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1
Goldring, Edward, and Sheena Chestnut Greitens. "Rethinking Democratic Diffusion: Bringing Regime Type Back In." Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 2 (June 16, 2019): 319–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414019852701.
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Studies of democratic diffusion often emphasize geographic proximity: democratization in a country or region makes democratization nearby more likely. We argue that regime type has been underappreciated; authoritarian breakdown and democratization often diffuse along networks of similar regimes. A regime’s type affects its vulnerability to popular challenge, and regime similarity increases the likelihood that protest strategies developed against one regime are effective against similar regimes. We employ a qualitative case study from China to generate our theory, then test it quantitatively and with out-of-sample cases. We find that regime similarity strongly predicts autocratic breakdown and democratic diffusion, making both outcomes more likely. Including regime similarity significantly reduces the effect of geographic proximity, although geographic proximity may increase the effect of regime similarity. Reinterpreting democratic diffusion as a regime-type phenomenon calls for revision to conventional wisdom on the role of international factors in authoritarian breakdown and democratization.
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Maerz, Seraphine F. "The Many Faces of Authoritarian Persistence: A Set-Theory Perspective on the Survival Strategies of Authoritarian Regimes." Government and Opposition 55, no. 1 (August 2, 2018): 64–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.17.
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AbstractThis article examines how authoritarian regimes combine various strategies of repression, co-optation and legitimation to remain in power. The contribution of the article is two-fold. First, I conceptualize the hexagon of authoritarian persistence as a framework to explain how authoritarian regimes manage to survive. The hexagon is based on Gerschewski’s (2013) three pillars of stability but proposes some crucial modifications. In contrast to the model of the three pillars, the hexagon can grasp the causal complexity of autocratic survival because it is rooted in set theory and accounts for asymmetric causal relations, conjunctural causation and equifinality. Based on this, it illuminates how authoritarian regimes use multiple, mutually non-exclusive survival strategies. The second contribution is an empirical exploration which applies the hexagon and provides a case-oriented analysis of 62 persistent and non-persistent authoritarian regimes (1991–2010). By using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, the findings of this assessment illustrate five configurations of the hexagon – called hegemonic, performance-dependent, rigid, overcompensating and adaptive authoritarianism – as those combinations of strategies which facilitate authoritarian survival.
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Lachapelle, Jean, Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, and Adam E. Casey. "Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability." World Politics 72, no. 4 (September 3, 2020): 557–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887120000106.
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ABSTRACTThis article explores the causes of authoritarian durability. Why do some authoritarian regimes survive for decades, often despite severe crises, while others collapse quickly, even absent significant challenges? Based on an analysis of all authoritarian regimes between 1900 and 2015, the authors argue that regimes founded in violent social revolution are especially durable. Revolutionary regimes, such as those in Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam, endured for more than half a century in the face of strong external pressure, poor economic performance, and large-scale policy failures. The authors develop and test a theory that accounts for such durability using a novel data set of revolutionary regimes since 1900. The authors contend that autocracies that emerge out of violent social revolution tend to confront extraordinary military threats, which lead to the development of cohesive ruling parties and powerful and loyal security apparatuses, as well as to the destruction of alternative power centers. These characteristics account for revolutionary regimes’ unusual longevity.
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Alexander, Marcus. "Democratization and Hybrid Regimes." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 22, no. 4 (September 8, 2008): 928–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325408327634.
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Despite the central place of democratization studies in comparative politics, scholars still lack both theory and empirical evidence to understand institutional change in hybrid regimes (characterized by a collapse of one authoritarian regime and failure to transition to a consolidated democracy). This article makes a contribution to the emerging study of hybrid regimes by developing a middle-range theory for a medium- N set of previously neglected cases in Southeast Europe. It theorizes institutional change as a process initiated by the elites in power but then either accelerated or hampered by structural factors. After decomposing the effects of state capacity, opposition, and international influence in this dynamic and focusing on the process rather than the outcome, it is possible to refine the standard assumptions of democratization paradigm. The study finds that a strong state, a united opposition, and Western assistance can help authoritarian-leaning governments consolidate their coercive power.
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Kosterina, Svetlana. "Ambition, personalist regimes, and control of authoritarian leaders." Journal of Theoretical Politics 29, no. 2 (June 23, 2016): 167–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629816630434.
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Why do elites in some authoritarian regimes but not others remove from power the leaders who harm their interests? We develop a formal theory explaining this. The theory shows how elites’ ambition prevents them from controlling authoritarian leaders. Because ambitious elites are willing to stage coups to acquire power even when the leader is good, ambition renders elites’ claims that the leader’s actions harm them less credible, making the other elites less likely to support coups. We show that the impact of the proportion of competent politicians on personalist regimes is non-monotonic: personalist regimes are most likely to emerge not only when there are few competent politicians but also when there are lots of them. We also provide insight into which elites become coup-plotters. The theory explains the emergence of personalist regimes, the frequency of coups, and why some authoritarian countries enjoy a more competent leadership than others.
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Riedl, Rachel Beatty, Dan Slater, Joseph Wong, and Daniel Ziblatt. "Authoritarian-Led Democratization." Annual Review of Political Science 23, no. 1 (May 11, 2020): 315–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052318-025732.
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Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little risk. In some cases, the risk of democratization to authoritarian incumbents is so low that ending authoritarianism might not mean exiting power at all. This article develops a unified theory of authoritarian-led democratization under conditions of relatively low incumbent risk. We argue that the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is the most pivotal factor in authoritarian-led democratization. When incumbent party strength has been substantial enough to give incumbent authoritarian politicians significant electoral victory confidence, nondemocratic regimes have pursued reversible democratic experiments that eventually culminated in stable, thriving democracies. Evidence from Europe's first wave of democratization and more recent democratic transitions in Taiwan and Ghana illustrate how party strength has underpinned authoritarian-led democratization across the world and across modern history.
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Kadivar, Mohammad Ali. "PREELECTION MOBILIZATION AND ELECTORAL OUTCOME IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES*." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 22, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 293–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/1086-671x-22-3-293.
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Does preelection protest have an effect on the outcomes of authoritarian elections? Electoral authoritarian regimes use elections to consolidate their power and claim democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, on some occasions authoritarian incumbents lose elections despite their advantages, and a democratic breakthrough is achieved. I propose that preelection protests contribute to such election results. Existing scholarship focuses primarily on the effectiveness of postelection upheavals, and the effects of preelection protest are still theoretically and empirically understudied. This article proposes a theory for why preelection contention has an independent effect on incumbent defeat of authoritarian regimes and democratization. I present empirical support for the association between preelection protest activities, incumbent defeat, and democratization using data from 190 elections across 65 countries with nondemocratic regimes. The findings of this analysis have important implications for studies of social movements, authoritarian politics, and democratization.
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Munck, Gerardo L. "Democratic Theory afterTransitions from Authoritarian Rule." Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 2 (June 2011): 333–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592711000600.
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Recent events across the globe make clear the complexities of the politics of “democratization” and the importance of developing nuanced and compelling understandings of these complexities. In Eurasia, “Color Revolutions” have given way to democratic disappointments and “authoritarian regimes.” In north Africa, an unanticipated upsurge of democratic movements has felled autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt, but the political outcomes of these “transitions” are very much in doubt. Contemporary political science has developed an elaborate vocabulary for understanding such processes. And this vocabulary owes a great deal to a small group of scholars—Juan Linz, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Alfred Stepan and Adam Przeworksi—who helped to lay the theoretical foundations of our current understanding of politics around the globe.
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Chen, Jidong, and Yiqing Xu. "Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian Regimes." Political Science Research and Methods 5, no. 1 (June 23, 2015): 163–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.21.
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We develop a theory of how an authoritarian regime interactively uses information manipulation, such as propaganda or censorship, and policy improvement to maintain social stability. The government can depict the status quo policy more popularly supported than it actually is, while at the same time please citizens directly by enacting a costly reform. We show that the government’s ability of making policy concessions reduces its incentive to manipulate information and improves its credibility. Anticipating a higher chance of policy concessions and less information manipulation, citizens are more likely to believe the government-provided information and support the regime. Our model provides an explanation for the puzzling fact that reform coexists with selective information disclosure in authoritarian countries like China.
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Laruelle, Marlene. "Urban Regimes in Russia’s Northern Cities: Testing a Concept in a New Environment." ARCTIC 73, no. 1 (March 18, 2020): 53–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.14430/arctic69933.
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At a time when urbanization represents a major trend in human history and when the majority of the world’s population lives in an urban environment, the urban regime theory, developed by Clarence Stone in the 1980s, offers an insightful framework for discussing how urban stakeholders are compelled to work together to achieve their goals. While research on urban regimes has historically focused mainly on democratic contexts, this article argues that it is time to use urban regime theory in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries in order to better understand how urban politics develop. With growing urban activism and huge territorial contrasts, Russia offers a good case study for testing the notion of “urban regime.” This article focuses on three cities in Russia’s Far North—Murmansk, Norilsk, and Yakutsk—that face common sustainability challenges in Arctic or subarctic conditions; it delves into the mechanisms of their urban regimes and categorizes them by type: instrumental, organic, and symbolic.
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Donno, Daniela, and Anne-Kathrin Kreft. "Authoritarian Institutions and Women’s Rights." Comparative Political Studies 52, no. 5 (September 10, 2018): 720–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414018797954.
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While dictatorships perform worse than democracies in respect for most human rights, a large number of autocracies have prioritized the advancement of women’s rights. We present a theory of authoritarian rights provision that focuses on the incentives for dictatorships to secure women’s loyalty, and we identify the particular capacity of institutionalized party-based regimes to supply—and capitalize from—women’s rights policies. Analyzing a comprehensive sample of authoritarian regimes from 1963 to 2009, we find that party-based regimes are associated with greater economic and political rights for women irrespective of whether they hold multiparty elections. A comparative exploration of authoritarian Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya sheds further light on these findings and examines alternative explanations. Our account of women’s rights as a tool of autocratic party coalition-building contrasts with the provision of civil and associational rights—so-called “coordination goods”—which represents a concession to the opposition and tends to accompany liberalization.
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REUTER, ORA JOHN, and DAVID SZAKONYI. "Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia." American Political Science Review 113, no. 2 (March 6, 2019): 552–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000030.
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Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime’s willingness to provide spoils. Regimes that share power with the opposition, limit access to spoils, and lack formal institutions see more defections. Co-opting the opposition assuages outside threats but leaves regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defection. Those with personal followings and business connections are the most likely to defect, since they can pursue their political goals independently of the regime. Taken together, our results highlight important tradeoffs among authoritarian survival strategies. Many of the steps autocrats take to repel challenges simultaneously heighten the risk of defections.
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Semenov, Andrey. "MASS MOBILIZATION AND AUTOCRATIC CONCESSIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY." Вестник Пермского университета. Политология 14, no. 4 (2020): 98–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2020-4-98-106.
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Why are some authoritarian regimes more inclined to make concessions to mass movements than others? In this article, based on the institutional theory of autocracies, I posit that institutionalized regimes should be more prone to concessions than regimes without parties and elected parliaments. This expectation is due to the capacity of the institutions to provide an opportunity for negotiation and representation of interests of mass movements, thus I expect the dictators in such regimes to bow more frequently to the demands of mass movements. Using the NAVCO database, the Barbara Geddes typology, and indicators of the institutionalization of autocracies, I test hypotheses about the relationship between institutions and concessions on a global sample of authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010. The results of statistical modeling do not confirm the hypotheses and, if anything, demonstrate that there are no serious differences between the types of authoritarian regimes regarding compliance with the demands of mass movements; moreover, the institutionalized autocracies are somewhat less inclined to satisfy the demand than dictatorships without elected parliaments and independent opposition parties. This empirical pattern points to a number of interesting questions for subsequent research on the links between institutions and the dynamics of mobilization in authoritarian regimes.
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Rodan, Garry. "New Modes of Political Participation and Singapore's Nominated Members of Parliament." Government and Opposition 44, no. 4 (2009): 438–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.01297.x.
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AbstractDespite growing recognition that authoritarianism can be far more durable than transition theorists previously expected, transition theory assumptions continue to constrain attempts to understand authoritarian regimes. In particular, alternative avenues of political participation to opposition political parties and electoral contests are under examined. Singapore's authoritarian regime involves a range of such innovative institutional and ideological initiatives, one of the most significant being the Nominated Members of Parliament scheme. This promotes notions of representation different from democratic parliamentary representation that are not without appeal to targeted, emerging social forces. Singapore's political economy dynamics contribute to this responsiveness by obstructing independent power bases.
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Wong, Mathew Y. H. "Selectorate Theory in Hybrid Regimes: Comparing Hong Kong and Singapore." Government and Opposition 53, no. 4 (April 6, 2017): 707–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2017.10.
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This article investigates public and private goods provision in two hybrid regimes: Hong Kong and Singapore. We build on the selectorate theory, which analyses all regimes in terms of the size of their leaders’ support coalitions. This research follows a differences-in-differences design, with the exogenous political change in Hong Kong in 1997 as a treatment and Singapore as a control case. This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as the aim of the selectorate theory is to transcend traditional regime typologies, a focus on hybrid regimes provides another test of the theory beyond the democratic–authoritarian divide. Second, the distinctive comparative set-up allows us to disentangle the effects of the size of the winning coalition from those of supporter loyalty. The empirical results demonstrate that whilst public goods increase with the winning coalition size, private goods provision is not affected unless accompanied by a change in supporter loyalty.
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MALESKY, EDMUND, and PAUL SCHULER. "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 482–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000250.
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Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the prime minister and Cabinet members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in nondemocratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with cooptation theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.
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Peou, Sorpong. "The Limits and Potential of Liberal Democratisation in Southeast Asia." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33, no. 3 (December 2014): 19–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341403300302.
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This article argues that Southeast Asia is a region where uneven political development presents a theoretical challenge to the study of regime change and continuity in the academic field of comparative politics. Of the 11 political regimes, only Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Indonesia can now be considered liberally democratic. However, these democracies are far from consolidated. The other eight regimes range from soft dictatorships to electoral authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies. This article seeks to explain why no single theory adequately explains regime change and continuity in this region. Impediments to democratisation are many – one of which is the fact that traditional and undemocratic institutions remain strong and that transitions to civilian rule remain vulnerable to other powerful state institutions, most notably the armed forces.
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Houle, Christian, Mark A. Kayser, and Jun Xiang. "Diffusion or Confusion? Clustered Shocks and the Conditional Diffusion of Democracy." International Organization 70, no. 4 (2016): 687–726. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002081831600028x.
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AbstractScholars, observing clustering in transitions to democracy, argue that democratization diffuses across borders as citizens in autocracies demand the same reforms they witness in neighboring states. We disagree. This article demonstrates that diffusion plays only a highly conditional role in democratization. We advance and test an alternative two-step theory of clustered democratization: (1) economic and international political shocks, which are clustered spatially and temporally, induce the breakdown of authoritarian regimes; then (2) democratic diffusion, in turn, influences whether a fallen dictatorship will be replaced by a democracy or a new autocracy. Diffusion, despite playing an important role, is insufficient to explain the clustering of transitions. Using data on 125 autocracies from 1875 to 2004, we show that economic crises trigger authoritarian breakdowns, while diffusion influences whether the new regime is democratic or authoritarian.
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Abdullah, Walid Jumblatt. "Bringing Ideology in: Differing Oppositional Challenges to Hegemony in Singapore and Malaysia." Government and Opposition 52, no. 3 (December 4, 2015): 483–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.30.
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This article explores the nature of the main opposition parties to the incumbent hegemonic regimes in Malaysia and Singapore. I argue that the differing characters of these opposition parties should be considered. In Singapore, where there is no ideological challenge to the ruling party, I contend that even if the opposition takes over it will be the end of a hegemonic party but not hegemony. In Malaysia, the opposite is true. This article contributes to the literature on transition theory in two ways: (1) it recognizes the diversity of authoritarian regimes and enhances analyses of various authoritarian regimes by focusing on one type – hegemonic parties; and (2) it brings ideology into the reckoning by focusing on the nature of the opposition parties most likely to take over.
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Olar, Roman-Gabriel. "Do they know something we don’t? Diffusion of repression in authoritarian regimes." Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 5 (March 21, 2019): 667–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343318822718.
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The use of repressive strategies by authoritarian regimes received a great deal of attention in the literature, but most explanations treat repression as the product of domestic events and factors. However, the similarity in repressive actions during the Arab Spring or the intense collaboration in dissident disappearances between the military regimes of Latin America indicate a transnational dimension of state repression and authoritarian interdependence that has gone largely understudied. The article develops a theory of diffusion of repression between autocracies between institutionally and experientially similar autocracies. It proposes that the high costs of repression and its uncertain effect on dissent determines autocracies to adjust their levels of repression based on information and knowledge obtained from their peers. Autocracies’ own experience with repression can offer suboptimal and incomplete information. Repression techniques and methods from other autocracies augment the decisionmaking regarding optimal levels of repression for political survival. Then, autocracies adjust their levels of repression based on observed levels of repression in their institutional and experiential peers. The results indicate that authoritarian regimes emulate and learn from regimes with which they share similar institutions. Surprisingly, regimes with similar dissent experience do not emulate and learn from each other. The results also indicate that regional conflict does not affect autocracies’ levels of repression.
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Slater, Dan. "Violent Origins of Authoritarian Variation: Rebellion Type and Regime Type in Cold War Southeast Asia." Government and Opposition 55, no. 1 (May 16, 2018): 21–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.4.
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AbstractDictatorships are every bit as institutionally diverse as democracies, but where does this variation come from? This article argues that different types of internal rebellion influence the emergence of different types of authoritarian regimes. The critical question is whether rebel forces primarily seek to seize state power or to escape it. Regional rebellions seeking toescapethe state raise the probability of a military-dominated authoritarian regime, since they are especially likely to unify the military while heightening friction between civilian and military elites. Leftist rebellions seeking toseizethe state are more likely to give rise to civilian-dominated dictatorships by inspiring ‘joint projects’ in which military elites willingly support party-led authoritarian rule. Historical case studies of Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam illustrate the theory, elaborating how different types of violent conflict helped produce different types of dictatorships across the breadth of mainland and island Southeast Asia during the Cold War era.
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Wojcieszak, Magdalena, Erik C. Nisbet, Lea Kremer, Golnoosh Behrouzian, and Carroll Glynn. "What Drives Media Use in Authoritarian Regimes? Extending Selective Exposure Theory to Iran." International Journal of Press/Politics 24, no. 1 (November 7, 2018): 69–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1940161218808372.
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Most work on selective exposure comes from the United States or other western democracies and typically examines partisan attitudes as the cognitive or motivational drivers of selectivity. This study extends the boundary conditions of existing literature by studying the factors affecting media choice in the Islamic Republic of Iran, a drastically understudied context. Within the overarching framework of motivated reasoning, we propose two theoretically relevant factors that should drive selective exposure into regime media or non-regime alternatives in authoritarian contexts: (1) system-justifying attitudes and (2) regime-sanctioned identities, here religiosity. Relying on two different surveys conducted within Iran in 2012 and 2016, we find that religiosity strongly predicts the reliance on non-regime media in both studies, whereas system-justifying attitudes predict selectivity in Study 2. Theoretical implications for the selectivity literature are discussed.
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Heurlin, Christopher. "Authoritarian Aid and Regime Durability: Soviet Aid to the Developing World and Donor–Recipient Institutional Complementarity and Capacity." International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 4 (September 1, 2020): 968–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa064.
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Abstract How does authoritarian aid influence the durability of dictatorships? Western aid is thought to facilitate authoritarian durability because it can provide patronage. Authoritarian aid, by contrast, has received far less attention. This article examines both Soviet economic and military assistance, developing a theory of donor–recipient institutional complementarity to explain the impact of Soviet aid during the Cold War. The argument is developed through case studies of Vietnam and Ghana and a cross-national statistical analysis of Soviet economic aid and military assistance to developing countries from 1955 to 1991. Soviet economic aid was tied to the purchase of Soviet industrial equipment. When recipient states shared the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy, economic aid strengthened state infrastructural power by (1) enhancing fiscal capacity and (2) cultivating the dependency of the population on the state. Aid flows helped consolidate and maintain authoritarian institutions, promoting authoritarian durability. By contrast, while Soviet economic aid to noncommunist regimes provided some opportunities for patronage through employment in SOEs, the lack of institutional complementarity in planning institutions and overall lack of capacity of these institutions caused Soviet aid to contribute to inflation and fiscal crises. Economic problems, in turn, increased the vulnerability of noncommunist regimes to military coups, particularly when ideological splits emerged between pro-Soviet rulers and pro-Western militaries that undermined elite cohesion. The institutional subordination of the military to communist parties insulated communist regimes from the risk of coups.
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Kisilowski, Maciej. "The Middlemen: The Legal Profession, the Rule of Law, and Authoritarian Regimes." Law & Social Inquiry 40, no. 03 (2015): 700–722. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12095.
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Scholars are increasingly interested in exploring ways to strengthen the rule of law in authoritarian states—especially when deeper political reforms are not attainable. The article contributes to this discussion by revisiting the story of the emergence of the so‐called socialist legality in the communist states of Eastern Europe. Using the historical record from Poland, the author demonstrates a previously unnoticed, yet pivotal, role of legal professionals in facilitating socialist legality's rise to prominence. Using the lenses of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of fields, the article chronicles the evolving dynamic between the legal profession, the authoritarian regime, and society. These observations challenge conventional explanations of the emergence of the rule of law in nondemocratic conditions.
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van Ham, Carolien, and Brigitte Seim. "Strong states, weak elections? How state capacity in authoritarian regimes conditions the democratizing power of elections." International Political Science Review 39, no. 1 (June 7, 2017): 49–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512117697544.
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State capacity may be a crucial factor conditioning the democratizing power of elections in authoritarian regimes. This paper develops a two-phase theory considers the different effects of state capacity on turnover in elections and democratic change after elections. In regimes with limited state capacity, manipulating elections and repressing opposition is more difficult than in regimes with extensive state capacity, rendering turnover in elections more likely in weak states. However, if the new incumbent has limited capacity to deliver public services and make policy changes after coming to power, sustainable democratic change is unlikely. Hence, state capacity is hypothesized to have a negative effect on turnover, but a positive effect on democratic change. These hypotheses are confirmed in a sample of 460 elections in 110 authoritarian regimes taking place in the period 1974 to 2012 using the Varieties of Democracy dataset. The findings suggest a need to revisit strong-state-first theories of democratization.
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Joshi, Devin K. ""Do We Have a Winner? What the China-India Paradox May Reveal about Regime Type and Human Security"." International Studies Review 10, no. 1 (October 15, 2009): 73–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01001004.
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As the concept of human security spreads in the pose-Cold War period it is often presumed that non-democracies have worse human security than democracies. But the national human security (NHS) siruation in weak or failed democracies can be even worse than in some non-democracies. So how exactly do the NHS records of stares with different regime types like non-democratic China and democratic India compare? To address this question the paper assesses and compares NHS in terms of "freedom from want" (anti-poverty security) and "freedom from fear" (anti-violence securiry). It develops a theory of how different regime types might impact NHS based on how regimes differ along the 1) democratic-authoritarian and 2) predarory-developmental dimensions. It then conducts empirical testing of the theory through a global analysis of 178 countries and case studies of contemporary China and India. The study finds that while democracies and developmental states generally have higher NHS than autocracies and predatory states, developmental authoritarian states like China on average have slightly higher human security than predatory democracies like India.
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Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. "Star Search: Do Elections Help Nondemocratic Regimes Identify New Leaders?" Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 1 (April 2013): 35–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800008523.
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A commonly proffered theory to explain the use of elections in authoritarian regimes is that they help identify talented young leaders who can be groomed for leadership positions. Unfortunately, due to the difficulties of obtaining data in authoritarian settings, this hypothesis has not been tested satisfactorily. We examine candidate-level data from the 2007 Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA) election and subsequent selection of candidates for top positions within the VNA and for top ministry positions. We find no evidence that vote share is associated with promotion to leadership positions in the VNA and only limited evidence for vote share association with ministerial posts. Instead, the results indicate that leadership selection takes place within the party rather than through elections. Furthermore, behavior within the assembly suggests that those who were chosen may have been selected based on their loyalty or at least pliancy to the party elites.
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MALESKY, EDMUND, PAUL SCHULER, and ANH TRAN. "The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly." American Political Science Review 106, no. 4 (September 21, 2012): 762–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000408.
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An influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, the incentive for improved performance is created by voters’ responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun to export transparency interventions to authoritarian regimes under the assumption that nongovernmental organizations and the media can substitute for the incentives created by voters. Such interventions, however, are at odds with an emerging literature that argues that authoritarian parliaments primarily serve the role of co-optation and limited power sharing, where complaints can be raised in a manner that does not threaten regime stability. We argue that under these conditions, transparency may have perverse effects, and we test this theory with a randomized experiment on delegate behavior in query sessions in Vietnam, a single-party authoritarian regime. We find no evidence of a direct effect of the transparency treatment on delegate performance; however, further analysis reveals that delegates subjected to high treatment intensity demonstrate robust evidence of curtailed participation and damaged reelection prospects. These results make us cautious about the export of transparency without electoral sanctioning.
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Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789–2016." Perspectives on Politics 17, no. 1 (February 13, 2019): 66–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592718002098.
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We attempt to integrate the literatures on authoritarian regime types and democratic forms of government. We propose a theoretical framework of five dimensions of executive appointment and dismissal that can be applied in both more democratic and more authoritarian regimes: the hereditary, military, ruling party, direct election, and confidence dimensions, respectively. Relying on the Varieties of Democracy data, we provide measures of these five dimensions for 3,937 individual heads of state and 2,874 heads of government from 192 countries across the globe from 1789 to the present. After presenting descriptive evidence of their prevalence, variation, and relationship to extant regime typologies, a set of exploratory probes gauge the extent to which the five dimensions can predict levels of repression, corruption, and executive survival, controlling for aspects of democracy. This leads to generation of a set of original hypotheses that we hope can serve as building blocks for explanatory theory. We conclude by discussing some limitations of these novel data.
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Arifin, Moch Zainul. "MENIM(B)ANG DISENSUS: POLITIK DAN ESTETIKA SENO GUMIRA AJI DARMA DALAM CERPEN SAKSI MATA." ATAVISME 22, no. 1 (June 26, 2019): 47–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.24257/atavisme.v22i1.525.47-60.
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This study aims to discuss Seno Gumira Ajidarma's political and aesthetic disensus efforts towards the representative regime of the Utan Kayu Community and the Soeharto ethical regime through the short story "Saksi Mata". Seno's census efforts were displayed through the short story "Saksi Mata" seen from class migration and author's ideology, socio-political conditions, and narrative aesthetics at the time so as to destabilize the police hierarchy and establishment of the regime. Departing from this, how "Saksi Mata" offers an aesthetic form through the census of political and aesthetic structures, with the migration of its authors to shake the power of both regimes. This research uses the census theory of Jacques Rancière. Data collection is done by referring and dialectically. The results showed that, first, "Saksi Mata" responded to the New Order's authoritarian political structure that mobilized censorship, confining the freedom of opinion and work. Second, Seno's aesthetic movement also undermines the conventions of ethical regimes and representative regimes. From there the census of the Seno movement with "Saksi Mata" which offered aesthetics that were not trapped in communal imagination.
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Pelke, Lars. "Economic inequality, income, and their effects on electoral and civil society participation in authoritarian regimes." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 14, no. 4 (November 19, 2020): 269–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12286-020-00463-4.
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AbstractWhat effect does economic inequality in authoritarian regimes have upon the political participation of its citizens? Do individual income and repression each have a greater effect than economic inequality? Three prominent theories, namely the Conflict, Relative Power, and Resource Theories address the inequality-participation puzzle in the context of democracies. However, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for non-democratic regimes are scarce. I argue that it is individual income and the level of repression rather than economic inequality that explain political participation in autocracies. Using three-level hierarchical models that combine micro and macro level data for 65,000 individuals covering a various set of 31 authoritarian regimes and 54 country-years, this analysis demonstrates that higher levels of economic inequality hardly suppress political participation among all citizens. However, individual income has a more powerfully effect on civil society participation, while the level of repression decreases the voting likelihood more powerful than income. These findings suggest that the Resource Theory generates the greatest empirical support for autocracies.
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Díaz-Andreu, Margarita. "Theory and ideology in archaeology: Spanish archaeology under the Franco régime." Antiquity 67, no. 254 (March 1993): 74–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003598x00045075.
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Archaeology is notoriously vulnerable to the ideological pressures of authoritarian regimes. This paper charts the political influences that shaped archaeology in Spain for some 40 years. Following the Civil War Spanish archaeologists were isolated from mainstream theoretical evolution, a situation that was exacerbated by the exile of some leading figures. The centralizing authoritarianism of the Franco régime stifled regional autonomy in administration and research, and key archaeological appointments went to committed supporters of the régime.
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Saha, Aishik. "Engels’s Theory of Social Murder and the Spectacle of Fascism: A Critical Enquiry into Digital Labour and its Alienation." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 19, no. 1 (November 27, 2020): 52–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v19i1.1214.
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In this paper, I shall attempt to respond to the charge that the digital labour theory, as developed by Christian Fuchs, doesn’t faithfully stick to the Marxist schema of the Labour Theory of Value by arguing that Marx’s critique of capitalism was based on the social and material cost of exploitation and the impact of capitalist exploitation of the working class. Engels’s analysis of The Condition of The Working Class in England links the various forms of violence faced by the working class to the bourgeois rule that props their exploitation. I shall argue, within the framework of Critical Social Media Studies, that the rapid advance of fascist and authoritarian regimes represents a similar development of violence and dispossession, with digital capitalism being a major factor catalysing the rifts within societies. It shall be further argued that much like the exploitative nature of labour degrades social linkages and creates conditions of that exaggerates social contradictions, the “labour” performed by social media users degenerates social relations and promotes a hyper-violent spectacle that aids and abets fascist and authoritarian regimes.
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Truex, Rory. "Authoritarian Gridlock? Understanding Delay in the Chinese Legislative System." Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 9 (April 26, 2018): 1455–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414018758766.
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Legislative gridlock is often viewed as a uniquely democratic phenomenon. The institutional checks and balances that produce gridlock are absent from authoritarian systems, leading many observers to romanticize “authoritarian efficiency” and policy dynamism. A unique data set from the Chinese case demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can have trouble passing laws and changing policies—48% of laws are not passed within the period specified in legislative plans, and about 12% of laws take more than 10 years to pass. This article develops a theory that relates variation in legislative outcomes to the absence of division within the ruling coalition and citizen attention shocks. Qualitative analysis of China’s Food Safety Law, coupled with shadow case studies of two other laws, illustrates the plausibility of the theoretical mechanisms. Division and public opinion play decisive roles in authoritarian legislative processes.
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Morse, Yonatan L. "The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism." World Politics 64, no. 1 (December 20, 2011): 161–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887111000281.
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In recent years scholarly attention has shifted from the study of democratization to the phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism. In these regimes, regular elections are held for national legislatures and chief executives, yet they fail to live up to democratic standards of freedom and fairness. A range of new research has investigated these regimes and especially the capacity of elections to either dislodge or reinvigorate authoritarian incumbents. This article reviews some of the current work on electoral authoritarianism and attempts to find ways to achieve synthesis and better theoretical development. It notes the need for greater conceptual consensus, attention to context, and better evaluation of what electoral competiveness means under authoritarian conditions. It argues that the next stage for research should be smaller and contextual comparison that can allow for greater attention to concepts, while allowing for strong midrange theory.
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Zhang, Changdong. "A Fiscal Sociological Theory of Authoritarian Resilience." Sociological Theory 35, no. 1 (March 2017): 39–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0735275117693038.
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The “institutional turn” of comparative authoritarianism enriches our understanding of authoritarian politics, but its lack of institutional theory, tendency to focus on epiphenomena or exogenous force, and failure to address autocrats’ dilemmas constitute weaknesses. Focusing on the taxation institution, this article builds an endogenous institutional explanation of authoritarian resilience. The author argues that while the taxation infrastructural power matters, it causes autocrats two dilemmas: the representation dilemma and the growth dilemma. Taking China as an ideal case, the author argues that two mechanisms, under-institutionalized taxation system and a half-tax state, help in resolving two dilemmas so far, but in the long term, these two mechanisms may counteract each other and weaken the authoritarian regime.
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Khoo, Boo Teik. "Political Turbulence and Stalemate in Contemporary Malaysia: Oligarchic Reconstitutions and Insecurities." TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 6, no. 2 (July 2018): 227–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/trn.2018.7.
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AbstractMalaysian politics has been turbulent over the past two decades, as seen in the damaged tradition of leadership transition, non-violent revolts against successive regimes, and unstable realignments of opposing forces. Two startling symptoms point to disorder. One is the heavy electoral losses and loss of legitimacy suffered by the post-Mahathir regimes. The other is the political re-entry of Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir Mohamad. The persisting turbulence raises certain questions. Why has the ruling party, the United Malays National Organization, been susceptible to internal fighting, being at once a source of hegemonic stability and systemic instability? Why has the apex of the United Malays National Organization repeatedly jeopardised its traditions of leadership succession? Why has one leader, Mahathir Mohamad, been involved in all the disputes? How did the crisis of the party, not just the regime, become intimately tied to economic crisis? Conventional paradigmatic explanations of Malaysian politics – inter-ethnic rivalry in a plural society, elite solidarity, and regime type (semi-democratic, hybrid, or competitive authoritarian) – are of little help even if ethnicity, elite conduct, and authoritarian rule are relevant. Instead, this essay suggests that the turbulence is part of a long trajectory of oligarchic reconstitution bound to a peculiar nexus of state, ethnicity, and class. The paper does not construct a theory of Malaysian politics. It offers a historically informed exploration of a leitmotif of an unfinished project that runs through much of the past 20 years of political conflict and struggle.
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Kenyon, Thomas, and Megumi Naoi. "Policy Uncertainty in Hybrid Regimes: Evidence From Firm-Level Surveys." Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 4 (December 3, 2009): 486–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414009355267.
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Cross-national surveys suggest that regulatory and policy uncertainty is an important constraint on investment in developing countries. Yet there has been little direct empirical investigation of the sources of this uncertainty. This article presents evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between firms’ perceptions of policy uncertainty and political regime type. Firms in hybrid regimes report higher levels of concern over policy uncertainty than those in either more authoritarian regimes or liberal established democracies. The authors argue that the explanation lies with a combination of polarized political competition and limited access to credible information and test their theory using survey data of around 10,000 firms from the World Bank—European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey from 27 postcommunist countries and five Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. Methodologically, the authors propose a means of controlling for reporting and suppression biases in these surveys when an anchoring vignette is not available.
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Gould, John A., and Yaroslav Hetman. "Market Democracy Unleashed? Business Elites and the Crisis of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine." Business and Politics 10, no. 2 (August 2008): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1236.
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This paper examines the political economy of the Orange Revolution in an effort to understand routes by which less democratic postcommunist countries might break with an illiberal status quo. The fusion of Ukraine's rent-seeking economic interests and illiberal political regime produced an unstable equilibrium that is poorly explained by two leading theoretical frameworks: ‘market reform’ and ‘political competition’ theory. Only by combining key insights from each do we get a full explanation of the pressures that generated Ukraine's challenge to illiberalism in 2004. We examine this story with a particular focus on the crisis-prone nature of ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ and the related strategic calculations of business elites.
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Wijayanto, Wijayanto. "Bourdieu and Media Theory: Explaining Media’s Changes and Continuities in The Post Authoritarian Countries." Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4, no. 2 (July 25, 2019): 274–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v4i2.19513.
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What happens to the media after the regime changes from authoritarian to the democratic system? Would the media also change accordingly and automatically become free after the regime’s change? Furthermore, what are the forces within and outside the media that influence these changes? This paper aims to review the exiting literatures in the post authoritarian Latin America and Southeast Asia to answer the questions. As a method, this study conducts a critical literature review. This study found that there is agreement among scholars that regime’s change didn’t automatically lead to more free reporting. However, debate is going on about what factors influence the degree of change or continuity with regard to media freedom in post-authoritarian settings. In this regard, scholars have been divided to a theoretical dichotomy. In one hand, there are groups of scholars who believe that political economy factors are the main factors that influence degrees of media freedom. In another hand, there are scholars who believe that cultural factors are more influential. Borrowing the theory of Pierre Bourdie, French sociologists who also concern about this issue, the paper argues that his theory on media’ change can be used as a theoretical framework to examine the media’s changes and overcome the existing theoretical dichotomies.
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Robertson, Graeme. "Political Orientation, Information and Perceptions of Election Fraud: Evidence from Russia." British Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (October 7, 2015): 589–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123415000356.
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Citizen perceptions of the extent of fraud in a given authoritarian election can differ widely. This article builds on the literature on information acquisition and processing in democracies to argue that much of this variation is due to the way in which citizens’ underlying political orientations affect both the kind of information they gather and how they process that information. These differences in information acquisition and processing have important implications for how election monitoring reports, access to the internet and other sources of information are likely to affect the stability of contemporary authoritarian regimes. The theory is tested using observational data and a survey experiment from the Russian presidential election of 2012.
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Uzair Hashmi, Muhammad. "THEOCRATIC AUTOCRACY IN PAKISTAN BETWEEN 1977 TO 1988 FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GRAMSCI'S THEORY OF CULTURAL HEGEMONY." March 2021 37, no. 01 (March 30, 2021): 26–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.51380/gujr-37-01-03.
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This paper employs the Gramsci's "Theory of Cultural Hegemony" to investigate the objectives, methodology, and outcomes of theocratic political approach opted by the autocratic regime in Pakistan between 1977 to 1988. Gramsci Cultural Hegemony theory provides parameters of analysis such as "traditional intellectuals," "manufactured consent," "civil society," "political society," "organic intellectuals," and "historic bloc," which serve as concrete foundations for data analysis through the qualitative research methodology. This paper is significant as it elucidates how "political society" (authoritarian regimes), rather than choosing coercion, exercise “soft tools” over "civil society" (religious intellectuals) to manufacture the consent of the masses. This paper is unique as it has attempted to apply the Gramsci's cultural hegemony theory in its true essence to bring to light the long-term repercussions of the hegemonic policies of Zia's rule and to answer the unanswered questions regarding the foreign and internal policy challenges in today's Pakistan.
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Dinas, Elias, and Ksenia Northmore-Ball. "The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism." Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 12 (July 7, 2019): 1957–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414019852699.
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How do the labels left and right take on meaning in new democracies? Existing explanations point to the universality of the left–right scheme or, reversely, emphasize regionally dominant social cleavages. We propose an alternative legacy-focused theory based on two observations: Dictatorships are not ideologically neutral and are negatively evaluated by most citizens and elites after democratization. These premises lead us to expect that when the authoritarian regime is associated with the left (right), the citizens of a new democracy will display an antileft (antiright) bias in their left–right self-identification. We test this hypothesis across Latin American and European new democracies. We find significant bias, which in the case of new democracies following left-wing regimes is concealed due to intercohort heterogeneity. Although older cohorts denote a positive bias, cohorts born after Stalin’s era denote negative bias against the left. Consistent with our expectations, repression exacerbates this bias whereas indoctrination mitigates it. Finally, we look at how these biases apply to party preferences. The findings have important implications for understanding authoritarian legacies and party system development in new democracies.
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Edwards, Adam, and Gordon Hughes. "Public safety regimes: Negotiated orders and political analysis in criminology." Criminology & Criminal Justice 12, no. 4 (January 27, 2012): 433–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748895811431850.
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Implicit in the concept of negotiated orders is an understanding of the social productivity of political power; the power to accomplish governing programmes for citizens as much as the power over citizens for the purposes of social control. This distinction is especially pertinent for the role of political analysis in critical criminological thought, where criticism of the authoritarian state has vied with studies of governmentality and governance to explain the exercise of political power beyond the State and with the distinction between politics and administration found in liberal criminology. Outside of criminology, political economists interested in the ‘power to’ govern suggest its analysis in terms of ‘regimes’ of advocacy coalitions that struggle for the capacity to govern complex problems and populations in specific social contexts. Regime formation or failure can differ in character, and in outcomes, as much within nation states as between them and in relation to different kinds of governing problems. The article considers the applicability of regime theory to the negotiation of ‘public safety’, a governing problem which is a particular focus for political analysis within criminology.
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Topak, Özgün E. "The authoritarian surveillant assemblage: Authoritarian state surveillance in Turkey." Security Dialogue 50, no. 5 (June 26, 2019): 454–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010619850336.
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This article examines Turkey’s authoritarian state surveillance regime by developing the concept of the authoritarian surveillant assemblage (ASA), building on and expanding the concept of the surveillant assemblage (SA). Turkey’s ASA is the outcome of diverse surveillance systems, which continuously expand their reach, form new connections and incorporate new actors. These systems include a protest and dissent surveillance system, an internet surveillance system, a synoptic media surveillance system and an informant–collaborator surveillance system. Turkey’s ASA is controlled by the Turkish state and serves its repressive interests. Although pivotal in emphasizing the complexity of surveillance connections and increasing diversification of and collaboration among surveillance actors, the SA model of surveillance puts the main emphasis on decentralized, uncoordinated and multifaceted forms of surveillance, and does not offer sufficient analytical space to understand how an authoritarian state could coordinate diverse surveillance systems and use it for the overarching purpose of control. The article draws on Michael Mann’s theory of state power and the authoritarian state to address these limitations of the SA and conceptualize the ASA. It shows how the diverse systems of Turkey’s ASA work in concert with one another under the hierarchical command of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) to control the population and suppress dissent.
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Agafonov, Y. "European Neighbourhood Policy’s Impact on Political Regimes of Eastern Partnership Countries." World Economy and International Relations, no. 10 (2015): 40–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-10-40-49.
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The study deals with the impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on political regimes dynamics in Eastern Partnership countries in the period 2007 to 2013. Based on the regime transition theory, Europeanisation perspective and political economy, the research claims to introduce a new theoretical model which allows to combine domestic and international factors of regime dynamics. By using the rational choice institutionalism as an analytical framework, and employing the multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA) in combination with case studies of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine it shows that the ENP could lead to three different outcomes: democratization, stabilization of a hybrid regime, and authoritarian consolidation. The outcomes are explained by the fact that the assistance within the ENP is used by ruling elites for implementation of two conflicting strategies: the strategy of partial political reform equilibrium preservation and the strategy of new political reform equilibrium formation. Variation in the ENP's influence on the dynamics of a particular political regime is dependent on the predominance of one of these strategies, which in turn are mediated by three main domestic factors: the type of political system, the level of political monopolism, and the degree of government effectiveness. The article contains three parts. The first part presents a brief review of the main theoretical approaches to the analysis of political regimes dynamics. A general analytical framework is formulated. The second part shows how the ENP influenced the dynamics of political regimes in Eastern Partnership countries. The third and final part demonstrates the logic of such influence by examples of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
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Xu, Jian. "The Role of Corporate Political Connections in Commercial Lawsuits: Evidence From Chinese Courts." Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 14 (May 5, 2020): 2321–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414020919962.
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Like courts in democratic regimes, courts under authoritarianism play an important role in the regulation of complex economies. In particular, scholars suggest that authoritarian judiciaries are commonly encouraged to provide independent adjudication in the context of economic disputes between firms. Yet because regime insiders are often connected to firms, judges have strong incentives to consider the political implications of their decisions even in areas of the law where they are allegedly more independent. In this article, I propose a new theory about the role of corporations’ political background in commercial lawsuits. Using a data set on the litigation outcomes of firms in China, I find that the composition of a firm’s board membership is a significant predictor of its lawsuit outcomes. A higher percentage of corporate board members with political connections leads to a higher probability of lawsuit success. The results point to the limitations of the selective judicial independence theory.
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Hakim, Herdiana. "‘Unsilencing’ Chinese Indonesians through Children's Literature." International Research in Children's Literature 13, Supplement (July 2020): 141–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/ircl.2020.0343.
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This study investigates children's books published after the collapse in 1998 of an authoritarian regime in Indonesia that spanned more than three decades. During these years, Indonesians with Chinese ancestry were silenced from expressing their culture, tradition, and language in public. A dichotomy between Chinese Indonesians and the ‘indigenous’ Indonesians was also employed as a political strategy that resulted in negative stereotypes of the ethnic group that persist long after the regime's demise. As the current post-authoritarian government attempts to reinstate Chinese Indonesians’ rights in observing their culture, children's literature in the country is also embracing this ethnic group. This article employs a critical multicultural reading to examine the representation of Chinese Indonesians across a range of picturebooks and middle-grade novels.
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Grančayová, Michaela. "Plagues of Egypt – the COVID-19 crisis and the role of securitization dilemmas in the authoritarian regime survival strategies in Egypt and Turkey." Mezinárodní vztahy 56, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): 69–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.32422/mv-cjir.1766.
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The research looks into the authoritarian regime survival strategies in Egypt and Turkey during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, it examines how the autocratic rulers in both countries dealt with the securitization dilemma caused by the coronavirus outbreak. It applies securitization theory and the concept of selective securitization to argue that although both Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule were at some point expected to be shaken by the pandemic, the COVID-19 securitization dilemmas had an important role in helping to prolong the autocratic directions of their respective countries. Additionally, the article demonstrates that the securitization of the COVID-19 pandemic in Egypt and Turkey follows a certain political pattern where every crisis constitutes an opportunity for expanding the regimes’ powers at the expense of citizens’ rights.
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Viatkin, Ilia, and Kristina Komarova. "A Loosening Grip: Why Do Autocracies Engage in the Neoliberalization of Their Welfare Sectors?" Journal of Economic Sociology 22, no. 1 (2021): 140–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1726-3247-2021-1-140-164.
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Despite the wealth of studies on neoliberalism, research on why authoritarian states engage in processes of neoliberalization remains scarce. Therefore, our article seeks to explore why autocracies use neoliberal power practices, which, as suggested by Foucauldian governmentality approach to neoliberalism, are understood as governance techniques aimed primarily at disciplining and controlling populations through promoting the free market as a key form of societal organization. Empirically, these power practices can manifest in a state’s withdrawal from the provision of welfare services. However, scholars have argued that control over the public sector is essential to the maintenance of authoritarian regimes, and hence, governments must have compelling reasons to opt for its neoliberalization. In this study, we employ three mutually nonexclusive theoretical perspectives that suggest incentives that may motivate autocrats to retreat from the welfare sector; these are the authoritarian legitimation, authoritarian modernization, and political economy perspectives. By means of a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we tested the foregoing theories on a sample of 42 autocracies active during 1980–2005. The results revealed that authoritarian modernization theory has the highest explanatory capacity, as it identifies two distinct pathways to public sector neoliberalization—internal and external policy considerations or one of the two—while the political economy perspective was an important theoretical concern in several cases. Overall, our paper contributes to research on the governmentality approach to neoliberalism and serves as a departure point for further investigations into neoliberal authoritarianism.