Academic literature on the topic 'Theocratic State'

The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism, Lucas Swaine, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. xxii, 215.The Liberal Conscience by Lucas Swaine represents a response from a liberal to those who affirm a theocratic conception of the good. Swaine distinguishes between logic and rhetoric, between that which should persuade and that which is likely to persuade. He suggests that a justification of liberal principles founded on conscience should persuade honest theocrats and Swaine makes the case that this should matter to both liberals and theocrats. The liberal, who founds a justification of liberal principles in conscience and accommodates those whose conscience forces them to seek exemption from certain conventional norms, in Swaine's view, is acting in a manner consistent with the authentic spirit of liberal principles. A liberal democratic state reflecting such a spirit, Swaine argues, is in a stronger position logically to expect theocrats to view it as a legitimate political authority. Otherwise, it is presumptuous, he suggests, for a liberal democratic state to expect the allegiance of theocrats.

This article is about freedom of religion in South Africa before and after 1994. It is often argued that the relationship between church and state, and the resultant freedom of religion, during 1652-1994 was determined by a theocratic model of the relationship between church and state. In a theocratic model it is religion and its teachings that determine the place and role of religion in society. This article argues that it was, in fact, a Constantinian model of the relationship between state and church which determined the place and role of religion in society between 1652 and 1994. In a Constantinian model it is the governing authority's understanding and application of religion that determines the place and role of religion in society as well as the resulting degree of freedom of religion. Examples from history are used to prove the point. The second part of the article discusses freedom of religion in South Africa after 1994.

AbstractThis article deals with one of the perennial questions of legal and political philosophy, ie, how the state should relate to religion? It makes a distinction between five models: (i) the atheist state, (ii) the theocratic state, (iii) the model of an official state church, (iv) the multiculturalist state, and (v) the agnostic state (or secular state). The authors reflect on the legitimacy of each of these models. Some states reclaim their right to adopt an official religion as their state religion or as the religious Leitkultur of their country (model iii). Others favor the support of religion as long as this is premised on the equal rights of all religions (model iv). And others think that the state can only support equal citizenship if the state does not support any religion whatsoever (model v).

Abstract Despite some indications to the contrary, religion still plays an important role in contemporary society. In this paper, the association between religion and the quality of public goods and services, measured by the so-called “delivery quality” index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators project, is empirically investigated. Besides religion, different political regimes may also have a crucial impact on the quality of public goods and services. In the paper, a distinction is made between theocratic, autocratic and democratic systems. It is hypothesized that the delivery quality is lower in theocratic and autocratic regimes than in democracies. In addition, religious diversity may enhance the quality of public goods and services in otherwise autocratic and democratic regimes. The level of religious goods and services provision should be lower in religiously diverse societies, because the costs of these goods are higher due to a lack of economies of scale. This may leave more potential for the provision of high-quality public goods and services by the state. These hypotheses are tested empirically with data from 190 countries. The empirical estimates confirm that both theocratic and autocratic regimes provide lower average delivery quality than democracies. Furthermore, a positive association of religious leadership with delivery quality is found in strict autocracies. Greater religious diversity is thus linked to a better quality of pubic goods and services in democracies, but not in autocracies.

This study aimed at addressing the relationship between religion and state, by reviewing the evolution of that relationship in the western vision, beginning with the dominance of the Church in the medieval period, and the emergence of the theocratic state, then ideas of secularism, and the conflict between religion and state in the Frame of ideology, Then reviewing a regression in the thesis of the transition to secularism and the emergence of religious presence in the public sphere. On the other hand, the study dealt with the relationship between religion and state in the Islamic vision in its Asian Models. Where the study dealt with the model of the "Madina State" during the era of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), which is the Islamic model that spread in the Asian Peninsula, which was the basis of Sunni Islamic thought later. The study also dealt with the "Wilayat al-Faqih" model, which forms the basis of Shiite thought in Iran. The study relied on the descriptive approach that deals with the analysis and description of the phenomenon. This approach was used in this study to trace the development of the relationship between religion and state in the western vision and Islamic vision in its Asian models. The study concluded with some results. The most important of these was that: the Western vision to a certain extent passed with integration between religion and the state, as embodied in the model of the "Theocratic State" in the Medieval Period, where the church dominated all the political and social affairs of the state. The Western vision also to a certain extent passed with separation between the religion and the state, as embodied in the model of "secularism", where modernity was linked to the non-involvement of religion in politics, The Western vision also passed with the emergence of a regression in the thesis of the transition to secularism, as reflected in the model of "religious presence in the public sphere. Finally, the Islamic vision with its Asian Models witnessed the difficulty of full integration or separation between the religion and the state, as embodied in the model of the "Madina State" during the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and its thought which is followed by Sunni Islamic thought. And the Shiite "Wilayat al-Faqih" model, which was the origin of a religious mandate for political power, although it differs from the "Theocratic State" model completely.

Naser Ghobadzadeh’s Religious Secularity presumes that Muslim thinkers nolonger consider an Islamic state as the desired political system. This aversionto a theocratic state is perhaps felt most by those Iranian reformist thinkerswho have had to operate in such a state since the 1979 Islamic revolution. Theauthor claims that in its place, the Muslim world has devised a new theoreticalcategory called “religious secularity,” which allows for a religiously secularstate to, at least theoretically, present itself as an alternative to an Islamic one.He defines this religiously secular attitude as one that refuses to eliminate religionfrom the political sphere, but simultaneously carves out a space for secularpolitics by narrowly promoting only the institutional separation of religionand state.He claims that this concept has two goals: to (1) restore the clergy’s genuinespiritual aims and reputation and (2) show that Islam is compatible withthe secular democratic state. In Iran, rather than launching overt attacks againstthe theocratic state, this discourse of religious secularity has created a more“gentle, implicit and sectarian manner in challenging the Islamic state.” Unlikein pre-revolutionary times when there were both religious and non-religiousideologies vying for an audience, Ghobadzadeh suggests that in Iran today,“the alternative discourses are religious and concentrate on liberating religiousdiscourse from state intervention.”The author pays homage to Abdullahi An-Na’im and claims to be usingIslam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‘a (2008) as aconceptual framework. As far as subfields within political science go,Ghobadzadeh’s Religious Secularity is also similar in form to NaderHashemi’s Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy (2009) and, as such,can be considered a work of theoretical comparative political science ...

The societal conflicts between Secularist groups and Jihadist militants on the role religious orientations played in the state democratization, social justice, human rights, and population development posited national exigencies un-decisively met by governments of the African and Arab regions. Part one of our research theorized three typologies shaping the challenges of similar conflicts in the Arab-African states of Egypt and Sudan. The typologies symbolized a Sufi culture perpetuating Muslims’ humanitarian relations; Secularist thought excluding the politics of faith; and Jihadist reactionaries manipulating symbolic representation of religion in the striving for power domains. Lacking in serenity the Sufi culture maintained for ages by popular prevalence, the Jihadist reactionaries sponsored a theocratic militancy that generated instability by excessive violence. Entrenched in non-democratic authoritative systems, the state failed in both countries to end peacefully the deepened tensions of the ongoing contradictions. Preserving the popular culture and supporting democratic governance, the Sufi/Secularist groups would probably continue to resist the theocratic dogma that evidently penetrated the region. Part two of the research proposed a study on the typologies’ dynamics to project the extent of political integrity in the future of Sudan and Egypt. This paper comprised a brief summary of part one of the analysis.

The major focus of this dissertation is the ancestor worship that is inferred to have been practiced in the multiethnic Middle Sicán theocratic state (AD 950-1100) that prospered on the northern North Coast of Peru. The major objective is twofold: (1) demonstrating by archaeological means that ancestors were indeed worshipped in the Middle Sicán society and (2) elucidating the nature and role of the inferred ancestor cult and associated rituals and ceremonies. Ancestor (and the veneration of it) is one of the themes that have the deepest roots in the anthropological thoughts; nevertheless, many archaeologists have uncritically invoked ancestor veneration without sufficient theoretical underpinning and empirical support, to the point that James Whitley (2002) decried "too many ancestors." This dissertation thus begins with a review of the earlier anthropological discoveries and theoretical debates on what ancestor is and who becomes an ancestor, including the cases in the Andes. Based on this review of previous studies, it is hypothesized that the select members of deceased Middle Sicán elites were transformed into an ancestor through a series of prescribed processes. This hypothesis is examined in terms of the five possible material correlates of the inferred Sicán ancestors extracted from the regional archaeological database of the study area accumulated by the Sicán Archaeological Project (SAP) for the last three decades. The role of the inferred Middle Sicán ancestor cult is approached from the ideological perspective. It is inferred that the ancestor cult was employed by the ruling group as an ideological and political means to justify the existence and extension of social hierarchies and inequalities and thus targeted at wider populations different in genealogical origins as opposed to family or lineage members. This study focuses attention on the food preparations and consumptions documented by a test excavation at the principle plaza of the Sicán capital, "Great Plaza," adjacent to the inferred ancestral tombs and hypothesizes that the commensality among the living and the dead during feasts there served not only to commemorate the inferred ancestors, but also to bring together people in different social tiers and to consolidate the highly stratified, multiethnic Middle Sicán society. Two excavations at the ceremonial core of the Middle Sicán state capital, one at the Huaca Loro West Cemetery in 2006 and the other at the Great Plaza in 2008, provide varied lines of evidence that support the above two hypotheses. The results suggest that ancestor worship was indeed practiced during the Middle Sicán Period. By maintaining and monopolizing the ritual access to the Sicán Deity through their ancestors, the Sicán elites reproduced their religious and political power and retained the legitimacy of their social status. Concurrently, the Sicán elites consciously employed their ancestor cult for social integration. After the Middle Sicán Period, these ancestors seem to have retained their spiritual viability even after the later Chimú Empire took the control of this region. If not recognized as the Sicán anymore, they were remembered and honored by the living for over four centuries. On the basis of the merits of traditional approach (e.g., the study of architecture, iconography, bioarchaeology, and ethnohistory and ethnography in the Andes), this study gives primacy to the direct focus on the material residues and relational contexts and patterns of ritual activities and studies their change and stability through time in relation to other historical contingencies. The merit of focusing on the trajectories of ritual activities themselves in a long and wide perspective is that it sheds light on the regional peculiarities and contingent nature of the inferred ancestor veneration, which may be overlooked in cross-cultural, ethnological arguments about the nature, role, and capacity of ancestors. It also provides a wealth of information not only to determine what types of activities took place, but also to explore the intangible symbolic significance behind those activities. As a result, this approach provides a practical solution to the justified criticism by Whitley (2002) and demonstrates how we should approach ancestor veneration and what evidence we would need in order to appropriately define it in archaeological record.

Cette recherche se donne pour objet d’étudier une théorie récente, très discutée à l’heure actuelle, à savoir l’émergence des ‘‘ intellectuels intermédiaires ‘’ dont la finalité était un encouragement à la démocratie en Iran à partir des années 1990 jusqu’à nos jours. Ce courant d’idées, même s’il n’a jamais été perçu comme parfaitement structuré, comporte des spécificités concrètes qui la distingue des générations d’intellectuels précédentes, de sorte qu‘on pourrait dire que cette nouvelle génération de par ses idées, réflexions et par son engagement social, pose les bases d’une refondation de la notion et de l’identité de l’intellectuel en Iran. Il en émerge alors une nouvelle substance de l’intellectualité qui engendre, au fur et à mesure de son évolution, un passage des intellectuels classiques et ambitieux (« d’avant-garde ») aux intellectuels intermédiaires.La première partie de cette étude s’articulera autour de l’analyse et de la présentation du discours des quatre générations d’intellectuels, du contexte de leur apparition en Iran, et tout particulièrement de celle des intellectuels intermédiaires. Ensuite, nous aborderons les différents aspects et les nombreux facteurs qui ont permis la naissance de ce mouvement avec une attention tout d’abord pour les facteurs externes ; l’influence de l’environnement international et des différents écoles de la pensée, l’apparition de nouveaux discours sur la modernité puis sur la postmodernité, , l’accélération de la diffusion de leurs idées à travers l’usage d’internet et des réseaux sociaux (qui tissent et renforcent les liens entre les différentes forces sociales). Puis dans un second temps nous nous intéresserons aux facteurs internes; l’épreuve de bouleversements politiques choquants, entrainant un regard plus critique que les discours précédant et la mise en avant de valeurs démocratiques depuis les mouvements réformistes apparus pendant les années 1996 et 1997. Ces changements sociopolitiques sont pour beaucoup dans l’affaiblissement du courant des « intellectuels religieux ».La deuxième partie de cette étude portera sur les trois axes, autour desquels les intellectuels, au cours de l’histoire des idées en Iran, ont conçu les interactions sociales : Occident, état, et religion. Ils s’efforceront tout le long de l’histoire iranienne de répondre à des questions ayant trait à ces trois thèmes. Les réponses des intellectuels intermédiaires ont rencontrés beaucoup de succès en proposant des réponses à de réelles inquiétudes sociales. En effet, ils ont réussi à schématiser des plans d’action pour atteindre leurs objectifs et à mettre en relief une dimension plus pragmatique de la société iranienne contemporaine. On n’a pas souvent pu en dire autant pour les générations précédentes d’intellectuels.Le but principal de cette recherche est d’étudier comment ces intellectuels intermédiaires fondent leurs convictions et leurs actions, avec en toile de fond une marche déterminée vers la démocratie. La démarche de ces intellectuels est marquée par cet engagement pour la démocratie, et la coexistence des différents courants d’idées dans la société iranienne. Pour ces intellectuels toutes réflexions ou action doit prendre en compte le caractère indissociable des notions de démocratie, d’occident et de religion au sein d’une sphère politique ou l’état possède tous les attributs de la souveraineté. D’ailleurs leur orientations se conforment à la plupart des principes démocratiques; la tolérance, la liberté de pensée, la liberté d’expression et le pluralisme, le sécularisme, la souveraineté du peuple, le droit de citoyenneté, le dialogue entre tous les force sociales, une société libre et sans censure. Ce contexte sera abordé au cours de la dernière partie de la recherche
The aim of this research is to study a recent theory, much discussed at present, namely the emergence of "intermediary intellectuals" whose purpose was to encourage democracy in Iran from the 1990s to the present. 'nowadays. This stream of ideas, even though it has never been perceived as perfectly structured, has concrete specificities that distinguish it from previous generations of intellectuals, so that one could say that this new generation by its ideas, reflections and by its social commitment, lays the groundwork for a refoundation of the notion and identity of ‘the intellectual’ in Iran. Eventually, a new form of intellectuality emerges that gradually witnesses the creation of an evolution in itself which is a transition from classical and ambitious ("avant-garde") intellectualism to the intermediary intellectualism. The first part of this study will articulate the presentation as well as the analysis of the discourse of four generations of intellectuals, the context of their appearance in Iran, and especially that of the intermediary intellectuals. Then we will discuss the different aspects and the many factors that led to the birth of this movement with the main focus laid on external factors; these factors include the influence of international environment and different schools of thought, the appearance of new discourses on modernity followed by postmodernity, the acceleration of the diffusion of their ideas through the use of the Internet and social networks (which weave and reinforce the links between the different social forces). This part will be followed by a focus on internal factors such as shocking political upheavals, leading to a more critical perspective and the promotion of democratic values since the reformist movements that appeared during the years 1996 and 1997. One of the reasons for these socio-political changes is the weakening of the notion of "Religious intellectualism" which is happening along the mentioned changes. The second part of this study will focus on the three axes around which intellectuals, during the history of ideas in Iran, have conceived social interactions: the West, the state, and religion. They will strive throughout Iranian history to answer questions related to these three themes. Intermediary intellectuals' responses have been very successful in providing answers to real social concerns. Indeed, they have succeeded in schematizing action plans to achieve their goals and highlighting a more pragmatic dimension of contemporary Iranian society. It has not often been said so for previous generations of intellectuals. The main purpose of this research is to study how these intermediary intellectuals base their convictions and actions, against the backdrop of a determined march towards democracy. The approach of these intellectuals is marked by this commitment to democracy and the coexistence of different currents of ideas in Iranian society. For these intellectuals all reflections or actions must be taken in light of the inevitable essence of the notion of democracy, the West and religion within a political sphere where the state has all the attributes of sovereignty. Moreover, their orientations conform to most democratic principles, such as tolerance, freedom of thought, freedom of expression and pluralism, secularism, the sovereignty of the people, the right of citizenship, dialogue among all social forces, and a free and uncensored society. This context will be addressed during the last part of the research

Das arabische Wort „Khalifa“ in der Bedeutung „Stellvertreter“ oder „Nachfolger“ wird im Koran, dem heiligen Buch der Muslime an zwei Stellen verwendet (Sure 7, Vers 69 und Sure 38, Vers 26). Darin wird der Mensch als der Stellvertreter Gottes auf Erden bezeichnet. Im historischen Kontext entsteht der Begriff nach dem Tod des Propheten Muhammad im Jahr 632. Die ersten vier Nachfolger in der politischen Führung der Gemeinde werden in der sunnitischen Geschichtsschreibung als die „Raschidun“ (die Rechtgeleiteten) bezeichnet. In dieser Zeit, also zwischen 632 und 661, entsteht auch der Begriff „Amir al-Muminin“ (Beherrscher der Gläubigen) als Titel des Kalifen, mit dem die Herrscher auch angeredet wurden. Die Frage der Nachfolge des Propheten Muhammad entwickelte sich zu einem grundlegenden Streitpunkt innerhalb der jungen muslimischen Gemeinde. Aus diesen Auseinandersetzungen heraus entstand dann die konfessionelle Spaltung der muslimischen Welt in die sunnitische Mehrheit und die schiitische Minderheit. Grundlegend gibt es Gemeinsamkeiten sowie Unterschiede zwischen den zwei Hauptströmungen der islamischen Gemeinde, den Sunniten und Schiiten. Der Umfang der Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten sind mehr als deren Ähnlichkeiten, obwohl diese Unterschiede auf den ersten Blick nicht erkennbar sind. Die Wurzeln all dieser Differenzen sind darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Schiiten nach dem Hinscheiden des Propheten die Dogmen ihres Glaubens von den Ahl al-Bayt (Angehörige des Hauses Man darf das Thema Kalifat als den Schwerpunkt aller anderen Diskrepanzen der Glaubensauffassungen der sunnitischen und schiitischen Gelehrten betrachten.
The Arabic word "Khalifa" in the meaning "deputy" or "successor" has been used in the Coran, the holy book of the Muslims at two locations: sura 7, verse 69 and sura 38, verse 26. In These verses is the human being known as God''s representative on earth. In historical context, the term arises after the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632. The first four successors of him in the political leadership of the community calls in the Sunni historiography as the "Rashidun" means (the rightly guided). During this time, i. e. from 632 to 661, the term "Amir al-Mu''minin" (Commander of the Faithful) was created as the title for the Caliphs; thereby the rulers were also addressed. The question of the succession of the Prophet Muhammad became a fundamental point of conflicts within the young Muslim community. From these contentions arose then the confessional division of the Muslim world in the Sunni majority and the Shia minority. Basically, there are similarities and differences between the two mainstreams of the Islamic community, the Sunnis and Shiites. The dimensions of disagreements between Sunnis and Shiites are more than their similarities, although these differences at first glance are not recognizable. The roots of all these differences are due to the fact that the Shiites after the passing away of the Prophet adopted the dogmas of their faith from the Ahl al-Bayt (solely 13 members of the house of the Prophet) and the Sunnis from others. It must be considered, that the issue Caliphate is the focus of all other discrepancies in the beliefs of the Sunni and Shiite scholars.

Hobbes’s views on church–state relations go well beyond Erastianism. Rather than claiming that the state holds supremacy over the church, Hobbes argued that church and state are identical in Christian commonwealths. This chapter shows that Hobbes advanced two distinct arguments for the church–state identity thesis over time. Both arguments are of considerable interest. The argument found in De Cive explains how the sovereign unifies a multitude of Christians into one personified church—without, intriguingly, any appeal to representation. Leviathan’s argument is premised on the sovereign’s authorized representation of Christian subjects. Authorization explains why, from Leviathan onwards, full sacerdotal powers are ex officio attributed to the sovereign. In Hobbes’s mature theory, every clerical power, including baptism and consecration, derives from the sovereign—now labelled ‘the Supreme Pastor’. Developments in Hobbes’s account of church personation thus explain Leviathan’s theocratic turn.

In this chapter the author suggests that, in their preoccupation with the Oxford Movement’s theological and ecclesiological legacy, historians have until recently overlooked its extensive social and political commentary. The author argues that the Tractarians’ obvious anti-Erastianism did not typically conduce to a simple anti-establishmentism, and that in fact the Tractarians nourished a high ideal of relations between Church and state. Equipped with that quasi-theocratic ideal, first-generation Tractarians—and not only the later Ritualists and Christian Socialists who are often thought to have first developed an incarnational politics—directed an extensive periodical and fictional commentary to the ‘condition of England’ question.

This chapter studies theocratic ideology on the ground of political psychology. The mission is shedding the light on the patterns of communication and techniques of persuasion which the Iranian supreme leader, Khomeini, applied in his books to Iranian people in order to establish and preserve a theocratic state. Texts are chosen from the periods before 1979 revolution and the time of his demise in 1989. Research approach is qualitative and content analysis as the main methodology to study his texts. There are three important concepts which shape the core of text analysis: legislation and freedom, social interaction and self conception. The findings show, the same recognizable communication pattern in Khomeini's texts: psychological preparation, macro divination, micro salvation, theo-value credential. Persuasion technique in Khomeini's texts is rooted in defining a religious duty.

Chapter four highlights two crucial issues that modern Indonesia has faced as a nation state: a systematic and passionate inclusion of Sharia into the legal and public sphere of this country (Shariatization), and secularization, applied to guard Indonesia, which fulfils the standard of a democratic modern state. These two are problematic considering Indonesia is neither an Islamic nor a secular State. As a non-theocratic State, in fact, Indonesia remains unable to completely stop several efforts of Shariatization promoted by some groups of Muslim society, and as non-secular State, Indonesia cannot adopt a total separation of religion and politics either. This chapter traces the first moment of Indonesia adopting Sharia on one hand and selecting compatible aspects of secularism on the other hand, and analyses how both are maintained in the configuration of the Indonesian nation state.

This chapter offers a novel interpretation of Ernst Kantorowicz’s monumental work on political theology, The King’s Two Bodies. It argues that Kantorowicz’s innovation with respect to Schmitt consists in offering a genealogy of liberal government in opposition to state sovereignty. The chapter shows how this modern idea of government finds its remote origins in the development of a ‘religion of law’ by jurists working for medieval emperors and monarchs in their struggle against the theocratic claims of the Catholic Church. The chapter contextualizes Kantorowicz’s work in the 20th-century Anglo-American debate on the medieval origins of medieval constitutionalism in Bracton. It also discusses the continuing relevance of Kantorowicz’s genealogy of government in the current debate between defenders of national sovereignty and advocates for global constitutionalism.

Chapter 5 examines the first half of the twentieth century, focusing initially on the judicial and political critics of Progressivism. Although conservatives such as Justice David Brewer drew upon Christian elements in articulating their judicial theory, it was in a limited and circumscribed way. Similarly, political conservatives such as Elihu Root substituted a constitutional formalism and veneration of the Founders for the more theological approach of the Gilded Age dissenters. Meanwhile, leaders such as Presbyterian scholar John Gresham Machen helped draw evangelicals away from the older theocratic approach toward more libertarian views regarding politics and the state. Conservative responses to the Great Depression included Fundamentalists who viewed the New Deal apocalyptically and organizers of the Liberty League who warned of a coming totalitarianism. The modest connections established between Liberty Leaguers and evangelicals foreshadowed the deeper alliance that would profoundly shape the post–World War II conservative movement.

Religion and religiosity have flourished as Singapore has modernized and industrialized, bucking the secularization thesis originating from the particular context of the post-sacred West. While the government is committed to an anti-theocratic rather than anti-theistic model of secularism, which is pragmatic, not doctrinaire, there are hints of a growing form of militant secularism from sectors of society, which is inimical to democracy and human rights such as religious freedom and free speech. The government has had to devise rules of engagement to deal with the role of religious views in public policy making, particularly given the increasingly confrontational stance adopted by those with religiously and secularly influenced views in the ‘culture wars’ over matters implicating public morality. Formerly authoritarian, the government and style of governance based on the Westminster parliamentary system is in a transitional state, with increasing democratization in the promotion of a more participatory and consensualist political culture.

Evidence shows that in pre-colonial West Africa, Islamic education played a significant role following conversion of West Africans to Islam because of its impact on all spheres of life. With the establishment of theocratic states and communities, Islamic learning centers emerged to spread Islamic education and consolidate the Islamic way of life in West Africa. In this vast region where people of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds lived and interacted for trade and commerce, Islamic education fostered Islamic affinities constructed on the universalism of Islam and Islamic injunction to form Muslim brotherhood and create the Ummah.