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Journal articles on the topic 'Theocratic State'
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1
Mellon, James G. "The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism." Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 260–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423907070321.
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The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism, Lucas Swaine, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, pp. xxii, 215.The Liberal Conscience by Lucas Swaine represents a response from a liberal to those who affirm a theocratic conception of the good. Swaine distinguishes between logic and rhetoric, between that which should persuade and that which is likely to persuade. He suggests that a justification of liberal principles founded on conscience should persuade honest theocrats and Swaine makes the case that this should matter to both liberals and theocrats. The liberal, who founds a justification of liberal principles in conscience and accommodates those whose conscience forces them to seek exemption from certain conventional norms, in Swaine's view, is acting in a manner consistent with the authentic spirit of liberal principles. A liberal democratic state reflecting such a spirit, Swaine argues, is in a stronger position logically to expect theocrats to view it as a legitimate political authority. Otherwise, it is presumptuous, he suggests, for a liberal democratic state to expect the allegiance of theocrats.
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Coertzen, P. "Freedom of religion in South Africa: Then and now 1652 – 2008." Verbum et Ecclesia 29, no. 2 (November 17, 2008): 345–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/ve.v29i2.19.
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This article is about freedom of religion in South Africa before and after 1994. It is often argued that the relationship between church and state, and the resultant freedom of religion, during 1652-1994 was determined by a theocratic model of the relationship between church and state. In a theocratic model it is religion and its teachings that determine the place and role of religion in society. This article argues that it was, in fact, a Constantinian model of the relationship between state and church which determined the place and role of religion in society between 1652 and 1994. In a Constantinian model it is the governing authority's understanding and application of religion that determines the place and role of religion in society as well as the resulting degree of freedom of religion. Examples from history are used to prove the point. The second part of the article discusses freedom of religion in South Africa after 1994.
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Cann, Rebecca, and Constantine Danopoulos. "The Military and Politics in a Theocratic State: Iran as Case Study." Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 2 (January 1998): 269–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9702400204.
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Alontseva, Dina V. "The Idea of Theocratic Statehood in State and Legal Views of E.N. Trubetskoy." History of state and law 2 (February 6, 2019): 76–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.18572/1812-3805-2019-2-76-80.
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ASHTIANI, Ali. "Cultural Formation in a Theocratic State: The Institutionalization of Shiism in Safavid Iran." Social Compass 36, no. 4 (December 1989): 481–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/003776889036004005.
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Cliteur, Paul, and Afshin Ellian. "The Five Models for State and Religion: Atheism, Theocracy, State Church, Multiculturalism, and Secularism." ICL Journal 14, no. 1 (June 25, 2020): 103–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/icl-2018-0056.
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AbstractThis article deals with one of the perennial questions of legal and political philosophy, ie, how the state should relate to religion? It makes a distinction between five models: (i) the atheist state, (ii) the theocratic state, (iii) the model of an official state church, (iv) the multiculturalist state, and (v) the agnostic state (or secular state). The authors reflect on the legitimacy of each of these models. Some states reclaim their right to adopt an official religion as their state religion or as the religious Leitkultur of their country (model iii). Others favor the support of religion as long as this is premised on the equal rights of all religions (model iv). And others think that the state can only support equal citizenship if the state does not support any religion whatsoever (model v).
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Prinz, Aloys L., and Christian J. Sander. "Political leadership and the quality of public goods and services: Does religion matter?" Economics of Governance 21, no. 4 (September 9, 2020): 299–334. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00242-7.
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Abstract Despite some indications to the contrary, religion still plays an important role in contemporary society. In this paper, the association between religion and the quality of public goods and services, measured by the so-called “delivery quality” index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators project, is empirically investigated. Besides religion, different political regimes may also have a crucial impact on the quality of public goods and services. In the paper, a distinction is made between theocratic, autocratic and democratic systems. It is hypothesized that the delivery quality is lower in theocratic and autocratic regimes than in democracies. In addition, religious diversity may enhance the quality of public goods and services in otherwise autocratic and democratic regimes. The level of religious goods and services provision should be lower in religiously diverse societies, because the costs of these goods are higher due to a lack of economies of scale. This may leave more potential for the provision of high-quality public goods and services by the state. These hypotheses are tested empirically with data from 190 countries. The empirical estimates confirm that both theocratic and autocratic regimes provide lower average delivery quality than democracies. Furthermore, a positive association of religious leadership with delivery quality is found in strict autocracies. Greater religious diversity is thus linked to a better quality of pubic goods and services in democracies, but not in autocracies.
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Mohamed, Taha Abdel Aal Taha. "The Relationship Between the Religion and the State Between the Western Vision and the Islamic Vision in Its Asian Models." Asian Social Science 15, no. 5 (April 30, 2019): 102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v15n5p102.
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This study aimed at addressing the relationship between religion and state, by reviewing the evolution of that relationship in the western vision, beginning with the dominance of the Church in the medieval period, and the emergence of the theocratic state, then ideas of secularism, and the conflict between religion and state in the Frame of ideology, Then reviewing a regression in the thesis of the transition to secularism and the emergence of religious presence in the public sphere. On the other hand, the study dealt with the relationship between religion and state in the Islamic vision in its Asian Models. Where the study dealt with the model of the "Madina State" during the era of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), which is the Islamic model that spread in the Asian Peninsula, which was the basis of Sunni Islamic thought later. The study also dealt with the "Wilayat al-Faqih" model, which forms the basis of Shiite thought in Iran.
The study relied on the descriptive approach that deals with the analysis and description of the phenomenon. This approach was used in this study to trace the development of the relationship between religion and state in the western vision and Islamic vision in its Asian models.
The study concluded with some results. The most important of these was that: the Western vision to a certain extent passed with integration between religion and the state, as embodied in the model of the "Theocratic State" in the Medieval Period, where the church dominated all the political and social affairs of the state. The Western vision also to a certain extent passed with separation between the religion and the state, as embodied in the model of "secularism", where modernity was linked to the non-involvement of religion in politics, The Western vision also passed with the emergence of a regression in the thesis of the transition to secularism, as reflected in the model of "religious presence in the public sphere. Finally, the Islamic vision with its Asian Models witnessed the difficulty of full integration or separation between the religion and the state, as embodied in the model of the "Madina State" during the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and its thought which is followed by Sunni Islamic thought. And the Shiite "Wilayat al-Faqih" model, which was the origin of a religious mandate for political power, although it differs from the "Theocratic State" model completely.
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Madaninejad, Banafsheh. "Religious Secularity." American Journal of Islam and Society 33, no. 3 (July 1, 2016): 99–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v33i3.920.
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Naser Ghobadzadeh’s Religious Secularity presumes that Muslim thinkers nolonger consider an Islamic state as the desired political system. This aversionto a theocratic state is perhaps felt most by those Iranian reformist thinkerswho have had to operate in such a state since the 1979 Islamic revolution. Theauthor claims that in its place, the Muslim world has devised a new theoreticalcategory called “religious secularity,” which allows for a religiously secularstate to, at least theoretically, present itself as an alternative to an Islamic one.He defines this religiously secular attitude as one that refuses to eliminate religionfrom the political sphere, but simultaneously carves out a space for secularpolitics by narrowly promoting only the institutional separation of religionand state.He claims that this concept has two goals: to (1) restore the clergy’s genuinespiritual aims and reputation and (2) show that Islam is compatible withthe secular democratic state. In Iran, rather than launching overt attacks againstthe theocratic state, this discourse of religious secularity has created a more“gentle, implicit and sectarian manner in challenging the Islamic state.” Unlikein pre-revolutionary times when there were both religious and non-religiousideologies vying for an audience, Ghobadzadeh suggests that in Iran today,“the alternative discourses are religious and concentrate on liberating religiousdiscourse from state intervention.”The author pays homage to Abdullahi An-Na’im and claims to be usingIslam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‘a (2008) as aconceptual framework. As far as subfields within political science go,Ghobadzadeh’s Religious Secularity is also similar in form to NaderHashemi’s Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy (2009) and, as such,can be considered a work of theoretical comparative political science ...
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Mahmoud, Mahgoub El-Tigani. "Between Secularist and Jihadist Bodes, Egypt and Sudan in Crossroads." European Scientific Journal, ESJ 12, no. 26 (September 30, 2016): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n26p21.
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The societal conflicts between Secularist groups and Jihadist militants on the role religious orientations played in the state democratization, social justice, human rights, and population development posited national exigencies un-decisively met by governments of the African and Arab regions. Part one of our research theorized three typologies shaping the challenges of similar conflicts in the Arab-African states of Egypt and Sudan. The typologies symbolized a Sufi culture perpetuating Muslims’ humanitarian relations; Secularist thought excluding the politics of faith; and Jihadist reactionaries manipulating symbolic representation of religion in the striving for power domains. Lacking in serenity the Sufi culture maintained for ages by popular prevalence, the Jihadist reactionaries sponsored a theocratic militancy that generated instability by excessive violence. Entrenched in non-democratic authoritative systems, the state failed in both countries to end peacefully the deepened tensions of the ongoing contradictions. Preserving the popular culture and supporting democratic governance, the Sufi/Secularist groups would probably continue to resist the theocratic dogma that evidently penetrated the region. Part two of the research proposed a study on the typologies’ dynamics to project the extent of political integrity in the future of Sudan and Egypt. This paper comprised a brief summary of part one of the analysis.
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GRABOVSKA, Iryna, Тetiana ТALKO, Svitlana KAHAMLYK, Maryna HONCHARENKO, and Yuliia SIEROVA. "Political Ideas Presented by Leaders of the “New Generation” Charismatic Movement Regarding the Formation of Postsecular Trends in Ukraine." WISDOM 17, no. 1 (March 21, 2021): 96–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v17i1.452.
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The article is devoted to analysing political ideas presented by leaders of Ukrainian communities of the International New Religious Movement “New Generation” related to the aggravation of conflict in the Ukrainian community’s public life within deepening post-secular trends. The negative attitude of a particular part of the Ukrainian student community towards charismatic leaders’ political strategies was identified in the analysis process. It was based on the criticism of personal qualities and manipulating practices employed by the movement leaders. The term “political theology” is used by the Ukrainian “New Generation” charismatic leaders to outline and describe the nature of the movement’s political ideology. It is based on ideas of the “New World Order” by O. Lediaev and some Christian extremism features. Criticizing the “New Generation” leaders’ theocratic ideas, the authors focused on their influence on the formation of strategies for developing Ukrainian communities of new generations. It was noted that most leaders of Ukrainian communities are aware of the utopian and conflict-generating nature of the idea of creating a theocratic state in modern Ukraine.
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Siddiqui, Rushda. "Defining Religion Based States in West Asia." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 4 (December 2011): 341–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492841106700404.
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As speculation grows about the possibility of a turbulent Egypt, Libya, Tunisia or even Algeria drifting from demanding democracy and political liberalism to establishing an Islamic state, this article, by attempting to define religion based states would want to form a background to the speculations. The author would like to point out that the coming power by a political party with a religious affiliation would not make the states into Islamic States. As a matter of fact, given the kind of external and internal forces at play in West Asia and North Africa, it would not be possible for any country to redefine the basis of its identity, let alone transform itself into a theocratic state in classical parlance. With the close of the Second World War and the establishment of nation–states in the new world order, two deviant states were created from Asia. Israel and Pakistan were created taking religion, instead of geography or history of the land or ethnicity or race or existing socio-political structures, for the foundational basis of their identity. It heralded a new era for history. These states were going to be yardsticks for later day religion based socio-political movements. If these movements were going to gain power, they would need to conform to the newly set patterns for religion based states. Re-creating a theocratic state based on classical historical lines, is no longer an option.
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Makiłła, Dariusz. "The Establishment of the Prussian Fiefdom in 1525. Discontinuity from the Treaty of Toruń or its continuation?" Masuro-Warmian Bulletin 296, no. 2 (July 5, 2017): 263–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.51974/kmw-134975.
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The subject of the article is the establishment of the legal basis and conditions for the transformation of the Prussian part of the Teutonic Order’s state, previously under theocratic authority, subjected to Polish sovereigntly under the Peace of Thorn from 1466, into the secular duchy which, after the Treaty of Kraków in 1525 became a fiefdom of Poland, as well as discussing the legal nature of the transformation and the manner in which it was implemented.
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Rochmat, Saefur. "The Fiqh Paradigm for the Pancasila State: Abdurrahman Wahid’s Thoughts on Islam and the Republic of Indonesia." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 52, no. 2 (December 26, 2014): 309. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2014.522.309-329.
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<p>The Republic of Indonesia was not established as a purely secular state as muslims constitute the majority of Indonesians. Indeed, they were divided into three main paradigms: secular, theocratic, and fiqh. The Pancasila state was the result of a gentlemen’s agreement amongst different muslim groups with different paradigms. The regimes of Soekarno and Soeharto considered that the Pancasila state was unique to the Indonesian character and accordingly these leaders tried to unify these different paradigms following Prof Soepomo’s idea of an integralistic state in which the state gives more power to the executive. This idea of an integralistic state is, however, alien to the secular, theocratic, and fiqh paradigms so that this failed to resolve the conflict. In this regard, Abdurrahman Wahid tries to resolve the ideological conflict by incorporating modern sciences into the fiqh paradigm. This fiqh paradigm has supported the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, but also, according to Wahid, is able to harmonize secular and Islamic aspirations in the national political system.</p><p>[Republik Indonesia tidak didirikan berdasarkan konsep murni sebuah negara sekuler karena muslim merupakan mayoritas rakyat Indonesia. Muslim Indonesia terbagi dalam tiga paradigma utama: sekular, teokratik, dan fikih. Bentuk negara Pancasila merupakan hasil kesepakatan ketiga kelompok paradigma tersebut. Regime Soekarno dan Soeharto memahami Negara Pancasila sebagai budaya asli bangsa Indonesia dan mereka berusaha menyatukan pendukung ketiga paradigma itu berdasarkan konsep negara integralistic yang diperkenalkan oleh Prof. Soepomo. Namun konsep negara integralistik ini tidak dikenal dalam ketiga paradigm itu, sehingga gagal menyelesaikan konflik. Dalam hal ini Abdurrahman Wahid berusaha menyelesaikan konflik ideologis dengan cara mengadaptasi pengetahuan modern ke dalam paradigma fikih. Paradigma fikih tidak hanya mendukung berdirinya Republik Indonesia, tetapi juga mampu mengharmoniskan aspirasi sekular dan religius dalam sistem politik nasional.]</p>
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Dike, Uche A. "African Metaphysics and Theocracy: A Case Study of Theocratic Politics in Ogba Land, Rivers State, Nigeria." Open Journal of Philosophy 03, no. 01 (2013): 81–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2013.31a013.
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Foran, John. "The Modes of Production Approach to Seventeenth-Century Iran." International Journal of Middle East Studies 20, no. 3 (August 1988): 345–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800053666.
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A number of the basic works on Iranian history have attempted to characterize seventeenth-century Iran as a whole, usually from a non-Marxist perspective. Vladimir Minorsky, for example, employs the term “tribal feudalism” to describe the pre-'Abbas I system, and speaks of the “great transformation” in the period to 1630 from tribal feudalism to “patrimonial absolutism.” These leads have been followed by Nikki Keddie, with “tribal feudalism”; Alessandro Bausani, with “pastoral nomadic feudalism”; and Amin Banani, with “patrimonial absolutism.” James Reid offers the term “uymaqsystem” (tribal state), while Hafez Farmayan notes the transition from Isma'ils “theocratic-feudal form of government” to 'Abbass “military and bureaucratic” centralized state. Marshall Hodgson's panoptic view of Islamic history provides the general term “agrarlanate citied society” and specific characterizations of Safavid Iran as heir to “military patronage state,” as a “bureaucratic absolutism” and as an “agrarian absolutism.” Each of these conceptualizations has its merits, not the least being that their authors include some of the most perceptive and empirically well-informed twentieth-century historians of Iran, Islam and the Middle East. While it is impossible to discuss their theoretical approaches in detail here, it should noted that the terminology tends to disclose two basic (if somewhat overlapping) orientations: (1) these are largelypoliticalconceptualizations—patrimonial absolutism, agrarian absolutism, theocratic feudalism, tribal state, military patronage state, and (2) a number of them suggest hybrid economic entities—tribal pastoral nomadic feudalism, agrarianate citied society. Without denying the interest of the first, primarily political approach to characterizing seventeenth-century Iran as a total system, it is the second set of terms—those of Minorsky, Bausani, Keddie and Hodgson—that is of particular significance for the present analysis, since each hints at themixedeconomic bases of the Iranian social formation, to which we shall return after a look at the standard Marxist approaches.
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Jakopovich, Daniel. "A left „theocracy“: The church and the state in revolutionary Nicaragua." Filozofija i drustvo 25, no. 2 (2014): 157–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1402157j.
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This paper analyses the antagonism between the established (Nicaraguan and global) Catholic Church and the Sandinista movement and government, which was one of the focal points for the ascendancy of a continental and global liberation theology movement. The paper provides a critical overview of the Nicaraguan liberation theology movement, as well as Sandinista strategies, primarily in relation to the social functions of religion and religious institutions. The central focus of this essay is to identify how the left-theological and Sandinista understanding of the imperatives of the counter-hegemonic project, the ?historical bloc? (conceived as a system of political and social networks and alliances) and the ?national-popular? strategy contributed to the tentative naissance of a novel state religion and a novel political project: a left-wing ?theocratic? social order. The Nicaraguan experience is useful for focusing the wider discussion about the importance of context-specific normative judgments about Church-state relations.
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Chehabi, H. E., and Asghar Schirazi. "The Islamic Republic of Iran." Journal of Persianate Studies 5, no. 2 (2012): 175–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18747167-12341243.
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Abstract Contemporary Iran plays a special role in the history of Islamic constitutionalism, as the constitution of 1979 was the first attempt since the debates over Pakistan’s Islamic Republic to derive the basic law of a modern state from Islamic principles. The Islamic Republic that came into being that year combines, as the name implies, Islamic and republican principles, which find institutional expression in a state that combines theocratic and republican organs. Iran was thus the first state in modern times in which sections of the ulema took direct control of the state. In this article we will first provide a historical context for the emergence of the idea of an Islamic state and its central principle, the dominion of the Shiʿi jurisprudent or velāyat-e faqih (from Arabic wilāyat al-faqih). This will be followed by a discussion of the process of constitution making, leading to a close examination of the constitution itself and the debates to which its various parts gave rise.
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NAVARI, CORNELIA. "States and state systems: democratic, Westphalian or both?" Review of International Studies 33, no. 4 (October 2007): 577–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026021050700767x.
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AbstractTwo rival accounts have come to dominate discussion of the origins and character of the contemporary international system. One, closely associated with the English School and the traditional account, places its origins with the appearance, and acceptance, of the centralised authority of the modern state. We might call this ‘the Westphalia version’. In this account, the modern state system is often represented in terms of what it is not. It is not a feudal regnum with a multiplicity of functionally distinct authorities. It is not a theocratic imperium where one power aimed at ‘the control and protection of Christendom’. It is a society of sovereigns, of de jure equals, each of whom accorded the others’ right to exist, and whose common ideological quantum is low. The rival is located within democratic transition theory. It postulates the modern state system as an extension of the liberal democratic state. The liberal state is not sovereign in the Westphalian sense: liberal authority is diffuse. Moreover, the liberal state produces its own, distinctive, international impulses that distance it in significant ways from the Westphalian pattern. Both see the state system as ‘produced’ by the state, as an immanent effect of stateness, but the account of the state’s trajectory differs radically.
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Zulkarnain, Fisher, and Tata Septayuda Purnama. "Gerakan Isis dan Ancaman Radikalisme Agama di Indonesia." MIMBAR, Jurnal Sosial dan Pembangunan 32, no. 1 (June 25, 2016): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.29313/mimbar.v32i1.1590.
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This article purposes to analyze the movement of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its influence in Indonesia. The concept of theocratic state, is often adapted by ISIS movement to create a country based on a caliphate system while treating the rigidity of Islamic law. This reseach employes correspondence with former activists of the radical Islamic movement and literature review as data collecting technique. The study finds out there some ideologies of ISIS movement. One of them is takfir (an infidel) others who disagrees with him and kills anyone who opposes religious ideology. Although ISIS is resistant from the Muslim majority, it still appeal tacit sympathy from jihadist groups in Indonesia. One evidence of the support in Indonesian Muslim community, can be viewed the access on the ISIS website until now.
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Hunt, Priscilla. "Ivan IV's Personal Mythology of Kingship." Slavic Review 52, no. 4 (1993): 769–811. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2499652.
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Ivan IV was the head of a theocratic state and an ardent participant in the spiritual culture of his church. He nevertheless seems to have deliberately flaunted the religious standards which were the basis of his legitimacy, especially during the Oprichnina (1564-1572). He reveled in blasphemy and his cruelties often manifested the ironic twist of what is termed "glumlenie": he denigrated his victims, ostentatiously violating their status by immersing them in inverted worlds of carnival. Although scholars have explored Ivan's motivations, no one has adequately explained the contradiction between his affirmation of his official status as model Christian and his blasphemous and immoral behavior.
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Fedorchenko, A. V., and A. V. Krylov. "The Phenomenon of «Islamic State»." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(41) (April 28, 2015): 211–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-2-41-211-220.
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On the first day of the holy month of Ramadan July 29,2014, jihadist organization "Islamic State" (IG), formerly known as "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIS), announced the creation of a "caliphate" in the areas controlled by its militants in Iraq and Syria. Using the weakness of state power and poignancy of inter-ethnic, inter-tribal conflicts, the leaders of the ISIS were able to multiply the number of its supporters and increase their influence. The crisis of "secular ideologies" (primarily Western liberalism and communism), greatly contributed to the success of "Islamic boom", including the creation of the ISIS. It prompted broad appeal to the Muslim masses on the ideological basis closer to them in spirit, mentality, purely religious values. The ISIS is funded better than any other extremist group before it. At least five sources of replenishment of its finances can be named. Current goals ofjihadists include the use of a power vacuum, bringing chaos in the various territories in the Muslim world, and prepare the ground for the transition to the ultimate goal of the program, namely the re-establishment, as it is declared, of the powerful theocratic state - the Caliphate, in the likeness of that which existed in Middle Ages, during the victorious Muslim conquests in the VII-IX centuries. The effectiveness of the fight against the ISIS depends on a combination of political, military, economic and social measures. Furthermore, it should be coordinated internationally. International coordination of anti-terrorist activities of Russia with the West and the East should bring positive results.
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Shchyokin, Nikolai S. "INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MODELS OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION." Doklady of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus 62, no. 4 (September 13, 2018): 495–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.29235/1561-8323-2018-62-4-495-503.
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The theocratic models of dialogue between church and state were reconstructed. The central problem of the article is the explication of emergence of the socio-historical situation that once again called for a new formulation of the traditional problem of the church and state interaction as a significant resource for achieving a social consensus and a successful development of society as a whole. The strategy of socio-dynamics of modern society is substantiated, in which the constant and constructive church and state interaction should be considered as a necessary and unique resource for its civilizational capabilities to successfully resolve both global and regional-local problems and contradictions of the modern world. The analysis of the history of Europe and a subsequent secularization of its cultural space justify the fact that just the elaboration of the strategy of the church and state interaction led to the situation that Christian cultural values, remaining in many respects a meaningful constant of the European culture, arrange their clerical nature and successfully integrate into the secular cultural landscape.
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De Poli, Barbara. "Arab revolts and 'Civil State': a new term for old conflicts between Islamism and secularism." Approaching Religion 4, no. 2 (December 8, 2014): 95–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.30664/ar.67553.
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The Arab revolts that erupted in late 2010, forcing from power the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and dragging Syria through a ferocious civil war, reactivated the public debate on government in Islamic countries. In all those countries, after removing the authoritarian regimes (or fighting against them), the political arena saw a division into two main camps: Islamic parties and secularists; both claiming to stand for democracy. Within the political discourse of both sides a new concept began to play a pivotal role: that of the ’civil state’ – dawla madaniyya – a term which, however, renders different semantic interpretations according to the political actors involved, meaning both ‘no military or theocratic (but Islamic) State’, and ‘secular State’. We’ll especially analyse the usage of the term ‘dawla madaniyya’ in Tunisia and Egypt since the beginning of the Arab revolts and up until 2014 and, for the same time period, the political practices of Islamist and secularist parties (government experiences, constituent assemblies) focusing on the effectiveness of the dawla madaniyya paradigm for building a democratic state.
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Besschetnova, Elena V. "E. N. Trubetskoy and his dispute about theocracywith Vl. S. Solovyov." Philosophy Journal, no. 3 (2021): 84–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2021-14-1-84-96.
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The paper examines E.N. Trubetskoy’s reception of Vl.S. Solovyov’s theocratic project. In addition, the author establishes the points of convergence and divergence of the two Russian religious thinkers on the nature and the possible ways of Christian unity. The two philosophers were close friends and in his texts devoted to Solovyov Trubetskoy repeatedly emphasized the influence of his friend’s ideas on his own philosophical constructions. Nevertheless, Trubetskoy took those ideas critically. To prepare his answer to Solovyov’s arguments Trubetskoy need the years between the time of his master’s thesis “The world outlook of Saint Augustine” until the time of his doctoral dissertation. “The world outlook of Vl.S. Solovyov” became one of his fundamental works. It is in this work that Trubetskoy’s key arguments against Solovyov’s “free theocracy” project are presented. The author shows that despite adopting Solovyov’s views on Christian unity Trubetskoy did not accept the ways by which Solovyov proposed to achieve it. Trubetskoy argues with the Solovyov of the 1880s, contrasting Solovyov’s ideas of that period with his later ideas and emphasizing that Solovyov’s key work on the topic was “War, Progress and the End of World History, Including a Short Tale of the Antichrist”. The paper also emphasizes that theocracy becomes one of the principal topics for Trubetskoy. In the process of analyzing Solovyov’s project of a “free theocracy” and studying the historical context in which the theocratic idea had been formed in the Western tradition Trubetskoy formulates his principled views on the relationship between the church and the state and justifies the need for their separation.
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Shustova, Alla Mihaylovna. "G. Roerich’s contribution to history of Russian expeditions in Central Asia." RUDN Journal of World History 13, no. 2 (December 15, 2021): 157–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8127-2021-13-2-157-166.
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The study of G. Roerichs scientific heritage is at its beginning. An important basis of Roerichs many-sided scientific activities were his investigations during the expeditions in Asia. The longest, most dangerous and laborious among them was the Central Asiatic expedition of his father - N.K. Roerich. The goal of this article is to examine G.N. Roerichs activities on every stage of the Central Asiatic expedition, as well as G.N. Roerichs works, publishing the results of the expedition research. G.N. Roerich presented the basic results in his monograph Trails to Inmost Asia: Five years of exploration with the Roerich Central Asian Expedition published in English in USA in 1931. Roerichs description of North and Central Tibet is unique because the theocratic state in Tibet and nomad tribes, which Roerich had observed, are no more existing. Roerichs field investigations continued the historical tradition of Russian expeditions in Central Asia. It extended our scientific knowledge about the insufficiently known regions in Asia.
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Mahdi, Ali Akbar. "ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, Tortured Confessions: Prison and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Pp. 279." International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 3 (August 2000): 414–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800002567.
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The Iranian Revolution of 1979 has unleashed a flood of books on the causes and consequences of the rise of political Islam and the failure of Western-supported modernizing states. Ervand Abrahamian's new book is important because it is the first detailed academic work that deals with the conditions of the prisons and the horrors of the criminal system—the torture, the forced confessions, and the executions—in the newly established theocratic state. This book is a testimony to the horrors of self-righteous ideological regimes whose ruling elite claims a monopoly on truth and the knowledge of what is best for its citizens. This is a chilling book that should be read by all scholars and non-scholars who care about human rights.
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Сквозников, Александр, and Aleksandr Skvoznikov. "LEGAL STATUS NON-MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE XVI-XIX CENTURIES." Advances in Law Studies 4, no. 2 (June 29, 2016): 102–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/19638.
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The aim of the article is to investigate the legal status of non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire. The author concluded that the sources of Islamic law, including the Koran and Islamic legal doctrine, formed the basis of the legal system of the Ottoman Empire, recognized the equality of people regardless of their racial, ethnic or religious affiliation. Non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire guaranteed the right to life, security of person and property, freedom of religion, freedom of economic activity, the right to judicial protection and protection against external enemies. However, the scope of rights and duties of citizens depend on their religious affiliation. The Ottoman Empire was essentially theocratic state, where Islam is the state religion and regularly held a dominant position among the other denominations. Served non-Muslim were somewhat limited in their rights: they could not come to the state, including military service, which does not allow us to talk about full equality of all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of religion.
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Sene, Birane. "The Puritans in Early American Society and the Premises of Religious Fundamentalism." Noble International Journal of Social Sciences Research, no. 63 (April 20, 2021): 24–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.51550/nijssr.63.24.29.
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Puritanism is historically a form of Protestantism, resulting from the movement of John Calvin affirmed in England, from the 1560s in reaction against official Anglicanism considered too close to idolatry. Puritans will leave England where they were persecuted and settle in the East of the United States later known as New England. This puritan community will serve as a model of a Protestant state based on religious principles. The rigor of the Calvinist doctrine determined social relations and guided the destiny of handpicked people for their moral rectitude. The principles that governed this Puritan society were already laying the foundations for a theocracy whose imprints are still visible in today’s American society. The puritans were pretending to be the light that should shine above the world and enlighten it with its values, and on this basis, they excluded any relationship of equality with others. Despite this theocratic ideal, the Protestant identity will gradually fade in favor of a secular state with a religious diversity and pluralism.
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Gose, Peter. "Segmentary State Formation and the Ritual Control of Water Under the Incas." Comparative Studies in Society and History 35, no. 3 (July 1993): 480–514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417500018557.
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There is a strange and unacknowledged paradox in the historiography of the Incas. On the one hand, few would deny that theirs was a typically theocratic archaic state, a divine kingship in which the Inca was thought to.be the son of the Sun. On the other hand, the standard descriptions of Inca political structure barely mention religion and seem to assume a formal separation between state and cult.1I believe that these secularizing accounts are misguided and will show in this essay that the political structure of the pre-Columbian Andes took form primarily around a system of sacred ancestral relics and origin points known generically ashuacas. Each huaca defined a level of political organization that might nest into units of a higher order or subdivide into smaller groupings. Collectively they formed a segmentary hierarchy that transcended the boundaries of local ethnic polities and provided the basis for empires like that of the Incas. However, these huacas were also the focus of local kinship relations and agrarian fertility rituals. The political structure that they articulated therefore had a built-in concern for the metaphysical reproduction of human, animal, and plant life. Political power in the pre-Columbian Andes was particularly bound up with attempts to control the flow of water across the frontier of life and death, resulting in no clear distinction between ritual and administration.
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Belkeziz, Abdelilah. "Religion and the state in contemporary Arab society: theoretically, practically and prospectively†." Contemporary Arab Affairs 6, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 505–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2013.850773.
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Through an examination of the different types of relationships between religion and the state, this article argues that the two extremes of this relationship – namely, the case whereby the state exploits religion and the one where it tries to banish it – ultimately lead to the emergence of political Islam as a reaction. Political Islam can be seen as employing religion to gain political power, hence reinforcing the worldly aspects and self-interest of a certain group at the expense of intellectual, ethical and doctrinal considerations. Practically speaking, political Islam has pushed the idea of an Islamic state to suicidal theocratic ends. The main factor behind the ascent of Islamists to political power is the political vacuum resulting from the retreat of the left, added to absolute obstructionism in the political domain. In an attempt to redeem religion and the state in contemporary Arab society and end the struggle between Islamists and secularists, four suggestions are presented: (1) recognition of the right of any political movement to derive its basic ethos from religion, or religious heritage, on condition that this is considered a personal endeavour rather than a religious issue; (2) stressing the civil nature of all parties, whether secular or religious; (3) respecting the civil nature of the state; and (4) abiding by the democratic circulation of power. In sum, a revitalization of the modern state system is inevitable.
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Moked, Oran. "The Relationship between Religion and State in Hegel's Thought." Hegel Bulletin 25, no. 1-2 (2004): 96–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200002032.
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To say that Hegel's position on the relationship between religion and state is not easy to categorise would be a vast understatement. Eluding comfortable labels, his ideas on the subject diverge from historically prevalent conceptions, which together are often thought to be exhaustive. On the one hand, Hegel's position contrasts sharply with theocratic doctrines that propose a simple identity of political and religious institutions, or subjugate the former to the latter. Almost equally distant from Hegel's position, however, are liberal and Enlightenment views that urge the complete separation of religion from secular authority and mundane politics.This tension is characteristic of many of Hegel's writings on the subject, from the earliest to die most mature. On numerous occasions, Hegel voices his vehement opposition to the notion of a radical split between religion and the ‘ethical’ (sittlich) institutions of political power. In an early fragment from 1798 he writes, ‘if the principle of the state is a complete totality, then church and state cannot possibly be unrelated’, and similar sentiments are voiced in many other writings, including Hegel's very last lectures on the Philosophy of Religion from 1831. Yet, at other junctures he contends, rather, that only ‘in despotism church and state are one’. Of all Hegel's extended discussions of the subject, one — in the Remark and Addition to §270 of thePhilosophy of Right— lays emphasis on the cleft between church and state; others — in §552 of theEncyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences(Third Edition), the aforementioned 1831Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and the final sections of thePhilosophy of History— seem, on the contrary, to stress the essential and eventual unity of religious and political life. To reconcile such seemingly contradictory views within a coherent position (even adialecticallycoherent one) and salvage Hegel's position from the muddle of apparent contradictions and oblique formulations is therefore a challenge.
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Aktamov, I. G., S. B. Bukhogolova, S. B. Dashieva, B. L. Tushinov, and N. D. Tsyrenova. "Lama Jambal Dorjo gegen and His Treatise “One who has Reached the Highest Wisdom”." Nauchnyi dialog, no. 6 (June 29, 2020): 371–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.24224/2227-1295-2020-6-371-385.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of a historical source of the nineteenth century entitled “One who has reached the highest wisdom”, the authorship of which is attributed to the Mongolian lama, the hierarchy of the Buddhist Sangha, Jambal Dorjo gegen, who had the title “Nomun Khan”. It is emphasized that this source reveals some aspects of bilateral Russian-Mongolian diplomatic relations in the historical period that is very difficult for countries - the beginning of the 20th century, the period of civil wars and the formation of new statehood. The uniqueness of the source is determined by the fact that this manuscript was not the subject of historical analysis, its content reveals the position of theocratic Mongolia in relation to the Russian state. It is noted that the message of Jambal Dorjo gegen to his fellow believers-Buryats, already in the department of the Russian state, is seen as a kind of mandate, a wish for a safe and peaceful coexistence within the country. It is argued that the establishment of the state border between the Russian Empire and Mongolia has not yet passed its final phase, so its appeal to the Buryats, subjects of the White Tsar, fundamentally influenced the process of legitimization of imperial power in the territory of ethnic Buryatia.
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Bottoni, Rossella. "The Origins of Secularism in Turkey." Ecclesiastical Law Journal 9, no. 2 (April 11, 2007): 175–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0956618x07000336.
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This paper aims to offer some remarks on the relationship between Ottoman reforms and Atatürk's revolutionary laws – a relationship that is generally minimised or misperceived. The first part focuses upon the Ottoman system of relations between state and religious denominations. It challenges the theory of the theocratic character of the Ottoman Empire, which constitutes one of the traditional arguments strengthening the case against the importance of the Ottoman secularising reforms. The second part of the paper deals with the Ottoman reforms concerning dress, education and administration of justice. It stresses the secular character of such measures, and maintains that there is no historically grounding to the view that the secularisation of institutions is always accompanied by the secularisation of society. The third part takes into account the two elements that most distinguish Mustafa Kemal's reforms from the Ottoman ones: that is, the ideological nature of the principle of secularism, and the method of preparation and implementation of the revolutionary laws.
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Hardin, Russell. "Liberalism: Political and Economic." Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 2 (1993): 121–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004179.
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Political liberalism began in the eighteenth century with the effort to establish a secular state in which religious differences would be tolerated. If religious views include universal principles to apply to all by force if necessary, diverse religions must conflict, perhaps fatally. In a sense, then, political liberalism was an invention to resolve a then current, awful problem. Its proponents were articulate and finally persuasive. There have been many comparable social inventions, many of which have failed, as Communism, egalitarianism, and perhaps socialism have all failed to date. The extraordinary thing about political liberalism is that it seems to have succeeded in its authors' initial hope for it. It may have helped end the turmoil occasioned by religious differences. Political liberalism has since expanded in various ways under other influences, and, if it were not for Islamic fundamentalism with its seemingly coercive theocratic program, we might no longer today associate religious conflict with the core of liberalism in its actual practice.
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Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. "Between Neutrality and Perfectionism." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 7, no. 2 (July 1994): 217–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900002678.
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It has been argued that the difference between liberal states and theocratic, communist or fascist states is not that the liberal states promote different ideals of the good, but that they promote none. Unlike illiberal states, which regard it as a primary function of the state to prescribe the moral character of society, liberal states shun such attempts and allow freedom to citizens to develop their own conceptions.The aim of this paper is to analyze the notions of “conception of the good” and “neutrality” and to suggest a perspective which provides a middle ground between strict perfectionism, on the one hand, and complete neutrality, on the other. This perspective would allow plurality and diversity without resorting to absolute neutrality. It would involve some form of perfectionism without resorting to coercion. I will assert that liberal states do resort to some forms of perfectionism in conducting their policies. I will further argue that the policy they should adhere to is one of impartiality rather than one of neutrality.
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Noman, Omar. "Crafting a New Alliance with the Muslim World." Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 2 (September 2002): 9–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00390.x.
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Most Muslims now live in democracies—a fact that is rarely acknowledged. The Muslim world has also elected five women heads of state in the past decade. These two indicators are symbolic of the diversity within the Muslim world, and also of the direction in which that world is headed.Few Muslims wish to be classified in a category that would prevent them from participating in the benefits of modernity. The pull of mass education, commerce, trade, and engagement with the world is strong. But these possibilities are openings that radical Islam is attempting to close off, which has led to an ideological civil war within Islam. In country after country, the middle class, the elite, and most of the poor are frightened by an austere version of theocratic Islam that has managed to gain political leverage. In order to sustain modern governments and access to the world in which they want to be active contributors, Muslims need an alliance with the West—not a confrontation.
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Cole, Juan. "Caliphates and Juntas: Ottoman Legacies in Today's Controversies over Religion and State in the Arab World." Social Science History 42, no. 4 (2018): 797–810. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2018.2.
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Egypt and Iraq display contrasting policies in the relationship between state and religion. Egypt's nationalist officer corps has subordinated political Islam, stigmatized the Muslim Brotherhood, and bended clerics to its will. While Arab Iraq presents two models, both hold a similar stance on religion: one an elected, parliamentary government dominated by political Islam and Shiite clerics; the other a theocratic Sunni caliphate of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Egypt and Iraq are heirs to two differing Ottoman solutions to the problem of religion-state relations, the legacy of which is often overlooked. The most prevalent model subordinates clergy and religion to the state in the tradition of Mehmet I. This model is characteristic of the empire in its glory years and would have been recognized by Suleyman the Magnificent. In the other model, the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Hamidian caliphate, the head of state claimed temporal and religious authority to combat colonial penetration. Neither Ottoman nor colonial norms of governance, nor nationalist states succeeding them, developed methods to deal with multiethnic states or avoid a tyranny of the majority. Unlike the modernizing Ottoman caliphate, however, the caliphates of Mulla Omar and Ibrahim al-Samarra'i display a literalist reading of sharia and a ruthless disregard of humane prohibitions in mainstream Islamic law against killing innocents. Of the two models, the likely victor is the state-centric subordination of religion because latter-day caliphates have flourished only briefly as radical and sectarian movements in rugged territories where power vacuums existed.
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Wisri, Wisri, and Mohammad Asra. "RELASI AGAMA DAN NEGARA UNTUK PEMBANGUNAN INDONESIA DALAM KONTEK GOOD GOVERNANCE." LISAN AL-HAL: Jurnal Pengembangan Pemikiran dan Kebudayaan 9, no. 1 (June 9, 2015): 55–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.35316/lisanalhal.v9i1.88.
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The concept of government with the authority of God is not in direct contrast to the concept of theocracy whose character is essentially the direct rule of God. God is God, and man is His servant. But one thing to keep in mind that God does not regulate directly, preferably, the power of God delegated to His Messenger, Muhammad duty to spread the new religion and sharia, which all comes from God. Therefore, the Islamic system of government with the law of God as the primary source of authority, can not be categorized as a form of theocratic government directly under the administration.In simple terms the State is the organization in the region that has the highest legal authority and obeyed by his people. Pancasila as the basic philosophy of the state, the state ideology. Pancasila is used as the basis for regulating the conduct of the state. Therefore, efforts to achieve good governance (good governance) is a good faith which has always been a political agenda in every leadership. Indonesia periodization is one country that is rather difficult to be separated from the cultural practices of corruption that has taken hold in the recesses of government. Even today has a resistance to fight against corruption and fighting corruption. A special team has been formed, but corruption is unstoppable with all the tricks. Therefore, routine effort required in order to create good governance and governance fun
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Voropaev, Vladimir A. "Nikolai Gogol as a political thinker." Two centuries of the Russian classics 2, no. 4 (2020): 74–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/2686-7494-2020-2-4-74-85.
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Nikolai Gogol’s political thought was conservative. All questions of life — everyday, social, state, literary — had a religious and moral meaning for him. Recognising and accepting the existing order of things, he strove to change society through the transformation of human. The historical and political views of Nikolai Gogol are close to the views of Nikolay Karamzin and the Slavophiles. At the same time, he remained unsurpassed in the religious perception of the West. According to Vasiliy Zen’kovsky, no one else had such a deep direct feeling of the religious untruth of that time. In his interpretation of Russia as a theocratic state, Nikolai Gogol was at odds with Nikolay Karamzin and Alexander Pushkin, but the former was in solidarity with the latters in the sympathies for the nobility as an educated class. Nikolai Gogol came close to the main themes of Russian religious philosophy. He became the first representative of the deep and tragic religious and moral aspiration that had permeated Russian literature in the subsequent decades. The ideal of the churching of Russian life put forward by him is still profoundly significant for Russia to this day. Creators such as Nikolai Gogol, in their meaning in history, in words are similar to the Holy Hierarchs in Orthodoxy.
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Grami, Amel. "The debate on religion, law and gender in post-revolution Tunisia." Philosophy & Social Criticism 40, no. 4-5 (March 27, 2014): 391–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453714526405.
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In a society transitioning to democracy from an authoritarian regime, drafting a new constitution is an important step in the establishment of a civil and democratic state. Indeed, the demand of Tunisians to write a new constitution reflects their ambitions, aspirations and hopes; but reality shows a huge gap between the expectations of the majority of Tunisians and the result of the drafting process. The Tunisian transition is characterized by a fierce debate between the secular and the religious forces. This unfolding confrontation forms the backdrop to the process of drafting a new constitution, amid anxiety surrounding the place of Islam in the new political system. However, fears of the resurrection of a new theocratic dictatorship are mitigated by a dynamic civil society in which voices that were silenced or misused by the former regime of Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali are becoming distinctly vocal. Their action has become increasingly visible, evolving around the place of religion, law and gender in the new constitutional framework. This article focuses on the debate on religion, law and gender in post-revolution Tunisia.
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NEDELJKOVIĆ, SLAVIŠA. "BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT AND REBELS (Old Serbia during the rebellion of the Shkodra Pasha Mustafa Bushati and the Bosnian aristocracy 1830–1832)." ИСТРАЖИВАЊА, no. 26 (January 6, 2016): 91–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.19090/i.2015.26.91-105.
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One of the major problems which the Turkish central authorities had to cope with after 1826 was the issue of relations with great feudal lords who represented the holders of political and economic power in the inland parts of the empire. The problem was even more intensified when the Porte came into permanent conflict with the local government in the Rumelia pashalik wanting to abolish the old theocratic-military system and introduce a more modern and liberal regime. This conflict in the Muslim society was destroying the unity of the Turkish Islamic state and was one of the important factors in the further weakening of the Ottoman Empire. The fight with the Sultan and the Porte was first started by the Shkodra Pasha Mustafa and then by the Bosnian captain Husein Gradaščević. Both of these uprisings developed into a large military-political movement whose aim was to force the Sultan and Porte with armed force to suspend the reforms and to permit the return to old traditions and institutions stipulated by the Sharia.
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Touraine, Alain. "Many cultures, one citizenship." Philosophy & Social Criticism 37, no. 4 (May 2011): 393–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453710396810.
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Two opposite statements must be rejected with the same rigor. First (1) is that a few countries have identified themselves with modernity by their scientific, technical and economic achievement and that the rest of the world, which is lagging behind the ‘advanced countries’, must follow in their footsteps and imitate their example. The article first of all sets out the falsity of such a statement, because there is not one but many western paths of modernization, and indicates that it is nothing but a colonialist ideology, which spread from European and American societies and cultures and destroyed all independent efforts of modernization in other countries, in particular China. The hegemony of the western capitalist model is more than challenged by other ways of modernization, for though the soviet model has failed, other countries are ‘emerging’ or have already emerged. Second (2) the opposite representation defends the idea of a complete multiculturalism including political regimes and human rights. It fights against the previous colonialist model and supports a total relativism. But this view makes impossible the communication between completely different countries and cultures and reciprocal fear leads to an extreme conflict between ‘civilizations’, such as S. Huntington has described. This view leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable if each civilization has a complete internal unity and a complete control on all its activities. But the world is not divided into various theocratic states: no single theocratic state commands the whole or the majority of Muslim population. The central problem remains real and difficult: how to combine unity and diversity, the difference between cultures and the capacity for them to communicate with each other? The most useful idea is to elaborate one general definition of modernity, as a culture which is based on universalistic principles. The western mode of modernization is not the only possible one; nor is it at all sure that the western process of separation of temporal and spiritual powers is the only possibility. We cannot assert that universalism must penetrate social life only through political institutions and citizenship. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that modernity, with its universalistic components, cannot be identified with only one type of social organization and cultural values.
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Heradstveit, Daniel, and Matthew G. Bonham. "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran." Middle East Journal 61, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 421–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/61.3.12.
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This article focuses on the Axis of Evil metaphor that was used by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address in 2002 to represent Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. After describing "axis" as a metonym for fascism and Nazism, and "evil" as a metonym for Satanic forces that implies an alliance of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that is collectively responsible for evil deeds, the authors analyze the impact of this metaphor on Iranian self-image and politics. The data for this analysis are drawn from in-depth interviews conducted with 18 members of the Iranian oppositional elite. The interview results suggest that the Axis of Evil metaphor had an impact on political discourse in Iran and strengthened the rhetorical position of conservatives vis-à-vis reformers by reviving militant revolutionary language with the Great Satan (the United States) as the main target of the theocratic and conservative forces. The article concludes with some observations about the implications of using cultural and historical experiences for explaining differences between the ways in which Americans (and other people in the West) and Iranians have understood the metaphor.
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A. Rahman, Syed Fadhil Hanafi Syed. "The Malaysian Federal Constitution: An Islamic or a Secular Constitution?" Constitutional Review 5, no. 1 (May 31, 2019): 134. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/consrev515.
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Constitutionalism dictates that the government must only act within the four walls of the constitution. While adherence to this fundamental doctrine is proven to be difficult, it becomes more complicated when the walls are unclear. For decades, Malaysians struggle to ascertain the actual legal value of religion, particularly Islam, in its Federal Constitution and the impact of religion to the Malaysian legal system. Some opined that secularism is a basic structure of the Malaysian Federal Constitution and in the name of constitutionalism, religious laws cannot be the basis for administration of public law and must be confined to personal law matters. On the other hand, some opined that Islam constitutes a salient feature of the Constitution and the position of Islam as the religion of the Federation implies Malaysia as an Islamic state. This paper analyses the conflicting views, via qualitative studies of constitutional provisions which have religious element in the light of their history, together with relevant case laws which interpreted them. The analysis is done with a view to determine whether the Malaysian Federal Constitution is a secular instrument creating a secular state or a religious document establishing a theocratic state. From such analysis, the author presents that the Malaysian Federal Constitution, albeit giving special preference to Islam, is a religion-neutral document which is receptive to both religious and secular laws. This is based on the fact that the Constitution upholds the validity of both secular and religious laws for as long as they are enacted according to procedural laws required by the Constitution.
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Asim, Muhammad, Muhammad Akram Zaheer, and Yasmin Roofi. "Constitutional Economics under an Official Thought to be Divinely Guided: Implication on Islamic Republic of Iran." Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization 10, no. 101 (June 2020): 273–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.32350/jitc.101.15.
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Constitutional economics is an interdisciplinary subject of constitutionalism and economics where political government tries to constitutionalize the economic activities within the state. Although, every political government tries to deal with all the economic aspects during constitutional engineering but, in theocratic states, the supreme religious institution performs the respective task because of having an official thought to be divinely guided. This study comprehensively describes the concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih (introduced by the Imam Khomeni) in Iran, by which, the entire political system including the economic and financial affairs of Iran has become the subjects of Supreme Leader and his Guardian Council. Similarly, articles 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 31 of the Iranian constitution emphasize upon economic rights of the nation in general. On the other hand, articles 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48 of the constitution define Iranian economic infrastructure, which is comprised of state, corporate and private sectors.At the same time, articles from 100 to 106 of the constitution focus on the power and authorities of“the councils” at the town, city, district and provincial levels. Moreover,this study also provides constitutional economic analysis of article 05, articles 107 to 112, article 150,and article 176 that exhibits hegemony of Supreme Leader (in consultation with Guardian Council and Revolutionary Guards)regarding looking after, controlling and directing all the economic activities within the state. Furthermore, the study also investigates how and why each constitutional provision is the subject of the post of Supreme Leader (also called Vilayat-e-Faqīh; considered to be divinely guided).
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Greenwood, David Neal. "PLATO'S PILOT IN THE POLITICAL STRATEGY OF JULIAN AND LIBANIUS." Classical Quarterly 67, no. 2 (October 12, 2017): 607–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838817000659.
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The rhetorical career of Libanius of Antioch (a.d.314–c.393) spanned the reigns of a number of fourth-century emperors. Like many orators, he used the trope of the emperor as a pilot, steering the ship of state. He did this for his imperial exemplar Julian and in fact for his predecessor Constantius II as well. Julian sought to craft an identity for himself as a theocratic king. He and his supporters cast him as an earthly parallel to the Christ-like versions of Heracles and Asclepius he constructed, which was arguably a co-opting of Christian and particularly Constantinian themes. In a public oration, Julian even placed himself in the role of Christ in the Temptation in the Wilderness. This kind of overtly Christian metaphor was not Libanius’ preferred idiom, however, and he wrote of Julian as another kind of chosen and divine saviour-figure, one with its roots in the golden age of Greek philosophy. The figure of the κυβερνήτης, the ‘pilot’ or ‘helmsman’, is a philosophical concept with roots in the thought of the pre-Socratics but most familiar from Plato. The uses of this metaphor by Julian and Libanius highlight the rhetorical strategy and self-presentation the emperor employed during his reign.
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Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. "Cultural Pluralism and the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology." International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 4 (November 1995): 461–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800062504.
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Know from where you come and where you are going. (Akavya Ben-Mahalalel, Avot, 3)It has been argued that the difference between liberal democracies and theocratic, communist, or fascist states is not that liberal states promote different ideals of the good, but that they promote none. Whereas illiberal states regard it as a primary function of the state to prescribe the moral character of society, liberal states shun such attempts and allow freedom to citizens to develop their own conceptions. Liberals hold that governments cannot use as their justification for any action the fact that one person's plan of life is more or less worthy than that of another. Since many people believe in more than one objective “correct” set of values, every person should enjoy the freedom to arrive at her own conception of the good. By “conception of the good” is meant a more or less determinate scheme of ends that the doer aspires to carry out for their own sake as well as of attachments to other individuals and loyalties to various groups and associations. It involves a mixture of moral, philosophical, ideological, and religious notions, together with personal values that contain some picture of a worthy life.
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Arjmand, Reza, and Maryam Ziari. "Sexuality and concealment among Iranian young women." Sexualities 23, no. 3 (November 21, 2018): 393–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1363460718797047.
Full textAbstract:
Criminalization of sexual relations outside the institution of marriage in Iran fosters – among other means – concealment as one of the safest methods to undermine social and legal impediments. In a context where any alternative practices of sexualities are subject to persecution, sexual concealments are applied as tactics for survival. The female body in such a normative-laden society is conditioned by its “openness” which makes it a subject of honor for family and kin and core for the management of desire and regulating the intimate for the theocratic state. Based on life stories of young women who have had pre-marital sexual relations in Tehran, this article addresses sexual concealment as the main method used by those women. Findings of the study suggest a three-fold model of concealment practiced in various social settings. Body concealment which was encouraged by the families and authorities to reduce the visibility of the female body during adolescence, engenders other types of concealment. Lesbian-like practices were utilized by women in homosocial settings to undermine the heteronormative social structure. Concealment of sexual orientations, desires and practices was applied to “keep the order of things in place” and to undermine the repressive policies and practices based on the socio-religious normative.
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Tverdislowa, Elena. "Vladimir Solovyov. Messianism: idea – model – testament – symbol." Herald of Culturology, no. 1 (2021): 140–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/hoc/2021.01.06.
Full textAbstract:
The problem of messianism is one of the most relevant and confusing. An integral component of Soloviev’s project of unity, messianism is considered as a connecting thread of his religious structures within the framework of the history of ideas: God-manhood as a fact and process of unity, Judaism and Christianity, the Church as a creative force in the reunification of Churches, the construction of a theocratic state, Slavophilism as a way to the interaction of Eastern and Western Christianity, etc. Soloviev’s messianism is a multivariant and polysemantic system, it allows you to classify its components according to the characteristics that the scientist gives, without specifically designating them: idea, model, testament, symbol. The idea implies all systems and subsystems as one. Inside the idea, a model is distinguished (Jewish, Polish, Russian – not according to nationality, but according to the experience of the people), covenant (personal agreement with God: people with God, peoples among themselves), symbol – a creative image of the unity of societies, states, Churches, peoples with God, finally – the Jewish and Christian religions. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that Soloviev’s messianism is a cross-cutting concept of the doctrine of all-unity, in which the philosopher’s thought found evolution and development.