Journal articles: 'The WTO'

1

Read, Stuart. "Like WTO, Why not WCO?" Journal of Universal Language 2, no. 1 (March 31, 2001): 61–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.22425/jul.2001.2.1.61.

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2

Ranga, Mamta, and Deepti Sharma. "WTO and Indian Agriculture." Indian Journal of Applied Research 4, no. 6 (October 1, 2011): 80–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/june2014/24.

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Daku, Mark, and Krzysztof J. Pelc. "Who Holds Influence over WTO Jurisprudence?" Journal of International Economic Law 20, no. 2 (May 31, 2017): 233–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgx017.

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4

Marceau, Gabrielle. "News from Geneva on RTAs and WTO-Plus, WTO-more, and WTO-Minus." Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 103 (2009): 124–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0272503700033887.

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5

Foltea, Marina. "The WTO-WCO: A Model of Judicial Institutional Cooperation?" Journal of World Trade 46, Issue 4 (August 1, 2012): 815–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2012025.

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The examination of the relationship of WTO and other international organizations (IOs) has been mostly seen through prism of fragmentation of international law and institutions. This is fully understandable given that different IOs have received uneven treatment at the WTO, including in dispute settlement. This is a sign of an inconsistent and fragmented landscape of international legal order with different IOs playing differently defined roles, even within the narrow field of WTO dispute settlement. While many remedies have been offered to cure the problem, this article examines institutional fragmentation by using the example of interaction between the WTO and WCO. While the cooperation between the WTO and WCO has been quite prolific, the central question addressed in this article is to what extent this cooperation model can serve as reference for the WTO judiciary in shaping its interactions with other IOs and what would be the factors for such assessment.

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Prakash, Siddhartha. "Wto Rules." Journal of World Intellectual Property 3, no. 1 (November 1, 2005): 155–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2000.tb00121.x.

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7

Boisson de Chazournes, Laurence. "WTO and Non-Trade Issues: Inside/Outside WTO." Journal of International Economic Law 19, no. 2 (April 20, 2016): 379–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgw029.

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8

PETERSMANN, ERNST-ULRICH. "How Should WTO Members React to Their WTO Crises?" World Trade Review 18, no. 3 (May 24, 2019): 503–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745619000144.

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AbstractSince 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members have been violating their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU). Article 17 defines the AB as being ‘composed of seven persons’, with vacancies being ‘filled as they arise’. Sections 2 and 3 explain why none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates – on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates – can justify the illegal disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX WTO – if necessary, based on ‘a majority of the votes cast’ – to complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Sections 4 and 5 explain why the competition, social policy, and rule-of-law principles underlying European ‘ordo-liberalism’ offer coherent strategies for overcoming the WTO governance crises by limiting hegemonic abuses of both US neo-liberalism and Chinese state-capitalism.

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Ewing-Chow, M., A. W. S. Goh, and A. K. Patil. "Are Asian WTO Members Using the WTO DSU 'Effectively'?" Journal of International Economic Law 16, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 669–705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgt023.

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10

Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. "Towards Democratic Globalization: To WTO or not to WTO?" Development and Change 35, no. 5 (November 2004): 1057–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00393.x.

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11

Swaak-Goldman, Olivia Q. "Who Defines Members' Security Interest in the WTO?" Leiden Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (June 1996): 361–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156596000246.

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The European Community (EC) has recently announced its decision to begin dispute-resolution procedures in the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the United States (US) because of the latter's passage of the so-called ‘Helms-Burton’ law, which tightens the sanctions against Cuba by means of extraterritorial application. This will, in all probability, offer the WTO an ideal opportunity to define the limits of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT) security exception. The security exception, contained in GATT Article XXI, is also included in other agreements annexed to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). It provides an exception from all GATT (as well as GATS and TRIPs) obligations, including the all-important ‘most-favoured-nation’ non-discrimination rule. The security interests at issue must be those of a political, rather than an economic, nature. It should be noted that because there is no human rights and democracy exception to the GATT or other agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, trade restrictions that are based either in whole or in part on these concerns, such as the measures against Cuba, are usually justified on the basis of the security exception.

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12

Paci, Enzo. "WTO’s activities in the field of tourism statistics." Tourism and hospitality management 4, no. 1 (July 1998): 3–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.20867/thm.4.1.1.

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The activities of WTO are focused on promoting a creative approach by National Tourism Administrations, Statistical Offices and local authorities to encourage countries to collect more reliable and more complete tourism statistics in line with WTO definitions, so as to improve their international comparability. WTO also emphasizes the need to speed up the production and publication of these statistics at country level in order to provide the means of identifying tourism trends by month and fine-tuning promotion and marketing policies. Computerization and the successful effort to develop standard definitions and classifications for tourism have given renewed force to WTO’s work in statistics. WTO has expanded activities with Member States to implement the WTO Recommendations on Tourism Statistics, adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission in 1993, through manuals, seminars and an ambitious statistical development programme to assess the economic importance of tourism. The programme includes the holding of a World Conference on the measurement of the economic impact of tourism in Nice (France) towards the end of May/beginning of June 1999. The objective of the Conference is to develop a core of indicators for the assessment of the net economic impact of tourism at both national and international level, thereby enhancing the credibility of the tourism industry.

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13

Paci, Enzo. "WTO’s activities in the field of tourism statistics." Tourism and hospitality management 4, no. 2 (December 1998): 311–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.20867/thm.4.2.6.

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The activities of WTO are focused on promoting a creative approach by National Tourism Administrations, Statistical Offices and local authorities to encourage countries to collect more reliable and more complete tourism statistics in line with WTO definitions, so as to improve their international comparability. WTO also emphasizes the need to speed up the production and publication of these statistics at country level in order to provide the means of identifying tourism trends by month and fine-tuning promotion and marketing policies. Computerization and the successful effort to develop standard definitions and classifications for tourism have given renewed force to WTO's work in statistics. WTO has expanded activities with Member States to implement the WTO Recommendations on Tourism Statistics, adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission in 1993, through manuals, seminars and an ambitious statistical development programme to assess the economic importance of tourism. The programme includes the holding of a World Conference on the measurement of the economic impact o tourism in Nice (France) towards the end of May/beginning of June 1999. The objective of the Conference is to develop a core of indicators for the assessment of the net economic impact of tourism at both national and international level, thereby enhancing the credibility of the tourism industry.

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14

Kwon, Young-min. "WTO Dispute Settlements and the U. S. Trade Policy." Journal of Korea Research Association of International Commerce 20, no. 1 (February 29, 2020): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.29331/jkraic.2020.02.20.1.1.

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15

Pelzman, Joseph, and Amir Shoham. "WTO Enforcement Issues." Global Economy Journal 7, no. 1 (January 2007): 1850105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1245.

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In theory, the WTO dispute settlement system is expected, via an elaborate system of sequential legal maneuvers to ensure the implementation of the dispute settlement body (DSB) recommendations. In reality when trade issues rise above some critical threshold to a respondent, the theory behind the DSU enforcement breaks down and the well meaning legal system only leads to prolonging the dispute rather than resolving it. Since 1995, more than 300 complaints have been filed through the WTO dispute settlement system. In most cases, the parties reach a mutually satisfactory solution in accordance with the WTO Agreements through consultations without having recourse to the panel and Appellate Body review. When the consultation process fails the resulting process of Panel reports and Appellate Body reports result in a removal or modification of the violating measures. In those cases where there is no removal or modification of the violating measures, the period of non-compliance tends to be very long and leads to core questions about the true intent of the DSU. In particular, was the DSU designed to ensure a legal process for the settlement of a dispute and to recommend a remedy to the offending violation but was not designed to secure compliance. The intent of this paper is to show that this is indeed the case. Moreover, if one treats the WTO as a contract, then the non-compliance issue may be viewed as an `efficient breach' and the only efficient remedy is a `fine' rather than the usual practice of suspension of concessions or other obligations to the offending Member. Under our suggested enforcement rules, it may be possible for a Member to continue to breach her obligation to the WTO contract while simultaneously compensating for damages created by the offending measure. The end result will be more efficient than the current system of diplomatic maneuvering designed to pressure the Member to remove or modify the offending measure.

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16

Häuser, Dipl Vw Wolfgang. "20 Jahre WTO." WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 44, no. 1 (2015): 40–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.15358/0340-1650_2015_1_40.

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17

Pitschas, Christian. "WTO und Telekommunikation." Archiv des Völkerrechts 47, no. 3 (2009): 418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/000389209789566549.

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18

Arndt, S. W. "Challenging the WTO." North American Journal of Economics and Finance 12, no. 2 (July 2001): 157–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1062-9408(01)00049-3.

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19

Jafari, Jafar, and Scott Wayne. "WTO general assembly." Annals of Tourism Research 19, no. 3 (January 1992): 579–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0160-7383(92)90145-f.

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20

Gillham, P. F. "WTO History Project." Journal of American History 100, no. 2 (August 13, 2013): 615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jat339.

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21

Orozco, Claudia. "The Wto Solution." Journal of World Intellectual Property 4, no. 2 (November 1, 2005): 245–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2001.tb00087.x.

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22

Ghosh, Arun. "Globalization and WTO." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 3-4 (July 1998): 9–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492849805400301.

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23

Chawla, R. L. "India and WTO." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 3-4 (July 2003): 256–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492840305900312.

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24

Hübner, Jörg. "Quo vadis, WTO?" Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik 47, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 105–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.14315/zee-2003-0115.

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Abstract In the wake of massive structural changes within the world trade the WTO faces important challenges. Like an invisible world govemment the WTO uses its agreement as a sort of basic law. This basic law demands equal chances for every human being in the world. Therefore it is important to strengthen the WTO in order to pave the way for fair conditions within the world trade. This essay asks which circumstances are necessary to achieve this goal.

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25

Langhammer, Rolf J., and Matthias Lücke. "WTO Accession Issues." World Economy 22, no. 6 (August 1999): 837–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9701.00235.

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26

Kreß, Angelika, Ortwin Renn, Heinz Hauser, Meinhard Hilf, Sebastian Puth, Júlio Duarte Neto, Peter Bartelmus, Hartmut Stiller, and Friederike Hesse. "Stichwort 14: WTO." GAIA - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society 9, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 215–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.14512/gaia.9.3.11.

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27

Koopmann, Georg. "Zehn Jahre WTO." Wirtschaftsdienst 85, no. 1 (January 2005): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10273-005-0326-6.

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28

Yu, Minyou. "WTO disputes settlement." Frontiers of Law in China 4, no. 4 (November 11, 2009): 601–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11463-009-0031-2.

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29

Kuenzel, David J. "WTO dispute determinants." European Economic Review 91 (January 2017): 157–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.09.010.

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30

Wayne, Scott, and Jafar Jafari. "WTO general assembly." Annals of Tourism Research 23, no. 4 (October 1996): 962–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0160-7383(96)89749-0.

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31

Jensen, Jens-Jørgen. "Rusland og WTO." Nordisk Østforum 17, no. 03 (August 17, 2003): 311–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.18261/issn1891-1773-2003-03-02.

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32

Davis, Christina L., and Yuki Shirato. "Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan's Selection of WTO Disputes." World Politics 59, no. 2 (January 2007): 274–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0021.

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What explains the selection of cases for WTO adjudication? This article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the WTO adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions. It explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment. While WTO adjudication is seen as costly and slow, a positive ruling brings broad benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination. Firms in static industries will invest in WTO dispute settlement to achieve these benefits, but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication. This argument accounts for why there are fewer WTO cases about electronics industry issues than there are likely incidences of protectionist measures. Since Japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential WTO disputes, it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth. Interviews with Japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument. The authors conclude that the passive attitude toward WTO adjudication by Japan's largest export industry, electronics, and the sensitivity of Japan's diplomatic relations with China have constrained the cases that Japan files. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of the WTO for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members.

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33

Stevenson, Cliff. "Are WTO Members Correctly Applying WTO Rules in Safeguard Determinations?" Journal of World Trade 38, Issue 2 (April 1, 2004): 307–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2004013.

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34

Singla, Dr Surinder Kumar, and Dr Kulwinder Singh. "India And China: Economic Reforms And WTO." Indian Journal of Applied Research 1, no. 5 (October 1, 2011): 55–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/feb2012/21.

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35

Mavroidis, Petros C. "No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts." American Journal of International Law 102, no. 3 (July 2008): 421–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20456639.

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This article provides a critical assessment of the corpus of law that the adjudicating bodies of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the Appellate Body (AB) and panels—have used since the organization was established on January 1, 1995. After presenting a taxonomy of WTO law, I move to discern, and to provide a critical assessment of, the philosophy of the WTO adjudicating bodies, when called to interpret it. In discussing the law that WTO adjudicating bodies have used, I distinguish between sources of WTO law and interpretative elements. This distinction will be explicated in part I below. Part II provides a taxonomy of the sources of WTO law, and part III a taxonomy of the interpretative elements used to illuminate those sources. Part IV concludes.

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36

Josling, Tim. "The WTO: What Next? L'OMC: et après? Die WTO: Was nun?" EuroChoices 6, no. 2 (August 2007): 6–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-692x.2007.00057.x.

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37

Lee, Hae Jun, and Sun Ihee Kim. "An Analysis of WTO Disputes in Aircraft Manufacturing Industry." Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics 27, no. 4 (December 2019): 83–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.12985/ksaa.2019.27.4.083.

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38

Davis, Christina L., and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. "Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication." Journal of Politics 71, no. 3 (July 2009): 1033–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022381609090860.

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39

MOSSNER, LOUISE EVA. "The WTO and Regional Trade: a family business? The WTO compatibility of regional trade agreements with non-WTO-members." World Trade Review 13, no. 4 (May 23, 2014): 633–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745613000347.

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AbstractNumerous WTO members pursue regional economic integration with both other members and non-WTO-members. The resulting derogation from the most-favoured-nation principle needs to be justified in accordance with the relevant WTO provisions. Regional integration in the service sector is expressly allowed between WTO and non-WTO members pursuant to GATS Article V. In the absence of clear regulation, it has been questioned whether the same is true for regional trade agreements (RTAs) covering trade in goods. Providing a comprehensive interpretation, this paper argues that neither GATT Article XXIV nor the Enabling Clause require the WTO membership of all the parties to an RTA.

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40

Tangermann, S. "EU enlargement in agriculture and the WTO process." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 49, No. 2 (February 29, 2012): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/5268-agricecon.

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Inclusion of the countries in Central Europe (CECs) in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union raises a large number of issues, not the least in the context of the accession negotiations among the current EU member states and the newcomers. However, in the process of enlargement, negotiations will also be necessary with other countries. This is because both the EU and the accession candidates have commitments in the WTO and inclusion of the CECs in the CAP may affect the nature of these commitments, as well as the ability of the enlarged Union to honour them. The paper deals with the fundamental problems in connection with presented themes.

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41

AYNAGÖZ ÇAKMAK, Özge. "WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY." İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 18, no. 1 (June 10, 2016): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5578/jeas.26363.

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42

Kim, Sara. "Reviewing the Remedies Applicable to the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines." Korean Journal of International Economic Law 18, no. 2 (July 31, 2020): 61–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.46271/kjiel.2020.07.18.2.61.

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43

Rovnov, Yury. "EU-Ukraine Arbitration: Will WTO Law Become More Deferential Outside the WTO?" Journal of World Trade 55, Issue 6 (October 1, 2021): 969–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2021041.

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The first dispute brought by the EU under its bilateral trade agreements, Ukraine – Export Restrictions on Wood, was in many respects a typical World Trade Organization (WTO) case. A panel of three arbitrators, including two prominent and highly experienced WTO adjudicators, was to rule on consistency of the respondent’s export bans with Articles XI and XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, incorporated by reference into the EUUkraine Association Agreement. The latter, moreover, explicitly requires that arbitrators rely on the WTO jurisprudence – which they, technically, did. Yet, the arbitration panel appears to have shown more deference to the respondent than any WTO panel ever has (or would). By contrasting the reasoning of the arbitration panel with that of WTO panels deciding similar issues, the article questions whether WTO law may take a more deferential path outside the WTO. WTO law, GATT, Article XX(b), EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, wood export ban, dispute settlement, judicial deference

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44

Maarif, Syamsul. "WTO dan Lingkungan Hidup." Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan 29, no. 1 (April 29, 1999): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.21143/jhp.vol29.no1.551.

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Banyak negara terutama negara maju menyambut dengan antusias berdirinya WTO. Alasannya,enforcement mechanism lebih efektif dan banyak hal masuk ke dalam disiplin WTO termasukdiantaranya jasa, barang-barang hasil pertanian, tekstil, investasi serta kekayaan intelektual. Akan tetapi antusias ini tidak diikuti oleh beberapa kalangan terutama non-pemerintahan. Pecinta lingkungan tidak puas karena WTO ternyata tidak berwawasan lingkungan. Menurut mereka, akan banyak kebijakan lingkungan terganjal oleh ketentuan WTO. Benarkah demikian? Tulisan ini mencoba memberikan satu kemungkinan jawaban.

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45

Charnovitz, Steve. "Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions." American Journal of International Law 95, no. 4 (October 2001): 792–832. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2674626.

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The most salient feature of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the possibility of authorizing a trade sanction against a scofflaw member government. This feature, however, is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it fortifies WTO rules and promotes respect for them. On the other hand, it drains away the benefits of free trade and provokes “sanction envy.” Undoubtedly, putting teeth in the WTO was one of the key achievements of the Uruguay Round ending in 1994, and a very significant step in the evolution of international economic law.1 Yet after six years of experience, WTO observers are questioning whether the availability of trade enforcement is sensible.2 This article undertakes an appraisal of trade sanctions as a WTO instrument, and concludes that this practice undermines the trading system. In view of this dysfunction, the article explores alternatives to trade enforcement and points to some softer measures that might have promise.

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46

Esserman, Susan, and Robert Howse. "The WTO on Trial." Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (2003): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033434.

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47

Noshab, Farzana. "Globalization, WTO and Pakistan." Muslim World 96, no. 2 (April 2006): 341–262. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2006.00132.x.

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48

Steiner, Silke. "Entwicklungsländer in der WTO." Verfassung in Recht und Übersee 41, no. 3 (2008): 336–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2008-3-336.

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49

노유경. "WTO 분쟁해결기구 최신 동향." International Trade Law ll, no. 144 (August 2019): 52–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.36514/itl.2019..144.003.

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50

BOWN, CHAD P., and PETROS C. MAVROIDIS. "WTO Case Law 2016." World Trade Review 17, no. 2 (April 2018): 191–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147474561700060x.

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The WTO adjudicating bodies faced some very tough questions in 2016: the status of non-market economies, the consistency of policies aiming to address tax evasion with the WTO, and the clash between environment and trade policies were all on the menu. Old issues, like the consistency of zeroing, resurfaced as well, albeit with a twist this time, since the Appellate Body (AB) had to address the question whether zeroing is consistent with the WTO when practiced in the realm of a methodology that was so far untested.

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Journal articles on the topic 'The WTO'

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