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Journal articles on the topic 'Theory of contracts'
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1
Viljanen, Mika. "Actor-Network Theory Contract Theory." European Review of Contract Law 16, no. 1 (April 7, 2020): 74–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2020-0005.
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AbstractFirms increasingly use complex hybrid governance structures to manage value generation networks. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the structures contain soft, “enforcement-challenged” contractual devices. Existing contract theories, however, fail to recognize and explain how these soft contract devices work as legal devices. The article seeks to address this failure.The article uses a conceptual innovation by Schepker et al to construct an actor-network theory (ANT) inspired contract theory. Schepker et al argued that contracts are best understood as often concurrently serving safeguarding, coordination, and adaptation goals. The article argues that combined with ANT the functional contracting frame allows us to recognize that contracts work and gain efficacy in multiple ways. To understand how the soft, “enforcement-challenged” contract devices work, the article traces the efficacy mechanisms the devices perform and enact.The tracings lead the article to propose an ANT contract theory that builds on three intertwined ideas: 1) contract devices have no core efficacy networks but multiple parallel efficacies, 2) contracts should be understood as bricolage collages of small-scale contractual point intervention devices that each deploy and rely on their own efficacy mechanisms and patterns, and 3) the force of contract resides in the socio-material assemblages contracts are capable of creating and sustaining.
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Kőszegi, Botond. "Behavioral Contract Theory." Journal of Economic Literature 52, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 1075–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.4.1075.
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This review provides a critical survey of psychology-and-economics (“behavioral-economics”) research in contract theory. First, I introduce the theories of individual decision making most frequently used in behavioral contract theory, and formally illustrate some of their implications in contracting settings. Second, I provide a more comprehensive (but informal) survey of the psychology-and-economics work on classical contract-theoretic topics: moral hazard, screening, mechanism design, and incomplete contracts. I also summarize research on a new topic spawned by psychology and economics, exploitative contracting, that studies contracts designed primarily to take advantage of agent mistakes. (JEL A12, D03, D82, D86)
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Rutešić, Snežana, Jasmina Ćetković, Slobodan Lakić, Angelina Živković, and Miloš Knežević. "Proposition of a Model for Selection of the Hybrid Contract Implementation Strategy for a Pilot Project of Regular Road Maintenance in Montenegro." Advances in Civil Engineering 2020 (November 19, 2020): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8844980.
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Performance-based maintenance contracts (PBMCs) are modern contracts that should allow road maintenance entities to contract maintenance activities more successfully and generate money value. In the case of Montenegro, a gradual approach of PBMC introduction is recommended through a hybrid contract for routine road maintenance. Hybrid contract implementation will enable a lower level of client risk in the early stages of PBM contract. Game theory is used for selection of an adequate model for hybrid contract structure in terms of size and nature of the BoQ elements. In addition to the estimated or charged quantities of works from previous contracts, the model also includes parameters that to some extent take into account the experience and expertise of contractors and clients, but also the availability of road data. In order for model to be applied, historical data from traditional road maintenance contracts, which were implemented in the previous period in Montenegro, are used.
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Alexandrowicz, Piotr. "Paolo Comitoli SJ on Contracts." Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung 107, no. 1 (June 1, 2021): 255–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zrgk-2021-0006.
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Summary Contract law in the early modern period has always been the subject of intensive research. The present article is intended as a contribution to this. It presents the contract doctrine of an Italian Jesuit, Paolo Comitoli. He was a moral theologian and author of the “Doctrina de contractu”. The paper begins with a biographical introduction and an overview of Comitoli’s writings. News about Comitoli’s life, however, is sparse and widely dispersed. The following section focuses on Comitoli’s concept of and his definition of contract. A brief explanation of Comitoli’s concept of contract attributes follows. Comitoli saw in these attributes the identity-forming characteristics of all contracts and used these elements to place the traditional problems of contract theory in a new framework.
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Azab, Rania S. "Interpreting digital licensing contracts between a metaphorical and functional direction: A comparative analytical study." International Journal of ADVANCED AND APPLIED SCIENCES 8, no. 8 (August 2021): 103–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.21833/ijaas.2021.08.013.
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This study seeks to clarify the importance of explaining the type of digital license contracts to see if it can continue subjecting them to the metaphorical direction that adopts the direction of applying the traditional rules to this types of contract or must it be subject to the functional direction that adopts the necessity of establishing independent legal rules in the theory of contracts in Egypt. The problem of the user not reading the contract terms is still there. Although consumers do not read the terms of digital licensing contracts, some jurisprudence in the US often insist that it must be the exchange of consent must take place that the offeree must see the terms and conditions before assenting in some sort of this contracts, this differs from the nature of digital licensing contracts and the way they are contracted. It is right that the consumers discover in some the types of contracts do not express the consent by the traditional way in the contract but are subject to specific instructions set by the site, due to the inability to read and understand the terms of the contract, but rather that in some types of digital licensing contracts the consumers are not aware to be a party to a contract according to the traditional concept of contract theory. Legal recognition is important by the Egyptian and Arab legislations in the role of technical and digital in regulations next to the contract and the law (functional direction) which can contribute to help the user to read the terms of use, we must make use of digital technology to fulfill the function of the contract, which aims to create obligations on both parties, businesses and the user. The following questions were analyzed: Is it possible an individual can enter into a contract without realizing it on the internet? Is the individual obligated to contractual terms that he did not read and understand? How can the provisions of the traditional contract be applied to digital licensing contracts? Then I concluded the necessity of enacting new legal rules that regulate digital licensing contracts within Egyptian legislation.
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Wawrosz, P. "Productive of the Service Sector: Theory and Practice of Corruption Declining." Marketing and Management of Innovations, no. 4 (2019): 269–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/mmi.2019.4-21.
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Corruption contracts are, throughout the democratic world, illegal and considered immoral. Their participants thus cannot use standard procedures to find a second party, to negotiate the content of the contract, to check if it performs what was promised, and to enforce the promises. This increases the risks associated with the contract. Illegality or immorality of the contract makes both parties more vulnerable – each party can threaten to reveal the contract and denounce the second party. Connecting a corruption contract with a previously established legal contract is usually seen as the best way to reduce risks and to reinforce the corruption contract. Owing to legal contacts and contracts, potential parties interested in corruption know where they should seek a counterparty and what to offer. At the same time, the corruption contract is tied to legal contracts, and failure to fulfil conditions of the corruption contract may put such legal contract at risk, therefore there is a higher probability that both parties to the corruption contract would fulfil what was promised and that there will be no extortion by any of the parties to demand additional fulfilment after the end of the corruption contract or that the corruption contract will not be disclosed. This paper presents the opposite approach in which a corruption contract is established as the first and it creates the base for further often legal but immoral contracts. All contracts lead to the mutually advantageous affinity of all its participants who often become members of corruption networks. The article presents the model when a blackmailed or dependent person must participate in corruption contracts, otherwise, it faces serious problems. But sooner or later, participation will begin to bring him benefits, so he becomes dependent on the network, although initially, he had moral inhibitions to participate in its activities. The subjects looking a counterparty of the corruption contract thus often create the environment of dependency and blackmailing and when people that are obliged to corruption lose their scruples and they see corruption as the common behaviour. Our model comes from real corruption networks in the Czech Republic. Some of them are briefly analysed. Theory of corruption must pay higher attention to all factors contributing to the spread of corruption behaviour, including mutual dependence and extortion Keywords: blackmailing, corruption, corruption networks, corruption risks, mutual dependency
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Gusakova, Еlena, and Aleksandr Pavlov. "Contractual relations of participants in the life cycle of a construction project." E3S Web of Conferences 263 (2021): 04008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202126304008.
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Contracts accompany all stages of the life cycle of a construction object. The contractual relationship should ensure a balance of production and economic interests of numerous participants in the construction project and stakeholders of the project. When a project is being implemented by several dozen contractors, it is difficult to achieve a balance of interests, the content of contracts is often multidirectional or contradicts each other. In order to systematize the relationships of the project participants, contractual relations in the construction industry and the functions of the subjects of contracts are analyzed. The structure of contracts in construction, based on the cash flow of the project, is proposed. Allocated 6 groups of contracts: agreements concluded by the investor; contracts concluded by the developer, employer; contract agreements; contracts for the supply of goods and the provision of services; collective and individual labor contracts. The main features of each group of agreements and the functions of the subjects of agreements in Russia and abroad are considered. It is shown that, as part of the theory of project management, it is relevant and expedient to develop a section on the structure of contracts, planning a contract campaign and support for a complex of project contracts. It is proposed to develop contracts and think through the contractual terms of the project agreed, under the leadership of the project management team.
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Shymanska, Oksana. "Theoretical framework of optimal contracts (Nobel Prize in Economics 2016 awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström)." Herald of Ternopil National Economic University, no. 3(89) (October 10, 2018): 126–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2018.03.126.
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The article considers Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström’s contributions to the development of contract theory. The contributions are represented by studies on the nature of optimal contract in view of motivation of contract agents and factors that affect their motivation. A particular attention is placed on the practical utility of the research done by Nobel Laureates in Economic Sciences 2016 that have fostered further studies on the theory of the firm, corporate finance, management, labour economics and the public sector, political science and law. The new theoretical tools created by O. Hart and B. Holmström serve for analysis of financial terms of contracts and for the distribution of supervisiory rights, property rights and decision-making rights. It is emphasized that O. Hart and B. Holmström’s contributions to the field of contract theory present formal treatment of motivation issues, moral hazard and incomplete contracts. The role of contracts in managing future interactions and ensuring conditions for establishing high-quality institutions is recognized. It is pointed out that the contract theory reveals working mechanisms of institutions, and presents potential hazard that may arise when new contracts are being drafted. Particular attention is paid to positioning of the contract theory within the theory of economic organization and the economic theory of information that is aimed at developing models with asymmetric information and taking into account non-observable actions. Real situations, game models and contract structure with the distinction between complete and incomplete contracts are examined (based on the informativeness principle). The performance of multi-task model and career-growth model in the contract theory is outlined. The paper analyzes the impact of the contract theory on changes in approaches to analyzing corporate relationships, which were previously based on the trade-off theory that includes balancing between the reduction of tax payments and corporate debt servicing.
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Michler, Jeffrey D., and Steven Y. Wu. "Relational Contracts in Agriculture: Theory and Evidence." Annual Review of Resource Economics 12, no. 1 (October 6, 2020): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-101719-034514.
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We appraise the current status of relational contract theory, along with associated empirical studies, with the goal of providing an orientation to the field to economists who may not have expertise in contract theory. We begin with a theoretical discussion focusing mainly on intuition and the usefulness of the theory for conceptualizing applied agricultural contracting problems. We also discuss current theoretical challenges and the current state of empirical research on relational contracts. We conclude by discussing potentially fruitful areas for future research.
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De Jong, Arjan, and Klaas Smit. "Collaboratives to improve industrial maintenance contract relationships." Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering 25, no. 4 (October 2, 2019): 545–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jqme-07-2013-0050.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how collaborative contracts can improve industrial maintenance contract relationships. Design/methodology/approach The research compares performance contracts with collaborative contracts, a new contract type whereby the contract parties align their objectives. The study uses game theory and describes the contract types as mechanism designs to compare the contract types. The mechanisms are validated with case studies. The utility of the contract types is verified with Monte Carlo simulations using expert opinions. Findings The research demonstrates that, under certain conditions, collaborative contracts result in a higher utility than performance contracts for all contract parties. Practical implications The use of collaborative contracts between an operator of a technical system and a maintenance organisation reduces maintenance costs and improves the availability of the technical system, increasing the utility for all contract parties. Originality/value The collaborative contract is a new contract type for maintenance services and the research method provides a new approach to optimise industrial maintenance contract relationships.
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Ellerman, David. "Corporate governance, capital theory, and corporate finance theory: An approach from property theory." Corporate Ownership and Control 1, no. 4 (2004): 13–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv1i4p1.
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An analysis of the corporate governance debate is developed using a descriptive theory about the system of private property and contract in a market economy. There are strong implications for capital theory and corporate finance theory. The structure of the main results is that what often appears as being an owned property right is upon analysis seen to be only a contractual position—and contractual positions only extend a few years into the future. An enterprise could be described concretely as specific people working with specific machines producing a certain product or it could be described more abstractly using the economists’ notion of a production function. But either way, it is not determined who is legally undertaking the enterprise until the contracts between the factor suppliers are given. Thus the determination of who undertakes an enterprise is contractually determined; it is not an owned property right. In this sense, there is no such thing as the "ownership of the firm" since the party undertaking an enterprise, the residual claimant, is determined by the direction of the hiring contracts. There is the ownership of a conventional joint stock corporation, but a corporation does not "own" the enterprise that it is currently undertaking by virtue of its contractual position. For another party to take over the enterprise, it is sufficient to redo the contracts, not "buy the firm." Since a corporation’s paid contracts at best extend only a few years into the future, there is no basis for the common assumption in capital theory or corporate finance theory that the corporation "owns" the future enterprise cash flows in perpetuity. This simple result thus has rather strong implications for considerations of enterprise governance as well as for capital theory and corporate finance theory. Many of the "ownership" assertions that fuel the debate about enterprise governance are groundless, and the discounting of future enterprise net returns beyond the horizon of current contracts does not represent the valuation of current property rights.
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Lyons, B. "Empirical relevance of efficient contract theory: inter-firm contracts." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 27–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/12.4.27.
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Zeemering, Eric S. "Why Terminate? Exploring the End of Interlocal Contracts for Police Service in California Cities." American Review of Public Administration 48, no. 6 (April 3, 2017): 596–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0275074017701224.
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With the recent growth in interlocal contracts for municipal service delivery, insufficient attention has been given to city governments that choose to terminate interlocal contracts. The termination of interlocal contracts deserves scrutiny because theory points to multiple possible explanations for service change. This research examines the termination of interlocal contracts for police service delivery by California cities between 2001 and 2010. Public documents from the nine cities that terminated interlocal contracts are analyzed to assess rationale for termination. The stated reasons for termination include problems related to community responsiveness, the contract relationship, local control, service cost, service levels, and staffing. Grounded theory is advanced through analysis of the nine cities. The research refines our understanding of how cities weigh the costs and benefits of in-house production versus production through interlocal contract. While contract failure is evident in some cities, termination may also be explained as a process of vertical integration and service expansion. The research refines theories about local government service delivery and informs the practice of interlocal contract management.
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Wigglesworth, Sarah. "‘WLTM caring contractor’: the dating game of Design and Build contracts." Architectural Research Quarterly 16, no. 3 (September 2012): 210–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1359135513000055.
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The standard construction contract in the UK, such as JCT 2005, is designed to balance time, quality and cost. Typically, the contract documents consist of a bespoke design described by a full package of drawings and a specification describing quality, techniques and materials. These enable a contractor to offer a fixed price for the work and establish a programme and the aim is to provide a level of financial security that leaves little to error or to contingent forces. That, at least, is the theory. In practice, there are few contracts that run as smoothly as the theory suggests, which accounts for the myriad case law in this area.In preparing the contract documents, an architect conventionally begins their work by acting as agent for the client. Once appointed, s/he develops the brief with the client and/or users, designs the building and guides the scheme through the regulatory system, describing it in sufficient detail to allow a contractor to arrive at an accurate cost. After this, the ways in which a building can be procured can vary considerably. This article focuses on what happens under a Design and Build (D&B) contract.
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Lemanowicz, Marzena. "THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN THE LIGHT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS. THE SPECIFICITY OF AGRICULTURAL CONTRACTS." Acta Scientiarum Polonorum. Oeconomia 17, no. 4 (December 30, 2018): 97–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/aspe.2018.17.4.56.
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The article reviews Polish and foreign economic literature regarding new institutional economics (NIE) and various research approaches used in the framework of NIE. Particular attention was paid to the economic theory of contracts and the transaction costs, as the limitation of transaction costs is indeed the main stimulus for contract signing. Special attention was given to agricultural contracts and their specificity. The article discusses different theories applied in the analysis of contracts, characterizes contracts according to different criteria, and draws attention to the importance of transaction costs in the theory of contracts. In addition, factors which contribute to these costs have been identified, indicating the necessity of adapting the principles of transaction cost economics to the needs of the agricultural sector.
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Dagan, Hanoch, and Michael Heller. "Freedom, Choice, and Contracts." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20, no. 2 (July 26, 2019): 595–635. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0023.
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Abstract In “The Choice Theory of Contracts,” we explain contractual freedom and celebrate the plurality of contract types. Here, we reply to critics by refining choice theory and showing how it fits and shapes what we term the “Contract Canon”. I. Freedom. (1) Charles Fried challenges our account of Kantian autonomy, but his views, we show, largely converge with choice theory. (2) Nathan Oman argues for a commerce-enhancing account of autonomy. We counter that he arbitrarily slights noncommercial spheres central to human interaction. (3) Yitzhak Benbaji suggests that choice theory’s commitment to autonomy is overly perfectionist. Happily, in response to Benbaji, we can cite with approval Charles Fried’s point that contract types are “enabling our liberties.” II. Choice. (4) Aditi Bagchi criticizes our inattention to impediments to choice. We show how choice theory’s commitments to both multiplicity and relational justice ameliorate these impediments. (5) Gregory Klass explores parol evidence to highlight the mechanisms of choice. We substantially concur with his position, and show how such mechanisms can ensure voluntariness, an essential element of choice. (6) Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette question the institutional capacity of existing legal actors to implement choice theory. Working from the example of cohabitation, we offer a somewhat more optimistic view. III. Contracts. (7) Peter Benson contends our focus on the rational slights the reasonable. Although we did not use this Rawlsian vocabulary, choice theory complies with its strictures — more so than transfer theory. (8) Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz claim provocatively that contract theory must: capitulate before pluralism (as they endorse); leverage it; or fall victim to a so-called “embracing” approach (their charge against us). We reject the charge that choice theory is foundationally value-pluralist. Instead, we cabin pluralism and put it to work. (9) The Contract Canon starts on the next big step for choice theory by explaining existing doctrine (rebutting Benson on lack of fit) and helping adjudicate contract practice (countering Markovits and Schwartz on the vices of our pluralism). Each Article in this Issue advances the field; each prompts us to refine choice theory — all steps, we hope, toward a more just and justified law of contract.
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Donaldson, Thomas, and Thomas W. Dunfee. "Integrative Social Contracts Theory." Economics and Philosophy 11, no. 1 (April 1995): 85–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100003230.
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Difficult moral issues in economic life, such as evaluating the impact of hostile takeovers and plant relocations or determining the obligations of business to the environment, constitute the raison d'etre of business ethics. Yet, while the ultimate resolution of such issues clearly requires detailed, normative analysis, a shortcoming of business ethics is that to date it has failed to develop an adequate normative theory.1 The failing is especially acute when it results in an inability to provide a basis for fine-grained analyses of issues. Both general moral theories and stakeholder theory seem incapable of expressing the moral complexity necessary to provide practical normative guidance for many business ethics contexts.
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Mohd Noor, Nurul Syazwani, Muhammad Hakimi Mohd. Shafiai, and Abdul Ghafar Ismail. "The derivation of Shariah risk in Islamic finance: a theoretical approach." Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research 10, no. 5 (October 14, 2019): 663–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jiabr-08-2017-0112.
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Purpose This paper aims to propose a derivation of Shariah risk from both the Islamic finance theory and theory of contracts in Islamic law. Specifically, it deliberates the derivation of Shariah risk following the contracts validity and apprises the readers of the Shariah risk issues currently under debate. Design/methodology/approach This study reviews the relevant literature and presents an analysis of contract rulings through evidence derived from the Qur’an, Hadith and other secondary sources of Islamic law. Various theories of Islamic finance and Islamic law of contracts are identified, to examine the general principles and essential elements and conditions of a valid contract. Findings This analysis asserts that any circumstances that may render invalidity of the contract will trigger Shariah risk. More importantly, this paper highlights the implications of invalid contracts, based on the opinion of Hanafi jurists, who concluded that Shariah risk may be derived from any void or voidable contracts due to the failure of the contractual parties to comply with Shariah contractual obligations. Research limitations/implications This paper emphasises the derivation of Shariah risk over theoretical approaches. It does not include an explanation in the form of any empirical model. Originality/value This is the first study that contributes to the field of derivation of Shariah risk, based on the theory from the Islamic law of contracts.
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Malatesta, Deanna, and Craig Smith. "Contract amendments: for better or for worse?" International Journal of Public Sector Management 32, no. 6 (August 2, 2019): 635–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijpsm-06-2018-0141.
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PurposePublic management researchers have successfully leveraged theory to advance the understanding of contracts and the different governance structures that underpin contract relationships. Yet there is still much to learn about the implications for different governance structures. Applying insights from property rights, the purpose of this paper is to examine the substance of initial government contracts and their subsequent amendments in order to determine whether allocation of decision rights leads to better or worse contract amendments.Design/methodology/approachThe authors evaluate the text of initial contracts and their subsequent amendments in 258 government–business relationships and focus on the implications of assigning key decision rights to the party with most relevant knowledge expertise.FindingsTwo primary findings are presented. First, initial contracts where knowledge expertise and the associated decision rights are co-located (i.e. integrated) are likely to be associated withex postadjustments that benefit both parties to the contract. Second, the authors find that this initial finding is likely a result of government integration as opposed to supplier integration.Originality/valueGiven that we know most professional service contracts require some form of contract amendment over time, this research helps us understand why some amendments will reinforce the collaborative (Pareto enhancing) nature of the relationship, while others may be more one sided (rent seeking). Unlike other theoretical approaches (e.g. transaction cost theory), property rights theory provides guidance for such decision making.
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Guriev, Sergei, and Dmitriy Kvasov. "Contracting on Time." American Economic Review 95, no. 5 (November 1, 2005): 1369–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282805775014452.
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The paper shows how time considerations, especially those concerning contract duration, affect incomplete contract theory. Time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds, but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts. We consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting, investment, trade, and renegotiation take place in continuous time. We show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed-term contracts; or through a renegotiation-proof “evergreen” contract—a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice. We provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts.
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Gorovaia, Nina. "Determinants, transactional alignment, and performance outcomes of franchise contract length." International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 47, no. 7 (November 13, 2018): 714–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijrdm-10-2017-0245.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants, transactional alignment and performance outcomes of franchise contract length using transaction costs theory (TCT) and resource-based theory (RBT). Design/methodology/approach The author hypothesizes that franchisors choose contract length according to TCT and RBT arguments. TCT explains the safeguarding function of contracts: the franchisors will offer longer contracts when franchisees’ specific investments are high and environmental uncertainty is low. RBT highlights the knowledge leverage function of contracts: the franchisors will offer longer contracts when the brand name and intangible knowledge assets are high. Franchise companies that design contract length aligned with transactional attributes will perform better. The author tests the misalignment hypothesis and comparative performance of franchise contracts by estimating two-stage least squares regression and Heckman two-stage procedure that control for endogeneity and self-selection. Findings Empirical data from the German franchise sector support the hypotheses. In addition to the safeguarding function, franchise contracts have an important knowledge leverage function. Longer contracts perform better due to the development of relational strategic assets and stronger commitment. Research limitations/implications Franchisors must offer longer contracts when specific investments of franchisees, brand name, intangible knowledge assets are high, and environmental uncertainty is low. Franchisors should invest in the development of relational strategic assets and offer longer contracts for the benefit of superior performance. Originality/value The study addresses the significant question of transactional alignment and comparative performance of franchise contracts. It empirically confirms the importance of RBT in explaining contractual choices and performance.
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Tomanek, Artur. "Klauzule autonomiczne umów o pracę — zagadnienia pojęciowe." Przegląd Prawa i Administracji 117 (December 20, 2019): 133–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/0137-1134.117.11.
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AUTONOMOUS CLAUSES OF LABOUR CONTRACTS — CONCEPTUAL ISSUESThe starting point of this article is the notion of an autonomous clause which was introduced into the theory of Polish labour law by Marcin Święcicki. The author of the text maintains that an employer and an employee have the freedom to agree upon autonomous clauses of a labour contract. The above-mentioned clauses are separate contracts which are amended and terminated according to rules which are different from those relating to the main contract contract of labour. The autonomous clauses form rights and obligations of the parties of the labour contract as opposed to other individual labour-law contracts and civil-law contracts. The limitations of the subject-matter of autonomous clauses should be deduced from the legal nature of the discussed clauses and the main labour contract.
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Sheth, Alpen, and Hemang Subramanian. "Blockchain and contract theory: modeling smart contracts using insurance markets." Managerial Finance 46, no. 6 (May 29, 2019): 803–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-10-2018-0510.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to model blockchain-based smart contracts specifically for the insurance industry. The authors introduce the concept of smart contracts and further discuss the implementation of a decentralized insurance marketplace, namely Etherisc, using smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain platform. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ three methods in this paper. The first one is a design illustration of a live application, namely, Etherisc. The second one is an economic model using demand–supply and equilibrium economics. The third one is an illustration using principal–agent modeling using constrained optimization. Findings The findings illustrate the following: in the design discussion, the authors demonstrate the architecture of a live Ethereum-based smart contract system. In the economic model, the authors illustrate how decentralized smart contract systems can increase social welfare by shifting demand and supply by reducing transactional costs. In the principal–agent model, the authors show how both the principal and agent are positively benefited by various mechanisms. Originality/value The paper is an original contribution and can be used as a reference model to study insurance or other similar marketplaces and the underlying economic transformations happening therein.
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Goorha, Prateek. "Contextual Contracts: On a Context-sensitive Approach to Contract Theory." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 30, no. 2 (May 2, 2018): 191–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0260107917740510.
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I propose a method for introducing ‘context’ within the contractual environment based on a simple and intuitive application of control theory. The approach permits looking at several interesting practical features of contracts, be they incomplete, complete or smart, within a single framework. I define a contextual environment with the help of an interaction between three distinct spaces: a market-based contractual space framed within a formal institutional space and an even larger cultural space. Each space is characterized by a governing law built on a selection of control mechanisms that differ in their approach as well as their reliance on information generated from feedback mechanisms. I suggest how these governing laws tie the contextual spaces together and present some ideas on how they evolve through their interactions with other spaces. JEL: D20, D86, P50, Z10
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Thompson, Jeffery A., and David W. Hart. "Psychological Contracts: A Nano-Level Perspective on Social Contract Theory." Journal of Business Ethics 68, no. 3 (April 29, 2006): 229–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9012-x.
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Wennberg, Mikko. "On Barnett's Theory of Default Rules." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 16, no. 1 (January 2003): 147–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900006664.
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This discussion is a critique of Professor Randy E. Barnett's solution to the problem of filling in gaps in incomplete contracts. The articles discussed are “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent” (1992) and “Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud” (1992).
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Ma, Chenghu, and Wing-Keung Wong. "A theoretical foundation for games of complete/incomplete contracts." International Journal of Financial Engineering 08, no. 01 (February 28, 2021): 2150010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2424786321500109.
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This paper provides a theoretical foundation for complete/incomplete contracts to extend game theory for multi-agent interactions. We explain why rational agents may agree to sign incomplete contracts even though signing a complete contract incurs no cost. Some arguments claim that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. Under common assumptions of rationality, an incomplete contract can be the final solution if the agents’ attitudes toward uncertainty are not neutral. Assuming that agents can form coalitions by participating in the game and they are uncertainty averse, we develop equilibrium solutions for complete/incomplete contracts in an extensive game of multi-agent interactions.
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Solechan, Solechan. "The Concept of Private-Administration Contracts in Settling Problems in Government Goods/Services Procurement Contracts." International Journal of Criminology and Sociology 10 (April 30, 2021): 662–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2021.10.77.
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Contracts for the procurement of government goods/services are the realm of private law that implements pure private contracts. A legal relationship in a private contract, especially in a contract settlement, is a relationship between the settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties. This study describes the settlement of government goods/service procurement contracts that require a legal basis both in principle and theory. By using the conceptual analysis method, the findings indicate an inconsistency in solving a legal problem in a government procurement contract, where private legal issues are resolved through administrative law. Theoretically, this study contributes to the resolution of this problem, there are intersections between two legal aspects, namely private law and administrative law. In practical terms, this study encourages the development of government goods/service procurement contract problem-solving practices to adopt the contract problem-solving method starting to use administrative law.
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Hu, Yun Peng. "Research on Risk Sharing Mode of the Construction Project Based on Systems Theory." Applied Mechanics and Materials 99-100 (September 2011): 233–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.99-100.233.
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The construction contracts are the important basis of the project risk management and a reasonable contract system can effectively share engineering risks among various project participants. However, the current situation of risk management in China is not optimistic. Based on the analysis of the existing problems in the risk sharing management, the paper introduces Hall three dimension structure into the engineering fields and establishes a three-dimensional (contract dimension, procedure dimension and logic dimension) space structure of the construction project to elaborate the vital role of the contracts in the project risk management. Finally, the paper attempts to put forward a risk sharing mode centered on contract systems to make a reasonable and effective risk distribution among various project participants
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Nuwagaba, Innocent, and Thekiso Molokwane. "A Qualitative Analysis of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Project Contracts in the Roads Sector. A Contextual Elucidation of Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA)." International Journal of Business Administration 11, no. 5 (September 6, 2020): 44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/ijba.v11n5p44.
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Public Private Partnership Projects continue to gain momentum across the world. Governments in developing countries now find PPP projects as an alternative to conventional financing and providing public infrastructure. Guided by the principal agency theory, this study examines different types of PPP Project contracts in the roads sector with specific focus on the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA). Contracting out of projects in the roads sector has led to increased costs of road construction in Uganda. The main objectives of this study are to examine the relevance of the principal-agency theory to the adoption of PPP project contracts by UNRA and establish the types of PPP Project contracts suitable for adoption by UNRA. Data was collected through literature survey and interviews. Study findings revealed that Principal-Agency theory is relevant to adoption of PPP project contracts and that UNRA intends to use mainly management PPP contract. It is concluded that principal-agent relationship is very crucial if the execution of PPP Project contracts is to be a success and that there is a very high chance that UNRA is planning to also adopt the use of Build, Own and Transfer (BOT) PPP Project contract in the roads sector. The study recommends that UNRA should ensure a cordial relationship with private parties and not rely solely on management PPP contracts. The organisation should explore other PPP project contracts such as Private Finance Initiative, Leasing, Design Build, Build Operate and Transfer, and then Design Build and Finance. The choice of contracts should always be based on affordability and value for money.
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Esposito, Fabrizio. "Carrying the Choice Theory of Contracts Further: Transfers, Welfare, and the Size of the Community." European Review of Contract Law 15, no. 3 (August 21, 2019): 297–334. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2019-0018.
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Abstract The Choice Theory of Contracts is an ambitious, concise, and largely successful contribution to contract theory. Choice Theory is a liberal theory of contract law, grounded in a rich notion of autonomy, which stresses the obligation of the legal system to enhance our autonomy by ensuring the multiplicity of contractual types within the spheres of family, employment, home, and commerce.This article mitigates three shortcomings in The Choice Theory of Contracts and tries to carry Choice Theory further. A first shortcoming of the book is that the critique of transfer theory fails to acknowledge its analytical value. Second, in Part II of the book, Dagan and Heller overlap two issues: what the goods of contract are, and the compatibility of Choice Theory with the key concepts used by mainstream contract theories. Finally, Dagan and Heller do not fully acknowledge that the value of our autonomy is related to our ability to choose well. These revisions are useful to channelling scholarly attention on the implementation of Choice Theory and to sharpening the conceptual tools needed to do so.To show the potential of Choice Theory, this article carries it further. First, the economic concept of consumer sovereignty extends the programme of autonomy-grounded economic theories of contracts. Second, the size of the communities in which contractual relationships are created helps understand how various doctrines and even entire branches of the law foster the autonomy-enhancing capacity of contracts.The article concludes with a series of suggestions for carrying Choice Theory even further.
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Ranneva, N. A. "Contract theory as a unified discipline (On the occasion of the Russian publication of “Contract Theory” by Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont)." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 5 (May 13, 2020): 141–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-5-141-160.
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The article is devoted to the Russian edition in 2019 of perhaps the most important textbook on the theory of contracts in the last twenty-thirty years. From the very moment of its publication, in 2005, “Contract theory” by Bolton and Dewatripont has become the definitive English text on the topic for graduate students in all leading economic universities of the world. The translation of the book into Russian is an important event, since this textbook is unique: it provides the most general systemic overview of the huge field of contemporary economics, called contract theory, and which has evolved greatly for the last 30 years. The article gives the general overview of the book and briefly describes the evolution of the theory of contracts and general approach to the analysis of exchange of goods and services in the economy on the basis of this book and other literature. The article focuses on reviewing general ideas and concepts introduced by contract theory and the main models and methods that have made this domain a unified science.
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Majerczyk, Michael, Joel Owens, and Nathan Waddoups. "Contract Framing, Expected Disappointment, and Effort: The Moderating Role of External Locus of Control." Journal of Management Accounting Research 32, no. 2 (September 1, 2019): 183–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52566.
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ABSTRACT Understanding when incentive contracts are effective is important for organizations. Prior research documents that while employees generally prefer to work under contracts that include bonuses, employees exert more effort under economically equivalent penalty contracts. One reason for this is that penalties cause employees to experience greater expected disappointment than do bonuses. This study extends prior research in this area by documenting that external locus of control (ELOC), an individual characteristic, helps explain how different employees respond to incentive contracts. We predict and find that, compared to individuals with higher ELOC, individuals with lower ELOC are less susceptible to contract frame-induced differences in expected disappointment and not as motivated by penalty contracts compared to bonus contracts. This finding extends theory on contract framing and has important implications for organizations. Our results suggest that penalty provisions are most efficacious at lower ranks in the organization where higher ELOC is more common.
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Gomes Maia, Leticia, P. Matthijs Bal, and Antônio Virgilio Bittencourt Bastos. "Changes to Newcomers’ Psychological Contract Over Time: The Interactive Effects of the Fulfilment of Employer and Employee Obligations." Universitas Psychologica 18, no. 1 (February 20, 2019): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/javeriana.upsy18-1.cnpc.
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The goal of this study was to examine changes in newcomers’ psychological contract over time. Based on schema theory and the post-violation model of the psychological contract, we theorized that psychological contract fulfillment is strengthening the psychological contract over time, while changes in the psychological contract are most likely to occur in a situation of low employer and employee fulfillment. In a sample of newcomers in a Brazilian public organization, we tested how the fulfillment of both employer and employee obligations explain the change in the psychological contract. The results support the hypotheses, and we found that the highest level of change in psychological contracts occurred when the fulfilments of the obligations of both parties were low. We discuss the implications for theory on the change in psychological contracts.
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Heien, Dale. "Price Formation in the California Winegrape Economy." Journal of Wine Economics 1, no. 2 (2006): 162–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1931436100000183.
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AbstractThis paper presents a theory of price determination for winegrapes in California. As the California wine economy developed, winegrape contracts took on a role as one of the centerpieces of this transformation. The theory is presented and it is shown how two important factors, weather and fi nancial uncertainty, served to shape the contracts. Hence, long term planting contracts for new vineyards, specifying the price, helped ameliorate the uncertainty to growers. Similarly, shorter contracts played a similar role for established vintners. The model deals with two types of growers: those with contracts made well before the year in question and those who will sign a contract in the Spring of the year of harvest. This paper hopes to illuminate these elements and their interaction. The model is then empirically estimated and tested. (JEL classifi cation: K12, Q11)
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Lu, Xiaohe. "Incomplete Contracts and Stakeholder Theory." Business and Professional Ethics Journal 38, no. 3 (2019): 321–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bpej201982086.
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If market transactions are optimal, why do so many transactions occur within firms themselves? Ronald H. Coase explains this phenomenon by arguing that market transaction costs differ from intra-company transaction costs and that clear intra-intra-firm property rights have the effect of reducing transaction costs. But what exactly are the relevant transaction costs, and what factors determine them? Oliver Hart argues that market contracts are incomplete, and that the key to improving efficiency is putting the power to deal with these unspecified circumstances into the hands of owners within the same entity.In this paper, I argued that, the development of the theory and practice of business ethics as well as China’s innovative practice in recent decades provide a new perspective, one that is especially relevant to the issues raised by Case and Hart and that bear directly on the reform of China’s state-owned enterprises.
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Emons, Winand. "THE THEORY OF WARRANTY CONTRACTS." Journal of Economic Surveys 3, no. 1 (March 1989): 43–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1989.tb00057.x.
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Chu, Leon Yang, and David E. M. Sappington. "Procurement contracts: Theory vs. practice." International Journal of Industrial Organization 27, no. 1 (January 2009): 51–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.04.001.
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Mahoney, Curtis J. "Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties." Yale Law Journal 116, no. 4 (January 1, 2007): 824. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20455741.
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Yu, Yimin, and Xiangyin Kong. "Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard." Operations Research 68, no. 5 (September 2020): 1457–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1994.
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Linear contracts and their variants are quite popular in practice, for example, salesforce incentives and chief executive officer compensation. However, agency theory typically stipulates complex contract forms. Yimin Yu and Xiangyin Kong provide an alternative explanation for the popularity of linear contracts: the robustness to model uncertainty renders the linear or generalized linear forms of the contracts under moral hazard. They adopt the worst-case decision criterion, and robust incentive compatibility to ensure that the agent always behaves. The results are robust to general effort-contingent distributions and the risk-averse agent. These findings also shed light on how to design robust contracts when firms are facing model uncertainty or incomplete model information.
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Eller, Klaas Hendrik. "Comparative Genealogies of “Contract and Society”." German Law Journal 21, no. 7 (October 2020): 1393–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/glj.2020.84.
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AbstractSince contracts form a basic institution of every legal order, the interdisciplinary orientation of concepts of contracts reveals socio-legal inclinations of a legal order more broadly. Contrasting the UK and US Common Law of contracts with developments under German law, this Article examines the relation between normative and social science approaches, notably rooted in economics, economic sociology, and social theory in the genealogy of contract law. A shared leitmotif over the 20th century has been the drive to account for the societal embeddedness of contract. However, conceptualizations of “Contract and Society” differ considerably between legal orders in their disciplinary ingredients and design. In the US, and to a lesser extent also in the UK, the rather continuous reception of legal realism has paved the way for broad interdisciplinary perspectives on contract law, ranging from classical socio-legal, empirical work (e.g., Macaulay), economics (e.g., Williamson), sociology (e.g., Powell), and critical theory (e.g., Kennedy) to today’s landscape, where essentially instrumental and ideal-normative theories compete. Alternatively, in Germany, where the realist heritage was more ephemeral, the transformations of contract law were processed from within legal discourse and foremost in their effects on private autonomy as conceptualized, for example, in German idealism, discourse theory and critical theory. Similarly, the “constitutionalization” of contract law—even if championed for fostering private law’s reflexivity—has, for the most part, defied a socio-legal orientation. Finally, the Article highlights the path dependencies with which these different starting points translate in current debates around the role of contract in transnational governance.
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Moqbel, Tareq, and Habib Ahmed. "Flexibility and Sharīʿah Compliance of Islamic Financial Contracts: An Evaluative Framework." Arab Law Quarterly 35, no. 1-2 (July 22, 2020): 92–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15730255-bja10052.
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Abstract Although the key distinguishing feature of Islamic finance is compliance with Sharīʿah, there is criticism from various quarters on the Sharīʿah compliance of its products. However, there is no objective way to assess the Sharīʿah compliance of Islamic financial contracts. This article develops a structured framework for analysing Sharīʿah compliance of Islamic financial contracts by deconstructing them and developing principles of evaluation based on concepts from Islamic legal theory. Other than providing a framework to assess Sharīʿah compliance of Islamic financial contracts, this article also alludes to an important issue regarding the contracts’ flexibility. Using concepts from Islamic legal theory, the article classifies different contractual stipulations according to their legal weight, and identifies how legal perspectives on the requirements of compliance can determine the flexibility of contracts. An evaluative framework is used to assess the Sharīʿah compliance of an actual muḍārabah (silent partnership) contract and finds it to be defective.
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Hurmerinta-Haanpää, Anna, and Sampo Viding. "The functions of contracts in interorganizational relationships: A contract experts’ perspective." Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation 4, no. 1-2 (March 2018): 98–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2055563619884791.
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Previous research has shown how contracts are used together with relational governance (RG) mechanisms to manage interorganizational relationships (IORs). Moreover, research has found that contracts are used in safeguarding, adapting, and coordinating business relationships. Based on the findings of an interview study with 24 contract experts, we argue that, in addition to safeguarding, adaptation, and coordination, firms use contracts to: codify their deals; steer their internal work; and plan, promote, and steer collaboration. On the one hand, when used intelligently, contractual techniques that reflect different functions can enhance IOR performance. On the other hand, the careless use of contracts can negatively affect RG and IOR performance. Our research has notable theoretical and managerial contributions, as it develops the theory of the functions of contracts and argues that the functions are fundamental to designing a contract that aims to complement RG and support IOR performance.
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Nichol, Jennifer E. "The Effects of Contract Framing on Misconduct and Entitlement." Accounting Review 94, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 329–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52260.
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ABSTRACT This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on misreporting and entitlement. I conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, and (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. Collectively, this study's theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can sometimes increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful. Data Availability: Contact the author.
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Aghion, Philippe, and Richard Holden. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 181–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.2.181.
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Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart used the theory of incomplete contracts to develop answers to the question “What is a firm, and what determines its boundaries?” in their path-breaking paper on “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration” (Journal of Political Economy, 1986, vol. 94, no. 4). Perhaps the central issue is that economic actors are only boundedly rational and cannot anticipate all possible contingencies. It might well be that certain states of nature or actions cannot be verified by third parties after they arise, like certain qualities of a good to be traded in the future, and thus cannot be written into an enforceable contract. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all uses of an asset can be specified in advance, any contract negotiated in advance must leave some discretion over the use of the assets; and the “owner” of the firm is the party to whom the residual rights of control have been allocated at the contracting stage. The optimal allocation of property rights—or governance structure—is one that minimizes efficiency losses. This produces a theory of ownership and vertical integration as well as a theory of the firm. First we spell out Grossman and Hart's argument using a simple numerical example. Then we show how the incomplete contracts approach can be used to analyze the firms' internal organization; the firms' financial decisions; the costs and benefits from privatization; and the organization of international trade between inter- and intrafirm trade. We discuss several criticisms of the incomplete contracts/property rights methodology and review recent developments of the incomplete contracts approach.
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Benson, Peter. "Unity and Multiplicity in Contract Law: From General Principles to Transaction-Types." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20, no. 2 (July 26, 2019): 537–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0021.
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Abstract Modern contract law is characterized by a certain kind of unity and multiplicity. On the one hand, it establishes fundamental principles that apply to all contracts in general. But at the same time, it specifies further principles and rules for particular kinds of contracts or transaction-types that mark out their distinctive features, incidents and effects. Clearly, a viable theory of contract law should be able to provide a suitable account of both aspects. The central critical contention of The Choice Theory of Contracts is that all prior approaches, in particular rights-based theories, have failed to do so. Indeed, Dagan and Heller argue that only a theory that explains the settled rules of contract law as teleologically oriented toward facilitating individuals’ pursuit of their different substantive goods, and thus as primarily power-conferring in this particularly robust sense, can provide the needed account. Such a theory, they believe, would be not only interpretatively accurate with respect to the actual law but also fully acceptable as a liberal view of contract. This Article challenges the core contentions of choice theory, suggesting why it may be unable to meet its own goal of explaining how contract law coherently specifies and integrates the general and specific dimensions of enforceable agreements. The Article looks into basic contract doctrines in order to specify a general conception of the contractual relation that can meet this desideratum and it sketches how, beginning with that conception, contract law unfolds a rich multiplicity of transaction-types. The resulting view is liberal but rights-based rather than teleological, and it proposes an alternative understanding of how the rules of contract law are power-conferring as well as duty-imposing.
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Hipp, Janie S., and Harriet F. Francis. "The Legal Environment Facing Economic Agents in Production." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 37, no. 2 (August 2005): 327–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800006817.
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Agriculture has seen a steady movement toward the increased use of contracts. Agricultural contracts now guide the interrelationships of parties throughout the modern production system, extending well beyond the livestock sector. With this predominance come new issues that require us to reexamine contract theory and the roles of the parties. This review examines legislation, regulations, and recent court rulings in seemingly unrelated areas that have specific relationships to the development of contracts in production agriculture: environmental law and labor law.
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Alexander, Corinne, Rachael E. Goodhue, and Gordon C. Rausser. "Do Incentives for Quality Matter?" Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 39, no. 1 (April 2007): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800022719.
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We use an unusual dataset involving 14 tomato growers over 4 years to analyze the effect of incentive contracts on behavior in a fixed effects econometric model. We find that growers respond to incentive contracts by improving tomato quality, as predicted by economic theory. The comparison is not confounded by the usual contract endogeneity and simultaneity problems because of characteristics of the processing tomato industry and our dataset. We discuss the implications of our findings for the design of agricultural contracts.
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Handayani, Erna, Heru Kurnianto Tjahjono, and Akhmad Darmawan. "Uniqueness of psychological contract in a faith-based organization (FBO)." International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147- 4478) 9, no. 6 (October 26, 2020): 58–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijrbs.v9i6.912.
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This study aims to explore the uniqueness of the psychological contract in the Faith-Based Organization (FBO). Psychological contracts, as part of the bond between individuals and organizations, are constantly evolving research. In line with the Conservation of Organizational Resources (COR) theory, organizations strive to defend their resources. Faith-Based Organization (FBO) is an organization with minimal written formal contracts. The bond with the members is a bond with the same values and goals. This research examines the psychological contract of FBO, from the aspects of formation, contribution, and violation. The formation of shared values which becomes the affective commitment of FBO members is specifically discussed because of the uniqueness of the organization with its ideological and religiosity sides. Using the lens of the COR theory, this study sees the psychological contract of the two elements of the FBO, namely members and organizations. This study is a literature review using traditional narrative methods. The results show that there have not been many in-depth studies of the psychological contract on religious organizations (FBO) with religious aspects that characterize the psychology of individuals in it. This study creates new gaps in research related to psychological contracts.
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Weickhardt, George. "The Law and Role of Contracts in The Muscovite Tsardom." Russian History 36, no. 4 (2009): 530–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/009428809x12536994047613.
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AbstractMuscovite law, which was advanced and well-articulated in many areas, developed no coherent theory of contracts. Even the Law Code of 1649 contains few provisions on contracts and virtually none on the sale of goods or free (non-serf, non-slave) labor. The Muscovite tsardom did, however, adopt some simple provisions that served to reduce the possibility of disputes about whether there was a contract and what its terms were, such as requiring all important contracts to be in writing. Muscovite law also made it clear that consent to a contract had to be freely given, without duress or fraud. The article attempts to explain the lack of any law regulating the sale of goods and free labor.