Books on the topic 'Thomas Richard Moore'

When launching the Alliance for Progress in 1961, John F. Kennedy promised that this new development program would transform Latin America into a community of modern, prosperous, and politically stable allies. Yet, when Richard Nixon ended the program ten years later, there was more evidence of broken promises, political coups, and covert military operations than of transformative cooperation. Sandwiched between Kennedy’s and Nixon’s presidencies, Lyndon Johnson’s marked a transformative era in inter-American relations as Johnson and his chief inter-American aide, Thomas C. Mann, struggled to deliver on their predecessors’ bold promises while grappling with the demands of Cold War national security. In this first in-depth study of Johnson, Mann, and Latin America in the 1960s, Thomas Tunstall Allcock provides a nuanced and balanced assessment of two often maligned yet hugely influential policy makers during this vital period. In demonstrating that Johnson and Mann were New Dealers, keen to operate as good neighbors and support Latin American development and regional integration, Tunstall Allcock illuminates the difficulties faced by US modernization efforts. Ranging from domestic challenges from both right and left to a series of military and political crises including riots in the Panama Canal Zone and the threat of “another Cuba” in the Dominican Republic, these difficulties would be handled with wildly varying degrees of success. In Tunstall Allcock’s account, Johnson and Mann emerge as complex, rounded figures struggling to overcome a host of challenges and their own limitations even as the flaws and shortcomings of US policy are laid bare.

In this the second of the three autobiographical chapters, Andrew Steane (A.S.) recounts some of his experiences. He describes a life at a crossing-point of conservative and liberal forms of Christian witness, and conscious of both modern-day atheist and theist values and points of view. This has been difficult but, hopefully, creative. A.S. describes his reading of Bertrand Russell as a young man, and of later being waylaid by Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion. He gives brief reactions and asks what the reaction to such books shows us about contemporary culture. More penetrating authors have been Rowan Williams, R. S. Thomas, Brian McLaren, and N. T. Wright. A.S. describes aspects of Christian community life that have proved positive and significant for him.

Robert E. Brown focuses on Jonthan Edwards’ engagement with the emerging criticism of the early modern period, when the question of who authored the Pentateuch occupied many a biblical interpreter. Influenced by the more rationalistic approach of the Jewish scholar Abraham ibn Ezra (1089–1164), several writers—including Thomas Hobbes, Isaac La Peyrère, Benedict Spinoza, Richard Simon, and Jean Le Clerc—argued against the traditional belief that Moses wrote the first five books of the Bible. One leading responder to this view was Louis Ellie Du Pin, a French Catholic ecumenist, and Edwards, interestingly enough, drew substantially on Du Pin in his own discussion of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Brown uses this episode to show that Edwards was a creative consumer of European ideas, which illustrates that early modern biblical interpretation was more complex and layered than often recognized.

Chapter 3 is devoted to the film-related activities of southern literary figures. From nineteenth-century writers including Mark Twain and Harriet Beecher Stowe (not a southerner by birth, but, as author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a huge influence on southern literary history) to modern figures like Thomas Dixon, William Faulkner, Lillian Hellman, and the Nashville Agrarians, the southern literary tradition made myriad contributions to film. Faulkner’s screenwriting work provides perhaps the most engaging example. Meanwhile, the efforts of African American writers to make similar contributions were limited by the hard facts of Jim Crow, leaving such important figures as Richard Wright and Langston Hughes, among many others, to generate their own opportunities, often abroad, in a far more uneven fashion. Black film critics like Lester A. Walton also emerged as important literary figures.

This chapter examines the global impact of Anthony Benezet's antislavery ministry, including Benezet's influence on black abolitionists outside the Society of Friends. More than any other individual's work in the eighteenth century, that of Benezet served as a catalyst, throughout the Atlantic world, for the initial organized fight against slave trade and the eventual ending of slavery. His written work, which combined Quaker principles and Enlightenment thinking with knowledge gained through a deep study of Africa and her history, and his own contacts with black people as a teacher and philanthropist influenced men from Benjamin Franklin to John Jay and Patrick Henry in North America; from Thomas Clarkson, Granville Sharp, and William Wilberforce in England; to Condorcet and the Abbé Raynal in France. His words helped inspire African-born Olaudah Equiano and Ottabah Cugoano to write, and students at his Quaker schools such as American-born blacks Richard Allen and Absalom Jones to organize.

This book is the first anthology of perspectives on the future of text, one of our most important mediums for thinking and communicating, with a Foreword by the co-inventor of the Internet, Vint. Cerf and a Postscript by the founder of the modern Library of Alexandria, Ismail Serageldin. In a time with astounding developments in computer special effects in movies and the emergence of powerful AI, text has developed little beyond spellcheck and blue links. In this work we look at myriads of perspectives to inspire a rich future of text through contributions from academia, the arts, business and technology. We hope you will be as inspired as we are as to the potential power of text truly unleashed. Contributions by Adam Cheyer • Adam Kampff • Alan Kay • Alessio Antonini • Alex Holcombe • Amaranth Borsuk • Amira Hanafi • Amos Paul Kennedy Jr. • Anastasia Salter • Andy Matuschak & Michael Nielsen • Ann Bessemans & María Pérez Mena • Andries Van Dam • Anne-Laure Le Cunff • Anthon Botha • Azlen Ezla • Barbara Beeton • Belinda Barnet • Ben Shneiderman • Bernard Vatant • Bob Frankston • Bob Horn • Bob Stein • Catherine C. Marshall • Charles Bernstein • Chris Gebhardt • Chris Messina • Christian Bök • Christopher Gutteridge • Claus Atzenbeck • Daniel Russel • Danila Medvedev • Danny Snelson • Daveed Benjamin • Dave King • Dave Winer • David De Roure • David Jablonowski • David Johnson • David Lebow • David M. Durant • David Millard • David Owen Norris • David Price • David Weinberger • Dene Grigar • Denise Schmandt-Besserat • Derek Beaulieu • Doc Searls • Don Norman • Douglas Crockford • Duke Crawford • Ed Leahy • Elaine Treharne • Élika Ortega • Esther Dyson • Esther Wojcicki • Ewan Clayton • Fiona Ross • Fred Benenson & Tyler Shoemaker • Galfromdownunder, aka Lynette Chiang • Garrett Stewart • Gyuri Lajos • Harold Thimbleby • Howard Oakley • Howard Rheingold • Ian Cooke • Iian Neil • Jack Park • Jakob Voß • James Baker • James O’Sullivan • Jamie Blustein • Jane Yellowlees Douglas • Jay David Bolter • Jeremy Helm • Jesse Grosjean • Jessica Rubart • Joe Corneli • Joel Swanson • Johanna Drucker • Johannah Rodgers • John Armstrong • John Cayle • John-Paul Davidson • Joris J. van Zundert • Judy Malloy • Kari Kraus & Matthew Kirschenbaum • Katie Baynes • Keith Houston • Keith Martin • Kenny Hemphill • Ken Perlin • Leigh Nash • Leslie Carr • Lesia Tkacz • Leslie Lamport • Livia Polanyi • Lori Emerson • Luc Beaudoin & Daniel Jomphe • Lynette Chiang • Manuela González • Marc-Antoine Parent • Marc Canter • Mark Anderson • Mark Baker • Mark Bernstein • Martin Kemp • Martin Tiefenthaler • Maryanne Wolf • Matt Mullenweg • Michael Joyce • Mike Zender • Naomi S. Baron • Nasser Hussain • Neil Jefferies • Niels Ole Finnemann • Nick Montfort • Panda Mery • Patrick Lichty • Paul Smart • Peter Cho • Peter Flynn • Peter Jenson & Melissa Morocco • Peter J. Wasilko • Phil Gooch • Pip Willcox • Rafael Nepô • Raine Revere • Richard A. Carter • Richard Price • Richard Saul Wurman • Rollo Carpenter • Sage Jenson & Kit Kuksenok • Shane Gibson • Simon J. Buckingham Shum • Sam Brooker • Sarah Walton • Scott Rettberg • Sofie Beier • Sonja Knecht • Stephan Kreutzer • Stephanie Strickland • Stephen Lekson • Stevan Harnad • Steve Newcomb • Stuart Moulthrop • Ted Nelson • Teodora Petkova • Tiago Forte • Timothy Donaldson • Tim Ingold • Timur Schukin & Irina Antonova • Todd A. Carpenter • Tom Butler-Bowdon • Tom Standage • Tor Nørretranders • Valentina Moressa • Ward Cunningham • Dame Wendy Hall • Zuzana Husárová. Student Competition Winner Niko A. Grupen, and competition runner ups Catherine Brislane, Corrie Kim, Mesut Yilmaz, Elizabeth Train-Brown, Thomas John Moore, Zakaria Aden, Yahye Aden, Ibrahim Yahie, Arushi Jain, Shuby Deshpande, Aishwarya Mudaliar, Finbarr Condon-English, Charlotte Gray, Aditeya Das, Wesley Finck, Jordan Morrison, Duncan Reid, Emma Brodey, Gage Nott, Aditeya Das and Kamil Przespolewski. Edited by Frode Hegland.

The Johannine Renaissance in Early Modern English Literature and Theology argues that the Fourth Gospel and First Epistle of Saint John the Evangelist were so influential during the early modern period in England as to share with Pauline theology pride of place as leading apostolic texts on matters Christological, sacramental, pneumatological, and political. The book argues further that, in several instances, Johannine theology is more central than both Pauline theology and the Synoptic theology of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, particularly with regard to early modern polemicizing on the Trinity, distinctions between agape and eros, and the ideologies of radical dissent, especially the seventeenth-century antinomian challenge of free grace to traditional Puritan Pietism. In particular, early modern religious poetry, including works by Robert Southwell, George Herbert, John Donne, Richard Crashaw, Thomas Traherne, and Anna Trapnel, embraces a distinctive form of Johannine devotion that emphasizes the divine rather than human nature of Christ; the belief that salvation is achieved more through revelation than objective atonement and expiatory sin; a realized eschatology; a robust doctrine of assurance and comfort; and a stylistic and rhetorical approach to representing these theological features that often emulates John’s mode of discipleship misunderstanding and dramatic irony. Early modern Johannine devotion assumes that religious lyrics often express a revelatory poetics that aims to clarify, typically through dramatic irony, some of the deepest mysteries of the Fourth Gospel and First Epistle.

States are commonly blamed for wars, called on to apologize, held liable for debts and reparations, bound by treaties, and punished with sanctions. But what does it mean to hold a state responsible as opposed to a government, a nation, or an individual leader? Under what circumstances should we assign responsibility to states rather than individuals? This book demystifies the phenomenon of state responsibility and explains why it is a challenging yet indispensable part of modern politics. Taking Thomas Hobbes' theory of the state as a starting point, the book presents a theory of state responsibility that sheds new light on sovereign debt, historical reparations, treaty obligations, and economic sanctions. Along the way, it overturns longstanding interpretations of Hobbes' political thought, explores how new technologies will alter the practice of state responsibility as we know it, and develops new accounts of political authority, representation, and legitimacy. The book argues that Hobbes' idea of the state offers a far richer and more realistic conception of state responsibility than the theories prevalent today and demonstrates that Hobbes' Leviathan is much more than an anthropomorphic “artificial man.” The book is essential reading for political theorists, scholars of international relations, international lawyers, and philosophers. It recovers a forgotten understanding of state personality in Hobbes' thought and shows how to apply it to the world of imperfect states in which we live.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.