Relevant bibliographies by topics / Theory of contracts

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
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Academic literature on the topic 'Theory of contracts'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Theory of contracts"

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Viljanen, Mika. "Actor-Network Theory Contract Theory." European Review of Contract Law 16, no. 1 (April 7, 2020): 74–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2020-0005.

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AbstractFirms increasingly use complex hybrid governance structures to manage value generation networks. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the structures contain soft, “enforcement-challenged” contractual devices. Existing contract theories, however, fail to recognize and explain how these soft contract devices work as legal devices. The article seeks to address this failure.The article uses a conceptual innovation by Schepker et al to construct an actor-network theory (ANT) inspired contract theory. Schepker et al argued that contracts are best understood as often concurrently serving safeguarding, coordination, and adaptation goals. The article argues that combined with ANT the functional contracting frame allows us to recognize that contracts work and gain efficacy in multiple ways. To understand how the soft, “enforcement-challenged” contract devices work, the article traces the efficacy mechanisms the devices perform and enact.The tracings lead the article to propose an ANT contract theory that builds on three intertwined ideas: 1) contract devices have no core efficacy networks but multiple parallel efficacies, 2) contracts should be understood as bricolage collages of small-scale contractual point intervention devices that each deploy and rely on their own efficacy mechanisms and patterns, and 3) the force of contract resides in the socio-material assemblages contracts are capable of creating and sustaining.
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Kőszegi, Botond. "Behavioral Contract Theory." Journal of Economic Literature 52, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 1075–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.4.1075.

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This review provides a critical survey of psychology-and-economics (“behavioral-economics”) research in contract theory. First, I introduce the theories of individual decision making most frequently used in behavioral contract theory, and formally illustrate some of their implications in contracting settings. Second, I provide a more comprehensive (but informal) survey of the psychology-and-economics work on classical contract-theoretic topics: moral hazard, screening, mechanism design, and incomplete contracts. I also summarize research on a new topic spawned by psychology and economics, exploitative contracting, that studies contracts designed primarily to take advantage of agent mistakes. (JEL A12, D03, D82, D86)
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Rutešić, Snežana, Jasmina Ćetković, Slobodan Lakić, Angelina Živković, and Miloš Knežević. "Proposition of a Model for Selection of the Hybrid Contract Implementation Strategy for a Pilot Project of Regular Road Maintenance in Montenegro." Advances in Civil Engineering 2020 (November 19, 2020): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8844980.

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Performance-based maintenance contracts (PBMCs) are modern contracts that should allow road maintenance entities to contract maintenance activities more successfully and generate money value. In the case of Montenegro, a gradual approach of PBMC introduction is recommended through a hybrid contract for routine road maintenance. Hybrid contract implementation will enable a lower level of client risk in the early stages of PBM contract. Game theory is used for selection of an adequate model for hybrid contract structure in terms of size and nature of the BoQ elements. In addition to the estimated or charged quantities of works from previous contracts, the model also includes parameters that to some extent take into account the experience and expertise of contractors and clients, but also the availability of road data. In order for model to be applied, historical data from traditional road maintenance contracts, which were implemented in the previous period in Montenegro, are used.
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Alexandrowicz, Piotr. "Paolo Comitoli SJ on Contracts." Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 107, no. 1 (June 1, 2021): 255–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zrgk-2021-0006.

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Summary Contract law in the early modern period has always been the subject of intensive research. The present article is intended as a contribution to this. It presents the contract doctrine of an Italian Jesuit, Paolo Comitoli. He was a moral theologian and author of the “Doctrina de contractu”. The paper begins with a biographical introduction and an overview of Comitoli’s writings. News about Comitoli’s life, however, is sparse and widely dispersed. The following section focuses on Comitoli’s concept of and his definition of contract. A brief explanation of Comitoli’s concept of contract attributes follows. Comitoli saw in these attributes the identity-forming characteristics of all contracts and used these elements to place the traditional problems of contract theory in a new framework.
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Azab, Rania S. "Interpreting digital licensing contracts between a metaphorical and functional direction: A comparative analytical study." International Journal of ADVANCED AND APPLIED SCIENCES 8, no. 8 (August 2021): 103–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.21833/ijaas.2021.08.013.

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This study seeks to clarify the importance of explaining the type of digital license contracts to see if it can continue subjecting them to the metaphorical direction that adopts the direction of applying the traditional rules to this types of contract or must it be subject to the functional direction that adopts the necessity of establishing independent legal rules in the theory of contracts in Egypt. The problem of the user not reading the contract terms is still there. Although consumers do not read the terms of digital licensing contracts, some jurisprudence in the US often insist that it must be the exchange of consent must take place that the offeree must see the terms and conditions before assenting in some sort of this contracts, this differs from the nature of digital licensing contracts and the way they are contracted. It is right that the consumers discover in some the types of contracts do not express the consent by the traditional way in the contract but are subject to specific instructions set by the site, due to the inability to read and understand the terms of the contract, but rather that in some types of digital licensing contracts the consumers are not aware to be a party to a contract according to the traditional concept of contract theory. Legal recognition is important by the Egyptian and Arab legislations in the role of technical and digital in regulations next to the contract and the law (functional direction) which can contribute to help the user to read the terms of use, we must make use of digital technology to fulfill the function of the contract, which aims to create obligations on both parties, businesses and the user. The following questions were analyzed: Is it possible an individual can enter into a contract without realizing it on the internet? Is the individual obligated to contractual terms that he did not read and understand? How can the provisions of the traditional contract be applied to digital licensing contracts? Then I concluded the necessity of enacting new legal rules that regulate digital licensing contracts within Egyptian legislation.
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Wawrosz, P. "Productive of the Service Sector: Theory and Practice of Corruption Declining." Marketing and Management of Innovations, no. 4 (2019): 269–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/mmi.2019.4-21.

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Corruption contracts are, throughout the democratic world, illegal and considered immoral. Their participants thus cannot use standard procedures to find a second party, to negotiate the content of the contract, to check if it performs what was promised, and to enforce the promises. This increases the risks associated with the contract. Illegality or immorality of the contract makes both parties more vulnerable – each party can threaten to reveal the contract and denounce the second party. Connecting a corruption contract with a previously established legal contract is usually seen as the best way to reduce risks and to reinforce the corruption contract. Owing to legal contacts and contracts, potential parties interested in corruption know where they should seek a counterparty and what to offer. At the same time, the corruption contract is tied to legal contracts, and failure to fulfil conditions of the corruption contract may put such legal contract at risk, therefore there is a higher probability that both parties to the corruption contract would fulfil what was promised and that there will be no extortion by any of the parties to demand additional fulfilment after the end of the corruption contract or that the corruption contract will not be disclosed. This paper presents the opposite approach in which a corruption contract is established as the first and it creates the base for further often legal but immoral contracts. All contracts lead to the mutually advantageous affinity of all its participants who often become members of corruption networks. The article presents the model when a blackmailed or dependent person must participate in corruption contracts, otherwise, it faces serious problems. But sooner or later, participation will begin to bring him benefits, so he becomes dependent on the network, although initially, he had moral inhibitions to participate in its activities. The subjects looking a counterparty of the corruption contract thus often create the environment of dependency and blackmailing and when people that are obliged to corruption lose their scruples and they see corruption as the common behaviour. Our model comes from real corruption networks in the Czech Republic. Some of them are briefly analysed. Theory of corruption must pay higher attention to all factors contributing to the spread of corruption behaviour, including mutual dependence and extortion Keywords: blackmailing, corruption, corruption networks, corruption risks, mutual dependency
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Gusakova, Еlena, and Aleksandr Pavlov. "Contractual relations of participants in the life cycle of a construction project." E3S Web of Conferences 263 (2021): 04008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202126304008.

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Contracts accompany all stages of the life cycle of a construction object. The contractual relationship should ensure a balance of production and economic interests of numerous participants in the construction project and stakeholders of the project. When a project is being implemented by several dozen contractors, it is difficult to achieve a balance of interests, the content of contracts is often multidirectional or contradicts each other. In order to systematize the relationships of the project participants, contractual relations in the construction industry and the functions of the subjects of contracts are analyzed. The structure of contracts in construction, based on the cash flow of the project, is proposed. Allocated 6 groups of contracts: agreements concluded by the investor; contracts concluded by the developer, employer; contract agreements; contracts for the supply of goods and the provision of services; collective and individual labor contracts. The main features of each group of agreements and the functions of the subjects of agreements in Russia and abroad are considered. It is shown that, as part of the theory of project management, it is relevant and expedient to develop a section on the structure of contracts, planning a contract campaign and support for a complex of project contracts. It is proposed to develop contracts and think through the contractual terms of the project agreed, under the leadership of the project management team.
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Shymanska, Oksana. "Theoretical framework of optimal contracts (Nobel Prize in Economics 2016 awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström)." Herald of Ternopil National Economic University, no. 3(89) (October 10, 2018): 126–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2018.03.126.

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The article considers Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström’s contributions to the development of contract theory. The contributions are represented by studies on the nature of optimal contract in view of motivation of contract agents and factors that affect their motivation. A particular attention is placed on the practical utility of the research done by Nobel Laureates in Economic Sciences 2016 that have fostered further studies on the theory of the firm, corporate finance, management, labour economics and the public sector, political science and law. The new theoretical tools created by O. Hart and B. Holmström serve for analysis of financial terms of contracts and for the distribution of supervisiory rights, property rights and decision-making rights. It is emphasized that O. Hart and B. Holmström’s contributions to the field of contract theory present formal treatment of motivation issues, moral hazard and incomplete contracts. The role of contracts in managing future interactions and ensuring conditions for establishing high-quality institutions is recognized. It is pointed out that the contract theory reveals working mechanisms of institutions, and presents potential hazard that may arise when new contracts are being drafted. Particular attention is paid to positioning of the contract theory within the theory of economic organization and the economic theory of information that is aimed at developing models with asymmetric information and taking into account non-observable actions. Real situations, game models and contract structure with the distinction between complete and incomplete contracts are examined (based on the informativeness principle). The performance of multi-task model and career-growth model in the contract theory is outlined. The paper analyzes the impact of the contract theory on changes in approaches to analyzing corporate relationships, which were previously based on the trade-off theory that includes balancing between the reduction of tax payments and corporate debt servicing.
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Michler, Jeffrey D., and Steven Y. Wu. "Relational Contracts in Agriculture: Theory and Evidence." Annual Review of Resource Economics 12, no. 1 (October 6, 2020): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-101719-034514.

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We appraise the current status of relational contract theory, along with associated empirical studies, with the goal of providing an orientation to the field to economists who may not have expertise in contract theory. We begin with a theoretical discussion focusing mainly on intuition and the usefulness of the theory for conceptualizing applied agricultural contracting problems. We also discuss current theoretical challenges and the current state of empirical research on relational contracts. We conclude by discussing potentially fruitful areas for future research.
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De Jong, Arjan, and Klaas Smit. "Collaboratives to improve industrial maintenance contract relationships." Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering 25, no. 4 (October 2, 2019): 545–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jqme-07-2013-0050.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how collaborative contracts can improve industrial maintenance contract relationships. Design/methodology/approach The research compares performance contracts with collaborative contracts, a new contract type whereby the contract parties align their objectives. The study uses game theory and describes the contract types as mechanism designs to compare the contract types. The mechanisms are validated with case studies. The utility of the contract types is verified with Monte Carlo simulations using expert opinions. Findings The research demonstrates that, under certain conditions, collaborative contracts result in a higher utility than performance contracts for all contract parties. Practical implications The use of collaborative contracts between an operator of a technical system and a maintenance organisation reduces maintenance costs and improves the availability of the technical system, increasing the utility for all contract parties. Originality/value The collaborative contract is a new contract type for maintenance services and the research method provides a new approach to optimise industrial maintenance contract relationships.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Theory of contracts"

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Ma, Ching To. "Incentive contracts and organisation theory." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.363261.

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Sancho, Calderón Diego. "Selection of contract type in construction contracts: Lump-Sum, Target-cost and Cost-plus contracts." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för industriell ekonomi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-14823.

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The construction contract is a document which governs the business relationship of Contractor and Employer for the duration of a construction project. However, the selection of the contract type for the project tends to be performed too shallowly. The present thesis aims to analyse how the contract type is chosen among the three paradigmatic contracts considered here: lump-sum contracts, target-cost contracts and cost-plus contracts. The basis of the study is a case study performed on Project X, a large mine construction project in Western Europe. The relevant literature to the subject was reviewed, mainly the principal-agent theory, literature on risk allocation and on contract selection. After identifying several factors which may influence the contract selection in the literature and in a preliminary interview, a survey was conducted to assess their relative influence in general and in particular for the Project X. The survey was responded by a small sample of highly qualified and experienced managers. and was complemented with in-depth interviews with the majority of them. Some research on the project and on contract documents of the NEC standard contract was also performed in order to provide a context of the characteristics of Project X. The findings of the three sources made it possible to confirm the influence on the selection of the contract type of many of the factors proposed. It was possible to shortlist a small number of factors which influenced the most the selection of the contract type for Project X. These were the preferred risk allocation by the parties, the ability to adapt the contract to scope changes, the knowledge of each contract type by the contracting parties, the improvement of the project delivery by the contract type and the aim to enhance cooperation between the parties. Factors not present in previous research were also discovered, such as the different financial costs of the contract types and the requirement of financial information by the funders of the parties. The very different opinions of the respondents to the survey and interviews regarding the selection of the contract type confirm that the parties should consider in more detail that complex process, because by now the parties are not really sure why they are choosing a certain contract type. Further research should be performed in the future to analyse the factors which influenced the contract type selection in other projects. The projects could also be analysed during their whole duration. Other contract types or variants of the three contract types studied in this thesis could also be added to the analysis.
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Hong, Sukhwa. "Mechanism Design Theory for Service Contracts." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/76865.

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This paper presents a novel approach for designing and optimizing maintenance service contracts through the application of mechanism design theory. When offering a contract to its customer, the maintenance service provider seeks to specify contract terms - such as price, service features and incentives - that maximize the provider's profit, satisfy customer needs, allocate risks effectively and mitigate moral hazards. Optimal contract design has to account for asymmetric information and uncertainties associated with customer characteristics and behaviors. We illustrate our mechanism design approach by applying it to the contract design challenge of a gas turbine manufacturer, which also provides maintenance services for its aircraft engines. In our solution approach, we compute an optimal set of contracts. The entire set is presented to the customer and is designed such that the customer will accept one of the contract alternatives without negotiations. In addition to eliminating the costs and delays associated with negotiations, this approach also reveals the customer's private information to the service provider, which the provider can use to its benefit in maintenance management and future contract renewals. Furthermore, we design and incorporate win-win incentive mechanisms into the contracts, which reward the customer for actions that reduces maintenance costs. We present a deterministic and a stochastic mechanism design model, the latter accounting for uncertainties associated with customer actions, engine performance, and maintenance costs during the contract execution phase.
Master of Science
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Lockwood, Ben. "Dynamic equilibrium : game theory, contracts, and search." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1986. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56207/.

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This thesis comprises three chapters centered on two common themes. The first theme is the application of non-cooperative game theory to economic questions; the second is the study of the kind of arrangements that can arise in the labour market as a response to asymmetric information. The first chapter surveys recent developments in non-cooperative game theory, and then attempts an extension of the recent results characterising perfect equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without discounting to more general games. We choose the dynamic game framework for the generalisation, and shows that there are two jointly, but not indi vidually sufficient condi tions for the generalisation to go through. We then turn to an application of these ideas to the theory of longterm contracts. The main motivation for this is that the view that wages and employment are determined by risk-sharing implicit contracts is now a well established alternative to fixed-price and marketclearing theories. In general, long-term arrangements may mitigate inefficiencies in the short-term contract that arise from various sorts of asymmetric information which are likely to be prevalent in worker-firm relationships. In this chapter two things are attempted; first, we try to integrate the game-theoretic approach to contractinq of Radner with the work of Townshend, Rogerson, Roberts and Manning among others, and second, we characterise the optimal contract, and obtain some new results. The labour market is also the topic of the third chapter. Here, we attempt to extend a well-known model of "frictional" labour market equilibrium to the case where onr or both sides of the market differ in inherent characteristics (e.g. skills) which may be observable or unobservable. We show first that the equilibrium may be inefficient even in the absence of externalities which work through the matching technology. Also, the model with unobservable characteristics provides a framework for a theoretical anal;Tsis of the practice of firms of screening workers by unemployment duration. We show that in our model, there are screening equilibria, and also investigate in some detail the impact of exogenous variables on the equilibrium.
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Rosen, Asa. "Contributions to the theory of labour contracts." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1992. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2429/.

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The thesis consists of thee parts. Part one considers firm-union bargain over wages and working conditions (effort). It studies in a partial equilibrium setting, the theoretical relationship between the scope of firm-union bargains and the outcome in terms of wages, employment and effort. In particular, the outcome of a bargain over wages and effort is contrasted with the outcome of a pure wage bargain. A main result is that both effort and wages are lower when effort requirements are negotiable (rather than being determined by the employer). The analysis yields implications for the impact of unions on productivity, and gives an explanation to cross-industry differences in union mark-up on wages. In the second part I study labour contracts under temporarily asymmetric information. Under the assumption that workers are more heavily credit rationed than firms, the standard model of testing and self-selection in the labour market is extended in several directions. First, it is shown that ex post inefficient termination may be used as a self-selection device. This is a new explanation for up-or-out contracts in occupations where workers' productivity is revealed slowly. Second, when risk neutral workers can be of more than two different productivities, only the best worker should be overpaid. Finally, when productivity is non-verifiable, large firms may have an advantage in hiring more able workers. The issue of discrimination in the labour market is addressed in the last part. A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work. The model also offers a new explanation for duration dependence in exit rates from unemployment.
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Ishihara, Akifumi. "Essays on relational contracts." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2011. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/345/.

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This dissertation contains three essays on self-enforcing implicit contracts in economic transactions and politics. Chapter 2 studies a repeated agency model with two tasks where the agent has private information on the first task and there is no verifiable performance signal for the second task. The equilibrium level of the first task is determined so as to guarantee the credibility of the relational contracts to provide incentives for the second task. It implies interesting economic results including non-monotonic relation between the discount factor and the total surplus, social desirability of unverifiability, and implications for organization design. Chapter 3 studies a model of political contribution of dynamic common agency where state-contingent agreements must be self-enforced. First, we investigate the punishment strategy for supporting the self-enforcing mechanism. The most severe punishment strategy on the principals takes the form of a two-phase scheme in general. Second, we characterize the payoff set of the equilibria on which the same decision is chosen by the agent through implicit agreements and examine whether it can achieve the same payoff as in the standard static menu auction model. It implies that there could be an equilibrium outcome in a static menu auction that cannot be supported in our model for any discount factor. Chapter 4 studies repeated political competition with policy-motivated citizen candidates. The dynamic relationship could cause strategic candidacy in two-candidate competition, such as in circumstances where two candidates stand for election and one of them has no chance to win. The candidate can choose her implementing policy depending on the set of the rival candidates in the election and the rival candidate actually has an incentive to stand even with no chance to win since it can induce policy compromises from the winning candidate.
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Wilkinson, Thomas. "A macroeconomics of social contracts." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2013. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/60075/.

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This thesis sets out the case and foundations for a new way to think about, and model, Macroeconomics. This framework aims to describe the fluctuations and differing growths of economies, not in terms of the choice and exchange of Microeconomics, but rather in terms of the enforcement relationships that allow that exchange and other cooperation between people. It first establishes just why this is necessary, with a thorough methodological critique of the way Macroeconomics is done right now. It then presents computational models of two presumably competing kinds of enforcement relationship. The first of these is the third party supervision that we are most familiar with as enforcement from every day life, and which has received some of the longest running philosophical discussion. This hierarchical model reproduces economic fluctuations, through occasional collapses of large parts of the hierarchy. To assess the scientific merit of this model on the terms of conventional Macroeconomics, I develop a compatible hypothesis testing strategy. The second kind of enforcement considered is what would commonly be called peer pressure. For this I derive a preliminary result, that would allow further development of an overarching research program.
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Bolton, Patrick. "The role of contracts in industrial organisation theory." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.434872.

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Westman, Jonas. "Specifying Safety-Critical Heterogeneous Systems Using Contracts Theory." Doctoral thesis, KTH, Mekatronik, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-192150.

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Requirements engineering (RE) is a well-established practice that is also emphasized in safety standards such as IEC 61508 and ISO 26262. Safety standards advocate a particularly stringent RE where requirements must be structured in an hierarchical manner in accordance with the system architecture; at each level, requirements must be allocated to heterogeneous (SW, HW, mechanical, electrical, etc.) architecture elements and trace links must be established between requirements. In contrast to the stringent RE in safety standards, according to previous studies, RE in industry is in general of poor quality. Considering a typical RE tool, other than basic impact analysis, the tool neither gives feedback nor guides a user  when specifying, allocating, and structuring requirements. In practice, for industry to comply with the stringent RE in safety standards, better support for RE is needed, not only from tools, but also from principles and methods. Therefore, a foundation is presented consisting of an underlying theory for specifying heterogeneous systems and complementary principles and methods to specifically support the stringent RE in safety standards. This foundation is indeed suitable as a base for implementing guidance- and feedback-driven tool support for such stringent RE; however, the fact is that the proposed theory, principles, and methods provide essential support  regardless if tools are used or not. The underlying theory is a formal compositional contracts theory for heterogeneous systems. This contracts theory embodies the essential RE property of separating requirements on a system from assumptions on its environment. Moreover, the contracts theory formalizes the stringent RE effort of structuring requirements hierarchically with respect to the system architecture. Thus, the proposed principles and methods for supporting the stringent RE in safety standards are well-rooted in formal concepts and conditions, and are thus, theoretically sound. Not only that, but the foundation is indeed also tailored to be enforced by both existing and new tools considering that the support is based on precise mathematical expressions that can be interpreted unambiguously by machines. Enforcing the foundation in a tool entails support that guides and gives feedback when specifying heterogeneous systems in general, and safety-critical ones in particular.
Kravhantering är en väletablerad praxis som ocksåbetonas i säkerhetsstandarder såsom IEC 61508 och ISO 26262. Säkerhetsstandarder förespråkar en särskilt noggrann kravhantering där krav skall struktureras på ett hierarkiskt sätt i enlighet med systemarkitekturen; på varje nivå så skall krav allokeras till heterogena (SW, HW, mekaniska, elektriska, etc.) arkitekturelement och spårlänkar skall upprättas mellan kraven. I motsats till den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder så är kravhantering i industrin av allmänt dålig kvalitet enligt tidigare studier. Ett typisk kravverktyg ger inte mycket mer stöd än grundläggande konsekvensanalyser, d.v.s.\ verktyget ger varken återkoppling eller vägledning för att formulera, allokera, och strukturera krav. Bättre stöd behövs för att industrin i praktiken skall kunna förverkliga den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder -- inte bara stöd från verktyg, men också från kravhanteringsprinciper och metoder. Därför presenteras ett fundament bestående av en underliggande teori för specifiering av heterogena system, samt kompletterande principer och metoder för att stödja den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder. Detta fundament är lämplig som en bas för att kunna implementera verktyg som ger återkoppling och vägledning för kravhantering; likväl så ger den föreslagna teorin, principerna och metoderna essentiellt stöd oavsett om verktyg används eller inte. Den underliggande teorin är en kompositionell och formell kontraktsteori för heterogena system. Denna kontraktsteori ger konkret form åt den centrala kravhanteringsegenskapen att separera kraven på ett system från antaganden på dess omgivning. Dessutom så formaliserar kontraksteorin den noggranna uppgiften att hierarkiskt strukturera krav i enlighet med systemarkitekturen. Således så är de föreslagna principerna och metoderna för att stödja den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder välförankrade i formella begrepp och villkor och är därmed också teoretiskt sunda. Det erbjudna stödet är dessutom välanpassat för att kunna verkställas av såväl befintliga som nyaverktyg med tanke på att stödet är grundat på exakta matematiska uttryck som kan tolkas entydigt av maskiner. Verkställandet av fundamentet av ett verktyg medför stöd i form av vägledning och återkoppling vid specifiering av heterogena system i allmänhet, och säkerhetskritiska sådana i synnerhet.

QC 20160909


ESPRESSO
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10

Tong, Fei Carlo. "Incomplete contracts and behavioural aspects – a case study in the construction and IT industries." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/65173.

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Contracts capture an agreement between two parties to exchange a resource in the future (ex-ante), however the future is not certain. Only after the event has happened, might the two parties compare the resources they have received to what they expected (ex-post). Entering into a contract with unknowns gives rise to incomplete contracts theory, the focus of which includes the study of human behavior. Relational contracting is currently being studied as a method of reducing the transaction costs and incompleteness of contracts. Using case studies, this research aimed to reach a conclusion regarding why certain contractual projects run over budget. Overruns are often related to a variation agreement that is incomplete and open to interpretation. Understanding what the issues are and how to mitigate contractual risks was thus a key focus of this research. The research examined two industries - construction and IT. From the case studies, 16 interviews were conducted and 12 contracts reviewed. The least concern for all the parties was disputes, as the parties find solutions to address issues not considered when drafting contracts. Industry specific experience and knowledge is needed to mitigate some unknown contractual risks, however. Relational contracting was also very evident in resolving issues outside of a contract. Further studies into ancillary contracts will reveal more insight into behavioural and relational contracting.
Dissertation(MBA)--Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria,2018.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
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Books on the topic "Theory of contracts"

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Contract theory. Oxford, Eng: Oxford University Press, 2004.

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Vernon, David H. Contracts, theory and practice. 2nd ed. New York, NY: M. Bender, 1991.

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Hart, Oliver D. The theory of contracts. [Cambridge, Mass: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology], 1986.

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Yakubu, Ademola. International contracts: Evolution and theory. Ikeja, Lagos State, Nigeria: Malthouse Press, 1999.

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Prem, Christian. The Theory of Credit Contracts. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29362-8.

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Contract law and theory. New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011.

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E, Scott Robert. Contract law and theory. 3rd ed. Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2003.

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E, Scott Robert. Contract law and theory. 2nd ed. Charlottesville, Va: Michie Co., 1993.

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author, Kraus Jody S., ed. Contract law and theory. New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis, 2013.

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S, Kraus Jody, ed. Contract law and theory. 3rd ed. Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2002.

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Book chapters on the topic "Theory of contracts"

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Wang, Susheng. "Incentive Contracts." In Microeconomic Theory, 405–34. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0041-7_12.

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Slutskiy, Pavel. "Communication Theory of Contracts." In Communication and Libertarianism, 181–95. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6664-0_12.

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Outreville, J. François. "Pricing Insurance Contracts." In Theory and Practice of Insurance, 147–77. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6187-3_9.

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Kaiser, Dirk. "Inner Exchange Contracts." In Economic Theory in the 21st Century, 39–53. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-30639-7_6.

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Kaiser, Dirk. "Outer Financial Contracts." In Economic Theory in the 21st Century, 55–59. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-30639-7_7.

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Seyoum, Belay. "Export Sales Contracts." In Export–Import Theory, Practices, and Procedures, 189–208. 4th ed. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003020509-12.

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Castagna, Giuseppe, and Luca Padovani. "Contracts for Mobile Processes." In CONCUR 2009 - Concurrency Theory, 211–28. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04081-8_15.

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De Vylder, F. Etienne. "Life Insurance Contracts (Several Lives)." In Life Insurance Theory, 111–13. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2616-9_13.

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De Vylder, F. Etienne. "Life Insurance Contracts (One Life)." In Life Insurance Theory, 65–81. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2616-9_9.

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Stockinger, Peter. "On Conventions and Contracts." In Current Advances in Semantic Theory, 385. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/cilt.73.32sto.

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Conference papers on the topic "Theory of contracts"

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Harper, Christofer M., and Keith R. Molenaar. "Association between Construction Contracts and Relational Contract Theory." In Construction Research Congress 2014. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/9780784413517.136.

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Beulen, E., and P. Ribbers. "IT outsourcing contracts: practical implications of the incomplete contract theory." In 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of the. IEEE, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2003.1174788.

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Nyberg, Mattias, and Jonas Westman. "Failure Propagation Modeling Based on Contracts Theory." In 2015 11th European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/edcc.2015.21.

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Castagna, Giuseppe, Nils Gesbert, and Luca Padovani. "A theory of contracts for web services." In the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1328438.1328471.

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Zhang, Hao, Mahesh Nagarajan, and Greys Sošić. "Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807446.

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Fahrioglu, M., and F. L. Alvarado. "Designing cost effective demand management contracts using game theory." In IEEE Power Engineering Society. 1999 Winter Meeting (Cat. No.99CH36233). IEEE, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pesw.1999.747493.

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Al-Ali, Ayub, Abdul Azeez Ustadi, Arif Galadari, Abdulla, and Al-Yousuf. "Deciding the way forward of construction contracts during cash flow deficits." In 2010 International Conference on Financial Theory and Engineering (ICFTE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icfte.2010.5499432.

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Barth, Dominique, Boubkeur Boudaoud, and Thierry Mautor. "Game theory for contracts establishment with guaranteed QoS in the interdomain network." In 2012 International Conference on Communications and Information Technology (ICCIT). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccitechnol.2012.6285807.

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Keizer, Navin V., Onur Ascigil, Ioannis Psaras, and George Pavlou. "Rewarding relays for decentralised NAT traversal using smart contracts." In Mobihoc '20: The Twenty-first ACM International Symposium on Theory, Algorithmic Foundations, and Protocol Design for Mobile Networks and Mobile Computing. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3397166.3412799.

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Chang, Chen-Yu. "A critique of the Principal-Agent theory as applied to the design of engineering contracts." In 2012 IEEE International Technology Management Conference (ITMC). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itmc.2012.6306356.

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Reports on the topic "Theory of contracts"

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Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin Murphy. Implicit Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6177.

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Spiller, Pablo. An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14152.

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Koh, Annie, and Richard Levich. Synthetic Eurocurrency Interest Rate Futures Contracts: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3055.

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Gibbons, Robert, and Kevin Murphy. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3792.

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Kaplan, Steven, and Per Stromberg. Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7660.

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Abraham, Katharine, and Susan Taylor. Firms' Use of Outside Contractors: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4468.

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Research Institute (IFPRI), International Food Policy. Contract farming in developing countries: Theory, practice, and policy implications. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/9780896292130_04.

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Farmer, Roger E. A. AIL Theory and the Ailing Phillips Curve: A Contract Based Approach to Aggregate Supply. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3115.

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Lang, Kevin. Why Was there Mandatory Retirement? or the Impossibility of Efficient Bonding Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2199.

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Higdon, Jonathan L. Base Operation and Support (BOS) Contracts: Their Value to the US Navy. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada471883.

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