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1
Ma, Ching To. "Incentive contracts and organisation theory." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.363261.
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Sancho, Calderón Diego. "Selection of contract type in construction contracts: Lump-Sum, Target-cost and Cost-plus contracts." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för industriell ekonomi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-14823.
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The construction contract is a document which governs the business relationship of Contractor and Employer for the duration of a construction project. However, the selection of the contract type for the project tends to be performed too shallowly. The present thesis aims to analyse how the contract type is chosen among the three paradigmatic contracts considered here: lump-sum contracts, target-cost contracts and cost-plus contracts. The basis of the study is a case study performed on Project X, a large mine construction project in Western Europe. The relevant literature to the subject was reviewed, mainly the principal-agent theory, literature on risk allocation and on contract selection. After identifying several factors which may influence the contract selection in the literature and in a preliminary interview, a survey was conducted to assess their relative influence in general and in particular for the Project X. The survey was responded by a small sample of highly qualified and experienced managers. and was complemented with in-depth interviews with the majority of them. Some research on the project and on contract documents of the NEC standard contract was also performed in order to provide a context of the characteristics of Project X. The findings of the three sources made it possible to confirm the influence on the selection of the contract type of many of the factors proposed. It was possible to shortlist a small number of factors which influenced the most the selection of the contract type for Project X. These were the preferred risk allocation by the parties, the ability to adapt the contract to scope changes, the knowledge of each contract type by the contracting parties, the improvement of the project delivery by the contract type and the aim to enhance cooperation between the parties. Factors not present in previous research were also discovered, such as the different financial costs of the contract types and the requirement of financial information by the funders of the parties. The very different opinions of the respondents to the survey and interviews regarding the selection of the contract type confirm that the parties should consider in more detail that complex process, because by now the parties are not really sure why they are choosing a certain contract type. Further research should be performed in the future to analyse the factors which influenced the contract type selection in other projects. The projects could also be analysed during their whole duration. Other contract types or variants of the three contract types studied in this thesis could also be added to the analysis.
3
Hong, Sukhwa. "Mechanism Design Theory for Service Contracts." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/76865.
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This paper presents a novel approach for designing and optimizing maintenance service contracts through the application of mechanism design theory. When offering a contract to its customer, the maintenance service provider seeks to specify contract terms - such as price, service features and incentives - that maximize the provider's profit, satisfy customer needs, allocate risks effectively and mitigate moral hazards. Optimal contract design has to account for asymmetric information and uncertainties associated with customer characteristics and behaviors. We illustrate our mechanism design approach by applying it to the contract design challenge of a gas turbine manufacturer, which also provides maintenance services for its aircraft engines. In our solution approach, we compute an optimal set of contracts. The entire set is presented to the customer and is designed such that the customer will accept one of the contract alternatives without negotiations. In addition to eliminating the costs and delays associated with negotiations, this approach also reveals the customer's private information to the service provider, which the provider can use to its benefit in maintenance management and future contract renewals. Furthermore, we design and incorporate win-win incentive mechanisms into the contracts, which reward the customer for actions that reduces maintenance costs. We present a deterministic and a stochastic mechanism design model, the latter accounting for uncertainties associated with customer actions, engine performance, and maintenance costs during the contract execution phase.Master of Science
4
Lockwood, Ben. "Dynamic equilibrium : game theory, contracts, and search." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1986. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56207/.
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This thesis comprises three chapters centered on two common themes. The first theme is the application of non-cooperative game theory to economic questions; the second is the study of the kind of arrangements that can arise in the labour market as a response to asymmetric information. The first chapter surveys recent developments in non-cooperative game theory, and then attempts an extension of the recent results characterising perfect equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without discounting to more general games. We choose the dynamic game framework for the generalisation, and shows that there are two jointly, but not indi vidually sufficient condi tions for the generalisation to go through. We then turn to an application of these ideas to the theory of longterm contracts. The main motivation for this is that the view that wages and employment are determined by risk-sharing implicit contracts is now a well established alternative to fixed-price and marketclearing theories. In general, long-term arrangements may mitigate inefficiencies in the short-term contract that arise from various sorts of asymmetric information which are likely to be prevalent in worker-firm relationships. In this chapter two things are attempted; first, we try to integrate the game-theoretic approach to contractinq of Radner with the work of Townshend, Rogerson, Roberts and Manning among others, and second, we characterise the optimal contract, and obtain some new results. The labour market is also the topic of the third chapter. Here, we attempt to extend a well-known model of "frictional" labour market equilibrium to the case where onr or both sides of the market differ in inherent characteristics (e.g. skills) which may be observable or unobservable. We show first that the equilibrium may be inefficient even in the absence of externalities which work through the matching technology. Also, the model with unobservable characteristics provides a framework for a theoretical anal;Tsis of the practice of firms of screening workers by unemployment duration. We show that in our model, there are screening equilibria, and also investigate in some detail the impact of exogenous variables on the equilibrium.
5
Rosen, Asa. "Contributions to the theory of labour contracts." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1992. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2429/.
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The thesis consists of thee parts. Part one considers firm-union bargain over wages and working conditions (effort). It studies in a partial equilibrium setting, the theoretical relationship between the scope of firm-union bargains and the outcome in terms of wages, employment and effort. In particular, the outcome of a bargain over wages and effort is contrasted with the outcome of a pure wage bargain. A main result is that both effort and wages are lower when effort requirements are negotiable (rather than being determined by the employer). The analysis yields implications for the impact of unions on productivity, and gives an explanation to cross-industry differences in union mark-up on wages. In the second part I study labour contracts under temporarily asymmetric information. Under the assumption that workers are more heavily credit rationed than firms, the standard model of testing and self-selection in the labour market is extended in several directions. First, it is shown that ex post inefficient termination may be used as a self-selection device. This is a new explanation for up-or-out contracts in occupations where workers' productivity is revealed slowly. Second, when risk neutral workers can be of more than two different productivities, only the best worker should be overpaid. Finally, when productivity is non-verifiable, large firms may have an advantage in hiring more able workers. The issue of discrimination in the labour market is addressed in the last part. A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work. The model also offers a new explanation for duration dependence in exit rates from unemployment.
6
Ishihara, Akifumi. "Essays on relational contracts." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2011. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/345/.
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This dissertation contains three essays on self-enforcing implicit contracts in economic transactions and politics. Chapter 2 studies a repeated agency model with two tasks where the agent has private information on the first task and there is no verifiable performance signal for the second task. The equilibrium level of the first task is determined so as to guarantee the credibility of the relational contracts to provide incentives for the second task. It implies interesting economic results including non-monotonic relation between the discount factor and the total surplus, social desirability of unverifiability, and implications for organization design. Chapter 3 studies a model of political contribution of dynamic common agency where state-contingent agreements must be self-enforced. First, we investigate the punishment strategy for supporting the self-enforcing mechanism. The most severe punishment strategy on the principals takes the form of a two-phase scheme in general. Second, we characterize the payoff set of the equilibria on which the same decision is chosen by the agent through implicit agreements and examine whether it can achieve the same payoff as in the standard static menu auction model. It implies that there could be an equilibrium outcome in a static menu auction that cannot be supported in our model for any discount factor. Chapter 4 studies repeated political competition with policy-motivated citizen candidates. The dynamic relationship could cause strategic candidacy in two-candidate competition, such as in circumstances where two candidates stand for election and one of them has no chance to win. The candidate can choose her implementing policy depending on the set of the rival candidates in the election and the rival candidate actually has an incentive to stand even with no chance to win since it can induce policy compromises from the winning candidate.
7
Wilkinson, Thomas. "A macroeconomics of social contracts." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2013. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/60075/.
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This thesis sets out the case and foundations for a new way to think about, and model, Macroeconomics. This framework aims to describe the fluctuations and differing growths of economies, not in terms of the choice and exchange of Microeconomics, but rather in terms of the enforcement relationships that allow that exchange and other cooperation between people. It first establishes just why this is necessary, with a thorough methodological critique of the way Macroeconomics is done right now. It then presents computational models of two presumably competing kinds of enforcement relationship. The first of these is the third party supervision that we are most familiar with as enforcement from every day life, and which has received some of the longest running philosophical discussion. This hierarchical model reproduces economic fluctuations, through occasional collapses of large parts of the hierarchy. To assess the scientific merit of this model on the terms of conventional Macroeconomics, I develop a compatible hypothesis testing strategy. The second kind of enforcement considered is what would commonly be called peer pressure. For this I derive a preliminary result, that would allow further development of an overarching research program.
8
Bolton, Patrick. "The role of contracts in industrial organisation theory." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.434872.
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9
Westman, Jonas. "Specifying Safety-Critical Heterogeneous Systems Using Contracts Theory." Doctoral thesis, KTH, Mekatronik, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-192150.
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Requirements engineering (RE) is a well-established practice that is also emphasized in safety standards such as IEC 61508 and ISO 26262. Safety standards advocate a particularly stringent RE where requirements must be structured in an hierarchical manner in accordance with the system architecture; at each level, requirements must be allocated to heterogeneous (SW, HW, mechanical, electrical, etc.) architecture elements and trace links must be established between requirements. In contrast to the stringent RE in safety standards, according to previous studies, RE in industry is in general of poor quality. Considering a typical RE tool, other than basic impact analysis, the tool neither gives feedback nor guides a user when specifying, allocating, and structuring requirements. In practice, for industry to comply with the stringent RE in safety standards, better support for RE is needed, not only from tools, but also from principles and methods. Therefore, a foundation is presented consisting of an underlying theory for specifying heterogeneous systems and complementary principles and methods to specifically support the stringent RE in safety standards. This foundation is indeed suitable as a base for implementing guidance- and feedback-driven tool support for such stringent RE; however, the fact is that the proposed theory, principles, and methods provide essential support regardless if tools are used or not. The underlying theory is a formal compositional contracts theory for heterogeneous systems. This contracts theory embodies the essential RE property of separating requirements on a system from assumptions on its environment. Moreover, the contracts theory formalizes the stringent RE effort of structuring requirements hierarchically with respect to the system architecture. Thus, the proposed principles and methods for supporting the stringent RE in safety standards are well-rooted in formal concepts and conditions, and are thus, theoretically sound. Not only that, but the foundation is indeed also tailored to be enforced by both existing and new tools considering that the support is based on precise mathematical expressions that can be interpreted unambiguously by machines. Enforcing the foundation in a tool entails support that guides and gives feedback when specifying heterogeneous systems in general, and safety-critical ones in particular.Kravhantering är en väletablerad praxis som ocksåbetonas i säkerhetsstandarder såsom IEC 61508 och ISO 26262. Säkerhetsstandarder förespråkar en särskilt noggrann kravhantering där krav skall struktureras på ett hierarkiskt sätt i enlighet med systemarkitekturen; på varje nivå så skall krav allokeras till heterogena (SW, HW, mekaniska, elektriska, etc.) arkitekturelement och spårlänkar skall upprättas mellan kraven. I motsats till den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder så är kravhantering i industrin av allmänt dålig kvalitet enligt tidigare studier. Ett typisk kravverktyg ger inte mycket mer stöd än grundläggande konsekvensanalyser, d.v.s.\ verktyget ger varken återkoppling eller vägledning för att formulera, allokera, och strukturera krav. Bättre stöd behövs för att industrin i praktiken skall kunna förverkliga den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder -- inte bara stöd från verktyg, men också från kravhanteringsprinciper och metoder. Därför presenteras ett fundament bestående av en underliggande teori för specifiering av heterogena system, samt kompletterande principer och metoder för att stödja den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder. Detta fundament är lämplig som en bas för att kunna implementera verktyg som ger återkoppling och vägledning för kravhantering; likväl så ger den föreslagna teorin, principerna och metoderna essentiellt stöd oavsett om verktyg används eller inte. Den underliggande teorin är en kompositionell och formell kontraktsteori för heterogena system. Denna kontraktsteori ger konkret form åt den centrala kravhanteringsegenskapen att separera kraven på ett system från antaganden på dess omgivning. Dessutom så formaliserar kontraksteorin den noggranna uppgiften att hierarkiskt strukturera krav i enlighet med systemarkitekturen. Således så är de föreslagna principerna och metoderna för att stödja den noggranna kravhanteringen i säkerhetsstandarder välförankrade i formella begrepp och villkor och är därmed också teoretiskt sunda. Det erbjudna stödet är dessutom välanpassat för att kunna verkställas av såväl befintliga som nyaverktyg med tanke på att stödet är grundat på exakta matematiska uttryck som kan tolkas entydigt av maskiner. Verkställandet av fundamentet av ett verktyg medför stöd i form av vägledning och återkoppling vid specifiering av heterogena system i allmänhet, och säkerhetskritiska sådana i synnerhet.
QC 20160909
ESPRESSO
10
Tong, Fei Carlo. "Incomplete contracts and behavioural aspects – a case study in the construction and IT industries." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/65173.
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Contracts capture an agreement between two parties to exchange a resource in the future (ex-ante), however the future is not certain. Only after the event has happened, might the two parties compare the resources they have received to what they expected (ex-post). Entering into a contract with unknowns gives rise to incomplete contracts theory, the focus of which includes the study of human behavior. Relational contracting is currently being studied as a method of reducing the transaction costs and incompleteness of contracts.
Using case studies, this research aimed to reach a conclusion regarding why certain contractual projects run over budget. Overruns are often related to a variation agreement that is incomplete and open to interpretation. Understanding what the issues are and how to mitigate contractual risks was thus a key focus of this research.
The research examined two industries - construction and IT. From the case studies, 16 interviews were conducted and 12 contracts reviewed. The least concern for all the parties was disputes, as the parties find solutions to address issues not considered when drafting contracts. Industry specific experience and knowledge is needed to mitigate some unknown contractual risks, however.
Relational contracting was also very evident in resolving issues outside of a contract. Further studies into ancillary contracts will reveal more insight into behavioural and relational contracting.Dissertation(MBA)--Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria,2018.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
MBA
Unrestricted
11
Rohenkohl, Caio Eduardo. "A evolução da teoria contratual e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco : a hipótese do risco econômico imprevisto como integrante autônomo do conteúdo do contrato." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/164123.
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O trabalho estuda a evolução da teoria geral dos contratos e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco contratual, tendo como ponto de partida o direito contratual clássico do século XIX e o paradigma da autonomia da vontade. No novo direito contratual do século XX em diante, a análise toma como fio condutor as obras de Emilio Betti e de Karl Larenz, dentro do que se pode considerar o novo paradigma do direito contratual: a regulação e a satisfação de interesses privados mediante critérios de autonomia e heteronomia. O objetivo específico desse estudo é verificar a hipótese de que a teoria atual tenha (ou não) enfrentado o problema econômico dos riscos imprevistos dentro da idéia de "economia interna do contrato", tratando o risco econômico imprevisto como um integrante do conteúdo do contrato com autonomia diante da prestação. O caminho percorrido pelo trabalho identifica que o direito contratual tem sua estrutura teórica construída sobre uma concepção formalista de contrato, segundo a qual essa figura jurídica é uma entidade com existência própria, a qual está centrada na noção jurídica-formal de "obrigação de prestar". Mesmo que, com a evolução do direito contratual, tal estrutura tenha passado a contar com uma função a ser desempenhada na vida real, o trabalho conclui que a teoria continua sem tratar adequadamente o risco econômico imprevisto, porque tal função permanece limitada pela noção jurídico-formal de "obrigação de prestar".This dissertation studies the evolution of contract law theory and its influences on the legal theory of contractual risk. It begins with the classic theory of the 19th century and the will theory paradigm within it; from the 20th century onwards, the main analysis is based on the works of Emilio Betti and Karl Larenz, alongside with the new paradigm that pursues concrete interests through the combination of private autonomy and private heteronomy. The specific purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the current theory may have (or may have not) dealt with the economic problem of unforeseen risks by utilizing the idea of economic balance of contract, insofar as to consider the unforeseen economic risk as an autonomous factor in the content of contracts. The research identifies that the theoretical structure of contract law is built over a formalist conception of contract, according to which the contract is an entity with selfexistence, one that is exclusively centered on the notion of "duty to pay". Although the evolution of contract law has given a function to this structure to perform in society and between parties to a given contract, the dissertation concludes that the current theory is still limited by the notion of "duty to pay", and that the unforeseen economic risk has not yet been provided with an adequate legal treatment.
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ERKAN, ATILLA DJAN. "VALUATING ELECTRICITY SWAP CONTRACTS IN BRAZIL WITH UTILITY THEORY." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2013. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=22205@1.
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As impactantes transformações pelas quais o Brasil passou durante o início
da década de 1990 exigiram mudanças profundas no setor elétrico. O Decreto n
5.163/2004 introduziu ao mercado brasileiro de energia elétrica o Ambiente de
Contratação Livre (ACL), onde os agentes passaram a poder negociar livremente
contratos bilaterais de compra e venda de energia. No Brasil, os agentes
participantes estão expostos às bruscas variações do preço da energia no curto
prazo, chamado de Preço de Liquidação das Diferenças – PLD. Devido às
restrições existentes na malha de transmissão, os valores do PLD se distinguem
entre os quatro Submercados existentes: Norte, Nordeste, Sul e Sudeste/Centro-
Oeste. Ao fechar contratos em Submercados diferentes, o gerador deve vender a
energia ao PLD local e comprá-la ao preço spot do Submercado de destino. Desta
forma, o vendedor corre o risco de vender a um PLD mais baixo do que deverá
comprar. O swap de submercado pode ser utilizado para anular esta exposição,
mas cabe investigar o preço que cada parte deve estar disposta a pagar para fechar
o negócio. Assim, é proposta uma abordagem pela Teoria da Utilidade para se
chegar a estes valores. Dado que os Submercados Sudeste/Centro-Oeste e
Nordeste atualmente transacionam entre si a maior carga, estes foram
selecionados para avaliação. O ano de 2015 foi utilizado para delimitar o estudo.
Presume-se que ambas as partes são avessas ao risco de forma decrescente e que
há equilíbrio de forças na negociação. O valor final do contrato é estimado em
10,66 reais/MWh.The impacting transformations suffered by Brazil during the 1990s demanded profound changes in the eletrical sector.Decree 5.163/2004 established the Ambiente de ContrataçãoLivre (ACL), allowing participants to freely negotiate bilateral energy contracts. In Brazil, those who do so are exposed to extreme variations in spot prices, called Preço de Liquidação das Diferenças – PLD. Due to transmission capacity restrictions, PLD prices vary between the four existing submarkets: North, Northeast, South, and Southeast/Central-West. Dealing in different submarkets requires electricity generators to sell energy for local PLD and buy it for the spot price of the destination submarket. By doing so the seller may end up selling energy for a lower PLD than the buying price. Submarket swaps can be used for hedging, but what each party should be willing to pay requires investigation. Thus, to discover these prices, the Utility Theory is applied. Given that submarkets Southeast/Central-West and Northeast are currently the ones concentrating the greatest amount of transactions, these were selected for evaluation. Year 2015 was used to delimit the study. It is assumed that both parties are risk averse in a decreasing manner and that there is an equilibrium of forces in the negotiation. The final value of the contract is estimated at 10,66 reais/MWh.
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TORRES, RODRIGO CORREA. "PORTFOLIO VALUATION OF ELECTRICITY CONTRACTS: AN OPTIONS THEORY APPROACH." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=8675@1.
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O Ambiente de Contratação Livre proporcionou uma
continuidade do
processo de livre concorrência de mercado iniciado com a
reestruturação do setor
elétrico em 1997. A mudança de um regime baseado em
contratos de suprimento
renováveis para uma estrutura baseada em preços dados por
um mercado
competitivo, expõe as empresas do setor elétrico
brasileiro à volatilidade do
mercado de eletricidade. Neste novo ambiente, as empresas
devem gerenciar os
riscos associados às suas operações. Devido às
características singulares do setor
elétrico brasileiro, o gerenciamento de risco é um grande
desafio para os próximos
anos. Por outro lado, com a liberdade de negociação
permitida pelo segmento de
comercialização de energia no Ambiente de Contratação
Livre, os contratos de
compra e venda de energia elétrica passaram a adaptar-se
as necessidades de
mercado com a incorporação de flexibilidades que viessem a
mitigar os riscos
com relação à demanda por energia elétrica e
principalmente com relação ao
preço. Dentro desse contexto, foi desenvolvido um modelo
de avaliação de
portfolio de contratos de compra e venda de energia
elétrica, incorporando as
flexibilidades inerentes a atividade de comercialização,
de forma a quantificar os
riscos associados a esta atividade e determinar o valor
adicionado ao portfolio
pelas flexibilidades. O caso estudado é fictício, mas é um
exemplo típico na área
de comercialização de energia elétrica dentro deste novo
modelo.The Free Contracts Environment enabled continuity of the free market competition process which started with the electric sector restructure in 1997. The shift from a regime based on renewable supply contracts to a structure based on prices established by competition exposes companies in the Brazilian electric sector to the volatility of the electricity market. In this new environment companies must manage the risks associated to the operations. The Brazilian electric sector singular features make risk management a great challenge for ensuing years. On the other hand, with free negotiation enabled by the energy trade segment within the free contracts environment, electric energy purchase and sale contracts started to adapt to the market needs incorporating flexibilities designed to face uncertainty regarding electric energy demand in general and prices in particular. Within this context, an electric energy purchase and sale portfolio valuation model was developed, incorporating the flexibilities inherent to commercialization activities, in order to quantify the risks associated with this activity and establish the value added to the portfolio by the flexibilities. The case studied is fictitious, but typical in the field of electric energy trading within this new model.
14
Panunzi, Fausto. "Three essays in the theory of contracts and organizations." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11896.
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Hirata, Daisuke. "Essays on the Economics of Contracts and Organizations." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467213.
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This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of contracts and organizations. The first essay studies organizational design as the allocation of decision rights, primarily focusing on its interplay with agents' career motives. It identifies a new tradeoff between delegation and centralization, which arises solely from career concerns: When delegated, an agent takes inefficient actions at the cost of a principal but also works harder ex post to implement his project, in order to manipulate the market expectations of his ability. Compared to the existing literature, the contribution of this study is two-fold. First, it endogenizes the agent's bias as a result of career concerns. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it uncovers a new link between organizational design and the implementation of a decision. Both of these features are in sharp contrast to the vast majority of the existing studies, which takes the agent's bias as given and abstracts away from the implementation stage of a decision process. Specifically, delegation can be strictly optimal in the present framework even if the agent has no information advantage over the principal.
Motivated by some entry-level labor markets, the second essay studies an incentive-contracting problem where (i) a principal learns an agent's ability before the agent himself, and (ii) both the agent's productivity with the principal as well as his outside option depends on his ability. I characterize the optimal contracts for the principal, defined to be the most profitable equilibrium outcomes among those satisfying the D1 criterion; pooling at an earlier date is strictly optimal if the agent's outside option is sufficiently sensitive to the principal's private information, whereas separation at a later date is (weakly) optimal otherwise.Further, the principal's profit is shown to be neither continuous nor monotone with respect to the agent's outside option.
The third essay studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one.
Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is shown to be the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Notably, these results are established without any substitutes conditions on hospitals' choice functions, and hence, the proofs do not rely on the "rural hospital" theorem. Finally, a stable and strategy-proof rule, when exists, is shown to be second-best optimal for doctor welfare, in the sense that no individually-rational and strategy-proof rule can dominate it.Economics
16
Duncan, Alfred James Michael. "Essays on financial contracts and business cycles." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7267/.
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This dissertation studies the intersection between the sharing of individual specific risks and business cycle risks. Individual specific or idiosyncratic risk sharing is typically hampered by moral hazard, and in Chapter 2 we propose a new theory of debt finance as an effective mechanism for sharing idiosyncratic risks. But business cycle or systemic risk sharing is also affected by the means of idiosyncratic risk sharing. Departures from full systemic risk sharing can dampen the incentive compatibility constraint allowing a greater degree of idiosyncratic risk sharing (Chapter 1). Entrepreneurs’ productive risk can quickly transform into low employment, as wages fall below marginal revenue products of labour (Chapter 3). Market prices for systemic risk insurance do not necessarily internalise balance sheet externalities, resulting in excessive swings in leverage and factor market wedges of inefficiency (Chap- ter 4). Sometimes, agents have private information about the risks faced by their projects, and how they correlate with the broader economy. When this is the case, optimal systemic risk sharing arrangements must allocate business systemic risk in a way that deters entrepreneurs from herding among their peers (Chapter 5).
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Sekiyama, Taro. "An Integrated Theory of Type-Based Static and Dynamic Verification." 京都大学 (Kyoto University), 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/215690.
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© 2015 Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26529-2_11© 2015 ACM, Inc. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2676726.2676996Kyoto University (京都大学)
0048
新制・課程博士
博士(情報学)
甲第19863号
情博第614号
新制||情||107(附属図書館)
32899
京都大学大学院情報学研究科通信情報システム専攻
(主査)教授 五十嵐 淳, 教授 山本 章博, 教授 岡部 寿男
学位規則第4条第1項該当
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Banerjee, Anindya. "Information and contracts : a study of principal-agent relationships." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62b32d23-b43f-4a1a-a4e0-8185e3104ecd.
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This thesis is concentrated broadly in the field of mathematical industrial economics and more specifically upon what is known in the literature as principal-agent relationships. It focuses on investigating the nature of optimal contracts between, say, owners of the firm and the manager appointed by them to run the affairs of the firm or yet again between the owners and the workers employed in the firm. Chapter 1 introduces by first establishing the background of the analysis and then summarising the results of the thesis. The background consists mainly of implicit contract models, both of the symmetric and asymmetric information kind, and models of moral-hazard. The results of the thesis are contained in four chapters following the introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned primarily with the use made of principal agent models in the asymmetric-information implicit contract literature. This literature attempts to explain involuntary unemployment by showing that the inefficiency generated by the asymmetry in information between the principal (firm) and the workers (agent) manifests itself in employment lower than the efficient level. We show instead that results are altered in quite striking ways depending not only on the eventual asymmetry of information but also the asymmetry prevailing, say, when the agent takes his action, but before production occurs. Chapter 4 makes the case in favour of using the first-order approach in solving principal-agent models by proposing a weakening of the sufficient conditions which make this approach valid. Such weakening extends the range of cases - given by particular configurations of utility and density functions - for which the analytical convenience of the first-order approach may be utilised. Chapter 5 uses moral-hazard models and the first-order approach to answer the specific question "Should owner-managed firms with limited liability be taxed a higher rate than similar firms with unlimited liability?". The answer is "Yes, but only under certain conditions". Chapter 6 summarises and draws together the various strands of the arguments presented in the thesis.
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Yin, Shihong. "Theory and application of exotic options, pricing revenue insurance contracts in agriculture." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2002. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/NQ65842.pdf.
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Al-Tawil, Tareq Nail. "Promises, contracts and remedies : The efficient breach theory versus routine specific performance." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.511210.
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Nishida, Yuki. "Typed Software Contracts with Intersection and Nondeterminism." Kyoto University, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/253520.
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Briglauer, Wolfgang, and Christian Holzleitner. "Efficient contracts for government intervention in promoting next generation communications networks." Forschungsinstitut für Regulierungsökonomie, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2012. http://epub.wu.ac.at/3641/1/briglauer_holzleitner_efficient_contracts.pdf.
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Although the future socio-economic benefits of a new fibre-based ("next generation access", NGA) telecommunications infrastructure seem to be uncontroversial, most countries have to date only undertaken NGA investments on a small scale. Accordingly, a universal NGA coverage appears to be a rather unrealistic objective without government intervention. Indeed, many governments have already initiated diverse subsidy programs in order to stimulate NGA infrastructure deployment. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on NGA infrastructure-based services and the public authorities' incomplete information about the capital costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the NGA provider. Simple linear profit-sharing contracts can be designed to control the NGA provider's incentives and to put in balance the public objectives of network expansion and limitation of public expenditure. (author's abstract)Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics
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Ho, Shirley Jin-Shien. "Asymmetric multistage models of R&D : technology adoption, contracts and protection." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1997. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/108373/.
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This thesis consists of three individual models on technology adoption, contracts and protection. The first model is motivated by the inconsistency between empirical results and theoretical models regarding the firm size effects upon the timing of adoption. By proposing a two-stage, endogenous learning, Stackelberg model, we conclude that in a pure strategy equilibrium, the large firm may or may not tacitly delay its adoption to capture the information advantage, depending on cost and belief parameters. The welfare analysis provides a justification for government interventions in firms’ adoption decisions. The second model is motivated by the fact that although more and more resources have been devoted to R&D activities, there is little theoretical discussion regarding R&D funding issues. Chapter 3 derives the optimal funding contract, which happens to be a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract in the literature. After considering the adverse selection problem, the optimal contract induces no efficiency loss under both discrete and continuous settings and the principal will be more conservative in funding. The optimal auction maintains both allocation and production efficiency, and bidding the principal’s reservation price will be a dominant strategy in a second price auction. Neither the revenue equivalence nor the separation property will hold. With symmetric beliefs, the optimal funding length is shorter than that of contractible effort. Under some assumptions, the lock-in effect persists and the principal will prefer short-term contracts to long-term contracts. The third model decides the optimal protection forms, protection rates and protection lengths under various cost and revenue circumstances. Since the incentive scheme will be affected by the target firm’s future profits, we show that in the context of incomplete information, screening protection schemes can sometimes coincide with the efficient schemes. In R&D area, our result suggests that optimal patent length need not necessarily be increasing in firm’s investment efficiency.
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Thompson, Andrew C. "A theory of natural gas contracting, and a contingent claim method of evaluating natural gas purchase volume options /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/8822.
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Tsai, Angela C. F. "Valuation of Eurodollar futures contracts under alternative term structure models : theory and evidence." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.366802.
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Rea, David Hamish. "Employing contracts : an assessment of the new institutional economic theory of employment contracting." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.621586.
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KNAPP, JOSHUA R. "Developing a Multi-Foci Perspective of Psychological Contract Theory." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1213812609.
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Baldwin, Kenneth. "The economics of information and piecewise linear limited liability profit sharing contracts." Thesis, Loughborough University, 2000. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/27586.
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This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the design of profit-sharing contracts which maximise the surplus a principal extracts from an agency relationship, whereby a pay floor limits the liability of an agent in low profit states, and information is either unilaterally or bilaterally asymmetric.
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Sweis, Rajai K. "Construction insurance in the Arab Gulf area : an analysis of cover and contracts." Thesis, City University London, 1988. http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/8357/.
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Important problems have been frequently encountered in connection with the insurance covers of projects in the Arab Gulf Area. An attempt to investigate such problems and recommend solutions thereto is given in this thesis. The investigation started by a study of the economic and the legal background, the legal liabilities of the parties to the construction project and the insurance market background and practices in the area. Analysis of the insurance requirement contract conditions forms used in the ambiguities, shortfalls etc. therein, lack of insurance awareness, resulted ance covers asked for and led to most clauses in the main area, revealed many which, in addition to in inadequate insurproblems encountered. Investigation of 453 losses showed that in many claims, inadequate covers asked for and obtained resulted in amounts claimed being either much reduced or wholly repudiated. Delays in settlements following disputes were therefore frequent. In some cases significant losses occurred, seriously affecting contractors with limited means, as the losses were totally or partially not covered under the CAR policies they asked for. Analysis of 1573 CAR/EAR policies showed the present low adequacy of cover. A system adopted in some cases, for checking CAR policies, improved their protection level, to the benefit of contractors, principals and insurers. To assist engineersf accountants etc., who are not insurance experts but deal with CAR policies, an index has been formulated in the thesis to measure adequacy of cover thereunder. A limited random sample survey among contractors, employers and consulting engineers showed that they think the index would be very useful and they welcomed the idea. The study confirmed that insurers are losing a sizable portion of the market left uninsured whether totally or partially. If properly arranged, these additional covers would widen insurers' market base and protect employers and contractors at relatively small cost. To remedy the position, recommendations are given in the thesis for a suggested new wording of the insurance requirement clauses in the contract conditions. The new wording seeks clarity and adequate protection for contractors and employers without departing from normal insurance practices. Other recommendations given suggested implementing some practical steps for improvement, including the use of the aforementioned index to initiate better understanding and increased demand for more adequate construction insurance covers.
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Graf, Julia [Verfasser]. "Rebate Contracts and Consumer Tariff Choice: Three Essays on Industrial Organization Theory / Julia Graf." Düsseldorf : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1047666316/34.
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Ishiguro, Shingo. "Essays on the Theory of Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation with Applications to Organizational Designs." Kyoto University, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/181765.
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Cordero-Salas, Paula. "Essays in Contract Design under Incomplete Enforcement: Theory and Experiments." The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1306500896.
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Han, YongQiang. "The relevance of Adams and Brownsword's Theory of contract law ideologies to insurance contract law reform : an interpretative and evaluative approach." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2013. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=201899.
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This thesis approaches key areas of insurance contract law and their reform from the perspective of Adams and Brownsword’s theory of contract law ideologies. Pursuant to this theory, there are two layers of ideologies underlying contract law. One is the formalist versus realist judicial approaches. The other is that the realist approach being broken down into two limbs, namely market-individualism and consumer-welfarism in contract law. The theory of contract law ideologies is relevant to insurance contract law, because there is substantiated homogeneity between general contract law and insurance contract law, and the relevance consists in the theory’s usefulness both as an interpretive framework and as an evaluative standard. Specifically, from that particular ideological perspective, the thesis interprets the law of disclosure and warranty in insurance, of the requirement of insurable interest, and of the legal rules for insurance payment. Under the theory of contract law ideologies as an interpretative framework, the current law of insurance as far as those three key areas are concerned is found to be much more formalist than realist. The thesis also evaluates the core proposals tentatively put forward by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission for reform in those key areas of insurance contract law. From the theory of contract law ideologies, it can be derived an evaluative standard that, for law reform through legislation, the realist approach is more preferable, and market-individualism should prevail in business insurance whereas consumer-welfarism should prevail in consumer insurance. By this standard, most of the core tentative proposals by the two Law Commissions for reform in the law of disclosure in business insurance and of warranties in insurance are realist and therefore desirable, but two of the proposals need to be amended. The recent proposals in 2011 to retain the requirement of insurable interest are not realist and instead it is better to return to the proposals in 2008. Among the proposals regarding the legal rules of insurance payment, the Scottish approach is preferable for its realist re-characterization of insurers’ primary contractual obligation.
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Iolovitch, Marcos Brossard. "Efficient breach theory – a análise do rompimento eficiente dos contratos empresariais à luz da legislação brasileira e da law and economics." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/148302.
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O presente trabalho examina a teoria da quebra eficiente do contrato, oriunda do direito anglo-saxão, segundo a qual, sinteticamente, um contrato só será cumprido se os custos para adimplir a obrigação forem inferiores àqueles incorridos pelo descumprimento, admitindo-se, portanto, o inadimplemento voluntário dos contratos. O objetivo é, além de apresentar a teoria, verificar a possibilidade de aplicação da mesma no Brasil, com enfoque especial nos contratos empresariais. Para tanto, o trabalho é estruturado em introdução, quatro capítulos de desenvolvimento e encerra com a conclusão. Superada a introdução, que apresenta mais profundamente as razões que levaram à pesquisa sobre o tema, o capítulo 2 versa acerca dos paradigmas clássicos de responsabilidade contratual, com destaque às modalidades de extinção do contrato sem a consecução do seu objeto bem como às regras indenizatórias aplicáveis nestes casos, em que se busca cotejá-las com o entendimento jurisprudencial. A seguir, o capítulo 3 traz as premissas teóricas da Law and Economics focadas no Direito dos Contratos necessárias à compreensão, no capítulo seguinte, da teoria da quebra eficiente do contrato, que representa o tema central do presente estudo. Neste capítulo 4 será feita uma abordagem teórica e prática da teoria sob exame, apontando sua origem histórica, desenvolvimento e aceitação do paradigma, identificando os requisitos para sua aplicação, potenciais barreiras e também as críticas doutrinárias para, em seguida, delinear o que seria o cenário ideal para sua aplicação, bem como um tópico dedicado exclusivamente à sua abordagem prática e metodologia, indicando os elementos que devem ser sopesados antes de se tomar a decisão de romper um contrato. No capítulo 5, verifica-se quais requisitos são aceitos, as efetivas barreiras e como elas podem ser superadas para autorizar a sua incidência no Brasil, tanto os de caráter jurídico como os extralegais. Para o fechamento, o último capítulo apresenta as conclusões alcançadas através da pesquisa, indicando pontos relevantes sobre a teoria da quebra eficiente e respondendo ao principal questionamento cuja resposta era almejada, se é possível aplicar a teoria no Brasil, sob quais circunstâncias e em qual extensão.The current paper examines the efficient breach theory of contracts, from the Anglo-Saxon law origin, according to which, briefly, a contract will only be performed if the costs for performance of the obligation are lower than those incurred for non-performance, admitting, therefore, intentional breach of contract. The goal is, in addition to presenting the theory, check the possibility of applying it in Brazil, focusing mostly on business contracts. Therefore, the work is structured into introduction, four chapters of development and ends with the conclusion. Surpassed the introduction, which explains more deeply the reasons that led to research on the topic, chapter 2 examines the classical paradigms of contractual liability, especially to terminate the contract without achieving its object as well as the applicable indemnity rules in these cases, seeking to compare them with the jurisprudential understanding. Following, chapter 3 provides the theoretical premises of Law and Economics focused on the Law of Contracts necessary to understand, in the next chapter, the efficient breach theory, which is the central theme of this study. In chapter 4 a theoretical and practical approach of the theory under examination will be addressed with its historical origin, development and acceptance of the paradigm, identifying the requirements for its application, potential barriers and also the criticism it has faced to, then, outline what would be the ideal scenario for its application as well as a topic dedicated exclusively to its practical approach and methodology, pointing the elements that should be weighed before deciding to breach a contract. In chapter 5, it is shown the which requirements are accepted, the actual barriers and how they can be surpassed to permit its incidence in Brazil, both legal and non-legal. For closure, the last chapter presents the conclusions reached through the research, indicating the relevant points on the theory of efficient breach and responding to the main question of which answer was longed for, whether it is possible to apply the theory in Brazil, under what circumstances and to what extent.
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Asseyer, Andreas. "Essays in contract theory and industrial organization." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17734.
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Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln in Vertragstheorie und Industrieökonomik. Die Kapitel 1 und 2 bearbeiten Fragestellungen der Vertragstheorie. In diesen Kapiteln studiere ich die Ausprägung der Informationsasymmetrien, die in vertraglichen Beziehungen entstehen, wenn die schlechter informierte Partei versucht ihren Informationsnachteil gegenüber dem Vertragspartner zu reduzieren. In Kapitel 1 analysiere ich die Möglichkeit, dass die schlechter informierte Vertragspartei eine dritte Partei – einen Berater oder Supervisor – konsultiert, der jedoch mit der besser informierten Partei kolludieren könnte. In Kapitel 2 analysiere ich den Fall, in dem die schlechter informierte Vertragspartei selbst Monitoring-Aktivitäten aufnehmen kann, um zusätzliche Information zu sammeln. In Kapitel 3 untersuche ich den Effekt von Informationsasymmetrien innerhalb von Unternehmen auf diskriminierende Preissetzungsstrategien in Zwischengutmärkten. Hierbei analysiere ich Preisdiskriminierung und die aus dieser resultierenden Wohlfahrtseffekte in einem Modell eines Zwischengutmarktes, auf dem ein monopolistischer Verkäufer ein Zwischengut an zwei Abnehmer verkauft, die aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen vertikalen Organisation unterschiedlich stark von Agenturkosten betroffen sind.This dissertation consists of three independent chapters in the fields of contract theory and industrial organization. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with topics in contract theory. In these chapters, I study the form of information asymmetry that arises in contractual relationships where the less knowledgeable party can reduce its informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the contractual partner. In Chapter 1, I analyze the opportunity of the less knowledgeable party to consult a third party – an expert or supervisor – who can provide advice. In Chapter 2, the less knowledgeable party can itself engage in monitoring activities to gather additional information. In Chapter 3, I explore the effect of information asymmetry within firms on discriminatory pricing in intermediate good markets. In particular, I study price discrimination and the associated welfare effects in an intermediate good market where a monopolistic upstream firms sells an input to downstream firms that vary in their exposure to the problem of asymmetric information due to different degrees of vertical integration.
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Awe, Akinwale A. "The function of indemnity clauses in the context of Brian Coote's "The essence of contract theory"." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2017. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=237095.
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Apples and pears may be related fruits, but that does not mean they are the same! If I were to host a dinner party and intended to bake and serve an apple tart, but was delivered pears, I would end up with a pear frangipane and some very disappointed house guests. The context in which words are communicated is very important - apples and pears could relate to fruits or indeed stairs. Recognising intention as being important even in social contracts highlights the importance of intention in commercial transactions. The utility of contract law is to facilitate the agreement of parties and the rights and obligations assumed by them -this is the true essence of contract. Reverting to the analogy above, indemnity clauses although in some cases achieving similar ends as exclusion clauses, are not intended to result in exclusions of liability but are a more specific method of contractual risk management. One could infer that parties who specifically make use of indemnity clauses do not intend these to function as limitation of liability clauses, neither would they have intended such clauses be construed an exclusion of liability. Exclusion clauses could be construed as defences to accrued rights, however a central theme in this thesis is that an exclusion clause is clear in its function- it negates the accrual of a primary duty, implied by law. An indemnity on the other hand undeniably relates to secondary obligations to compensate or make good loss upon breach of primary obligations to perform. An indemnity clause, transfers secondary obligations to compensate to another who has assumed such obligation(s). In most cases the transferred obligation is financial; an indemnity is similar to a contractual insurance in this sense. An indemnity clause is not an exclusion clause. The difference is not only academic but also relevant to commerce. As the indemnity becomes a more common feature in high risk and high value contracting, certainty of its meaning is all too important. Where an indemnity is misconstrued as an exclusion of liability, the latter a duty defining clause, this could have an effect on the insurance arrangements between the parties ultimately making the venture uneconomical for one or both of the parties. The certainty of a contractual term enhances its effectiveness and consequently reduces the economic transaction costs of its inclusion. Thus, parties can focus on the first stage of Posner's transaction cost theory – 'negotiations and drafting' enhancing the utility of contract law.
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Panvisavas, Veerades. "An investigation of the use of hotel management contracts and the application of agency theory." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.510856.
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Yu, Ka-wai Marco. "A contractual theory of the firm : a construction project case study /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2001. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B24873226.
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Bechara, Guilherme Fontes. "A causa dos contratos." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2014. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/6491.
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Previous issue date: 2014-08-12This paper has the purpose of analyzing the cause of contracts. The subject is relevant and justifiable because although there is no statutory provision on the cause of contracts, it is important to the theory of contracts. Moreover, its practical importance is unquestionable. It is herein inquired what is the concept of the cause of contracts and what is the role played by it in the national legal system. Through academic research carried out in domestic and foreign doctrine and case law of Brazilian Courts, particularly the Superior Court of Justice and Court of Appeals of the State of São Paulo, this paper concludes that the cause of contracts are the practical intent of the contract which is highlighted by the parties comprised in the contractual provisions. It is also argued the relevance and practical application of the concept of cause of contracts in several areas of law notably the ones related to the interpretation and classification of contracts and in situations involving the issues of contractually linked agreements (contratos coligados), general duty of good faith, social role of the agreement and frustration. Finally, it is emphasized the large number of legal opinions where the cause of contracts have directly or indirectly driven the decision of the case
Este trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a causa do contrato. Justifica-se o tema porque, a despeito da inexistência de previsão legislativa a respeito, a causa do contrato é relevante para a teoria contratual e sua aplicação prática é indiscutível. Questiona-se, assim, qual é o conceito e o papel desempenhado pela causa do contrato no cenário jurídico nacional. Por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica em acervo nacional e estrangeiro, além de repertórios de jurisprudência dos tribunais pátrios, notadamente do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e do Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, este trabalho conclui que a causa encerra a razão prática do contrato, evidenciada pelos interesses das partes constantes do regulamento contratual. Verifica-se, por fim, a relevância e aplicação do conceito da causa do contrato em diversas áreas, principalmente em relação à interpretação e qualificação dos contratos e, em especial, em situações envolvendo as figuras dos contratos coligados, da boa-fé objetiva, da função social do contrato e da frustração do fim do contrato, ressaltando-se, ainda, o significativo número de julgados em que a figura da causa norteou a solução da demanda, seja de forma direta ou indireta
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OLIVEIRA, I. G. S. "REMUNERAÇÃO Executiva e Desempenho. Evidências Empíricas no Brasil." Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2014. http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/2772.
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Previous issue date: 2014-10-24O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a relação existente entre remuneração executiva e desempenho em companhias brasileiras de capital aberto listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. A linha teórica parte do pressuposto que o contrato de incentivos corrobora com o alinhamento de interesses entre acionistas e executivos e atua como um mecanismo de governança corporativa a fim de direcionar os esforços dos executivos para maximização de valor da companhia. A amostra foi composta pelas 100 companhias mais líquidas listadas em quantidade de negociações de ações na BM&FBOVESPA durante o período 2010-2012, totalizando 296 observações. Os dados foram extraídos dos Formulários de Referência disponibilizados pela CVM e a partir dos softwares Economática® e Thomson Reuters ®. Foram estabelecidas oito hipóteses de pesquisa e estimados modelos de regressão linear múltipla com a técnica de dados em painel desbalanceado, empregando como variável dependente a remuneração total e a remuneração média individual e como regressores variáveis concernentes ao desempenho operacional, valor de mercado, tamanho, estrutura de propriedade, governança corporativa, além de variáveis de controle. Para verificar os fatores que explicam a utilização de stock options, programa de bônus e maior percentual de remuneração variável foram estimados modelos de regressão logit. Os resultados demonstram que, na amostra selecionada, existe relação positiva entre remuneração executiva e valor de mercado. Verificou-se também que os setores de mineração, química, petróleo e gás exercem influência positiva na remuneração executiva. Não obstante, exerce relação inversa com a remuneração total à concentração acionária, o controle acionário público e o fato da companhia pertencer ao nível 2 ou novo mercado conforme classificação da BMF&BOVESPA. O maior valor de mercado influencia na utilização de stock options, assim como no emprego de bônus, sendo que este também é impactado pelo maior desempenho contábil. Foram empregados também testes de robustez com estimações por efeitos aleatórios, regressões com erros-padrão robustos clusterizados, modelos dinâmicos e os resultados foram similares. Desse modo, conclui-se que há indícios de que a remuneração executiva e os planos de incentivos estão relacionados com a maximização de valor da companhia, a despeito o desempenho operacional apresentou associação negativa com a remuneração executiva.
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Incorvia, Joseph H. "An evaluation of defense contracting based on transaction cost theory." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/42008.
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This study investigates the use of the transaction
cost paradigm, as a framework, for evaluating defense
contracts and exploring problems related to defense
contracting. The study shows that defense contracting is
beleaguered with bounded rationality and uncertainty
problems, and furthermore, that bounded rationality and
uncertainty can lead to opportunistic behavior within
defense contracting. The study shows, in particular that
adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up problems exist
within defense contracting.
Based on the results of this study the transaction
cost paradigm can be used as a framework for evaluating
defense contracts and related problems. The results also
indicate that hold-up problems and moral hazard problems
may be minimized by using proper contracts or acquisition
strategies. Based on the case study in Chapter III there
does not appear to be a contractual solution to adverse
selection problems.
Master of Arts
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Chen, Shaoling. "Incomplete contracts and corporate governance : theory and evidence : case studies on Chinese banking and U.S. franchising /." View abstract or full-text, 2007. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?ECON%202007%20CHEN.
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Dudley, Larkin S. "Contractual governance: theory and practice in Circular A-76." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37863.
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This study builds a conceptual framework of contractual governance through an examination of the policy environment and contracting process under one federal program, circular A-76. To comply with the government's general policy of relying on commercial sources to supply products and services, Circular A-76 requires agencies to study selected activities and put them up for bid between in0-house government departments and private companies.Ph. D.
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Lounsbury, H. Bruce (Hugh Bruce) Carleton University Dissertation Management Studies. "Options theory as a framework for decision-making in R & D investments." Ottawa, 1992.
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Lin, Jason. "Analysis of Blockchain-based Smart Contracts for Peer-to-Peer Solar Electricity Transactive Markets." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/87563.
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The emergence of blockchain technology and increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) have created a new opportunity for peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. However, challenges arise in such transactive markets to ensure individual rationality, incentive compatibility, budget balance, and economic efficiency during the trading process. This thesis creates an hour-ahead P2P energy trading network based on the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain and explores a comparative analysis of different auction mechanisms that form the basis of smart contracts. Considered auction mechanisms are discriminatory and uniform k-Double Auction with different k values. This thesis also investigates effects of four consumer and prosumer bidding strategies: random, preference factor, price-only game-theoretic approach, and supply-demand game-theoretic approach. A custom simulation framework that models the behavior of the transactive market is developed. Case studies of a 100-home microgrid at various photovoltaic (PV) penetration levels are presented using typical residential load and PV generation profiles in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. Results indicate that regardless of PV penetration levels and employed bidding strategies, discriminatory k-DA can outperform uniform k-DA. Despite so, discriminatory k-DA is more sensitive to market conditions than uniform k-DA. Additionally, results show that the price-only game-theoretic bidding strategy leads to near-ideal economic efficiencies regardless of auction mechanisms and PV penetration levels.MS
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Burger, Kenneth Kehr Jonathan Wobensmith Brian. "Contingency contracting." Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2003. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/03Dec%5FBurger%5FKehr%5FWobensmith%5fManual.pdf.
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[Thesis (M.B.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003.][MBA professional report] [Thesis advisor(s): R. Marshall Engelbeck, Rob B. Tudor.] [Authors: Kenneth Burger, Jonathan Kehr, Brian Wobensmith.] Also available online.
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Vasconcelos, Francisco Josà Mendes. "The EVALUATION AND PLANNING IN CONTRACTS AGROBUSINESS AS STRATEGIES OF UNCERTAINTY minimizing transaction costs." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2014. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=12724.
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The present study aimed to analyze the applicability of legal theories ImprevisÃo and avoidable damage in minimizing the effects of uncertainty in the agribusiness contracts. To examine such application, first, secondary data extracted from time series database of IBGE and IPEA-DATA in the estimation of an econometric model, where methods of time series, unit root test, test were employed were worked co-integration Johansen model vector error correction and variance decomposition of forecast errors. This econometric procedure aims to demonstrate margins of errors in the prognosis of future data. The sample period covers January 2007 to December 2011. As an additional function was taken concomitantly, a research field whose basic aim was to characterize the contractual relationship of an agribusiness production chain. The supply chain was chosen the culture of cashew in the state of CearÃ. The set of results in a systemic way, demonstrates that despite all the caring of economic agents in running a successful strategic planning within their productive activity, there is always a "gray area", under the impenetrable human perspective, imbued with extraordinary facts and unpredictable that when they occur, cause imbalance in contracts. This means that the fatality not envisioned by econometric methods, the legal instruments supplementing them in order to adjust the contracts, rebalancing them again.O presente trabalho se propÃs analisar a aplicabilidade das teorias jurÃdicas da ImprevisÃo e dos Danos evitÃveis na minimizaÃÃo dos efeitos da incerteza no contratos de agronegÃcio. Para examinar referida aplicaÃÃo, primeiramente, foram trabalhados dados secundÃrios extraÃdos de sÃries histÃricas do banco de dados do IBGE e IPEA-DATA na estimaÃÃo de um modelo economÃtrico, onde foram empregados mÃtodos de sÃries de tempo, teste de raiz unitÃria, teste de co-integraÃÃo de Johansen, modelo de vetor de correÃÃo de erros e decomposiÃÃo da variÃncia de erros de previsÃo. Tal procedimento economÃtrico tem o objetivo de demonstrar margens de erros no prognostico de dados futuros. O perÃodo analisado abrange janeiro de 2007 a dezembro de 2011. Em uma funÃÃo suplementar foi feita, concomitantemente, uma pesquisa de campo cujo intuito basilar foi caracterizar a relaÃÃo contratual de uma cadeia produtiva do agronegÃcio. A cadeia produtiva escolhida foi a cultura da castanha de caju no Estado do CearÃ. O conjunto de resultados, de forma sistÃmica, demonstra que, apesar de todo zelo dos agentes econÃmicos em executar um bom planejamento estratÃgico dentro de sua atividade produtiva, sempre hà uma âzona obscuraâ, impenetrÃvel sob a Ãtica humana, impregnada de fatos extraordinÃrios e imprevisÃveis que, quando de sua ocorrÃncia, causam desequilÃbrio nos contratos. Isso significa que, na fatalidade nÃo antevista pelos mÃtodos economÃtricos, os instrumentos jurÃdicos suplementando-os, de forma a reajustar os contratos, reequilibrando-os novamente.
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Smith, N. J. "The study of criticality : an investigation based on network theory into the relationship between time and cost in civil engineering bridgeworks contracts and the measurement of the effects of change." Thesis, University of Manchester, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.233393.
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Kantur, Habil, and Charles Bamuleseyo. "How smart contracts can change the insurance industry : Benefits and challenges of using Blockchain technology." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Informatik, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-39899.
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The world is becoming more and more digitized. Recently many industries have started to research the blockchain technology and particularly smart contracts. One industry that so far has not adopted new technology in the same pace as other industries, is the insurance industry so this interview study aims at finding opportunities and challenges for insurance companies that want to learn about smart contracts and its use cases.By doing a literature review and performing interviews with blockchain experts and insurance company employees, this study found that both IT companies working with smart contracts and the insurance companies have limited knowledge of the legal aspect of smart contracts. The lack of standards and regulations allows IT companies to freely create smart contracts without much quality control. The insurance companies must innovate themselves in order to not be disrupted. The blockchain technology will offer many new insurance types and if the insurance industry fails to adopt the blockchain technology they may face market disruption.There is much room for future research following this study. It would be beneficial to research how contract theory could be used in practice during the creation of legally binding smart contracts. Furthermore, research around fraud prevention in smart contracts would be interesting as would an in-depth exploration of the ecosystem of third party software and services around smart contracts.
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Gil, Fabio Coutinho de Alcantara. "A onerosidade excessiva em contratos de engineering." Universidade de São Paulo, 2007. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-24052011-143442/.
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O presente trabalho visa analisar em que medida a alteração das circunstâncias negociais que levem à situação de onerosidade excessiva prevista pelo Código Civil produz efeitos sobre a utilidade que as partes derivam dos contratos de engineering, considerados estes como contratos que têm por objeto o desenvolvimento de projetos industriais e de infraestrutura de grande porte. Situa esses contratos em seu contexto histórico e social, descrevendo seus principais elementos de distinção, especialmente a complexidade e risco das operações econômicas que lhes é subjacente e os qualifica como contratos socialmente típicos, sujeitos ao regime dos contratos de empreitada. A tese discute a adequação do tratamento jurisprudencial que vem sendo dado à onerosidade excessiva e descreve os esquemas negociais geralmente usados em tais contratos para fins de alocação de riscos. Finalmente, a tese discute a aplicação de modelos da Análise Econômica do Direito, como a Teoria dos Contratos Incompletos, como subsídio para a valoração de aplicabilidade das normas sobre onerosidade excessiva aos contratos de engineering e análise dos efeitos de sua aplicação sobre esses contratos.The aim of this work is to analyze to what extent changed circumstances that are contractually relevant, so as to characterize the legal figure of excessive onerosity [a situation of material burden for complying with a given obligation on one of the contracting parties] pursuant to the Brazilian Civil Code, bring about effects on the payoffs the contracting parties derive from so-called engineering agreements, understood as agreements for the development of large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects. The work traces back the historical and social context of such agreements and describes their main distinguishing features, especially the complexity and risk elements of their underlying economic transactions. The work also describes such agreements as socially codified agreements, subject to the discipline of a legally codified figure called empreitada [or contractor agreement]. The work also discusses how court precedents deal with the legal figure of excessive onerosity and describes the deal structures normally used in such agreements for the purposes of risk allocation. Finally, the work discusses the application of Law & Economics models, such as the Theory of Incomplete Contracts, as a tool for evaluating the applicability of rules governing the legal figure of excessive onerosity to engineering agreements and analyzing their respective effects.