managed to safeguard its institutional legitimacy as evident in the high degree of support it enjoys among the Canadian public. Indeed, how do the Supreme Court of Canada, and high courts everywhere, ensure the attainment and retention of institutional legitimacy? The paper develops an answer to this question by presenting a strategic theory of legitimacy cultivation. The theory is applied and tested in the context of the 1998Secession Reference case. The paper sheds a new light on the case, shows that patterns of judicial strategic behaviour can provide important insights into how the Supreme Court acquires institutional legitimacy and points out the significance of extending the strategic approach to the study of the Canadian Supreme Court.Résumé. L'importance politique de la Cour suprême du Canada s'est accrue de manière notable au cours des dernières décennies. Malgré tout, la Cour a réussi à maintenir sa légitimité institutionnelle, comme en fait foi le niveau de soutien élevé pour la Cour que manifeste la population canadienne. Mais comment la Cour suprême du Canada, ainsi que les cours suprêmes ailleurs dans le monde, s'assurent-elles de développer et de maintenir leur légitimité institutionnelle? Cet article propose une réponse à cette question en présentant une théorie stratégique du développement de la légitimité. La théorie est appliquée et testée dans le contexte du Renvoi relatif à la sécession duQuébec de 1998. Cet article jette un regard différent sur cette décision en démontrant que certaines tendances dans le comportement judiciaire stratégique peuvent fournir des indices importants quant à l'acquisition de la légitimité institutionnelle. L'article souligne aussi l'importance d'étendre l'utilisation de l'approche stratégique à l'étude de la Cour suprême du Canada.
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RAMOS, Edith Maria Barbosa, Pedro Trovão do ROSÁRIO, and Sara Barros Pereira de MIRANDA. "JUDICIALIZAÇÃO E ATIVISMO JUDICIAL EM PERSPECTIVA: UMA ANÁLISE A PARTIR DAS EXPERIÊNCIAS DAS SUPREMAS CORTES DO BRASIL E DO CANADÁ." Revista Juridica 1, no. 54 (January 28, 2020): 425. http://dx.doi.org/10.21902/revistajur.2316-753x.v1i54.3753.
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RESUMOA presente pesquisa por escopo analisar os fenômenos da judicialização e do ativismo judicial a partir das experiências da Suprema Corte do Canadá e do Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. Observou-se que, em ambos os países, tem havido, nas últimas décadas, uma contínua expansão da autoridade do Poder Judiciário e da sua atuação em temáticas de natureza política até então abordadas apenas pelos Poderes Legislativo e Executivo, o que pode ser evidenciado a partir da análise das decisões proferidas pelas Cortes Supremas dos dois países. Apesar das diferenças na arquitetura constitucional, ambas as Cortes atuam como condutoras do processo de expansão alcance do poder de suas estruturas judiciárias. O presente artigo foi desenvolvido a partir de levantamento bibliográfico em artigos obtidos em diferentes bancos de dados e indexadores, publicados na integra em português e inglês, acessados de forma gratuita. Foram selecionadas revistas científicas na área do Direito Constitucional Comparado com extratos elevados, qualis A e B. Utilizou-se, ainda, dados constantes em documentos oficiais e na legislação pertinente com recorte epistemológico e científico fundado na construção teórica contemporânea dos Direitos Fundamentais. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Judicialização; Ativismo Judicial; Suprema Corte do Canadá; Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. ABSTRACTThis research by scope analyzes the phenomena of judicialization and judicial activism from the experiences of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Brazilian Supreme Court. It has been observed that, in both countries, there has been, in the last decades, a continuous expansion of the authority of the Judiciary Power and its action in themes of a political nature hitherto addressed only by the Legislative and Executive Powers, which can be evidenced by from the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of both countries. Despite differences in constitutional architecture, both courts act as drivers of the process of expanding the power of their judicial structures. This article was developed from a bibliographic survey in articles obtained in different databases and indexers, published in full in Portuguese and English, accessed for free. Scientific journals were selected in the area of Constitutional Law Compared with high extracts, qualis A and B. It was also used data in official documents and relevant legislation with epistemological and scientific basis based on the contemporary theoretical construction of Fundamental Rights. KEYWORDS: Judicialization; Judicial activism; Supreme Court of Canada; Brazilian Supreme Court.
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Kruger, Stephen. "Supreme Courts as Courts of General Original Jurisdiction." International Journal of Legal Information 39, no. 1 (2011): 51–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0731126500006065.
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AbstractIn a common-law jurisdiction, “Supreme Court” is not always the name of a court of final appeal. There are 41 Supreme Courts and Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction. They cover 60 political units. In addition to general original jurisdiction, some of those courts have general appellate jurisdiction. There is a number of political units in which a second appellate consideration is possible.This article provides information about Supreme Courts and Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction. It includes a list with the names of the political units served by Supreme Courts or by Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction; a statement whether a Supreme Court or a Supreme Court of Judicature of a political unit has both general original jurisdiction and general appellate jurisdiction, or only general original jurisdiction; and further information.The goal of this article is to inform librarians, lawyers, solicitors, and barristers about the many court systems in the common-law world, in which the court of general original jurisdiction is named “Supreme Court” or “Supreme Court of Judicature.” Those courts are found in diverse political units, including Australian states and territories, Belize, Brunei, Canadian provinces and territories, Gibraltar, and Samoa. The oldest among them is the Supreme Court of New York, founded more than 300 years ago.
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Wills, David, and Marie-Francoise Plissart. "Supreme Court." Diacritics 18, no. 3 (1988): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/465252.
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Peele, Gillian. "Supreme court." Contemporary Record 2, no. 4 (December 1988): 27–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13619468808581006.
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Jackson, Adam. "Supreme Court." Journal of Criminal Law 81, no. 6 (December 2017): 448–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022018317746833.
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Falcão, Joaquim, and Ivar Hartmann. "Direito constitucional de recorrer e a judicialização da ineficiência empresarial." Espaço Jurídico Journal of Law [EJJL] 18, no. 2 (August 31, 2017): 421–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18593/ejjl.12249.
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Resumo: A judicialização das questões consumeristas atinge o Supremo Tribunal Federal por via dos juizados especiais há vários anos. Recentemente uma empresa do ramo de telefonia, a Oi, destacou-se pelo volume desproporcional de processos que levou ao tribunal. Ao analisar o perfil da litigância de direito do consumidor da Oi no Supremo, identificamos que a empresa envia o dobro de processos do segundo colocado no ranking de maiores litigantes, apesar de ter taxa de sucesso menor do que 0,07%. No contexto da necessidade de adequada proteção dos direitos do consumidor, esse comportamento pode ser caracterizado como bullying processual e demanda novas atitudes por parte dos órgãos reguladores e do próprio Supremo.Palavras-chave: Direito do consumidor. Judicialização. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Abstract: The consumer rights lawsuits have reached the Brazilian Supreme Court through small claims courts for years. Recently, one phone company, Oi, stood out for the disproportional number of appeals it took to the court. We found that Oi brought double the number of appeals of the second most frequent appellant in consumer rights at the Supreme Court, even though Oi’s success rate is lower than 0,07%. In the context of appropriate consumer rights protection, this behavior can be characterized as lawsuit bullying and calls for a new attitude by the regulating agencies and the Supreme Court itself.Keywords: Consumer rights. Lawsuits. Brazilian Supreme Court.
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Falcão, Joaquim, and Ivar Hartmann. "Direito constitucional de recorrer e a judicialização da ineficiência empresarial." Espaço Jurídico Journal of Law [EJJL] 18, no. 2 (August 31, 2017): 421–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18593/ejjl.v0i2.12249.
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Resumo: A judicialização das questões consumeristas atinge o Supremo Tribunal Federal por via dos juizados especiais há vários anos. Recentemente uma empresa do ramo de telefonia, a Oi, destacou-se pelo volume desproporcional de processos que levou ao tribunal. Ao analisar o perfil da litigância de direito do consumidor da Oi no Supremo, identificamos que a empresa envia o dobro de processos do segundo colocado no ranking de maiores litigantes, apesar de ter taxa de sucesso menor do que 0,07%. No contexto da necessidade de adequada proteção dos direitos do consumidor, esse comportamento pode ser caracterizado como bullying processual e demanda novas atitudes por parte dos órgãos reguladores e do próprio Supremo.Palavras-chave: Direito do consumidor. Judicialização. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Abstract: The consumer rights lawsuits have reached the Brazilian Supreme Court through small claims courts for years. Recently, one phone company, Oi, stood out for the disproportional number of appeals it took to the court. We found that Oi brought double the number of appeals of the second most frequent appellant in consumer rights at the Supreme Court, even though Oi’s success rate is lower than 0,07%. In the context of appropriate consumer rights protection, this behavior can be characterized as lawsuit bullying and calls for a new attitude by the regulating agencies and the Supreme Court itself.Keywords: Consumer rights. Lawsuits. Brazilian Supreme Court.
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Songer, Donald R., John Szmer, and Susan W. Johnson. "Explaining Dissent on the Supreme Court of Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 44, no. 2 (June 2011): 389–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423911000151.
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Abstract.While there is an extensive literature on the causes of dissensus on appellate courts in the US, few empirical studies exist of the causes of dissent in Canadian Supreme Court. The current study seeks to close that gap in the literature, proposing and then testing what we call a Canadian model of dissent. We find that the likelihood of dissent is strongly related to four broad factors that appear to exert independent influence on whether the Court is consensual or divided: political conflict, institutional structure, legal ambiguity in the law and variations in the leadership style of the chief justice.Résumé.Les causes de dissension dans les cours d'appel aux États-Unis font l'objet de nombreux articles et publications, mais il existe très peu d'études empiriques sur les causes de dissidence à la Cour suprême du Canada. La présente étude vise à combler cette lacune en proposant, un modèle canadien de dissension, puis en le mettant à l'épreuve. Nous avons constaté que le risque de dissension est fortement lié à quatre facteurs genéraux qui semblent exercer une influence indépendante, que la Cour soit en accord ou divisée. Ces facteurs sont le conflit politique, la structure institutionnelle, la présence d'une ambiguité juridique dans la loi et le style de direction du juge en chef.
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Handoyo, Samuel Tirta, and Cut Memi. "KEWENANGAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG REPUBLIK INDONESIA DALAM PEMBUATAN PERATURAN TENTANG PERMOHONAN PERNYATAAN PAILIT MELALUI SURAT EDARAN (BELEIDSREGELS) DITINJAU DARI SUDUT ILMU PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN." Jurnal Hukum Adigama 2, no. 2 (December 27, 2019): 646. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/adigama.v2i2.6581.
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One important element of the rule of law is that any government action must be based on law. The consequence is that laws must be made, implemented and enforced. Therefore, the state has the power to make laws to regulate all its activities. The Supreme Court as one of the highest judicial institutions in Indonesia has the status of all the courts and as the highest court for the four judicial institutions. The regulating and oversight functions are part of the functions of the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court is authorized to issue further regulations in the form of Supreme Court Regulations and Supreme Court Circular Letters, where Supreme Court Regulations are regulating, whereas Supreme Court Circular Letters are as policy regulations. However, in practice the substance of the Supreme Court Circular is often not in accordance with its requirements, namely as a policy regulation. One of them is the Supreme Court Circular Letter Number 2 Year 2016 concerning Increasing Efficiency and Transparency in Handling Bankruptcy Cases and Delaying Obligations of Debt Payment in Courts. The writing of this thesis will discuss the authority of the Supreme Court in determining the substance of the Supreme Court Circular Number 2 of 2016 in terms of statutory knowledge. Judging from its nature, the research used is descriptive analysis using normative legal research.
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Ferrey, Steven. "Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When the Lower Federal Courts Don't Follow the Supreme Court." Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law, no. 6.1 (2016): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.6.1.superfund.
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There is legal chaos in the national Superfund. The Supreme Court reversed decisions of eleven federal circuit courts in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. There is no instance in modern Supreme Court history where the Court reversed every federal circuit court in the country, as it did in Atlantic Research. The Supreme Court’s reversal was through a unanimous decision. This was extraordinary: It not only reversed the entire legal interpretation of one of America’s most critical statutes, but also re-allocated billions of dollars among private parties. The Supreme Court, when it rendered its decision, seemed to be rectifying a bottleneck in Superfund remediation of hazardous waste. However, in the decade since this Supreme Court decision, several federal trial and circuit courts have circumvented the Supreme Court command. This article illustrates how the lower federal courts have done this without violating Article III of the Constitution, by re-defining a one-word term. The practical impact has been chaos in hazardous substance remediation across the U.S., affecting an estimated 600,000 contaminated waste sites. There are huge dollar impacts: addressing the 350,000 remaining contaminated sites in the U.S. would cost up to one-quarter trillion dollars, or an expenditure of $6-8 billion annually. This Article analyzes how the lower federal courts have circumvented the Supreme Court decisions, with particular focus on decisions and legal prestidigitation in the most recent four years. This lower court inversion of the law is without much basis in law, and resurrects exactly what the Supreme Court thought it had overruled unanimously. What transpired in enforcement in the lower courts is not what the Supreme Court’s opinion contemplated. This Article examines the method by which the lower federal courts have created an ongoing legal mechanism to circumvent the most important Supreme Court holding in a critical area of the economy.
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Mujuzi, Jamil Ddamulira. "Bail pending appeal in Uganda." South African Journal of Criminal Justice 34, no. 2 (2021): 307–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.47348/sacj/v34/i2a7.
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Article 23(6) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides that an arrested person is ‘entitled’ to apply to court for bail. However, it is silent on the issue of bail pending appeal. Bail pending appeal is provided for in the Magistrates Courts Act, the Judicature Act and the Criminal Procedure Code Act. Although the Supreme Court, the highest court in Uganda, provided criteria for granting bail pending appeal, some high court and Court of Appeal judges, who are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, have ignored these criteria. There are conflicting high court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judgments on the questions of whether art 23(6) is applicable to bail pending appeal and whether the right to be presumed innocent is applicable to a person who is applying for bail pending appeal. There are notable controversies in the rich jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on bail pending appeal. In October 2020, one of the justices of the Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court does not have the jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal and that Rule 6(2)(a), which empowers the Supreme Court to grant bail pending appeal, is unconstitutional. In November 2020, another Supreme Court justice granted an applicant bail pending appeal without even referring to her colleague’s decision which held that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal. This article examines the jurisprudence developed by the courts of Uganda on the subject. The discussion focuses on the following issues: courts with jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal; the right to bail pending appeal; the presumption of innocence and bail pending appeal; and conditions for granting bail pending appeal.
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Wicaksono, Dian Agung, and Faiz Rahman. "Influencing or Intervention? Impact of Constitutional Court Decisions on the Supreme Court in Indonesia." Constitutional Review 8, no. 2 (December 30, 2022): 260. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/consrev823.
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The third amendment of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, conducted in 2001, had significant implications for the nation’s judiciary. It transformed the judiciary from a single to a dual structure. Consequently, there are two apexes of the judiciary: the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the establishment of the Constitutional Court divided judicial review authority between the two apex courts. The Constitutional Court can review laws against the Constitution, while the Supreme Court has the power to review whether regulations, made under laws, contradict such laws. Although the Indonesian Constitution provides explicit delineations over the absolute competence of judicial review, the division of judicial review has often triggered tension between the two courts. The Constitution allows the Supreme Court to have additional authorities granted by laws. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has the power to review any law against the Constitution, including laws related to the Supreme Court. This article seeks to answer the important question of whether the Constitutional Court could influence or intervene in the Supreme Court through judicial review. The authors argue that the duality of judicial review authority unintentionally causes an imbalance in the functional relationship between the two apexes of the judiciary. The main reason is that the Constitutional Court can influence or intervene in the Supreme Court through constitutional review authority. The authors examine two essential aspects of this: (1) the functional implications of duality of judicial review authority; and (2) the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s authority in reviewing laws, especially those closely related to the Supreme Court’s authorities. Various cases are examined to illustrate how the Constitutional Court could directly or indirectly influence the Supreme Courts’ authorities. The Constitutional Court, however, often seems to ‘play safe’ to maintain the judiciary’s imbalanced relationship caused by the dualism of judicial review authority.
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Lawrence, Van R. "Supreme Court Review." Policy Perspectives 5, no. 1 (May 1, 1998): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.4079/pp.v5i1.4200.
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Regan, Richard J. "Supreme Court Roundup." Thought 60, no. 1 (1985): 99–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thought198560116.
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Regan, Richard J. "Supreme Court Roundup." Thought 61, no. 2 (1986): 290–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thought19866129.
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Regan,, Richard J. "Supreme Court Roundup." Thought 62, no. 2 (1987): 234–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thought198762230.
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Regan, Richard J. "Supreme Court Roundup." Thought 63, no. 4 (1988): 429–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thought198863431.
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Regan,, Richard J. "Supreme Court Roundup." Thought 64, no. 2 (1989): 176–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/thought198964238.
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Warshaw, Thayer S. "Supreme Court Watch." Religion & Public Education 12, no. 3 (July 1985): 67–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10567224.1985.11487869.
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Mech, Ann. "Supreme Court Update." Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice 3, no. 1 (February 2002): 31–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/152715440200300105.
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Mech, Ann. "Supreme Court Update." Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice 4, no. 2 (May 2003): 144–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527154403004002008.
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BOSKEY, BENNETT. "Supreme Court Declinations." Journal of Supreme Court History 31, no. 3 (November 2006): 252–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5818.2006.00141.x.
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Stratford, Jean Slemmons, Juri Stratford, and Joe Morehead. "The Supreme Court." Journal of Government Information 21, no. 2 (March 1994): 179–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1352-0237(94)90104-x.
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Krisyulaeni. "EKSISTENSI PEMBERLAKUAN SISTEM E-COURT DALAM PERADILAN TATA USAHA NEGARA DI INDONESIA." Yustitia 7, no. 2 (November 8, 2021): 209–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.31943/yustitia.v7i2.140.
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The massive rate of technological development that is happening in Indonesia today, has led various judicial bodies in all parts of the world, including Indonesia to then begin to adopt and take advantage of these technological developments. The procurement of e-court itself began to be implemented after the Supreme Court Regulation Number 3 of 2018. PTUN which stands for the term State Administrative Court is one of the judicial institutions in Indonesia whose position is under the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court itself has made various efforts through convenience in terms of administrative services through a system called the electronic court or hereinafter referred to as e-court, and then by law, this is contained in Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2019.
Keywords : Technological developments, Electronic courts, State Administrative Courts
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Napitupulu, Brierly. "SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION." Indonesia Private Law Review 3, no. 1 (June 29, 2022): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.25041/iplr.v3i1.2559.
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The information disclosure issue to the public prompted the Supreme Court to issue a Regulation in the form of a Decision of the Supreme Court concerning Information Disclosure in Courts, which was supplemented by a Decision of the Supreme Court concerning Guidelines for Information Services in Courts. This decision resulted in the existence of the Supreme Court Decision Directory that allows the public free access to a copy of each case's entire decision. Meanwhile, the Criminal Procedure Code limits the distribution of copies of decisions in cases where not everyone can obtain a court decision. The objective of this research is to know how the legal protection of the parties' personal data in the Directory of Decisions of the Supreme Court, especially in criminal cases. Data analysis was performed using legal theory and related legislation, with doctrinal research, concept, and statutory approach methods. The conclusions obtained by the Supreme Court Decision Directory have not fully provided legal protection for the Personal Data of the Parties, especially the Defendant. The KMA SK, which is the technical guideline for information disclosure in court, does not mention Defendant's privacy rights and also the privacy rights of third parties.
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Sankoff, Peter. "OPPORTUNITY LOST: THE SUPREME COURT MISSES A HISTORIC CHANCE TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING FOR ANIMAL INTERESTS." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 30, no. 2 (October 1, 2012): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v30i2.4372.
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The Supreme Court of Canada recently denied leave to appeal in Reece v. Edmonton (City), a 2-1 decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, which focused on the right of private parties to seek judicial intervention on behalf of animals. In this article, the author examines the implications of this "lost opportunity" to develop an important area of law relating to public interest standing, explores the important questions that were at stake in the appeal, and suggests why the Supreme Court should have decided otherwise.La Cour suprême du Canada a récemment rejeté la demande d’autorisation d’appel de l’affaire Reece v. Edmonton (Ville), – une décision (2 contre 1) de la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta – qui portait sur le droit de simples individus de demander une intervention judiciaire au nom des animaux. Dans le présent article, l’auteur examine les conséquences de cette [TRADUCTION] « occasion ratée » de développer un important domaine du droit relatif à l’intérêt public, et de traiter les questions sérieuses qui étaient soulevées dans l’appel; il tente d’expliquer pourquoi la Cour suprême aurait dû rendre une décision différente.
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Muhammad, Hasanuddin. "EFEKTIFITAS DAN EFISIENSI PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA EKONOMI SYARIAH DI PERADILAN AGAMA." Jurnal Ilmiah Mizani: Wacana Hukum, Ekonomi Dan Keagamaan 7, no. 1 (June 19, 2020): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.29300/mzn.v7i1.3192.
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The era of the industrial revolution 4.0 has brought great changes to the human. The Supreme Court as the highest judicial body should embody effective and efficient justice with the simple, fast, and low cost princeples. This study examines the extent to which the Supreme Court Regulations regulate and embody an effective and efficient judicial system in resolving Islamic economic disputes in religious courts. This type of research is qualitative with a normative juridical approach. As a result, the Supreme Court has issued several rules as an effort to embody an effective and efficient judiciary, namely Supreme Court Regulation Number 2 of 2015 concerning the procedure for simple lawsuit resolution, Supreme Court Regulation Number 14 of 2016 concerning Procedures for Settling Sharia Economic Disputes, Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 5 year 2016 concerning Sharia Economic Judge Certification, Supreme Court Regulation 04 of 2019 concerning amendment to Supreme Court Regulation Number 02 of 2015 concerning Simple Settlement Procedures and Supreme Court Regulations 01 of 2019 concerning Electronic Case and Trial Administration. It regulates efforts to embody the resolution for Sharia economic disputes that are effective and efficient, namely through a simple lawsuit, judges must have competence in the field of sharia economics by issuing a sharia economic judge certification policy and providing judicial services electronically.
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Ostberg, C. L., Matthew E. Wetstein, and Craig R. Ducat. "Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change: Explaining the Citation of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 (June 2001): 377–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423901777943.
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Policy convergence theory suggests that political leaders of societies will often emulate policy solutions that work in other settings. Yet political leaders can also reject policy alternatives, leading to policy divergence. This study explores the extent to which policy convergence (and/or divergence) takes place in the legal setting of citation practices by the Supreme Court of Canada. The authors examine the Court's practice of citing authorities from other countries, particularly the United States. The findings echo earlier works that have found increasing citation of US case law since the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. The justices of the Canadian Supreme Court continue to devote considerable attention to the legal doctrines of other countries' courts, particularly when they are confronted with Charter disputes. Thus, convergence theory gets some qualified support when applied to the Canadian Supreme Court's citation practices. The authors provide several complementary explanations for this evidence of policy emulation, suggesting that it stems from the individual attitudes of justices, from the litigation strategies pursued by groups and from broader societal values that the justices adhere to in their rulings. As such, foreign citation patterns of justices on the Supreme Court of Canada should not only be of interest to public law scholars, but to political scientists generally.La théorie sur la convergence des politiques soutient que les dirigeants des sociétés imitent souvent les solutions politiques qui ont fait leur preuve dans d'autres contextes. Les dirigeants peuvent également, cependant, rejeter les alternatives politiques menant à des divergences. Cette étude examine la portée de la convergence (ou des divergences) des politiques dans le cadre des pratiques de citation de la Cour suprême du Canada, lorsque celles-ci concernent les autorités de d'autres pays, les États-Unis en particulier. Ses conclusions rejoignent celles de travaux antérieurs qui ont constaté une augmentation des citations des lois américaines depuis l'adoption de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, en l982. Les juges de la Cour Suprême du Canada continuent d'accorder une attention importante aux doctrines légales des cours des autres pays, en particulier lorsqu'ils sont confrontés à des contestations de la Charte. Donc la théorie de la convergence est confirmée dans une certaine mesure par les pratiques de citation de la Cour suprême du Canada. L'article fournit plusieurs explications complémentaires de cette politique d'imitation, suggérant qu'elle origine des attitudes individuelles des juges, des stratégies de contestation utilisées par les groupes et, plus largement, des valeurs sociétales auxquelles se référent les juges dans leurs décisions. Par conséquent, les patterns de citation des jurisprudences étrangères de la Cour suprême du Canada devraient intéressé, non seulement les chercheurs en droit public, mais les spécialistes de la science politique en général.
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Klepitskiy, I. A. "Binding Nature of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation Explanations in Criminal Law." Lex Russica, no. 6 (July 5, 2021): 95–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1729-5920.2021.175.6.095-107.
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The question of the legal nature and the binding nature of explanations of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation remains debatable in the literature. When considering criminal cases, the courts do not always follow the decisions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court. It seems that the explanations of the Supreme Court, while not being a source of criminal law, are nevertheless binding on courts and officials applying the norms of criminal law. This is a general rule, to which there are exceptions. First, there are erroneous explanations of the Supreme Court, which are not based on the established judicial practice and are not supported by it. Second, there are outdated explanations of the Supreme Court that do not meet modern legal realities. Third, there are explanations of the Supreme Court, which, in relation to a particular situation, require an expansive or restrictive interpretation. In these three situations, the Supreme Court’s explanations do not bind the law enforcement officer. The binding nature of the Supreme Court’s explanations is determined by the value of the law as such. Questions of law require a uniform resolution. An alternative to a uniform interpretation of the law is arbitrary administration. Arbitrary administration is not within the competence of the judge. There is no case law in Russia. The works of legal scholars in modern Russia also cannot satisfy the need for a uniform interpretation of the law. The significance of the explanations of the Supreme Court determines the high requirements for their quality. The Supreme Court’s explanations should not directly contradict the law. The Supreme Court’s explanations should not change unless there is an urgent need to do so. The rule nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, being an achievement of legal culture, binds the Supreme Court. By clarifying the practice of applying the law, the Supreme Court forms and preserves judicial doctrine, thereby providing legal certainty.
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La Morte, Michael W. "Courts Continue to Address the Wealth Disparity Issue." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 11, no. 1 (March 1989): 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/01623737011001003.
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Lawsuits in nearly three dozen states have challenged the constitutionality of state school finance provisions on equal protection or educational adequacy grounds. Presently, the U.S. Supreme Court, a federal appellate court, and 10 state supreme courts have upheld state provisions, and 7 state supreme courts have held school financing provisions unconstitutional. Although wealth-related school finance litigation began in 1968 and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the issue in 1973, the judicial caldron continues to boil. Protracted rounds of litigation over the years in several states and a rash of recent suits reveal this issue to remain lively and contentious.
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Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "Court to Court." American Journal of International Law 92, no. 4 (October 1998): 708–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998135.
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Leave aside the question whether the indication of provisional measures by the International Court of Justice in the Breard case was binding on the United States as a matter of international or domestic law. Scholars will continue to differ on this question; government decision makers will reach their own conclusions. Leave aside that the state of Virginia violated a solemn treaty obligation, a treaty that the Supreme Court is obliged to uphold as the supreme law of the land. Without denigrating the power of these arguments, a less contentious case can be made for the granting of a stay—a case based less on compulsion than on civility.
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Zherobkina, Y. A. "Administrative and legal status of decisions of the supreme court through the prism of the development of case law in Ukraine." Fundamental and applied researches in practice of leading scientific schools 39, no. 3 (June 30, 2020): 41–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.33531/farplss.2020.3.7.
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In recent years’ modernization and reform of the judiciary has become one of Ukraine’s key tasks. The events of 2013-2014, called the Revolution of Dignity, exacerbated the existing problems of judicial and legal reform, as well as slowed down effective reform measures in this area. Under such conditions, the executive and legislative bodies had to act in the direction of reforming and adapting the judicial system to generally accepted European norms and standards. Since 2014, a number of progressive laws on the functioning of the judiciary and the administration of justice in the state have been approved. And in 2016, the judicial system in Ukraine was reformed: the Supreme Court of Ukraine, the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine, the Supreme Economic Court of Ukraine, and the High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases were terminated and subsequently liquidated. Instead, all functions, tasks and powers to consider the case as a court of cassation were assigned to the newly created Supreme Court. One of the preconditions for judicial reform in Ukraine was the overburdening of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and higher specialized courts, which violates the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time, which is enshrined and guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In accordance with Art. 17 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”, the judicial system in Ukraine consists of the Supreme Court, appellate courts, local courts. At the same time, the highest court in this system is the Supreme Court. Along with such innovations in the structural and functional characteristics of the judiciary in Ukraine, there is a tendency to the possibility of future recognition of decisions of the Supreme Court – the official source of law in the country.
The article reveals the issue of determining the administrative and legal status of decisions of the Supreme Court in Ukraine, outlining key theoretical and practical conclusions over the years of judicial reform. Emphasis is placed on the development of the peculiarities of the Anglo-Saxon legal system in the state and the development of case law.
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Uzquiano, Gabriel. "The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle." Nous 38, no. 1 (March 2004): 135–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00465.x.
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Crowder, Michael E. "Texas v. Cobb, The United States Supreme Court Limits the Sixth Amendment to Exonerate Innocent Suspects-Police Officers Acting in Good Faith." Texas Wesleyan Law Review 8, no. 1 (October 2001): 79–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/twlr.v8.i1.5.
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This Note argues that the Texas Court should adopt the Supreme Court's holding in Cobb on state constitutional claims as well, thus avoiding further entanglement in the "closely related" confusion. For background purposes, Part II reviews the history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as provided by the Supreme Court and other lower courts prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cobb. Part III discusses Cobb's facts and procedural history and examines the analyses of both the Texas Court and the Supreme Court. Part IV analyzes how the questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court, prior to Cobb, resulted in the Texas Court's expansion of Sixth Amendment protections. Additionally, Part IV discusses why the Texas Court should recognize a defendant's ability to waive his right to counsel after it has attached-an issue which was not addressed by the Supreme Court in Cobb. Part V discusses alternative grounds not considered by the Texas Court that could have also rendered Cobb's confession admissible. In conclusion, this Note suggests how to resolve future Sixth Amendment questions in Texas.
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Ponomarova, O. "Functions of the Commercial Cassation Court in the Supreme Court in Ukraine." Herald of criminal justice, no. 4 (2019): 123–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2413-5372.2019.4/123-129.
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During the judicial reform of 2016, the Law of Ukraine "On Judicial System and Status of Judges" was adopted from 02.06.2016 No. 1402-VIII, as well as amendments to the procedural legislation, which created the legal basis for the creation of a new Supreme Court as a whole and in its composition economic court, in particular. Established on the basis of the Supreme Economic Court of Ukraine, the Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court assumed the main functions of the court of cassation of economic jurisdiction and organizationally took the place of the structural unit of the Supreme Court, which operates within the unified system of interaction between the courts of cassation and the Supreme Court. As the cassation instance in the field of economic justice in accordance with the Law of Ukraine " On Judicial System and Status of Judges " of 02.06.2016 No. 1402-VIII has changed, in particular, it is currently acting in the form of the Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court, so the author has a need more detailed study of their functions, which is the purpose of the article. The author has made a thorough analysis of scientific approaches to understanding the essence of the concept of "function". In addition, the article deals with the classifications of the functions of the cassation instance ..., given by domestic scientists, and on their basis proposed its own classification of the functions of the Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court. In particular, the author substantiates the concept of dividing the functions of the Court of Cassation within the Supreme Court into two groups: main and derivative. The main function of the Court of Cassation in the Supreme Court, according to the author, is the function of justice, which is manifested through the functions of cassation and appeal review cases. In its turn, the author of the article refers to the following functions: 1) supervision of the activity of lower courts and control over the observance of the rules of law; 2) ensuring the unity of case law; 3) interpretation function; 4) explanatory function; 5) analysis and synthesis of case law. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of theoretical developments in national science and a practical approach to the definition of functions, the author concluded that all functions of the Court of Cassation are closely related to each other, and they are inherently complex in the administration of justice.
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Waluyo, Bernadette M. "ASAS TERBUKA UNTUK UMUM DAN KEHADIRAN FISIK PARA PIHAK DALAM SIDANG DI PENGADILAN NEGERI PASCA PERATURAN MAHKAMAH AGUNG NOMOR 1 TAHUN 2019." Veritas et Justitia 6, no. 1 (June 28, 2020): 237–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.25123/vej.3883.
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The Indonesian Supreme Court, in response to the information era, modernizes the civil procedural rules at the district court level. This is done by issuing Supreme Court Regulation no. 1 of 2019 re. Administration of Justice at Civil Law Courts and Electronic-Court Proceedings. Undoubtedly, modernization of existing rules on the administration of justice is much needed. On the other hand, these changes may violate a number of procedural civil law principles. The author argues, from a civil procedural law perspective, that the above Supreme Court regulation violates the basic principle of transparency of court proceedings and physical attendance at court proceedings.
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Dr. Ganesh Dubey and Dheerendra Singh. "National Judicial Commission In India: The New Challenge." Legal Research Development: An International Refereed e-Journal 1, no. I (September 30, 2016): 67–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.53724/lrd/v1n1.09.
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Art. 50 of our constitution provide - separation of powers and independent judiciary (under directive principles) and Art. 13 of the Indian constitution provide vital power to amend any new statute and empowered to Supreme Court to check the constitutional validity of particular act/statute. For much of its history the Indian judiciary has been regarded as largely fair and incorruptible. No action was taken on the bill but the system of Supreme Court appointments that it envisaged was mandated three years later by the Supreme Court itself. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association vs. Union of India (1993 (4) SCC. 441) the Court ruled that the Constitution’s provision that the President appoint Supreme Court judges in ‘‘consultation with such Judges of the Supreme Courts...as the President may deem necessary” (Article 124(2)) meant that the advice of the Supreme Court judges was binding upon the President. It also resolved that the judges involved in this ‘consultation’ would be the Chief Justice of India and the two judges next in seniority. This decision was upheld in 1998 in the Third Judges case, only slightly modified to involve the Chief Justice of India and the four judges – rather than two – next in seniority as well as all Supreme Court judges from the candidate’s High Court. The Supreme Court of India and the High Court’s set the standard for judicial conduct and competence in the country. It is vital that we create a National Judicial Commission, combining input from the elected branches of government and the judiciary, to appoint and over see the judges of the Supreme Court and High Court.
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Simanjuntak, Enrico. "KEWENANGAN HAK UJI MATERIL PADA MAHKAMAH AGUNG RI." Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan 2, no. 3 (April 23, 2018): 337. http://dx.doi.org/10.25216/jhp.2.3.2013.337-356.
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Under art 24A(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is granted the power to review legal instruments below laws (undang-undang). This means that an applicant could seek judicial review of regulations other than Acts of Parliament (Undang-Undang) with a request to strike it out because, for example, it contravenes national laws. This would provide the courts with an opportunity to review the legitimacy of the regulation and determine whether it is ultra vires, or beyond power. The Supreme Court has the power to cancel a regulation if it is found to be in conflict with a higher law. This article analyses the judicial review in the Supreme Court. It begins by highlighting the origins and formation of judicial review before the regulation promulgation of the Supreme Court (PERMA) No. 1/1993, and then examines several aspects of procedural law in the current Supreme Court Regulation in No. 1/2011. Keywords: Supreme Court, Judicial Review, Procedural Law.
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Baum, Lawrence. "Supreme Court Elections: How Much They Have Changed, Why They Changed, and What Difference It Makes." Law & Social Inquiry 42, no. 03 (2017): 900–923. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12290.
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This essay draws on four recent studies of elections to state supreme courts in the United States to probe widely perceived changes in the scale and content of electoral campaigns for seats on state supreme courts. 1 Evidence from these studies and other sources indicates that changes have indeed occurred, though they are more limited than most commentaries suggest. These changes stem most directly from trends in state supreme court policy that have attracted interest-group activity, especially from the business community. Like their extent, the effects of change in supreme court campaigns have been meaningful although exaggerated by many observers. What we have learned about changes in supreme court elections has implications for choices among selection systems, but those implications are mixed and complex.
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Ahmad, Sufmi Dasco. "PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL CASES THROUGH MEDIATION IN STATE COURTS BASED ON REGULATION OF THE SUPREME COURT NUMBER 1 OF 2016." Fox Justi : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 12, no. 1 (July 30, 2021): 93–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.58471/justi.v12i1.187.
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The process of examining civil cases (lawsuits) in District Courts, such as at the Class IA Bale Bandung District Court is carried out through several stages, namely from the administrative process, to the examination in front of the trial/trial proceedings, one of which is a peace event (mediation), which carried out at the beginning of the trial, the procedure for which is currently regulated in Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2016 concerning Mediation Procedures in Courts, which revokes and declares that Perma Number 1 of 2008, whose implementation is considered ineffective. Based on the background and problems discussed in this thesis, the objectives of this study are as follows: To find out and analyze the process of resolving civil cases through mediation at the Class IA Bale Bandung District Court based on Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2016 concerning Mediation Procedures in Court, and the prospect of settling civil cases through mediation at the Class IA Bale Bandung District Court based on Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2016 concerning Mediation Procedures in Court. This study finds answers, namely that: the process of settling civil cases through mediation at the Class IA Bale Bandung District Court based on Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2016 concerning Mediation Procedures in Courts has been carried out optimally, but the results of case settlement through mediation have not been achieved optimally and settlement of civil cases through mediation at the Class IA Bale Bandung District Court based on Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2016 concerning Mediation Procedures in Courts has good prospects, if judges, mediators, and advocates are able to motivate and encourage litigants to settle the case amicably through mediation in order to accelerate the settlement of the case. In connection with the results of the study, the authors submit the following suggestions: In order for the implementation of the settlement of civil cases through mediation in the District Court based on the Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 of 2016 concerning Mediation Procedures in Courts, the results are more optimal, one of which is the need for a mediator who has high integrity and impartiality supported by the ability to listen, ask questions, observe, interview, counsel and negotiate; and it is necessary to socialize the Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 1 of 2016 intensively to all elements of the legal profession to better understand the objectives of the PERMA.
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WERNECK ARGUELHES, DIEGO, and LEANDRO MOLHANO RIBEIRO. "‘The Court, it is I’? Individual judicial powers in the Brazilian Supreme Court and their implications for constitutional theory." Global Constitutionalism 7, no. 2 (June 11, 2018): 236–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381718000072.
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Abstract:Collective decision-making is often taken as an ‘institutional fact’ when it comes to supreme and constitutional courts. In this article, we focus on the example of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, or STF) to argue that this feature should not be assumed from the outset, as it does not necessarily hold, across countries, for all relevant powers that courts may have. As this example illustrates, the assignment to individual Justices of three distinct powers, namely agenda setting, position taking, and decision making, can have profound effects on the legislative status quo outside the court, amounting in some circumstances to a form of individual judicial review. This expanded typology of court powers both points to an underexplored spectrum for comparing different courts and makes it necessary to discuss if and how particular distributions of such powers within multi-member courts are normatively justified. In the specific case of the STF, we argue that the specific combination of individual allocations of agenda setting and decision-making powers, which gives rise in practice to the possibility of individual judicial review, cannot be reconciled with basic tenets of constitutional theory.
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Xheraj, Blerina, and Solomon Ebere. "Who Decides Arbitrability Where a Precondition to Arbitration Has Not Been Satisfied?: A Comment on the U.S. Supreme Courts Decision to Hear the Appeal in BG Group v. Argentina." Journal of International Arbitration 31, Issue 1 (February 1, 2014): 101–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/joia2014006.
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In BG Group v. Argentina, the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time in its history, has decided to hear a case involving a bilateral investment treaty. The threshold question before the Supreme Court is whether courts, rather than arbitrators, should decide arbitrability where a precondition to arbitration has not been satisfied. Both the U.S. arbitration community and the U.S. Solicitor General have weighed in on this question, submitting opposite amicus curiae briefs. While the former urged the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the challenged court decision, the latter opposed the petition. The debate and the underlying issues this case raises are not unique to the United States. Courts in Europe and investment tribunals have also had the opportunity to address similar questions and have adopted a variety of approaches, calling to mind the positions advocated by the different stakeholders before the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Dąbrowski, Marcin. "The Dispute between the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court over Interpretative Verdicts in the Republic of Poland." International and Comparative Law Review 17, no. 1 (June 1, 2017): 211–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/iclr-2018-0009.
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Summary The article is focused on a serious dispute between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal over interpretative verdicts in the Republic of Poland. This kind of decisions are issued by the Tribunal. Interpretative verdicts contain explanation (interpretation) of a statutory provision, which constitutionality is controlled by the Tribunal. The main problem is, if this kind of decisions bind other courts. Judges of the Tribunal Court claim that courts, including the Supreme Court, are suppose to obey interpretative verdicts. The judges of Supreme Court maintain that this kind of decisions only indicates one of possible interpretation of a statutory provision and courts don’t have to follow it. In the article the author describes this type of verdicts, their history and explains the essence of the dispute.
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Stehlík, Václav, and David Sehnálek. "The Use of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure by Czech Courts: Historical Retrospective and Beyond." Baltic Journal of European Studies 9, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 150–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjes-2019-0041.
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Abstract The article analyses the use of the preliminary ruling procedure by the Czech courts in the 15 years of the Czech membership in the European Union. It presents statistics of cases lodged to the EU Court of Justice and refers to the most important decisions. The article compares the practise of both lower courts as well as courts of last instance, namely the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. It also outlines the attitude of the Czech Constitutional Court towards this procedure.
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Hudon, Edward G. "Growing Pains and Other Things: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of the United States." Revue générale de droit 17, no. 4 (April 26, 2019): 753–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059229ar.
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This article is in part a book review and in part a study of two institutions. In it, the author compares the origin and growth of the Supreme Court of Canada and of the Supreme Court of the United States. He uses Professors James G. Snell and Frederick Vaughan's The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the Institution as a starting point, and he compares various aspects of the two Supreme Courts. He points out similarities in the problems that the two have confronted since the beginning, and he indicates the manner in which these problems have been resolved by each.
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Marshall, Thomas R. "What Moves the Court? Interest Groups, Public Opinion, Court Composition and the Solicitor General." American Review of Politics 23 (November 1, 2002): 245–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2002.23.0.245-260.
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The impact of several major types of interest groups, the solicitor general, Court composition, and American public opinion on U.S. Supreme Court decision-making is tested with a poll-matched database from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. Results indicate that the solicitor general’s position, American public opinion, Court composition, and a few (but not most) interest groups all significantly and independently affect Supreme Court decision-making.
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WALDREP, CHRISTOPHER. "Review: The Supreme Court." Public Historian 30, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 153–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/tph.2008.30.1.153.
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Frey, John J. "The Court rules Supreme." British Journal of General Practice 62, no. 603 (October 2012): 548–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3399/bjgp12x656964.
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Lydiatt, Kathryn. "Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt)." Arab Law Quarterly 2, no. 1 (1987): 84–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157302587x00084.
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